

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
SECURITY INSPECTION REPORT

License/Docket Nos: DPR-70/50-272; DPR-75/50-311; NPF-57/50-354

Reports No: 50-272/94-25; 50-311/94-25; 50-354/94-23

Licensee: Public Service Electric and Gas Company

Facility name: Salem and Hope Creek Generating Stations

Inspection at: Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey

Inspection dates: September 12-16, 1994

Inspectors: Edu C McCabe, Jr., Sr.

David F. Limroth, Senior Reactor Engineer
Arthur Della Ratta, Safeguards Inspector

Approved by: Edu C McCabe
E. C. McCabe, Chief, Safeguards Section

SCOPE

Announced physical security inspection of Audits, Corrective Actions and Management Support; Effectiveness of Management Controls; Protected Area Intrusion Detection Equipment and Assessment Aids; Protected and Vital Area Control of Personnel, Packages and Vehicles; Alarm Stations and Communications; Testing, Maintenance and Compensatory Measures; and Security Training and Qualification.

RESULTS

The licensee's program was found to be directed toward assuring public health and safety. No safety inadequacies or violations of regulatory requirements were identified. A violation and two inspector follow-up items identified in two previous inspections were closed. One inspector follow-up item identified in the previous safeguards inspection remains open pending completion of the licensee's ongoing assessment aids upgrade effort. Assessment aid aging is a continuing potential problem. Adherence to the licensee's schedule for upgrading assessment aids is important to assuring continued overall adequacy of the assessment function. Another follow-up item, package searches, remains open pending further evaluation of the adequacy of package searches during periods of high traffic.

DETAILS

1.0 Audits, Corrective Actions and Management Support

The licensee's Quality Assurance Department has recently modified its approach to the scheduling of audits by distributing the audit throughout the year in a series of modules while still covering all requisite subject areas. The inspectors reviewed the report of Audit No. 94-031, February 16 through 25, 1994, which covered the entire security program, and the report of Audit No. 94-031-1, May 30 through June 6, 1994, which, under the new schedule, covered approximately one-third of the requisite subject matter. The inspectors verified that the audits had been conducted in accordance with the NRC-approved Physical Security Plan (the Plan). The three deficiencies identified in Audit 94-031 were not indicative of programmatic breakdown and prompt corrective action on the part of the Security Department was noted.

The licensee's program for corrective actions was determined to be effective with minimal open maintenance items and relatively prompt follow-up and close-out. Personnel interviewed demonstrated a satisfactory knowledge of programs available for notifying upper echelons of recommendations for security program improvements as well as deficiencies noted.

Management support for the licensee's physical security program was generally determined to be adequate. This determination was based upon the inspectors' review of the various program activities during this inspection as documented in this report.

2.0 Effectiveness of Management Controls

The inspectors reviewed several administrative controls (procedures), primarily those associated with functional testing of search equipment. The inspectors noted from that review and from interviews with members of the security staff, that there was some difference in interpretation with respect to the completion of documentation associated with some functional tests. For example, the record for documenting the results of performance tests of the explosives and metal detectors provided space for documenting retests following an unsatisfactory test; however, the results of the retests were not documented in the space provided but were instead documented in the shift log in accordance with the test procedure. The inconsistency was discussed with licensee supervision who agreed to review this and other similar procedures. No other concerns were noted.

3.0 Protected Area Intrusion Detection Equipment and Assessment Aids

The inspectors observed the licensee performing scheduled tests of the protected area (PA) perimeter intrusion detection aids on September 13. The inspectors determined that the detection aids were installed, maintained and operated as committed to in the Plan. No deficiencies were noted.

(Open) Inspector Follow-up Item (IFI) 50-272/93-28-01, 50-311/93-28-01, and 50-354/93-28-01: During a previous inspection, the inspector had noted that aging assessment aids were a performance concern despite aggressive maintenance. During this inspection, the inspectors observed the performance of newly installed assessment aids. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's assessment aids upgrade schedule and records and verified that the licensee was maintaining the previously reviewed schedule. Overall, the inspectors concluded that continued adherence to the assessment aids upgrade schedule is important to assuring continued adequacy of the assessment function. This item remains open pending completion of the replacement program.

4.0 Protected and Vital Area Control of Personnel, Packages and Vehicles

The inspectors determined that the licensee was exercising positive control over personnel access to the vital areas (VA) by verifying that unescorted access to VAs was limited to authorized individuals. The access list was being revalidated at least once every 31 days as committed to in the Plan.

The inspectors reviewed the security lock and key procedures and determined that they were consistent with commitments in the Plan. The inspectors also reviewed the protected and vital area key inventory logs and discussed lock and key procedures with members of the security force and the licensee's security staff.

The inspectors also verified that the licensee had a procedure for expediting access to vital equipment during emergencies and that the procedure is adequate for that purpose.

(Open) IFI 50-272/94-16-01, 50-311/94-16-01 and 50-354/94-15-01: During a previous safeguards inspection, during observation of access control functions during a peak period, the inspector observed a personnel search officer fail to respond to an individual who had generated an alarm from a portal metal detector. A security supervisor who was overseeing access control activities recognized what the officer had allowed to occur, intervened and resolved the alarm. During this inspection, the inspectors observed the performance of search officers during periods of high activity as well as at random periods during the day. The inspectors noted that the search officers were thorough in the performance of their duties; however, another NRC inspector noted one occasion during which the time dedicated to the search of packages appeared to be driven by the press of people awaiting entrance into the protected area. No resulting inadequate searches were identified, but the potential for less than adequate package searches to occur during high traffic periods was considered to be in need of further review. Therefore, this IFI remains open.

