



PSEG

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

November 19, 1992

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

SALEM GENERATING STATION
LICENSE NO. DPR-70
DOCKET NO. 50-272
UNIT NO. 1

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 92-022-00

This Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A). This report is required to be issued within thirty (30) days of event discovery.

Sincerely yours,

C. A Vondra
General Manager -
Salem Operations

MJP:pc

Distribution

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) Salem Generating Station - Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 7 2	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 3
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TITLE (4)
Controlled Shutdown to Comply with Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.4.1.

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		
1	0	27	9	2	0	2	2	0			
									DOCKET NUMBER(S) 0 5 0 0 0		
									0 5 0 0 0		

OPERATING MODE (8) 2	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)										
POWER LEVEL (10)	<input type="checkbox"/>	20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/>	20.405(c)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/>	73.71(b)			
	<input type="checkbox"/>	20.405(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.38(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/>	73.71(c)			
	<input type="checkbox"/>	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.38(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)				
	<input type="checkbox"/>	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)					
	<input type="checkbox"/>	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)					
<input type="checkbox"/>	20.405(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(x)						

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME M.J. Pollack - LER Coordinator	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE: 6 0 9 3 3 9 - 2 0 2 2

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUF. TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUF. TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15) MONTH: DAY: YEAR:
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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On October 27, 1992 at 1815 hours, a controlled shutdown from Mode 2 was commenced in anticipation of an inability to meet the 72-hour time requirement of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.4.1 which was entered when 12 Service Water (SW) header was removed from service to replace a pipe section whose walls had shown indication of thinning per ultrasonic examination. The Unit was placed in Mode 2 on October 24, 1992 for repair of a packing leak on the 12BF19 feedwater regulating valve. Although a Safety Evaluation had documented the absence of an immediate SW system operability concern, management decided to replace the pipe section in the current plant condition. Pipe section replacement required the removal from service of 12 Service Water header which occurred at 0346 hours on October 25. The initial job duration estimate anticipated work completion prior to expiration of the Action Statement time limitation, assuming only minor emergent work. Significant emergent work was encountered preventing work completion prior to the expiration of the 72-hour allowance at 0346 on October 28. A Unit cooldown was commenced toward Cold Shutdown. Repairs to the 12 Service Water header were completed at 0215 hours on October 29. Cooldown was secured prior to entry into Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown). The root cause of this occurrence is "Other". As discussed above, emergent work prevented return of 12 Service Water header to service within the required Action Statement time constraint.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

Salem Generating Station	DOCKET NUMBER	LER NUMBER	PAGE
Unit 1	5000272	92-022-00	2 of 3

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as {xx}

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Controlled Shutdown to comply with Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.4.1.

Event Date: 10/27/92

Report Date: 11/19/92

This report was initiated by Incident Report No. 92-695.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 2 (Startup)

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On October 27, 1992 at 1815 hours, a controlled shutdown from Mode 2 was commenced in anticipation of an inability to meet the 72-hour time requirement of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.4.1. The Technical Specification Action Statement was entered when 12 Service Water header was removed from service to replace a section of piping whose walls had shown indication of thinning due to erosion/corrosion.

The Unit was placed in Mode 2 on October 24, 1992 for repair of a packing leak on the 12BF19 feedwater regulating valve. While in Mode 2, the decision was made to repair other items that could challenge plant operation during the operating cycle. This included replacement of the Service Water (SW) {BI} pipe section downstream of the 12SW387 valve. This section had shown indications of wall thinning from recent ultrasonic examinations. Although a Safety Evaluation had documented the absence of an immediate operability concern, management decided to replace the pipe section in the current plant condition. The tagging boundaries to support replacement required the removal from service of 12 Service Water header, necessitating entry into the 72-hour Action Statement at 0346 hours on October 25. The initial job duration estimate anticipated work completion prior to expiration of the Action Statement time limitation, assuming only minor emergent work. Significant emergent work was encountered during pipe fit-up due to inside diameter mismatch between the existing pipe and the new pipe section. This required the welding and grinding of a taper to provide a smooth transition on the inside of the pipe. The work could not be completed prior to the expiration of the 72-hour allowance at 0346 on October 28, and a Unit cooldown was commenced toward Cold Shutdown.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

Salem Generating Station	DOCKET NUMBER	LER NUMBER	PAGE
Unit 1	5000272	92-022-00	3 of 3

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd)

Repairs to the 12 Service Water header were completed at 0215 hours on October 29. Cooldown was secured prior to entry into Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown). Plant heatup commenced at 0330 on October 29 and the Unit was synchronized to the grid at 2316 on November 1, 1992.

Technical Specification 3.7.4.1 states:

"At least two independent service water loops shall be OPERABLE."

Technical Specification 3.7.4.1 Action states:

"With only one service water loop OPERABLE, restore at least two loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours."

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The root cause of this occurrence is "Other", per NUREG 1022, "Licensee Event Report System". As discussed above, emergent work prevented return of 12 Service Water header to service within the required Action Statement time constraint. Consequently, the Unit entered Mode 3.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The operability of the Service Water System ensures that sufficient cooling capacity exists for continued operation of safety related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

In this event, the other SW loop remained available. The requirements of the Technical Specification Action Statement were met. Therefore, this event did not affect the health or safety of the public. This event is reportable to the NRC in accordance with 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A).

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The Service Water pipe section was replaced and the system returned to service.

General Manager -
Salem Operations