

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

3/4.5.4 BORON INJECTION SYSTEM

BORON INJECTION TANK

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.5.4.1 The boron injection tank shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. A minimum contained volume of 900 gallons of borated water,
- b. Between 20,100 and 21,800 ppm of boron, and
- c. A minimum solution temperature of 145°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

With the boron injection tank inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to 1% $\Delta k/k$ at 200°F within the next 6 hours; restore the tank to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.*

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.5.4.1 The boron injection tank shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

- a. Verifying the water level through a recirculation flow test at least once per 7 days,
- b. Verifying the boron concentration of the water in the tank at least once per 7 days, and
- c. Verifying the water temperature at least once per 24 hours.

*Effective 5:55 P.M. January 12, 1979 and expiring at 11:55 A.M., January 13, 1979 the following ACTION statement is applicable: With the boron injection tank inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to 1% $\Delta k/k$ at 200°F within the next 24 hours; restore the tank to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

HEAT TRACING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.5.4.2 At least two independent channels of heat tracing shall be OPERABLE for the boron injection tank and for the heat traced portions of the associated flow paths.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

With only one channel of heat tracing on either the boron injection tank or on the heat traced portion of an associated flow path OPERABLE, operation may continue for up to 30 days provided the tank and flow path temperatures are verified to be $\geq 145^{\circ}\text{F}$ at least once per 8 hours; otherwise, be in HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.5.4.2 Each heat tracing channel for the boron injection tank and associated flow path shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 31 days by energizing each heat tracing channel, and
- b. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the tank and flow path temperatures to be $\geq 145^{\circ}\text{F}$. The tank temperature shall be determined by measurement. The flow path temperature shall be determined by either measurement or recirculation flow until establishment of equilibrium temperatures within the tank.

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.5.4 The refueling water storage tank (RWST) shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. A contained volume of between 364,500 and 400,000 gallons of borated water,
- b. A boron concentration of between 2000 and 2200 ppm, and
- c. A minimum water temperature of 35°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With the refueling water storage tank inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.5.4 The RWST shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 7 days by:
 1. Verifying the water level in the tank, and
 2. Verifying the boron concentration of the water.
- b. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the RWST temperature when the outside air temperature is less than 35°F.

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

BASES

3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK

The OPERABILITY of the RWST as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA. The limits on RWST minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that 1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, and 2) the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition following mixing of the RWST and the RCS water volumes with all control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly. These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.

In addition, the OPERABILITY of the RWST as part of the ECCS ensures that sufficient negative reactivity is injected into the core to counteract any positive increase in reactivity caused by RCS cooldown. RCS cooldown can be caused by inadvertent depressurization, a loss-of-coolant accident or a steamline rupture.

The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST also ensure a pH value of between 8.5 and 11.0 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components. The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

4.5.4 BORON INJECTION SYSTEM

BORON INJECTION TANK

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.5.4.1 The boron injection tank shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. A minimum contained volume of 900 gallons of borated water,
- b. Between 20,000 and 22,500 ppm of boron, and
- c. A minimum solution temperature of 145°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

With the boron injection tank inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to 1% $\Delta k/k$ at 200°F within the next 6 hours; restore the tank to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.5.4.1 The boron injection tank shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

- a. Verifying the water level through a recirculation flow test at least once per 7 days,
- b. Verifying the boron concentration of the water in the tank at least once per 7 days, and
- c. Verifying the water temperature at least once per 24 hours.

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

HEAT TRACING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.5.4.2 At least two independent channels of heat tracing shall be OPERABLE for the boron injection tank and for the heat traced portions of the associated flow paths.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

With only one channel of heat tracing on either the boron injection tank or on the heat traced portion of an associated flow path OPERABLE, operation may continue for up to 30 days provided the tank and flow path temperatures are verified to be greater than or equal to 145°F at least once per 8 hours; otherwise, be in HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.5.4.2 Each heat tracing channel for the boron injection tank and associated flow path shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 31 days by energizing each heat tracing channel, and
- b. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the tank and flow path temperatures to be greater than or equal to 145°F. The tank temperature shall be determined by measurement. The flow path temperature shall be determined by either measurement or recirculation flow until establishment of equilibrium temperatures within the tank.

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.5.4 The refueling water storage tank (RWST) shall be OPERABLE with:

- a. A contained volume of between 364,500 and 400,000 gallons of borated water,
- b. A boron concentration of between 2000 and 2200 ppm, and
- c. A minimum water temperature of 35°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With the refueling water storage tank inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.5.4 The RWST shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

- a. At least once per 7 days by:
 1. Verifying the water level in the tank, and
 2. Verifying the boron concentration of the water.
- b. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the RWST temperature when the outside air temperature is less than 35°F.

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

BASES

ECCS SUBSYSTEMS (Continued)

With the RCS temperature below 350°F, one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.

The limitation for a maximum of one safety injection pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all safety injection pumps except the allowed OPERABLE safety injection pump to be inoperable below 312°F provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single POPS relief valve.

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensures that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained. Surveillance requirements for throttle valve position stops and flow balance testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA. Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to: 1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, 2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and 3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses.

3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK

The OPERABILITY of the RWST as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA. The limits on RWST minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that 1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core, and 2) the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition following mixing of the RWST and the RCS water volumes with all control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly. These assumptions are consistent with the LOCA analyses.

In addition, the OPERABILITY of the RWST as part of the ECCS ensures that sufficient negative reactivity is injected into the core to counteract any positive increase in reactivity caused by RCS cooldown. RCS cooldown can be caused by inadvertent depressurization, a loss-of-coolant accident or a steam-line rupture.

The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST also ensure a pH value of between 8.5 and 11.0 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components. The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.

LCR# 85-07

ATTACHMENT A

MARKED-UP SALEM FSAR SECTION 15.4.8.2
STEAMLINE BREAKS

been shown on similar plants to less severe than the double ended hot leg break. Cold leg breaks, on the other hand are lower both in the blowdown peak and in the reflood pressure rise. Thus an analysis of smaller pump suction breaks is representative of the spectrum of break sizes.

For these analyses it was assumed that the single failure occurred on a diesel generator such that one spray pump and two fan coolers failed to operate.

Figures 15.4-86 and 15.4-87 give the containment pressure transients for several break sizes and locations for the design basis case. Additional margin cases assuming entrainment continues up to the 10 foot core level were analyzed with results presented in Figures 15.4-88 and 15.4-89. The peak pressures for these cases are summarized in Table 15.4-22.

Structural heat transfer coefficients as a function of time are indicated in Figure 15.4-90.

The DEPS results are shown in Figure 15.4-91. This transient results in the highest peak pressure of 45 psig.

15.4.8.2 Steamline Breaks

15.4.8.2.1 Analytical Methods

~~Various containment models have been utilized to analyze steam break in the Salem Plant.~~

Steamline break analysis

The ~~majority of the Analyses~~ performed utilized the Westinghouse containment model developed for the IEEE-323-1971 Equipment Qualification program. These models and their justification (experimental and analytical) are detailed in References 56 through 60. Some major points of the model are as follows:

1. The saturation temperature corresponding to the partial pressure of the containment vapor is used in the calculation of condensing heat transfer to the passive heat sinks and the heat removal by containment fan coolers.
2. The Westinghouse containment model utilizes the analytical approaches described in References 6 and 60 to calculate the condensate removal from the condensate film. Justification of this model is provided in References 56, 59, 60, and 6. (For large breaks 100 percent revaporization of the condensate is used, and a calculated fractional revaporization due to convective heat flux is used for small breaks.)
3. The small steam line break containment analyses utilized the stagnant Tagami correlation, and the large steam line break analyses utilized the blowdown Tagami correlation with an exponential decay to the stagnant Tagami correlation. The details of these models are given in Reference 38. Justification of the use of heat transfer coefficients has been provided in References 58, 59, and 61.

A complete analysis of main steamline breaks inside containment has been performed using the ^{LOFTRAN} MARVEL code (WCAP-8843) ⁷¹⁰⁷ [62] and the Westinghouse containment computer code, COCO, as described in WCAP-8936 ⁸³²⁶ [60] and its references. All blowdown calculations with the ^{LOFTRAN} MARVEL code were done assuming the reactor coolant pumps were running, (i.e. offsite power available) because this increases the primary-to-secondary heat transfer and therefore maintains higher blowdown flow rates (Ref. Section 3.1.7 of WCAP-8822 ^[63]). Although this is inconsistent with the delay times assumed in containment fan cooler and spray initiations, where loss of offsite power is assumed, the combined effect is extra conservatism in the calculated containment conditions.

15.4.8.2.2 Mass and Energy Releases

Several failures can be postulated which would impair the performance of various ~~steam~~ break protection systems and therefore would change the steamline

net energy ^{considered} releases from a ruptured line. Three different single failures were analyzed for each break condition. These were (1) failure of a main feed ~~isolation~~ ^{regulator} valve; 2) failure of a main steam isolation valve; and 3) failure of auxiliary feedwater runout protection equipment.

Feedwater Flow

resulting in a limiting transient

There are two valves in each main feedwater line which serve to isolate main feed flow following a steam line break. One is the main feed regulator valve which receives dual, separate train trip signals from the plant protection system on any safety injection signal and closes within five seconds of receipt of this signal. The second is the feed line isolation valve which also receives dual, separate train trip signals from the protection system following a safety injection signal. This valve closes within 30 seconds. Additionally, the main feed pumps receive dual, separate train trip signals from the protection system following a steam line break. Thus, the worst failure in this system is a failure of the main feed regulator valve to close. This results in an additional 25 seconds during which feedwater from the condensate feed system may be added to the steam generator. Also, since the feed isolation valve is upstream of the regulator valve, failure of the regulator results in additional feed line volume which is not isolated from the steam generator. Thus, water in this portion of the lines can flash and enter into the steam generator.

The only non-safety grade equipment in the main feed system which is relied upon to terminate the main feed flow to the steam generators are the main feedwater control valves. These valves are not seismic category I. However, each valve receives dual, independent, safety grade trip=closed signals from the protection system following a steam line break. Also, the valves are air-operated fail-closed design. Since the assumed break is inside containment in a seismic category I pipe, it is not assumed to be initiated by a seismic event. Therefore, to assume a coincident seismic event with the hypothetical pipe rupture is not required, and thus a seismic classification for the main feed

regulation valve is not necessary to insure closure following a steam-line break inside containment.

Because of the conservative nature of the transient calculations used for the 1971 Equipment Qualification Program, the results of the Salem temperature transient calculation will fall under the peak transient calculated for the 1971 Equipment Qualification Program and presented in Reference 60 (approximately 385°F). The pressure transient will fall below the design limits for the Salem 2 containment.

Feedwater flow to the faulted steam generator from the main feed system is calculated using the hydraulic resistances of the system piping, head/flow curves for the main feed pumps, and the steam generator pressure decay as calculated by the ~~MARVEL~~ ^{LOFTRAN} code. In the calculations performed to match these systems variables, a variety of assumptions are made to maximize the calculated flows. These include:

1. No credit for extra pressure drop in the feed lines due to flashing of feedwater.
2. Feed regulator valve in the faulted loop is full open.
3. Feed regulator valves in the intact loop do not change position prior to a trip signal, ~~and close instantly upon receipt of a signal to close.~~
4. All feed pumps are running at maximum speed.
5. No credit is taken for flow reduction through the feed regulator or feed isolation valve until they are full closed.
6. Flow from the pumps decays linearly following pump trip.

Calculation of feedwater flashing is performed by the ~~MARVEL~~ ^{LOFTRAN} code as described in Section ~~2.2.3~~ ^{4.1.5} of WCAP-8843-~~[62]~~ ⁷⁹⁰⁷ [27]. For the Salem units, the

maximum volume of unisolated feed lines is 328.2 ft³ without a feed regulator valve failure, and increases to 868.5 ft³ with a feed regulator valve failure. ~~(See Table 4 of WCAP-8843).~~ [62]

~~The feedwater flow as a function of time is presented in Figure 15.4-92.~~

Main Steam Isolation

Since all main steam isolation valves have closing times of no more than five seconds, failure of one of these valves affects only the volume of the main steam and turbine steam piping which cannot be isolated from the pipe rupture. ~~Table 4 of WCAP-8822~~ [63] and Table 15.4-23 shows the mass in the steam lines with and without an isolation valve failure at the four power levels considered in the analyses.

Steam contained in the unisolated portions of the steam lines and turbine plant were considered in the containment analyses in two ways. For the large double-ended ruptures, steam in the unisolated steam lines is released to the containment as part of the reverse flow. This is accomplished by having the reverse flow begin at the time of the break at the Moody critical flow rate for steam as established by the cross-sectional area of the steam line and the initial steam pressure. The flow is held constant at this rate for a time period sufficient to purge the entire unisolated portion of the steam lines. Enthalpy of the flow is also held constant at the initial steam enthalpy. Following the period of constant flow representing purging of the steam lines, flow from the intact steam generators, as calculated by ^{LOFTRAN} ~~MARVEL~~, is added to the containment and continues until steam line isolation is complete.

When considering the split ruptures, steam in the steam lines is included in the analysis by adding the total mass in the lines to the initial mass of steam in the faulted steam generator. This is necessary because, unlike double-ended ruptures, the total break area for a split is unchanged by steam line isolation; only the source of the blowdown effluent is changed. Thus, steam flow from the piping in the intact

loops is indistinguishable from steam leaving the faulted steam generator. However, by adding the piping mass to the faulted steam generator mass, and by having dry steam blowdowns, the steam line inventory is included in the total blowdown.

Auxiliary Feedwater Flow

The Auxiliary Feedwater System is actuated shortly after the occurrence of a steam line break. The mass addition to the faulted steam generator from the Auxiliary Feedwater System was conservatively determined by using the following assumptions.

1. The entire Auxiliary Feedwater System was assumed to be actuated at the time of the break and instantaneously pumping at its maximum capacity.
2. The affected steam generator was ^{assumed} ~~assumed~~ to be at atmospheric pressure.
3. The intact steam generators were assumed to be at the safety valve set pressure.
4. Flow to the affected steam generator was calculated from the Auxiliary Feedwater System head curves, assumptions 2 and 3 above, and the system line resistances. The effects of flow limiting devices were considered.
5. The flow to the faulted steam generator from the Auxiliary Feedwater System was assumed to exist from the time of rupture until realignment of the system was completed.
6. The failure of auxiliary feedwater runout control was considered as one of ~~three separately as~~ single failures. Failure of runout control was simulated by assuming a constant auxiliary feedwater flow of 2040 gpm to the faulted steam generator.

~~The analysis used the following auxiliary feedwater flow rates:~~

- ~~1. With runout protection operational, a constant auxiliary feed flow of 1840 gpm to the faulted steam generator.~~
- ~~2. Failure of runout control was simulated by assuming a constant auxiliary feedwater flow of 2040 gpm to the faulted steam generator.~~

~~The above flow rates were held constant from time of break until realignment, which was assumed at ten minutes.~~

In the analysis, the auxiliary feedwater flow to the faulted steam generator was assumed to exist from the time of the rupture until realignment of the system was completed. The Auxiliary Feedwater System is manually realigned by the operator after 10 minutes. Therefore, the analysis assumes maximum auxiliary feedwater flow to a depressurized steam generator for ^Vfull 10 minutes.
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In the event a postulated main steam line break occurs, auxiliary feedwater to the affected steam generator must be terminated manually. Present design criteria allows ten minutes for the operator to recognize the postulated event and perform the necessary actions. However, the operator is expected to terminate auxiliary feedwater flow to the affected steam generator in much less time due to the amount of Class 1E indication provided to monitor plant conditions.

The information available to alert the operator of the need to isolate auxiliary feedwater to the affected steam generator is mounted on the control console in the control room. The pressure in each steam generator is monitored and ~~displayed~~^{displayed} by two independent channels of instrumentation. Also, a bank of pen recorders indicates steam and feedwater flows for each steam generator; this allows the control room operator to readily view and compare the steam flow of one steam generator to the others.

The suction and discharge pressures of each auxiliary feedwater pump are indicated on the control console. The auxiliary feedwater flow indications for each steam generator are mounted on the control console next to each other, allowing the operator to easily view and compare flows.

In addition to the above mentioned indications, high steam flow, low steam pressure, and steam-feed flow deviation conditions for each steam generator are alarmed on the main control console in the control room. Alarms for these conditions are also provided on the overhead annunciator.

Since a sufficient number of trains of instrumentation must be available for normal plant operation, steam generator instrumentation will be in operation at the time of the postulated event. Therefore, changes in steam generator pressure and steam flow will be detected as they occur. The only delay expected in transmitting the information to the control room is the time required for the instrumentation to react to the changing conditions. This delay is expected to be no more than a few seconds.

Failure of the auxiliary feedwater isolation valve to close has not been considered. The maximum auxiliary feedwater flow that can be delivered to a faulted steam generator has been assumed in the analysis for ten minutes with ^{the single failure} ~~two cases~~ being considered: ~~1) runout protection operational; 2) failure of runout protection.~~ Only after ten minutes the operator takes action to isolate auxiliary feedwater isolation valves fails to close, the operator can trip the two auxiliary feedwater pumps feeding the broken steam generator until this valve or another in the line is manually closed.

The pump curves for the Auxiliary Feed pump are shown in Figure 15.4-93 (Steam Driven) and Figure 15.4-94 (Electrical Driven). A schematic of the Auxiliary Feed System is shown in Figure 10.4-17.

15.4.8.2.3 Heat Sinks

The worst effect of a containment safeguards failure is the loss of a spray pump which reduces containment spray flow by 50 percent. In all analyses, the times assumed for initiation of containment sprays and fan coolers are 59 and 35 seconds respectively following the appropriate initiating trip signal. These times are based on the assumption of a loss of offsite power and the delays are consistent with Technical Specification limits. The delay time for spray delivery includes the time required for the spray pumps to reach full speed and the time required to fill the spray headers and piping.

The saturation temperature corresponding to the partial pressure of the vapor in the containment is conservatively assumed for the temperature in the calculation of condensing heat transfer to the passive heat sinks. This temperature is also conservatively assumed for the calculation of heat removal by the containment fan coolers.

Parameters for the Sprays and Fan Coolers are presented in Table 15.4-24. The parameters for the Passive Heat Sinks are presented in Table 15.4-25.

The Fan Cooler heat removal rate as a function of containment temperature is presented in Figure 15.4-96.

15.4.8.2.4 Results

A total of ^{twenty-nine (29)} ~~forty eight (48)~~ different blowdowns covering four power levels and ^{five} ~~three~~ different break sizes were evaluated. The ^{five} ~~three~~ break sizes considered at each power level (0, 30, 70 and 102 percent of nominal) ~~were a full double-ended rupture upstream of the steam line flow restrictor, a full double-ended rupture downstream of the steam line flow restrictor and the largest split rupture that will~~ ^{neither} result in generation of a steam line isolation signal from the primary plant

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were a 4.25 ft^2 full double-ended rupture with
entrainment, a 1.4 ft^2 full double-ended rupture with
entrainment, a small double-ended rupture having an
area just larger than that at which entrainment
occurs, a small double-ended rupture having an area
just smaller than that at which entrainment occurs,

nor result in entrainment.^{fifth}
protection equipment[†]. In the analysis of the ~~third~~ (split) break, reactor trip, feed line isolation and steam line isolation are generated by high containment pressure signals. ~~Additionally, all blowdowns used in the analyses were assumed to consist of dry steam.~~

~~Containment evaluation resulting in a limiting transient.~~
For each break condition, four different single failures were considered in the ~~evaluation~~. These were (1) failure of a containment safeguards train, (2) failure of a main feed ^{regulator} isolation valve, (3) failure of a main steam isolation valve, and (4) failure of the auxiliary feedwater runout protection equipment.

~~WCAP-8822 provides containment initial values (See Table 15.4-26), and containment temperatures and pressures resulting from all cases considered are presented in Table 15.4-27 along with pertinent trips, trip times, and single failures associated with each. Also shown in Table 15.4-27 are four additional entries. These show the results of analyses of the worst temperature and pressure transients as analyzed with the GOCO code modified to conform to the NRC interim containment evaluation model and the results of the worst pressure transient initiated by a double ended rupture when analyzed assuming entrainment in the blowdown as specified in Section 3.2.2 for WCAP-8822.^{†63} These results have been provided for comparison of Westinghouse and NRC containment models and for quantification effects on peak pressure from entrained moisture which is expected to be present in large break blowdowns. As can be seen from the table, the peak pressure for any case using the Westinghouse model is 42.8 psig and the peak temperature for any case using the Westinghouse model is 333.5°F. Mass and energy releases for the worst cases are provided in Table 15.4-28 thru 15.4-30. Graphical results showing containment atmospheric temperature, containment pressure, and other pertinent variables are provided in Figures 15.4-97 through 15.4-111 illustrating the resultant containment pressure and~~

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temperature transients for the cases producing the limiting results in terms of the highest peak containment pressure and
(insert B)

[†]Reference Section 2.3 of WCAP-8822 for a complete discussion of this split break.

Insert B

Temperature for both the large double-ended ruptures (DERs) and the small DERs and split breaks.

As illustrated in Figures 15.4-97 and 15.4-98, the 1.4 ft² DER at Hot Zero Power transient generated

the pressure and temperature curves for this

making large break case, producing a peak

containment pressure of 45.5 psig and a peak

containment temperature of 268.3°F. The limiting

small break case which produced the peak

containment pressure of 46.4 psig was the split

break at 30% power transient illustrated in

Figures 15.4-99 and 15.4-100 for containment

pressure and temperature. Figures 15.4-101 and

15.4-102 provide the containment pressure and

temperature transients for the limiting temperature

case for the small break cases. The 0.6 ft^2

DER without entrainment at Hot Full Power transients

generated a peak containment temperature of 345.5°F .

In summary, the results provided in the steamline

break analysis demonstrate sufficient margin available

below the containment design pressure and equipment

qualification temperature.

The large break case resulting in the calculated peak pressure has been identified as the 1.4 ft² break at 70 percent power. This case resulted in a peak pressure of 39.1 psig when dry steam blowdowns are used. When this same case was reanalyzed utilizing blowdowns which included the effect of liquid carryover from the secondary side, the resulting peak pressures were 37.7 and 37.2 using the Westinghouse and NRC containment models respectively. This indicates the overall conservatism of the Westinghouse containment model when used with dry steam, vs. using the expected mass and energy releases which include the effect of entrainment. Transients for the Westinghouse model with dry steam blowdowns are provided in Figures 15.4-97 through 15.4-99.

The case resulting in the calculated peak pressure for the small breaks has been identified as the 0.86 ft² break at 102 percent power. The resulting peak pressure for this case was 42.8 psig. When this case was reanalyzed utilizing the NRC containment model, and the same mass and energy release rates, the peak calculated pressure was found to be 43.0 psig. The transients for the Westinghouse model are provided in Figures 15.4-100 through 15.4-102. Similar transients for the case which used the NRC model are provided in Figures 15.4-103 through 15.4-105.

The case resulting in the calculated peak temperature has been identified as the 0.908 ft² break at 70 percent power. This case resulted in a peak temperature of 333.5°F. When this same case was analyzed with the NRC containment model a peak temperature of 347°F was calculated. These results verify that the Westinghouse and NRC models yield similar results. Transients for both of these cases have been provided in Figures 15.4-106 through 15.4-108.

An evaluation of the safety related instrumentation will be performed to show conformance with the requirements of IEEE-223-1971. This evaluation will be performed by comparing the containment equipment test conditions versus the calculated containment accident environments previously discussed. If a thermal analysis is necessary Westinghouse will

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~~Use a thermal model similar to that presented in Reference 24. Any differences between the Westinghouse thermal analysis model and the proposed NRC interim model will be discussed and justified. Some major points of the model are the following:~~

- ~~1. The condensing heat transfer coefficient will be the same as used in the approved Westinghouse model for ECCS analysis. This model is documented in Appendix A of WCAP-8339 [2] and is comparable to the model recommended in Branch Technical Position CBS 6-1.~~
- ~~2. A convective heat transfer coefficient comparable to that recommended by the NRC will be used. If necessary, sensitivity studies will be performed to justify any model differences.~~

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15.4.8.3 Subcompartment Pressure Analysis

Reference 64 presents the containment subcompartment pressure analysis using an 18 node containment model and the latest version of the TMD computer code.

