

Entergy Operations, Inc. 1448 S.R. 333 Russellville, AR 72802 Tel 479-858-4704

Stephenie L. Pyle Manager, Regulatory Assurance Arkansas Nuclear One

0CAN031804

March 28, 2018

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject: Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure Arkansas Nuclear One – Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-313, 50-368, and 72-13 License Nos. DPR-51 and NPF-6

Dear Sir or Madam:

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.4(b)(5), 10 CFR 50.54(q)(5), 10 CFR 72.4, and 10 CFR 72.44(f), the Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) Emergency Plan (EPlan) Emergency Action Level Classification procedure has been revised and is included in Attachment 2 to this letter. A summary of the changes to the implementing procedure is included in Attachment 1 of this letter.

The screening and/or evaluation concluded that the changes do not reduce the effectiveness of the EPlan, and the EPlan continues to meet the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 10 CFR 50, Appendix E.

This correspondence contains no new commitments. Should you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact me.

Sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY STEPHENIE L. PYLE

SLP/dbb

Attachments:

- 1. Summary of Changes to ANO Emergency Plan Implementing Document
- 2. Procedure OP-1903.010, Revision 54, Emergency Action Level Classification

cc: Mr. Kriss M. Kennedy Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission RGN-IV 1600 East Lamar Boulevard Arlington, TX 76011-4511

> NRC Senior Resident Inspector Arkansas Nuclear One P. O. Box 310 London, AR 72847

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Mr. Thomas Wengert MS O-8B1 One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852

Mr. Michael Laylon Director, Division of Spent Fuel Management Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington D. C. 20555

Mr. Paul Elkmann NRC Region IV (Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector) Division of Reactor Safety 1600 East Lamar Blvd Arlington, TX 76011-4125

Mr. Bernard R. Bevill Arkansas Department of Health Radiation Control Section 4815 West Markham Street Slot #30 Little Rock, AR 72205

ATTACHMENT 1 TO

0CAN031804

SUMMARY OF CHANGES TO ANO EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING DOCUMENT

SUMMARY OF CHANGES TO ANO EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING DOCUMENT

The following tables provide a brief description or summary of changes made to an Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) Emergency Plan (EP) implementing documents included in Attachment 2 of this submittal.

Procedure	Procedure OP-1903.010, Revision 54, "Emergency Action Level Classification"					
Section Revised	Description of Change					
Section 3.2 References Attachment 1 EAL AA2 and Attachment 2 EAL Basis AA2	 General editorial and administrative changes/enhancements including: References to other procedure numbers and titles revised as appropriate. Added further procedure references. Added "Area" To "Fuel Handling" in applicable ANO-1 effluent monitor table 					
	(AU1) - Changed "VALID reading on Channel 7 on any of the following radiationmonitors > the reading shown for ≥ 60 minutes:" To "VALID reading on SPING GasChannel (Unit 2 - Channel 7) on any of the following radiation monitors > the readingshown for ≥ 60 minutes:"					
	(AA1) – Changed "VALID reading on Channel 7 on any of the following radiation monitors > the reading shown for \ge 15 minutes:" To "VALID reading on SPING Gas Channel (Unit 2 - Channel 7) on any of the following radiation monitors > the reading shown for \ge 15 minutes:"					
	(AS1 and AG1) – Changed "VALID reading on Channel 9 on any of the following radiation monitors > the reading shown for \geq 15 minutes:" To "VALID reading on SPING Gas Channel (Unit 2 - Channel 9) on any of the following radiation monitors > the reading shown for \geq 15 minutes:"					
	ANO-1 SPINGs 1 through 4 have been replaced.					
Attachment 1, EAL 1 for AU1, AA1, AS1, and AG1	The proposed change consists of replacing "Channel 7" and "Channel 9" with "SPING Gas Channel" in the denoted radiological effluent EALs (and associated Basis). This change allows the procedure to be compatible with both the current SPINGs on ANO-2 and the relacement SPINGS on ANO-1. The current SPINGs have three gas detectors. The detectors are commonly referred to as "Channel 5" for the low range detector, "Channel 7" for the mid-range detector, and "Channel 9" for the high range detector. The Effluent EALs use this terminology within the EAL description. The replacement SPINGs have two gas detectors which have virtually the same range as the three detectors on the current SPINGS (1E-7 – 1E5 μ Ci/cc). The use of the SPING channel number is not required to determine if the EAL has been met. SPING alarms will continue to annunciate as designed and SPING data will remain available to the ERO personnel as normal. The set point at which the EAL is met is listed in the EAL procedure just below the EAL. Therefore, even though the EAL will not specifically state the channel number, the set point will be available to the user to reference. The proposed change does not affect the EAL or the level at which the EAL is met.					
Attachment 1, EALs AU1, AA1, and AA2 Attachment 2, EAL Basic	Changed "Ch 7 or 9" (or "Channel 7 or 9") To "SPING Gas Channel" in ANO-1 effluent monitor tables.					
Autoninent 2, EAL basis AU1, AA1, and AA2	See above table entry for justification of change.					
Attachment 2, EAL Basis AU1, AA1, AA2, AS1, and AG1	Where applicable, changed "Channel 7" To "SPING Gas Channel (Unit 2 – Channel 7)" Where applicable, changed "Channel 9" To "SPING Gas Channel (Unit 2 – Channel 9)" See above table entry for justification of change.					

Procedure OP-1903.010, Revision 54, "Emergency Action Level Classification"

Description of Change

Bases for Acceptability of Changes

Section Revised

The described changes do not change a meaning or the intent of a description, do not change emergency response facilities or equipment, and do not change a process. The above changes have been screened and/or evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q). The changes continue to meet the applicable planning standards outlined in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), (b)(8), and (b)(9). This revision does not require a change to the Emergency Plan or represent a reduction in the effectiveness to the Emergency Plan.

List of Acronyms

- EAL Emergency Action Level
- ERO Emergency Response Organization
- SPING Super Particulate Iodine and Noble Gas

ATTACHMENT 2 TO

0CAN031804

OP-1903.010, EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTIO	DNS				PAGE N	0.		
1.0	Purpose	•••••	•••••		••••	2		
2.0	Scope .	•••••	•••••		••••	2		
3.0	Referen	ces	••••			2		
4.0	Definitions							
5.0	Responsibility and Authority12							
6.0	Instructions							
7.0	Attachm	ents / T	abs an	d Forms		17		
	7.1	Attachme	ent 1 -	- Index of Emergency Action Levels.		19		
		7.1.1	Tab A	Abnormal Radiation Levels / Radiolo Effluents	ogical	23		
		7.1.2	Tab C	Cold Shutdown / Refueling System Malfunction		28		
		7.1.3	Tab E	Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) Malfunction		35		
		7.1.4	Tab F	Fission Product Barrier Degradation	1	37		
		7.1.5	Tab H	Hazards and Other Conditions Affect Plant Safety	ing	42		
		7.1.6	Tab S	System Malfunction	•••••	55		
	7.2	Attachme	ent 2 -	- ANO EAL Basis Document	••••	64		
	7.3	Attachme	ent 3 -	- EAL Matrix Chart		179		

1.0 PURPOSE

This procedure establishes criteria for detection and classification of plant events into the four standard Emergency Classes.

2.0 SCOPE

This procedure is applicable to Units 1 and 2 in all modes; it does not include specific plant casualty procedures or systems operations requirements, but rather provides administrative processes only.

3.0 REFERENCES

- 3.1 REFERENCES USED IN PROCEDURE PREPARATION:
 - 3.1.1 ANO Emergency Plan
 - 3.1.2 NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1
 - 3.1.3 10 CFR 50
 - 3.1.4 NRC Branch Position on Acceptable Deviations to Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, July 11, 1994
 - 3.1.5 NEI 99-01 Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels
 - 3.1.6 NEI Industry White Paper "Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Programs for Hostile Action," dated November 18, 2005
 - 3.1.7 NRC Bulletin 2005-02, "Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-Based Events"
 - 3.1.8 NRC Information Notice No. 97-45, Supp. 1 Environmental Qualification Deficiency for Cables and Containment Penetration Pigtails
- 3.2 References Used in Conjunction with this Procedure:
 - 3.2.1 EN-LI-102, "Corrective Action Process"
 - 3.2.2 1903.011, "Emergency Response/Notifications"
 - 3.2.3 1903.064, "Emergency Response Facility Control Room"
 - 3.2.4 1903.081, "Technical Support Center (TSC) Activation"
 - 3.2.5 1903.082, "Operational Support Center (OSC) Activation"
 - 3.2.6 1903.080, "Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Activation"
 - 3.2.7 1203.025, "Natural Emergencies"
 - 3.2.8 2203.008, "Natural Emergencies"

3.2.9	1202.XXX.	"Emergency	Operating	Procedures"
5.2.5	1202•MM	LINCEGOINCY	operating	TIOCCOULCD

- 3.2.10 2202.XXX, "Emergency Operating Procedures"
- 3.2.11 1404.052, "Post Earthquake Seismic Data Retrieval"
- 3.2.12 1904.002, "Offsite Dose Projections"
- 3.2.13 NRC Position Paper on "Timeliness of Classification of Emergency Conditions" dated August 17, 1995
- 3.2.14 1607.001, "Reactor Coolant System Sampling"
- 3.2.15 2607.001, "Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System Sampling"
- 3.2.16 1203.048, "Security Event"
- 3.2.17 1903.069, "Equipment Important to Emergency Preparedness"
- 3.2.18 EN-EP-609, "Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Operations"
 - 3.2.19 EN-EP-610, "Technical Support Center (TSC) Operations"
 - 3.2.20 EN-EP-611, "Operations Support Center (OSC) Operations"
- 3.3 Related ANO Procedures:
 - 3.3.1 1043.042, "Response to Security Contingencies"
 - 3.3.2 1502.004, Attachment H
 - 3.3.3 1903.023, "Personnel Emergency"
 - 3.3.4 ANO Security Plan/Security Procedures
 - 3.3.5 1015.007, "Fire Brigade Organization and Responsibilities"
 - 3.3.6 1903.042, "Duties of the Emergency Medical Team"
 - 3.3.7 1903.043, "Duties of the Emergency Radiation Team"
 - 3.3.8 1302.022, "Core Damage Assessment"
- 3.4 Regulatory correspondence containing NRC commitments which are implemented in this procedure are DENOTED in left hand margin:
 - 3.4.1 CNRO-2005-044 (NRC Bulletin 2005-02) Definition Section of EAL Basis Document associated with EAL classifications, Hostile Action, Hostile Force and applicable security related EAL's.

4.0 DEFINITIONS

4.1 AFFECTING SAFE SHUTDOWN:

Event in progress has adversely affected functions that are necessary to bring the plant to and maintain it in the applicable HOT or COLD SHUTDOWN condition. Plant condition applicability is determined by Technical Specification LCOs in effect.

Example 1: Event causes damage that results in entry into an LCO that requires the plant to be placed in HOT SHUTDOWN. HOT SHUTDOWN is achievable, but COLD SHUTDOWN is not. This event is not "AFFECTING SAFE SHUTDOWN."

Example 2: Event causes damage that results in entry into an LCO that requires the plant to be placed in COLD SHUTDOWN. HOT SHUTDOWN is achievable, but COLD SHUTDOWN is not. This event is "AFFECTING SAFE SHUTDOWN."

4.2 ALERT:

Events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline (PAG) exposure levels.

4.3 BOMB:

Refers to an explosive device suspected of having sufficient force to damage plant systems or structures.

4.4 CIVIL DISTURBANCE:

A group of persons violently protesting station operations or activities at the site

4.5 CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY:

The barrier(s) between areas containing radioactive substances and the environment

4.6 CONTAINMENT CLOSURE:

The actions to secure primary containment and its associated structures, systems, and components as a functional barrier to fission product release under existing plant conditions. Containment closure must be capable of being set within 30 minutes. Containment Closure is set when the penetrations are isolated by manual or automatic isolation valve, blind flange, or equivalent.

4.7 CORE DAMAGE:

A failure of fuel cladding integrity to the extent that any of the following happen:

- 4.7.1 Fission product activity in the coolant exceeds the limits in the technical specifications.
- 4.7.2 Fuel is no longer in the original geometry.
- 4.7.3 A major portion of the core cannot be operated for its design cycle length.
- 4.8 COURTESY CALL:

A notification to the Arkansas Department of Health and follow-up notification to the NRC for conditions/events other than those constituting an Emergency Class as listed in procedure 1903.11, "Emergency Response/Notifications", Section 6.3.

4.9 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL (EAL):

A pre-determined, site specific, observable threshold for a plant IC that places the plant in a given emergency classification level. An EAL can be: an instrument reading; an equipment status indicator; a measurable parameter (on-site or off-site); a discrete, observable event; results of analyses; entry into specific emergency operating procedures; or another phenomenon which, if it occurs, indicates entry into a particular emergency classification level.

4.10 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION LEVEL:

One of a minimum set of names or titles established by the NRC for grouping off normal nuclear power plant conditions according to (1) their relative radiological seriousness, and (2) the time sensitive on-site and off-site radiological emergency preparedness actions necessary to respond to such conditions. The existing radiological emergency classification levels, in ascending order of seriousness, are called:

Notification of Unusual Event (NUE) Alert Site Area Emergency (SAE) General Emergency (GE)

4.11 EMERGENCY DIRECTION AND CONTROL:

Overall direction of facility response which must include the nondelegable responsibilities for the decision to notify and to recommend protective actions to Arkansas Department of Health personnel and other authorities responsible for offsite emergency measures. With activation of the EOF, the Emergency Director (ED) typically assumes the responsibility for Emergency Direction and Control. The management of on-site facility activities to mitigate accident consequences remains with the Emergency Plant Manager (EPM) in the Technical Support Center. The Shift Manager retains responsibility for the Control Room and plant systems operation.

4.12 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF):

A near-site emergency response facility located approximately 0.65 miles northeast of the reactor buildings (the ANO Training Center).

4.13 EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE (EPZ):

The EPZ considered by this procedure is the inhalation zone and is that area within approximately a 10 mile radius of ANO.

4.14 EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION (ERO):

The organization which is composed of the Initial Response Staff (IRS), the EOF staff, the TSC staff, the OSC staff, and the Emergency Team members. It has the capability to provide manpower and other resources necessary for immediate and long-term response to an emergency situation.

4.15 EPA PROTECTIVE ACTION GUIDELINE (PAG) Exposure Levels:

The projected dose to reference man, or other defined individual, from an unplanned release of radioactive material at which a specific protective action to reduce or avoid that dose is recommended (i.e., 1 Rem TEDE or 5 Rem Child Thyroid (CDE)).

4.16 EXCLUSION AREA:

That area surrounding ANO within a minimum radius of 0.65 miles of the reactor buildings, but outside the protected area and controlled to the extent necessary by ANO during periods of emergency.

4.17 EXPLOSION:

A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion or catastrophic failure of pressurized/energized equipment that imparts energy of sufficient force to potentially damage permanent structures, systems, or components.

4.18 EXTORTION:

An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force.

4.19 FAULTED:

In a steam generator, the existence of secondary side leakage that results in an uncontrolled drop in steam generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized.

4.20 FIRE:

Combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute FIREs.

Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

4.21 FUEL OVERHEAT:

Condition in which fission products trapped within the fuel pellet are released at an accelerated rate due to increasing temperature. Fuel overheating temperatures typically range from 1600 $^{\circ}$ F to 3600 $^{\circ}$ F cladding temperature.

4.22 GENERAL EMERGENCY (GE):

Events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA PAG exposure levels off-site for more than the immediate site area.

4.23 HOSTAGE:

A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that demands will be met by the station.

4.24 HOSTILE ACTION:

An act toward a Nuclear Power Plant or its personnel that includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or intimidate the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, or water using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be included. HOSTILE ACTION should not be construed to include acts of civil disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the NPP. Non-terrorismbased EALs should be used to address such activities (i.e., this may include violent acts between individuals in the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA).

CHANGE:

4.25 HOSTILE FORCE:

One or more individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, maiming, or causing destruction.

4.26 IMMINENT:

> Mitigation actions have been ineffective, additional actions are not expected to be successful, and trended information indicates that the event or condition will occur. Where IMMINENT timeframes are specified, they shall apply.

4.27 INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI):

> A complex that is designed and constructed for the interim storage of spent nuclear fuel and other radioactive materials associated with spent fuel storage.

- 4.28 INITIAL RESPONSE STAFF (IRS): The emergency organization composed of plant personnel which must be able to respond to the site in accordance with Table B-1 of the Emergency Plan.
- 4.29 INITIATING CONDITION (IC):

One of a predetermined subset of nuclear power plant conditions where either the potential exists for a radiological emergency, or such an emergency has occurred.

4.30 INTRUSION:

> A person(s) present in a specified area without authorization. Discovery of a BOMB in a specified area is indication of INTRUSION into that area by a HOSTILE FORCE.

4.31 LOSS OF PHYSICAL CONTROL OF THE PLANT:

> Plant personnel are unable to operate equipment required to maintain safety functions to:

- Shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition
- Remove residual heat
- Control the release of radioactive material
- Mitigate the consequences of an accident; or
- Cool irradiated fuel assemblies in the Spent Fuel Pool.

4.32 NORMAL MAKEUP (MU) CAPACITY:

Unit 1: Normal makeup capacity is defined as 50 gpm. 50 gpm approximates a leak size for which the ability to make additions to the makeup tank is no longer adequate to maintain makeup tank level.

Unit 2: Normal makeup capacity is defined as 44 gpm. 44 gpm is the capacity of a single charging pump.

4.33 NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS:

Activities at the plant site associated with routine testing, maintenance, or equipment operations, in accordance with normal operating or administrative procedures. Entry into off-normal or emergency operating procedures, or deviation from normal security or radiological controls posture, is a departure from NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS.

4.34 NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT (NUE):

Events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring off-site response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.

4.35 OFFSITE:

Those areas not covered by Section 4.36.

4.36 ONSITE:

The area within the Exclusion Area Boundary

4.37 OPERATIONAL SUPPORT CENTER (OSC):

Emergency response center within the ANO Maintenance Facility where support is coordinated for the following functions:

- Onsite Radiological Monitoring
- Maintenance
- Chemistry
- Emergency Medical Support
- Fire Fighting Support
- The OSC also serves as the briefing area for repair and damage control teams and is located in the Maintenance Facility.

4.38 OWNER CONTROLLED AREA (OCA):

The external area contiguous to the designated reactor site Protected Area over which site Security exercises control. The OCA extends outward to the Entergy site property lines.

4.39 PLANT TRANSIENT:

- 4.39.1 Any unplanned reactor trip from criticality.
- 4.39.2 A planned reactor trip in which the expected post-trip response did not occur.
- 4.39.3 Any event resulting in an automatic ESAS (Unit 1) or ESF (Unit 2) actuation or any event requiring manual initiation of these systems where automatic initiation would likely have occurred
- 4.39.4 Any turbine-generator power change in excess of 100 MWe in less than one (1) minute other than a momentary spike due to a grid disturbance or a manually initiated runback.
- 4.39.5 Any unplanned main turbine or main feedwater pump turbine trip which results in a significant plant transient (change in excess of 100 MWe).

4.40 PROJECTILE:

An object directed toward a Nuclear Power Plant that could cause concern for its continued operability, reliability, or personnel safety.

4.41 PROTECTED AREA:

An area encompassed by physical barriers (i.e., the security fence) and to which access is controlled.

4.42 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) LEAKAGE:

4.43 RUPTURED:

In a steam generator, existence of primary-to-secondary leakage of a magnitude sufficient to require or cause a reactor trip and safety injection

4.44 SABOTAGE:

Deliberate damage, mis-alignment, or mis-operation of plant equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable. Equipment found tampered with or damaged due to malicious mischief may not meet the definition of SABOTAGE until this determination is made by security supervision.

4.45 SECURITY CONDITION:

Any Security Event as listed in the approved security contingency plan that constitutes a threat/compromise to site security, threat/risk to site personnel, or a potential degradation to the level of safety of the plant. A SECURITY CONDITION does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION.

4.46 SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT:

An UNPLANNED event involving one or more of the following: (1) automatic turbine runback > 25% thermal reactor power, (2) electrical load rejection > 25% full electrical load, (3) Reactor Trip, (4) Safety Injection Activation, or (5) thermal power oscillations > 10%.

4.47 SITE AREA EMERGENCY (SAE):

Events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts; 1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or; 2) that prevent effective access to, equipment needed for the protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA PAG exposure levels beyond the site boundary.

4.48 STRIKE ACTION:

A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on Entergy or its affiliates. The STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS.

4.49 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC):

The location within the ANO Administration Building equipped with instrumentation and communication systems and facilities useful in monitoring the course of an accident; this center is located in the 3rd Floor of the ANO Administration Building.

4.50 UNISOLABLE:

A breach or leak that cannot be promptly isolated

4.51 UNPLANNED:

A parameter change or an event that is not the result of an intended evolution and requires corrective or mitigative actions

4.52 VALID:

An indication, report, or condition, is considered to be VALID when it is verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indicator's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment.

4.53 VISIBLE DAMAGE:

Damage to equipment or structures that is readily observable without measurement, testing, or analysis. Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of the affected structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, paint blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should not be included.

4.54 VITAL AREAS:

Any area within a protected area containing any equipment, system or device which, by result of failure, destruction or associated release, could directly or indirectly endanger the health and safety of the public.

5.0 RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY

- 5.1 The responsibility for event classification is assigned to the individual with responsibility for Emergency Direction and Control (i.e., The Shift Manager or Emergency Director).
- 5.2 The Control Room Supervisor (CRS) will assume Emergency Direction and Control responsibilities whenever the SM is not available to assume this responsibility (e.g. the SM becomes incapacitated and a replacement has not yet arrived).
- 5.3 Any individual who observes an initiating condition which warrants an emergency class declaration, as described in Attachment 1, shall immediately notify the person with current responsibility for Emergency Direction and Control (i.e. SM/ED).

CHANGE: 054

6.0 INSTRUCTIONS

NOTE

On emergencies that affect both units such as earthquakes, tornadoes, etc., the unit with the highest Emergency Action Level Classification should declare the emergency. **IF** the Emergency Action Level Classification is the same, **THEN** the Shift Managers should determine which unit has Emergency Direction and Control based on plant conditions, manpower, etc.

6.1 CLASSIFYING EMERGENCIES:

NOTE

NRC 10CFR50 Appendix E IV. C.2 requires the capability to assess, classify, and declare an emergency condition within <u>15 minutes</u> after the availability of indications to plant operators that an emergency action level has been exceeded and SHALL PROMPTLY declare the emergency condition as soon as possible following identification of the appropriate emergency classification level.

NOTE

The emergency action levels described in this procedure are not intended to be used during maintenance and/or testing situations where abnormal temperature, pressure, equipment status, etc., is expected. In addition, each EAL contains information on the mode(s) of operation during which it is applicable.

NOTE

When determining EAL classifications the EAL bases should be referred to if needed.

