

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION I

Report Nos. 50-354/87-15  
50-272/87-14  
50-311/87-17

Docket Nos. 50-354  
50-272  
50-311

License Nos. NPF-57  
DPR-70  
DPR-75

Licensee: Public Service Electric & Gas Company

P.O. Box 236

Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Facility Name: Artificial Island Nuclear Generating Stations

Inspection At: Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey

Inspection Conducted: May 18-21, 1987

Type of Inspection: Routine, Unannounced Physical Security

Inspectors: *Roland J. Bailey*  
R. J. Bailey, Physical Security Inspector

*August 6, 1987*  
date

*T. P. Madden*  
T. P. Madden, Physical Security Inspector

*August 6, 1987*  
date

Approved by: *R. R. Keimig*  
R. R. Keimig, Chief, Safeguards Section

*8.10.87*  
date

Inspection Summary: Routine, Unannounced Physical Security Inspection on May 18-21, 1987 (Combined Inspection Nos. 50-354/87-15, 50-272/87-14, and 50-311/87-17)

Areas Inspected: Security plan; organization; management effectiveness; security program audits; assessment aids; records and reports; testing and maintenance; physical barriers (protected and vital areas); access control (personnel); training and qualification; and follow-up on an allegation concerning the personnel access control process.

Results: The licensee was in compliance with NRC requirements in the areas inspected. Certain information contained in the allegation was substantiated; however, no violations of NRC requirements were identified.

## DETAILS

### 1. Key Personnel Contacted

P.A. Moeller, General Manager, Nuclear Services  
\*J. T. Bavlish, Manager, Nuclear Security  
\*D. W. Renwick, Senior Security Supervisor  
B. C. Weiser, Security Engineering and Planning Staff  
\*T. H. Deckerd, Security Shift Supervisor  
\*R. L. Young, Program Manager, Wackenhut  
\*R. A. Jorgensen, Senior Quality Assurance Engineer  
J. L. Lark, Quality Assurance Engineer  
W. R. Schultz, Manager, Quality Assurance  
\*R. W. Borchardt, NRC Senior Resident Inspector (Hope Creek)  
K. H. Gibson, NRC Resident Inspector (Salem)

The inspectors also interviewed other Public Service Electric and Gas Company employees and members of the Wackenhut contract security force.

\*present at the exit interview.

### 2. Security Plan

The licensee submitted Revision 0 to the Artificial Island Security Plan to the NRC, under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.54(p). Revision 0 reflects the consolidation of the NRC's previously approved plans for the Salem Station and the Hope Creek Station and is currently under NRC review.

### 3. Security Organization

The inspectors reviewed the PSE&G Artificial Island Nuclear Security organization chart. The chart depicts the licensee's management personnel who are responsible for the implementation of the security program at Artificial Island. The inspectors verified that the security staff was established and is functioning as depicted on the organization chart.

On April 30, 1987, the licensee awarded a contract to the Wackenhut Corporation for guard force services at Artificial Island. Previously, Protection Technology, Inc. (PTI) provided these services. The inspectors discussed this change with representatives of the licensee and Mr. Robert Cobb, a representative of PTI, who was on site during this inspection. Mr. Cobb stated that the transition was accomplished without difficulty and that all but seven members of PTI force had been retained by Wackenhut. The inspectors confirmed that all key positions were filled and that the current staffing was consistent with the licensee's NRC-approved security plan. The inspectors were advised that the pay and benefit plans were retained.

The inspectors determined that 16 individuals left the contract security force since January 1, 1987. This includes the seven not retained by Wackenhut because of poor performance; four resignations for other

employment; four others for poor performance (before the new guard force service contract); and one who did not pass the physical qualifications. These individuals have been replaced. No deficiencies were noted.

4. Management Effectiveness

The inspectors were advised by the Manager, Nuclear Security that all of the licensee's security shift supervisors, as a group, attended a special management training program between February 2 and 27, 1987. The purpose of this training was to convey the duties and responsibilities of a licensee security shift supervisor and to reinforce the supervisors' knowledge and understanding of the security program, NRC regulations, and plant specific information.

5. Security Program Audit

The inspectors reviewed the security program audits that were conducted by quality assurance auditors. The inspectors determined that the auditors were knowledgeable and had experience in auditing the security program. The lead auditor has been involved in auditing the security program for five years. The inspectors observed that the results of the 1986 annual audit had been reviewed by appropriate levels of management and that corrective actions had been taken on all audit findings and observations.

6. Records and Reports

The inspectors conducted a random sampling review of security records and reports for accuracy and completeness. The review included: security shift supervisor's log; access control log; audit reports; alarm records; maintenance records; key control logs; CAS/SAS (Central and Secondary Alarm Station) operator logs; and personnel access records. No discrepancies were noted.

7. Testing and Maintenance

Maintenance engineers, assigned to support the security program, were observed by the inspectors performing preventive maintenance on personnel search equipment in the security building. The inspectors determined that preventive maintenance is being routinely performed on this equipment and that, after the maintenance has been completed, a security force supervisor conducts an operational test before the equipment is restored to service. The inspectors also determined that the licensee has a program in-place to safeguard computer firmware and software that includes the monitoring and review of system modifications.