15.4.8.4 Miscellaneous Analysis

15.4.8.4.1 Minor Reactor Coolant Leakage

The Hi Containment Pressure signal actuates engineered safety features. Since the set point for this signal is two psig, the maximum containment pressure caused by leakage is restricted to this value. The containment response to such leakage would be a gradual pressure and temperature rise which would reach a pressure peak of slightly less than two pounds gauge. At this point energy removal due to structural heat sinks and operating fan coolers would match the energy addition due to the leakage and other sources.

REFERENCES FOR SECTION 15.4

1. "Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling Systems for Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Reactors," 10CFR50.46 and Appendix K of 10CFR50. Federal Register, Volume 39, Number 3, January 4, 1974.
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TABLE 15.4-23 (Sheet 1 of 2)

EFFECTS OF SINGLE FAILURES ON CONTAINMENT ANALYSES

I. MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES*

Break Area (ft^2)		Power Percent	Piping Blowdown (lb/sec)	Duration of Piping Blowdown (sec)		Steam Mass (lb)	
Forward	Reverse			No MSIV Failure	MSIV Failure	No MSIV Failure	MSIV Failure
1.4	4.25	102	7047	0.140 0.136	2.587 2.532	985 959	18,323 17,840
1.4	4.25	70	7595	0.136 0.137	2.534 2.541	1034 1038	19,242 19,302
1.4	4.25	30	8377	0.137 0.137	2.550 2.556	1148 1151	21,358 21,409
1.4	4.25	0	9002	0.137 0.138	2.552 2.568	1235 1243	22,973 23,115
4.25	1.4	102	2315	0.414	7.706	959	17,840
4.25	1.4	70	2495	0.416	7.736	1038	19,302
4.25	1.4	30	2752	0.418	7.780	1151	21,409
4.25	1.4	0	2957	0.420	7.817	1243	23,115

*Failure of main steam line isolation valve ^{increases} increases the unisolatable steam line volume from 542 ft^3 to $10,083 \text{ ft}^3$.

II. MAIN FEED LINE ISOLATION VALVE

Maximum Unisolatable Feed Line Volume Without MFIV Failure	= 328.2 ft^3
Maximum Unisolatable Feed Line Volume With MFIV Failure	= 868.5 ft^3
Closing Time of Feed Regulation Valve	= <5.0 sec.
Closing Time of Feed Isolation Valve	= <30.0 sec.

III. AUXILIARY FEED SYSTEM RUNOUT PROTECTION FAILURE

~~Maximum Auxiliary Feed Flow Without~~ = ~~1840~~ gpm
~~Runout Protection Failure~~

Maximum Auxiliary Feed Flow With = 2040 gpm
Runout Protection Failure

TABLE 15.4-24

SPRAY SYSTEM

Number of Spray Trains	2
Number of Spray Trains Operating in Minimum Safeguards Analysis	1
Number of Spray Trains Operating in Maximum Safeguards Analysis	2
Spray Flow Rate per Spray Train	2600 gpm

FAN COOLERS

Number of Fan Coolers	5
Number of Fan Coolers Operating in Minimum Safeguards Analysis	3
Number of Fan Coolers Operating in Maximum Safeguards Analysis	4

INITIATION TIMES/SETPOINTS

System	Containment Setpoint used	Delay After Setpoint (sec)
Spray	26.7 psig	59.
Fan Coolers	7.9 psig	35.

TABLE 15.4-25 (Sheet 1 of 2)

PASSIVE HEAT SINK

Wall No.	Area (ft ²)	Layer	Composition	ft. Thickness	Thermal Cond. BTU/HR-FT-°F BTU	Volumetric Heat Capacity BTU/FT ³ -°F
1	45169	1	Paint	0.000625	0.083	39.6
		2	Steel	0.03125	27.0	58.8
		3	Concrete	0.5	0.92	22.6
		4	Concrete	4.0	0.92	22.6
2	14206	1	Insulation	0.2083	0.024	3.94
		2	Steel	0.03125	27.0	58.8
		3	Concrete	0.5	0.92	22.6
		4	Concrete	4.0	0.92	22.6
3	29249	1	Paint	0.000625	0.083	39.6
		2	Steel	0.04167	27.0	58.8
		3	Concrete	0.5	0.92	22.6
		4	Concrete	3.0	0.92	22.6
*4	11611	1	Paint	0.0015	0.083	39.6
		2	Concrete	0.5	0.92	22.6
		3	Concrete	3.0	0.92	22.6
5	6806	1	Paint	0.0015	0.083	39.6
		2	Concrete	0.5	0.92	22.6
		3	Concrete	0.5	0.92	22.6
		4	Concrete	0.5	0.92	22.6
6	9424	1	Paint	0.0015	0.083	39.6
		2	Concrete	0.5	0.92	22.6
		3	Concrete	1.21	0.92	22.6
7	31660	1	Paint	0.00117	0.083	39.6
		2	Concrete	0.5	0.92	22.6
		3	Concrete	1.0	0.92	22.6
8	13279	1	Stainless Steel	0.01773	8.0	53.6
		2	Concrete	0.5	0.92	22.6
		3	Concrete	1.4	0.92	22.6
9	47590	1	Paint	0.000625	0.083	39.6
		2	Steel	0.011	27.0	58.8

* in contact with sump

TABLE 15.4-25 (Sheet 2 of 2)

PASSIVE HEAT SINK

Wall No.	Area (ft ²)	Layer	Composition	ft. Thickness	Thermal Cond. BTU/HR-FT-°F BTU	Volumetric Heat Capacity BTU/FT ³ -°F
10	76741	1	Paint	0.000625	0.083	39.6
		2	Steel	0.02102	27.0	58.8
11	19348	1	Paint	0.000625	0.083	39.6
		2	Steel	0.0437	27.0	58.8
12	9330	1	Paint	0.000625	0.083	39.6
		2	Steel	0.611 0.0611	27.0	58.8
13	7452	1	Paint	0.000625	0.083	39.6
		2	Steel	0.086	27.0	58.8
14	3218	1	Paint	0.000625	0.083	39.6
		2	Steel	0.1112	27.0	58.8
15	1553	1	Paint	0.000625	0.083	39.6
		2	Steel	0.217	27.0	58.8
16	43740	1	Paint	0.000625	0.083	39.6
		2	Steel	0.0052	7.0	58.8
17	4272	1	Stainless Steel	0.0329	8.0	53.6
18	53745	1	Paint	0.000625	0.083	39.6
		2	Steel	0.0211	27.0	58.8
19	11244	1	Paint	0.000625	0.083	39.6
		2	Steel	0.0379	27.0	58.8
20	2989	1	Paint	0.000625	27.0	39.6
		2	Steel	0.15806	27.0	58.8

TABLE 15.4-26

CONTAINMENT INITIAL CONDITIONS
FOR MSLB

Containment Design Pressure	47 psig
Containment Volume	2,620,000 ft ³
Initial Containment Pressure	0.3 psig
Initial Air Partial Pressure	14.7 psia
Initial Steam Partial Pressure	0.3 psia
Initial Containment Temperature	120°F
Refueling Water Storage Tank Inventory	350,000 gal
Service Water Temperature	85°

SSS-UFSAR

RESULTS FOR SPLIT RUPTURES

Revision 0
July 22, 1982

Break Area (ft ²)	Break Level (ft)	Single Failure	Reactor Trip Time (sec)	Time of HI-1 Containment Press. (sec)	Time of HI-2 Containment Press. (sec)	Time of Fuel Line Isolation (sec)	Time of Steam Line Isolation (sec)	Containment Model	Peak Pressure (psia)	Time of Peak Pressure (sec)	Max Temp. (°F)
840	100	1	HRP @ 14.7	21.0	95.0	11.0	101.0	M	42.0	809.7	110.0
840	100	2	HRP @ 14.7	21.0	101.0	58.0	107.0	M	37.1	747.1	127.0
840	100	3	HRP @ 14.7	21.0	97.5	101.5	101.5	M	36.5	701.0	121.0
840	100	4	HRP @ 14.75	21.5	97.5	11.5	101.5	M	36.7	696.4	121.0
900	70	1	CPI @ 21.0	21.0	89.5	11.0	95.5	M	42.1	870.4	131.5
900	70	2	CPI @ 21.0	21.0	95.0	58.0	101.0	M	35.5	710.9	126.0
900	70	3	CPI @ 21.0	21.0	91.5	11.0	97.5	M	35.4	678.7	126.7
900	70	4	CPI @ 21.0	21.0	91.0	11.0	97.0	M	35.4	673.1	126.7
940	10	1	CPI @ 19.0	19.0	89.0	29.0	95.0	M	37.0	870.5	132.2
940	10	2	CPI @ 19.0	19.0	95.0	54.0	101.0	M	31.6	570.5	131.2
940	10	3	CPI @ 19.0	19.0	91.5	29.0	97.5	M	31.9	592.3	135.2
940	10	4	CPI @ 19.0	19.0	90.5	29.0	96.5	M	32.1	574.4	135.5
960	0	1	N/A	17.0	90.0	27.0	96.0	M	32.7	791.5	139.0
960	0	2	N/A	17.0	96.0	52.0	102.0	M	29.2	656.2	121.2
960	0	3	N/A	17.5	91.0	27.5	97.5	M	29.3	627.0	122.7
960	0	4	N/A	17.0	91.5	27.0	97.5	M	29.6	651.1	123.1
900	70	1	CPI @ 21.5	21.5	93.0	11.5	97.0	M	42.4	895.1	137.0
960	100	1	HRP @ 14.7	21.5	99.0	21.5	105.0	M	43.0	930.2	144.7
1.4	100	1	HTLP @ 0.5	2	141	10.0	0.0	M	30.7	672.0	260.0
1.4	100	2	HTLP @ 0.5	2	133	15.0	0.0	M	37.1	609.0	260.0
1.4	100	3	HTLP @ 0.5	2	142	10.0	0.0	M	35.2	655.7	260.0
1.4	100	4	HTLP @ 0.5	2	62	10.0	0.0	M	37.3	602.0	292.0
4.25	1	1	HTLP @ 1.0	4	112	10.0	0.5	M	35.2	630.3	249.4
4.25	1	2	HTLP @ 1.0	4	91	10.0	0.5	M	35.3	613.6	253.0
4.25	1	3	HTLP @ 1.0	4	111	10.0	0.5	M	32.3	606.5	264.6
4.25	1	4	HTLP @ 1.0	4	56	10.0	0.5	M	30.3	610.7	282.6
1.4	70	1	HTLP @ 0.5	2	133	10.0	0.0	M	39.1	657.0	262.1
1.4	70	2	HTLP @ 0.5	2	140	10.0	0.0	M	36.4	615.9	262.1
1.4	70	3	HTLP @ 0.5	2	140	10.0	0.0	M	35.0	617.1	262.1
1.4	70	4	HTLP @ 0.5	2	146	10.0	0.0	M	36.1	617.9	265.6
1.4	70	1	HTLP @ 0.5	2	140	10.0	0.0	M	31.0	635.6	265.6
1.4	70	2	HTLP @ 0.5	2	142	10.0	0.0	M	36.95	582.0	101.0
1.4	70	3	HTLP @ 0.5	2	116	10.0	0.5	M	37.0	610.2	254.2
4.25	2	1	HTLP @ 1.5	2	102	10.0	0.0	M	32.0	601.0	280.2
4.25	2	2	HTLP @ 1.5	2	113	10.0	0.0	M	32.0	609.0	281.2
4.25	2	3	HTLP @ 1.5	2	46	10.0	0.0	M	37.1	609.6	280.7
1.4	0	1	N/A	2	141	10.0	0.0	M	35.0	701.1	265.6
1.4	0	2	N/A	2	146	10.0	0.0	M	36.1	617.9	265.6
1.4	0	3	N/A	2	140	10.0	0.0	M	31.0	635.6	265.6
1.4	0	4	N/A	2	142	10.0	0.0	M	36.95	582.0	101.0
1.4	0	1	N/A	2	116	10.0	0.5	M	37.0	610.2	254.2
4.25	2	1	N/A	2	102	10.0	0.0	M	32.0	601.0	280.2
4.25	2	2	N/A	2	113	10.0	0.0	M	32.0	609.0	281.2
4.25	2	3	N/A	2	46	10.0	0.0	M	37.1	609.6	280.7
1.4	70	1	HTLP @ 0.5	2	141	10.0	0.0	M	35.0	701.1	265.6
1.4	70	2	HTLP @ 0.5	2	146	10.0	0.0	M	36.1	617.9	265.6
1.4	70	3	HTLP @ 0.5	2	140	10.0	0.0	M	31.0	635.6	265.6
1.4	70	4	HTLP @ 0.5	2	142	10.0	0.0	M	36.95	582.0	101.0
1.4	70	1	HTLP @ 1.5	2	116	10.0	0.5	M	37.0	610.2	254.2
4.25	2	1	HTLP @ 1.5	2	102	10.0	0.0	M	32.0	601.0	280.2
4.25	2	2	HTLP @ 1.5	2	113	10.0	0.0	M	32.0	609.0	281.2
4.25	2	3	HTLP @ 1.5	2	46	10.0	0.0	M	37.1	609.6	280.7

DELETE whole table

Notes:
 1 - Failure of a containment safety-grade valve
 2 - Failure of a fuel line isolation valve
 3 - Failure of the auxiliary condenser steam protection

TRIP SIGNALS:
 HRP - High Reactor Trip Trip
 HTLP - High Steam Flow/High Steamline Pressure Trip
 CPI - High Containment Pressure Trip

Containment Models:
 M - Best Estimate CTRD Model, Dry Steam Alchema
 M - Best Estimate CTRD Model, Dry Steam Alchema
 M - Best Estimate CTRD Model, Dry Steam Alchema
 M - Best Estimate CTRD Model, Dry Steam Alchema

TABLE 15.4-28

0.944
 MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES FROM A ~~0.06~~ FT² SPLIT BREAK
 AT ~~102~~³⁰ PERCENT POWER (Worst ~~Temperature~~ Case)

<u>Time</u> (sec.)	<u>Break Flow</u> (lb/sec.)	<u>Energy Flow</u> (million Btu/sec.)
-----------------------	--------------------------------	--

a,e

PROPRIETARY

~~Refer to (50-311) "Application
for Withholding"~~

~~R. L. Mittl to Olan D. Parr
November 20, 1978~~

and

~~NRC Approval letter,
Olan D. Parr to Wieseemann
January 22, 1979~~

Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)	Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)
0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	37.50	1420.	1.704
.5000	1741.	2.080	38.00	1416.	1.699
1.000	1741.	2.080	38.50	1411.	1.693
1.500	1728.	2.065	39.00	1406.	1.688
2.000	1718.	2.053	39.50	1401.	1.682
2.500	1708.	2.041	40.00	1396.	1.676
3.000	1698.	2.030	40.50	1392.	1.670
3.500	1688.	2.018	41.00	1387.	1.665
4.000	1678.	2.007	41.50	1382.	1.659
4.500	1669.	1.995	42.00	1377.	1.653
5.000	1659.	1.984	42.50	1372.	1.647
5.500	1650.	1.974	43.00	1367.	1.642
6.000	1641.	1.963	43.50	1362.	1.636
6.500	1633.	1.954	44.00	1357.	1.630
7.000	1625.	1.944	44.50	1352.	1.624
7.500	1617.	1.935	45.00	1348.	1.619
8.000	1608.	1.925	45.50	1343.	1.613
8.500	1602.	1.917	46.00	1338.	1.607
9.000	1594.	1.908	46.50	1333.	1.601
9.500	1587.	1.899	47.00	1328.	1.595
10.00	1579.	1.891	47.50	1323.	1.590
10.50	1572.	1.882	48.00	1319.	1.584
11.00	1565.	1.874	48.50	1314.	1.578
11.50	1558.	1.866	49.00	1309.	1.573
12.00	1552.	1.858	49.50	1304.	1.567
12.50	1545.	1.851	50.00	1299.	1.561
13.00	1539.	1.843	50.50	1295.	1.556
13.50	1533.	1.836	51.00	1290.	1.550
14.00	1526.	1.829	51.50	1287.	1.546
14.50	1520.	1.822	52.00	1287.	1.546
15.00	1515.	1.815	52.50	1285.	1.544
15.50	1509.	1.808	53.00	1283.	1.542
16.00	1503.	1.801	53.50	1280.	1.539
16.50	1498.	1.795	54.00	1278.	1.536
17.00	1493.	1.790	54.50	1275.	1.533
			55.00	1272.	1.529
17.50	1487.	1.782	55.50	1269.	1.526
18.00	1483.	1.777	56.00	1267.	1.522
18.50	1477.	1.770	56.50	1264.	1.519
19.00	1473.	1.766	57.00	1261.	1.516
19.50	1467.	1.759	57.50	1258.	1.512
20.00	1463.	1.754	58.00	1255.	1.509
20.50	1459.	1.749	58.50	1252.	1.505
21.00	1454.	1.744	59.00	1249.	1.502
21.50	1448.	1.736	59.50	1246.	1.498
22.00	1443.	1.731	60.00	1243.	1.494
22.50	1437.	1.726	60.50	1240.	1.491
23.00	1432.	1.721	61.00	1237.	1.487
23.50	1427.	1.716	61.50	1234.	1.483
24.00	1422.	1.711	62.00	1231.	1.480
24.50	1417.	1.706	62.50	1228.	1.476
25.00	1412.	1.701	63.00	1224.	1.472
25.50	1407.	1.696	63.50	1221.	1.469
26.00	1402.	1.691	64.00	1218.	1.465
26.50	1397.	1.686	64.50	1215.	1.461
27.00	1392.	1.681	65.00	1212.	1.457
27.50	1387.	1.676	65.50	1209.	1.454
28.00	1382.	1.671	66.00	1206.	1.450
28.50	1377.	1.666	66.50	1203.	1.446
29.00	1372.	1.661	67.00	1199.	1.443
29.50	1367.	1.656	67.50	1196.	1.439
30.00	1362.	1.651	68.00	1193.	1.435
30.50	1357.	1.646	68.50	1190.	1.431
31.00	1352.	1.641	69.00	1187.	1.428
31.50	1347.	1.636	69.50	1184.	1.424
32.00	1342.	1.631	70.00	1181.	1.421
32.50	1337.	1.626	70.50	1178.	1.417
33.00	1332.	1.621	71.00	1175.	1.413
33.50	1327.	1.616	71.50	1172.	1.410
34.00	1322.	1.611	72.00	1169.	1.406
34.50	1317.	1.606	72.50	1166.	1.403
35.00	1312.	1.601	73.00	1163.	1.399
35.50	1307.	1.596	73.50	1160.	1.396
36.00	1302.	1.591	74.00	1157.	1.392
36.50	1297.	1.586	74.50	1154.	1.389
37.00	1292.	1.581			

Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)	Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)
75.00	1151.	1.385	112.0	876.6	1.056
75.50	1149.	1.382	112.5	866.8	1.044
76.00	1146.	1.378	113.0	857.2	1.033
76.50	1143.	1.375	113.5	848.0	1.021
77.00	1140.	1.372	114.0	839.1	1.011
			114.5	830.5	1.000
77.50	1137.	1.368			
78.00	1134.	1.365	115.0	822.1	.9902
78.50	1131.	1.361	115.5	814.0	.9805
79.00	1128.	1.358	116.0	806.2	.9710
79.50	1125.	1.354	116.5	798.6	.9618
80.00	1123.	1.351	117.0	791.2	.9529
80.50	1120.	1.348			
81.00	1117.	1.344			
81.50	1114.	1.341			
82.00	1111.	1.337	117.5	784.0	.9442
82.50	1109.	1.334	118.0	776.9	.9357
83.00	1106.	1.331	118.5	770.1	.9275
83.50	1103.	1.327	119.0	763.5	.9194
84.00	1100.	1.324	119.5	757.0	.9116
84.50	1097.	1.321	120.0	750.7	.9040
85.00	1095.	1.318	120.5	744.5	.8966
85.50	1092.	1.314	121.0	738.5	.8893
86.00	1089.	1.311	121.5	732.6	.8822
86.50	1086.	1.308	122.0	726.9	.8753
87.00	1084.	1.305	122.5	721.3	.8685
87.50	1081.	1.301	123.0	715.9	.8620
88.00	1078.	1.298	123.5	710.5	.8555
88.50	1076.	1.295	124.0	705.3	.8492
89.00	1073.	1.292	124.5	700.3	.8431
89.50	1070.	1.289	125.0	695.3	.8371
90.00	1068.	1.285	125.5	690.5	.8313
90.50	1065.	1.282	126.0	685.8	.8256
91.00	1062.	1.279	126.5	681.1	.8200
91.50	1060.	1.276	127.0	676.6	.8146
92.00	1057.	1.273	127.5	672.2	.8093
92.50	1055.	1.270	128.0	668.0	.8041
93.00	1052.	1.267	128.5	663.8	.7990
93.50	1049.	1.263	129.0	659.7	.7941
94.00	1047.	1.260	129.5	655.7	.7893
94.50	1044.	1.257	130.0	651.8	.7846
95.00	1042.	1.254	130.5	648.0	.7800
95.50	1039.	1.251	131.0	644.3	.7755
96.00	1037.	1.248	131.5	640.7	.7711
96.50	1034.	1.245	132.0	637.2	.7669
97.00	1032.	1.242	132.5	633.8	.7627
			133.0	630.5	.7587
97.50	1029.	1.239	133.5	627.2	.7548
98.00	1027.	1.236	134.0	624.1	.7510
98.50	1024.	1.233	134.5	621.0	.7472
99.00	1022.	1.230	135.0	618.0	.7436
99.50	1019.	1.227	135.5	615.1	.7401
100.0	1017.	1.224	136.0	612.2	.7367
100.5	1014.	1.221	136.5	609.5	.7333
101.0	1012.	1.218	137.0	606.8	.7301
101.5	1009.	1.215			
102.0	1007.	1.212	137.5	604.2	.7269
102.5	1004.	1.209	138.0	601.6	.7238
103.0	1002.	1.206	138.5	599.1	.7208
103.5	999.4	1.203	139.0	596.7	.7179
104.0	996.7	1.200	139.5	594.4	.7151
104.5	994.5	1.198	140.0	592.1	.7123
105.0	991.9	1.194	140.5	589.9	.7096
105.5	989.7	1.192	141.0	587.7	.7070
106.0	987.1	1.189	141.5	585.6	.7045
106.5	985.0	1.186	142.0	583.6	.7020
107.0	982.4	1.183	142.5	581.6	.6996
107.5	980.4	1.181	143.0	579.7	.6973
108.0	978.6	1.179	143.5	577.9	.6950
108.5	976.7	1.168	144.0	576.0	.6928
109.0	974.5	1.152	144.5	574.3	.6907
109.5	973.8	1.137	145.0	572.6	.6886
110.0	971.6	1.122	145.5	570.9	.6866
110.5	969.6	1.108	146.0	569.3	.6847
111.0	967.4	1.094	146.5	567.7	.6827
111.5	886.8	1.081	147.0	566.2	.6809
		1.068	147.5	564.7	.6791

Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)	Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)
148.0	543.2	.6773	185.0	515.2	.6192
148.5	541.8	.6756	185.5	514.9	.6189
149.0	540.4	.6740	186.0	514.7	.6185
149.5	539.1	.6723	186.5	514.4	.6182
150.0	537.8	.6708	187.0	514.2	.6179
150.5	536.5	.6692	187.5	513.9	.6176
151.0	535.3	.6678	188.0	513.7	.6173
151.5	534.1	.6663	188.5	513.4	.6170
152.0	533.0	.6649	189.0	513.2	.6167
152.5	531.8	.6635	189.5	512.9	.6164
153.0	530.7	.6622	190.0	512.7	.6161
153.5	549.6	.6609	190.5	512.5	.6158
154.0	548.6	.6596	191.0	512.2	.6156
154.5	547.6	.6584	191.5	512.0	.6153
155.0	546.6	.6572	192.0	511.8	.6150
155.5	545.6	.6560	192.5	511.5	.6148
156.0	544.7	.6549	193.0	511.3	.6145
156.5	543.8	.6538	193.5	511.1	.6142
157.0	542.9	.6527	194.0	510.9	.6140
			194.5	510.7	.6137
			195.0	510.5	.6135
			195.5	510.3	.6132
			196.0	510.1	.6130
			196.5	509.9	.6127
			197.0	509.7	.6125
157.5	542.0	.6517			
158.0	541.2	.6506			
158.5	540.3	.6496			
159.0	539.5	.6487			
159.5	538.8	.6477			
160.0	538.0	.6468			
160.5	537.2	.6459	197.5	509.5	.6122
161.0	536.5	.6450	198.0	509.3	.6120
161.5	535.8	.6441	198.5	509.1	.6117
162.0	535.1	.6433	199.0	508.9	.6115
162.5	534.4	.6425	199.5	508.7	.6113
163.0	533.8	.6417	200.0	508.5	.6111
163.5	533.1	.6409	200.5	508.3	.6108
164.0	532.5	.6401	201.0	508.1	.6106
164.5	531.9	.6394	201.5	507.9	.6104
165.0	531.3	.6386	202.0	507.8	.6102
165.5	530.7	.6379	202.5	507.6	.6099
166.0	530.1	.6372	203.0	507.4	.6097
166.5	529.6	.6366	203.5	507.2	.6095
167.0	529.0	.6359	204.0	507.0	.6093
167.5	528.5	.6352	204.5	506.9	.6091
168.0	527.9	.6346	205.0	506.7	.6089
168.5	527.4	.6340	205.5	506.5	.6086
169.0	526.9	.6334	206.0	506.3	.6084
169.5	526.4	.6328	206.5	506.2	.6082
170.0	526.0	.6322	207.0	506.0	.6080
170.5	525.5	.6316	207.5	505.8	.6078
171.0	525.0	.6311	208.0	505.6	.6076
171.5	524.6	.6305	208.5	505.5	.6074
172.0	524.1	.6300	209.0	505.3	.6072
172.5	523.7	.6295	209.5	505.1	.6070
173.0	523.3	.6290	210.0	505.0	.6068
173.5	522.9	.6285	210.5	504.8	.6066
174.0	522.5	.6280	211.0	504.7	.6064
174.5	522.1	.6275	211.5	504.5	.6062
175.0	521.7	.6270	212.0	504.3	.6060
175.5	521.3	.6265	212.5	504.2	.6058
176.0	520.9	.6261	213.0	504.0	.6056
176.5	520.5	.6257	213.5	503.8	.6054
177.0	520.2	.6252	214.0	503.7	.6052
			214.5	503.5	.6050
			215.0	503.4	.6048
			215.5	503.2	.6046
			216.0	503.1	.6045
			216.5	502.9	.6043
			217.0	502.7	.6041
177.5	519.8	.6248			
178.0	519.3	.6244			
178.5	519.1	.6240			
179.0	518.8	.6235			
179.5	518.5	.6231			
180.0	518.2	.6228			
180.5	517.8	.6224			
181.0	517.5	.6220			
181.5	517.2	.6216			
182.0	516.9	.6213			
182.5	516.6	.6209			
183.0	516.3	.6205			
183.5	516.0	.6202			
184.0	515.8	.6199			
184.5	515.5	.6195			
185.0	515.2	.6192			

Age (yr.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)	Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)
217.5	502.6	.6039	255.0	491.4	.5903
218.0	502.4	.6037	255.5	491.2	.5901
218.5	502.3	.6035	256.0	491.1	.5899
219.0	502.1	.6033	256.5	490.9	.5898
219.5	502.0	.6031	257.0	490.8	.5896
220.0	501.8	.6029			
220.5	501.7	.6028			
221.0	501.5	.6026	257.5	490.6	.5894
221.5	501.3	.6024	258.0	490.5	.5892
222.0	501.2	.6022	258.5	490.3	.5890
222.5	501.2	.6022	259.0	490.2	.5889
223.0	501.0	.6020	259.0	490.2	.5889
223.5	500.9	.6018	259.5	490.0	.5887
223.5	500.7	.6017	260.0	489.9	.5885
224.0	500.6	.6015	260.5	489.7	.5883
224.5	500.4	.6013	261.0	489.6	.5881
225.0	500.3	.6011	261.5	489.4	.5880
225.5	500.1	.6009	262.0	489.3	.5878
226.0	500.0	.6007	262.5	489.1	.5876
226.5	499.8	.6006	263.0	489.0	.5874
227.0	499.7	.6004	263.5	488.8	.5872
227.5	499.5	.6002	264.0	488.7	.5871
228.0	499.4	.6000	264.5	488.5	.5869
228.5	499.2	.5998	265.0	488.4	.5867
229.0	499.1	.5996	265.5	488.2	.5865
229.5	498.9	.5995	266.0	488.1	.5863
230.0	498.8	.5993	266.5	488.0	.5862
230.5	498.6	.5991	267.0	487.8	.5860
231.0	498.5	.5989	267.5	487.7	.5858
231.5	498.3	.5987	268.0	487.5	.5856
232.0	498.2	.5986	268.5	487.4	.5854
232.5	498.0	.5984	269.0	487.2	.5853
233.0	497.9	.5982	269.5	487.1	.5851
233.5	497.7	.5980	270.0	486.9	.5849
234.0	497.6	.5978	270.5	486.8	.5847
234.5	497.4	.5977	271.0	486.6	.5845
235.0	497.3	.5975	271.5	486.5	.5843
235.5	497.2	.5973	272.0	486.3	.5842
236.0	497.0	.5971	272.5	486.2	.5840
236.5	496.9	.5969	273.0	486.0	.5838
237.0	496.7	.5968	273.5	485.9	.5836
			274.0	485.7	.5834
			274.5	485.6	.5833
237.5	496.6	.5966	275.0	485.4	.5831
238.0	496.4	.5964	275.5	485.3	.5829
238.5	496.3	.5962	276.0	485.1	.5827
239.0	496.1	.5960	276.5	485.0	.5825
239.5	496.0	.5959	277.0	484.8	.5824
240.0	495.8	.5957			
240.5	495.7	.5955	277.5	484.7	.5822
241.0	495.5	.5953	278.0	484.5	.5820
241.5	495.4	.5952	278.5	484.4	.5818
242.0	495.2	.5950	279.0	484.2	.5816
242.5	495.1	.5948	279.5	484.1	.5815
243.0	494.9	.5946	280.0	483.9	.5813
243.5	494.8	.5944	280.5	483.8	.5811
244.0	494.6	.5943	281.0	483.6	.5809
244.5	494.5	.5941	281.5	483.5	.5807
245.0	494.3	.5939	282.0	483.3	.5806
245.5	494.2	.5937	282.5	483.2	.5804
246.0	494.0	.5935	283.0	483.0	.5802
246.5	493.9	.5934	283.5	482.9	.5800
247.0	493.7	.5932	284.0	482.7	.5798
247.5	493.6	.5930	284.5	482.6	.5796
248.0	493.4	.5928	285.0	482.4	.5795
248.5	493.3	.5926	285.5	482.3	.5793
249.0	493.2	.5925	286.0	482.1	.5791
249.5	493.0	.5923	286.5	482.0	.5789
250.0	492.9	.5921	287.0	481.8	.5787
250.5	492.7	.5919	287.5	481.7	.5786
251.0	492.6	.5917	288.0	481.5	.5784
251.5	492.4	.5916	288.5	481.4	.5782
252.0	492.3	.5914	289.0	481.2	.5780
252.5	492.1	.5912	289.5	481.1	.5778
253.0	492.0	.5910	290.0	480.9	.5777
253.5	491.8	.5908	290.5	480.8	.5775
254.0	491.7	.5907	291.0	480.7	.5773
254.5	491.5	.5905	291.5	480.5	.5771

Time (.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)	Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)
292.0	480.4	.5770	329.0	469.7	.5640
292.5	480.2	.5768	329.5	469.6	.5639
293.0	480.1	.5766	330.0	469.4	.5637
293.5	479.9	.5764	330.5	469.3	.5635
294.0	479.8	.5762	331.0	469.1	.5634
294.5	479.6	.5761	331.5	469.0	.5632
295.0	479.5	.5759	332.0	468.9	.5630
295.5	479.3	.5757	332.5	468.7	.5628
296.0	479.2	.5755	333.0	468.6	.5627
296.5	479.0	.5753	333.5	468.4	.5625
297.0	478.9	.5752	334.0	468.3	.5623
			334.5	468.2	.5622
			335.0	468.0	.5620
297.5	478.7	.5750	335.5	467.9	.5618
298.0	478.6	.5748	336.0	467.7	.5617
298.5	478.4	.5746	336.5	467.6	.5615
299.0	478.3	.5745	337.0	467.5	.5613
299.5	478.1	.5743			
300.0	478.0	.5741			
300.5	477.9	.5739	337.5	467.3	.5612
301.0	477.7	.5737	338.0	467.2	.5610
301.5	477.6	.5736	338.5	467.0	.5608
302.0	477.4	.5734	339.0	466.9	.5606
302.5	477.3	.5732	339.5	466.8	.5605
303.0	477.1	.5730	340.0	466.6	.5603
303.5	477.0	.5729	340.5	466.5	.5601
304.0	476.8	.5727	341.0	466.4	.5600
304.5	476.7	.5725	341.5	466.2	.5598
305.0	476.5	.5723	342.0	466.1	.5596
305.5	476.4	.5722	342.5	465.9	.5595
306.0	476.3	.5720	343.0	465.8	.5593
306.5	476.1	.5718	343.5	465.7	.5591
307.0	476.0	.5716	344.0	465.5	.5590
307.5	475.8	.5715	344.5	465.4	.5588
308.0	475.7	.5713	345.0	465.2	.5586
308.5	475.5	.5711	345.5	465.1	.5585
309.0	475.4	.5709	346.0	465.0	.5583
309.5	475.2	.5708	346.5	464.8	.5581
310.0	475.1	.5706	347.0	464.7	.5580
310.5	475.0	.5704	347.5	464.6	.5578
311.0	474.8	.5702	348.0	464.4	.5576
311.5	474.7	.5701	348.5	464.3	.5575
312.0	474.5	.5699	349.0	464.1	.5573
312.5	474.4	.5697	349.5	464.0	.5571
313.0	474.2	.5695	350.0	463.9	.5570
313.5	474.1	.5694	350.5	463.7	.5568
314.0	474.0	.5692	351.0	463.6	.5566
314.5	473.8	.5690	351.5	463.5	.5565
315.0	473.7	.5688	352.0	463.3	.5563
315.5	473.5	.5687	352.5	463.2	.5561
316.0	473.4	.5685	353.0	463.0	.5560
316.5	473.2	.5683	353.5	462.9	.5558
317.0	473.1	.5682	354.0	462.8	.5556
			354.5	462.6	.5555
317.5	473.0	.5680	355.0	462.5	.5553
318.0	472.8	.5678	355.5	462.4	.5551
318.5	472.7	.5676	356.0	462.2	.5550
319.0	472.5	.5675	356.5	462.1	.5548
319.5	472.4	.5673	357.0	462.0	.5547
320.0	472.2	.5671			
320.5	472.1	.5670			
321.0	472.0	.5668	357.5	461.8	.5545
321.5	471.8	.5666	358.0	461.7	.5543
322.0	471.7	.5664	358.5	461.6	.5542
322.5	471.5	.5663	359.0	461.4	.5540
323.0	471.4	.5661	359.5	461.3	.5538
323.5	471.3	.5659	360.0	461.1	.5537
324.0	471.1	.5658	360.5	461.0	.5535
324.5	471.0	.5656	361.0	460.9	.5533
325.0	470.8	.5654	361.5	460.7	.5532
325.5	470.7	.5652	362.0	460.6	.5530
326.0	470.6	.5651	362.5	460.5	.5528
326.5	470.4	.5649	363.0	460.3	.5527
327.0	470.3	.5647	363.5	460.2	.5525
327.5	470.1	.5646	364.0	460.1	.5523
328.0	470.0	.5644	364.5	459.9	.5522
328.5	469.8	.5642	365.0	459.8	.5520

Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)	Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)
365.0	459.7	.5519	403.0	449.7	.5398
366.0	459.5	.5517	403.5	449.6	.5396
366.5	459.4	.5515	404.0	449.4	.5395
367.0	459.3	.5514	404.5	449.3	.5393
367.5	459.1	.5512	405.0	449.2	.5392
368.0	459.0	.5510	405.5	449.1	.5390
368.5	458.8	.5509	406.0	448.9	.5389
369.0	458.7	.5507	406.5	448.8	.5387
369.5	458.6	.5506	407.0	448.7	.5385
370.0	458.4	.5504	407.5	448.5	.5384
370.5	458.3	.5502	408.0	448.4	.5382
371.0	458.2	.5501	408.5	448.3	.5381
371.5	458.0	.5499	409.0	448.1	.5379
372.0	457.9	.5497	409.5	448.0	.5378
372.5	457.8	.5496	410.0	447.9	.5376
373.0	457.6	.5494	410.5	447.8	.5374
373.5	457.5	.5493	411.0	447.6	.5373
374.0	457.4	.5491	411.5	447.5	.5371
374.5	457.2	.5489	412.0	447.4	.5370
375.0	457.1	.5488	412.5	447.2	.5368
375.5	457.0	.5486	413.0	447.1	.5367
376.0	456.8	.5484	413.5	447.0	.5365
376.5	456.7	.5483	414.0	446.9	.5363
377.0	456.6	.5481	414.5	446.7	.5362
			415.0	446.6	.5360
			415.5	446.5	.5359
			416.0	446.3	.5357
			416.5	446.2	.5356
			417.0	446.1	.5354
377.5	456.4	.5480			
378.0	456.3	.5478			
378.5	456.2	.5476			
379.0	456.0	.5475			
379.5	455.9	.5473			
380.0	455.8	.5471			
380.5	455.6	.5470			
381.0	455.5	.5468	417.5	445.9	.5352
381.5	455.4	.5467	418.0	445.8	.5351
382.0	455.2	.5465	418.5	445.7	.5349
382.5	455.1	.5463	419.0	445.6	.5348
383.0	455.0	.5462	419.5	445.4	.5346
383.5	454.8	.5460	420.0	445.3	.5345
384.0	454.7	.5459	420.5	445.2	.5343
384.5	454.6	.5457	421.0	445.0	.5341
385.0	454.4	.5455	421.5	444.9	.5340
385.5	454.3	.5454	422.0	444.8	.5338
386.0	454.2	.5452	422.5	444.7	.5337
386.5	454.0	.5451	423.0	444.5	.5335
387.0	453.9	.5449	423.5	444.4	.5334
387.5	453.8	.5447	424.0	444.3	.5332
388.0	453.6	.5446	424.5	444.1	.5331
388.5	453.5	.5444	425.0	444.0	.5329
389.0	453.4	.5443	425.5	443.9	.5327
389.5	453.3	.5441	426.0	443.8	.5326
390.0	453.1	.5439	426.5	443.6	.5324
390.5	453.0	.5438	427.0	443.5	.5323
391.0	452.9	.5436	427.5	443.4	.5321
391.5	452.7	.5435	428.0	443.2	.5320
392.0	452.6	.5433	428.5	443.1	.5318
392.5	452.5	.5431	429.0	443.0	.5317
393.0	452.3	.5430	429.5	442.9	.5315
393.5	452.2	.5428	430.0	442.7	.5313
394.0	452.1	.5427	430.5	442.6	.5312
394.5	451.9	.5425	431.0	442.5	.5310
395.0	451.8	.5423	431.5	442.4	.5309
395.5	451.7	.5422	432.0	442.2	.5307
396.0	451.5	.5420	432.5	442.1	.5306
396.5	451.4	.5419	433.0	442.0	.5304
397.0	451.3	.5417	433.5	441.8	.5303
			434.0	441.8	.5302
			434.5	441.7	.5300
			435.0	441.5	.5299
397.5	451.1	.5415	435.5	441.4	.5297
398.0	451.0	.5414	436.0	441.3	.5296
398.5	450.9	.5412	436.5	441.1	.5294
399.0	450.8	.5411	437.0	441.0	.5293
399.5	450.6	.5409			
400.0	450.5	.5408			
400.5	450.4	.5406			
401.0	450.2	.5404			
401.5	450.1	.5403			
402.0	450.0	.5401			
402.5	449.8	.5400			

Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)	Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)
437.5	440.9	.5291	475.0	431.4	.5176
438.0	440.8	.5289	475.5	431.3	.5175
438.5	440.6	.5288	476.0	431.2	.5173
439.0	440.5	.5286	476.5	431.0	.5172
439.5	440.4	.5285	477.0	430.9	.5170
440.0	440.2	.5283			
440.5	440.1	.5282			
441.0	440.0	.5280			
441.5	439.9	.5279	477.5	430.8	.5169
442.0	439.7	.5277	478.0	430.7	.5167
442.5	439.6	.5276	478.5	430.5	.5166
443.0	439.5	.5274	479.0	430.4	.5164
443.5	439.4	.5272	479.5	430.3	.5163
444.0	439.2	.5271	480.0	430.2	.5161
444.5	439.1	.5269	480.5	430.1	.5160
445.0	439.0	.5268	481.0	429.9	.5158
445.5	438.8	.5266	481.5	429.8	.5157
446.0	438.7	.5265	482.0	429.7	.5155
446.5	438.6	.5263	482.5	429.6	.5154
447.0	438.5	.5262	483.0	429.4	.5152
447.5	438.3	.5260	483.5	429.3	.5151
448.0	438.2	.5259	484.0	429.2	.5149
448.5	438.1	.5257	484.5	429.1	.5148
449.0	438.0	.5255	485.0	428.9	.5146
449.5	437.8	.5254	485.5	428.8	.5145
450.0	437.7	.5252	486.0	428.7	.5143
450.5	437.6	.5251	486.5	428.6	.5142
451.0	437.4	.5249	487.0	428.4	.5140
451.5	437.3	.5248	487.5	428.3	.5139
452.0	437.2	.5246	488.0	428.2	.5137
452.5	437.1	.5245	488.5	428.1	.5136
453.0	436.9	.5243	489.0	427.9	.5134
453.5	436.8	.5242	489.5	427.8	.5133
454.0	436.7	.5240	490.0	427.7	.5131
454.5	436.6	.5239	490.5	427.6	.5130
455.0	436.4	.5237	491.0	427.4	.5128
455.5	436.3	.5236	491.5	427.3	.5127
456.0	436.2	.5234	492.0	427.2	.5125
456.5	436.1	.5233	492.5	427.1	.5124
457.0	435.9	.5231	493.0	427.0	.5122
			493.5	426.8	.5121
			494.0	426.7	.5119
457.5	435.8	.5229	494.5	426.6	.5118
458.0	435.7	.5228	495.0	426.5	.5116
458.5	435.6	.5226	495.5	426.3	.5115
459.0	435.4	.5225	496.0	426.2	.5113
459.5	435.3	.5223	496.5	426.1	.5112
460.0	435.2	.5222	497.0	426.0	.5110
460.5	435.1	.5220			
461.0	434.9	.5219			
461.5	434.8	.5217	497.5	425.8	.5109
462.0	434.7	.5216	498.0	425.7	.5107
462.5	434.5	.5214	498.5	425.6	.5106
463.0	434.4	.5213	499.0	425.5	.5104
463.5	434.3	.5211	499.5	425.4	.5103
464.0	434.2	.5210	500.0	425.2	.5101
464.5	434.0	.5208	500.5	425.1	.5100
465.0	433.9	.5207	501.0	425.0	.5098
465.5	433.8	.5205	501.5	424.9	.5097
466.0	433.7	.5204	502.0	424.7	.5095
466.5	433.5	.5202	502.5	424.6	.5094
467.0	433.4	.5201	503.0	424.5	.5092
467.5	433.3	.5199	503.5	424.4	.5091
468.0	433.2	.5197	504.0	424.2	.5089
468.5	433.0	.5196	504.5	424.1	.5088
469.0	432.9	.5194	505.0	424.0	.5086
469.5	432.8	.5193	505.5	423.9	.5085
470.0	432.7	.5191	506.0	423.8	.5083
470.5	432.5	.5190	506.5	423.6	.5082
471.0	432.4	.5188	507.0	423.5	.5080
471.5	432.3	.5187	507.5	423.4	.5079
472.0	432.2	.5185	508.0	423.3	.5077
472.5	432.0	.5184	508.5	423.1	.5076
473.0	431.9	.5182	509.0	423.0	.5074
473.5	431.8	.5181	509.5	422.9	.5073
474.0	431.7	.5179	510.0	422.8	.5071
474.5	431.5	.5178	510.5	422.6	.5070

Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)	Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)
533.0	312.4	.3753	571.0	305.6	.3669
533.5	312.3	.3752	571.5	305.3	.3667
534.0	312.2	.3751	572.0	305.3	.3666
534.5	312.2	.3750	572.5	305.2	.3665
535.0	312.1	.3749	573.0	305.1	.3664
535.5	312.0	.3748	573.5	305.0	.3663
536.0	311.9	.3747	574.0	304.9	.3662
536.5	311.8	.3746	574.5	304.8	.3661
537.0	311.7	.3745	575.0	304.7	.3660
			575.5	304.6	.3658
			576.0	304.5	.3657
			576.5	304.4	.3656
			577.0	304.3	.3655
537.5	311.6	.3744			
538.0	311.5	.3742			
538.5	311.4	.3741			
539.0	311.3	.3740			
539.5	311.3	.3739			
540.0	311.2	.3738			
540.5	311.1	.3737	577.5	304.2	.3654
541.0	311.0	.3736	578.0	304.1	.3653
541.5	310.9	.3735	578.5	304.0	.3652
542.0	310.8	.3734	579.0	303.9	.3650
542.5	310.7	.3733	579.5	303.8	.3649
543.0	310.6	.3731	580.0	303.7	.3648
543.5	310.5	.3730	580.5	303.7	.3647
544.0	310.4	.3729	581.0	303.6	.3646
544.5	310.3	.3728	581.5	303.5	.3645
545.0	310.3	.3727	582.0	303.4	.3644
545.5	310.2	.3726	582.5	303.3	.3642
546.0	310.1	.3725	583.0	303.3	.3641
546.5	310.0	.3724	583.5	303.2	.3640
547.0	309.9	.3723	584.0	303.1	.3639
547.5	309.8	.3721	584.5	303.0	.3638
548.0	309.7	.3720	585.0	302.8	.3637
548.5	309.6	.3719	585.5	302.7	.3636
549.0	309.5	.3718	586.0	302.6	.3634
549.5	309.4	.3717	586.5	302.5	.3633
550.0	309.3	.3716	587.0	302.4	.3632
550.5	309.2	.3715	587.5	302.3	.3631
551.0	309.2	.3714	588.0	302.3	.3630
551.5	309.1	.3713	588.5	302.2	.3629
552.0	309.0	.3711	589.0	302.1	.3628
552.5	308.9	.3710	589.5	302.1	.3626
553.0	308.8	.3709	590.0	302.0	.3625
553.5	308.7	.3708	590.5	301.9	.3624
554.0	308.6	.3707	591.0	301.8	.3623
554.5	308.5	.3706	591.5	301.7	.3622
555.0	308.4	.3705	592.0	301.6	.3621
555.5	308.3	.3704	592.5	301.5	.3620
556.0	308.2	.3702	593.0	301.4	.3618
556.5	308.1	.3701	593.5	301.3	.3617
557.0	308.0	.3700	594.0	301.2	.3616
			594.5	301.1	.3615
			595.0	301.0	.3614
			595.5	300.9	.3614
			596.0	300.8	.3613
			596.5	300.7	.3612
			597.0	300.6	.3610
				300.5	.3609
557.5	308.0	.3699			
558.0	307.9	.3698			
558.5	307.8	.3697			
559.0	307.7	.3696			
559.5	307.6	.3695			
560.0	307.5	.3693			
560.5	307.4	.3692	597.5	300.4	.3608
561.0	307.3	.3691	598.0	300.4	.3607
561.5	307.2	.3690	598.5	300.3	.3606
562.0	307.1	.3689	599.0	300.2	.3606
562.5	307.0	.3688	599.5	300.2	.3604
563.0	306.9	.3687	600.0	300.1	.3604
563.5	306.8	.3686		300.0	.3602
564.0	306.7	.3684			
564.5	306.7	.3683			
565.0	306.6	.3682			
565.5	306.5	.3681			
566.0	306.4	.3680			
566.5	306.3	.3679			
567.0	306.2	.3678			
567.5	306.1	.3677			
568.0	306.0	.3675			
568.5	305.9	.3674			
569.0	305.8	.3673			
569.5	305.7	.3672			
570.0	305.6	.3671			
570.5	305.5	.3670			

TABLE 15.4-30

DER AT HOT ZERO

MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES FROM A 1.4 FT² ~~DER AT 70 PERCENT~~
POWER (Including Entrained Moisture Effects)

<u>Time</u> (sec.)	<u>Break Flow</u> (lb/sec.)	<u>Energy Flow</u> (million Btu/sec.)
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-a,c