- 6.1.1 When indications of abnormal occurrences are received by the Control Room staff, the SM/ED shall:
 - A. Verify the indications of the off-normal event or reported sighting.
 - B. Ensure that the immediate actions (e.g., use of Emergency and Abnormal Operating Procedures) are taken for the safe and proper operation of the plant.

NOTE

When plant conditions satisfy multiple EAL classifications then declare the HIGHEST level classification.

- C. **IF** EAL classification is known, **THEN** proceed to appropriate tab.
- D. <u>IF</u> EAL classification is <u>NOT</u> known, <u>THEN</u> compare the abnormal conditions with those listed in Attachment 1 "Index of Emergency Action Levels".
 - 1. Turn to the appropriate tab which corresponds to the condition picked from the Index of EALs.

(Step 6.1.1.D cont.)

- 2. Assess the information available from valid indications or reports, then:
 - Compare information to criteria given for EAL.
 - Review related EALs to determine if plant conditions meet their criteria.
 - Declare the emergency classification that is indicated.
- E. **IF** the indications or reports do not match the given EALs, **THEN** refer to Tab H "Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety" and using appropriate judgment, determine if the plant status warrants an emergency declaration.

NRC Emergency Preparedness Position (EPPOS) 2 states that, "The staff position is that 15-minutes is a reasonable period of time for assessing and classifying an emergency once indications are available to control room operators that an EAL has been exceeded." EPPOS 2 goes on to state that the 15-minute period should not be interpreted as providing a grace period in which corrective actions can be taken to avoid classifying the emergency. Classification is expected to be made upon completion of the assessment without delay. This 15-minute period is the "assessment period" referred to below.

6.1.2 In some cases, the conditions requiring an Emergency Class declaration are discovered and recognized after the conditions requiring such a declaration no longer exist. The discovery could come in a matter of minutes (in the case of a rapidly concluded event), days, or even weeks (as might occur during the review of the response to an abnormal plant condition).

The following guidance should be used to determine the proper notification method for a transient event:

A. Situation 1

It is discovered that plant conditions previously existed that would have warranted the declaration of an Emergency Class. However, at the time of discovery, those conditions were no longer present and there is no current basis for an Emergency Class declaration.

In this case, an actual Emergency Class declaration is not necessary; however, an ENS notification must be made to the NRC within one hour of the discovery reporting that an undeclared Emergency Class previously existed. A Courtesy Call must also be performed in accordance with procedure 1903.011, "Emergency Response/Notifications". (Step 6.1.2 cont.)

B. Situation 2

An event occurs in the plant during which conditions are present that would result in an Emergency Class declaration. The conditions are discovered while they still exist. However, before the completion of the allowed assessment period and before an Emergency Class is declared, the conditions clear.

In this case, the conditions cleared before completion of the assessment and prior to an Emergency Class declaration. Therefore, an actual Emergency Class declaration is not necessary; however, an ENS notification must be made to the NRC within one hour of the discovery reporting that an undeclared Emergency Class previously existed. A Courtesy Call must also be performed in accordance with procedure 1903.011, "Emergency Response/Notifications".

C. Situation 3

An event occurs in the plant during which the conditions are present that would result in an Emergency Class declaration. At the time of discovery, these conditions still exist. Upon the completion of the allowed assessment period, the appropriate Emergency Class is declared. However, before offsite notifications are performed, the conditions requiring the Emergency Class declaration clear.

In this case, an Initial Notification (within 15 minutes) to State and local authorities shall be performed in accordance with procedure 1903.011, "Emergency Response/Notifications". This notification is to inform State and local authorities that the station was briefly in a declared Emergency Class but the conditions meeting the criteria for that Emergency Class no longer exist.

Notification to the NRC should follow immediately after notification of State and local authorities and not later than one hour of the event. Activation of the Emergency Response Organization should be based on current plant conditions. Offsite organizations should be informed that the conditions requiring an emergency class declaration no longer exist and State and local authorities should activate their emergency response organizations based on the current plant conditions.

6.1.3 IF NO emergency declaration is required, <u>THEN</u> refer to procedure 1903.011, "Emergency Response / Notifications", Section 6.4 to determine if the event warrants a "For Information Only" notification to Entergy Management, NRC Resident Inspector and/or the Arkansas Department of Health.

6.1.4 Upon declaration of an emergency classification implement procedure, 1903.011, "Emergency Response / Notifications", to ensure that immediate notification requirements are met and the proper Emergency Plan response is taken.

- 6.1.5 Upgrade the emergency classification if plant conditions degrade per steps 6.1.1.A through E.
- 6.1.6 Downgrade the emergency classification when plant conditions have improved and step 6.2 is applicable.
- 6.2 DOWNGRADING THE EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION:
 - 6.2.1 Assess the current plant conditions, then perform the following:
 - A. Compare the abnormal conditions with those listed in the "Index Of Emergency Action Levels".
 - B. Turn to the appropriate tab which corresponds to the condition picked from the Index of EALs.
 - C. Assess the information available from valid indications or reports, compare it to the given EALs. Obtain concurrence from NRC and State officials that downgrading is appropriate (if their emergency response organizations have been activated as a result of this event). Downgrade to the emergency classification that is indicated.
 - D. If the indications or reports do not match the given EALs, then refer to Tab H "Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety" and using appropriate judgment, determine if the plant status warrants downgrading the emergency classification.
 - 6.2.2 Perform notifications to downgrade the emergency classification if appropriate per procedure 1903.011, "Emergency Response/Notifications".
 - 6.2.3 **IF** NO emergency classification appears necessary, **THEN** TERMINATE the emergency per step 6.3.
 - 6.2.4 **IF** the emergency classification is still REQUIRED, <u>THEN</u> repeat steps 6.2.1 through 6.2.3 whenever plant conditions again appear to have improved.

6.3 TERMINATING THE EMERGENCY:

- 6.3.1 Compare the existing plant conditions with the following:
 - A. Plant conditions no longer meet the emergency action level criteria <u>AND</u> it appears unlikely that current conditions will degrade further requiring reinstitution of an emergency classification.
 - B. Non-routine releases of radioactive material to the environment are under control or terminated.
 - C. Any fire, flood, earthquake, or similar emergency condition is controlled or has ceased.
 - D. All specified corrective actions have occurred <u>OR</u> the plant has been placed in the appropriate operational mode.
 - E. All required notifications have been completed.
 - F. NRC and State officials are in agreement that termination or transition to the recovery phase is appropriate (if their emergency response organizations have been activated as a result of this event).
- 6.3.2 **IF** the conditions of 6.3.1 A-F are met, **THEN** TERMINATE the emergency or proceed to the recovery phase.

7.0 ATTACHMENTS / TABS AND FORMS

- 7.1 Attachment 1 Index of Emergency Action Levels
 - 7.1.1 TAB A: Abnormal Radiation Levels / Radiological Effluents
 - 7.1.2 TAB C: Cold Shutdown / Refueling System Malfunction
 - 7.1.3 TAB E: Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) Malfunction
 - 7.1.4 TAB F: Fission Product Barrier Degradation
 - 7.1.5 TAB H: Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety
 - 7.1.6 TAB S: System Malfunction
- 7.2 Attachment 2 ANO EAL Basis Document
- 7.3 Attachment 3 EAL Matrix Chart

PROC./WORK PLAN NO.	PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE:	PAGE:	18 of 181
1903.010	EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION	CHANGE:	054

ATTACHMENT 1

INDEX OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS

PROC./WORK	K PLAN NO.	PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE:	PAGE:	19 of 181				
1903	.010	EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION	CHANGE:	054				
<u>SECTIC</u>	<u>)N</u>	INDEX OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS		PAGE				
<u> TAB A:</u>	Abnorma	I Radiation Levels / Radiological Effluents						
AU1	Any relea ODCM lir	use of gaseous or liquid radioactivity to the environment > 2 time nits for ≥60 minutes	es the	24				
AA1	Any relea ODCM lir	use of gaseous or liquid radioactivity to the environment > 200 ti nits for ≥15 minutes	mes the	24				
AS1	AS1 Offsite dose resulting from an actual or IMMINENT release of gaseous radioactivity > 100 mR TEDE or 500 mR child thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release							
AG1	1 Offsite dose resulting from an actual or IMMINENT release of gaseous radioactivity >1000 mR TEDE or 5000 mR child thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release using actual meteorology							
AU2	UNPLAN	NED rise in plant radiation levels		26				
AA2	Damage the uncov	to irradiated fuel or loss of water level that has resulted or will reversing of irradiated fuel outside the reactor vessel	esult in	26				
AA3	Rise in ra	idiation levels within the facility that impedes operation of system to maintain plant safety functions	ms	27				
<u> TAB C:</u>	Cold Shu	tdown / Refueling System Malfunction						
CU1	RCS leak	age		29				
CA1	Loss of R	CS / reactor vessel inventory		29				
CS1	Loss of R capability	CS / reactor vessel inventory affecting core decay heat remova	ıl	29				
CG1	Loss of R	Loss of RCS / reactor vessel inventory affecting fuel clad integrity with						

containment challengedCU2UNPLANNED loss of RCS / reactor vessel inventory29

CU3	UNPLANNED loss of decay heat removal capability with irradiated fuel in the	31
CA3	Inability to maintain plant in Cold Shutdown	31
CAJ		51

CU5 AC power capability to Vital 4.16 KV busses reduced to a single power source 32 ≥15 minutes such that any additional single power source failure would result in station blackout

CA5 Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to Vital 4.16KV busses \geq 15 minutes 32

PROC./WORK PLAN NO.		PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE:	PAGE:	20 of 181		
1903	.010	EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION	CHANGE:	054		
SECTIC	<u>)N</u>	TABLE OF CONTENTS		<u>PAGE</u>		
CU6	Loss of re	equired DC power ≥ 15 minutes		33		
CU7	Inadverte	ent criticality		33		
CU8	CU8 Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities					
<u> TAB E:</u>	Independ	ent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) Malfunction				
E-HU1	Damage	to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY		36		
<u> TAB F:</u>	Fission P	roduct Barrier Degradation				
	General I	Bases		38		
	Fuel Clac	Barrier EALs (FCB)		38		
	RCS Bar	rier EALs (RCB)		38		
	Containm	nent Barrier EALS (CNB)		38		
<u> TAB H:</u>	Hazards	and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety				
HU1	Confirme degradat	d SECURITY CONDITION or threat which indicates a potential ion in the level of safety of the plant		43		
HA1	HOSTILE threat	ACTION within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne	e attack	43		
HS1	HOSTILE	ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA		42		
HG1	HOSTILE	ACTION resulting in loss of physical control of the facility		43		
HU2	Other cor NUE	nditions exist which in the judgment of the SM warrant declaration	on of an	44		
HA2	Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the SM / ED warrant declaration an Alert					
HS2	Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the SM / ED warrant declaration of a Site Area Emergency					
HG2	Other cor a Genera	aration of	f 44			
HA3	Control re		45			
HS3	Control F establish		45			

PROC./WOR	K PLAN NO.	PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE:	PAGE:	21 of 181		
1903	.010	EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION		054		
			CHANGE.	034		
SECTIC	N	TABLE OF CONTENTS		PAGE		
	211					
HU4	FIRE with detection	nin the PROTECTED AREA not extinguished within 15 minutes or EXPLOSION within the PROTECTED AREA	of	46		
HA4	FIRE or E establish	EXPLOSION affecting the operability of plant safety systems re or maintain safe shutdown	quired to	46		
HU5	Release to NORM	of toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant, or flammable gases deemed de IAL PLANT OPERATIONS	trimental	49		
HA5	1A5 Access to a VITAL AREA is prohibited due to toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gases which jeopardize operation of operable equipment required to maintain safe operations or safely shutdown the reactor.					
HU6	Natural o	r destructive phenomena affecting the PROTECTED AREA		51		
HA6	Natural o	r destructive phenomena affecting VITAL AREAS		51		
TADO	Suctor	Molfunction				
<u> 1AD 3 .</u>	. System	wanunction				
SU1	Loss of a	II offsite AC power to Vital 4.16 KV busses \geq 15 minutes		56		
SA1	AC powe 15 minute station bl	er capability to Vital 4.16 KV busses reduced to a single power s es such that any additional single power source failure would re ackout	source ≥ sult in	56		
SS1	Loss of a	Il offsite and all onsite AC power to Vital 4.16 KV busses \ge 15 r	ninutes	56		
SG1	Prolonge	d loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to Vital 4.16 KV bus	ses	56		
SA3	Automati reactor c	c trip fails to shutdown the reactor and the manual actions take ontrol console are successful in shutting down the reactor	n from the	e 57		
SS3	Automati reactor c	c trip fails to shutdown the reactor and manual actions taken fro ontrol console are not successful in shutting down the reactor	om the	55		
SG3	Automatic trip and all manual actions fail to shutdown the reactor and indication of an extreme challenge to the ability to cool the core exists					
SS4	Loss of all vital DC power ≥ 15 minutes					
SU6	UNPLANNED loss of safety system annunciation or indication in the Control Room ≥ 15 minutes					
SA6	UNPLANNED loss of safety system annunciation or indication in the Control Room with either (1) a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress, or (2) compensatory indicators unavailable					
SS6	Inability t	o monitor a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress		59		
SU7	RCS leak	kage		60		

PROC./WORK PLAN NO.		PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE:	PAGE: 22 of 181
1903.010		EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION	CHANGE: 054
<u>SECTIO</u>	<u>N</u>	TABLE OF CONTENTS	PAGE
SU8	Loss of a	Il onsite or offsite communications capabilities	61
SU9	Fuel clad	degradation	62
SU10	Inadverte	ent criticality	63
SU11	Inability t	o reach required operating mode within Technical Specification	limits 63

PROC./WORK PLAN NO.	PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE:	PAGE:	23 of 181
1903.010	EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION	CHANGE	054

TAB A

Abnormal Radiation Levels / Radiological Effluents

G		GENCY	51		KGENCY		ALERI			UNUSUAL EVE	NI
				ABNORMA	L RADIOLO	GICAL E	FFLUENTS				
AG1	1 2	3456D	AS1	1 2	3 4 5 6 D	AA1	1 2 3	4 5 6 D	AU1	1 2 3	4 5 6 D
Offsite dose resulting from an actual or IMMINENT release of gaseous radioactivity > 1000 mR TEDE or 5000 mR child thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release using actual meteorology			Offsite dose resulting from an actual or IMMINENT release of gaseous radioactivity > 100 mR TEDE or 500 mR child thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release			Any release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity to the environment > 200 times the ODCM limits for ≥ 15 minutes Emergency Action Level(s):			Any release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity to the environment > 2 times the ODCM limits for ≥ 60 minutes Emergency Action Level(s):		
Emerae	ncv Action Leve	l(s):	Emerge	ncv Action Leve	l(s):	NOTE:			NOTE:		
NOTE: The SM / I	ED should not wait un	til the	NOTE: The SM/	ED should not wait un	til the	The SM / applicable declare th that the re	ED should not wait un time has elapsed, bu e event as soon as it lease duration has ex	til the t should is determined ceeded, or	The SM time has event as release	should not wait until the elapsed, but should de soon as it is determine duration has exceeded,	e applicable clare the ed that the or will likely
applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition will likely exceed the applicable time. If dose assessment results are available, the classification should be based on EAL #2 instead of EAL #1. Do not delay declaration awaiting dose assessment results		t should declare nined that the pplicable time. available, the n EAL #2 / declaration lts.	applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition will likely exceed the applicable time. If dose assessment results are available, the classification should be based on EAL #2 instead of EAL #1. Do not delay declaration awaiting dose assessment results.			will likely exceed, the applicable time. In the absence of data to the contrary, assume that the release duration has exceeded the applicable time if an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown.			exceed, the applicable time. In the absence of data to the contrary, assume that the release duration has exceeded the applicable time if an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown.		
 VALID reading on SPING Gas Channel (Unit 2 – Channel 9) on any of the following radiation monitors > the reading shown for > 15 minutes: 		NG Gas nnel 9) on diation shown for	 VALID reading on SPING Gas Channel (Unit 2 – Channel 9) on any of the following radiation monitors > the reading shown for ≥ 15 minutes: 			 VALID reading on SPING Gas Channel (Unit 2 – Channel 7) on any of the following radiation monitors > the reading shown for ≥ 15 minutes: 			 VALID reading on SPING Gas Channel (Unit 2 – Channel 7) of any of the following radiation monitors > the reading shown ≥ 60 minutes: 		
M	ONITORS – Unit 1	LIMIT	MONITORS – Unit 1 LIMI		LIMIT	MONITORS – Unit 1 LIMIT		LIMIT		LIMIT	
RX-9820	Containment Purge	1.18E+2 µCi/cc	RX-9820	Containment Purge	1.18E+1 µCi/cc	RX-9820	Containment Purge	1.18E0 µCi/cc	RX-9820	Containment Purge	1.18E-02 µCi/cc
RX-9825	Radwaste Area	1.07E+2 µCi/cc	RX-9825	Radwaste Area	1.07E+1 µCi/cc	RX-9825	Radwaste Area	1.07E0 µCi/cc	RX-9825	Radwaste Area	1.07E-02 µCi/cc
RX-9830	Fuel Handling Area	9.08E+1 µCi/cc	RX-9830	Fuel Handling Area	9.08E0 µCi/cc	RX-9830	Fuel Handling Area	9.08E-1 µCi/cc	RX-9830	Fuel Handling Area	9.08E-03 µCi/cc
RX-9835	Emerg. Penetration Room	1.91E+3 µCi/cc	RX-9835	Emerg. Penetration Room	1.91E+2 µCi/cc	RX-9835	Emerg. Penetration Room	1.91E+1 µCi/cc	RX-9835	Emerg. Penetration Room	1.91E-01 µCi/cc
M	ONITORS – Unit 2	LIMIT	м	ONITORS – Unit 2	LIMIT	м	ONITORS – Unit 2	LIMIT		MONITORS – Unit 2	LIMIT
2RX-9820	Containment Purge	8.92E+1 µCi/cc	2RX-9820	Containment Purge	8.92E0 µCi/cc	2RX-9820	Containment Purge	8.92E-1 µCi/cc	2RX-9820	Containment Purge	8.92E-3 µCi/cc
2RX-9825	Radwaste Area	6.64E+1 µCi/cc	2RX-9825	Radwaste Area	6.64E0 µCi/cc	2RX-9825	Radwaste Area	6.64E-1 µCi/cc	2RX-9825	5 Radwaste Area	6.64E-3 µCi/cc
2RX-9830	Fuel Handling Area	8.92E+1 µCi/cc	2RX-9830	Fuel Handling Area	8.92E0 µCi/cc	2RX-9830	Fuel Handling Area	8.92E-1 µCi/cc	2RX-9830	Fuel Handling Area	8.92E-3 µCi/cc
2RX-9835	Emerg. Penetration Room	1.77E+3 µCi/cc	2RX-9835	Emerg. Penetration Room	1.77E+2 µCi/cc	2RX-9835	Emerg. Penetration Room	1.77E+1 µCi/cc	2RX-9835	Emerg. Penetration Room	1.77E-1 µCi/cc
2RX-9840	PASS Building	8.84E+2 µCi/cc	2RX-9840	PASS Building	8.84E+1 µCi/cc	2RX-9840	PASS Building	8.84E0 µCi/cc	2RX-9840) PASS Building	8.84E-2 µCi/cc
2RX-9845	Aux. Building Extension	2.53E+2 µCi/cc	2RX-9845	Aux. Building Extension	2.53E+1 µCi/cc	2RX-9845	Aux. Building Extension	2.53E0 µCi/cc	2RX-9845	Aux. Building Extension	2.53E-2 µCi/cc
						2RX-9850	LLRW Storage Building	3.54E0 µCi/cc	2RX-9850	LLRW Storage Building	3.54E-2 µCi/cc

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION

GENERAL EMERGENCY	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	ALERT		UNUSUAL EVENT		
	ABNORMAL RADIOLO	GICAL EFFLUENTS				
<u>OR</u>	<u>OR</u>	OR		<u>OR</u>		
AG1 (continued)	AS1 (continued)	AA1 (continued)		AU1 (continued)		
 Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses > 1000 mR TEDE or 5000 mR child thyroid CDE at or beyond the site boundary. 	 Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses > 100 mR TEDE or 500 mR child thyroid CDE at or beyond the site boundary. 	 EITHER VALID reading of the following radiating monitors > 200 times setpoint established by release permit for ≥ 1500000000000000000000000000000000000	ng on any ion the alarm by a current 5 minutes	 2. VALID reading on any of the following radiation monitors > 2 times the alarm setpoint established by a current release permit for ≥ 60 minutes: 		
<u>OR</u>	<u>OR</u>	OR VALID reading gro	eater than		MONITORS – Unit 1	
3 Field survey results indicate closed	3 Field survey results indicate closed		is minutes.	RX-9820	Cont. Purge SPING Gas Channel	
window dose rates > 1000 mR/hr	window dose rates > 100 mR/br	MONITORS – Unit 1	LIMIT	RX-4830	Waste Gas Monitor	
expected to continue for ≥ 60	expected to continue for ≥ 60	RX-9820 Cont. Purge SPING Gas Channel	N/A	RX-4642	Liquid Radwaste Monitor	
minutes; or analyses of field	minutes; or analyses of field	RX-4830 Waste Gas Monitor	9.5E7 cpm	RX-9835	Emerg. Penetration Room	
survey samples indicate child	survey samples indicate child	RX-4642 Liquid Radwaste Monitor	9.5E7 cpm	0.574 0.000	MONITORS – Unit 2	
thyroid CDE > 5000 mR for one	thyroid CDE > 500 mR for one	RX-9835 Emerg. Penetration Room	N/A	2RX-9820	Cont. Purge (Ch 7 or 9)	
hour of inhalation, at or beyond the	hour of inhalation, at or beyond the	MONITORS – Unit 2	LIMIT	2RX-2330	BMS Discharge Monitor	
site boundary.	site boundary.	2RX-9820 Cont. Purge (Ch. 7 or 9)	N/A	2RX-4423	L BW Discharge Monitor	
		2RX-2429 Waste Gas Monitor	9.5E5 cpm	2RX-4425	SG BD to Flume Monitor	
		2RX-2330 BMS Discharge Monitor	9.5E5 cpm			
		2RX-4423 LRW Discharge Monitor	9.5E5 cpm	OR		
		2RX-4425 SG BD to Flume Monitor	9.5E5 cpm	3. Confirm	ned grab sample analyses	
		 OR Confirmed grab sample analyses for gaseous or liquid releases indicates concentrations or release rates > 200 times the applicable values of the ODCM for ≥ 15 minutes. 		for gaseous or liquid releases indicates concentrations or release rates > 2 times the applicable values of the ODCM for ≥ 60 minutes.		

