



Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

November 30, 1988

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

SALEM GENERATING STATION
LICENSE NO. DPR-75
DOCKET NO. 50-311
UNIT NO. 2
SUPPLEMENTAL SPECIAL REPORT 88-5-1

This supplemental Special Report addresses those planned fire barrier penetration impairments which were not restored to functional status within seven (7) days. These penetrations were impaired in support of the Unit 2 outage. This report satisfies the reporting requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "L. K. Miller".

L. K. Miller
General Manager-
Salem Operations

MJP:pc

Distribution

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The Energy People

PLANT IDENTIFICATION:

Salem Generating Station - Unit 2
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Fire Barrier Penetrations Impaired For Greater Than 7 Days

Event Date(s): 8/17/88

Report Date: 11/30/88

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

N/A

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

This report addresses the planned impairment of several fire barrier penetrations located throughout Salem Unit 2. These impairments are in support of design modifications during the current refueling outage. The impairments will in some cases last greater than seven days. Therefore a Special Report is required as per Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a.

Technical Specification 3.7.11 states:

"All fire penetrations (including cable penetration barriers, fire doors and fire dampers), in fire zone boundaries, protecting safety related areas shall be OPERABLE."

Salem Unit 2 Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a states:

"With one or more of the above required fire barrier penetrations inoperable, within one (1) hour either establish a continuous fire watch on at least one (1) side of the affected penetration, or verify the OPERABILITY of fire detectors on at least one side of the inoperable fire barrier and establish an hourly fire watch patrol. Restore the inoperable fire barrier penetration(s) to functional status within 7 days or, in lieu of any other report required by Specification 6.9.1, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next 30 days outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperable penetration and plans and schedule for restoring the fire barrier penetration(s) to OPERABLE status."

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

As explained in prior correspondence with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (e.g., PSE&G letter NLR-N88037, dated March 4, 1988), PSE&G is undergoing a complete review of its Fire Protection Program. Included in this review was the adequacy of the fire

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd)

barrier penetrations to meet their design function. To ensure consistent and adequate seal design, PSE&G decided to curtail the repair of fire barrier penetration impairments until completion of the Penetration Seal Task Force review of the penetration configuration/design. This review, due to the work scope of the task force, in some cases has taken greater than seven (7) days.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The functional integrity of the penetration fire barriers ensures that fires will be confined or prevented from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility. This design feature minimizes the possibility of a single fire involving several areas of the facility. The fire barrier penetration seals are a passive element in the facility fire protection program and are subject to periodic inspections. Since the penetration impairments will not be sealed within seven (7) days, this report is required as per Technical Specification 3.7.11.a pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2.

Where fire watches were not yet in place, they were posted in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a when barrier penetrations within those areas were impaired. With the controls implemented in accordance with Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a, this practice did not involve undue risk to the health or safety of the public.

A total of 105 penetration impairments were issued and resealed in support of the Unit 2 refueling outage in various fire barriers throughout the Unit. Of these impaired penetrations, ten (10) were resealed within seven (7) days.

The NRC resident inspector has been periodically apprised of those fire barriers affected by this policy during the course of the Unit 2 outage. This report satisfies the Action Statement "Special Report" requirement as per the agreement reached with the NRC on August 26, 1988 via telephone conference.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Impaired penetrations, caused in support of the Unit 2 outage, have been resealed utilizing existing procedures prior to the Unit restart.

The hourly fire watches, in the subject areas, will continue until those fire protection concerns addressed in Unit 1 LER 272/88-013-00 and Unit 2 LER 311/88-009-06 are resolved.



General Manager -
Salem Operations

MJP:pc

SORC Mtg. 88-105