(Closed) IFI 50-272/93-28-02, 50-311/93-28-02 and 50-354/93-28-02; and VIO 50-272/94-16-03, 50-311/94-16-03 and 50-354/94-15-03: During a previous inspection, an inspector had noted that factory-sealed items were exempt from search; however, the guidance was not clear on how to

verify factory seals. In addition, lesson plans and the instructors interviewed indicated that a vehicle was to be searched by one officer when, in actuality, a team approach had evolved. During the two previous safeguards inspections, the reporting inspector had reviewed the licensee's corrective actions including a procedure change specifying one search officer per vehicle and enhanced training on vehicle searches; however, the inspector voiced concern with regard to the quality of vehicle searches. Additionally, the licensee had not provided the inspector with definitive guidance with respect to the issue of factory seals.

On various occasions during this inspection, the inspectors observed the searching of numerous vehicles by a cross section of security officers, usually during periods of high entry activity. The inspectors noted that the vehicles were subjected to uniformly thorough searches and that the press of time had no adverse effect on the search. Through interviews with the search officers, the inspectors noted a uniform understanding of what constituted a factory-sealed package and noted that, should the officer have any doubt, the package was opened. The inspectors also noted that the licensee had assigned a supervisory officer to the search area during daylight shift when activity is highest. The addition of this more experienced officer significantly enhanced the movement of vehicles through the sally port and, further, provided the on-scene authority to refuse entry to those vehicles for which the valid need for entry did not exist. Based on the observations of the performance of the search officers and the results of the interviews with those officers, the above IFI and violation are closed.

(Closed) IFI 50-272/94-16-02, 50-311/94-16-02 and 50-354/94-15-02: During the previous safeguards inspection, the inspector noted weaknesses associated with the search officers' conduct of package searches at the warehouse, the details of which were classified as safeguards information. During this inspection, the inspectors interviewed the warehouse search officer and observed the processing of several incoming packages. The search officer's actions were noted to be conservative and thorough. The officer interviewed demonstrated an adequate knowledge of what constituted a factory seal. Further, when several packages containing apparently similar material as noted on x-ray were processed, the search officer was observed to open and inspect at least one of the packages in order to verify its contents and then reseal it prior to admitting them to the protected area. Based on the results of the interviews with the search officer and observations of his performance, this item is closed.

No deficiencies were noted in the above items.

5.0 Alarm Stations and Communications

The inspectors observed the activities in the Central Alarm Station (CAS) and the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS). The CAS and SAS were maintained and operated as committed to in the Plan. The CAS and SAS operators interviewed by the inspectors were found to be knowledgeable

of their duties and responsibilities. The inspectors verified that the CAS and SAS operators do not perform any operational activities that would interfere with assessment and response functions. No concerns other than the quality of some assessment aids discussed in 3.0 above were noted.

6.0 Testing, Maintenance and Compensatory Measures

The inspectors reviewed the testing and maintenance records and confirmed that the records committed to in the Plan were available for licensee and NRC review. Failures of equipment were infrequent and downtime was minimal, probably due in large part to the instrumentation and control technicians dedicated to the maintenance of Security Department equipment. Possible procedural and documentation enhancements were discussed with licensee supervision. No discrepancies were noted.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's use of compensatory measures and determined them to be as committed to in the Plan. There was a minimum of need for compensatory measures being implemented during the inspection and the cause necessitating the use of compensatory measures was corrected promptly in those few instances noted. No discrepancies were noted.

7.0 Security Training and Qualification

The inspectors randomly selected and reviewed the training and qualification records for 12 security force members including armed guards and supervisors. The physical and firearms qualification records for those personnel were also inspected. In addition, the inspectors randomly selected and reviewed the medical qualification records for 3 security force members. No discrepancies were noted.

8.0 Key Personnel Contacted and Entrance/Exit Interviews

The inspectors met with key personnel at the beginning of the inspection at which time the scope of the inspection was presented. The inspectors met with the below listed personnel at the conclusion on September 16 at which time the scope of the inspection was reviewed and the preliminary NRC findings discussed. The licensee acknowledged the inspectors' findings.

- P. A. Moeller, Manager-Site Protection
- D. W. Renwick, Nuclear Security Manager
- C. B. Weiser, Senior Staff Engineer-Security
- M. Ivanick, Senior Security Regulatory Coordinator
- T. H. Deckard, Security Supervisor
- J. J. Loeb, Security Support Staff Assistant
- L. Krajewski, Site Access Administrator
- R. K. Fisher, Screening and Badging Supervisor
- R. Beckwith, Station Licensing Engineer

J. Fleming, Senior Staff Engineer-QA Audits

R. Savage, Senior Staff Engineer-QA Audits

R. O. Matthews, Program Manager, Wackenhut Corporation

J. Schoppy, Resident Inspector, USNRC

Other members of the security organization were interviewed throughout the period of the inspection in order to assess the level of understanding of their duties and responsibilities with respect to the protection of public health and safety. No deficiencies were noted.