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION

PAGE: 26 of 181

GENERAL EMERGENCY	SITE AREA EMERGENCY		ALERT	U	NUSUAL EVENT	
ABNORMAL RADIATION LEVELS						
		AA2	1 2 3 4 5 6 D	AU2	1 2 3 4 5 6 D	
		Damage to water level result in the	irradiated fuel or loss of that has resulted or will e uncovering of irradiated	UNPLANN levels	NED rise in plant radiation	
		 fuel outside the reactor vessel <u>Emergency Action Level(s):</u> 1. A water level drop in the refueling canal or spent fuel pool that will result in irradiated fuel becoming uncovered. <u>OR</u> 2. VALID alarm on any of the following radiation monitors due to damage to irradiated fuel or loss of water level: 		1. a. UNPLANNED lowering of water level in the refueling		
				 Personnel observation, refueling crew report, indication on area security camera, borated water source (BWST or RWT) level drop due to makeup demands. 		
		RX-9820	Containment Purge (SPING Gas Channel)	b. VAL	ID Area Radiation Monitor	
		RX-9825 RX-9830	Radwaste Area (SPING Gas Channel) Fuel Handling Area (SPING Gas	following:		
		RE-8060	Containment High Range Monitor	DE 0000	MONITORS – Unit 1	
		RE-8061	Containment High Range Monitor	RE-8009	Spent Fuel Area	
		RE-8009	Spent Fuel Area		MONITORS – Unit 2	
		RE-8017	Fuel Handling Area	2RE-8914	Spent Fuel Area	
			MONITORS – Unit 2	2RE-8915	Spent Fuel Area	
		2RX-9820	Containment Purge (Channel 7 or 9)	2RE-8916	Spent Fuel Area	
		2RX-9825	Fuel Handling Area (Channel 7 or 9)	2RE-8912	Containment Incore Instrumentation	
		2RE-8905	Containment Equipment Hatch Area			
		2RE-8909	Containment Personnel Hatch Area			
		2RE-8925-1/2	Containment High Range Monitors			
		2RE-8914/15/16	Spent Fuel Area Monitors			
		2RE-8912	Containment Incore Instruments			

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION

PAGE: 27 of 181

GENERAL EMERGENCY	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	ALERT	UNUSUAL EVENT			
ABNORMAL RADIATION LEVELS						
		 AA3 1 2 3 4 5 6 D Rise in radiation levels within the facility that impedes operation of systems required to maintain plant safety functions. Emergency Action Level(s): 1. Dose rate > 15 mR/hr in any of the following areas requiring continuous occupancy to maintain plant safety functions: Unit 1 Control Room Unit 2 Control Room Central Alarm Station 	OR AU2 (continued) 2. UNPLANNED VALID Area Radiation Monitor readings or survey results indicate a rise by a factor of 1000 over normal* levels. NOTE: For area radiation monitors with ranges incapable of measuring 1000 times normal* levels, classification shall be based on VALID full scale indication unless surveys confirm that area radiation levels are below 1000 times normal* within 15 minutes of the Area Radiation Monitor indications going to full scale indication. * Normal can be considered as the highest reading in the past twenty-four hours excluding the current peak value.			

TAB C

Cold Shutdown / Refueling System Malfunction

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION

PAGE: 29 of 181

GENERAL EMERGENCY	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	ALERT	UNUSUAL EVENT			
COLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION – Loss of RCS / Reactor Vessel Inventory						
CG1 5 6	CS1 5 6	CA1 5 6	CU1 5			
Loss of RCS / reactor vessel inventory affecting fuel clad integrity with containment challenged Emergency Action Level(s): NOTE: The SM / ED should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition will likely exceed the applicable time. 1. a. Core exit thermocouples indicate superheat for ≥ 30 minutes. <u>AND</u> b. Any of the following containment challenge indications: • CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established • Explosive mixture inside containment • UNPLANNED rise in containment pressure <u>OR</u> 2. a. RCS / reactor vessel level cannot be monitored for ≥ 30 minutes with a loss of RCS/ reactor vessel inventory as indicated by any of the following:	Loss of RCS / reactor vessel inventory affecting core decay heat removal capability <u>Emergency Action Level(s):</u> NOTE: The SM / ED should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition will likely exceed the applicable time. 1. With CONTAINMENT CLOSURE <u>not</u> established: Loss of RCS / reactor vessel level as indicated by: Unit 1: RVLMS Levels 1 through 9 indicate DRY Unit 2: RVLMS Levels 1 through 6 indicate DRY <u>OR</u> 2. With CONTAINMENT CLOSURE established, core exit thermocouples indicate superheat. <u>OR</u>	Loss of RCS / reactor vessel inventory <u>Emergency Action Level(s):</u> NOTE: The SM / ED should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition will likely exceed the applicable time. 1. Loss of RCS / reactor vessel inventory as indicated by: Unit 1: RVLMS Levels 1 through 8 indicate DRY Unit 2: RVLMS Levels 1 through 5 indicate DRY <u>OR</u> Unit 1: Reactor vessel level <368 ft., 0 in. (bottom of the hot leg) Unit 2: Reactor vessel level < 369 ft., 1.5 in. (bottom of the hot leg) <u>OR</u>	RCS leakage <u>Emergency Action Level(s):</u> NOTE: The SM should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition will likely exceed the applicable time. 1. RCS leakage results in the inability to maintain or restore level within Pressurizer or RCS level target band for ≥ 15 minutes. CU2 <u>CU2</u> <u>6</u> UNPLANNED loss of RCS / reactor vessel Inventory <u>Emergency Action Level(s):</u> NOTE: The SM should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition will likely exceed the applicable time. 1. UNPLANNED RCS / reactor vessel level drop as indicated by either of the following:			

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION

GENERAL EMERGENCY	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	ALERT	UNUSUAL EVENT		
COLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION – Loss of RCS / Reactor Vessel Inventory					
 CG1 (continued) Containment High Range Radiation Monitor reading >10 R/hr Erratic source range monitor indication Unexplained level rise in Reactor Building Sump, Reactor Drain Tank, Quench Tank, Aux. Building Equipment Drain Tank, or Aux. Building Sump Any of the following containment challenge indications: CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established Explosive mixture inside containment UNPLANNED rise in containment pressure 	 CS1 (continued) 3. RCS / reactor vessel level cannot be monitored for ≥ 30 minutes with a loss of RCS / reactor vessel inventory as indicated by any of the following: Containment High Range Radiation Monitor reading > 10 R/hr Erratic source range monitor indication Unexplained level rise in Reactor Building Sump, Reactor Drain Tank, Quench Tank, Aux. Building Equipment Drain Tank, or Aux. Building Sump 	 CA1 (continued) 2. RCS / reactor vessel level cannot be monitored for ≥ 15 minutes with a loss of RCS / reactor vessel inventory as indicated by an unexplained level rise in the Reactor Building Sump, Reactor Drain Tank, Aux. Building Equipment Drain Tank, Aux. Building Sump, or Quench Tank. 	 CU2 (continued) a. RCS / reactor vessel water level drop below the reactor vessel flange for ≥15 minutes when the RCS / reactor vessel level band is established above the reactor vessel flange. <u>OR</u> b. RCS / reactor vessel water level drop below the RCS / reactor vessel level band for ≥ 15 minutes when the RCS / reactor vessel level band is established below the reactor vessel flange. <u>OR</u> 2. RCS / reactor vessel level cannot be monitored with a loss of RCS / reactor vessel level cannot be monitored with a loss of RCS / reactor vessel level not be monitored with a loss of RCS / reactor vessel level cannot be monitored with a loss of RCS / reactor vessel level cannot be monitored with a loss of RCS / reactor vessel level not prize in (as applicable) the Reactor Building Sump, Reactor Drain Table Aux Building 		
			Reactor Building Sump, Reactor Drain Tank, Aux. Building Equipment Drain Tank, Aux. Building Sump, or Quench Tank.		
EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION

PAGE: 31 of 181

GENERAL EMERGENCY	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	AI	LERT		UNUSUAL EVENT		
COLD SHUTE	OOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM M	ALFUNCTION	– Loss of	Decay H	leat Removal		
		CA3		56	CU3 56		
		Inability to main Shutdown	tain plant iı	n Cold	UNPLANNED loss of decay heat removal capability with irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel		
		 Emergency Action Level(s): 1. An UNPLANNED event results in RCS temperature > 200 °E > 			Emergency Action Level(s):		
		the specified duration in Table C1.					
		Table C1 RCS Reheat Duration Thresholds			condition will likely exceed the applicable time.		
		RCS	Containment Closure	Duration	1. UNPLANNED event results in		
		Intact (but not RCS lowered inventory)	N/A	60 minutes*	RCS temperature exceeding		
		Not intact or RCS	Established	20 minutes*	200 F.		
		lowered inventory	Established	0 minutes			
		*If an RCS heat removal this time frame and RCS the EAL is not applicabl	system is in oper S temperature is t le.	ation within being reduced,	2. Loss of all RCS temperature and RCS / reactor vessel level		
		<u>OR</u>			indication for \geq 15 minutes.		
		NOTE: EAL #2 doe plant condit	es not apply il tions.	n solid			
		2. An UNPLAN in RCS press due to a loss	NED event sure rise > of RCS co				

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION

PAGE: 32 of 181

GENERAL EMERGENCY	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	ALERT	UNUSUAL EVENT
COLD S	HUTDOWN / REFUELING SYST	EM MALFUNCTION – Loss of AC	C Power
		CA5 5 6 D	CU5 5 6
		Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to Vital 4.16 KV busses ≥ 15 minutes Emergency Action Level(s): NOTE:	AC power capability to Vital 4.16 KV busses reduced to a single power source ≥ 15 minutes such that any additional single power source failure would result in station blackout
		 The SM / ED should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition will likely exceed the applicable time. 1. Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to Vital 4.16KV busses ≥ 15 minutes. 	Emergency Action Level(s): NOTE: The SM should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition will likely exceed the applicable time. 1. a. AC power capability to Vital 4.16 KV busses reduced to a single power source ≥ 15 minutes. <u>AND</u> b. Any additional single power source failure will result in station blackout

GENERAL EMERGENCY	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	ALERT	UNUSUAL EVENT						
COLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION – Loss of DC Power									
			CU6						
			Loss of required DC power ≥ 15 minutes						
			Emergency Action Level(s):						
			NOTE:						
			The SM should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition will likely exceed the applicable time.						
			 < 105 volts on required Vital DC bus ≥ 15 minutes. 						

GENERAL EMERGENCY	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	ALERT	UNUSUAL EVENT
COLD SH	Criticality		
			CU7 5 6
			Inadvertent criticality
			Emergency Action Level(s):
			 UNPLANNED sustained positive startup rate observed on nuclear instrumentation.

GENERAL EMERGENCY	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	ALERT	UNUSUAL EVENT
COLD SHU	TDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM	MALFUNCTION – Loss of Com	nunications
			CU8 5 6 D
			Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities
			Emergency Action Level(s):
			 Loss of all Table C2 onsite communication methods affecting the ability to perform routine operations.
			Table C2 Onsite Communications Equipment
			Station radio system
			Plant paging system
			In-plant telephones
			Gaitronics
			<u>OR</u>
			2. Loss of all Table C3 offsite communication methods affecting the ability to perform offsite notifications.
			Table C3 Offsite Communications Equipment
			All telephone lines (commercial and microwave)
			ENS

ΤΑΒ Ε

Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) Malfunction

GENERAL EMERGENCY	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	ALERT	UNUSUAL EVENT						
ISFSI MALFUNCTION – Cask Damage									
			E-HU1 1 2 3 4 5 6 D						
			Note: Security Events are bounded by the Hazards EALs.						
			Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY						
			Emergency Action Level(s):						
			1. Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY.						

TAB F

Fission Product Barrier Degradation

PROC./WORK PLAN NO.	OC./WORK PLAN NO. PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE:						PAGE: 38 of 18
1903.010	1903.010 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION						
GENERAL EN	GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSU						
		FISSIO	N PRODUCT BARRIE	R DEGRADATION - I	Barriers		
FG1	1234	FS1	1 2 3 4	FA1 1	2 3 4	FU1	1 2 3 4
Loss of ANY two b or potential loss of	arriers AND loss third barrier	Loss or po barriers	tential loss of ANY two	ANY loss or ANY poter EITHER fuel clad or R	ntial loss of CS	ANY loss or containment	ANY potential loss of
Note: Determine whi in the conclusi	ch combination of the on that exceeding the	three barriers a loss or potentia	are lost or have a potential loss al loss EALs is IMMINENT. In t	and use the above key to class his imminent loss situation use	sify the event. Al judgment and cl	so, multiple ever assify as if the E	nts could occur which result ALs are exceeded.
Fuel Cl	ad Barrier EALs		RCS Bar	rier EALs C		Containment Barrier EALs	
LOSS	POTENTI	AL LOSS	LOSS	POTENTIAL LOSS	LO	SS	POTENTIAL LOSS
1. Primary Coola	Int Activity Leve	I (FCB1)	1. RCS Leak Rate (R	<u>RCB1)</u> 1. <u>Contr</u>		ntainment Pressure (CNB1)	
 Coolant activity > 300 μCi/gm dose equivalent I-131 acti 	None		RCS leak rate > available makeup capacity as indicated by:	Unit 1: UNISOLABLE RCS leak > 50 gpm with	1. Rapid unex in containm pressure fo	xplained drop nent Illowing an	1. Unit 1: Containment pressure 73.7 PSIA

equivalent I-131 activity by Chemistry sample	indicate Unit 1:	d by: Loss of adequate	11:4 2.	> 50 gpm with Letdown isolated		pressure following an initial rise in containment pressure				73.7 PSIA (59 PSIG) and rising	
OR 2. Radiation levels > 1000 MR/hr Unit 1: at SA-229 Unit 2: at 2TCD-19	Unit 2:	subcooling margin RCS subcooling (MTS) can NOT be maintained at least 30 °F	Unit 2:	UNISOLABLE RCS leak > 44 gpm with Letdown isolated	2	OR Containment pressure or sump level response not consistent with LOCA conditions	2. 3.	Un Exp insi <u>OR</u> a.	it 2: Solosivide C Cont actu Unit Unit LES full t oper	Containment pressure 73.7 PSIA and rising //e mixture exists containment sure > tainment spray Jation setpoint t 1: 44.7 PSIA (30 PSIG) t 2: 23.3 PSIA D SS THAN one train of spray rating	

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION

Fuel Clad E	Barrier EALs	RCS Bar	rier EALs	Containment Barrier EALs		
LOSS	POTENTIAL LOSS	LOSS	POTENTIAL LOSS	LOSS	POTENTIAL LOSS	
2. <u>Core Exit Thermo</u> (FCB2)	couple Readings	2. SG Tube Rupture	(RCB2)	2. <u>Core Exit Thermocouple Readings</u>		
> 1200 °F CET temperature	 Unit 1: ICC exists as evidenced by CETs indicating superheated conditions Unit 2: Average CETs indicate superheat for current RCS pressure 	SGTR that results in an ECCS (SI) actuation	None	None	 a. CETs indicate > 1200 °F AND b. Restoration procedures not effective within 15 minutes a. CETs indicate > 700 °F AND b. RVLMS indicates Unit 1: Levels 1 through 9 DRY Unit 2: Levels 1 through 7 DRY C. Restoration procedures not effective within 15 minutes 	

Fuel Clad Barrier EAL	S	RCS Barrier EALs		Containment Barrier EALs		
LOSS	POTENTIAL LOSS	LOSS	POTENTIAL LOSS	LOSS	POTENTIAL LOSS	
3. <u>Reactor Vessel W</u>	ater Level (FCB3)	3. <u>Containment Radi</u> (RCB3)	ation Monitoring	3. <u>SG Secondary Side Release With</u> Primary-to-Secondary Leakage (CNB3)		
None	 Unit 1: RVLMS Levels 1 through 9 indicate DRY Unit 2: RVLMS Levels 1 through 7 indicate DRY 	Containment high range radiation monitor reading > 100 R/hr	None	 RUPTURED steam generator is also FAULTED outside of containment <u>OR</u> a. Primary to secondary leakrate > 10 gpm <u>AND</u> b. UNISOLABLE steam release from affected steam generator to the environment 	None	
4. <u>Containment Radi</u> (FCB4)	ation Monitoring	4. Emergency Director Judgment (RCB4)		4. <u>Containment Isola</u> (CNB4)	tion Failure or Bypass	
Containment high range radiation monitor reading > 1000 R/hr	None	Any condition in the opinion Loss or Potential Loss of the	of the SM / ED that indicates RCS barrier	 UNISOLABLE breach of containment AND Direct downstream pathway to the environment exists after containment isolation signal 	None	

Fuel Clad Barrier EAL	S	RCS Barrier EALs		Containment Barrier EALs		
LOSS	POTENTIAL LOSS	LOSS	POTENTIAL LOSS	L	OSS	POTENTIAL LOSS
5. <u>Core Damage Ass</u>	essment (FCB5)			5. <u>Containment Radiation Monitoring</u> (CNB5)		
At least 5% fuel clad damage as determined from core damage assessment	None			None		Containment high range radiation monitor reading > 4000 R/hr
6. Emergency Direct	or Judgment (FCB6)			6. <u>Othe</u>	r Indications	<u>(CNB6)</u>
Any condition in the opinion of Loss or Potential Loss of the	of the SM/ED that indicates fuel clad barrier			Elevated readings on the following radiation monitors th indicate loss or potential loss of the Containment barrier		lowing radiation monitors that s of the Containment barrier:
					MONIT	ORS – Unit 1
				RX-98	20 Containm	nent Purge
				RX-98	25 Radwaste	e Area
				RX-98	³⁰ Fuel Han	dling Area
				RX-98	³⁵ Emergen	cy Penetration Room
					MONIT	ORS – Unit 2
				2RX-9	320 Containm	nent Purge
				2RX-9	Radwast	e Area
				2RX-9	Bigging Fuel Han	dling Area
				284-9	BAD Post Acc	
				2RX-9	Auxiliary	Building Extension
						<u> </u>
				7. <u>Eme</u>	rgency Direc	tor Judgment (CNB7)
				Any condition in the opinion of the SM / ED that indicates Loss or Potential Loss of the containment barrier		

TAB H

Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety

GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY		ALERT	UNUSUAL EVENT
HAZAR	DS AND OTHER CONDITIONS A	AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY – S	ecurity
HG1 1 2 3 4 5 6 D	HS1 1 2 3 4 5 6 D	HA1 1 2 3 4 5 6 D	HU1 1 2 3 4 5 6 D
 HOSTILE ACTION resulting in loss of physical control of the facility <u>Emergency Action Level(s):</u> 1. A HOSTILE ACTION has occurred such that plant personnel are unable to operate equipment required to maintain safety functions. 	 HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA <u>Emergency Action Level(s):</u> 1. A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the PROTECTED AREA as reported by ANO Security Shift Supervision. 	 HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne attack threat <u>Emergency Action Level(s):</u> 1. A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA as reported by ANO Security Shift Supervision. 	 Confirmed SECURITY CONDITION or threat which indicates a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant <u>Emergency Action Level(s):</u> A SECURITY CONDITION that does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION as reported by ANO Security Shift Supervision.
 A HOSTILE ACTION has caused failure of Spent Fuel Cooling Systems and IMMINENT fuel damage is likely for a freshly off-loaded reactor core in pool. 		OR 2. A validated notification from NRC of an airliner attack threat within 30 minutes of the site.	 <u>OR</u> 2. A credible site specific security threat notification. <u>OR</u> 3. A validated notification from NRC providing information of an aircraft threat.

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION

PAGE: 44 of 181

GENERAL EMERGENCY	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	ALERT	UNUSUAL EVENT		
HAZARDS	HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY – Discretionary				
HG2 1 2 3 4 5 6 D	HS2 1 2 3 4 5 6 D	HA2 1 2 3 4 5 6 D	HU2 1 2 3 4 5 6 D		
Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the SM / ED warrant declaration of General	Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the SM / ED warrant declaration of a Site Area	Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the SM / ED warrant declaration of an Alert	Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the SM warrant declaration of an NUE		
Emergency	Emergency	Emergency Action Level(s):	Emergency Action Level(s):		
 Emergency Action Level(s): Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the SM / ED indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area. 	 Emergency Action Level(s): Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the SM / ED indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts; (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or; (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the site boundary. 	1. Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the SM / ED indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.	 Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the SM indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs. 		

PROC./WORK PLAN NO.

1903.010

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION

PAGE: 45 of 181

GENERAL EMERGENCY	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	ALERT	UNUSUAL EVENT			
HAZARDS AND	HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY – Control Room Evacuation					
	HS3 1 2 3 4 5 6 D	HA3 1 2 3 4 5 6 D				
	Control Room evacuation has been initiated and plant control cannot be established	Control Room evacuation has been initiated				
	Emergency Action Level(s):	1. Alternate Shutdown procedure				
	1. a. Control Room evacuation has been initiated.	requires Control Room evacuation:				
	AND b. Control of the plant cannot be established in accordance with the following procedures within 15 minutes: Unit 1: 1203.002, "Alternate Shutdown"	Unit 1: 1203.002, "Alternate Shutdown"Unit 2: 2203.014, "Alternate Shutdown"				
	Unit 2: 2203.014, "Alternate Shutdown"					

PROC./WORK PLAN NO.	PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE:		PAGE: 46 of 181
1903.010	EMERGENCY ACTION	LEVEL CLASSIFICATION	CHANGE: 054
GENERAL EME	ERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY	ALERT	UNUSUAL EVENT
	HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDIT	IONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY	
		F	ire
		¹ HA4 1 2 3 4 5 6 D	¹ HU4 1 2 3 4 5 6 D
		FIRE or EXPLOSION affecting the operability of plant safety systems required to establish or maintain safe shutdown	FIRE within the PROTECTED AREA not extinguished within 15 minutes of detection <u>OR</u>
		Emergency Action Level(s):	EXPLOSION within the
		1. FIRE or EXPLOSION resulting	PROTECTED AREA
		Table H1 structure or area containing safety systems or	Emergency Action Level(s): NOTE:
		components <u>or</u> Control Room indication of degraded performance of those safety systems:	The SM should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition has exceeded, or will likely exceed, the applicable time.
			1. FIRE in any Table H1 structure or area not extinguished:
			a. within 15 minutes of Control Room notification
			OR
			 b. within 15 minutes of ²verification of a Control Room FIRE alarm (i.e. Alarm valid until disproved)
			OR
			2. EXPLOSION within the PROTECTED AREA.

¹The HA4 and HU4 EALs apply to any Table H1 structure or area whether in service or tagged out for maintenance. ²Verification of a fire detection system alarm/actuation includes actions that can be taken within the Control Room or other nearby site specific location to ensure that it is not spurious.

