

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Salem Generating Station	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 050003111	PAGE (3) 1 OF 04
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TITLE (4)
T. S. 3.7.10.3 Non-Compliance - Inadequate Fire Watch Due To Personnel Error

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		
05	06	87	87	006	00	06	05	87			
									DOCKET NUMBER(S) 05000		

OPERATING MODE (9) 1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 8: (Check one or more of the following) (11)				
POWER LEVEL (15) 01818	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.408(e)	<input type="checkbox"/> 89.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b) 73.71(c) OTHER (Specify in Abstract Below and in Text, NRC Form 388A)	
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.408(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 89.38(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 89.73(a)(2)(v)		
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.408(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 89.32(a)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 89.73(a)(2)(vi)		
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.408(a)(1)(iii)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 89.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 89.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)		
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.408(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 89.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 89.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)		
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.408(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 89.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 89.73(a)(2)(ix)			

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME M. J. Pollack - LER Coordinator	TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE: 610 339 402 212
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPSDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPSDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH DAY YEAR
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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On May 6, 1987, during the lunch period, the Maintenance supervisor, responsible for work in the Diesel Generator {EK} area and the Nos. 21 and 22 Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and Transfer Pumps {DC} area, established one individual to act as the fire watch for continuous monitoring of both areas. This was subsequently determined to be inadequate fire protection coverage. The two areas are on different elevations of the Auxiliary Building (100' and 84' respectively) thereby prohibiting continuous fire protection coverage as specified by Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.10.3.a. The root cause of this event was attributed to personnel error. The coordination of the job requirements was inadequate between departments and the job supervisor provided inadequate fire watch for the job(s). Corrective Action includes reviewing the administrative controls for planning work which involve Fire Protection Impairments. A detailed review of the station fire protection program requirements was conducted with the Maintenance Supervisor. A general review of the fire protection program requirements and interpretations as well as this incident was conducted with all other Maintenance supervision.

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PDR ADOCK 05000311
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PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as {xx}

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Technical Specification 3.7.10.3 Non-Compliance - Inadequate fire watch due to personnel error

Discovery Date: 05/06/87

Report Date: 06/05/87

This report was initiated by Incident Report Nos. 87-182 and 87-183

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 Reactor Power 88% - Unit Load 1000 MWe

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On May 6, 1987, during the lunch period, the Maintenance supervisor, responsible for work in the Diesel Generator {EK} area and the Nos. 21 and 22 Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tanks and Transfer Pumps {DC} area established one individual to act as the fire watch for continuous monitoring of both areas. This was subsequently determined to be inadequate fire protection coverage since the two areas are on different elevations of the Auxiliary Building (100' and 84' respectively). Therefore, the fire watch coverage was not in strict compliance with Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.10.3.a.

This event was discovered by Fire Protection Department personnel during their investigation involving observations that neither area had fire protection impairment permits (required by Administrative Procedure AP-25, "Fire Protection Program") for the disabling of their respective Cardox System automatic actuation feature.

Technical Specification 3.7.10.3 states:

"The following low pressure Cardox systems shall be OPERABLE with a minimum level of 50% and a minimum pressure of 285 psig in the associated storage tanks.

- a. Diesel Generator Areas
- b. Diesel Fuel Oil Storage
- c. Vital Switchgear Rooms
- d. Electrical Penetration Area"

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DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd)

Action Statement 3.7.10.3.a states:

"With one or more of the above required Cardox systems inoperable, within one hour establish a continuous fire watch with backup fire suppression equipment for those areas in which redundant systems or components could be damaged; for other areas, establish an hourly fire watch patrol. Restore the system to OPERABLE status within 14 days or, in lieu of any other report required by Specification 6.9.1, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next 30 days outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status."

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The root cause of this event is personnel error. The implementation coordination of the fire protection program, between the Operations, Maintenance, and Planning Departments (coupled with no involvement of the Fire Protection Department) was inadequate. The Operation Department allowed the two (2) Cardox Systems to be tagged out without the use of a Fire Protection Impairment Permit. The Station Planning Department did not identify the need for inactivating the Cardox System automatic actuation features and therefore did not identify the need for a permit (as they would be required to do per Administrative Procedure AP-9, "Maintenance Program"). It has been standard practice to disable and tag out the automatic actuation feature of Cardox Systems anytime extensive work is to be performed in Cardox System areas.

A contributing factor to this event was the maintenance supervisor not recognizing the need for two (2) continuous fire watches, one for elevation 84' and one for elevation 100'. The supervisor involved is a new supervisor. The inexperience of the supervisor with station programmatic requirements such as Fire Protection implementation and interpretation contributed to this event.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The Cardox System automatic actuation feature (in the event of a fire) assures a fire in the respective areas will be extinguished before it can affect redundant safety equipment. When the system or a portion of the system is disabled, the requirement to post a fire watch with backup fire extinguishing equipment or establish a fire watch patrol provides reasonable assurance of the mitigation of a fire before redundant safety system operability can be impaired. Since this impairment of the Cardox System affected areas containing redundant trains of safety equipment support, i.e. fuel oil, posting of a continuous fire watch was required. In this instance, however, backup fire protection equipment was not required since manual actuation of the Cardox System remained available.


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CORRECTIVE ACTION:

A review of the planning of work involving Fire Protection Impairments is being conducted. This review will be completed by August 3, 1987. Necessary administrative procedural changes will be made upon completion of the review.

A detailed review of the station fire protection program requirements was conducted with the Maintenance Supervisor (in question) by management. Additionally, a general review of the fire protection program requirements and interpretations as well as this incident was presented to all other Maintenance supervision.


General Manager -
Salem Operations

MJP:pc

SORC Mtg. 87-038



Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

June 5, 1987

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

SALEM GENERATING STATION
LICENSE NO. DPR-75
DOCKET NO. 50-311
UNIT NO. 2
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 87-006-00

This Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i). This report is required within thirty (30) days of discovery.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "J. M. Zupko, Jr.", is written above the typed name.

J. M. Zupko, Jr.
General Manager-
Salem Operations

MJP:pc

Distribution

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The Energy People