PROPRIETARY

~~Refer to (50-311) "Application
for Withholding"~~

~~R. L. Mittl to Olan D. Parr
November 20, 1978~~

~~and~~

~~NRC Approval letter,
Olan D. Parr to Wieseemann
January 22, 1979~~

Time (.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)	Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)
0.000	11899.	14.179	37.50	774.8	.9313
2.552	14945.	14.849	38.00	773.6	.9298
3.052	14917.	14.530	38.50	772.3	.9282
3.552	14517.	13.977	39.00	770.8	.9264
4.052	14279.	13.607	39.50	769.2	.9245
4.552	13959.	13.224	40.00	767.5	.9225
5.552	13208.	12.469	40.50	765.8	.9203
6.552	12495.	11.753	41.00	764.0	.9181
7.552	11385.	11.104	41.50	762.1	.9158
8.552	11252.	10.527	42.00	760.1	.9135
9.552	10656.	9.986	42.50	758.2	.9111
11.052	9658.	9.197	43.00	756.2	.9087
11.552	9357.	8.958	43.50	754.2	.9063
11.602	4422.	3.028	44.00	752.1	.9038
			44.50	750.1	.9014
			45.00	748.1	.8989
			45.50	746.0	.8964
			46.00	744.0	.8940
			46.50	742.0	.8915
			47.00	740.0	.8891
			47.50	737.9	.8866
			48.00	736.0	.8842
			48.50	734.0	.8818
			49.00	732.0	.8794
			49.50	730.0	.8770
12.00	4121.	2.760	50.00	728.0	.8746
12.50	3928.	2.667	50.50	726.0	.8722
13.00	3717.	2.569	51.00	724.1	.8698
13.50	3518.	2.476	51.50	722.1	.8674
14.00	3332.	2.387	52.00	720.1	.8650
14.50	3158.	2.302	52.50	718.2	.8627
15.00	2994.	2.221	53.00	716.3	.8604
	2840.	2.143	53.50	714.4	.8581
	2696.	2.070	54.00	712.5	.8558
	2515.	1.985	54.50	710.6	.8535
	2311.	1.895	55.00	708.8	.8512
			55.50	706.9	.8490
			56.00	705.1	.8468
			56.50	703.3	.8446
			57.00	701.5	.8424
17.50	2131.	1.812	57.50	699.7	.8403
18.00	1971.	1.737	58.00	697.9	.8381
18.50	1829.	1.668	58.50	696.2	.8360
19.00	1701.	1.605	59.00	694.5	.8339
19.50	1587.	1.547	59.50	692.7	.8318
20.00	1483.	1.493	60.00	691.0	.8298
20.50	1389.	1.443	60.50	689.4	.8277
21.00	1304.	1.396	61.00	687.7	.8257
21.50	1226.	1.352	61.50	686.1	.8237
22.00	1154.	1.310	62.00	684.4	.8217
22.50	1089.	1.271	62.50	682.8	.8198
23.00	1028.	1.235	63.00	681.2	.8179
23.50	1005.	1.210	63.50	679.7	.8160
24.00	986.0	1.187	64.00	678.1	.8141
24.50	968.0	1.165	64.50	676.6	.8122
25.00	950.7	1.144	65.00	675.1	.8104
25.50	934.2	1.124	65.50	673.6	.8086
26.00	918.3	1.105	66.00	672.1	.8068
26.50	903.1	1.087	66.50	670.6	.8050
27.00	888.5	1.069	67.00	669.2	.8033
27.50	874.5	1.052	67.50	667.7	.8015
28.00	861.0	1.036	68.00	666.3	.7998
28.50	848.0	1.020	68.50	664.9	.7981
29.00	835.5	1.005	69.00	663.5	.7964
29.50	823.5	.9902	69.50	662.1	.7947
30.00	811.9	.9762	70.00	660.8	.7931
30.50	800.8	.9627	70.50	659.4	.7914
31.00	790.0	.9496	71.00	658.1	.7898
31.50	779.5	.9369	71.50	656.8	.7882
32.00	769.3	.9247	72.00	655.5	.7866
32.50	777.2	.9342	72.50	654.3	.7852
33.00	778.0	.9352	73.00	653.0	.7836
33.50	778.5	.9358	73.50	651.7	.7821
34.00	778.8	.9361	74.00	650.5	.7806
34.50	778.8	.9361	74.50	649.2	.7791
35.00	778.6	.9358			
35.50	778.2	.9353			
36.00	777.6	.9346			
36.50	776.8	.9337			
37.00	775.9	.9326			

Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)	Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)
75.00	648.0	.7776	111.0	595.2	.7136
75.50	646.8	.7761	111.5	594.8	.7131
76.00	645.6	.7747	112.0	594.5	.7127
76.50	644.4	.7733	112.5	594.1	.7123
77.00	643.3	.7718	113.0	593.7	.7118
			113.5	593.4	.7114
			114.0	593.0	.7109
77.50	642.1	.7704	114.5	592.7	.7105
78.00	641.0	.7690	115.0	592.3	.7101
78.50	639.8	.7677	115.5	592.0	.7097
79.00	638.7	.7663	116.0	591.6	.7092
79.50	637.6	.7650	116.5	591.3	.7088
80.00	636.5	.7637	117.0	590.9	.7084
80.50	635.5	.7624			
81.00	634.4	.7611			
81.50	633.3	.7598	117.5	590.6	.7080
82.00	632.3	.7586	118.0	590.3	.7076
82.50	631.3	.7573	118.5	589.9	.7072
83.00	630.3	.7561	119.0	589.6	.7068
83.50	629.3	.7549	119.5	589.3	.7064
84.00	628.3	.7537	120.0	588.9	.7060
84.50	627.4	.7526	120.5	588.6	.7056
85.00	626.4	.7514	121.0	588.3	.7052
85.50	625.5	.7503	121.5	588.0	.7048
86.00	624.6	.7492	122.0	587.7	.7044
86.50	623.7	.7481	122.5	587.3	.7041
87.00	622.8	.7470	123.0	587.0	.7037
87.50	621.9	.7460	123.5	586.7	.7033
88.00	621.1	.7450	124.0	586.4	.7029
88.50	620.3	.7440	124.5	586.1	.7026
89.00	619.4	.7430	125.0	585.8	.7022
89.50	618.6	.7420	125.5	585.5	.7018
90.00	617.9	.7410	126.0	585.2	.7015
90.50	617.1	.7401	126.5	584.9	.7011
91.00	616.3	.7392	127.0	584.6	.7007
91.50	615.6	.7383	127.5	584.3	.7004
92.00	614.9	.7374	128.0	584.0	.7000
92.50	614.2	.7366	128.5	583.7	.6997
93.00	613.5	.7357	129.0	583.4	.6993
93.50	612.8	.7349	129.5	583.1	.6990
94.00	612.1	.7341	130.0	582.9	.6986
94.50	611.5	.7333	130.5	582.6	.6983
95.00	610.8	.7325	131.0	582.3	.6979
95.50	610.2	.7317	131.5	582.0	.6976
96.00	609.6	.7310	132.0	581.7	.6972
96.50	609.0	.7302	132.5	581.4	.6969
97.00	608.4	.7295	133.0	581.2	.6966
			133.5	580.9	.6962
			134.0	580.6	.6959
97.50	607.8	.7288	134.5	580.3	.6955
98.00	607.2	.7281	135.0	580.1	.6952
98.50	606.6	.7274	135.5	579.8	.6949
99.00	606.1	.7267	136.0	579.5	.6946
99.50	605.5	.7261	136.5	579.2	.6942
100.0	605.0	.7254	137.0	579.0	.6939
100.5	604.4	.7248			
101.0	603.9	.7241	137.5	578.7	.6936
101.5	603.4	.7235	138.0	578.4	.6933
102.0	602.9	.7229	138.5	578.2	.6929
102.5	602.4	.7223	139.0	577.9	.6926
103.0	601.9	.7217	139.5	577.6	.6923
103.5	601.4	.7211	140.0	577.4	.6920
104.0	601.0	.7206	140.5	577.1	.6916
104.5	600.5	.7200	141.0	576.9	.6913
105.0	600.1	.7195	141.5	576.6	.6910
105.5	599.6	.7190	142.0	576.3	.6907
106.0	599.2	.7184	142.5	576.1	.6904
106.5	598.8	.7179	143.0	575.8	.6901
107.0	598.4	.7174	143.5	575.6	.6898
107.5	598.0	.7169	144.0	575.3	.6895
108.0	597.6	.7164	144.5	575.0	.6891
108.5	597.2	.7159	145.0	574.8	.6888
109.0	596.8	.7155	145.5	574.5	.6885
109.5	596.4	.7150	146.0	574.3	.6882
110.0	596.0	.7145	146.5	574.0	.6879
110.5	595.6	.7141	147.0	573.8	.6876
			147.5	573.5	.6873

Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)	Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)
148.0	573.3	.6870	185.5	556.3	.6664
148.5	573.0	.6867	186.0	556.1	.6661
149.0	572.8	.6864	186.5	555.8	.6659
149.5	572.5	.6861	187.0	555.6	.6656
150.0	572.3	.6858	187.5	555.4	.6654
150.5	572.1	.6855	188.0	555.2	.6651
151.0	571.8	.6852	188.5	555.0	.6648
151.5	571.6	.6849	189.0	554.8	.6646
152.0	571.3	.6846	189.5	554.6	.6643
152.5	571.1	.6843	190.0	554.4	.6641
153.0	570.8	.6841	190.5	554.2	.6638
153.5	570.6	.6838	191.0	553.9	.6636
154.0	570.4	.6835	191.5	553.7	.6633
154.5	570.1	.6832	192.0	553.5	.6631
155.0	569.9	.6829	192.5	553.3	.6628
155.5	569.7	.6826	193.0	553.1	.6625
156.0	569.4	.6823	193.5	552.9	.6623
156.5	569.2	.6820	194.0	552.7	.6620
157.0	568.9	.6817	194.5	552.5	.6618
			195.0	552.3	.6615
			195.5	552.1	.6613
157.5	568.7	.6815	196.0	551.9	.6610
158.0	568.5	.6812	196.5	551.6	.6608
158.5	568.2	.6809	197.0	551.4	.6605
159.0	568.0	.6806			
159.5	567.8	.6803			
160.0	567.5	.6800			
160.5	567.3	.6798	197.5	551.2	.6603
161.0	567.1	.6795	198.0	551.0	.6600
161.5	566.9	.6792	198.5	550.8	.6598
162.0	566.6	.6789	199.0	550.6	.6595
162.5	566.4	.6787	199.5	550.4	.6593
163.0	566.2	.6784	200.0	550.2	.6590
163.5	565.9	.6781	200.5	550.0	.6588
164.0	565.7	.6778	201.0	549.8	.6585
164.5	565.5	.6775	201.5	549.6	.6583
165.0	565.3	.6773	202.0	549.4	.6580
165.5	565.0	.6770	202.5	549.2	.6578
166.0	564.8	.6767	203.0	549.0	.6575
166.5	564.6	.6765	203.5	548.7	.6573
167.0	564.4	.6762	204.0	548.5	.6570
167.5	564.1	.6759	204.5	548.3	.6568
168.0	563.9	.6756	205.0	548.1	.6565
168.5	563.7	.6754	205.5	547.9	.6563
169.0	563.5	.6751	206.0	547.7	.6560
169.5	563.2	.6748	206.5	547.5	.6558
170.0	563.0	.6746	207.0	547.3	.6555
170.5	562.8	.6743	207.5	547.1	.6553
171.0	562.6	.6740	208.0	546.9	.6550
171.5	562.3	.6737	208.5	546.7	.6548
172.0	562.1	.6735	209.0	546.5	.6545
172.5	561.9	.6732	209.5	546.3	.6543
173.0	561.7	.6729	210.0	546.1	.6540
173.5	561.5	.6727	210.5	545.9	.6538
174.0	561.2	.6724	211.0	545.7	.6536
174.5	561.0	.6721	211.5	545.5	.6533
175.0	560.8	.6719	212.0	545.3	.6531
175.5	560.6	.6716	212.5	545.1	.6528
176.0	560.4	.6713	213.0	544.9	.6526
176.5	560.2	.6711	213.5	544.7	.6523
177.0	559.9	.6708	214.0	544.5	.6521
			214.5	544.3	.6518
			215.0	544.1	.6516
177.5	559.7	.6706	215.5	543.9	.6514
178.0	559.5	.6703	216.0	543.7	.6511
178.5	559.3	.6700	216.5	543.5	.6509
179.0	559.1	.6698	217.0	543.3	.6506
179.5	558.8	.6695			
180.0	558.6	.6692			
180.5	558.4	.6690			
181.0	558.2	.6687			
181.5	558.0	.6685			
182.0	557.8	.6682			
182.5	557.6	.6679			
183.0	557.3	.6677			
183.5	557.1	.6674			
184.0	556.9	.6672			
184.5	556.7	.6669			
185.0	556.5	.6666			

Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)	Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)
217.5	543.1	.6504	253.5	529.0	.6334
218.0	542.9	.6501	254.0	528.8	.6331
218.5	542.7	.6499	254.5	528.6	.6329
219.0	542.5	.6496	255.0	528.4	.6327
219.5	542.3	.6494	255.5	528.3	.6324
220.0	542.1	.6492	256.0	528.1	.6322
220.5	541.9	.6489	256.5	527.9	.6320
221.0	541.7	.6487	257.0	527.7	.6317
221.5	541.5	.6484			
222.0	541.3	.6482			
222.5	541.1	.6480	257.5	527.5	.6315
223.0	540.9	.6477	258.0	527.3	.6313
223.5	540.7	.6475	258.5	527.1	.6311
224.0	540.5	.6472	259.0	526.9	.6308
224.5	540.3	.6470	259.5	526.7	.6306
225.0	540.1	.6467	260.0	526.6	.6304
225.5	539.9	.6465	260.5	526.4	.6301
226.0	539.7	.6463	261.0	526.2	.6299
226.5	539.5	.6460	261.5	526.0	.6297
227.0	539.3	.6458	262.0	525.8	.6295
227.5	539.1	.6455	262.5	525.6	.6292
228.0	538.9	.6453	263.0	525.4	.6290
228.5	538.7	.6451	263.5	525.2	.6288
229.0	538.5	.6448	264.0	525.1	.6286
229.5	538.3	.6446	264.5	524.9	.6283
230.0	538.1	.6444	265.0	524.7	.6281
230.5	537.9	.6441	265.5	524.5	.6279
231.0	537.7	.6439	266.0	524.3	.6277
231.5	537.5	.6436	266.5	524.1	.6274
232.0	537.3	.6434	267.0	523.9	.6272
232.5	537.1	.6432	267.5	523.8	.6270
233.0	536.9	.6429	268.0	523.6	.6268
233.5	536.7	.6427	268.5	523.4	.6265
234.0	536.5	.6425	269.0	523.2	.6263
234.5	536.3	.6422	269.5	523.0	.6261
235.0	536.1	.6420	270.0	522.8	.6259
235.5	535.9	.6417	270.5	522.6	.6256
236.0	535.7	.6415	271.0	522.5	.6254
236.5	535.6	.6413	271.5	522.3	.6252
237.0	535.4	.6410	272.0	522.1	.6250
			272.5	521.9	.6247
			273.0	521.7	.6245
237.5	535.2	.6408	273.5	521.5	.6243
238.0	535.0	.6406	274.0	521.3	.6241
238.5	534.8	.6403	274.5	521.2	.6238
239.0	534.6	.6401	275.0	521.0	.6236
239.5	534.4	.6399	275.5	520.8	.6234
240.0	534.2	.6396	276.0	520.6	.6232
240.5	534.0	.6394	276.5	520.4	.6230
241.0	533.8	.6392	277.0	520.2	.6228
241.5	533.6	.6389			
242.0	533.4	.6387			
242.5	533.2	.6385	277.5	520.1	.6225
243.0	533.0	.6382	278.0	519.9	.6223
243.5	532.9	.6380	278.5	519.7	.6221
244.0	532.7	.6378	279.0	519.5	.6218
244.5	532.5	.6375	279.5	519.3	.6216
245.0	532.3	.6373	280.0	519.2	.6214
245.5	532.1	.6371	280.5	519.0	.6212
246.0	531.9	.6368	281.0	518.8	.6210
246.5	531.7	.6366	281.5	518.6	.6208
247.0	531.5	.6364	282.0	518.5	.6206
247.5	531.3	.6361	282.5	518.3	.6204
248.0	531.1	.6359	283.0	518.1	.6202
248.5	530.9	.6357	283.5	517.9	.6199
249.0	530.7	.6354	284.0	517.8	.6197
249.5	530.5	.6352	284.5	517.6	.6195
250.0	530.4	.6350	285.0	517.4	.6193
250.5	530.2	.6347	285.5	517.2	.6191
251.0	530.0	.6345	286.0	517.1	.6189
251.5	529.8	.6343	286.5	516.9	.6186
252.0	529.6	.6340	287.0	516.7	.6184
252.5	529.4	.6338	287.5	516.5	.6182
253.0	529.2	.6336	288.0	516.3	.6180
			288.5	516.2	.6178
			289.0	516.0	.6176
			289.5	515.8	.6174

Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)	Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)
290.0	515.6	.6171	326.0	503.0	.6018
290.5	515.4	.6169	326.5	502.8	.6016
291.0	515.3	.6167	327.0	502.6	.6014
291.5	515.1	.6165	327.5	502.4	.6012
292.0	514.9	.6163	328.0	502.3	.6010
292.5	514.7	.6160	328.5	502.1	.6007
293.0	514.5	.6158	329.0	501.9	.6005
293.5	514.4	.6156	329.5	501.8	.6003
294.0	514.2	.6154	330.0	501.6	.6001
294.5	514.0	.6152	330.5	501.4	.5999
295.0	513.8	.6149	331.0	501.3	.5997
295.5	513.6	.6147	331.5	501.1	.5995
296.0	513.4	.6145	332.0	500.9	.5993
296.5	513.3	.6143	332.5	500.7	.5991
297.0	513.1	.6140	333.0	500.6	.5989
			333.5	500.4	.5987
			334.0	500.2	.5985
			334.5	500.1	.5983
297.5	512.9	.6138	335.0	499.9	.5981
298.0	512.7	.6136	335.5	499.7	.5979
298.5	512.5	.6134	336.0	499.6	.5977
299.0	512.3	.6132	336.5	499.4	.5975
299.5	512.2	.6129	337.0	499.2	.5973
300.0	512.0	.6127			
300.5	511.8	.6125			
301.0	511.6	.6123			
301.5	511.4	.6121			
302.0	511.3	.6118	337.5	499.1	.5971
302.5	511.1	.6116	338.0	498.9	.5969
303.0	510.9	.6114	338.5	498.7	.5967
303.5	510.7	.6112	339.0	498.6	.5965
304.0	510.6	.6110	339.5	498.4	.5963
304.5	510.4	.6108	340.0	498.2	.5960
305.0	510.2	.6106	340.5	498.1	.5958
305.5	510.0	.6103	341.0	497.9	.5956
306.0	509.9	.6101	341.5	497.7	.5954
306.5	509.7	.6099	342.0	497.5	.5952
307.0	509.5	.6097	342.5	497.4	.5950
307.5	509.3	.6095	343.0	497.2	.5948
308.0	509.2	.6093	343.5	497.0	.5946
308.5	509.0	.6091	344.0	496.9	.5944
309.0	508.8	.6089	344.5	496.7	.5942
309.5	508.6	.6087	345.0	496.5	.5940
310.0	508.5	.6085	345.5	496.4	.5938
310.5	508.3	.6082	346.0	496.2	.5936
311.0	508.1	.6080	346.5	496.0	.5934
311.5	507.9	.6078	347.0	495.9	.5932
312.0	507.8	.6076	347.5	495.7	.5930
312.5	507.6	.6074	348.0	495.5	.5928
313.0	507.4	.6072	348.5	495.4	.5926
313.5	507.3	.6070	349.0	495.2	.5924
314.0	507.1	.6068	349.5	495.0	.5922
314.5	506.9	.6066	350.0	494.9	.5920
315.0	506.7	.6064	350.5	494.7	.5918
315.5	506.6	.6062	351.0	494.5	.5916
316.0	506.4	.6060	351.5	494.4	.5914
316.5	506.2	.6058	352.0	494.2	.5912
317.0	506.1	.6056	352.5	494.0	.5910
			353.0	493.9	.5908
			353.5	493.7	.5906
			354.0	493.6	.5904
317.5	505.9	.6053	354.5	493.4	.5902
318.0	505.7	.6051	355.0	493.2	.5900
318.5	505.6	.6049	355.5	493.1	.5898
319.0	505.4	.6047	356.0	492.9	.5896
319.5	505.2	.6045	356.5	492.7	.5894
320.0	505.0	.6043	357.0	492.6	.5892
320.5	504.9	.6041			
321.0	504.7	.6039			
321.5	504.5	.6037			
322.0	504.4	.6035			
322.5	504.2	.6033			
323.0	504.0	.6031			
323.5	503.8	.6028			
324.0	503.7	.6026			
324.5	503.5	.6024			
325.0	503.3	.6022			
325.5	503.1	.6020			



Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)	Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)
357.5	492.4	.5890	395.0	478.5	.5722
358.0	492.2	.5888	395.5	476.8	.5700
358.5	492.1	.5886	396.0	474.8	.5677
359.0	491.9	.5884	396.5	472.7	.5651
359.5	491.7	.5882	397.0	470.5	.5625
360.0	491.6	.5880			
360.5	491.4	.5878			
361.0	491.2	.5876	397.5	468.2	.5597
361.5	491.1	.5874	398.0	465.8	.5568
362.0	490.9	.5872	398.5	463.3	.5537
362.5	490.8	.5870	399.0	460.7	.5505
363.0	490.6	.5868	399.5	458.0	.5473
363.5	490.4	.5866	400.0	455.1	.5438
364.0	490.3	.5864	400.5	452.2	.5403
364.5	490.1	.5862	401.0	449.2	.5367
365.0	489.9	.5860	401.5	446.2	.5330
365.5	489.8	.5858	402.0	443.0	.5292
366.0	489.6	.5856	402.5	439.8	.5252
366.5	489.4	.5854	403.0	436.5	.5213
367.0	489.3	.5852	403.5	433.2	.5172
367.5	489.1	.5850	404.0	429.7	.5131
368.0	489.0	.5848	404.5	426.3	.5088
368.5	488.8	.5846	405.0	422.7	.5046
369.0	488.6	.5844	405.5	419.1	.5002
369.5	488.5	.5842	406.0	415.5	.4958
370.0	488.3	.5840	406.5	411.8	.4913
370.5	488.1	.5838	407.0	408.1	.4868
371.0	488.0	.5836	407.5	404.3	.4822
371.5	487.8	.5834	408.0	400.4	.4776
372.0	487.7	.5832	408.5	396.5	.4728
372.5	487.5	.5830	409.0	392.6	.4681
373.0	487.3	.5829	409.5	388.6	.4633
373.5	487.2	.5827	410.0	384.6	.4584
374.0	487.0	.5825	410.5	380.6	.4535
374.5	486.8	.5823	411.0	376.5	.4486
375.0	486.7	.5821	411.5	372.4	.4436
375.5	486.5	.5819	412.0	368.3	.4386
376.0	486.4	.5817	412.5	364.1	.4336
376.5	486.2	.5815	413.0	359.9	.4286
377.0	486.0	.5813	413.5	355.8	.4235
			414.0	351.6	.4185
			414.5	347.4	.4134
377.5	485.9	.5811	415.0	343.2	.4084
378.0	485.6	.5808	415.5	339.1	.4033
378.5	485.4	.5806	416.0	334.9	.3983
379.0	485.3	.5804	416.5	330.8	.3933
379.5	485.1	.5802	417.0	326.6	.3884
380.0	485.0	.5800			
380.5	484.8	.5798			
381.0	484.7	.5796	417.5	322.6	.3835
381.5	484.5	.5794	418.0	318.5	.3786
382.0	484.3	.5792	418.5	314.6	.3738
382.5	484.2	.5790	419.0	310.6	.3690
383.0	484.0	.5788	419.5	306.7	.3644
383.5	483.9	.5787	420.0	302.9	.3598
384.0	483.7	.5785	420.5	299.2	.3552
384.5	483.5	.5783	421.0	295.5	.3508
385.0	483.4	.5781	421.5	291.8	.3463
385.5	483.2	.5779	422.0	288.2	.3421
386.0	483.1	.5777	422.5	284.8	.3379
386.5	482.9	.5775	423.0	281.4	.3338
387.0	482.8	.5773	423.5	278.2	.3299
387.5	482.6	.5771	424.0	275.0	.3261
388.0	482.4	.5769	424.5	271.9	.3224
388.5	482.3	.5767	425.0	268.9	.3188
389.0	482.1	.5765	425.5	266.0	.3153
389.5	482.0	.5763	426.0	263.3	.3120
390.0	481.8	.5762	426.5	260.6	.3088
390.5	481.6	.5760	427.0	258.0	.3057
391.0	481.5	.5758	427.5	255.6	.3027
391.5	481.3	.5756	428.0	253.2	.3000
392.0	481.2	.5754	428.5	250.9	.2971
392.5	481.0	.5752	429.0	248.8	.2945
393.0	480.8	.5750	429.5	246.7	.2921
393.5	480.7	.5748	430.0	244.7	.2897
394.0	480.5	.5746	430.5	242.9	.2874
394.5	479.9	.5738			

Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)	Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)
431.0	241.1	.2853	467.0	212.4	.2508
431.5	239.4	.2833	467.5	212.4	.2508
432.0	237.8	.2813	468.0	212.4	.2508
432.5	236.3	.2795	468.5	212.3	.2508
433.0	234.8	.2778	469.0	212.3	.2507
433.5	233.5	.2761	469.5	212.3	.2507
434.0	232.2	.2746	470.0	212.3	.2507
434.5	231.0	.2731	470.5	212.3	.2506
435.0	229.8	.2718	471.0	212.2	.2506
435.5	228.7	.2705	471.5	212.2	.2506
436.0	227.7	.2692	472.0	212.2	.2506
436.5	226.8	.2681	472.5	212.2	.2506
437.0	225.9	.2670	473.0	212.2	.2505
			473.5	212.2	.2505
			474.0	212.1	.2505
			474.5	212.1	.2505
437.5	225.0	.2660	475.0	212.1	.2505
438.0	224.2	.2650	475.5	212.1	.2505
438.5	223.5	.2641	476.0	212.1	.2504
439.0	222.8	.2633	476.5	212.1	.2504
439.5	222.1	.2625	477.0	212.0	.2504
440.0	221.5	.2617			
440.5	220.9	.2610			
441.0	220.4	.2604	477.5	212.0	.2504
441.5	219.8	.2598	478.0	212.0	.2504
442.0	219.4	.2592	478.5	212.0	.2503
442.5	218.9	.2587	479.0	212.0	.2503
443.0	218.5	.2582	479.5	212.0	.2503
443.5	218.1	.2577	480.0	212.0	.2503
444.0	217.8	.2572	480.5	212.0	.2503
444.5	217.4	.2568	481.0	211.9	.2503
445.0	217.1	.2565	481.5	211.9	.2503
445.5	216.8	.2561	482.0	211.9	.2502
446.0	216.5	.2558	482.5	211.9	.2502
446.5	216.2	.2554	483.0	211.9	.2502
447.0	216.0	.2551	483.5	211.9	.2502
447.5	215.8	.2549	484.0	211.9	.2502
448.0	215.5	.2546	484.5	211.9	.2502
448.5	215.3	.2544	485.0	211.9	.2502
449.0	215.2	.2541	485.5	211.9	.2502
449.5	215.0	.2539	486.0	211.8	.2502
450.0	214.8	.2537	486.5	211.8	.2502
450.5	214.7	.2535	487.0	211.8	.2501
451.0	214.5	.2534	487.5	211.8	.2501
451.5	214.4	.2532	488.0	211.8	.2501
452.0	214.2	.2530	488.5	211.8	.2501
452.5	214.1	.2529	489.0	211.8	.2501
453.0	214.0	.2527	489.5	211.8	.2501
453.5	213.9	.2526	490.0	211.8	.2501
454.0	213.8	.2525	490.5	211.8	.2501
454.5	213.7	.2524	491.0	211.8	.2501
455.0	213.6	.2523	491.5	211.8	.2501
455.5	213.5	.2522	492.0	211.8	.2501
456.0	213.4	.2521	492.5	211.8	.2501
456.5	213.4	.2520	493.0	211.8	.2501
457.0	213.3	.2519	493.5	211.7	.2500
			494.0	211.7	.2500
457.5	213.2	.2518	494.5	211.7	.2500
458.0	213.2	.2517	495.0	211.7	.2500
458.5	213.1	.2517	495.5	211.7	.2500
459.0	213.0	.2516	496.0	211.7	.2500
459.5	213.0	.2515	496.5	211.7	.2500
460.0	212.9	.2515	497.0	211.7	.2500
460.5	212.9	.2514			
461.0	212.8	.2513			
461.5	212.8	.2513			
462.0	212.7	.2512			
462.5	212.7	.2512			
463.0	212.7	.2511			
463.5	212.6	.2511			
464.0	212.6	.2511			
464.5	212.6	.2510			
465.0	212.5	.2510			
465.5	212.5	.2509			
466.0	212.5	.2509			
466.5	212.4	.2509			


Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)	Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)
497.5	211.7	.2500	533.0	211.5	.2498
498.0	211.7	.2500	533.5	211.5	.2498
498.5	211.7	.2500	534.0	211.5	.2498
499.0	211.7	.2500	534.5	211.5	.2498
499.5	211.7	.2500	535.0	211.5	.2498
500.0	211.7	.2500	535.5	211.5	.2498
500.5	211.7	.2500	536.0	211.5	.2498
501.0	211.7	.2500	536.5	211.5	.2498
501.5	211.7	.2500	537.0	211.5	.2498
502.0	211.7	.2500			
502.5	211.7	.2499			
503.0	211.7	.2499	537.5	211.5	.2498
503.5	211.7	.2499	538.0	211.5	.2498
504.0	211.7	.2499	538.5	211.5	.2498
504.5	211.7	.2499	539.0	211.5	.2498
505.0	211.7	.2499	539.5	211.5	.2498
505.5	211.6	.2499	540.0	211.5	.2498
506.0	211.6	.2499	540.5	211.5	.2498
506.5	211.6	.2499	541.0	211.5	.2498
507.0	211.6	.2499	541.5	211.5	.2498
507.5	211.6	.2499	542.0	211.5	.2498
508.0	211.6	.2499	542.5	211.5	.2498
508.5	211.6	.2499	543.0	211.5	.2498
509.0	211.6	.2499	543.5	211.5	.2498
509.5	211.6	.2499	544.0	211.5	.2498
510.0	211.6	.2499	544.5	211.5	.2498
510.5	211.6	.2499	545.0	211.5	.2498
511.0	211.6	.2499	545.5	211.5	.2498
511.5	211.6	.2499	546.0	211.5	.2498
512.0	211.6	.2499	546.5	211.5	.2498
512.5	211.6	.2499	547.0	211.5	.2498
513.0	211.6	.2499	547.5	211.5	.2498
513.5	211.6	.2499	548.0	211.5	.2498
514.0	211.6	.2499	548.5	211.5	.2498
514.5	211.6	.2499	549.0	211.5	.2498
515.0	211.6	.2499	549.5	211.5	.2498
515.5	211.6	.2499	550.0	211.5	.2498
516.0	211.6	.2499	550.5	211.5	.2498
516.5	211.6	.2499	551.0	211.5	.2498
517.0	211.6	.2499	551.5	211.5	.2498
			552.0	211.5	.2498
			552.5	211.5	.2498
517.5	211.6	.2499	553.0	211.5	.2498
518.0	211.6	.2498	553.5	211.5	.2498
518.5	211.6	.2498	554.0	211.5	.2498
519.0	211.6	.2498	554.5	211.5	.2498
519.5	211.6	.2498	555.0	211.5	.2498
520.0	211.6	.2498	555.5	211.5	.2498
520.5	211.6	.2498	556.0	211.5	.2498
521.0	211.6	.2498	556.5	211.5	.2498
521.5	211.6	.2498	557.0	211.5	.2498
522.0	211.6	.2498			
522.5	211.6	.2498			
523.0	211.6	.2498	557.5	211.5	.2498
523.5	211.6	.2498	558.0	211.5	.2498
524.0	211.6	.2498	558.5	211.5	.2498
524.5	211.6	.2498	559.0	211.5	.2498
525.0	211.6	.2498	559.5	211.5	.2498
525.5	211.6	.2498	560.0	211.5	.2498
526.0	211.6	.2498	560.5	211.5	.2498
526.5	211.6	.2498	561.0	211.5	.2498
527.0	211.6	.2498	561.5	211.5	.2498
527.5	211.6	.2498	562.0	211.5	.2498
528.0	211.6	.2498	562.5	211.5	.2498
528.5	211.6	.2498	563.0	211.5	.2498
529.0	211.6	.2498	563.5	211.5	.2498
529.5	211.6	.2498	564.0	211.5	.2498
530.0	211.6	.2498	564.5	211.5	.2498
530.5	211.6	.2498	565.0	211.5	.2498
531.0	211.6	.2498	565.5	211.5	.2498
531.5	211.6	.2498	566.0	211.5	.2498
532.0	211.6	.2498	566.5	211.5	.2498
532.5	211.5	.2498			

MSLB ANALYSIS

- A. 0.86 ft² Split @ 102% Power
- B. 0.908 ft² Split @ 70% Power




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July 22, 1982

FULL CAPACITY AUXILIARY
BOILER FEED


PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION	Pump Curves for Auxiliary Feed Pump/Steam Driven
	Updated FSAR Figure 15.4-93



Revision 0
July 22, 1982


PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION	Pump Curves - Auxiliary Feed Pump/Electrical Driven	
	Updated FSAR	Figure 15.4.9.4

Figure 15.4-95
(Intentionally Deleted)



Revision 0
July 22, 1982

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION	Fan Cooler Heat Removal Rate
	Updated FSAR Figure 15.4-96



PRESSURE (PSIA)

TIME (SECONDS)

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Replace w/ next sheet

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY
SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION


Containment Pressure Transient
1.4 FT² DE Break
70% Power Minimum Safeguards Westinghouse Mode 1


Updated FSAR

Figure 15.4-97

FIGURE 15.4-97

1.4ft² DER. HOT ZERO POWER






Revision 0
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
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PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION	Containment Temperature Transient 1.4 FT ² DE Break 70% Power Minimum Safeguards Westinghouse Mode 1
	Updated FSAR Figure 15.4-98

FIGURE 15.4-98

1.4 ft² DER, HOT ZERO POWER






Revision 0
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
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PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION	Containment Heat Transfer Coefficient 1.4 FT ² DE Break 70% Power Minimum Safeguards Westinghouse Mode 1
	Updated FSAR Figure 15.4-99

FIGURE 15.4-99

SPLIT BREAK, 30 PERCENT POWER





PRESSURE (PSIA)

TIME (SECONDS)


Revision 0
July 22, 1982


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PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION	Containment Pressure Transient 0.860 FT ² Split Break 102% Power Minimum Safeguards Westinghouse Mode 1
	Updated FSAR Figure 15.4-100

FIGURE 15.4-100

SPLIT BREAK, 30 PERCENT POWER





TEMPERATURE (°F)

TIME (SECONDS)

Replace w/ next sheet


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
PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION	Containment Temperature Transient 0.860 FT ² Split Break
	102% Power Minimum Safeguards Westinghouse Mode 1
Updated FSAR	Figure 15.4-101

FIGURE 15.4-101

0.6 DER BREAK, HOT FULL POWER

W/O ENTRAINMENT





HEAT TRANSFER COEFFICIENT (BTU/HR - FT² - °F)

TIME (SECONDS)


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
Revision 0
July 22, 1982

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION	Containment Heat Transfer Coefficient 0.860 FT ² Split Break 102% Power Minimum Safeguards Westinghouse Mode 1
	Updated FSAR Figure 15.4-102

FIGURE 15.4-102

0.6 DER BREAK, HOT FULL POWER
W/O ENTRAINMENT






Revision 0
 July 22, 1982


PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY
 SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

Containment Pressure Transient for 0.860 FT2
 Split Break at 102% Power with
 Minimum Safeguards (NRC Model)



Revision 0
July 22, 1982

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION	Containment Temperature for 0.860 FT2 Split Break at 102% Power with Minimum Safeguards (NRC Model)
	Updated FSAR DELETE Figure 15.4-104




Revision 0
 July 22, 1982

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY
 SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

Containment Heat Coefficient for 0.860 FT2
 Split Break at 102% Power with
 Minimum Safeguards (NRC Model)

Updated FSAR **DELETE**


~~Figure 15.4.105~~



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PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY
 SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

Containment Pressure Transient
 0.908 FT² Split Break
 70% Power Minimum Safeguards Westinghouse Mode 1
 Updated FSAR **DELETE**




Revision 0
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PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY
 SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

Containment Temperature Transient
 0.908 FT2 Split Break
 70% Power Minimum Safeguards Westinghouse Mode 1


Updated FSAR **DELETE**

Figure 45.4-107



Revision 0
 July 22, 1982

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION	Containment Heat Transfer Coefficient 0.908 FT ² Split Break 70% Power Minimum Safeguards Westinghouse Mode 1
	Updated FSAR DELETE Figure 15.4-108




Revision 0
 July 22, 1982

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY
 SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

Containment Pressure Transient for 0.908 FT2
 Split Break at 70% Power with
 Minimum Safeguards (NRC Model)

Updated FSAR **DELETE**

~~Figure 15.4-100~~




Revision 0
 July 22, 1982

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY
 SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

Containment Temperature Transient for 0.908 FT2
 Split Break at 70% Power with
 Minimum Safeguards (NRC Model)

Undated ESAP, D-707



Revision 0
 July 22, 1982

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY
 SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

Containment Heat Transfer Coefficient for
 0.908 FT2 Split Break at 70% Power with
 Minimum Safeguards (NRC Model)

ATTACHMENT B

REVISED SALEM FSAR SECTION 15.2.13
ACCIDENTAL DEPRESSURIZATION OF THE
MAIN STEAM SYSTEM

15.2.12.3 Results

Figure 15.2-38 illustrates the flux transient following the accident. Reactor trip on overtemperature ΔT occurs as shown in Figure 15.2-38. The pressure decay transient following the accident is given in Figure 15.2-39. The resulting DNBR never goes below 1.30 as shown in Figure 15.2-40.

15.2.12.4 Conclusions

The pressurizer low pressure and the overtemperature ΔT Reactor Protection System signals provide adequate protection against this accident, and the minimum DNBR remains in excess of 1.30.

15.2.13 ACCIDENTAL DEPRESSURIZATION OF THE MAIN STEAM SYSTEM

15.2.13.1 Identification of Causes and Accident Description

The most severe core conditions resulting from an accidental depressurization of the Main Steam System are associated with an inadvertent opening of a single steam dump, relief or safety valve. The analyses performed assuming a rupture of a main steam pipe are given in Section 15.4.3.

The steam release as a consequence of this accident results in an initial increase in steam flow which decreases during the accident as the steam pressure falls. The energy removal from the Reactor Coolant System causes a reduction of coolant temperature and pressure. In the presence of a negative moderator temperature coefficient, the cooldown results in a reduction of core shutdown margin.

The analysis is performed to demonstrate that the following criterion is satisfied: Assuming a stuck rod cluster control assembly and a single failure in the Engineered Safety Features there will be no return to

15.2.13 ACCIDENTAL DEPRESSURIZATION OF THE MAIN STEAM SYSTEM

15.2.13.1 IDENTIFICATION OF CAUSES AND ACCIDENT DESCRIPTION

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The steam release as a consequence of this accident results in an initial increase in steam flow which decreases during the accident as the steam pressure falls. The energy removal from the Reactor Coolant System causes a reduction of coolant temperature and pressure. In the presence of a negative moderator temperature coefficient, the cooldown results in a reduction of core shutdown margin.

The analysis is performed to demonstrate that the following criterion is satisfied: Assuming a stuck rod cluster control assembly, with or without offsite power, and assuming a single failure in the Engineered Safety Features there will be no consequential fuel damage after reactor trip for a steam release equivalent to the spurious opening, with failure to close, of the largest of any single steam dump, relief or safety valve. This criterion is satisfied by verifying the DNB design basis is met.

The following systems provide the necessary protection against an accidental depressurization of the Main Steam System:

1. Safety injection System actuation from any of the following:
 - a. Two out of three channels of low pressurizer pressure,
 - b. High differential pressure signals between steam lines.
2. The overpower reactor trips (neutron flux and ΔT) and the reactor trip occurring in conjunction with receipt of the safety injection signal.

3. Redundant isolation of the main feedwater lines: Sustained high feedwater flow would cause additional cooldown. Therefore, in addition to the normal control action which will close the main feedwater valves following reactor trip, a safety injection signal will rapidly close all feedwater control valves, trip the main feedwater pumps, and close the back up feedwater isolation valves.

15.2.13.2 METHOD OF ANALYSIS

The following analyses of a secondary system steam release are performed for this section.

1. A full plant digital computer simulation, LOFTRAN (Ref. 4), is used to determine Reactor Coolant System temperature and pressure during cooldown.
2. An analysis to determine that there is no consequential fuel damage.

The following conditions are assumed to exist at the time of a secondary system steam release:

1. End of life shutdown margin at no load, equilibrium xenon conditions, and with the most reactive assembly stuck in its fully withdrawn position. Operation of rod cluster control assembly banks during core burnup is restricted in such a way that addition of positive reactivity in a secondary system break accident will not lead to a more adverse condition than the case analyzed.
2. A negative moderator coefficient corresponding to the end of life rodded core with the most reactive rod cluster control assembly in the fully withdrawn position. The variation of the coefficient with temperature and pressure is included. The k_{eff} versus temperature at 1000 psi corresponding to the negative moderator temperature coefficient used plus the Doppler temperature effect is shown in Figure 15.2-41.

3. Minimum capability for injection of high concentration boric acid solution corresponding to the most restrictive single failure in the Safety Injection System. The injection curve used is shown in Figure 15.2-42. This corresponds to the flow delivered by one charging pump delivering its full contents to the cold leg header. No credit has been taken for the low concentration boric acid which must be swept from the safety injection lines downstream of the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) prior to the delivery of boric acid (2,000 ppm) to the reactor coolant loops.
4. The case studied is an initial total steam flow of 228 lbs/second at 1015 psia from one steam generator with offsite power available. This is the maximum capacity of any single steam dump or safety valve. Initial hot shutdown conditions at time zero are assumed since this represents the most pessimistic initial condition.

Should the reactor be just critical or operating at power at the time of a steam release, the reactor will be tripped by the normal overpower protection signals when power level reaches a trip point. Following a trip at power the Reactor Coolant System contains more stored energy than at no load, the average coolant temperature is higher than at no load and there is appreciable energy stored in the fuel.

Thus, the additional stored energy is removed via the cooldown caused by the steam line break before the no load conditions of Reactor Coolant System temperature and shutdown margin assumed in the analyses are reached. After the additional stored energy has been removed, the cooldown and reactivity insertions proceed in the same manner as in the analysis which assumes no load condition at time zero. However, since the initial steam generator water inventory is greatest at no load, the magnitude and duration of the Reactor Coolant System cooldown are less for steam line breaks occurring at power.

5. In computing the steam flow the Moody Curve for $f/D = 0$ is used.
6. Perfect moisture separation in the steam generator is assumed.

15.2.13.3 RESULTS

The results presented are a conservative indication of the events which would occur assuming a secondary system steam release since it is postulated that all of the conditions described above occur simultaneously.

Figure 15.2-43 shows the transient arising as the result of a steam release having an initial steam flow of 228 lbs/second at 1015 psia with steam release from one safety valve. The assumed steam release is typical of the capacity of any single steam dump or safety valve. In this case safety injection is initiated automatically by low pressurizer pressure. Operation of one centrifugal charging pump is considered. Boron solution at 2,000 ppm enters the Reactor Coolant System providing sufficient negative reactivity to assure no fuel damage. A DNB analysis was performed for this case and the minimum DNBR was above the limit value of 1.3. The reactivity transient for the case shown in Figure 15.2-43 is more severe than that of a failed steam generator safety or relief valve which is terminated by steam line differential pressure, or a failed condenser dump valve which is terminated by low pressurizer pressure. The transient is quite conservative with respect to cooldown, since no credit is taken for the energy stored in the system metal other than that of the fuel elements or the energy stored in the other steam generators. Since the transient occurs over a period of about ten minutes, the neglected stored energy is likely to have a significant effect in slowing the cooldown.

15.2.13.4 CONCLUSIONS

The analysis has shown that the criteria stated earlier in this section is satisfied since a DNBR less than 1.30 does not occur.

Coolant System providing sufficient negative reactivity to maintain the reactor well below criticality. The reactivity transient for the cases shown in Figures 15.2-43 and 15.2-44 is more severe than that of a failed steam generator safety or relief valve which is terminated by steam line differential pressure, or a failed condenser dump valve which is terminated by low pressurizer pressure and level. The transient is quite conservative with respect to cooldown, since no credit is taken for the energy stored in the system metal other than that of the fuel elements or the energy stored in the other steam generators. Since the transient occurs over a period of about five minutes, the neglected stored energy is likely to have a significant effect in slowing the cooldown.

15.2.13.4 Conclusions

The analysis has shown that the criteria stated earlier in this section is satisfied. Since the reactor does not return to critical the possibility of a DNBR less than 1.30 does not exist.

15.2.14 SPURIOUS OPERATION OF THE SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM AT POWER

15.2.14.1 Identification of Causes

Spurious SIS operation at power could be caused by operator error or a false electrical actuating signal. A spurious signal in any of the following channels could cause this incident.

1. High containment pressure
2. High steam line differential pressure
3. High steam line flow and low average coolant temperature or low steam line pressure.