CHANGE: 054

Table H1

<u>Unit 1</u>

Reactor Building

All Elevations

Aux Building

All Elevations Including Penthouse/MSIV Room Exceptions: Boric Acid Mix Tank Room (Chem Add Area) 404' (157-B) EDG Exhaust Fan area on 386' (1-E and 2-E)

Turbine Building

All Elevations Including: Pipechase under ICW Coolers CRD Pump Pit / T-28 Room / Area under ICW Pumps

Outside Areas

CHANGE: 054

Table H1

<u>Unit 2</u>

Reactor Building

All Elevations

Aux Building

All Elevations including Aux Extensions

Turbine Building

All Elevations

Outside Areas

PAGE: 49 of 181

GENERAL EMERGENCY	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	ALERT	UNUSUAL EVENT		
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY					
		Toxi	c Gas		
		HA5 1 2 3 4 5 6 D	HU5 1 2 3 4 5 6 D		
		Access to a VITAL AREA is prohibited due to toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant, or flammable gases which jeopardize operation of operable equipment required to maintain safe operations or safely shutdown the reactor Emergency Action Level(s): NOTE: If the equipment in the stated area was already inoperable, or out of service, before the event occurred, then this EAL should not be declared as it will have no adverse impact on the ability of the plant to safely operate or safely shutdown beyond that already allowed by Technical Specifications at the time of the event. 1. Access to a VITAL AREA is prohibited due to toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant, or flammable gases which jeopardize operation of systems required to maintain safe operations or safely shutdown the reactor.	Release of toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant, or flammable gases deemed detrimental to NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS Emergency Action Level(s): 1. Toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant, or flammable gases in amounts that have or could adversely affect NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS. <u>OR</u> 2. Report by Local, County or State officials for evacuation or sheltering of site personnel based on an offsite event.		

PROC./WORK PLAN NO.	PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE:			PAGE: 50 of 181
1903.010	EMERGENCY ACTION L	EVEL CLASSIFICA	TION	CHANGE: 054
GENERAL EMER	GENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY	ALER	Г	UNUSUAL EVENT
	HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITI	ONS AFFECTING P	LANT SAFETY	
			Toxic Ga	IS
		HA5 (continued)	1 2 3 4 5 6 D	
		<u>Unit 1</u>		
		VITAL AREA	APPLICABLE MODES	
		A-4 Switchgear Room	3, 4	
		Upper North Electrical Penetration Room	3, 4	
		Lower South Electrical Equipment Room	3, 4	
		Control Room	ALL	
		Unit 2		
		VITAL AREA	APPLICABLE MODES	
		Auxiliary Building 317' Emergency Core Cooling Rooms	3, 4	
		Auxiliary Building 317' Tendon Gallery Access	3, 4	
		Auxiliary Building 335' Charging Pumps/ 2B- 52	3, 4	
		Auxiliary Building 354' 2B-62 Area	3, 4	
		Emergency Diesel Generator Corridor	3, 4	
		Lower South Piping Penetration Room	3, 4	
		Auxiliary Building 386' Containment Hatch	3, 4	
		Control Room	ALL	

PROC./WORK PLAN NO.

PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE:

1903.010

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION

PAGE: 51 of 181

GENERAL EMERGENCY	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	ALERT	UNUSUAL EVENT			
H	HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY					
		Natural or Destructive Phenomena				
		HA6 1 2 3 4 5 6 D	HU6 1 2 3 4 5 6 D			
		Natural or destructive phenomena affecting VITAL AREAS	Natural or destructive phenomena affecting the PROTECTED AREA			
		Emergency Action Level(s):	Emergency Action Level(s):			
		1. a. Seismic event > Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) as	 Seismic event identified by any 2 of the following: 			
		indicated by annunciation of the 0.1g acceleration alarm.	 Seismic event confirmed by annunciation of the 0.01g 			
		AND	acceleration alarm			
		b. Earthquake confirmed by ANY	Earthquake felt in plant			
		of the following:	National Earthquake Center			
		Earthquake felt in plant	OR			
		National Earthquake Center Control Room indication of	2. Tornado striking within PROTECTED AREA boundary or high winds > 67 mph			
		degraded performance of systems required for the	(2 minute average)			
		safe shutdown of the plant	OR			
		<u>OR</u>	3. Internal flooding that has the potential to affect safety related equipment required by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode in any of the structures or areas in Table H1. (Page 47)			
			OR			
			4. Turbine failure resulting in casing penetration or damage to turbine or generator seals.			
			OR			

PAGE: 52 of 181

GENERAL EMERGENCY	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	ALERT	UNUSUAL EVENT		
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY					
		Natural or Destructive Phenomena			
		HA6 (continued)	HU6 (continued)		
		 2. Tornado striking or winds 67 mph (2 minute average) resulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE to any of the following structures/equipment containing safety systems or components <u>or</u> Control Room indication of degraded performance of those safety systems: Reactor Building Intake Structure Ultimate Heat Sink BWST/RWT Auxiliary Building Turbine Building QCST Control Room Startup Transformers Diesel Fuel Vault 	 5. Lake Dardanelle level < 335 feet. <u>OR</u> 6. Lake Dardanelle level > 345 feet. 		
		<u>OR</u>			
		 Internal flooding in any of the following areas resulting in an electrical shock hazard that precludes access to operate or monitor safety equipment <u>or</u> Control Room indication of degraded performance of those safety systems: Intake Structure Auxiliary Building Turbine Building 			

PROC./WORK PLAN NO.

PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE:

1903.010

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION

PAGE: 53 of 181

GENERAL EMERGENCY	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	ALERT	UNUSUAL EVENT		
HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY					
		Natural or Destrue	ctive Phenomena		
		HA6 (continued)			
		<u>OR</u>			
		 4. Turbine failure-generated PROJECTILES resulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE to or penetration of any of the structures/equipment containing safety systems or components <u>or</u> Control Room indication of degraded performance of those safety systems: Auxiliary Building 			
		 Turbine Building Control Room Startup Transformers 			
		 Lake Dardanelle level < 335 feet and Emergency Cooling Pond inoperable. 			
		<u>OR</u>			

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION

PAGE: 54 of 181

GENERAL EMERGENCY	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	ALERT	UNUSUAL EVENT			
н	HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY					
		Natural or Destruc	ctive Phenomena			
		HA6 (continued)				
		 6. Vehicle crash resulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE to any of the structures/equipment containing safety systems or components or Control Room indication of degraded performance of those safety systems: Reactor Building Intake Structure Ultimate Heat Sink BWST/RWT Auxiliary Building Turbine Building QCST Startup Transformers Diesel Fuel Vault 				

PROC./WORK PLAN NO.	PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE:	PAGE:	55 of 181
1903.010	EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION	CHANGE:	054

TAB S

System Malfunction

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION

GENERAL EMERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY	ALERT	UNUSUAL EVENT				
SYSTEM MALFUNCTION – Loss of AC Power						
SG1 1 2 3 4 SS1 1 2 3 4 5	SA1 1 2 3 4	SU1 1 2 3 4				
SG1 1 2 3 4 Prolonged loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to Vital 4.16 KV busses Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to Vital 4.16 KV busses Emergency Action Level(s): 1. a. Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to Vital 4.16 KV busses. AND Either of the following: • Restoration of at least one Vital 4.16 KV bus in < 4 hours is not likely.	AC power capability to Vital 4.16 KV busses reduced to a single power source ≥ 15 minutes such that any additional single power source failure would result in station blackout Emergency Action Level(s): NOTE: The SM / ED should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition has exceeded, or will likely exceed, the applicable time. 1. a. AC power capability to Vital 4.16 KV busses reduced to a single power source ≥ 15 minutes. <u>AND</u> b. Any additional single power	Loss of all offsite AC power to Vital 4.16 KV busses ≥ 15 minutes Emergency Action Level(s): NOTE: The SM / ED should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition has exceeded, or will likely exceed, the applicable time. 1. Loss of all offsite AC power to Vital 4.16 KV busses ≥ 15 minutes.				

PROC./WORK PLAN NO.

1903.010

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION

PAGE: 57 of 181

GENERAL EMERGENCY	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	ALERT	UNUSUAL EVENT		
SYSTEM MALFUNCTION – Failure of Reactor Protection System					
SG3 1 2	SS3 1 2	SA3 12			
Automatic trip and all manual actions fail to shutdown the reactor and indication of an extreme challenge to the ability to cool the core exists	Automatic trip fails to shutdown the reactor and manual actions taken from the reactor control console are not successful in shutting down the reactor	Automatic trip fails to shutdown the reactor and the manual actions taken from the reactor control console are successful in shutting down the reactor			
Emergency Action Level(s):	Emergency Action Level(s):	Emergency Action Level(s):			
1. a. An automatic trip failed to shutdown the reactor.	 a. An automatic trip failed to shutdown the reactor. 	1. a. An automatic trip failed to shutdown the reactor as			
AND	AND	indicated by reactor power ≥ 5%.			
 b. All manual actions do not shutdown the reactor as indicated by reactor power ≥ 5%. <u>AND</u> c. Either of the following exist or have occurred due to continued power generation: 	 b. Manual actions taken at panel C03 (Unit 1) or panels 2C03/2C14 (Unit 2) do not shutdown the reactor as indicated by reactor power ≥ 5%. 	AND b. Manual actions taken at panel C03 (Unit 1) or panels 2C03/2C14 (Unit 2) successfully shutdown the reactor as indicated by reactor power < 5%.			
 CET temperatures at or approaching 1200 °F. 					
OR					
 Feedwater flow rate less than: 					
Unit 1: 430 gpm					
Unit 2 : 485 gpm					

GENERAL EMERGENCY	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	ALERT	UNUSUAL EVENT		
	SYSTEM MALFUNCTION – Loss of DC Power				
	SS4 1 2 3 4				
	Loss of all Vital DC power ≥ 15 minutes				
	Emergency Action Level(s):				
	NOTE:				
	The SM / ED should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition has exceeded, or will likely exceed, the applicable time.				
	 < 105 volts on all Vital DC busses ≥ 15 minutes. 				

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION

PAGE: 59 of 181

GENERAL EMERGENCY	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	ALERT	UNUSUAL EVENT			
	SYSTEM MALFUNCTION – Loss of Annunciators					
	SS6 1 2 3 4	SA6 1 2 3 4	SU6 1 2 3 4			
	Inability to monitor a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress <u>Emergency Action Level(s):</u> NOTE:	UNPLANNED loss of safety system annunciation or indication in the Control Room with either (1) a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress, or (2) compensatory indicators unavailable	UNPLANNED loss of safety system annunciation or indication in the Control Room for ≥ 15 minutes Emergency Action Level(s):			
	NOTE: The SM / ED should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition has exceeded, or will likely exceed, the applicable time. 1. a. UNPLANNED loss of > approximately 75% of the following ≥ 15 minutes: • Control Room annunciators associated with safety systems. <u>OR</u> • Control Room safety system indication. <u>AND</u> b. A SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress. <u>AND</u> c. Compensatory indications are unavailable.	indicators unavailable Emergency Action Level(s): NOTE: The SM / ED should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition has exceeded, or will likely exceed, the applicable time. 1. a. UNPLANNED loss of > approximately 75% of the following ≥ 15 minutes: Control Room annunciators associated with safety systems. <u>OR</u> Control Room safety system indication. AND b. Either of the following: A SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT is in progress OR	NOTE: The SM / ED should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition has exceeded, or will likely exceed, the applicable time. 1. UNPLANNED loss of > approximately 75% of the following ≥ 15 minutes: a. Control Room annunciators associated with safety systems. <u>OR</u> b. Control Room safety system indication.			
		Compensatory indications are unavailable				

GENERAL EMERGENCY	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	ALERT	UNUSUAL EVENT		
	SYSTEM MALFUNCTION – RCS Leakage				
			SU7 1 2 3 4		
			RCS leakage		
			Emergency Action Level(s):		
			 Unidentified or pressure boundary leakage > 10 gpm. 		
			OR		
			2. Identified leakage > 25 gpm.		

PROC./WORK PLAN NO.

1903.010

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION

PAGE: 61 of 181

GENERAL EMERGENCY	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	ALERT	UNUSUAL EVENT	
SYSTEM MALFUNCTION – Loss of Communications				
			SU8 1 2 3 4	
			Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities	
			Emergency Action Level(s):	
			 Loss of all Table M1 onsite communications methods affecting the ability to perform routine operations. 	
			Table M1 Onsite Communications Methods	
			Station radio system	
			Plant paging system	
			In-plant telephones	
			Gaitronics	
			<u>OR</u>	
			 Loss of all Table M2 offsite communications methods affecting the ability to perform offsite notifications. 	
			Table M2 Offsite Communications Methods	
			All telephone lines (commercial and microwave)	
			ENS	

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION

PAGE: 62 of 181

GENERAL EMERGENCY	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	ALERT	UNUSUAL EVENT	
SYSTEM MALFUNCTION – Fuel Clad Degradation				
			SU9 1 2 3 4	
			Fuel clad degradation	
			Emergency Action Level(s):	
			 Failed Fuel lodine radiation monitor reading indicates fuel clad degradation > Technical Specification allowable limits: Unit 1: RI-1237S reads > 1.3 x 10⁵ cpm 	
			Unit 2: 2RITS-4806B reads > .65 x 10 ⁵ cpm	
			<u>OR</u>	
			 RCS sample activity value indicating fuel clad degradation Technical Specification allowable limits: 	
			 > 1.0 uCi/gm Dose Equivalent I-131 for more than 48 hours 	
			<u>OR</u>	
			• Unit 1: ≥ 60 uCi/gm Dose Equivalent I-131	
			Unit 2: > 60 uCi/gm Dose Equivalent I-131	
			<u>OR</u>	

PROC./WORK PLAN NO. PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE:

1903.010

EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION

PAGE: 63 of 181

GENERAL EMERGENCY	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	ALERT	UNUSUAL EVENT	
SYSTEM MALFUNCTION – Fuel Clad Degradation				
			SU9 (continued)	
			 Unit 1: > 2200 μCi/gm Dose Equivalent Xe-133 for more than 48 hours 	
			 Unit 2: > 3100 μCi/gm Dose Equivalent Xe- 133 for more than 48 hours 	
	SYSTEM MALFUNCTION	- Inadvertant Criticality		
			SU10	
			Inadvertent criticality	
			Emergency Action Level(s):	
			 An UNPLANNED sustained positive startup rate observed on nuclear instrumentation. 	
	SYSTEM MALFUNCTION	N – Failure to Shutdown		
			SU11 1 2 3 4 Inability to reach required operating mode within Technical Specification limits	
			Emergency Action Level(s):	
			 A Plant is not brought to required operating mode within Technical Specifications LCO action statement time. 	

Attachment 2

Arkansas Nuclear One

EAL Basis Document

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>SECTIO</u>	<u>200</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Genera	I Notes on Basis Document Use	69
Overvie	9W	70
<u>Abnorr</u>	nal Radiation Levels / Radiological Effluents	74
AU1	Any release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity to the environment >2 times the ODCM limits for \geq 60 minutes	75
AA1	Any release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity to the environment >200 times the ODCM limits for ≥15 minutes	80
AS1	Offsite dose resulting from an actual or IMMINENT release of gaseous radioactivity >100 mR TEDE or 500 mR child thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release	86
AG1	Offsite dose resulting from an actual or IMMINENT release of gaseous radioactivity >1000 mR TEDE or 5000 mR child thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release using actual meteorology	88
AU2	UNPLANNED rise in plant radiation levels	78
AA2	Damage to irradiated fuel or loss of water level that has resulted or will result in the uncovering of irradiated fuel outside the reactor vessel	83
AA3	Rise in radiation levels within the facility that impedes operation of systems required to maintain plant safety functions	85
Cold S	hutdown / Refueling System Malfunction	90
CU1	RCS leakage	91
CA1	Loss of RCS / reactor vessel inventory	99
CS1	Loss of RCS / reactor vessel inventory affecting core decay heat removal capability	104
CG1	Loss of RCS / reactor vessel inventory affecting fuel clad integrity with containment challenged	106
CU2	UNPLANNED loss of RCS / reactor vessel inventory	92
CU3	UNPLANNED loss of decay heat removal capability with irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel	94
CA3	Inability to maintain plant in Cold Shutdown	101
CU5	AC power capability to Vital 4.16 KV busses reduced to a single power source ≥ 15 minutes such that any additional single power source failure would result in station blackout	95

PROC./WORI	PROC./WORK PLAN NO. PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE: PAGE:		PAGE: 6	66 of 181	
1903	1903.010 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION			054	
<u></u>			CHANGE.	004	
		TABLE OF CONTENTS			
<u>SECTIC</u>	<u>DN</u>			<u>PAGE</u>	
<u>Cold Si</u>	<u>nutdown /</u>	Refueling System Malfunction (continued)			
CA5	Loss of a	Il offsite and all onsite AC power to Vital 4.16KV busses ≥15 mi	nutes	103	
CU6	Loss of re	equired DC power ≥15 minutes		96	
CU7	Inadverte	ent criticality		97	
CU8	Loss of a	Il onsite or offsite communications capabilities		98	
Indeper	ndent Spe	nt Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) Malfunction		108	
	Damage			100	
L-1101	Damage	to a loaded cash CONTINEMENT BOONDART		103	
Fission	Product E	Barrier Degradation		110	
	General	Bases		111	
	Fuel Clac	d Barrier EALs (FCB)		112	
	RCS Bar	rier EALs (RCB)		117	
	Containm	nent Barrier EALS (CNB)		120	
Hazard	s and Othe	er Conditions Affecting Plant Safety		128	
HU1	Confirme degradat	d SECURITY CONDITION or threat which indicates a potential ion in the level of safety of the plant		129	
HA1	HOSTILE	E ACTION within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne	attack	140	
HS1	HOSTILE	EACTION within the PROTECTED AREA		152	
HG1	HOSTILE	E ACTION resulting in loss of physical control of the facility		155	
HU2	Other con	nditions exist which in the judgment of the SM warrant declaration	on of an	131	
HA2	Other con an Alert	nditions exist which in the judgment of the SM / ED warrant decl	aration of	142	
HS2	Other con a Site Are	nditions exist which in the judgment of the SM / ED warrant decl ea Emergency	aration of	153	
HG2	Other con a Genera	nditions exist which in the judgment of the SM / ED warrant decl Il Emergency	aration of	156	
TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTIO	SECTION	
HA3	Control room evacuation has been initiated	143
HS3	Control Room evacuation has been initiated and plant control cannot be established	154
HU4	FIRE within the PROTECTED AREA not extinguished within 15 minutes of detection or EXPLOSION within the PROTECTED AREA	132
HA4	FIRE or EXPLOSION affecting the operability of plant safety systems required to establish or maintain safe shutdown	144
HU5	Release of toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant, or flammable gases deemed detrimental to NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS	136
HA5	Access to a VITAL AREA is prohibited due to toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gases which jeopardize operation of operable equipment required to maintain safe operations or safely shutdown the reactor.	147
HU6	Natural or destructive phenomena affecting the PROTECTED AREA	137
HA6	Natural or destructive phenomena affecting VITAL AREAS	149
<u>System</u>	<u>n Malfunction</u>	157
SU1	Loss of all offsite AC power to Vital 4.16 KV busses ≥ 15 minutes	158
SA1	AC power capability to Vital 4.16 KV busses reduced to a single power source ≥ 15 minutes such that any additional single power source failure would result in station blackout	167
SS1	Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to Vital 4.16 KV busses ≥15 minutes	171
SG1	Prolonged loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to Vital 4.16 KV busses	176
SA3	Automatic trip fails to shutdown the reactor and the manual actions taken from the reactor control console are successful in shutting down the reactor	168
SS3	Automatic trip fails to shutdown the reactor and manual actions taken from the reactor control console are not successful in shutting down the reactor	172
SG3	Automatic trip and all manual actions fail to shutdown the reactor and indication of an extreme challenge to the ability to cool the core exists	178
SS4	Loss of all vital DC power ≥15 minutes	173

PROC./WORK PLAN NO.	PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE:	PAGE: 68 of 181
1903.010	EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION	CHANGE: 054
-		

SECTION

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

	-	
SU6	UNPLANNED loss of safety system annunciation or indication in the Control Room ≥15 minutes	159
SA6	UNPLANNED loss of safety system annunciation or indication in the Control Room with either (1) a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress, or (2) compensatory indicators unavailable	169
SS6	Inability to monitor a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress	174
SU7	RCS leakage	161
SU8	Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities	162
SU9	Fuel clad degradation	163
SU10	Inadvertent criticality	165
SU11	Inability to reach required operating mode within Technical Specification limits	166

GENERAL NOTES ON BASIS DOCUMENT USE

Plant Operating Mode Usage for ANO EALs:

UNIT 1:

Mode 1 = Power Operation – Keff \geq 0.99, Reactor Power > 5%

Mode 2 = Startup – Keff \geq .99, Reactor Power \leq 5%

Mode 3 = Hot Standby – Keff < .99, RCS ≥ 280 °F

Mode 4 = Hot Shutdown – Keff < .99, 280 °F > RCS >200 °F

Mode 5 = Cold Shutdown – Keff < .99, RCS ≤ 200 °F

Mode 6 = Refueling – One or more reactor vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned

Defueled (D) – All reactor fuel removed from reactor pressure vessel (full core offload during refueling or extended outage). This is not an operating mode designation by Technical Specifications.

UNIT 2:

Mode 1 = Power Operation – Keff ≥ 0.99, Reactor Power > 5%, RCS ≥ 300 °F

Mode 2 = Startup – Keff ≥ .99, Reactor Power ≤ 5%, RCS ≥ 300 °F

Mode 3 = Hot Standby – Keff < .99, Reactor Power 0, RCS ≥ 300 °F

Mode 4 = Hot Shutdown – Keff < .99, Reactor Power 0, 300 °F > RCS > 200 °F

Mode 5 = Cold Shutdown – Keff < .99, Reactor Power 0, RCS ≤ 200 °F

Mode 6 = Refueling – Keff \leq .95, Reactor Power 0, RCS \leq 140 °F Reactor vessel head unbolted or removed and fuel in the vessel

Defueled (D) – All reactor fuel removed from reactor pressure vessel (full core offload during refueling or extended outage). This is not an operating mode designation by Technical Specifications.

This basis document serves two basic functions:

- It provides background and explanatory information based on NEI 99-01 to present a basis for the origination of the ANO EALs for reviewers and users.
- The second function this basis document may provide is an aid to decision makers when making a determination to classify an emergency event. It is intended that decision makers have all the information in Attachment 7.1 of this procedure that they need to make a sound classification decision. Information that may be useful to a decision maker in classifying emergency events is also contained in the <u>Basis</u> section for each IC in the Basis Document.

The expectation is that emergency classifications are to be made as soon as conditions are present and recognizable for the classification, but within 15 minutes or less in all cases of conditions present. A decision maker's use of this Basis Document for assistance is not intended to delay the classification.

1903.010

OVERVIEW

Emergency Action Levels

Planned evolutions involve preplanning to address the limitations imposed by the condition, the performance of required surveillance testing, and the implementation of specific controls prior to knowingly entering the condition in accordance with the specific requirements of the ANO Technical Specifications (TSs). Activities which cause the site to operate beyond that allowed by the TSs, planned or unplanned, may result in an EAL threshold being met or exceeded. Planned evolutions to test, manipulate, repair, perform maintenance or modifications to systems and equipment that result in an EAL value being met or exceeded are not subject to classification and activation requirements as long as the evolution proceeds as planned and is within the operational limitations imposed by the ANO operating license. However, these conditions may be subject to the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72.

