



**PSEG**

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

**Salem Generating Station**

May 2, 1994

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

SALEM GENERATING STATION  
LICENSE NO. DPR-75  
DOCKET NO. 50-311  
UNIT NO. 2

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 94-005-00

This Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of Code of Federal Regulation 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B). Issuance of this report is required within thirty (30) days of event discovery.

Sincerely yours,

J. J. Hagan  
General Manager -  
Salem Operations

MJPJ:pc

Distribution

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9405060263 940502  
PDR ADDCK 05000311  
S PDR

The power is in your hands.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)**

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) Salem Generating Station - Unit 2		DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000 311	PAGE (3) 1 OF 04
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TITLE (4) Late Surveillance Testing Of Reactor Trip System Power Range Instrument Channel 2N41 Due To Inadequate Communication.

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT NUMBER (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
04	03	94	94	005	00	05	02	94		05000
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
									FACILITY NAME	05000

OPERATING MODE (9) 1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)									
POWER LEVEL (10) 076	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)						
	20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)						
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER						
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	(Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)						
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)							
20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)								

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME M. J. Pastva, Jr. - LER Coordinator	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) (609) 339-5165
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NO		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On 4/3/94, failure to meet Technical Specification (TS) 4.0.2 occurred when the surveillance interval for channel functional testing of Reactor Trip System Power Range Instrument Channel 2N41 was exceeded. During this event, the TS specified minimum Operable channels were maintained. The surveillance was completed on 4/5/94. This event resulted from inadequate communication between the Senior Maintenance Controls Supervisor (SMCS) and Station Controls Scheduler (SCS). A contributor was failure of the station TS Administrator (TSA) to apprise the SMCS (Controls TS Coordinator) that the surveillance would be overdue after 4/2/94. The importance of adequate communication has been stressed with Maintenance Department supervisors. The TS Surveillance program administrative procedure has been reviewed to ensure full understanding of responsibilities. The SMCS, SCS, and the TSA were coached/counseled. The SMCS has been directed to establish and maintain a sign-off log to ensure daily review of reports listing upcoming overdue TS surveillances. The TSA has been directed to inform TS surveillance coordinators, within a specified time interval, of upcoming surveillances at risk of violating TS 4.0.2.

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PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as {xx}

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Late Surveillance Testing of Reactor Trip System Power Range Instrument Channel 2N41 Due To Inadequate Communication

Event Date: 4/3/94

Discovery Date: 4/5/94

Report Date: 5/2/94

This report was initiated by Incident Report No. 94-099.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 Reactor Power 76% - Unit Load 750 MWe

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On April 3, 1994, a failure to meet the requirements of Technical Specification (TS) 4.0.2 occurred when the surveillance interval for required channel functional testing of Reactor Trip System Power Range Instrument Channel 2N41 {JC} (including the 25% allowance per the TS) was exceeded. During this event, the minimum number (3) of Operable channels specified TS Table 3.3-1 was maintained. The surveillance, which is required by TS Table 4.3-1 with a specified interval of once per 92 days, was completed in accordance with the requirements of TS 4.0.3 on April 5, 1994.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

Surveillance requirements for the Reactor Trip System Power Range Instrument Channels ensure the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards. Periodic surveillance tests, performed at the minimum specified surveillance intervals are used to demonstrate this capability. TS 4.0.2 allows a maximum 25% extension of the normal TS surveillance interval to facilitate surveillance scheduling and consideration of plant operating conditions that may not be suitable for conducting the surveillance; e.g., transient conditions or other ongoing surveillance activities.

Based upon prior completion of the surveillance for Reactor Trip

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ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd)

System Power Range Instrument Channel 2N41 on December 8, 1993, the due date for completing this surveillance was April 2, 1994 (including the TS 4.0.2 allowance). The surveillance was originally scheduled for the week of March 7, 1994 however, performance of the schedule was deferred pending resolution of spiking problems with the axial flux distribution (AFD) monitor. This was done to avoid the possibility of a channel logic actuation due to a spurious spike(s) from the remaining channels (2N42, 2N43, and 2N44), during testing of the 2N41 channel. The AFD monitor spiking problem was fixed on March 30, 1994 allowing performance of the surveillance on March 31, 1994.

On March 31st, while reviewing pending work activities for the upcoming holiday/weekend beginning April 1st, the Senior Maintenance Controls Supervisor (SMCS) questioned the Controls Scheduler whether any TS required surveillances were pending. The scheduler stated there were none. His response was based on the assumption that the 2N41 surveillance, which was statused as "work in-progress" (WP) in the work control system and scheduled for performance on March 31, 1994, would be completed prior to going overdue. Based upon the scheduler's response, the SMCS did not review the surveillance schedule to ensure assignment of the surveillance work order. As a result of this inadequate communication, the 2N41 surveillance was not performed prior to its overdue date. The 2N41 surveillance was recognized as being overdue on April 5th, during a review of work orders by an Instrument Controls supervisor. Following event discovery, 2N41 was satisfactorily tested and the TS action statement was exited, at 0911 hours on April 5th.

A contributor to this event was failure of the station TS Administrator to adequately follow the TS Surveillance program nuclear department administrative procedure (NAP)-12. He did not apprise the department TS Coordinator (SMCS) that the surveillance would be overdue after April 2, 1994. His action was based upon review, on March 31, 1994, of the work control system which showed the 2N41 surveillance scheduled for completion on the same day.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The cause of this event is "Personnel Error", as classified in Appendix B of NUREG-1022. This resulted from inadequate communication during discussion between the Senior Maintenance Controls Supervisor and the Controls Scheduler. A contributor was failure of the station TS Administrator to adequately follow NAP-12.

PRIOR SIMILAR OCCURRENCES:

LERs 311/87-003-00, 311/88-011-00, and 272/92-006-00 reported prior

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PRIOR SIMILAR OCCURRENCES: (cont'd)

occurrences of TS surveillances performed late as the result of inadequate communication. Review shows the corrective actions to these events were appropriate. These corrective actions included counseling, review of the events, stressing the importance of adequate communications, and issuance of information letters addressing the events.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

This event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), due to failure to meet the requirements of TS 4.0.2 resulting from late performance of testing required by TS Table 4.3-1. This event did not affect the health and safety of the public. Although the 2N41 surveillance was performed late, it satisfactorily demonstrated the channel operability. In addition, during the time frame the required testing of channel 2N41 was overdue, the remaining Reactor Trip System Power Range Instrument Channels were operable, thereby meeting the TS LCO minimum requirements.


CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The importance of adequate communication has been stressed with supervisors within the Planning, Scheduling, and Instrument Controls subgroups of the Maintenance Department. In addition, the department TS Coordinator (SMCS), the Controls Scheduler, and the station TS Administrator have been coached and counseled concerning this event.

Appropriate personnel of the aforementioned Maintenance Department subgroups, as well as the station TS Administrator have reviewed NAP-12 to ensure full understanding of their responsibilities.

The SMCS has been directed to establish and maintain a sign-off log to ensure daily review of reports listing upcoming overdue TS surveillances.

The TS Administrator has been directed to inform TS surveillance coordinators, within a specified time interval, of upcoming surveillances at risk of violating TS 4.0.2.

  
General Manager -  
Salem Operations