



Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

September 6, 1988

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

SALEM GENERATING STATION
LICENSE NO. DPR-75
DOCKET NO. 50-311
UNIT NO. 2
SPECIAL REPORT 88-5

This Special Report addresses fire barrier penetration impairments which have not been restored to functional status within seven (7) days. This report satisfies the reporting requirements of Technical Specification Action 3.7.11.a pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2. It is being submitted within thirty (30) days as per the Action Statement.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "L. K. Miller".

L. K. Miller
General Manager-
Salem Operations

MJP:pc

Distribution

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The Energy People

PLANT IDENTIFICATION:

Salem Generating Station - Unit 2
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Fire Barrier Penetrations Impaired For Greater Than 7 Days

Event Date(s): 8/17/88

Report Date: 9/06/88

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

N/A

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

This report addresses the planned impairment of several fire barrier penetrations located throughout Salem Unit 2. These impairments are in support of design modifications during the current refueling outage. The impairments will in some cases last greater than seven days. Therefore a Special Report is required as per Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a.

Technical Specification 3.7.11 states:

"All fire penetrations (including cable penetration barriers, fire doors and fire dampers), in fire zone boundaries, protecting safety related areas shall be OPERABLE."

Salem Unit 2 Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a states:

"With one or more of the above required fire barrier penetrations inoperable, within one (1) hour either establish a continuous fire watch on at least one (1) side of the affected penetration, or verify the OPERABILITY of fire detectors on at least one side of the inoperable fire barrier and establish an hourly fire watch patrol. Restore the inoperable fire barrier penetration(s) to functional status within 7 days or, in lieu of any other report required by Specification 6.9.1, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next 30 days outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperable penetration and plans and schedule for restoring the fire barrier penetration(s) to OPERABLE status."

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

As explained in prior correspondence with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (e.g., PSE&G letter NLR-N88037, dated March 4, 1988), PSE&G is undergoing a complete review of its Fire Protection Program. Included in this review was the adequacy of the fire

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd)

barrier penetrations to meet their design function. To ensure consistent and adequate seal design, PSE&G decided to curtail the repair of fire barrier penetration impairments until completion of the Penetration Seal Task Force review of the penetration configuration/design. This review, due to the work scope of the task force, can take greater than seven days.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The functional integrity of the penetration fire barriers ensures that fires will be confined or prevented from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility. This design feature minimizes the possibility of a single fire involving several areas of the facility. The fire barrier penetration seals are a passive element in the facility fire protection program and are subject to periodic inspections. Since the penetration impairments will not be sealed within seven days, this report is required as per Technical Specification 3.7.11.a pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2.

Where fire watches are not yet in place, they will be posted in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a when barrier penetrations within those areas are impaired. With the controls implemented in accordance with Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a, this practice will not involve undue risk to the health or safety of the public.

To date, five (5) planned impaired penetrations have not been resealed as per the policy addressed in this report. On August 10, 1988, the first of these penetrations was impaired.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The hourly fire watches, as addressed in the Analysis of Occurrence section, will continue (or be established as applicable) until all fire protection concerns associated with the subject fire areas are resolved.

Impaired penetrations, caused in support of the Unit 2 outage, will be resealed utilizing existing procedures prior to unit restart. However, those penetrations where additional engineering review (e.g., awkward configuration) is required (~15%) to complete an appropriate seal, per the Penetration Seal Task Force, may not be resealed upon Unit restart. These penetrations will be resealed by January 1989.

The NRC resident will be periodically apprised of those fire barriers affected by this policy. Fire watches will be posted in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.11.a as applicable. "Special Reports", such as this, will not be issued for future planned impairments which are not sealed within seven days due to continued engineering review of the penetration configuration by the Penetration Seal Task Force (reference PSE&G letter NLR-N88037, dated

CORRECTIVE ACTION: (cont'd)

March 4, 1988). However, a supplement to this Special Report will be prepared at the conclusion of the Unit 2 outage to identify those Unit 2 penetrations which have not been resealed.



General Manager -
Salem Operations

MJP:pc

SORC Mtg. 88-073