Classifications are based on evaluation of each Unit. All classifications are to be based upon valid indications, reports or conditions. Indications, reports or conditions are considered valid when they are verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications on related or redundant indications, or (3) by direct observation by plant personnel, such that doubt related to the indication's operability, the condition's existence, or the report's accuracy is removed. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment.

With the emergency classification levels defined, the thresholds that must be met for each EAL to be placed under the EAL can be determined. There are two basic approaches to determining these EALs. EALs and emergency classification level boundaries coincide for those continuously measurable, instrumented ICs, such as radioactivity, core temperature, coolant levels, etc. For these ICs, the EAL will be the threshold reading that most closely corresponds to the EAL description using the best available information.

For discrete (discontinuous) events, the approach will have to be somewhat different. Typically, in this category are internal and external hazards such as fire or earthquake. The purpose for including hazards in EALs is to assure that station personnel and off-site emergency response organizations are prepared to deal with consequential damage these hazards may cause. If, indeed, hazards have caused damage to safety functions or fission product barriers, this should be confirmed by symptoms or by observation of such failures. Therefore, it may be appropriate to enter an Alert status for events approaching or exceeding design basis limits such as Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE), design basis wind loads, Fire within Vital Areas, etc. This would give the operating staff additional support and improved ability to determine the extent of plant damage. If damage to barriers or challenges to Safety Functions (SFs) have occurred or are identified, then the additional support can be used to escalate or terminate the emergency classification level based on what has been found. Of course, security events must reflect potential for increasing security threat levels.

Plant emergency operating procedures (EOPs) are designed to maintain and/or restore a set of SFs which are listed in the order of priority for restoration efforts during accident conditions.

The PWR CSF set includes:

Subcriticality Core cooling

Heat sink

Pressure-temperature-stress (RCS integrity)

Containment

RCS inventory

There are diverse and redundant plant systems to support each SF. By monitoring the SFs instead of the individual system component status, the impact of multiple events is inherently addressed, e.g., the number of operable components available to maintain the SF.

The EOPs contain detailed instructions regarding the monitoring of these functions and provides a scheme for classifying the significance of the challenge to the functions. In providing EALs based on these schemes, the emergency classification level can flow from the EOP assessment rather than being based on a separate EAL assessment. This is desirable as it reduces ambiguity and the time necessary to classify the event.

Although the majority of the EALs provide very specific thresholds, the Emergency Director must remain alert to events or conditions that lead to the conclusion that exceeding the EAL is imminent. If, in the judgment of the Emergency Director, an imminent situation is at hand, the classification should be made as if the threshold has been exceeded. While this is particularly prudent at the higher emergency classification levels (as the early classification may provide for more effective implementation of protective measures), it is nonetheless applicable to all emergency classification levels.

Treatment of Multiple Events and Classification Level Upgrading

The above discussion deals primarily with simpler emergencies and events that may not escalate rapidly. However, usable EAL guidance must also consider rapidly evolving and complex events. Hence, emergency classification level upgrading and consideration of multiple events must be addressed.

When multiple simultaneous events occur, the emergency classification level is based on the highest EAL reached. For example, two Alerts remain in the Alert category. Or, an Alert and a SAE is a SAE. Further guidance is provided in RIS 2007-02, Clarification of NRC Guidance for Emergency Notifications During Quickly Changing Events.

Emergency classification level upgrading must also consider the effects of a loss of a common system on more than one unit (e.g. potential for radioactive release from more than one core at the same site). This must be considered in the emergency classification level declaration and in the development of appropriate site specific ICs and EALs based on the generic EAL guidance.

PROC./WORK PLAN NO.	PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE:	PAGE: 72 of 181
1903.010	EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION	CHANGE: 054

Although the majority of the EALs provide very specific thresholds, the Emergency Director must remain alert to events or conditions that lead to the conclusion that exceeding the EAL is imminent. If, in the judgment of the Emergency Director, an imminent situation is at hand, the classification should be made as if the threshold has been exceeded. While this is particularly prudent at the higher emergency classification levels (as the early classification may provide for more effective implementation of protective measures), it is nonetheless applicable to all emergency classification levels.

Emergency Classification Level Downgrading

Another important aspect of usable EAL guidance is the consideration of what to do when the risk posed by an emergency is clearly decreasing. A combination approach involving recovery from GEs and some SAEs, and termination from NUEs, Alerts, and certain SAEs causing no long term plant damage appears to be the best choice. Downgrading to lower emergency classification levels adds notifications, but may have merit under certain circumstances.

Classifying Transient Events

For some events, the condition may be corrected before a declaration has been made. The key consideration in this situation is to determine whether or not further plant damage occurred while the corrective actions were being taken. In some situations, this can be readily determined, in other situations, further analyses (e.g., coolant radiochemistry sampling, may be necessary). Classify the event as indicated and terminate the emergency once assessment shows that there were no consequences from the event and other termination criteria are met.

Existing guidance for classifying transient events addresses the period of time of event recognition and classification (15 minutes). However, in cases when EAL declaration criteria may be met momentarily during the normal expected response of the plant, declaration requirements should not be considered to be met when the conditions are a part of the designed plant response, or result from appropriate Operator actions.

There may be cases in which a plant condition that exceeded an EAL was not recognized at the time of occurrence but is identified well after the condition has occurred (e.g., as a result of routine log or record review), and the condition no longer exists. In these cases, an emergency should not be declared.

Reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 are applicable and the guidance of NUREG-1022, Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73, should be applied.

Operating Mode Applicability

The plant operating mode that existed at the time that the event occurred, prior to any protective system or operator action initiated in response to the condition, is compared to the mode applicability of the EALs. If an event occurs, and a lower or higher plant operating mode is reached before the emergency classification level can be declared, the emergency classification level shall be based on the mode that existed at the time the event occurred.

PROC./WORK PLAN NO.	PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE:	PAGE: 73 of 181
1903.010	EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION	CHANGE: 054

For events that occur in Cold Shutdown or Refueling, escalation is via EALs that have Cold Shutdown or Refueling for mode applicability, even if Hot Shutdown (or a higher mode) is entered during any subsequent heat-up. In particular, the fission product barrier EALs are applicable only to events that initiate in Hot Shutdown or higher.

Summary

ANO has established an EAL Basis Document including basis information with the IC/EALs. This information may assist the Emergency Director in making classifications, particularly those involving judgment or multiple events. The basis information may also be useful in training, for explaining event classifications to off-site officials, and for facilitating regulatory review and approval of the classification scheme.

Initiating Condition – NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT

Any release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity to the environment >2 times the ODCM limits for ≥60 minutes

Operating Mode Applicability: All

Example Emergency Action Level(s): (1 or 2 or 3)

- **Note:** The SM should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the release duration has exceeded, or will likely exceed, the applicable time. In the absence of data to the contrary, assume that the release duration has exceeded the applicable time if an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown.
- 1. VALID reading on SPING Gas Channel (Unit 2 Channel 7) on any of the following radiation monitors > the reading shown for \geq 60 minutes:

	MONITORS – UNIT 1	LIMIT
RX-9820	Containment Purge	1.18E-02 µCi/cc
RX-9825	Radwaste Area	1.07E-02 µCi/cc
RX-9830	Fuel Handling Area	9.08E-03 µCi/cc
RX-9835	Emergency Penetration Room	1.91E-01 µCi/cc
	MONITORS – UNIT 2	LIMIT
2RX-9820	Containment Purge	8.92E-03 µCi/cc
2RX-9825	Radwaste Area	6.64E-03 µCi/cc
2RX-9830	Fuel Handling Area	8.92E-03 µCi/cc
2RX-9835	Emergency Penetration Room	1.77E-01 µCi/cc
2RX-9840	Post Accident Sampling Building	8.84E-02 µCi/cc
2RX-9845	Aux. Building Extension	2.53E-02 µCi/cc
2RX-9850	Low Level Radwaste Storage Bldg.	3.54E-02 µCi/cc

2. VALID reading on any of the following radiation monitors >2 times the alarm setpoint established by a current release permit for ≥60 minutes.

EFFLUENT MONITORS – Unit 1		
RX-9820	Containment Purge (SPING Gas Channel)	
RE-4830	0 Waste Gas Radiation Monitor	
RE-4642	RE-4642 Liquid Radwaste Monitor	
EFFLUENT MONITORS – Unit 2		
2RX-9820	Containment Purge (Channel 7 or 9)	
2RE-2429 Waste Gas Decay Tank Vent Line Radiation Monitor		
2RE-2330 BMS Liquid Discharge Monitor		
2RE-4423	Regenerative Waste Discharge Monitor	
2RE-4425	SG Blowdown to Flume Radiation Monitor	

3. Confirmed grab sample analyses for gaseous or liquid releases indicates concentrations or release rates >2 times the applicable values of the ODCM for ≥60 minutes.

Basis:

The SM should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition will likely exceed the applicable time.

This IC addresses a potential reduction in the level of safety of the plant as indicated by a radiological release that exceeds regulatory commitments for an extended period of time.

ANO incorporates features intended to control the release of radioactive effluents to the environment. Further, there are administrative controls established to prevent unintentional releases, or control and monitor intentional releases. The occurrence of extended, uncontrolled radioactive releases to the environment is indicative of a degradation in these features and/or controls.

The ODCM multiples are specified in AU1 and AA1 only to distinguish between non-emergency conditions, and from each other. While these multiples obviously correspond to an offsite dose or dose rate, the emphasis in classifying these events is the degradation in the level of safety of the plant, NOT the magnitude of the associated dose or dose rate.

Releases should not be prorated or averaged over 60 minutes. For example, a release exceeding 4 times ODCM limits for 30 minutes does not meet the threshold for this IC.

This Initiating Condition includes any release for which a radioactivity discharge permit was not prepared, or a release that exceeds the conditions (e.g., minimum dilution flow, maximum discharge flow, alarm setpoints, etc.) on the applicable permit.

<u>EAL #1</u>

This EAL addresses radioactivity releases, that for whatever reason, cause effluent radiation monitor readings to exceed the threshold identified in the EAL.

This EAL is intended for sites that have established effluent monitoring on non-routine release pathways for which a discharge permit would not normally be prepared.

<u>EAL #2</u>

This EAL addresses radioactivity releases, that for whatever reason, cause effluent radiation monitor readings to exceed the threshold identified in this Initiating Condition established by the release permit. This value may be associated with a planned batch release, or a continuous release path.

<u>EAL #3</u>

This EAL addresses uncontrolled releases that are detected by sample analyses, particularly on unmonitored pathways, e.g., spills of radioactive liquids into storm drains, heat exchanger leakage in river water systems, lake, etc.

EAL #1 and #2 directly correlate with the IC since annual average meteorology is required to be used in showing compliance with the ODCM and is used in calculating the alarm setpoints.

Reference Documents:

- 1. 1604.051, "Eberline Radiation Monitor System"
- 2. Offsite Dose Calculation Manual

Initiating Condition - NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT

UNPLANNED rise in plant radiation levels

Operating Mode Applicability: All

Example Emergency Action Level(s): (1 or 2)

- 1. a. UNPLANNED lowering of water level in the refueling canal or spent fuel pool as indicated by:
 - Personnel observation, refueling crew report, indication on area security camera, borated water source (BWST or RWT) level drop due to makeup demands.

AND

VALID Area Radiation Monitor reading rise on any of the following: b.

Unit 1		
RE-8009	Spent Fuel Area	
RE-8017	Fuel Handling Area	
Unit 2		
2RE-8914	Spent Fuel Area	
2RE-8915	Spent Fuel Area	
2RE-8916	Spent Fuel Area	
2RE-8912	Containment Incore Instrumentation	

OR

- 2. UNPLANNED VALID Area Radiation Monitor readings or survey results indicate a rise by a factor of 1000 over normal* levels.
 - **Note:** For area radiation monitors with ranges incapable of measuring 1000 times normal* levels, classification shall be based on VALID full scale indication unless surveys confirm that area radiation levels are below 1000 times normal* within 15 minutes of the Area Radiation Monitor indications going to full scale indication.
 - * Normal can be considered as the highest reading in the past twenty-four hours excluding the current peak value.

Basis:

This IC addresses elevated radiation levels as a result of lowered water level above irradiated fuel or events that have resulted, or may result, in UNPLANNED rises in radiation dose rates within plant buildings. These radiation rises represent a loss of control over radioactive material and represent a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant.

<u>EAL #1</u>

The refueling pathway is a site specific combination of cavities, tubes, canals and pools. While a radiation monitor could detect a rise in dose rate due to a drop in the water level, it might not be a reliable indication of whether or not the fuel is covered. For example, a refueling bridge ARM reading may rise due to planned evolutions such as head lift, or even a fuel assembly being raised in the manipulator mast. Also, a monitor could in fact be properly responding to a known event involving transfer or relocation of a source, stored in or near the fuel pool or responding to a planned evolution such as removal of the reactor head. Generally, elevated radiation monitor indications will need to be combined with another indicator (or personnel report) of water loss.

For refueling events where the water level drops below the RPV flange classification would be via CU2. This event escalates to an Alert per AA2 if irradiated fuel outside the reactor vessel is uncovered. For events involving irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel, escalation would be via the Fission Product Barrier Matrix for events in operating Modes 1-4.

<u>EAL #2</u>

This EAL addresses rises in plant radiation levels that represent a loss of control of radioactive material resulting in a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant.

This EAL excludes radiation level rises that result from planned activities such as use of radiographic sources and movement of radioactive waste materials. A specific list of ARMs is not required as it would restrict the applicability of the Threshold. The intent is to identify loss of control of radioactive material in any monitored area.

Initiating Condition - ALERT

Any release of gaseous or liquid radioactivity to the environment >200 times the ODCM limits for ≥15 minutes

Operating Mode Applicability: All

Example Emergency Action Level(s): (1 or 2 or 3)

- **Note:** The SM / ED should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the release duration has exceeded, or will likely exceed, the applicable time. In the absence of data to the contrary, assume that the release duration has exceeded the applicable time if an ongoing release is detected and the release start time is unknown.
- 1. VALID reading on SPING Gas Channel (Unit 2 Channel 7) on any of the following radiation monitors > the reading shown for ≥ 15 minutes:

	MONITORS – UNIT 1	LIMIT
RX-9820	Containment Purge	1.18E+00 µCi/cc
RX-9825	Radwaste Area	1.07E+00 µCi/cc
RX-9830	Fuel Handling Area	9.08E-01 µCi/cc
RX-9835	Emergency Penetration Room	1.91E+01 µCi/cc
	MONITORS – UNIT 2	LIMIT
2RX-9820	Containment Purge	8.92E-01 µCi/cc
2RX-9825	Radwaste Area	6.64E-01 µCi/cc
2RX-9830	Fuel Handling Area	8.92E-01 µCi/cc
2RX-9835	Emergency Penetration Room	1.77E+01 µCi/cc
2RX-9840	Post Accident Sampling Building	8.84E+00 µCi/cc
2RX-9845	Aux. Building Extension	2.53E+00 µCi/cc
2RX-9850	Low Level Radwaste Storage Bldg.	3.54E+00 µCi/cc

 <u>EITHER</u> VALID reading on any of the following radiation monitors > 200 times the alarm setpoint established by a current release permit for ≥ 15 minutes <u>OR</u> VALID reading greater than the value listed for ≥ 15 minutes.

	MONITORS – UNIT 1	LIMIT
RX-9820	Containment Purge (SPING Gas Channel)	N/A
RE-4830	Waste Gas Radiation Monitor	9.5E7 cpm
RE-4642	Liquid Radwaste Monitor	9.5E7 cpm
	MONITORS – UNIT 2	LIMIT
2RX-9820	Containment Purge (Channel 7 or 9)	N/A
2RE-2429	Waste Gas Monitoring System	9.5E5 cpm
2RE-2330	BMS Liquid Discharge Monitor	9.5E5 cpm
2RE-4423	Regenerative Waste Discharge Monitor	9.5E5 cpm
2RE-4425	SG Blowdown to Flume Radiation Monitor	9.5E5 cpm

3. Confirmed grab sample analyses for gaseous or liquid releases indicates concentrations or release rates > 200 times the applicable values of the ODCM for ≥ 15 minutes.

Basis:

The SM / ED should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition will likely exceed the applicable time.

This IC addresses an actual or substantial potential reduction in the level of safety of the plant as indicated by a radiological release that exceeds regulatory commitments for an extended period of time. ANO incorporates features intended to control the release of radioactive effluents to the environment. Further, there are administrative controls established to prevent unintentional releases, or control and monitor intentional releases. The occurrence of extended, uncontrolled radioactive releases to the environment is indicative of a degradation in these features and/or controls.

The ODCM multiples are specified in AU1 and AA1 only to distinguish between non-emergency conditions, and from each other. While these multiples obviously correspond to an offsite dose or dose rate, the emphasis in classifying these events is the degradation in the level of safety of the plant, NOT the magnitude of the associated dose or dose rate.

Releases should <u>not</u> be prorated or averaged. For example, a release exceeding 600 times ODCM limits for 5 minutes does not meet the threshold for this IC.

This Initiating Condition includes any release for which a release permit was not prepared, or a release that exceeds the conditions (e.g., minimum dilution flow, maximum discharge flow, alarm setpoints, etc.) on the applicable permit.

<u>EAL #1</u>

This EAL addresses radioactivity releases, that for whatever reason, cause effluent radiation monitor readings to exceed the threshold identified in the Initiating Condition.

This EAL is intended for sites that have established effluent monitoring on non-routine release pathways for which a discharge permit would not normally be prepared.

<u>EAL #2</u>

This EAL addresses radioactivity releases, that for whatever reason, cause effluent radiation monitor readings to exceed the threshold identified in this Initiating Condition established by the radioactivity discharge permit. This value may be associated with a planned batch release, or a continuous release path. The limit values provided are for those cases in which the maximum monitor range is less than the release permit value multiplied by 200.

<u>EAL #3</u>

This EAL addresses uncontrolled releases that are detected by sample analyses, particularly on unmonitored pathways, e.g., spills of radioactive liquids into storm drains, heat exchanger leakage in river water systems, lake, etc.

EAL #1 and #2 directly correlate with the IC since annual average meteorology is required to be used in showing compliance with the ODCM and is used in calculating the alarm setpoints.

Reference Documents:

- 1. 1604.051, "Eberline Radiation Monitor System"
- 2. Offsite Dose Calculation Manual

Initiating Condition - ALERT

Damage to irradiated fuel or loss of water level that has resulted or will result in the uncovering of irradiated fuel outside the reactor vessel

Operating Mode Applicability: All

Example Emergency Action Level(s): (1 or 2)

1. A water level drop in the refueling canal or spent fuel pool that will result in irradiated fuel becoming uncovered.

2. VALID alarm on any of the following radiation monitors due to damage to irradiated fuel or loss of water level.

Unit 1		
RX-9820	Containment Purge (SPING Gas Channel)	
RX-9825	Radwaste Area (SPING Gas Channel)	
RX-9830	Fuel Handling Area (SPING Gas Channel)	
RE-8060	Containment High Range Radiation Monitors	
RE-8061	Containment High Range Radiation Monitors	
RE-8009	Spent Fuel Area	
RE-8017	Fuel Handling Area	
Unit 2		
2RX-9820	Containment Purge (Channel 7 or 9)	
2RX-9825	Radwaste Area (Channel 7 or 9)	
2RX-9830	Fuel Handling Area (Channel 7 or 9)	
2RE-8905	E-8905 Containment Equipment Hatch Area	
2RE-8909 Containment Personnel Access Area		
2RE-8925-1 Containment High Range Radiation Monitors		
2RE-8925-2	Containment High Range Radiation Monitors	
2RE-8914	Spent Fuel Area	
2RE-8915	Spent Fuel Area	
2RE-8916	Spent Fuel Area	
2RE-8912 Containment Incore Inst.		

Basis:

This IC addresses rises in radiation dose rates within plant buildings, and may be a precursor to a radioactivity release to the environment. These events represent a loss of control over radioactive material and represent an actual or substantial potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant.

These events escalate from AU2 in that fuel activity has been released, or is anticipated due to fuel heatup. This IC applies to spent fuel requiring water coverage and is not intended to address spent fuel which is licensed for dry storage.

<u>EAL #1</u>

Indications may include instrumentation such as water level and local area radiation monitors, and personnel (e.g., refueling crew) reports. Depending on available level indication, the declaration may be based on indications of water makeup rate or drop in applicable borated water storage tank level. Video cameras (Security or outage-related) may allow remote observation of level.

<u>EAL #2</u>

This EAL addresses radiation monitor indications of fuel uncovery and/or fuel damage.

Elevated ventilation monitor readings may be indication of a radioactivity release from the fuel, confirming that damage has occurred. Elevated background at the ventilation monitor due to water level drop may mask elevated ventilation exhaust airborne activity and needs to be considered.

While a radiation monitor could detect a rise in dose rate due to a drop in the water level, it might <u>not</u> be a reliable indication of whether or <u>not</u> the fuel is covered.

For example, a refueling bridge ARM reading may rise due to planned evolutions such as head lift, or even a fuel assembly being raised in the manipulator mast. Also, a monitor could in fact be properly responding to a known event involving transfer or relocation of a source, stored in or near the fuel pool or responding to a planned evolution such as removal of the reactor head. Generally, elevated radiation monitor indications will need to be combined with another indicator (or personnel report) of water loss.

Escalation of this emergency classification level, if appropriate, would be based on AS1 or AG1.

Initiating Condition - ALERT

Rise in radiation levels within the facility that impedes operation of systems required to maintain plant safety functions

Operating Mode Applicability: All

Example Emergency Action Level(s):

Dose rate > 15 mR/hr in any of the following areas requiring continuous occupancy to maintain plant safety functions:

- Unit 1 Control Room
- Unit 2 Control Room •
- **Central Alarm Station** •

Basis:

This IC addresses elevated radiation levels that impact continued operation in areas requiring continuous occupancy to maintain safe operation or to perform a safe shutdown.

The cause and/or magnitude of the rise in radiation levels is not a concern of this IC. The SM/ED must consider the source or cause of the elevated radiation levels and determine if any other IC may be involved.

This IC is not meant to apply to rises in the containment dome radiation monitors as these are events which are addressed in the fission product barrier matrix EALs.

Areas requiring continuous occupancy include the Control Rooms and the Central Alarm Station.

