

Public Service
Electric and Gas
Company

Stanley LaBruna

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038 609-339-4800

Vice President - Nuclear Operations

December 30, 1988

NLR-N88212

**United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555**

Gentlemen:

**CONFIRMATORY LETTER
NRC BULLETIN 88-08
SALEM GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 2
DOCKET NO. 50-311**

PSE&G hereby submits supplemental information to NRC Bulletin 88-08. This information, provided in the enclosure to this letter, was developed during the Salem Unit 2 Fourth Refueling Outage as required by the subject Bulletin.

Should you have any questions with regard to this transmittal, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Sincerely,



Enclosure

C Mr. J. C. Stone, Licensing Project Manager

Ms. K. Halvey Gibson, Senior Resident Inspector

**Mr. W. T. Russell, Administrator
Region I**

**Ms. J. Moon, Interim Chief
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
Division of Environmental Quality
Bureau of Nuclear Engineering
CN 415
Trenton, NJ 08625**

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STATE OF NEW JERSEY)
) SS.
COUNTY OF SALEM)

Stanley LaBruna, being duly sworn according to law deposes and says:

I am Vice President - Nuclear Operations of Public Service Electric and Gas Company, and as such, I find the matters set forth in our letter dated December 30, 1988, concerning the Salem Generating Station, Unit No. 2, are true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.



Subscribed and Sworn to before me
this 30th day of December, 1988


Notary Public of New Jersey

LARAIN Y. BEARD
Notary Public of New Jersey
My Commission Expires May 1, 1991

My Commission expires on _____

ENCLOSURE

CONFIRMATORY LETTER
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Bulletin 88-08 requested that we review our reactor coolant systems to identify any connected, unisolable piping that could be subjected to temperature distributions due to valve leakage which would result in thermal stresses not evaluated in the design analysis of the piping. The bulletin addressed both fatigue cracking induced by thermal cycling and piping distortion caused by thermal stratification.

Our response, dated September 23, 1988, identified three locations in each of the Salem plants where thermal cycling could possibly induce fatigue cracking. The response also discussed the possibility of piping distortion of our pressurizer surge lines as described in the bulletin.

During the fourth refueling outage for Unit No. 2, we performed NDE examination of the three locations in question. The examinations included 2" and 3" CVCS piping, 1.5" safety injection piping and the 14" pressurizer surge line. The NDE results did not identify any recordable indications of flaws.

We resolved our concern for leakage past the SJ71 valve by removing this valve from Unit No. 2 as part of the BIT tank removal design change modification.

We also conducted a field walkdown of the pressurizer surge line to verify support and HEBA restraint clearances. This walkdown did not identify any indicative piping deflection.

As described in our September 23, 1988 response to the bulletin, PSE&G will perform the NDE inspections of the suspect locations and verification walkdowns of the pressurizer surge lines for a minimum of two consecutive outages on each unit to provide continuing assurance of system integrity. Accordingly, confirmatory letters will be provided within 30 days of completion of the outages describing the NDE results and all actions taken.