



PSE&G

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

May 05, 1988

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

SALEM GENERATING STATION
LICENSE NO. DPR-75
DOCKET NO. 50-311
UNIT NO. 2
SPECIAL REPORT 88-1

This Special Report addresses the circumstances surrounding four missed hourly roving fire watches. These fire watches are required by PSE&G Safety Evaluation S-C-M200-NSE-0709-2, "Justification For Continued Operation of Salem Units 1 & 2 With Outstanding Fire Protection Concerns".

Sincerely yours,

J. M. Zupko, Jr.
General Manager-
Salem Operations

MJP:pc

Distribution

The Energy People

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PLANT IDENTIFICATION:

Salem Generating Station - Unit 2
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Technical Specification 3.7.11 - Fire Barrier Impairment Repair > 7
Days

Event Date: 04/11/88

Report Date: 05/05/88

This report was initiated by Incident Report No. 88-128.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

N/A

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On April 4, 1988 at 1530 hours, six fire barrier floor penetrations were found degraded by Appendix R Task Force Penetration Seal Group personnel during a preliminary walkdown of plant areas. No seal was provided in any of the penetrations. These penetrations are cable conduits. Three of the conduits had cabling and three were empty. The floor penetrations are located in the 100' Inner Mechanical Penetration area (Fire Area 1FA-PP-100H) of the Auxiliary Building. An hourly roving fire watch had been established for this area previously due to other fire protection concerns. Therefore, the requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a, were met.

Technical Specification 3.7.11 states:

"All fire penetrations (including cable penetration barriers, fire doors and fire dampers), in fire zone boundaries, protecting safety related areas shall be functional."

Action Statement 3.7.11.a states:

"With one (1) or more of the above required fire barrier penetrations non-functional, within one (1) hour either establish a continuous fire watch on at least one (1) side of the affected penetration, or verify the OPERABILITY of fire detectors on at least one (1) side of the non-functional fire barrier and establish an hourly fire watch patrol. Restore the non-functional fire barrier penetration(s) to functional status within 7 days or, in lieu of any other report required by Specification 6.9.1, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next (30) days outlining the action taken, the cause of the non-functional penetration and plans and schedule for restoring the fire barrier penetration(s) to functional status."

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The cause of the degraded fire barrier penetrations could not be positively determined.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The functional integrity of the penetration fire barriers ensures that fires will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility. This design feature minimizes the possibility of a single fire involving several areas of the facility. The penetration fire barriers are a passive element in the facility fire protection program and are subject to periodic inspections. This report satisfies the reporting requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2 (both Units) since the time between discovery and eventual repair of the fire barrier impairment is greater than seven (7) days. Appropriate actions were taken in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a (both Units) to establish a one hour roving fire watch for the impaired fire barrier once the impairments were identified.


Both areas contain detection in addition to the roving fire watch patrol. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that a fire in either area would be detected before it could involve the adjacent area. This occurrence therefore involved no undue risk to the health or safety of the public.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The one hour roving fire watch, as addressed in the Description of Occurrence section, will continue until all fire protection concerns associated with this area are resolved.

The repair of the penetrations was not accomplished within seven (7) days due to the additional review being conducted by the Appendix R Task Force Penetration Seal Group. Upon completion of this review the penetrations will be sealed.

This review and corrective action will be completed in accordance with PSE&G letter NLR-N88037, dated March 4, 1988, to the NRC which discusses the Penetration Seal Review Program schedule.


General Manager -
Salem Operations

MJP:pc

SORC Mtg. 88-039