Initiating Condition -- SITE AREA EMERGENCY

Offsite dose resulting from an actual or IMMINENT release of gaseous radioactivity >100 mR TEDE or 500 mR child thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release

Operating Mode Applicability: All

Example Emergency Action Level(s): (1 or 2 or 3)

- **Note:** The SM / ED should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition will likely exceed the applicable time. If dose assessment results are available, the classification should be based on EAL #2 instead of EAL #1. Do not delay declaration awaiting dose assessment results.
- 1. VALID reading on SPING Gas Channel (Unit 2 Channel 9) on any of the following radiation monitors > the reading shown for ≥ 15 minutes:

	MONITORS – UNIT 1	LIMIT
RX-9820	Containment Purge	1.18E+01 µCi/cc
RX-9825	Radwaste Area	1.07E+01 µCi/cc
RX-9830	Fuel Handling Area	9.08E+00 µCi/cc
RX-9835	Emergency Penetration Room	1.91E+02 µCi/cc
	MONITORS – UNIT 2	LIMIT
2RX-9820	Containment Purge	8.92E+00 µCi/cc
2RX-9825	Radwaste Area	6.64E+00 µCi/cc
2RX-9830	Fuel Handling Area	8.92E+00 µCi/cc
2RX-9835	Emergency Penetration Room	1.77E+02 µCi/cc
2RX-9840	Post Accident Sampling Building	8.84E+01 µCi/cc
2RX-9845	Aux. Building Extension	2.53E+01 µCi/cc

2. Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses > 100 mR TEDE or 500 mR child thyroid CDE at or beyond the site boundary.

 Field survey results indicate closed window dose rates >100 mR/hr expected to continue for ≥60 minutes; or analyses of field survey samples indicate child thyroid CDE >500 mR for one hour of inhalation, at or beyond the site boundary.

Basis:

This IC addresses radioactivity releases that result in doses at or beyond the site boundary that exceed 10% of the EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs). Releases of this magnitude are associated with the failure of plant systems needed for the protection of the public.

<u>EAL #1</u>

The monitor list in EAL #1 includes monitors on all potential release pathways (plant stack, primarysecondary leak, fuel handling accident).

<u>EAL #2</u>

Since dose assessment in EAL #2 is based on actual meteorology, whereas the monitor readings in EAL #1 are not, the results from these assessments may indicate that the classification is not warranted, or may indicate that a higher classification is warranted. For this reason, emergency implementing procedures should call for the timely performance of dose assessments using actual meteorology and release information. If the results of these dose assessments are available when the classification is made (e.g., initiated at a lower classification level), the dose assessment results override the monitor reading EALs.

<u>EAL #3</u>

Field team surveys in EAL #3 should be performed at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY and at the most accurate indicator of the condition. Field data are independent of release elevation and meteorology. The assumed release duration is one hour. Expected post accident source terms would be dominated by noble gases providing the dose rate value. Sampling of radioiodine by adsorption on a charcoal cartridge should determine the iodine value.

Reference Documents:

- 1. 1604.051, "Eberline Radiation Monitor System"
- 2. Offsite Dose Calculation Manual

Initiating Condition -- GENERAL EMERGENCY

Offsite dose resulting from an actual or IMMINENT release of gaseous radioactivity >1000 mR TEDE or 5000 mR child thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release using actual meteorology

Operating Mode Applicability: All

Example Emergency Action Level(s): (1 or 2 or 3)

- **Note:** The SM / ED should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition will likely exceed the applicable time. If dose assessment results are available, the classification should be based on EAL #2 instead of EAL #1. Do not delay declaration awaiting dose assessment results.
- 1. VALID reading on SPING Gas Channel (Unit 2 Channel 9) on any of the following radiation monitors > the reading shown for ≥ 15 minutes:

	MONITORS – UNIT 1	LIMIT
RX-9820	Containment Purge	1.18E+02 (µCi/cc)
RX-9825	Radwaste Area	1.07E+02 (µCi/cc)
RX-9830	Fuel Handling Area	9.08E+01 (µCi/cc)
RX-9835	Emergency Penetration Room	1.91E+03 (µCi/cc)
	MONITORS – UNIT 2	LIMIT
2RX-9820	Containment Purge	8.92E+01 (µCi/cc)
2RX-9825	Radwaste Area	6.64E+01 (µCi/cc)
2RX-9830	Fuel Handling Area	8.92E+01 (µCi/cc)
2RX-9835	Emergency Penetration Room	1.77E+03 (µCi/cc)
2RX-9840	Post Accident Sampling Building	8.84E+02 (µCi/cc)
2RX-9845	Aux. Building Extension	2.53E+02 (µCi/cc)

2. Dose assessment using actual meteorology indicates doses >1000 mR TEDE or 5000 mR child thyroid CDE at or beyond the site boundary.

3. Field survey results indicate closed window dose rates >1000 mR/hr expected to continue for ≥60 minutes; or analyses of field survey samples indicate child thyroid CDE >5000 mR for one hour of inhalation, at or beyond the site boundary.

Basis:

This IC addresses radioactivity releases that result in doses at or beyond the site boundary that exceed the EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs). Public protective actions will be necessary. Releases of this magnitude are associated with the failure of plant systems needed for the protection of the public and likely involve fuel damage.

<u>EAL #1</u>

The monitor list in EAL #1 includes monitors on all potential release pathways (plant stack, primarysecondary leak, fuel handling accident).

<u>EAL #2</u>

Since dose assessment in EAL #2 is based on actual meteorology, whereas the monitor readings in EAL #1 are not, the results from these assessments may indicate that the classification is not warranted. For this reason, emergency implementing procedures should call for the timely performance of dose assessments using actual meteorology and release information. If the results of these dose assessments are available when the classification is made (e.g., initiated at a lower classification level), the dose assessment results override the monitor reading EALs.

<u>EAL #3</u>

Field team surveys in EAL #3 should be performed at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY and at the most accurate indicator of the condition. Field data are independent of release elevation and meteorology. The assumed release duration is one hour. Expected post accident source terms would be dominated by noble gases providing the dose rate value. Sampling of radioiodine by adsorption on a charcoal cartridge should determine the iodine value.

Reference Documents:

- 1. 1604.051, "Eberline Radiation Monitor System"
- 2. Offsite Dose Calculation Manual

Cold Shutdown / Refueling System Malfunction

Initiating Condition -- NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT

RCS leakage

Operating Mode Applicability: Cold Shutdown (Mode 5)

Example Emergency Action Level(s):

- **Note:** The SM should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition will likely exceed the applicable time.
- 1. RCS leakage results in the inability to maintain or restore level within Pressurizer or RCS level target band for \geq 15 minutes.

Basis:

This IC is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. The inability to maintain or restore level is indicative of loss of RCS inventory.

Relief valve normal operation should be excluded from this IC. However, a relief valve that operates and fails to close per design should be considered applicable to this IC if the relief valve cannot be isolated.

Prolonged loss of RCS Inventory may result in escalation to the Alert emergency classification level via either CA1 or CA3.

Initiating Condition -- NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT

UNPLANNED loss of RCS / reactor vessel inventory

Operating Mode Applicability: Refueling (Mode 6)

Example Emergency Action Level(s): (1 or 2)

- **Note:** The SM should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition will likely exceed the applicable time.
- 1. UNPLANNED RCS / reactor vessel level drop as indicated by either of the following:
 - a. RCS / reactor vessel water level drop below the reactor vessel flange for ≥15 minutes when the RCS / reactor vessel level band is established above the reactor vessel flange

<u>OR</u>

 B. RCS / reactor vessel water level drop below the RCS / reactor vessel level band for ≥15 minutes or longer when the RCS / reactor vessel level band is established below the reactor vessel flange.

2. RCS / reactor vessel level cannot be monitored with a loss of RCS / reactor vessel inventory as indicated by an unexplained level rise in (as applicable) the Reactor Building Sump, Reactor Drain Tank, Aux. Building Equipment Drain Tank, Aux. Building Sump, or Quench Tank.

Basis:

This IC is a precursor of more serious conditions and considered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

Refueling evolutions that lower RCS water level below the reactor vessel flange are carefully planned and procedurally controlled. An UNPLANNED event that results in water level dropping below the reactor vessel flange, or below the planned RCS water level for the given evolution (if the planned RCS water level is already below the reactor vessel flange), warrants declaration of an NUE due to the lowered RCS inventory that is available to keep the core covered.

The allowance of 15 minutes was chosen because it is reasonable to assume that level can be restored within this time frame using one or more of the redundant means of refill that should be available. If level cannot be restored in this time frame then it may indicate a more serious condition exists.

Continued loss of RCS Inventory will result in escalation to the Alert emergency classification level via either CA1 or CA3.

<u>EAL #1</u>

This EAL involves a drop in RCS level below the top of the reactor vessel flange that continues for 15 minutes due to an UNPLANNED event. This EAL is not applicable to drops in flooded reactor cavity level, which is addressed by AU2 EAL1, until such time as the level drops to the level of the vessel flange.

If reactor vessel level continues to drop and reaches the Bottom ID of the RCS Loop then escalation to CA1 would be appropriate.

<u>EAL #2</u>

This EAL addresses conditions in the refueling mode when normal means of core temperature indication and RCS level indication may not be available. Redundant means of reactor vessel level indication will normally be installed (including the ability to monitor level visually) to assure that the ability to monitor level will not be interrupted. However, if all level indication were to be lost during a loss of RCS inventory event, the operators would need to determine that reactor vessel inventory loss was occurring by observing sump and tank level changes. Sump and tank level rises must be evaluated against other potential sources of leakage such as cooling water sources inside the containment to ensure they are indicative of RCS leakage.

Escalation to the Alert emergency classification level would be via either CA1 or CA3.

Initiating Condition -- NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT

UNPLANNED loss of decay heat removal capability with irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel

Operating Mode Applicability: Cold Shutdown (Mode 5) Refueling (Mode 6)

Example Emergency Action Level(s): (1 or 2)

- **Note:** The SM should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition will likely exceed the applicable time.
- 1. UNPLANNED event results in RCS temperature exceeding 200 °F.

2. Loss of all RCS temperature and RCS/reactor vessel level indication for ≥15 minutes.

Basis:

This IC is a precursor of more serious conditions and, as a result, is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. In cold shutdown the ability to remove decay heat relies primarily on forced cooling flow. Operation of the systems that provide this forced cooling may be jeopardized due to the unlikely loss of electrical power or RCS inventory. Since the RCS usually remains intact in the cold shutdown mode a large inventory of water is available to keep the core covered.

During refueling the level in the reactor vessel will normally be maintained above the reactor vessel flange. Refueling evolutions that lower water level below the reactor vessel flange are carefully planned and procedurally controlled. Loss of forced decay heat removal at lowered inventory may result in more rapid rises in RCS/reactor vessel temperatures depending on the time since shutdown.

Normal means of core temperature indication and RCS level indication may not be available in the refueling mode. Redundant means of reactor vessel level indication are therefore procedurally installed to assure that the ability to monitor level will not be interrupted. However, if all level and temperature indication were to be lost in either the cold shutdown of refueling modes, EAL 2 would result in declaration of an NUE if both temperature and level indication cannot be restored within 15 minutes from the loss of both means of indication.

Escalation to Alert would be via CA1 based on an inventory loss or CA3 based on exceeding its temperature criteria.

Initiating Condition -- NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT

AC power capability to Vital 4.16 KV busses reduced to a single power source ≥15 minutes such that any additional single power source failure would result in station blackout

Operating Mode Applicability: Cold Shutdown (Mode 5) Refueling (Mode 6)

Example Emergency Action Level(s):

1. a. AC power capability to Vital 4.16 KV busses reduced to a single power source \geq 15 minutes.

<u>AND</u>

b. Any additional single power source failure will result in station blackout.

Basis:

The condition indicated by this IC is the degradation of the offsite and onsite AC power systems such that any additional single power source failure would result in a station blackout. This condition could occur due to a loss of offsite power with a concurrent failure of all but one emergency generator to supply power to its emergency busses. The subsequent loss of this single power source would escalate the event to an Alert in accordance with CA5.

Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses of power.

The EAL allows credit for operation of the Alternate AC Diesel Generator.

Reference Documents:

- 1. 1202.007, "Degraded Power"
- 2. 1202.008, "Blackout"
- 3. 2202.007, "Loss of Off-Site Power"
- 4. 2202.008, "Station Blackout"
- 5. 2104.037, "Alternate AC Diesel Generator Operations"

Note: The SM should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition will likely exceed the applicable time.

Initiating Condition -- NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT

Loss of required DC power ≥15 minutes

Operating Mode Applicability: Cold Shutdown (Mode 5) Refueling (Mode 6)

Example Emergency Action Level(s):

- **Note:** The SM should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition will likely exceed the applicable time.
- 1. < 105 volts on required Vital DC bus \geq 15 minutes.

Basis:

The purpose of this IC and its associated EALs is to recognize a loss of DC power compromising the ability to monitor and control the removal of decay heat during Cold Shutdown or Refueling operations.

It is intended that the loss of the operating (operable) train is to be considered. If this loss results in the inability to maintain cold shutdown, the escalation to an Alert will be per CA3.

Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

Initiating Condition -- NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT

Inadvertent criticality

Operating Mode Applicability: Cold Shutdown (Mode 5) Refueling (Mode 6)

Example Emergency Action Level(s):

1. UNPLANNED sustained positive startup rate observed on nuclear instrumentation.

Basis:

This IC addresses criticality events that occur in Cold Shutdown or Refueling modes such as fuel misloading events and inadvertent dilution events. This IC indicates a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant, warranting an NUE classification.

This condition can be identified using the startup rate meter. The term "sustained" is used in order to allow exclusion of expected short term positive startup rates from planned fuel bundle or control rod movements during core alteration. These short term positive startup rates are the result of the rise in neutron population due to subcritical multiplication.

Escalation would be by SM judgment.

Initiating Condition -- NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT

Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities

Operating Mode Applicability: Cold Shutdown (Mode 5) Refueling (Mode 6) Defueled

Example Emergency Action Level(s): (1 or 2)

1. Loss of all Table C2 onsite communication methods affecting the ability to perform routine operations.

<u>OR</u>

2. Loss of all Table C3 offsite communication methods affecting the ability to perform offsite notifications.

Table C2 Onsite Communications Methods	Table C3 Offsite Communications Methods	
Station radio system	All telephone lines (commercial and microwave)	
Plant paging system	ENS	
In-plant telephones		
Gaitronics		

Basis:

The purpose of this IC and its associated EALs is to recognize a loss of communications capability that either defeats the plant operations staff ability to perform routine tasks necessary for plant operations or the ability to communicate issues with offsite authorities. The loss of off-site communications ability is expected to be significantly more comprehensive than the condition addressed by 10 CFR 50.72.

The availability of one method of ordinary offsite communications is sufficient to inform federal, state, and local authorities of plant issues. This EAL is intended to be used only when extraordinary means (e.g., relaying of information from radio transmissions, individuals being sent to offsite locations, etc.) are being utilized to make communications possible.

Initiating Condition - ALERT

Loss of RCS / reactor vessel inventory

Operating Mode Applicability: Cold Shutdown (Mode 5) Refueling (Mode 6)

Example Emergency Action Level(s): (1 or 2)

- **Note:** The SM / ED should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition will likely exceed the applicable time.
- 1. Loss of RCS / reactor vessel inventory as indicated by:
 - Unit 1: RVLMS Levels 1 through 8 indicate DRY
 - Unit 2: RVLMS Levels 1 through 5 indicate DRY

- **Unit 1:** Reactor vessel level < 368 ft., 0 in. (bottom of the hot leg)
- Unit 2: Reactor vessel level < 369 ft., 1.5 in. (bottom of the hot leg)

2. RCS / reactor vessel level cannot be monitored for ≥15 minutes with a loss of RCS / reactor vessel inventory as indicated by an unexplained level rise in (as applicable) the Reactor Building Sump, Reactor Drain Tank, Aux. Building Equipment Drain Tank, Aux. Building Sump, or Quench Tank.

Basis:

These EALs serve as precursors to a loss of ability to adequately cool the fuel. The magnitude of this loss of water indicates that makeup systems have not been effective and may not be capable of preventing further reactor vessel level lowering and potential core uncovery. This condition will result in a minimum emergency classification level of an Alert.

<u>EAL #1</u>

The bottom of the RCS hot leg penetration into the reactor vessel is approximately RLVMS Level 8 (Unit 1) or RVLMS Level 5 (Unit 2). However, RVLMS may not be available in mode 6. Redundant means level indication is provided in this mode and included in EAL #1. The bottom of the RCS hot leg penetration into the reactor vessel is 368 ft., 0 in. (Unit 1) or 369 ft., 1.5 in. (Unit 2). Below this level, reactor vessel level indication will be lost and loss of suction to decay heat removal systems will occur. The inability to restore and maintain level after reaching this setpoint would be indicative of a failure of the RCS barrier.

<u>EAL #2</u>

In the cold shutdown mode, normal RCS level and reactor vessel level instrumentation systems will usually be available. In the refueling mode, normal means of reactor vessel level indication may not be available. Redundant means of reactor vessel level indication will usually be installed (including the ability to monitor level visually) to assure that the ability to monitor level will not be interrupted. However, if all level indication were to be lost during a loss of RCS inventory event, the operators would need to determine that reactor vessel inventory loss was occurring by observing sump and tank level changes. Sump and tank level rises must be evaluated against other potential sources of leakage such as cooling water sources inside the containment to ensure they are indicative of RCS leakage.

If reactor vessel level continues to lower then escalation to Site Area Emergency will be via CS1.

Initiating Condition - ALERT

Inability to maintain plant in Cold Shutdown

Operating Mode Applicability: Cold Shutdown (Mode 5) Refueling (Mode 6)

Example Emergency Action Level(s): (1 or 2)

1. An UNPLANNED event results in RCS temperature >200 °F > the specified duration in Table C1.

Table C1 RCS Reheat Duration Thresholds				
RCS	Containment Closure	Duration		
Intact (but not RCS Lowered Inventory)	N/A	60 minutes*		
Not intact or RCS Lowered Inventory	Established	20 minutes*		
Not infact of NCG Lowered inventory	Not Established	0 minutes		
* If an RCS heat removal system is in operation within this time frame and RCS temperature is being reduced, the EAL is not applicable.				

Note: EAL #2 does not apply in solid plant conditions.

2. An UNPLANNED event results in RCS pressure rise >10 psi due to a loss of RCS cooling.

Basis:

<u>EAL #1</u>

The RCS Reheat Duration Threshold table addresses complete loss of functions required for core cooling for greater than 60 minutes during refueling and cold shutdown modes when RCS integrity is established. RCS integrity should be considered to be in place when the RCS pressure boundary is in its normal condition for the cold shutdown mode of operation (e.g., no freeze seals or nozzle dams). The 60 minute time frame should allow sufficient time to restore cooling without there being a substantial degradation in plant safety.

The RCS Reheat Duration Threshold table also addresses the complete loss of functions required for core cooling for greater than 20 minutes during refueling and cold shutdown modes when CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is established but RCS integrity is not established or RCS inventory is lowered (e.g., mid-loop operation). As discussed above, RCS integrity should be assumed to be in place when the RCS pressure boundary is in its normal condition for the cold shutdown mode of operation (e.g., no freeze seals or nozzle dams). The allowed 20 minute time frame was included to allow operator action to restore the heat removal function, if possible.

Finally, the EAL addresses complete loss of functions required for core cooling during refueling and cold shutdown modes when neither CONTAINMENT CLOSURE nor RCS integrity are established.

The (*) indicates that this EAL is not applicable if actions are successful in restoring an RCS heat removal system to operation and RCS temperature is being reduced within the specified time frame.

<u>EAL #2</u>

The 10 psi pressure rise addresses situations where, due to high decay heat loads, the time provided to restore temperature control, should be less than 60 minutes. The RCS pressure setpoint chosen should be 10 psi or the lowest pressure that the site can read on installed Control Board instrumentation that is equal to or greater than 10 psi.

Escalation to Site Area Emergency would be via CS1 should boiling result in significant reactor vessel level loss leading to core uncovery.

A loss of Technical Specification components alone is not intended to constitute an Alert. The same is true of a momentary UNPLANNED excursion above the Technical Specification cold shutdown temperature limit when the heat removal function is available.

The SM / ED must remain alert to events or conditions that lead to the conclusion that exceeding the EAL is IMMINENT. If, in the judgment of the SM / ED, an IMMINENT situation is at hand, the classification should be made as if the threshold has been exceeded.
COLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION CA5

Initiating Condition - ALERT

Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to Vital 4.16KV busses ≥15 minutes

Operating Mode Applicability: Cold Shutdown (Mode 5) Refueling (Mode 6) Defueled

Example Emergency Action Level(s):

- **Note:** The SM / ED should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition will likely exceed the applicable time.
- 1. Loss of all offsite and all on-site AC power to Vital 4.16KV busses \geq 15 minutes.

Basis:

Loss of all AC power compromises all plant safety systems requiring electric power including DHR/shutdown cooling, emergency core cooling, containment cooling, spent fuel pool cooling and the ultimate heat sink.

The event can be classified as an Alert when in cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode because of the significantly reduced decay heat and lower temperature and pressure, which allow raising the time to restore one of the emergency busses, relative to that specified for the Site Area Emergency EAL.

Escalating to Site Area Emergency, if appropriate, is by Abnormal Radiation Levels/ Radiological Effluent (TAB A) ICs.

Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

COLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION CS1

Initiating Condition - SITE AREA EMERGENCY

Loss of RCS / reactor vessel inventory affecting core decay heat removal capability

Operating Mode Applicability: Cold Shutdown (Mode 5) Refueling (Mode 6)

Example Emergency Action Level(s): (1 or 2)

- **Note:** The SM / ED should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition will likely exceed the applicable time.
- 1. With CONTAINMENT CLOSURE <u>not</u> established:

Unit 1: RVLMS Levels 1 through 9 indicate DRY

Unit 2: RVLMS Levels 1 through 6 indicate DRY

2. With CONTAINMENT CLOSURE established, core exit thermocouples indicate superheat.

- 3. RCS / reactor vessel level cannot be monitored for ≥ 30 minutes with a loss of RCS / reactor vessel inventory as indicated by any of the following:
 - Containment High Range Radiation Monitor reading > 10 R/hr
 - Erratic source range monitor indication
 - Unexplained level rise in Reactor Building Sump, Reactor Drain Tank, Quench Tank, Aux. Building Equipment Drain Tank, or Aux. Building Sump.

Basis:

Under the conditions specified by this IC, continued lowering in RCS / reactor vessel level is indicative of a loss of inventory control. Inventory loss may be due to an RCS breach, pressure boundary leakage, or continued boiling in the RPV. Thus, declaration of a Site Area Emergency is warranted.

Escalation to a General Emergency is via CG1 or AG1.

COLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION CS1

<u>EAL #3</u>

In the cold shutdown mode, normal RCS level and reactor vessel level instrumentation systems will usually be available. In the refueling mode, normal means of reactor vessel level indication may not be available. Redundant means of reactor vessel level indication will usually be installed (including the ability to monitor level visually) to assure that the ability to monitor level will not be interrupted. However, if all level indication were to be lost during a loss of RCS inventory event, the operators would need to determine that reactor vessel inventory loss was occurring by observing sump and tank level changes. Sump and tank level rises must be evaluated against other potential sources of leakage such as cooling water sources inside the containment to ensure they are indicative of RCS leakage.

