The Honorable Alan Cranston United States Senate Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Cranston:

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I hope that this has been responsive to the concerns raised in Mr. Bloudin's letter.

Sincerely,

(Signed) William J. Dircke

William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations

#### Enclosures:

- 1. Cancer Mortality and Morbidity (Incidence) Around TMI -Pennsylvania Department of Health
- 2. May 6, 1983, Order
- 3. Corrective Action Program

#### \*SEE PREVIOUS WHITE FOR CONCURRENCES

ORB#1:DL\* CParrish

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- 1. Cancer Mortality and Morbidity (Incidence) Around TMI Pennsylvania Department of Health
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