TABLE 15.2-1 (Sheet 1 of 10)

TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR CONDITION II EVENTS

<u>Accident</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Time (sec.)</u>
Uncontrolled RCA Withdrawal from a Subcritical Condition	Initiation of uncontrolled rod withdrawal 7.5×10^{-4} $\Delta K/\text{sec.}$ reactivity insertion rate from 10^{-13} of nominal power	0.0
	Power range high neutron flux low setpoint reached	6.9
	Peak nuclear power occurs	7.0
	Rods begin to fall into core	7.5
	Peak heat flux occurs	7.8
	Peak average fuel temperature occurs	8.2
	Peak average clad temperature occurs	8.8
	Peak average coolant tempera- ture occurs	9.2

Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)	Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)
511.0	422.5	.5068	548.0	413.5	.4959
511.5	422.4	.5067	548.5	413.4	.4958
512.0	422.3	.5065	549.0	413.3	.4957
512.5	422.2	.5064	549.5	413.2	.4955
513.0	422.0	.5063	550.0	413.1	.4954
513.5	421.9	.5061	550.5	412.9	.4952
514.0	421.8	.5060	551.0	412.8	.4951
515.0	421.7	.5058	551.5	412.7	.4949
515.5	421.5	.5057	552.0	412.6	.4948
515.5	421.4	.5055	552.5	412.5	.4946
516.0	421.3	.5054	553.0	412.3	.4945
516.5	421.2	.5052	553.5	412.2	.4943
517.0	421.1	.5051	554.0	412.1	.4942
			554.5	412.0	.4941
517.5	420.9	.5049	555.0	411.9	.4939
518.0	420.8	.5048	555.5	411.7	.4938
518.5	420.7	.5046	556.0	411.6	.4936
519.0	420.6	.5045	556.5	411.5	.4935
519.5	420.4	.5043	557.0	411.4	.4933
520.0	420.3	.5042			
520.5	420.2	.5040	557.5	411.3	.4932
521.0	420.1	.5039	558.0	411.1	.4930
521.5	420.0	.5037	558.5	411.0	.4929
522.0	419.8	.5036	559.0	410.9	.4927
522.5	419.7	.5034	559.5	410.8	.4926
523.0	419.6	.5033	560.0	410.7	.4925
523.5	419.5	.5031	560.5	410.5	.4923
524.0	419.4	.5030	561.0	410.4	.4922
524.5	419.2	.5028	561.5	410.3	.4920
525.0	419.1	.5027	562.0	410.2	.4919
525.5	419.0	.5026	562.5	410.1	.4917
526.0	418.9	.5024	563.0	409.9	.4916
526.5	418.7	.5023	563.5	409.8	.4914
527.0	418.6	.5021	564.0	409.7	.4913
527.5	418.5	.5020	564.5	409.6	.4911
528.0	418.4	.5018	565.0	409.5	.4910
528.5	418.3	.5017	565.5	409.3	.4909
529.0	418.1	.5015	566.0	409.2	.4907
529.5	418.0	.5014	566.5	409.1	.4906
530.0	417.9	.5012	567.0	409.0	.4904
530.5	417.8	.5011	567.5	408.9	.4903
531.0	417.7	.5009	568.0	408.7	.4901
531.5	417.5	.5008	568.5	408.6	.4900
532.0	417.4	.5006	569.0	408.5	.4898
532.5	417.3	.5005	569.5	408.4	.4897
533.0	417.2	.5003	570.0	408.3	.4895
533.5	417.0	.5002	570.5	408.1	.4894
534.0	416.9	.5001	571.0	408.0	.4893
534.5	416.8	.4999	571.5	407.9	.4891
535.0	416.7	.4998	572.0	407.8	.4890
535.5	416.6	.4996	572.5	407.7	.4888
536.0	416.6	.4995	573.0	407.5	.4887
536.5	416.3	.4993	573.5	407.4	.4885
537.0	416.2	.4992	574.0	407.3	.4884
			574.5	407.2	.4882
537.5	416.1	.4990	575.0	407.1	.4881
538.0	416.0	.4989	575.5	406.9	.4880
538.5	415.8	.4987	576.0	406.8	.4878
539.0	415.7	.4986	576.5	406.7	.4877
539.5	415.6	.4984	577.0	406.6	.4875
540.0	415.5	.4983			
540.5	415.3	.4981	577.5	406.5	.4874
541.0	415.2	.4980	578.0	406.4	.4872
541.5	415.1	.4979	578.5	406.2	.4871
542.0	415.0	.4977	579.0	406.1	.4869
542.5	414.9	.4976	579.5	406.0	.4868
543.0	414.7	.4974	580.0	405.9	.4867
543.5	414.6	.4973	580.5	405.8	.4865
544.0	414.5	.4971	581.0	405.6	.4864
544.5	414.4	.4970	581.5	405.5	.4862
545.0	414.3	.4968	582.0	405.4	.4861
545.5	414.1	.4967	582.5	405.3	.4859
546.0	414.0	.4965	583.0	405.2	.4858
546.5	413.9	.4964	583.5	405.0	.4856
547.0	413.8	.4962	584.0	404.9	.4855
547.5	413.7	.4961	584.5	404.8	.4854

Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)
585.0	404.7	.4852
585.5	404.6	.4851
586.0	404.4	.4849
586.5	404.3	.4848
587.0	404.2	.4846
587.5	404.1	.4845
588.0	404.0	.4843
588.5	403.9	.4842
589.0	403.7	.4841
589.5	403.6	.4839
590.0	403.5	.4838
590.5	403.4	.4836
591.0	403.3	.4835
591.5	403.1	.4833
592.0	403.0	.4832
592.5	402.9	.4831
593.0	402.8	.4829
593.5	402.7	.4828
594.0	402.5	.4826
594.5	402.4	.4825
595.0	402.3	.4823
595.5	402.2	.4822
596.0	402.1	.4820
596.5	402.0	.4819
597.0	401.8	.4818
597.5	401.7	.4816
598.0	401.6	.4815
598.5	401.5	.4813
599.0	401.4	.4812
599.5	401.2	.4810
600.0	401.1	.4809

TABLE 15.4-29

0.6 FT² DER AT

MASS AND ENERGY RELEASES FROM A ~~0.908 FT² SPLIT BREAK~~
¹⁰²
~~AT 70 PERCENT POWER (Worst Temperature Case)~~

<u>Time</u> (sec.)	<u>Break Flow</u> (lb/sec.)	<u>Energy Flow</u> (million Btu/sec.)
-----------------------	--------------------------------	--

a,6

~~PROPRIETARY~~

~~Refer to (50-311) "Application
for Withholding"~~

~~R. L. Mittl to Olan D. Parr
November 20, 1978~~

~~and~~

~~NRC Approval letter,
Olan D. Parr to Wieseemann
January 22, 1979~~

Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)	Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)
0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	37.50	2215.	2.643
.5000	2048.	2.452	38.00	2205.	2.632
1.000	2066.	2.474	38.50	2196.	2.621
1.500	2078.	2.488	39.00	2186.	2.610
2.000	2089.	2.501	39.50	2177.	2.599
2.500	2100.	2.514	40.00	2167.	2.588
3.000	2111.	2.527	40.50	2158.	2.577
3.500	2122.	2.539	41.00	2149.	2.566
4.000	2132.	2.551	41.50	2139.	2.555
4.500	2142.	2.563	42.00	2130.	2.544
5.000	2151.	2.574			
5.500	2161.	2.585			
6.000	2170.	2.596	42.500	3438.	4.100
6.500	2179.	2.606	43.000	2097.	2.505
7.000	2189.	2.617	45.000	1984.	2.371
7.500	2198.	2.628	47.500	1844.	2.204
8.000	2208.	2.640	50.000	1705.	2.039
8.500	2218.	2.651	52.500	1568.	1.876
9.000	2228.	2.663	55.000	1432.	1.714
9.500	2238.	2.674	57.500	1298.	1.554
10.00	2248.	2.686	60.000	1165.	1.395
10.50	2258.	2.697	62.500	1033.	1.238
11.00	2268.	2.709	65.000	902.1	1.083
11.50	2278.	2.721	67.500	772.4	0.928
12.00	2289.	2.733	70.000	643.7	0.775
12.50	2299.	2.745			
13.00	2310.	2.757			
13.50	2320.	2.769			
14.00	2330.	2.780			
14.50	2340.	2.792			
15.00	2351.	2.804			
15.50	2357.	2.811			
16.00	2365.	2.820			
16.50	2373.	2.829			
17.00	2381.	2.838			
			70.50	626.6	.7546
			71.00	624.7	.7523
			71.50	622.7	.7500
			72.00	620.8	.7477
			72.50	619.0	.7454
			73.00	617.1	.7432
			73.50	615.3	.7411
			74.00	613.6	.7389
			74.50	611.8	.7368
			75.00	610.1	.7348
			75.50	608.4	.7327
			76.00	606.7	.7307
			76.50	605.1	.7287
			77.00	603.5	.7268
			77.50	601.9	.7249
			78.00	600.3	.7230
			78.50	598.7	.7211
			79.00	597.2	.7193
			79.50	595.7	.7175
			80.00	594.2	.7157
			80.50	592.8	.7139
			81.00	591.3	.7122
			81.50	589.9	.7105
			82.00	588.5	.7088
			82.50	586.9	.7069
			83.00	585.6	.7053
			83.50	584.2	.7037
			84.00	582.9	.7021
			84.50	581.6	.7005
			85.00	580.3	.6989
			85.50	579.0	.6974
			86.00	577.8	.6959
			86.50	576.5	.6944
			87.00	575.3	.6929
			87.50	574.1	.6915
			88.00	572.9	.6900
			88.50	571.7	.6886
			89.00	570.5	.6872
			89.50	569.4	.6858
			90.00	568.2	.6844
17.50	2388.	2.847			
18.00	2396.	2.856			
18.50	2403.	2.864			
19.00	2410.	2.872			
19.50	2416.	2.879			
20.00	2422.	2.886			
20.50	2427.	2.891			
21.00	2431.	2.896			
21.50	2526.	3.009			
22.00	2661.	3.168			
22.50	2865.	3.411			
23.00	2825.	3.363			
23.50	2751.	3.276			
24.00	2677.	3.188			
24.50	2597.	3.093			
25.00	2528.	3.011			
25.50	2475.	2.949			
26.00	2441.	2.908			
26.50	2420.	2.883			
27.00	2398.	2.857			
27.50	2386.	2.843			
28.00	2379.	2.835			
28.50	2372.	2.827			
29.00	2365.	2.818			
29.50	2357.	2.809			
30.00	2349.	2.800			
30.50	2341.	2.791			
31.00	2333.	2.781			
31.50	2324.	2.771			
32.00	2316.	2.761			
32.50	2307.	2.751			
33.00	2298.	2.740			
33.50	2289.	2.730			
34.00	2280.	2.719			
34.50	2271.	2.709			
35.00	2262.	2.698			
35.50	2252.	2.687			
36.00	2243.	2.676			
36.50	2233.	2.665			
37.00	2224.	2.654			

Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)	Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)
90.50	567.1	.6830	127.5	506.8	.6104
91.00	566.0	.6817	128.0	506.2	.6097
91.50	564.9	.6804	128.5	505.6	.6089
92.00	563.8	.6790	129.0	505.0	.6082
92.50	562.7	.6777	129.5	504.4	.6075
93.00	561.6	.6764	130.0	503.8	.6068
93.50	560.6	.6752	130.5	503.2	.6061
94.00	559.5	.6739	131.0	502.6	.6053
94.50	558.5	.6727	131.5	502.0	.6046
95.00	557.4	.6714	132.0	501.4	.6039
95.50	556.4	.6702	132.5	500.9	.6032
96.00	555.4	.6690	133.0	500.3	.6025
96.50	554.4	.6678	133.5	499.7	.6019
97.00	553.4	.6666	134.0	499.1	.6012
			134.5	498.6	.6005
			135.0	498.0	.5998
			135.5	497.5	.5991
			136.0	496.9	.5984
			136.5	496.3	.5978
			137.0	495.8	.5971
97.50	552.5	.6654			
98.00	551.5	.6643			
98.50	550.5	.6631			
99.00	549.6	.6620			
99.50	548.7	.6608			
100.0	547.7	.6597			
100.5	546.8	.6586	137.5	495.2	.5964
101.0	545.9	.6575	138.0	494.7	.5958
101.5	545.0	.6564	138.5	494.1	.5951
102.0	544.1	.6554	139.0	493.6	.5945
102.5	543.2	.6543	139.5	493.1	.5938
103.0	542.3	.6532	140.0	492.5	.5932
103.5	541.5	.6522	140.5	492.0	.5925
104.0	540.6	.6512	141.0	491.5	.5919
104.5	539.8	.6501	141.5	490.9	.5913
105.0	538.9	.6491	142.0	490.4	.5906
105.5	538.1	.6481	142.5	489.9	.5900
106.0	537.2	.6471	143.0	489.4	.5894
106.5	536.4	.6461	143.5	488.8	.5887
107.0	535.6	.6451	144.0	488.3	.5881
107.5	534.8	.6441	144.5	487.8	.5875
108.0	534.0	.6432	145.0	487.3	.5869
108.5	533.2	.6422	145.5	486.8	.5863
109.0	532.4	.6412	146.0	486.3	.5856
109.5	531.6	.6403	146.5	485.8	.5850
110.0	530.8	.6394	147.0	485.3	.5844
110.5	530.0	.6384	147.5	484.8	.5838
111.0	529.3	.6375	148.0	484.3	.5832
111.5	528.5	.6366	148.5	483.8	.5826
112.0	527.8	.6357	149.0	483.3	.5820
112.5	527.0	.6348	149.5	482.8	.5814
113.0	526.3	.6339	150.0	482.3	.5808
113.5	525.5	.6330	150.5	481.8	.5802
114.0	524.8	.6321	151.0	481.3	.5797
114.5	524.1	.6312	151.5	480.8	.5791
115.0	523.4	.6304	152.0	480.4	.5785
115.5	522.6	.6295	152.5	479.9	.5779
116.0	521.9	.6286	153.0	479.4	.5773
116.5	521.2	.6278	153.5	478.9	.5768
117.0	520.5	.6269	154.0	478.4	.5762
			154.5	478.0	.5756
			155.0	477.5	.5750
			155.5	477.0	.5745
			156.0	476.6	.5739
			156.5	476.1	.5733
			157.0	475.6	.5728
117.5	519.8	.6261			
118.0	519.1	.6253			
118.5	518.4	.6244			
119.0	517.8	.6236			
119.5	517.1	.6228			
120.0	516.4	.6220	157.5	475.2	.5722
120.5	515.7	.6212	158.0	474.7	.5717
121.0	515.1	.6204	158.5	474.2	.5711
121.5	514.4	.6196	159.0	473.8	.5706
122.0	513.8	.6188	159.5	473.3	.5700
122.5	513.1	.6180	160.0	472.9	.5695
123.0	512.5	.6172	160.5	472.4	.5689
123.5	511.8	.6164	161.0	472.0	.5684
124.0	511.2	.6157	161.5	471.5	.5678
124.5	510.5	.6149	162.0	471.1	.5673
125.0	509.9	.6141	162.5	470.6	.5667
125.5	509.3	.6134	163.0	470.2	.5662
126.0	508.7	.6126	163.5	469.7	.5657
126.5	508.0	.6119	164.0	469.3	.5651
127.0	507.4	.6111	164.5	468.8	.5646
			165.0	468.4	.5641

Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)	Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)
165.5	468.0	.5635	202.5	438.6	.5280
166.0	467.5	.5630	203.0	438.2	.5276
166.5	467.1	.5625	203.5	437.8	.5271
167.0	466.7	.5619	204.0	437.5	.5267
167.5	466.2	.5614	204.5	437.1	.5263
168.0	465.8	.5609	205.0	436.8	.5258
168.5	465.4	.5604	205.5	436.4	.5254
169.0	464.9	.5599	206.0	436.0	.5250
169.5	464.5	.5593	206.5	435.7	.5245
170.0	464.1	.5588	207.0	435.3	.5241
170.5	463.7	.5583	207.5	435.0	.5237
171.0	463.2	.5578	208.0	434.6	.5232
171.5	462.8	.5573	208.5	434.3	.5228
172.0	462.4	.5568	209.0	433.9	.5224
172.5	462.0	.5563	209.5	433.5	.5219
173.0	461.5	.5558	210.0	433.2	.5215
173.5	461.1	.5553	210.5	432.8	.5211
174.0	460.7	.5548	211.0	432.5	.5207
174.5	460.3	.5543	211.5	432.1	.5202
175.0	459.9	.5538	212.0	431.8	.5198
175.5	459.5	.5533	212.5	431.4	.5194
176.0	459.1	.5528	213.0	431.1	.5190
176.5	458.6	.5523	213.5	430.7	.5185
177.0	458.2	.5518	214.0	430.4	.5181
			214.5	430.0	.5177
			215.0	429.7	.5173
			215.5	429.4	.5169
			216.0	429.1	.5165
			216.5	428.8	.5162
			217.0	428.5	.5158
177.5	457.8	.5513			
178.0	457.4	.5508			
178.5	457.0	.5503			
179.0	456.6	.5498			
179.5	456.2	.5493			
180.0	455.8	.5488			
180.5	455.4	.5483	217.5	428.1	.5154
181.0	455.0	.5478	218.0	427.8	.5150
181.5	454.6	.5474	218.5	427.5	.5146
182.0	454.2	.5469	219.0	427.2	.5143
182.5	453.8	.5464	219.5	426.9	.5139
183.0	453.4	.5459	220.0	426.6	.5135
183.5	453.0	.5454	220.5	426.3	.5132
184.0	452.6	.5450	221.0	426.0	.5128
184.5	452.2	.5445	221.5	425.7	.5124
185.0	451.8	.5440	222.0	425.4	.5120
185.5	451.4	.5435	222.5	425.0	.5117
186.0	451.0	.5431	223.0	424.7	.5113
186.5	450.6	.5426	223.5	424.4	.5109
187.0	450.2	.5421	224.0	424.1	.5105
187.5	449.9	.5416	224.5	423.8	.5102
188.0	449.5	.5412	225.0	423.5	.5098
188.5	449.1	.5407	225.5	423.2	.5094
189.0	448.7	.5402	226.0	422.9	.5091
189.5	448.3	.5398	226.5	422.6	.5087
190.0	447.9	.5393	227.0	422.3	.5083
190.5	447.5	.5389	227.5	422.0	.5079
191.0	447.2	.5384	228.0	421.7	.5076
191.5	446.8	.5379	228.5	421.4	.5072
192.0	446.4	.5375	229.0	421.0	.5068
192.5	446.0	.5370	229.5	420.7	.5065
193.0	445.6	.5365	230.0	420.4	.5061
193.5	445.3	.5361	230.5	420.1	.5057
194.0	444.9	.5356	231.0	419.8	.5053
194.5	444.5	.5352	231.5	419.5	.5050
195.0	444.1	.5347	232.0	419.2	.5046
195.5	443.7	.5343	232.5	418.9	.5042
196.0	443.4	.5338	233.0	418.6	.5039
196.5	443.0	.5334	233.5	418.3	.5035
197.0	442.6	.5329	234.0	418.0	.5031
			234.5	417.7	.5026
			235.0	417.4	.5024
			235.5	417.1	.5020
			236.0	416.8	.5016
			236.5	416.5	.5013
			237.0	416.2	.5009
197.5	442.3	.5325			
198.0	441.9	.5320			
198.5	441.5	.5316			
199.0	441.1	.5311			
199.5	440.8	.5307			
200.0	440.4	.5302			
200.5	440.0	.5298			
201.0	439.7	.5293			
201.5	439.3	.5289			
202.0	438.9	.5285			

	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)	Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)
237.5	415.9	.5005	275.0	393.3	.4733
238.0	415.5	.5002	275.5	393.0	.4729
238.5	415.2	.4998	276.0	392.7	.4725
239.0	414.9	.4994	276.5	392.4	.4722
239.5	414.6	.4991	277.0	392.1	.4718
240.0	414.3	.4987			
240.5	414.0	.4983			
241.0	413.7	.4980			
241.5	413.4	.4976	277.5	391.8	.4715
242.0	413.1	.4972	278.0	391.5	.4711
242.5	412.8	.4969	278.5	391.2	.4708
243.0	412.5	.4965	279.0	390.9	.4704
243.5	412.2	.4961	279.5	390.6	.4701
244.0	411.9	.4958	280.0	390.4	.4697
244.5	411.6	.4954	280.5	390.1	.4694
245.0	411.3	.4950	281.0	389.8	.4690
245.5	411.0	.4947	281.5	389.5	.4687
246.0	410.7	.4943	282.0	389.2	.4683
246.5	410.4	.4939	282.5	388.9	.4680
247.0	410.1	.4936	283.0	388.6	.4676
247.5	409.8	.4932	283.5	388.4	.4673
248.0	409.5	.4928	284.0	388.1	.4669
248.5	409.2	.4925	284.5	387.8	.4666
249.0	408.9	.4921	285.0	387.5	.4662
249.5	408.6	.4918	285.5	387.2	.4659
250.0	408.3	.4914	286.0	386.9	.4656
250.5	408.0	.4910	286.5	386.6	.4652
251.0	407.7	.4907	287.0	386.4	.4649
251.5	407.4	.4903	287.5	386.1	.4645
252.0	407.1	.4899	288.0	385.8	.4642
252.5	406.8	.4896	288.5	385.5	.4638
253.0	406.5	.4892	289.0	385.2	.4635
253.5	406.2	.4889	289.5	385.0	.4632
254.0	405.9	.4885	290.0	384.7	.4628
254.5	405.6	.4881	290.5	384.4	.4625
255.0	405.3	.4878	291.0	384.1	.4622
255.5	405.0	.4874	291.5	383.9	.4618
256.0	404.7	.4870	292.0	383.6	.4615
256.5	404.4	.4867	292.5	383.3	.4612
257.0	404.1	.4863	293.0	383.0	.4608
			293.5	382.7	.4605
			294.0	382.5	.4602
			294.5	382.2	.4598
			295.0	381.9	.4595
			295.5	381.7	.4592
			296.0	381.4	.4588
			296.5	381.1	.4585
			297.0	380.8	.4582
257.5	403.8	.4860			
258.0	403.5	.4856			
258.5	403.2	.4853			
259.0	402.9	.4849			
259.5	402.6	.4845			
260.0	402.3	.4842			
260.5	402.0	.4838			
261.0	401.7	.4835	297.5	380.6	.4579
261.5	401.4	.4831	298.0	380.3	.4575
262.0	401.1	.4827	298.5	380.0	.4572
262.5	400.8	.4824	299.0	379.8	.4569
263.0	400.6	.4820	299.5	379.5	.4565
263.5	400.3	.4817	300.0	379.2	.4562
264.0	400.0	.4813	300.5	378.9	.4559
264.5	399.7	.4810	301.0	378.7	.4556
265.0	399.4	.4806	301.5	378.4	.4552
265.5	399.1	.4802	302.0	378.1	.4549
266.0	398.8	.4799	302.5	377.9	.4546
266.5	398.6	.4795	303.0	377.6	.4543
267.0	398.1	.4791	303.5	377.3	.4539
267.5	397.8	.4788	304.0	377.1	.4536
268.0	397.5	.4784	304.5	376.8	.4533
268.5	397.2	.4780	305.0	376.5	.4530
269.0	396.9	.4777	305.5	376.3	.4527
269.5	396.6	.4773	306.0	376.0	.4523
270.0	396.3	.4769	306.5	375.8	.4520
270.5	396.0	.4766	307.0	375.5	.4517
271.0	395.7	.4762	307.5	375.2	.4514
271.5	395.4	.4758	308.0	375.0	.4511
272.0	395.1	.4754	308.5	374.7	.4508
272.5	394.8	.4751	309.0	374.4	.4504
273.0	394.5	.4747	309.5	374.2	.4501
273.5	394.2	.4743	310.0	373.9	.4498
274.0	393.9	.4740	310.5	373.7	.4495

Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)	Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)
311.0	373.4	.4492	349.0	354.8	.4267
311.5	373.1	.4489	349.5	354.6	.4264
312.0	372.9	.4485	350.0	354.4	.4261
312.5	372.6	.4482	350.5	354.1	.4258
313.0	372.4	.4479	351.0	353.9	.4256
313.5	372.1	.4476	351.5	353.7	.4253
314.0	371.8	.4473	352.0	353.4	.4250
314.5	371.6	.4470	352.5	353.2	.4247
315.0	371.3	.4467	353.0	353.0	.4245
315.5	371.1	.4464	353.5	352.8	.4242
316.0	370.8	.4461	354.0	352.5	.4239
316.5	370.6	.4458	354.5	352.3	.4237
317.0	370.3	.4454	355.0	352.1	.4234
			355.5	351.9	.4231
			356.0	351.6	.4228
317.5	370.1	.4451	356.5	351.4	.4226
318.0	369.8	.4448	357.0	351.2	.4223
318.5	369.5	.4445			
319.0	369.3	.4442			
319.5	369.0	.4439	357.5	351.0	.4220
320.0	368.8	.4436	358.0	350.8	.4218
320.5	368.5	.4433	358.5	350.5	.4215
321.0	368.3	.4430	359.0	350.3	.4212
321.5	368.0	.4427	359.5	350.1	.4210
322.0	367.8	.4424	360.0	349.9	.4207
322.5	367.5	.4421	360.5	349.7	.4204
323.0	367.3	.4418	361.0	349.4	.4202
323.5	367.0	.4415	361.5	349.2	.4199
324.0	366.8	.4412	362.0	349.0	.4196
324.5	366.5	.4409	362.5	348.8	.4194
325.0	366.3	.4406	363.0	348.6	.4191
	366.0	.4403	363.5	348.4	.4189
	365.8	.4400	364.0	348.1	.4186
	365.6	.4397	364.5	347.9	.4183
	365.3	.4394	365.0	347.7	.4181
	365.1	.4391	365.5	347.5	.4178
328.0	364.8	.4388	366.0	347.3	.4176
328.5	364.6	.4385	366.5	347.1	.4173
329.0	364.3	.4382	367.0	346.9	.4170
329.5	364.1	.4379	367.5	346.6	.4168
330.0	363.8	.4376	368.0	346.4	.4165
330.5	363.6	.4373	368.5	346.2	.4163
331.0	363.3	.4370	369.0	346.0	.4160
331.5	363.1	.4367	369.5	345.8	.4158
332.0	362.8	.4364	370.0	345.6	.4156
332.5	362.6	.4361	370.5	345.4	.4153
333.0	362.4	.4358	371.0	345.2	.4151
333.5	362.1	.4355	371.5	345.0	.4149
334.0	361.9	.4352	372.0	344.9	.4146
334.5	361.6	.4349	372.5	344.7	.4144
335.0	361.4	.4347	373.0	344.5	.4141
335.5	361.2	.4344	373.5	344.3	.4139
336.0	360.9	.4341	374.0	344.1	.4137
336.5	360.7	.4338	374.5	343.9	.4134
337.0	360.4	.4335	375.0	343.7	.4132
			375.5	343.5	.4130
			376.0	343.3	.4127
337.5	360.2	.4332	376.5	343.1	.4125
338.0	360.0	.4329	377.0	342.9	.4123
338.5	359.7	.4326			
339.0	359.5	.4323			
339.5	359.2	.4320	377.5	342.7	.4120
340.0	359.0	.4318	378.0	342.5	.4118
340.5	358.8	.4315	378.5	342.3	.4116
341.0	358.5	.4312	379.0	342.2	.4113
341.5	358.3	.4309	379.5	342.0	.4111
342.0	358.1	.4306	380.0	341.8	.4109
342.5	357.8	.4303	380.5	341.6	.4107
	357.6	.4300	381.0	341.4	.4104
	357.4	.4298	381.5	341.2	.4102
	357.1	.4295	382.0	341.0	.4100
	356.9	.4292	382.5	340.8	.4097
	356.7	.4289	383.0	340.6	.4095
345.0	356.4	.4286	383.5	340.4	.4093
345.5	356.2	.4284	384.0	340.3	.4090
346.0	356.0	.4281	384.5	340.1	.4088
346.5	355.7	.4278	385.0	339.9	.4086
347.0	355.5	.4275	385.5	339.7	.4084
347.5	355.3	.4272	386.0	339.5	.4082
348.0	355.0	.4270			

Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)	Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)
387.5	339.3	.4079	424.0	328.1	.3943
387.0	339.2	.4077	424.5	328.0	.3942
387.5	339.0	.4075	425.0	327.9	.3941
388.0	338.8	.4073	425.5	327.8	.3940
388.5	338.6	.4070	426.0	327.7	.3938
389.0	338.4	.4068	426.5	327.6	.3937
389.5	338.2	.4066	427.0	327.5	.3936
390.0	338.1	.4064	427.5	327.4	.3935
390.5	337.9	.4062	428.0	327.3	.3934
391.0	337.7	.4059	428.5	327.2	.3933
391.5	337.5	.4057	429.0	327.1	.3931
392.0	337.3	.4055	429.5	327.0	.3930
392.5	337.1	.4053	430.0	326.9	.3929
393.0	337.0	.4051	430.5	326.9	.3928
393.5	336.8	.4048	431.0	326.8	.3927
394.0	336.6	.4046	431.5	326.7	.3926
394.5	336.4	.4044	432.0	326.6	.3925
395.0	336.3	.4042	432.5	326.5	.3924
395.5	336.1	.4040	433.0	326.4	.3923
396.0	335.9	.4038	433.5	326.3	.3922
396.5	335.8	.4036	434.0	326.3	.3921
397.0	335.6	.4034	434.5	326.2	.3920
			435.0	326.1	.3919
			435.5	326.0	.3918
			436.0	325.9	.3917
			436.5	325.9	.3916
			437.0	325.8	.3915
397.5	335.4	.4032			
398.0	335.2	.4030			
398.5	335.1	.4028			
399.0	334.9	.4026			
399.5	334.7	.4024			
400.0	334.6	.4022	437.5	325.7	.3914
400.5	334.4	.4020	438.0	325.6	.3913
401.0	334.3	.4018	438.5	325.6	.3912
401.5	334.1	.4016	439.0	325.5	.3911
402.0	333.9	.4014	439.5	325.4	.3911
402.5	333.8	.4012	440.0	325.3	.3910
403.0	333.6	.4010	440.5	325.3	.3909
403.5	333.5	.4008	441.0	325.2	.3908
404.0	333.3	.4006	441.5	325.1	.3907
404.5	333.2	.4005	442.0	325.1	.3906
405.0	333.0	.4003	442.5	325.0	.3905
405.5	332.9	.4001	443.0	324.9	.3905
406.0	332.7	.3999	443.5	324.8	.3904
406.5	332.6	.3997	444.0	324.8	.3903
407.0	332.4	.3996	444.5	324.7	.3902
407.5	332.3	.3994	445.0	324.6	.3901
408.0	332.1	.3992	445.5	324.6	.3901
408.5	332.0	.3990	446.0	324.5	.3900
409.0	331.8	.3988	446.5	324.5	.3899
409.5	331.7	.3987	447.0	324.4	.3898
410.0	331.6	.3985	447.5	324.3	.3898
410.5	331.4	.3983	448.0	324.3	.3897
411.0	331.3	.3982	448.5	324.2	.3896
411.5	331.1	.3980	449.0	324.1	.3895
412.0	331.0	.3978	449.5	324.1	.3895
412.5	330.9	.3977	450.0	324.0	.3894
413.0	330.7	.3975	450.5	324.0	.3893
413.5	330.6	.3974	451.0	323.9	.3892
414.0	330.5	.3972	451.5	323.8	.3892
414.5	330.3	.3970	452.0	323.8	.3891
415.0	330.2	.3969	452.5	323.7	.3890
415.5	330.1	.3967	453.0	323.7	.3889
416.0	330.0	.3966	453.5	323.6	.3889
416.5	329.8	.3964	454.0	323.5	.3888
417.0	329.7	.3963	454.5	323.5	.3887
			455.0	323.4	.3887
			455.5	323.4	.3886
			456.0	323.3	.3885
			456.5	323.3	.3885
			457.0	323.2	.3884
417.5	329.6	.3961			
418.0	329.5	.3960			
418.5	329.4	.3958			
419.0	329.2	.3957			
419.5	329.1	.3956			
420.0	329.0	.3954			
420.5	328.9	.3953			
421.0	328.8	.3951			
421.5	328.7	.3950			
422.0	328.6	.3949			
422.5	328.4	.3947			
423.0	328.3	.3946			
423.5	328.2	.3945			

Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)	Time (sec.)	Break Flow (lb/sec.)	Energy Flow (million Btu/sec.)
458.0	323.1	.3883	496.0	318.4	.3826
458.5	323.1	.3882	496.5	318.3	.3825
459.0	323.0	.3882	497.0	318.3	.3824
459.5	322.9	.3881			
460.0	322.9	.3880	497.5	318.2	.3823
460.5	322.8	.3879	498.0	318.1	.3822
461.0	322.7	.3878	498.5	318.1	.3822
461.5	322.7	.3878	499.0	318.0	.3821
462.0	322.6	.3877	499.5	317.9	.3820
462.5	322.6	.3876	500.0	317.8	.3819
463.0	322.5	.3876	500.5	317.8	.3818
463.5	322.5	.3875	501.0	317.7	.3817
464.0	322.4	.3874	501.5	317.6	.3816
464.5	322.4	.3874	502.0	317.5	.3815
465.0	322.3	.3873	502.5	317.5	.3814
465.5	322.2	.3872	503.0	317.4	.3813
466.0	322.2	.3872	503.5	317.3	.3813
466.5	322.1	.3871	504.0	317.2	.3812
467.0	322.1	.3870	504.5	317.2	.3811
467.5	322.0	.3870	505.0	317.1	.3810
468.0	322.0	.3869	505.5	317.0	.3809
468.5	321.9	.3868	506.0	316.9	.3808
469.0	321.9	.3867	506.5	316.9	.3807
469.5	321.8	.3867	507.0	316.8	.3806
470.0	321.7	.3866	507.5	316.7	.3805
470.5	321.7	.3865	508.0	316.6	.3804
471.0	321.6	.3865	508.5	316.5	.3803
471.5	321.6	.3864	509.0	316.5	.3802
472.0	321.5	.3863	509.5	316.4	.3801
472.5	321.4	.3862	510.0	316.3	.3800
473.0	321.4	.3862	510.5	316.2	.3799
473.5	321.3	.3861	511.0	316.1	.3798
474.0	321.3	.3860	511.5	316.1	.3797
474.5	321.2	.3860	512.0	316.0	.3796
475.0	321.1	.3859	512.5	315.9	.3795
475.5	321.1	.3858	513.0	315.8	.3794
476.0	321.0	.3858	513.5	315.7	.3793
476.5	321.0	.3857	514.0	315.7	.3793
477.0	320.9	.3856	514.5	315.6	.3792
			515.0	315.5	.3791
477.5	320.9	.3855	515.5	315.4	.3790
478.0	320.8	.3855	516.0	315.3	.3789
478.5	320.7	.3854	516.5	315.3	.3788
479.0	320.7	.3853	517.0	315.2	.3787
479.5	320.6	.3852			
480.0	320.5	.3852	517.5	315.1	.3786
480.5	320.5	.3851	518.0	315.0	.3785
481.0	320.4	.3850	518.5	314.9	.3784
481.5	320.4	.3849	519.0	314.8	.3783
482.0	320.3	.3849	519.5	314.8	.3781
482.5	320.2	.3848	520.0	314.7	.3780
483.0	320.2	.3847	520.5	314.6	.3779
483.5	320.1	.3846	521.0	314.6	.3778
484.0	320.0	.3846	521.5	314.5	.3777
484.5	320.0	.3845	522.0	314.4	.3777
485.0	319.9	.3844	522.5	314.3	.3776
485.5	319.8	.3844	523.0	314.2	.3775
486.0	319.8	.3843	523.5	314.2	.3774
486.5	319.7	.3842	524.0	314.1	.3773
487.0	319.7	.3842	524.5	314.0	.3772
487.5	319.6	.3841	525.0	313.9	.3771
488.0	319.5	.3840	525.5	313.8	.3770
488.5	319.5	.3839	526.0	313.7	.3769
489.0	319.4	.3838	526.5	313.6	.3768
489.5	319.3	.3837	527.0	313.6	.3767
490.0	319.3	.3836	527.5	313.5	.3766
490.5	319.2	.3835	528.0	313.4	.3765
491.0	319.1	.3835	528.5	313.3	.3764
491.5	319.0	.3834	529.0	313.2	.3763
492.0	319.0	.3834	529.5	313.1	.3762
492.5	318.9	.3833	530.0	313.0	.3761
493.0	318.8	.3832	530.5	313.0	.3760
493.5	318.8	.3831	531.0	312.9	.3759
494.0	318.7	.3830	531.5	312.8	.3758
494.5	318.6	.3829	532.0	312.7	.3756
495.0	318.6	.3828	532.5	312.6	.3755
495.5	318.5	.3827			.3754

TABLE 15.2-1 (Sheet 2 of 10)

TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR CONDITION II EVENTS

<u>Accident</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Time (sec.)</u>
Uncontrolled RCCA Withdrawal at Power 1. Case A	Initiation of uncontrolled RCCA withdrawal at maximum reactivity insertion rate (7.5×10^{-4} $\Delta K/sec.$)	0
	Power range high neutron flux high trip point reached	1.5
	Rods begin to fall into core	2.0
	Minimum DNBR occurs	2.7
2. Case B	Initiation of uncontrolled RCCA withdrawal at a small reactivity insertion rate (3.0×10^{-5} $\Delta K/sec.$ for 3 loop, 3.0×10^{-5} $\Delta K/sec.$ for 4 loop)	0
	Overtemperature ΔT reactor trip signal initiated	32.6
	Rods begin to fall into core	34.6
	Minimum DNBR occurs	34.7

TABLE 15.2-1 (Sheet 3 of 10)

TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR CONDITION II EVENTS

<u>Accident</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Time (sec.)</u>
Uncontrolled Boron Dilution		
1. Dilution during refueling and startup.	Dilution begins	0
	Operator isolates source of dilution; minimum margin to criticality occurs	~2400 or more
2. Dilution During Full Power Operation		
a. Automatic Reactor Control	One percent shutdown margin lost	~1300
b. Manual Reactor Control	Dilution begins	0
	Reactor trip setpoint reached for overtemperature ΔT	52
	Rods begin to fall into core	54
	One percent shutdown is lost (if dilution continues) after trip)	~900

TABLE 15.2-1 (Sheet 4 of 10)

TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR CONDITION II EVENTS

<u>Accident</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Time (sec.)</u>	
Partial Loss of Forced Reactor Coolant Flow 1. All loops operating, two pumps coasting down	Coastdown begins	0	
	Low flow reactor trip	1.26	
	Rods begin to drop	2.76	
	Minimum DNBR occurs	3.7	
	2. All but one loop operating, two pumps coasting down.	Coastdown begins	0
		Low flow reactor trip	2.30
		Rods begin to drop	3.80
		Minimum DNBR occurs	4.70

TABLE 15.2-1 (Sheet 5 of 10)

TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR CONDITION II EVENTS

<u>Accident</u>	<u>Events</u>	<u>Time (sec.)</u>	
Loss of External Electrical Load 1. With pressurizer control (BOL)	Loss of electrical load	0	
	Initiation of steam release from steam generator safety valves	9.0	
	Overtemperature ΔT	9.1	
	Rods begin to drop	11.1	
	Minimum DNBR occurs	11.5	
	Peak pressurizer pressure occurs	12.5	
	2. With pressurizer control (EOL)	Loss of electrical load	0
		Initiation of steam release from steam generator safety valves	9.0
		Overtemperature ΔT Reactor Trip Point Reached	9.5
		Rods begin to drop	11.5

TABLE 15.2-1 (Sheet 6 of 10)

TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR CONDITION II EVENTS

<u>Accident</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Time (sec.)</u>
	Minimum DNBR occurs	(1)
	Peak pressurizer pressure occurs	10.5
3. Without pressurizer control (BOL)	Loss of electrical load	0
	Initiation of steam release from steam generator safety valves	9.0
	High pressurizer pressure reactor trip point reached	6.1
	Rods begin to drop	8.1
	Minimum DNBR occurs	(1)
	Peak pressurizer pressure occurs	9.5

(1) DNBR does not decrease below its initial value.

TABLE 15.2-1 (Sheet 7 of 10)

TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR CONDITION II EVENTS

<u>Accident</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Time (sec.)</u>
4. Without pressurizer control (EOL)	Loss of electrical load	0
	Initiation of steam release from steam generator safety valves	9.0
	High pressurizer pressure reactor trip point reached	6.0
	Rods begin to drop	8.0
	Minimum DNBR occurs	(1)
	Peak pressurizer pressure occurs	9.0

(1) DNBR does not decrease below its initial value.

TABLE 15.2-1 (Sheet 8 of 10)

TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR CONDITION II EVENTS

<u>Accident</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Time (sec.)</u>
Loss of Normal Feedwater and Loss of Off-site Power to the Station Auxiliaries (Station Blackout)	Low-low steam generator water level reactor trip; reactor coolant pumps begin to coast down	0
	Rods begin to drop	2
	Two steam generators begin to receive auxiliary feed from one motor- driven auxiliary feedwater pump	60
	Peak water level in pressurizer occurs	3250
Excessive feedwater at full load	One main feedwater control valve fails fully open	0
	Minimum DNBR occurs	15.2
	Feedwater flow isolated due to high-high steam generator level	14.0


TABLE 15.2-1 (Sheet 9 of 10)

TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR CONDITION II EVENTS


<u>Accident</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Time (sec.)</u>
Excessive Load Increase		
1. Manual Reactor Control (BOL)	10 percent step load increase	0
	Equilibrium conditions reached (approximate times only)	200
2. Manual Reactor Control (EOL)	10 percent step load increase	0
	Equilibrium conditions reached (approximate times only)	75
3. Automatic Reactor Control (BOL)	10 percent step load increase	0
	Equilibrium conditions reached	100
4. Automatic Reactor Control (EOL)	10 percent step load increase	0
	Equilibrium conditions reached (approximate time only)	50

TABLE 15.2-1 (Sheet 10 of 10)
TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR CONDITION II EVENTS

<u>Accident</u>	<u>Events</u>	<u>Time (sec.)</u>
Accidental depressurization of the Reactor Coolant system	Inadvertent Opening of one RCS Safety Valve	0
	Reactor Trip	22.1
	Minimum DNBR occurs	24.0
Accidental depressurization of the Main Steam System	Inadvertent Opening of one main steam safety or relief valve	0
	Pressurizer Empties	172
	2,000 ppm boron reaches RCS loops	214
Inadvertent Operation of SI during Power Operation	Charging pumps begin borated water	0
	Low pressure trip point reached	64
	Rods begin to drop	66



PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION	Variation of K_{EFF} with Core Temperature
	Updated FSAR Figure 15.2-41




PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY
SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION


Safety Injection Curve

Updated FSAR

Figure 15.2-42



PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION	Transient Response for a Steam Line Break Equivalent to 228 Lb/Sec at 1015 PSIA with Outside Power Available
	Updated FSAR Figure 15.2-43



DELETE FIGURE

Revision 0
July 22, 1982

ATTACHMENT C

REVISED SALEM FSAR SECTION 15.4.2
MAJOR SECONDARY SYSTEM PIPE RUPTURE

15.4.2 MAJOR SECONDARY SYSTEM PIPE RUPTURE

15.4.2.1 IDENTIFICATION OF CAUSES AND ACCIDENT DESCRIPTION

The steam release arising from a rupture of a main steam pipe would result in an initial increase in steam flow which decreases during the accident as the steam pressure falls. The energy removal from the Reactor Coolant System causes a reduction of coolant temperature and pressure. In the presence of a negative moderator temperature coefficient, the cooldown results in a reduction of core shutdown margin. If the most reactive rod cluster control assembly is assumed stuck in its fully withdrawn position after reactor trip, there is an increased possibility that the core will become critical and return to power. A return to power following a steam pipe rupture is a potential problem mainly because of the high power peaking factors which exist assuming the most reactive rod cluster control assembly to be stuck in its fully withdrawn position. The core is ultimately shutdown by the boric acid injection delivered by the Safety Injection System.

The analysis of a main steam pipe rupture is performed to demonstrate that the following criteria are satisfied:

1. Assuming a stuck rod cluster control assembly, with or without offsite power, and assuming a single failure in the engineered safeguards there is no consequential damage to the primary system and the core remains in place and intact.
2. Energy release to containment from the worst steam pipe break does not cause failure of the containment structure.

Although DNB and possible clad perforation following a steam pipe rupture are not necessarily unacceptable, the following analysis, in fact, shows that no DNB occurs for any rupture assuming the most reactive assembly stuck in its fully withdrawn position.

The following functions provide the necessary protection against a steam pipe rupture:

1. Safety injection system actuation from any of the following:
 - a. Two-out-of-three channels of low pressurizer pressure
 - b. High differential pressure signals between steam lines
 - c. High steam line flow in two main steam lines (one-out-of-two per line) in coincidence with either low-low Reactor Coolant System average temperature or low steam line pressure in any two lines.
 - d. Two-out-of-three high containment pressure
2. The overpower reactor trips (neutron flux and ΔT) and the reactor trip occurring in conjunction with receipt of the safety injection signal.
3. Redundant isolation of the main feedwater lines: Sustained high feedwater flow would cause additional cooldown. Therefore, in addition to the normal control action which will close the main feedwater valves, a safety injection signal will rapidly close all feedwater control valves, trip the main feedwater pumps, and close the feedwater pump discharge valves.
4. Trip of the fast acting steam line stop valves (designed to close in less than 5 seconds) on:
 - a. High steam flow in two main steam lines in coincidence with low-low Reactor-Coolant System average temperature or low steam line pressure in any two lines.
 - b. High-high containment pressure

Fast-acting isolation valves are provided in each steam line that will fully close within 7 seconds of a signal to close (including instrumentation delays). For breaks downstream of the isolation valves, closure of all valves would completely terminate the blowdown. For any break, in any location, no more than one steam generator would blowdown even if one of the isolation valves fails to close. A description of steam line isolation is included in Chapter 10.

Steam flow is measured by monitoring dynamic head in nozzles inside the steam pipes. The nozzles which are of considerably smaller diameter than the main steam pipe are located inside the containment near the steam generators and also serve to limit the maximum steam flow for any break further downstream.

15.4.2.2 METHOD OF ANALYSIS

The analysis of the steam pipe rupture has been performed to determine:

1. The core heat flux and Reactor Coolant System temperature and pressure resulting from the cooldown following the steam line break. The LOFTRAN^[27] code has been used.
2. The thermal and hydraulic behavior of the core following a steam line break. A detailed thermal and hydraulic digital-computer code, THINC, has been used to determine if DNB occurs for the core conditions computed in (1) above.

The following conditions were assumed to exist at the time of a main steam line break accident.

1. End of life shutdown margin at no load, equilibrium xenon conditions, and the most reactive assembly stuck in its fully withdrawn position: Operation of the control rod banks during core burnup is restricted in such a way that addition of positive reactivity in a steam line break accident will not lead to a more adverse condition than the case analyzed.

2. The negative moderator coefficient corresponding to the end of life rodded core with the most reactive rod in the fully withdrawn position: The variation of the coefficient with temperature and pressure has been included. The k_{eff} versus temperature at 1000 psi corresponding to the negative moderator temperature coefficient used is shown in Figure 15.4-48. The effect of power generation in the core on over-all reactivity is shown in Figure 15.4-49.

The core properties associated with the sector nearest the affected steam generator and those associated with the remaining sector were conservatively combined to obtain average core properties for reactivity feedback calculations. Further, it was conservatively assumed that the core power distribution was uniform. These two conditions cause underprediction of the reactivity feedback in the high power region near the stuck rod. To verify the conservatism of this method, the reactivity as well as the power distribution was checked. These core analyses considered the Doppler reactivity from the high fuel temperature near the stuck RCCA, moderator feedback from the high water enthalpy near the stuck RCCA, power redistribution and nonuniform core inlet temperature effects. For cases in which steam generation occurs in the high flux regions of the core, the effect of void formation was also included. It was determined that the reactivity employed in the kinetics analysis was always larger than the reactivity calculated for all cases. These results verified conservatism; i.e., underprediction of negative reactivity feedback from power generation.

3. Minimum capability for injection of boric acid (2,000 ppm) solution corresponding to the most restrictive single failure in the safety injection system. This corresponds to the flow delivered by one charging pump delivering its full flow to the cold leg header. Low concentration boric acid (<2,000 ppm) must be purged from the safety injection lines downstream of the Refueling Water Storage Tank prior to the delivery of boric acid to the reactor coolant loops. This effect has been allowed for in the analysis by assuming the lines to contain unborated water. The modeling of the Safety Injection System in LOFTRAN is described in Reference 27.

For the cases where offsite power is assumed, the sequence of events in the Safety Injection System is the following. After the generation of the safety injection signal (appropriate delays for instrumentation, logic and signal transport included), the appropriate valves begin to operate and the high head injection pump starts. In an additional 12 sec, the valves are assumed to be in their final position and the pump is assumed to be at full speed. The volume containing the unborated water is purged before the 2,000 ppm boron reaches the core. This delay, described above, is inherently included in the modeling.

In cases where offsite power is not available, a 12-sec delay is assumed to start the diesels and to load the necessary safety injection equipment onto them.

4. Four combinations of break sizes and initial plant conditions have been considered in determining the core power and Reactor Coolant System transients:
 - a. Complete severance of a pipe outside the containment, downstream of the steam flow measuring nozzle, with the plant initially at no load conditions, full reactor coolant flow with offsite power available.
 - b. Complete severance of a pipe inside the containment at the outlet of the steam generator with the plant initially at no load conditions with offsite power available.
 - c. Case (a) above with loss of offsite power simultaneous with the initiation of the safety injection signal. Loss of offsite power results in coolant pump coastdown.
 - d. Case (b) above with the loss of offsite power simultaneous with the initiation of the safety injection signal.
5. Power peaking factors corresponding to one stuck RCCA and non uniform core inlet coolant temperatures are determined at end of core life. The coldest core inlet temperatures are assumed to occur in the sector with the stuck rod. The power peaking factors account for the effect of the

local void in the region of the stuck control assembly during the return to power phase following the steam line break. This void in conjunction with the large negative moderator coefficient partially offsets the effect of the stuck assembly. The power peaking factors depend upon the core power, temperature, pressure, and flow, and thus, are different for each case studied.

All the cases above assume initial hot shutdown conditions at time zero since this represents the most pessimistic initial condition. Should the reactor be just critical or operating at power at the time of a steam line break, the reactor will be tripped by the normal overpower protection system when power level reaches a trip point. Following a trip at power the Reactor Coolant System contains more stored energy than at no load, the average coolant temperature is higher than at no load and there is appreciable energy stored in the fuel. Thus, the additional stored energy is removed via the cooldown caused by the steam line break before the no load conditions of Reactor Coolant System temperature and shutdown margin assumed in the analyses are reached. After the additional stored energy has been removed, the cooldown and reactivity insertions proceed in the same manner as in the analysis which assumes no load condition at time zero.

However, since the initial steam generator water inventory is greatest at no load, the magnitude and duration of the Reactor Coolant System cooldown are less for steam line breaks occurring at power.

6. In computing the steam flow during a steam line break, the Moody Curve^[25] for $f/D = 0$ is used.
7. Perfect moisture separation in the steam generator is assumed. The assumption leads to conservative results since, in fact, considerable water would be discharged. Water carryover would reduce the magnitude of the temperature decrease in the core and the pressure increase in the containment.