The 30-minute duration allows sufficient time for actions to be performed to recover inventory control equipment.

As water level in the reactor vessel lowers, the dose rate above the core will rise. The dose rate due to this core shine should result in site specific monitor indication and possible alarm.

Initiating Condition - GENERAL EMERGENCY

Loss of RCS / reactor vessel inventory affecting fuel clad integrity with containment challenged

Operating Mode Applicability: Cold Shutdown (Mode 5) Refueling (Mode 6)

Example Emergency Action Level(s):

- **Note:** The SM / ED should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition will likely exceed the applicable time.
- 1. a. Core exit thermocouples indicate superheat for \geq 30 minutes.

<u>AND</u>

- b. Any of the following containment challenge indications:
 - CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established
 - Explosive mixture inside containment
 - UNPLANNED rise in containment pressure

- 2. a. RCS / reactor vessel level cannot be monitored for ≥ 30 minutes with a loss of RCS / reactor vessel inventory as indicated by any of the following:
 - Containment High Range Radiation Monitor reading > 10 R/hr
 - Erratic source range monitor indication
 - Unexplained level rise in Reactor Building Sump, Reactor Drain Tank, Quench Tank, Aux. Building Equipment Drain Tank, or Aux. Building Sump

<u>AND</u>

- b. Any of the following containment challenge indications:
 - CONTAINMENT CLOSURE not established
 - Explosive mixture inside containment
 - UNPLANNED rise in containment pressure

COLD SHUTDOWN / REFUELING SYSTEM MALFUNCTION CG1

Basis:

This IC represents the inability to restore and maintain reactor vessel level to above the top of active fuel with containment challenged. Fuel damage is probable if reactor vessel level cannot be restored, as available decay heat will cause boiling, further reducing the reactor vessel level. With the CONTAINMENT breached or challenged then the potential for unmonitored fission product release to the environment is high. This represents a direct path for radioactive inventory to be released to the environment. This is consistent with the definition of a GE. The GE is declared on the occurrence of the loss or IMMINENT loss of function of all three barriers.

A number of variables can have a significant impact on heat removal capability challenging the fuel clad barrier. Examples include mid-loop, reduced level / flange level, head in place, cavity flooded, RCS venting strategy, decay heat removal system design, vortexing pre-disposition, and steam generator U-tube draining.

Analysis indicates that core damage may occur within an hour following continued core uncovery therefore, 30 minutes was conservatively chosen.

If CONTAINMENT CLOSURE is re-established prior to exceeding the 30 minute core uncovery time limit then escalation to GE would not occur.

In the early stages of a core uncovery event, it is unlikely that hydrogen buildup due to a core uncovery could result in an explosive mixture of dissolved gasses in Containment. However, Containment monitoring and/or sampling should be performed to verify this assumption and a General Emergency declared if it is determined that an explosive mixture exists.

Sump and tank level rises must be evaluated against other potential sources of leakage such as cooling water sources inside the containment to ensure they are indicative of RCS leakage.

In the cold shutdown mode, normal RCS level and reactor vessel level instrumentation systems will usually be available. In the refueling mode, normal means of reactor vessel level indication may not be available. Redundant means of reactor vessel level indication will usually be installed (including the ability to monitor level visually) to assure that the ability to monitor level will not be interrupted. However, if all level indication were to be lost during a loss of RCS inventory event, the operators would need to determine that reactor vessel inventory loss was occurring by observing sump and tank level changes. Sump and tank level rises must be evaluated against other potential sources of leakage such as cooling water sources inside the containment to ensure they are indicative of RCS leakage.

As water level in the reactor vessel lowers, the dose rate above the core will rise. The dose rate due to this core shine should result in site specific monitor indication and possible alarm.

Reference Documents:

- 1. ULD-1-SYS-24, "Unit 1 Inadequate Core Cooling"
- 2. ULD-2-SYS-24, "Unit 2 Inadequate Core Cooling"

INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION (ISFSI) MALFUNCTION

ISFSI MALFUNCTION E-HU1

Initiating Condition - NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT

Note: Security Events are bounded by the Hazards EALs.

Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY

Operating Mode Applicability: All

Example Emergency Action Level(s):

1. Damage to a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY.

Basis:

An NUE in this IC is categorized on the basis of the occurrence of an event of sufficient magnitude that a loaded cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY is damaged or violated. This includes classification based on a loaded fuel storage cask CONFINEMENT BOUNDARY loss leading to the degradation of the fuel during storage or posing an operational safety problem with respect to its removal from storage.

This EAL addresses a dropped cask, a tipped over cask, EXPLOSION, PROJECTILE damage, FIRE damage or natural phenomena affecting a cask (e.g., seismic event, tornado, etc.).

FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DEGRADATION

General Bases

The logic used for these initiating conditions reflects the following considerations:

- The Fuel Clad Barrier and the RCS Barrier are weighted more heavily than the Containment Barrier (See Sections 3.4 and 3.8). NUE ICs associated with RCS and Fuel Clad Barriers are addressed under System Malfunction (S) ICs.
- At the Site Area Emergency level, there must be some ability to dynamically assess how far
 present conditions are from the threshold for a General Emergency. For example, if Fuel Clad
 and RCS Barrier "Loss" EALs existed, that, in addition to off-site dose assessments, would
 require continual assessments of radioactive inventory and containment integrity. Alternatively, if
 both Fuel Clad and RCS Barrier "Potential Loss" EALs existed, the SM / ED would have more
 assurance that there was no immediate need to escalate to a General Emergency.
- The ability to escalate to higher emergency classes as an event deteriorates must be maintained. For example, RCS leakage steadily increasing would represent an increasing risk to public health and safety.
- The Containment Barrier should not be declared lost or potentially lost based on exceeding Technical Specification action statement criteria, unless there is an event in progress requiring mitigation by the Containment barrier. When no event is in progress (Loss or Potential Loss of either Fuel Clad and/or RCS) the Containment Barrier status is addressed by Technical Specifications.

Fuel Clad Barrier Emergency Action Levels: FCB1 <u>OR</u> FCB2 <u>OR</u> FCB3 <u>OR</u> FCB4 <u>OR</u> FCB5 <u>OR</u> FCB6

The Fuel Clad barrier consists of the zircalloy or stainless steel fuel bundle tubes that contain the fuel pellets.

1. Primary Coolant Activity Level (FCB1)

Loss:

1. Coolant activity > 300 µCi/gm dose equivalent I-131 activity by Chemistry sample

2. Radiation levels > 1000 MR/hr

Unit 1: at SA-229

Unit 2: at 2TCD-19

Potential Loss: None

Basis:

Loss

The site specific value corresponds to 300 μ Ci/gm I-131 equivalent. Assessment by the EAL Task Force indicates that this amount of coolant activity is well above that expected for iodine spikes and corresponds to less than 5% fuel clad damage. This amount of radioactivity indicates significant clad damage and thus the Fuel Clad Barrier is considered lost.

A reading of greater than 1000 mR/hr within at one foot from the RCS sample lines (SA-229 for Unit 1, 2TCD-19 for Unit 2) has been determined to correspond to fuel clad failure of approximately 2-5%, and thus the fuel clad barrier is considered lost. This reading is well above that expected for iodine spikes and thus indicates significant clad damage and thus the fuel clad barrier is considered lost.

Potential Loss

There is no Potential Loss EAL associated with this item.

Reference Documents

1. ANO Calculation 03-E-0002-01, "Radiation Monitor EAL Setpoints for Fission Product Barrier Degradation"

2. Core Exit Thermocouple Readings (FCB2)

Loss: > 1200 °F CET temperature.

Potential Loss:

Unit 1: ICC exists as evidenced by CETs indicating superheated conditions

Unit 2: Average CETs indicate superheat for current RCS pressure

Basis:

<u>Loss</u>

The Loss EAL of > 1200 °F is consistent with NEI 99-01 and corresponds to significant superheating of the coolant.

Potential Loss

The Potential Loss EAL corresponds to a loss of subcooling margin.

Note that the loss or potential loss EAL for this category will occur after a loss of adequate sub-cooling margin, which represents a loss of the RCS barrier in EAL RCB1, and therefore represents the loss of two barriers, resulting in a Site Area Emergency per FS1. Any loss or potential loss of the containment barrier at that point would escalate to a General Emergency.

Reference Documents

- 1. Unit 1 EOP 1202.005, "Inadequate Core Cooling"
- 2. Unit 1 EOP 1202.013, "EOP Figures"
- 3. Unit 2 OP 2202.009, "Functional Recovery"
- 4. ANO Procedure OP 1302.022, "Core Damage Assessment"
- 5. CE-NPSD-241, "Development of the Comprehensive Procedure Guideline for Core Damage Assessment," Task 467
- 6. BWOG EOP Technical Bases Document, Vol. 3, Chapter III.F

3. Reactor Vessel Water Level (FCB3)

Loss: None

Potential Loss:

Unit 1: RVLMS Levels 1 through 9 indicate DRY

Unit 2: RVLMS Levels 1 through 7 indicate DRY

Basis:

Loss

There is no Loss EAL associated with this item.

Potential Loss

The Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring Systems at ANO do not provide positive indication of core uncovery. The above core level indication provided is used to monitor the approach to and recovery from ICC conditions, but the CETs are used to identify core uncovery, and are the only positive indication of core uncovery.

Per reference document #1, the reactor vessel level indicators installed in Unit 1 extend from the top of the reactor vessel to the fuel alignment plate, and information in reference document #2 indicates that the lowest sensor is greater than 2 feet above the top of active fuel. If any of the 4 RCPs are running, flow induced turbulence produced by the pumps renders the reactor vessel level indicator readings invalid.

Per reference document #3, only the reactor vessel level indicators above the core are considered part of the ICC monitoring system. Per reference document #4, the lowest sensor above the core, RVLMS LVL 6 on the ICC monitoring panel 2C388, is 47 inches above the top of the core. If any of the 4 RCPs are running, flow induced turbulence produced by the pumps renders the reactor vessel level indicator readings invalid.

For either unit then, should CET indication be unavailable and reactor vessel level indication be unavailable due to RCP operation or any other cause, a degraded ability to monitor the barrier would exist.

Reference Documents:

- 1. ULD-1-SYS-24, "Unit 1 Inadequate Core Cooling System"
- 2. Calculation 84-EQ-0080-02, "Loop Error Analysis for Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring System"
- 3. ULD-2-SYS-24, "Unit 2 Inadequate Core Cooling Monitoring System"
- 4. Calculation 90-E-0116-01, "Unit 2 EOP Setpoint Document," Setpoint R.3

4. Containment Radiation Monitoring (FCB4)

Loss: Containment high range radiation monitor reading > 1000 R/hr

Potential Loss: None

Basis:

Loss

The 1000 R/hr reading on the containment high range radiation monitors (RE-8060 or RE-8061 for Unit 1, 2RE-8925-1 or 2RE-8925-2 for Unit 2) is a value which indicates the release of reactor coolant, with elevated activity indicative of fuel damage, into the containment.

Reactor coolant concentrations of this magnitude are several times larger than the maximum concentrations (including iodine spiking) allowed within technical specifications and are therefore indicative of fuel damage.

This radiation monitor value is higher than that specified for RCS barrier Loss EAL RCB3. Thus, this EAL indicates a loss of both the Fuel Clad barrier and RCS barrier that appropriately escalates the emergency classification to a Site Area Emergency per FS1.

Potential Loss

There is no Potential Loss EAL associated with this item.

Reference Documents:

- 1. NUREG 1228, "Source Term Estimation During Incident Response to Severe Nuclear Power Plant Accidents"
- 2. ANO Calculation 03-E-0002-01, "Radiation Monitor EAL Setpoints for Fission Product Barrier Degradation"

5. Core Damage Assessment (FCB5)

Loss: At least 5% fuel clad damage as determined from core damage assessment

Potential Loss: None

Basis:

Loss

This level is consistent with other fuel clad barrier loss EALs indicative of significant fuel clad damage, but uses core damage assessment evaluations by Technical Support personnel. The fuel clad barrier is considered lost.

If this determination is made from the high range containment radiation monitor readings, or if accompanied by other indications of a loss or potential loss of the RCS barrier, this EAL condition represents a Site Area Emergency per FS1.

Potential Loss

There is no potential loss EAL associated with this item.

Reference Documents:

1. ANO Procedure OP-1302.022, "Core Damage Assessment"

6. Emergency Director Judgment (FCB6)

Any condition in the opinion of the SM / ED that indicates Loss or Potential Loss of the Fuel Clad barrier.

Basis:

This EAL addresses any other factors that are to be used by the SM / ED in determining whether the Fuel Clad barrier is lost or potentially lost. In addition, the inability to monitor the barrier should also be incorporated in this EAL as a factor in SM / ED judgment that the barrier may be considered lost or potentially lost.

RCS Barrier EALs: RCB1 OR RCB2 OR RCB3 OR RCB4

The RCS Barrier includes the RCS primary side and its connections up to and including the pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and including the primary isolation valves.

1. RCS Leak Rate (RCB1)

Loss: RCS leak rate > available makeup capacity as indicated by:

Unit 1: Loss of adequate subcooling margin

Unit 2: RCS subcooling (MTS) can NOT be maintained at least 30 °F

Potential Loss:

Unit 1: UNISOLABLE RCS leak > 50 gpm with Letdown isolated

Unit 2: UNISOLABLE RCS leak > 44 gpm with Letdown isolated

Basis:

Loss

This EAL addresses conditions where leakage from the RCS is greater than available inventory control capacity such that a loss of subcooling has occurred. The loss of subcooling is the fundamental indication that the inventory control systems are inadequate in maintaining RCS pressure and inventory against the mass loss through the leak.

Potential Loss

This EAL is based on the apparent inability to maintain normal liquid inventory within the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) by normal operation of the Makeup and Purification System (Unit 1) or the Chemical and Volume Control System (Unit 2).

Isolating letdown is a standard abnormal operating procedure action and may prevent unnecessary classifications when a non-RCS leakage path such as a Makeup and Purification System or CVCS leak exists. The intent of this condition is met if attempts to isolate Letdown are NOT successful. Additional charging pumps being required is indicative of a substantial RCS leak.

Reference Documents:

- 1. Unit 1 EOP 1202.013, Figure 1, "Saturation and Adequate SCM"
- 2. Unit 1 EOP Setpoint Document, Calculation 90-E-0116-07, Setpoint B.19
- 3. Unit 2 EOP 2202.009, "Functional Recovery"
- 4. Unit 2 EOP Setpoint Document, Calculation 90-E-0116-01
- 5. Unit 2 SAR Table 9.3-14, Charging Pumps Design Data

2. SG Tube Rupture (RCB2)

Loss: SGTR that results in an ECCS (SI) actuation

Potential Loss: None

Basis:

Loss

This EAL addresses the full spectrum of Steam Generator (SG) tube rupture events in conjunction with Containment barrier Loss EALs. It addresses RUPTURED SG(s) for which the leakage is large enough to cause actuation (either automatic or manual) of ECCS (SI). This is consistent to the RCS leak rate barrier Potential Loss EAL.

By itself, this EAL will result in the declaration of an Alert. However, if the SG is also FAULTED (i.e., two barriers failed), the declaration escalates to a Site Area Emergency per Containment barrier Loss EAL CNB3.

Potential Loss

There is no Potential Loss EAL associated with this item.

3. Containment Radiation Monitoring (RCB3)

Loss: Containment high range radiation monitor reading > 100 R/hr.

Potential Loss: None

<u>Basis</u>

Loss

The 100 R/hr reading on the containment high range radiation monitors (RE-8060 or RE-8061 for Unit 1, 2RE-8925-1 or 2RE-8925-2 for Unit 2) is a value which indicates the release of reactor coolant to the containment.

This reading is less than that specified for Fuel Clad barrier EAL FCB4. Thus, this EAL is indicative of a RCS leak only. If the radiation monitor reading rose to that specified by Fuel Clad barrier EAL, fuel damage would also be indicated.

NRC Information Notice 97-045 Supplement 1 identifies the potential for erratic indications from the high range radiation monitors (HRRMs) as a result of thermally induced currents (TIC) which may cause the HRRM to read falsely high (for approximately 15 minutes) on a rapid temperature increase, and fail low intermittently on a rapid temperature decrease. Because of this phenomenon, any trends or alarms on the HRRM's should be validated by comparison to the containment low range/area radiation monitors and Air Monitoring Systems trends before actions are taken.

Potential Loss

There is no Potential Loss EAL associated with this item.

Reference Documents:

1. ANO Calculation 03-E-0002-01, "Radiation Monitor EAL Setpoints for Fission Product Barrier Degradation"

4. Emergency Director Judgment (RCB4)

Any condition in the opinion of the SM / ED that indicates Loss or Potential Loss of the RCS Barrier.

Basis:

This EAL addresses any other factors that are to be used by the SM / ED in determining whether the RCS barrier is lost or potentially lost. In addition, the inability to monitor the barrier should also be incorporated in this EAL as a factor in SM / ED judgment that the barrier may be considered lost or potentially lost.

Containment Barrier EALs: CNB1 <u>OR</u> CNB2 <u>OR</u> CNB3 <u>OR</u> CNB4 <u>OR</u> CNB5 <u>OR</u> CNB6 <u>OR</u> CNB7

The Containment Barrier includes the containment building and connections up to and including the outermost containment isolation valves. This barrier also includes the main steam, feedwater, and blowdown line extensions outside the containment building up to and including the outermost secondary side isolation valve.

1. Containment Pressure (CNB1)

Loss:

1. Rapid unexplained drop in containment pressure following an initial rise in containment pressure

2. Containment pressure or sump level response not consistent with LOCA conditions

Potential Loss:

1. Unit 1: Containment pressure > 73.7 PSIA (59 PSIG) and rising

Unit 2: Containment pressure > 73.7 PSIA (59 PSIG) and rising

2. Explosive mixture exists inside containment.

3. a. Containment Pressure > containment spray actuation setpoint

UNIT 1: 44.7 PSIA (30 PSIG)

UNIT 2: 23.3 PSIA (8.6 PSIG)

<u>AND</u>

b. LESS THAN one full train of spray operating

Basis:

Loss

Rapid unexplained loss of pressure (i.e., not attributable to containment spray or condensation effects) following an initial pressure rise from a primary or secondary high energy line break indicates a loss of containment integrity. Containment pressure and sump levels should rise as a result of mass and energy release into containment from a LOCA. Thus, sump level or pressure not rising indicates containment bypass and a loss of containment integrity.

This indicator relies on operator recognition of an unexpected response for the condition and therefore, does not have a specific value associated with it. The unexpected response is important because it is the indicator for a containment bypass condition.

Potential Loss 1.

The site specific pressure is based on the containment design pressure.

Potential Loss 2.

Existence of an explosive mixture means a hydrogen and oxygen concentration of at least the lower deflagration limit curve exists. The hydrogen concentration of 4% has been recognized by the NRC staff as a well-established lower flammability limit in air or steam-air atmospheres that is adequately conservative for protecting against an H2 explosion. Hydrogen control systems at ANO are designed and operated as to maintain the containment hydrogen concentration below this level, so that indications of hydrogen concentrations above this are considered a potential challenge to the containment integrity.

Potential Loss 3.

This EAL represents a potential loss of containment in that the containment heat removal/depressurization system (e.g., containment sprays, ice condenser fans, etc., but not including containment venting strategies) are either lost or performing in a degraded manner, as indicated by containment pressure greater than the setpoint at which the equipment was supposed to have actuated.

Reference Documents:

- 1. Unit 1 OP-1105.003, "Engineering Safeguards Actuation System"
- 2. Unit 1 SAR Sections 1.4.43, 5.2.1.2.1, 14.2.2.5.5.1 (reactor building design pressure)
- 3. Unit 1 SAR Section 6.6 (Post-Loss of Coolant Accident Hydrogen Control)
- 4. Unit 1 TS Table 3.3.5-1
- 5. Unit 2 SAR Section 6.2.5 (Combustible Gas Control In Containment)
- 6. Unit 2 SAR Section 3.8.1.3.1.D (Containment Design Pressure)
- 7. Unit 2 TS Table 3.3-4
- 8. Regulatory Guide 1.7, "Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a Loss-of-Coolant Accident, Rev. 2 1978"

2. Core Exit Thermocouple Readings (CNB2)

Loss: None

Potential Loss:

1. a. CETs indicate > 1200 °F

<u>AND</u>

b. Restoration procedures not effective within 15 minutes.

2. a. CETs indicate > 700 °F

<u>AND</u>

b. RVLMS indicates:

Unit 1: Levels 1 through 9 DRY

Unit 2: Levels 1 through 7 DRY

<u>AND</u>

c. Restoration procedures not effective within 15 minutes.

Basis:

Loss

There is no Loss EAL associated with this item.

Potential Loss

The conditions in these EALs represent an IMMINENT core melt sequence which, if not corrected, could lead to vessel failure and a higher potential for containment failure. In conjunction with the Core Cooling and RCS Leakage criteria in the Fuel and RCS barrier columns, this threshold would result in the declaration of a General Emergency, i.e., loss of two barriers and the potential loss of a third. If the function restoration procedures are ineffective, there is no "success" path.

The function restoration procedures are those emergency operating procedures that address the recovery of the core cooling critical safety functions. The procedure is considered effective if the temperature is dropping or if the vessel water level is rising.

Whether or not the procedures will be effective should be apparent within 15 minutes. The SM / ED should make the declaration as soon as it is determined that the procedures have been, or will be ineffective.

3. SG Secondary Side Release With Primary-to-Secondary Leakage (CNB3)

Loss:

1. RUPTURED steam generator is also FAULTED outside of containment

2. a. Primary-to-secondary leakrate > 10 gpm

<u>AND</u>

b. UNISOLABLE steam release from affected steam generator to the environment

Potential Loss: None

Basis:

This loss EAL recognizes that SG tube leakage can represent a bypass of the containment barrier as well as a loss of the RCS barrier.

This EAL results in a NUE for smaller breaks that; (1) do not exceed the Normal Makeup Capacity for Unit 1 or the capacity of one charging pump in the normal charging lineup for Unit 2 EAL in RCS leak rate barrier Potential Loss, or (2) do not result in ECCS actuation in RCS SG tube rupture barrier Loss. For larger breaks, RCS barrier threshold criteria would result in an Alert. For SG tube ruptures which may involve multiple steam generators or UNISOLABLE secondary line breaks, this condition would exist in conjunction with RCS barrier conditions and would result in a Site Area Emergency. Escalation to General Emergency would be based on "Potential Loss" of the Fuel Clad Barrier.

<u>Loss 1.</u>

This EAL addresses the condition in which a RUPTURED steam generator is also FAULTED. This condition represents a bypass of the RCS and containment barriers and is a subset of the second threshold. In conjunction with RCS leak rate barrier loss EAL RCB2, this would always result in the declaration of a Site Area Emergency.

Loss 2.