8. Physical Barriers - Protected Area

An inspection of the protected area barriers (PABs) on May 18, 1987 by the inspectors found two areas in which minor washout had occurred under the inner fence. These areas were not previously identified by security patrols and were of sufficient size to have been reported. The licensee

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acknowledged this fact and took immediate corrective action to repair the areas. The inspectors noted that it had rained considerably during the inspection period. The licensee advised the inspectors that they would investigate why these areas were not previously identified and reported by the security patrols and take corrective action, as needed.

### 9. Physical Barriers - Vital Areas

The inspectors reviewed selected vital areas in the Salem Units 1 & 2 and Hope Creek plants and determined that the security equipment for those areas is as described in the NRC-approved physical security plan.

### 10. Assessment Aids

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## 11. Access Control - Personnel

The inspectors reviewed the licensee access control process for personnel as a result of an unsigned letter, containing allegations of misapplications, received in NRC Region I on February 5, 1987. Following are the findings and conclusions reached by the inspectors during their review of the allegations contained in the letter.

### a. Allegation

Workers currently employed at the site have had trouble with the law in the past. Sloppy background checks were completed on these workers.

### Finding

The inspectors determined, through interviews with security management personnel, a review of personnel files selected at random, and a review of the access control supervisor's interview log, that there are workers currently at Artificial Island who have had some type of trouble with law enforcement agencies in the past. The inspectors determined that these employees had indicated this in their employment application and personnel access questionnaires. After the licensee required these employees to satisfy the additional personnel screening requirements, e.g., criminal records checks, drug screening, medical examination, credit checks, checks of listed and developed references, and psychological evaluation, they were granted unescorted access to the site in accordance with the licensee's approved procedure (SP-4, Personnel Access Program).

The licensee's representatives stated that they had had problems with the contractor who previously conducted the background investigations, in that the results of the investigations were often delayed and the quality was sometimes poor. Additional background investigations had to be performed by the licensee to assure accurate results. That contract was terminated in December, 1986 and a new contractor was hired. The licensee's representatives stated that since January, 1987, they have received better quality investigations and the results have been timely. The inspector found no violations of licensee procedures or NRC requirements.

b. Allegation

The supervisor in charge of the Personnel Access Control Program made badge changes in the computerized system so that the badges would still work even though the checks had not been done.

Findings

The inspector reviewed records and conducted interviews with security management personnel and the supervisor of the Personnel Access Program. The senior security manager stated that procedurally, the supervisor of the Access Control Program is authorized to make or direct that changes be made in the computer for a number of reasons, e.g., to grant a 30 day grace period to employees whose general education training date has expired; to change the level of access authorization; to insert new information in the computer; and to invalidate access upon receipt of information which is grounds for termination. The inspector determined from the licensee's procedures that those types of changes can be made either during day shift or off-shift hours by access control office personnel, with the approval of the supervisor. The records indicate that, during the most recent maintenance outage (August-September 1986), the access control program supervisor and her office staff were called to work on off-shift hours in order to issue badges to workers on several occasions. The inspectors did not observe any abnormalities in this process and all actions were consistent with the approved procedures. The Senior Security Manager stated that, to ensure that there is positive control over the information that is entered in the access program, the access control program supervisor must personally approve each transaction. The inspector verified that this is being done. In addition, on-duty security shift supervisors verify the information that is programmed into the computer, each shift, to ensure that no errors have been made. A designated security shift supervisor is also authorized on off-shifts to program information into the computer which was previously approved during the day shift hours. In special situations, these designated supervisors may change the access level authorization of an employee, without prior approval, for 24 hours only. That type of change must be supported by written documentation that includes a formal request from a operating division manager who has certified that special employee access to areas not previously authorized is required. Those provisions are also documented in approved procedures. Observation of this process by persons unfamiliar with the access control program may have been the basis for the concern expressed in this allegation.

The inspector determined that no violation of the licensee's procedures or NRC requirements was identified.

c. Allegation

A former PSE&G security supervisor knew about changing badges in the security computer and tried to do something about it.

Finding

The inspector could not interview the named former security supervisor because he had terminated his employment with the licensee and moved from the area. However, the individual's former supervisor stated that the individual terminated his employment with PSE&G primarily because his family wanted to relocate to the southern states. Additionally, the former supervisor stated that the individual was also displeased with a reorganization in the security management staff which abolished his previous position and required him to work on a rotating shift schedule as a shift supervisor. The former supervisor stated that he could not recall any discussions with him involving the Access Control Program during the course of his employment. Because the inspector's review into the above allegations did not surface any violations of NRC requirements in the licensee's access control program, the inspector, with the concurrence of his supervision, deemed it unnecessary to pursue this allegation further.

12. Training and Qualification

The inspectors conducted a sample review of lesson plans, examinations, programs of instruction, training records, and observed a training class in session. No deficiencies were identified. Training facilities and office space were adequate, well-organized, and clean.

13. Exit Interview

The inspectors met with the licensee representatives indicated in paragraph 1 at the completion of the inspection on May 21, 1987, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.

No written material was provided to the licensee during this inspection.