15.4.2.3 RESULTS

The results presented are a conservative indication of the events which would occur assuming a steam line rupture since it is postulated that all of the conditions described above occur simultaneously.

15.4.2.4 CORE POWER AND REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM TRANSIENT

and 15.4-50B

Figures 15.4-50A show the Reactor Coolant System transient and core heat flux following a main steam pipe rupture (complete severance of a pipe) outside the containment, downstream of the flow measuring nozzle, at initial no load condition (case a). The break assumed is the largest break which can occur anywhere outside the containment either upstream or downstream of the isolation valves. Offsite power is assumed available such that full reactor coolant flow exists. The transient shown assumes an uncontrolled steam release from only one steam generator. Should the core be critical at near zero power when the rupture occurs the initiation of safety injection by high differential pressure between any steam line and the remaining steam lines, or by high steam flow signals in coincidence with either low-low Reactor coolant System temperature or low steam line pressure will trip the reactor. Steam release from more than one steam generator will be prevented by automatic trip of the fast action isolation valves in the steam lines by the high steam flow signals in coincidence with either low Reactor Coolant System temperature or low steam line pressure. The steam line isolation valves are designed to be fully closed in less than 5 seconds after receipt of closure signal with no flow through them. With the high flow existing during a steam line rupture the valves will close considerably faster.

The steam flow on Figure 15.4-50^{50B} as well as Figures 15.4-51^{51B} through 15.4-53^{53B} and 15.4-52^{52B} represent steam flow from the faulted steam generator only. In addition, all steam generators were assumed to discharge through the break until steam line isolation has occurred.

52B

53B

As shown in Figures 15.4-~~52~~ and 15.4-~~53~~, the core attains criticality with the rod cluster control assemblies inserted (with the design shutdown assuming one stuck assembly) before boron solution at 2,000 ppm enters the Reactor Coolant system from the Safety Injection System. The delay time consists of the time to receive and actuate the safety injection signal and the time to completely open valve trains in the safety injection lines. The safety injection pumps are then ready to deliver flow. At this stage a further delay time is incurred before 2,000 ppm boron solution can be injected to the Reactor Coolant System due to low concentration solution being purged from the safety injection lines. A peak core power well below the nominal full power value is attained.

The calculation assumes the boric acid is mixed with, and diluted by the water flowing in the Reactor Coolant System prior to entering the reactor core. The concentration after mixing depends upon the relative flow rates in the Reactor Coolant System and in the Safety Injection System. The variation of mass flow rate in the Reactor Coolant system due to water density changes is included in the calculation as in the variation of flow rate from the Safety Injection System and accumulator due to changes in the Reactor Coolant System pressure.

The Safety Injection System flow calculation includes the line losses in the system as well as the pump head curve. The accumulators provide the additional source of borated water if the RCS pressure decreases to below 580 psia. The integrated flow rate of borated water from both the accumulators and the Safety Injection System for each of the four cases analyzed are shown in Figure 15.4-54.

51A and 15.4-51B

Figures 15.4-~~51~~ shows case b, a steam line rupture at the exit of a steam generator at no-load. The sequence of events is similar to that described above for the rupture outside the containment except that criticality is attained earlier due to more rapid cooldown and a higher peak core average power is attained.

52A, 52B 53A, 53B

Figures 15.4-52, and 15.4-53 show the responses of the salient parameters for cases c and d which correspond to the cases discussed above with additional loss of offsite power at the time the safety injection signal is generated. The Safety Injection System delay time includes 12 seconds to start the diesel (including instrumentation delay time) and 12 seconds to get the safety injection pump to full speed. In each case criticality is achieved later and the core power increase is slower than in the similar case with offsite power available. The ability of the emptying steam generator to extract heat from the Reactor Coolant System is reduced by the decreased flow in the Reactor Coolant System. For both these cases the peak core power remains well below the nominal full power value.

It should be noted that following a steam line break only one steam generator blows down completely. Thus, the remaining steam generators are still available for dissipation of decay heat after the initial transient is over. In the case of loss of offsite power this heat is removed to the atmosphere via the steam line safety valves which have been sized to cover this condition.

The sequence of events is shown on Table 15.4-1.

15.4.2.5 MARGIN TO CRITICAL HEAT FLUX

A DNB analysis was performed for the three cases most critical to DNB. It was found that all cases had a minimum DNBR greater than 1.30.

15.4.2.6 OFFSITE DOSES

The off-site doses resulting from the steam line break accident, assuming a primary to secondary steam generator tube leak in the intact steam generators, were calculated. The assumptions and parameters including the mass transferred through the steam generator tube leak used in the analysis are listed below:

1. Prior to the accident, activity of fission products in the primary system is as given in Table 15.4-8. The iodine concentration in the secondary side is 0.28 uCi/cc of equivalent I-131.

2. Off-site power is lost, main steam condensers are not available for steam dump.
3. Eight hours after the accident the Residual Heat Removal System starts operation to cool down the plant.
4. The primary to secondary leakage is evenly distributed in the three non-defective steam generators, no tube leakage in the defective steam generator.
5. Defective fuel is 1 percent.
6. After eight hours following the accident, no steam and activity are released to the environment.
7. No air ejector release and no steam generator blowdown during the accident.
8. No noble gas is dissolved in the steam generator water.
9. The iodine partition factor $\frac{\text{amount of iodine/unit mass steam}}{\text{amount of iodine/unit mass liquid}} = 0.1$ in steam generators
10. The atmosphere dispersion factors (x/Q) at site boundary and low population zone are as listed in Table 15.4-9. The breathing rate is $3.47 \times 10^{-4} \text{ m}^3/\text{sec}$ for 0-8 hours.
11. In the affected steam generator, all the water boils off and releases through the break immediately after the accident. One tenth of the iodines in the water is released to the environment.
12. The primary pressure remains constant at 2235 psig for 0-2 hour and decreases linearly to atmosphere from 2235 psig during the period 2-8 hour.

STEAM LINE BREAK
STEAM RELEASE

	<u>0-2 Hours</u>	<u>2-8 Hours</u>
Mass release from defective S.G. lbs	95,000	0
Steam release from non-defective S.G.'s lbs	424,000	1,188,000
Feedwater Flow to 3 non-defective S.G.'s lbs	433,000	1,300,000
Mass of reactor coolant transferred into 3 non-defective S.G.'s lbs for a primary to secondary leak rate of 1 gpm, lbm	719	2,510

Using the above assumptions, the thyroid inhalation exposure was calculated to be 2.1 rem at the minimum exclusion distance (1270 meters) and 0.37 rem at the 5 mile low population zone radius. Using the conservative calculational models presented in Safety Guide 4, the whole body doses were calculated to be 0.0067 rem at the minimum exclusion distance and 0.0014 rem at the low population zone radius.

TABLE 15.4-1 (Sheet 1 of 3)

TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR CONDITION IV EVENTS

<u>Accident</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Time(Seconds)</u>
Major Reactor Coolant System Pipe Ruptures Double-Ended Cold Leg Guillotine 1. ($C_D = 1.0$)	Start	0.0
	Reactor trip signal	1.65
	Safety injection signal	0.86
	Accumulator injection	14.1
	End of Blowdown	28.1
	Bottom of core recovery	40.34
	Accumulators empty	51.15
	Pump injection	25.86
	End of bypass	25.4
	2. ($C_D = 0.8$)	Start
Reactor trip signal		1.66
Safety injection signal		0.92
Accumulator injection		14.6
End of Blowdown		28.8
Bottom of core recovery		40.95
Accumulators empty		51.6
Pump injection		25.92
End of bypass		26.0
3. ($C_D = 0.6$)	Start	0.0
	Reactor trip signal	1.66
	Safety injection signal	1.03
	Accumulator injection	16.8

TABLE 15.4-1 (Sheet 2 of 3)

TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR CONDITION IV EVENTS

<u>Accident</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Time(Seconds)</u>
	End of Blowdown	30.46
	Bottom of core recovery	42.5
	Accumulators empty	53.64
	Pump injection	26.03
	End of bypass	27.51
Rupture of main feedwater pipe	Feedline rupture occurs	0.00
	High pressure reactor trip setpoint reached (This trip was not considered in the analysis).	11.0
	Affected steam generator liquid discharge; low level coincident with feed/steam flow mismatch in other steam generators; reactor trip setpoints reached.	18.5
	Reactor trip occurs	20.5
	Peak steam relief from pressurizer safety valves	22.5
	Pressurizer fills	527
	Bulk boiling begins in reactor coolant fluid	876

TABLE 15.4-1 (Sheet 3 of 3)
 TIME SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR CONDITION IV EVENTS

<u>Accident</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Time (Seconds)</u>
	Core decay heat decreases to auxiliary feedwater heat removal capacity	2100
Major Secondary System		
Pipe Rupture		
1. Case a	Steam line ruptures	0
	Criticality attained	40
	Pressurizer empty	13
	2,000 ppm boron reaches loops	27
2. Case b	Steam line ruptures	0
	Criticality attained	24
	Pressurizer empty	13
	2,000 ppm boron reaches loops	27
3. Case C	Steam line ruptures	0
	Criticality attained	49
	Pressurizer empty	14
	2,000 ppm boron reaches loops	33
4. Case d	Steam line ruptures	0
	Criticality attained	28
	Pressurizer empty	15
	2,000 ppm boron reaches loops	34

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TABLE 15.4-7 (Sheet 1 of 3)

TABLE 15.4-7

CORE PARAMETERS USED IN STEAM BREAK DNB ANALYSIS

Case a, Time Point										
Parameter	1		2		3		4		5	
	Unit 1	Unit 2	Unit 1	Unit 2	Unit 1	Unit 2	Unit 1	Unit 2	Unit 1	Unit 2
Reactor Vessel inlet temperature to sector connected to affected steam generator °F	454.8	443.2	439.0	435.1	220.1	421.9	405.2	406.9	392.8	396.8
Reactor Vessel inlet temperature to remaining sector	497.4	494.8	495.3	494.3	492.6	493.0	483.2	485.5	468.0	473.8
RCS pressure, psia	907.3	869.5	868.6	849.1	796.7	799.2	693.1	702.4	578.0	597.4
RCS flow,	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Heat flux,	6.18	6.76	6.63	8.28	6.99	8.14	6.83	7.39	6.43	6.32
Time (sec)	25	30	32.5	34.5	47.5	45.5	70	67.5	97.5	92.5

DELETE

TABLE 15.4-7 (Sheet 2 of 3)

TABLE 15.4.7

CORE PARAMETERS USED IN STEAM BREAK DNB ANALYSIS

Parameter	Case b, Time Point									
	1		2		3		4		5	
	Unit 1	Unit 2	Unit 1	Unit 2	Unit 1	Unit 2	Unit 1	Unit 2	Unit 1	Unit 2
Reactor Vessel inlet temperature to sector connected to affected steam generator °F	391.4	386.7	377.8	375.9	348.7	372.5	340.1	367.7	328.6	358.4
Reactor Vessel inlet temperature to remaining sector °F	526.8	523.5	518.8	516.4	470.3	512.0	451.0	505.3	427.8	488.7
RCS pressure, psia	1303.9	1098.8	898.9	879.9	573.9	849.5	523.8	795.5	487.9	644.4
RCS flow,	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Heat flux,	8.22	9.57	8.37	12.45	9.65	11.65	8.46	12.58	7.75	12.02
Time (sec)	25	27.5	35	37	80	41.5	100	49.5	122.5	70

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TABLE 15.4-7

TABLE 15.4-7 (Sheet 3 of 3)

CORE PARAMETERS USED IN STEAM BREAK DNB ANALYSIS

Case d, Time Point										
Parameter	1		2		3		4		5	
	Unit 1	Unit 2	Unit 1	Unit 2	Unit 1	Unit 2	Unit 1	Unit 2	Unit 1	Unit 2
Reactor Vessel inlet temperature to sector connected to affected steam generator °F	390.5	375.5	356.6	350.9	345.5	322.1	312.1	303.2	281.5	284.3
Reactor Vessel inlet temperature to remaining sector °F	530.2	529.9	528.9	529.2	529.1	528.9	528.0	527.5	524.5	526.8
RCS pressure, psia	1712.5	1469.3	1359.1	1264.8	1270.4	1112.1	1004.9	998.3	877.5	891
RCS flow,	47	40.6	33.9	32.3	30.7	24.9	22.8	20.9	17.0	17.4
Heat flux,	5.27	5.8	6.10	6.74	6.2	7.87	4.52	5.10	3.59	3.58
Time (sec)	20	25	32.5	35	37.5	50.5	57.5	65	87.5	85

TABLE 15.4-8


REACTOR COOLANT EQUILIBRIUM FISSION AND CORROSION PRODUCT ACTIVITIES
(BASED ON PARAMETERS GIVEN IN TABLE 11.1-7)

<u>Isotope</u>	<u>Activity</u> <u>μc/cc</u>	<u>Isotope</u>	<u>Activity</u> <u>μc/cc</u>
Br-84	3.34×10^{-2}	Cs-136	2.93×10^{-2}
Rb-88	2.66	Cs-137	.859
Rb-89	6.74×10^{-2}	Cs-138	.670
Sr-89	3.18×10^{-3}	Ba-140	3.24×10^{-3}
Sr-90	7.88×10^{-5}	La-140	1.27×10^{-3}
Sr-91	1.42×10^{-3}	Ce-144	3.88×10^{-4}
Sr-92	5.97×10^{-4}	Pr-144	3.88×10^{-4}
Y-90	1.05×10^{-4}	Kr-85	3.93
Y-91	5.83×10^{-3}	Kr-85m	1.70
Y-92	7.68×10^{-4}	Kr-87	.942
Zr-95	6.66×10^{-4}	Kr-88	2.66
Nb-95	6.57×10^{-4}	Xe-133	194.7
Mo-99	2.36	Xe-133m	2.09
I-131	1.87	Xe-135	5.45
I-132	.657	Xe-135m	.132
I-133	2.89	Xe-138	.468
I-134	.376	Mn-54	5.87×10^{-4}
I-135	1.46	Mn-56	2.20×10^{-2}
Te-132	.208	Co-58	1.89×10^{-2}
Te-134	2.04×10^{-2}	Co-60	5.67×10^{-4}
Cx-134	.142	Fe-59	7.87×10^{-4}

TABLE 15.4-9
 ATMOSPHERIC DISPERSION FACTORS
 AND BREATHING RATES

Distance, m	Atmospheric Dispersion Factors, X/Q (sec/m ³)			
	<u>0 - 2 hrs</u>	<u>2 - 24 hrs</u>	<u>1 - 5 days</u>	<u>5 - 30 days</u>
1270	5.0×10^{-4}	2.5×10^{-4}	4.25×10^{-6}	2.53×10^{-6}
8052	4.0×10^{-5}	2.0×10^{-5}	1.8×10^{-7}	9.6×10^{-8}

<u>Time Period, hr</u>	<u>Breathing Rates, m /sec</u>
0 - 8	3.47×10^{-4}
8 - 24	1.75×10^{-4}
24 - 720	2.32×10^{-4}




PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY
SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

Variation of K_{EFF} with Core Temperature

Updated FSAR

Figure 15.4-48




PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY
SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION


Variation of Reactivity with Power at Constant
Core Average Temperature

Updated FSAR

Figure 15.4-49



PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION	Transient Response to Steam Line Break Downstream of Flow Measuring Nozzle with Safety Injection and Offsite Power (Case a)
	Updated FSAR Figure 15.4-50A




PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY
SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION


Transient Response to Steam Line Break Downstream
of Flow Measuring Nozzle with Safety
Injection and Offsite Power (Case a)

Updated FSAR

Figure 15.4-50B



PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION	Transient Response to Steam Line Break at Exit of Steam Generator with Safety Injection and Offsite Power (Case b)
	Updated FSAR Figure 15.4.51A




PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY
SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

Transient Response to Steam Line Break at Exit
of Steam Generator with Safety Injection and
Offsite Power (Case b)

Updated FSAR

Figure 15.4.51B




PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY
SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

Transient Response to Steam Line Break Downstream
of Flow Measuring Nozzle with Safety Injection,
Without Offsite Power (Case c)

Updated FSAR

Figure 15.4-52A




PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY
SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

Transient Response to Steam Line Break Downstream
of Flow Measuring Nozzle with Safety Injection,
Without Offsite Power (Case c)

Updated FSAR

Figure 15.4-52B




PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY
SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

Transient Response to Steam Line Break at Exit
of Steam Generator With Safety Injection and
Without Offsite Power (Case d)

Updated FSAR

Figure 15.4-53A




PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY
SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

Transient Response to Steam Line Break at Exit
of Steam Generator With Safety Injection and
Without Offsite Power (Case d)

Updated FSAR

Figure 15.4-53B




PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY
SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

Integrated Flow Rate of Borated Water versus Time

Updated FSAR

Figure 15.4-54



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
Revision 0
July 22, 1982

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY
SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

Transient Response to Steam Line Break at Exit
of Steam Generator with Safety Injection and
Offsite Power (Case b) - Unit 2

Updated FSAR

-Figure 15.4-55-



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
Revision 0
July 22, 1982

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY
SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

Transient Response to Steam Line Break at Exit
of Steam Generator With Safety Injection and
Without Offsite Power (Case d) - Unit 1

Updated FSAR

Figure 15.4.56



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
Revision 0
July 22, 1982

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY
SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

Transient Response to Steam Line Break at Exit
of Steam Generator With Safety Injection and
Without Offsite Power (Case d) - Unit 2

Updated FSAR

Figure 15.4.57



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
Revision 0
July 22, 1982

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY
SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

Integrated Flow Rate of Borated Water
versus Time - Unit 1

Updated FSAR

Figure 15.4-58



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Revision 0
July 22, 1982

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION	Integrated Flow Rate of Borated Water versus Time - Unit 2
	Updated FSAR Figure 15.4-59

LCR # 85-07

ATTACHMENT D

MARKED-UP SALEM FSAR TABLE 6.3-3
BORON INJECTION TANK DESIGN PARAMETERS

TABLE 6.3-3

BORON INJECTION TANK DESIGN PARAMETERS

Number	1
Total volume, gal (also useable volume)	900
Boron concentration	
Nominal, ppm	21,000
Maximum, ppm	22,500
Minimum, ppm	20,000
Design pressure, psig	2735
Design temperature, °F	150-180
Material	SS Clad Carbon Steel
Code	ASME III Class C

HEATERS

Number	2
Capacity, kw	6
Type	Strip

LCR # 85-07

ATTACHMENT E

REVISED SALEM FSAR TABLE 15.1-2
SUMMARY OF INITIAL CONDITIONS AND
COMPUTER CODES USED

TABLE 15.1-2 (Sheet 1 of 4)

SUMMARY OF INITIAL CONDITIONS AND COMPUTER CODES USED

FAULTS	COMPUTER CODES UTILIZED	REACTIVITY COEFFICIENTS ASSUMED		DOPPLER ⁽²⁾	INITIAL NSSS THERMAL POWER OUTPUT ASSUMED (MWt)
		MODERATOR ⁽¹⁾ TEMPERATURE ($\Delta k/^{\circ}F$)	MODERATOR ⁽¹⁾ DENSITY ($\Delta K/gm/cc$)		
CONDITION II					
Uncontrolled RCC assembly Bank Withdrawal from a Subcritical Condition	WIT-6, FACTRAN	$+1 \times 10^{-5}$	---	Lower	0
Uncontrolled RCC Assembly Bank Withdrawal at Power	LOFTRAN	---	0 and 0.43	Lower and upper	3423
RCC Assembly Misalignment	THINC, TURTLE, LOFTRAN	---	0	upper	3423
Uncontrolled Boron Dilution	NA	NA	NA	NA	0 and 3423
Partial Loss of Forced Reactor Coolant Flow	PHOENIX, LOFTRAN THINC, FACTRAN	---	0	upper	2396 and 3423
Start-up of an Inactive Reactor Coolant Loop	MARVEL, THINC	---	0.43	Lower	2369
Loss of External Electrical Load and/or Turbine Trip	LOFTRAN	---	0 and 0.43	upper	3423
Loss of Normal Feedwater	BLKOUT	---	NA	NA	3577
Loss of Off-Site Power to the Plant Auxiliaries (Plant Blackout)	BLKOUT	---	NA	NA	3423

TABLE 15.1-2 (Sheet 2 of 4)

SUMMARY OF INITIAL CONDITIONS AND COMPUTER CODES USED

FAULTS	COMPUTER CODES UTILIZED	REACTIVITY COEFFICIENTS ASSUMED		DOPPLER ⁽²⁾	INITIAL NSSS THERMAL POWER OUTPUT ASSUMED (Mwt)
		MODERATOR ⁽¹⁾ TEMPERATURE ($\Delta K/^{\circ}F$)	MODERATOR ⁽¹⁾ DENSITY ($\Delta K/gm/cc$)		
CONDITION II (continued)					
Excessive Heat Removal Due to Feedwater System Malfunctions	MARVEL	---	0.43	lower	0 and 3423
Excessive Load Increase	LOFTRAN	---	0 and 0.43	lower	3423
Accident Depressurization of the Reactor Coolant System	LOFTRAN	---	0	upper	3423
Accident Depressurization of the Main Steam System	LOFTRAN	---	Function of Moderator Density See Sec. 15.2.13 (Fig. 15.2.41)	Fig. 15.4-49	0 (Subcritical)
Inadvertent Operation of ECCS During Power Operation	LOFTRAN	---	0	lower	3423
CONDITION III					
Loss of Reactor Coolant from Small Ruptured Pipes or from Cracks in Large Pipe which Actuate Emergency Core Cooling	WFLASH, LOCTA-R2				3577

TABLE 15.1-2 (Sheet 3)
SUMMARY OF INITIAL CONDITIONS AND COMPUTER CODES USED

FAULTS	COMPUTER CODES UTILIZED	REACTIVITY COEFFICIENTS ASSUMED		DOPPLER ⁽²⁾	INITIAL NSSS THERMAL POWER OUTPUT ASSUMED (Mwt)
		MODERATOR ⁽¹⁾ TEMPERATURE ($\Delta K/^{\circ}F$)	MODERATOR ⁽¹⁾ DENSITY ($\Delta K/gm/cc$)		
CONDITION III (continued)					
Inadvertent Loading of a Fuel Assembly into an Improper Position	LEOPARD, TURTLE	---	NA	NA	3423
Complete Loss of Forced Reactor Coolant Flow	PHOENIX, LOFTRAN THINC, FACTRAN	---	0	upper	2396 and 3423
Waste Gas Decay Tank Rupture	NA	---	NA	NA	3577
Single RCC Assembly Withdrawal at Full Power	TURTLE, THINC LEOPARD	---	NA	NA	3423
CONDITION IV					
Major rupture of pipes containing reactor coolant up to an including double-ended rupture of the largest pipe in the Reactor Coolant System (Loss of Coolant Accident)	SATAN LOCTA-R2	Function of Moderator density See Section 15.4.1		Function of Fuel Temp. See Section 15.4.1	3579
Major secondary system pipe rupture up to and including double ended rupture (Rupture of a Steam Pipe)	LOFTRAN, THINC	Function of Moderator Density See Section 15.2.13 (Fig. 15.2-41)		Fig. 15.4-49	0 (Subcritical)

TABLE 15.1-2 (Sheet 4 of 4)
SUMMARY OF INITIAL CONDITIONS AND COMPUTER CODES USED

FAULTS	COMPUTER CODES UTILIZED	REACTIVITY COEFFICIENTS ASSUMED		DOPPLER ⁽²⁾	INITIAL NSSS THERMAL POWER OUTPUT ASSUMED (MWT)
		MODERATOR ⁽¹⁾ TEMPERATURE ($\Delta k/^\circ F$)	MODERATOR ⁽¹⁾ DENSITY ($\Delta K/gm/cc$)		
CONDITION IV (cont'd)					
Steam Generator Tube Rupture	NA	NA	NA	NA	3577
Single Reactor Coolant Pump Locked Rotor	PHOENIX, LOFTRAN THINC, FACTRAN	---	0	upper	2396 and 3423
Fuel Handling Accident	NA	NA	NA		3577
Rupture of a Control Rod Mechanism Housing (RCCA Ejection)	TWINKLE, FACTRAN LEOPARD	-1 pcm/ $^\circ E$ BOL -26 pcm/ $^\circ F$ EOL	---	Consistent with lower limit shown Fig. 15.1-5	0 and 3423

NOTES:

- (1) Only one is used in an analysis i.e. either moderator temperature or moderator density coefficient
- (2) Reference Figure 15.1-5