



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

December 16, 1987

*Rec'd  
12/21/87  
S.D.C.*

Docket No. 50-348, 364

MEMORANDUM FOR: Steven A. Varga, Director  
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

FROM: James G. Partlow, Director  
Division of Reactor Inspection and Safeguards  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT: RESOLUTION OF FARLEY SAFETY EVALUATION FOR  
ITEM 2.2.2 OF GENERIC LETTER 83-28

The VIB reviewed implementation of the Farley vendor interface program as part of the inspection documented in inspection report No. 87-11, dated July 29, 1987.

Farley has developed formal contact programs with Westinghouse (NSSS supplier), Colt (emergency diesel generator supplier), and General Electric (safety-related switchgear supplier), and adequately receives, evaluates, and processes technical information from these vendors. Farley has stated that other vendor information of importance is received through the INPO SEE-IN program. It further stated that this program, in addition to the formal contact programs is an efficient and realistic approach to ensure that vendor equipment problems are recognized and evaluated.

During the inspection, instances were identified where Farley fortuitously received vendor information from second hand sources rather than from the primary equipment vendor. This included technical information concerning Pacific Scientific mechanical snubbers which was obtained from Wyle Laboratories, and technical information on Terry auxiliary feedwater pump turbines from Bechtel, which was marketing seismic reanalysis for the type GS turbine.

These observations strengthen the staff view that vendors of "key" safety-related components should be informally contacted periodically. Presently, Farley does not do this, but contacts vendors on a need-to-know basis.

The shortcomings of Farley's current approach were demonstrated during this inspection when the licensee had to contact several vendors (12) to receive specific technical information to answer inspectors questions concerning installed components with potential hardware deficiencies, including Part 21 notifications.

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It appears that the vendor interface program in place at the Farley Nuclear Plant does not accomplish everything claimed by the licensee and requested by the NRC staff in the Safety Evaluation for resolution of item 2.2.2 of Generic Letter 83-28. It is our recommendation, based on a review of the program in place, that the licensee establish a program for informal contact with vendors of key safety-related components, as originally requested by the NRC in the SER enclosed in the letter to Alabama Power dated December 15, 1986.

It is important that specific commitments in this regard be obtained from each licensee with regard to generic letter 83-28. Implementation will be determined on an audit basis by headquarters vendor interface and region inspections. However, item 2.2.2 of generic letter 83-28 may be closed out on the basis of a specific commitment to establish a program which provides periodic contact with vendors of key safety-related components.



James G. Partlow, Director  
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