PSEG

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

March 30, 1994

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

SALEM GENERATING STATION
LICENSE NO. DPR-75
DOCKET NO. 50-311
UNIT NO. 2

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 94-004-00

This Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of Code of Federal Regulation 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B). Issuance of this report is required within thirty (30) days of event discovery.

Sincerely yours,

J. J. Hagan
General Manager -
Salem Operations

MJPJ:pc

Distribution

NRC FORM 366 (5-92) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES 5/31/95

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Salem Generating Station - Unit 2	05000 311	1 OF 04

TITLE (4)
Late Performance Of Offsite Power Avail. Surv. Due To Untimely Determination Of 2A D/G.

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT NUMBER (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000
03	03	94	94	-- 004 --	00	03	30	94	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER 05000

OPERATING MODE (9)	1
POWER LEVEL (10)	100

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)

	20.402(b)		20.405(c)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)
	20.405(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X	50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		(Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)		
	20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
M. J. Pastva, Jr. - LER Coordinator	(609) 339-5165

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)			EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
	YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

At 0500 hours on 3/3/94, required Action "a." of Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1.1. should have been performed due to clearing and tagging of A air receiver of 2A Diesel Generator (DG). TS 3.8.1.1.a requires demonstrating operability of the remaining independent alternating current circuit within one hour by performing TS 4.8.1.1.1.a and at least once per eight hours thereafter. This event was recognized at 0900 hours (same day) and TS 4.8.1.1.1.a was satisfactorily completed at 0912 hours. This event is attributed to management deficiency due to inadequate communication when Operations personnel incorrectly interpreted that an administrative requirement, to declare a DG inoperable when one of its starting air trains are removed from service, no longer applied. Historically, similar clearing and tagging evolutions were performed without declaring the involved DG inoperable. The basis for this practice is outlined in PSE&G's response to NRC's Notice of Violation contained in Inspection Report 50-272/93-23; 50-311/93-23, which concluded such practice does not involve a TS violation. Expectations regarding unavailability of a DG starting air train have been reinforced with all Licensed Operations personnel and the station planning department. These expectations will remain in effect pending final disposition of PSE&G's response to the subject NRC Notice Of Violation.

REQUIRED NUMBER OF DIGITS/CHARACTERS FOR EACH BLOCK

BLOCK NUMBER	NUMBER OF DIGITS/CHARACTERS	TITLE
1	UP TO 46	FACILITY NAME
2	8 TOTAL 3 IN ADDITION TO 05000	DOCKET NUMBER
3	VARIES	PAGE NUMBER
4	UP TO 76	TITLE
5	6 TOTAL 2 PER BLOCK	EVENT DATE
6	7 TOTAL 2 FOR YEAR 3 FOR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 2 FOR REVISION NUMBER	LER NUMBER
7	6 TOTAL 2 PER BLOCK	REPORT DATE
8	UP TO 18 – FACILITY NAME 8 TOTAL – DOCKET NUMBER 3 IN ADDITION TO 05000	OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED
9	1	OPERATING MODE
10	3	POWER LEVEL
11	1 CHECK BOX THAT APPLIES	REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR
12	UP TO 50 FOR NAME 14 FOR TELEPHONE	LICENSEE CONTACT
13	CAUSE VARIES 2 FOR SYSTEM 4 FOR COMPONENT 4 FOR MANUFACTURER NPRDS VARIES	EACH COMPONENT FAILURE
14	1 CHECK BOX THAT APPLIES	SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED
15	6 TOTAL 2 PER BLOCK	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as {xx}

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Late Performance Of Offsite Power Availability Surveillance Due To Untimely Determination Of 2A Diesel Generator Inoperability

Event Date: 3/3/94

Report Date: 3/30/94

This report was initiated by Incident Report No. 94-076.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 Reactor Power 100 % - Unit Load 1110 MWe

RIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 0500 hours on March 3, 1994, Action "a." of Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.1.1. should have been performed due to clearing and tagging of the A air receiver of 2A Diesel Generator (DG) {VJ} which, by administrative control, requires declaring the DG inoperable. TS 3.8.1.1.a requires demonstrating operability of the remaining independent alternating current (A.C.) circuit within one hour by performing TS Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a and at least once per eight hours thereafter. This event was not recognized until 0900 hours (same day) and TS Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a was satisfactorily completed at 0912 hours.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

Each Salem Unit has three DGs available to supply emergency electrical power to the safety related equipment. DG operability requires certain minimum auxiliary equipment be available. TS 4.8.1.1.1.a imposes restrictions upon continued facility operation to ensure the initial condition assumptions of the accident analyses are met. These assumptions are based upon maintaining at least two independent sets of onsite A.C. and direct current (D.C.) power sources and associated distribution systems OPERABLE during accident conditions coincident with an assumed loss of offsite power and a single failure of one onsite A.C source.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd)

The starting air system of each DG consists of two independent trains with each train having a starting air receiving tank and two starting air motors. The DG is designed and qualified to start and attain rated speed on any pair of air start motors within 10 seconds of a demand signal. Operability of the independent trains (two of the four air start motors per DG) is currently demonstrated monthly on alternating months in accordance with surveillances S2.OP-ST.DG-0001, 0002, and 0003.

At 0500 hours on March 3, 1994, the A starting air receiver of 2A DG was cleared and tagged to perform maintenance on the air receiver check valve 21DA6A. Prior to this evolution, the redundant starting air train (B) starting air receiver and compressor were verified to be functioning satisfactorily. No tagging was applied to the DG, which would have prevented it from performing its intended safety function. Subsequently, at 0900 hours (same day) it was determined that the DG should have been declared inoperable because of existing administrative controls when the A starting air receiver was removed from service. As such, the required surveillance was not completed until 0912 hours (same day). A Night Order Book (NOB) entry, dated November 5, 1993, requires declaring a DG inoperable whenever a starting air train is removed from service (rendered unavailable).

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The cause of this occurrence is "Management/Quality Assurance Deficiency", as classified in Appendix B of NUREG-1022, and resulted from inadequate communication. Following the submittal of PSE&G's response to NRC's Notice of Violation contained in Inspection Report 50-272/93-23; 50-311/93-23, Operations personnel incorrectly interpreted that the NOB entry of November 5, 1993 no longer applied. Historically, PSE&G has performed similar clearing and tagging of single DG starting air receivers without declaring the involved DG inoperable. The basis for this practice is outlined in PSE&G's response to the violation, which concluded such practice does not involve a TS violation.

PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES:

As outlined in the aforementioned notice of violation, prior similar occurrences involving removing DG starting air trains without administratively declaring the DG inoperable have occurred. PSE&G's response in regard to these occurrences is provided within its response to the notice of violation.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

This event did not affect the health and safety of the public. It is reportable pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by TS.

Operability of the independent trains (two of the four air start motors per DG) is demonstrated monthly on alternating months in accordance with surveillances S2.OP-ST.DG-0001, 0002, and 0003. This demonstrates the ability of each DG to start within design parameters and carry out their safety function with an unavailable starting air train. Throughout this event, 2A DG was fully capable of automatic starting and was considered inoperable due to administrative controls.

The satisfactory performance of TS 4.8.1.1.1.a verified proper alignment of the independent A.C. trains. In addition, two independent sources of offsite power were available at all times. As such, minimal consequence existed due to the late performance of the TS surveillance, since the DG was capable of automatic starting.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The expected action, to declare a DG inoperable in accordance with TS 3.8.1.1 whenever a starting air train is removed from service (rendered unavailable), has been reinforced with all Licensed Operations personnel.

The station planning department has also been advised that unavailability of a DG starting air train invokes entering the TS Limiting Condition of Operation and the required surveillance must be performed.

The above described actions will remain in effect until final disposition of PSE&G's response to the subject NRC Notice Of Violation at which time they will either become a permanent requirement or will be revised accordingly.

General Manager -
Salem Operations

MJPJ:pc

Mtg. 94-026