This EAL addresses SG tube leaks that exceed 10 gpm in conjunction with an UNISOLABLE release path to the environment from the affected steam generator. The threshold for establishing the UNISOLABLE secondary side release is intended to be a prolonged release of radioactivity from the RUPTURED steam generator directly to the environment. This could be expected to occur when the main condenser is unavailable to accept the contaminated steam (i.e., SG tube rupture with concurrent loss of off-site power and the RUPTURED steam generator is required for plant cooldown or a stuck open relief valve). The time it takes to isolate a SG with tube leakage > 10 gpm in accordance with plant specific EOPs is not considered a prolonged release. In this case the SG with tube leakage > 10 gpm with a concurrent loss of offsite power is normally steamed to the environment in a controlled manner to achieve and maintain a RCS Hot Leg temperature below that which corresponds to the Main Steam Safety Valve relief settings. However, if the SG cannot be isolated or if both SGs have tube leakage > 10 gpm, a prolonged release will likely be necessary to support plant cooldown. If the main condenser is available, there may be releases via air ejectors, gland seal exhausters, and other similar controlled, and often monitored, pathways. These pathways do not meet the intent of an UNISOLABLE release path to the environment. These minor releases are assessed using Abnormal Radiation Levels / Radiological Effluent ICs (TAB A).

Potential Loss

There is no Potential Loss EAL associated with this item.

4. Containment Isolation Failure or Bypass (CNB4)

Loss:

1. UNISOLABLE breach of containment

<u>AND</u>

2. Direct downstream pathway to the environment exists after containment isolation signal

Potential Loss: None

Basis:

<u>Loss</u>

This EAL addresses incomplete containment isolation that allows a direct release to the environment. A breach of containment has also occurred if an inboard and outboard pair of isolation valves fails to close on an automatic actuation signal or from a manual action in the Control Room and opens a release path to the environment.

The breach is not isolable from the Control Room if an attempt for isolation from the Control Room has been made and was unsuccessful. An attempt for isolation should be made prior to the accident classification. If isolable upon identification, then this Initiating Condition is not applicable.

The use of the modifier "direct" in defining the release path discriminates against release paths through interfacing liquid systems. The existence of an in-line charcoal filter does not make a release path indirect since the filter is not effective at removing fission product noble gases. Typical filters have an efficiency of 95-99% removal of iodine. Given the magnitude of the core inventory of iodine, significant releases could still occur.

In addition, since the fission product release would be driven by boiling in the reactor vessel, the high humidity in the release stream can be expected to render the filters ineffective in a short period.

Potential Loss

There is no Potential Loss EAL associated with this item.

5. Containment Radiation Monitoring (CNB5)

Loss: None

Potential Loss:

Containment high range radiation monitor reading > 4000 R/hr

Basis:

Loss

There is no Loss EAL associated with this item.

Potential Loss

The 4000 R/hr reading on the containment high range radiation monitors (RE-8060 or RE-8061 for Unit 1, 2RE-8925-1 or 2RE-8925-2 for Unit 2) is a value which indicates significant fuel damage well in excess of the EALs associated with both loss of Fuel Clad and loss of RCS barriers. A major release of radioactivity requiring off-site protective actions from core damage is not possible unless a major failure of fuel cladding allows radioactive material to be released from the core into the reactor coolant.

Regardless of whether containment is challenged, this amount of activity in containment, if released, could have such severe consequences that it is prudent to treat this as a potential loss of containment, such that a General Emergency declaration is warranted.

Because the monitor reading exceeds the readings for Fuel Clad Barrier loss in **FCB4** and RCS Barrier loss in **RCB3**, the SM/ED should declare a General Emergency when this value on the Containment High Range Rad Monitor is exceeded as a loss of two barriers (fuel clad and RCS) and potential loss of the third (containment).

Reference Documents:

- 1. ANO Calculation 03-E-0002-01, "Radiation Monitor EAL Setpoints for Fission Product Barrier Degradation"
- 2. NUREG 1228, "Source Term Estimation During Incident Response to Severe Nuclear Power Plant Accidents"

6. Other Indications (CNB6)

Elevated readings on the following radiation monitors that indicate loss or potential loss of the Containment barrier:

MONITORS – UNIT 1	
RX-9820	Containment Purge
RX-9825	Radwaste Area
RX-9830	Fuel Handling Area
RX-9835	Emergency Penetration Room
MONITORS – UNIT 2	
2RX-9820	Containment Purge
2RX-9825	Radwaste Area
2RX-9830	Fuel Handling Area
2RX-9835	Emergency Penetration Room
2RX-9840	Post Accident Sampling Building
2RX-9845	Aux. Building Extension

Basis:

This EAL covers other indications that may unambiguously indicate the loss or potential loss of the containment barrier.

7. Emergency Director Judgment (CNB7)

Any condition in the opinion of the SM / ED that indicates Loss or Potential Loss of the Containment Barrier.

Basis:

This EAL addresses any other factors that are to be used by the SM / ED in determining whether the Containment barrier is lost or potentially lost. In addition, the inability to monitor the barrier should also be incorporated in this EAL as a factor in SM / ED judgment that the barrier may be considered lost or potentially lost.

The Containment barrier should not be declared lost or potentially lost based on exceeding Technical Specification action statement criteria, unless there is an event in progress requiring mitigation by the Containment barrier. When no event is in progress (Loss or Potential Loss of either Fuel Clad and/or RCS) the Containment barrier status is addressed by Technical Specifications

Initiating Condition - NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT

Confirmed SECURITY CONDITION or threat which indicates a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant

Operating Mode Applicability: All

Example Emergency Action Level(s): (1 or 2 or 3)

1. A SECURITY CONDITION that does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION as reported by ANO Security Shift Supervision.

2. A credible site specific security threat notification.

3. A validated notification from NRC providing information of an aircraft threat.

Basis:

NOTE: Timely and accurate communication between Security Shift Supervision and the Control Room is crucial for the implementation of effective Security EALs.

Security events which do not represent a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant are reported under 10 CFR 73.71 or in some cases under 10 CFR 50.72. Security events assessed as HOSTILE ACTIONS are classifiable under HA1, HS1 and HG1.

A higher initial classification could be made based upon the nature and timing of the security threat and potential consequences. Consideration shall be given to upgrading the emergency response status and emergency classification in accordance with the Safeguards Contingency Plan and Emergency Plan.

<u>EAL #1</u>

The Security Shift Supervisor is the designated individual on-site qualified and trained to confirm that a security event is occurring or has occurred. Training on security event classification confirmation is closely controlled due to the strict secrecy controls placed on the plant Safeguards Contingency Plan.

This EAL is based on the Safeguards Contingency Plan. The Safeguards Contingency Plan is based on guidance provided in NEI 03-12.

EAL #2

This EAL is included to ensure that appropriate notifications for the security threat are made in a timely manner. This includes information of a credible threat. Only the plant to which the specific threat is made need declare the NUE.

The determination of "credible" is made through use of information found in the Safeguards Contingency Plan.

EAL #3

The intent of this EAL is to ensure that notifications for the aircraft threat are made in a timely manner and that Offsite Response Organizations and plant personnel are at a state of heightened awareness regarding the credible threat. It is not the intent of this EAL to replace existing non-hostile related EALs involving aircraft.

This EAL is met when a plant receives information regarding an aircraft threat from NRC. Validation is performed by calling the NRC or by other approved methods of authentication. Only the plant to which the specific threat is made need declare the NUE.

The NRC Headquarters Operations Officer (HOO) will communicate to the licensee if the threat involves an airliner (airliner is meant to be a large aircraft with the potential for causing significant damage to the plant). The status and size of the plane may be provided by NORAD through the NRC.

Escalation to Alert via HA1 would be appropriate if the threat involves an airliner within 30 minutes of the plant.

Initiating Condition - NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT

Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the SM warrant declaration of an NUE

Operating Mode Applicability: All

Example Emergency Action Level(s):

1. Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the SM indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.

Basis:

This EAL addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the SM to fall under the NUE emergency classification level.

Initiating Condition - NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT

FIRE within the PROTECTED AREA not extinguished within 15 minutes of detection or EXPLOSION within the PROTECTED AREA

Operating Mode Applicability: All

Example Emergency Action Level(s): (1 or 2)

- **Note:** The SM should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the duration has exceeded, or will likely exceed, the applicable time.
- 1. FIRE in any Table H1 structure or area not extinguished:

1) within 15 minutes of Control Room notification

2) within 15 minutes of verification of a Control Room FIRE alarm (i.e. Alarm valid until disproved).

2. EXPLOSION within the PROTECTED AREA.

Basis:

This IC addresses the magnitude and extent of FIRES or EXPLOSIONS that may be potentially significant precursors of damage to safety systems. It addresses the FIRE / EXPLOSION, and not the degradation in performance of affected systems that may result.

As used here, detection is visual observation and report by plant personnel or sensor alarm indication.

<u>EAL #1</u>

The 15-minute time period begins with a credible notification that a FIRE is occurring or indication of a fire detection system alarm/actuation. Verification of a fire detection system alarm/actuation includes actions that can be taken within the Control Room or other nearby site specific location to ensure that it is not spurious. An alarm is assumed to be an indication of a FIRE unless it is disproved within the 15-minute period by personnel dispatched to the scene. In other words, a personnel report from the scene may be used to disprove a sensor alarm if received within 15 minutes of the alarm, but shall not be required to verify the alarm.

The intent of this 15-minute duration is to size the FIRE and to discriminate against small FIRES that are readily extinguished (e.g., smoldering waste paper basket).

<u>EAL #2</u>

This EAL addresses only those EXPLOSIONS of sufficient force to damage permanent structures or equipment within the PROTECTED AREA.

No attempt is made to assess the actual magnitude of the damage. The occurrence of the EXPLOSION is sufficient for declaration.

The SM also needs to consider any security aspects of the EXPLOSION, if applicable.

Escalation of this emergency classification level, if appropriate, would be based on HA4.

CHANGE: 054

HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY HU4

Table H1 <u>Unit 1</u>

Reactor Building

All Elevations

Aux Building

All Elevations Including Penthouse/MSIV Room Exceptions: Boric Acid Mix Tank Room (Chem Add Area) 404' (157-B) EDG Exhaust Fan area on 386' (1-E and 2-E)

Turbine Building

All Elevations Including: Pipechase under ICW Coolers CRD Pump Pit / T-28 Room / Area under ICW Pumps

Outside Areas

Manholes adjacent to Startup #2 XFMR (MH-03/MH-04) Manholes adjacent to Intake Structure (MH-05/MH-06) Intake Structure (354' and 366') Diesel Fuel Vault Diesel Fuel Vault Pump Manholes MH-09 and MH-10 (Manhole, MH-09, is located approximately 15 feet northeast of the Unit 1 QCST, Manhole, MH-10, is located approximately 5 feet west of Unit 2 Condensate Storage Tank, 2T-41A)

CHANGE: 054

HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY HU4

Table H1 <u>Unit 2</u>

Reactor Building

All Elevations

Aux Building

All Elevations including Aux Extensions

Turbine Building

All Elevations

Outside Areas

Intake Structure (354' and 366') Concrete Manhole East, NE of intake Concrete Manhole East of Turbine building next to train bay Diesel Fuel Vault Diesel Fuel Vault Pump Manholes MH-09 and MH-10 (Manhole, MH-09, is located approximately 15 feet northeast of the Unit 1 QCST , Manhole, MH-10, is located approximately 5 feet west of Unit 2 Condensate Storage Tank, 2T-41A)

Initiating Condition - NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT

Release of toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant, or flammable gases deemed detrimental to NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS.

Operating Mode Applicability: All

Example Emergency Action Level(s): (1 or 2)

1. Toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gases in amounts that have or could adversely affect NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS.

2. Report by Local, County or State officials for evacuation or sheltering of site personnel based on an offsite event.

Basis:

This IC is based on the release of toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gases of sufficient quantity to affect NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS.

The fact that SCBAs may be worn does not eliminate the need to declare the event.

This IC is not intended to require significant assessment or quantification. It assumes an uncontrolled process that has the potential to affect plant operations. This would preclude small or incidental releases, or releases that do not impact structures needed for plant operation.

An asphyxiant is a gas capable of reducing the level of oxygen in the body to dangerous levels. Most commonly, asphyxiants work by merely displacing air in an enclosed environment. This reduces the concentration of oxygen below the normal level of around 19%, which can lead to breathing difficulties, unconsciousness or even death.

Escalation of this emergency classification level, if appropriate, would be based on HA5.

Initiating Condition - NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT

Natural or destructive phenomena affecting the PROTECTED AREA

Operating Mode Applicability: All

Example Emergency Action Level: (1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 6)

- 1. Seismic event identified by any 2 of the following:
 - Seismic event confirmed by annunciation of the 0.01g acceleration alarm
 - Earthquake felt in plant
 - National Earthquake Center

2. Tornado striking within PROTECTED AREA boundary or high winds > 67 mph (**2 minute average**).

3. Internal flooding that has the potential to affect safety related equipment required by Technical Specifications for the current operating mode in any of the structures or areas in **Table H1 (see Table H1 located in HU4)**.

4. Turbine failure resulting in casing penetration or damage to turbine or generator seals.

5. Lake Dardanelle level < 335 feet.

6. Lake Dardanelle level > 345 feet.
Basis:

These EALs are categorized on the basis of the occurrence of an event of sufficient magnitude to be of concern to plant operators.

<u>EAL #1</u>

Damage may be caused to some portions of the site, but should not affect ability of safety functions to operate.

As defined in the EPRI-sponsored Guidelines for Nuclear Plant Response to an Earthquake, dated October 1989, a "felt earthquake" is an earthquake of sufficient intensity such that the vibratory ground motion is felt at the nuclear plant site and recognized as an earthquake based on a consensus of control room operators on duty at the time.

The National Earthquake Center can confirm if an earthquake has occurred in the area of the plant.

<u>EAL #2</u>

This EAL is based on a tornado striking (touching down) or high winds within the PROTECTED AREA.

The high wind value in EAL #2 is conservatively based on the SAR design basis for Unit 1 of 67 mph. Unit 2 Design basis is 80 mph.

Escalation of this emergency classification level, if appropriate, would be based on VISIBLE DAMAGE, or by other in plant conditions, via HA6.

<u>EAL #3</u>

This EAL addresses the effect of internal flooding caused by events such as component failures, equipment misalignment, or outage activity mishaps.

Escalation of this emergency classification level, if appropriate, would be via HA6, or by other plant conditions.

<u>EAL #4</u>

This EAL addresses main turbine rotating component failures of sufficient magnitude to cause observable damage to the turbine casing or to the seals of the turbine generator. Generator seal damage observed after generator purge does not meet the intent of this EAL because it did not impact normal operation of the plant.

Of major concern is the potential for leakage of combustible fluids (lubricating oils) and gases (hydrogen cooling) to the plant environs. Actual FIRES and flammable gas build up are appropriately classified via HU4 and HU5.

This EAL is consistent with the definition of an NUE while maintaining the anticipatory nature desired and recognizing the risk to non-safety related equipment.

Escalation of this emergency classification level, if appropriate, would be to HA6 based on damage done by PROJECTILES generated by the failure or in conjunction with a steam generator tube rupture. These latter events would be classified by the radiological (A) ICs or Fission Product Barrier (F) ICs.

EALs #5 and #6

EALs #5 and #6 are based on the levels of Lake Dardanelle at which the site will take specific action to reduce the impact of the lake level on plant safety by initiating plant shutdown.

- 1. OP-1203.025, "Natural Emergencies"
- 2. OP-2203.008, "Natural Emergencies"
- 3. Unit 1 FSAR
- 4. Unit 2 FSAR

Initiating Condition - ALERT

HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne attack threat

Operating Mode Applicability: All

Example Emergency Action Level(s): (1 or 2)

1. A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA as reported by ANO Security Shift Supervision.

2. A validated notification from NRC of an airliner attack threat within 30 minutes of the site.

Basis:

NOTE: Timely and accurate communication between Security Shift Supervision and the Control Room is crucial for the implementation of effective Security EALs.

These EALs address the contingency for a very rapid progression of events, such as that experienced on September 11, 2001. They are not premised solely on the potential for a radiological release. Rather the issue includes the need for rapid assistance due to the possibility for significant and indeterminate damage from additional air, land or water attack elements.

The fact that the site is under serious attack or is an identified attack target with minimal time available for further preparation or additional assistance to arrive requires a heightened state of readiness and implementation of protective measures that can be effective (such as on-site evacuation, dispersal or sheltering).

<u>EAL #1</u>

This EAL addresses the potential for a very rapid progression of events due to a HOSTILE ACTION. It is not intended to address incidents that are accidental events or acts of civil disobedience, such as small aircraft impact, hunters, or physical disputes between employees within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA. Those events are adequately addressed by other EALs.

Note that this EAL is applicable for any HOSTILE ACTION occurring, or that has occurred, in the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA. This includes Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations that may be outside the PROTECTED AREA but still in the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA.

<u>EAL #2</u>

This EAL addresses the immediacy of an expected threat arrival or impact on the site within a relatively short time.

The intent of this EAL is to ensure that notifications for the airliner attack threat are made in a timely manner and that Offsite Response Organizations and plant personnel are at a state of heightened awareness regarding the credible threat. Airliner is meant to be a large aircraft with the potential for causing significant damage to the plant.

This EAL is met when a plant receives information regarding an airliner attack threat from NRC and the airliner is within 30 minutes of the plant. Only the plant to which the specific threat is made need declare the Alert.

The NRC Headquarters Operations Officer (HOO) will communicate to the licensee if the threat involves an airliner (airliner is meant to be a large aircraft with the potential for causing significant damage to the plant). The status and size of the plane may be provided by NORAD through the NRC.

Initiating Condition - ALERT

Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the SM / ED warrant declaration of an Alert

Operating Mode Applicability: All

Example Emergency Action Level(s):

 Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the SM / ED indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.

Basis:

This EAL addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere, but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the SM / ED to fall under the Alert emergency classification level.

Initiating Condition - ALERT

Control room evacuation has been initiated

Operating Mode Applicability: All

Example Emergency Action Level(s):

1. Alternate Shutdown procedure requires Control Room evacuation:

Unit 1: 1203.002, "Alternate Shutdown"

Unit 2: 2203.014, "Alternate Shutdown"

Basis:

With the Control Room evacuated, additional support, monitoring and direction through the Technical Support Center and/or other emergency response facilities may be necessary.

Inability to establish plant control from outside the Control Room will escalate this event to a Site Area Emergency.

Initiating Condition - ALERT

FIRE or EXPLOSION affecting the operability of plant safety systems required to establish or maintain safe shutdown

Operating Mode Applicability: All

Example Emergency Action Level(s):

 FIRE or EXPLOSION resulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE to any Table H1 structure or area containing safety systems or components or Control Room indication of degraded performance of those safety systems.

Basis:

VISIBLE DAMAGE is used to identify the magnitude of the FIRE or EXPLOSION and to discriminate against minor FIRES and EXPLOSIONS.

The reference to structures or areas containing safety systems or components is included to discriminate against FIRES or EXPLOSIONS in areas having a low probability of affecting safe operation. The significance here is not that a safety system was degraded but the fact that the FIRE or EXPLOSION was large enough to cause damage to these systems.

The use of VISIBLE DAMAGE should not be interpreted as mandating a lengthy damage assessment prior to classification. The declaration of an Alert and the activation of the Technical Support Center will provide the SM/ED with the resources needed to perform detailed damage assessments.

The SM / ED also needs to consider any security aspects of the EXPLOSION.

Escalation of this emergency classification level, if appropriate, will be based on System Malfunction (S), Fission Product Barrier Degradation (F) or Abnormal Radiation Levels / Radiological Effluent (A) ICs.

CHANGE: 054

HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY HA4

Table H1 <u>Unit 1</u>

Reactor Building

All Elevations

Aux Building

All Elevations Including Penthouse/MSIV Room Exceptions: Boric Acid Mix Tank Room (Chem Add Area) 404' (157-B) EDG Exhaust Fan area on 386' (1-E and 2-E)

Turbine Building

All Elevations Including: Pipechase under ICW Coolers CRD Pump Pit / T-28 Room / Area under ICW Pumps

Outside Areas

Manholes adjacent to Startup #2 XFMR (MH-03/MH-04) Manholes adjacent to Intake Structure (MH-05/MH-06) Intake Structure (354' and 366') Diesel Fuel Vault Diesel Fuel Vault Pump Manholes MH-09 and MH-10 (Manhole, MH-09, is located approximately 15 feet northeast of the Unit 1 QCST , Manhole, MH-10, is located approximately 5 feet west of Unit 2 Condensate Storage Tank, 2T-41A)

CHANGE: 054

HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY HA4

Table H1 <u>Unit 2</u>

Reactor Building

All Elevations

Aux Building

All Elevations including Aux Extensions

Turbine Building

All Elevations

Outside Areas

Intake Structure (354' and 366') Concrete Manhole East, NE of intake Concrete Manhole East of Turbine building next to train bay Diesel Fuel Vault Diesel Fuel Vault Pump Manholes MH-09 and MH-10 (Manhole, MH-09, is located approximately 15 feet northeast of the Unit 1 QCST , Manhole, MH-10, is located approximately 5 feet west of Unit 2 Condensate Storage Tank, 2T-41A)

Initiating Condition - ALERT

Access to a VITAL AREA is prohibited due to toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gases which jeopardize operation of operable equipment required to maintain safe operations or safely shutdown the reactor.

<u>Unit 1</u>

VITAL AREA	APPLICABLE MODES
A-4 Switchgear Room	3, 4
Upper North Electrical Penetration Room	3, 4
Lower South Electrical Equipment Room	3, 4
Control Room	ALL

<u>Unit 2</u>

VITAL AREA	APPLICABLE MODES
Auxiliary Building 317' Emergency Core Cooling Rooms	3, 4
Auxiliary Building 317' Tendon Gallery Access	3, 4
Auxiliary Building 335' Charging Pumps / 2B-52	3, 4
Auxiliary Building 354' 2B-62 Area	3, 4
Emergency Diesel Generator Corridor	3, 4
Lower South Piping Penetration Room	3, 4
Auxiliary Building 386' Containment Hatch	3, 4
Control Room	ALL

Operating Mode Applicability: As stated in above tables.

Example Emergency Action Level(s):

- **Note:** If the equipment in the stated area was already inoperable, or out of service, before the event occurred, then this EAL should not be declared as it will have no adverse impact on the ability of the plant to safely operate or safely shutdown beyond that already allowed by Technical Specifications at the time of the event.
- 1. Access to a VITAL AREA is prohibited due to toxic, corrosive, asphyxiant or flammable gases which jeopardize operation of systems required to maintain safe operations or safely shutdown the reactor.

Basis:

Gases in a VITAL AREA can affect the ability to safely operate or safely shutdown the reactor. The fact that SCBAs may be worn does not eliminate the need to declare the event.

Declaration should not be delayed for confirmation from atmospheric testing if the atmosphere poses an immediate threat to life and health or an immediate threat of severe exposure to gases. This could be based upon documented analysis, indication of personal ill effects from exposure, or operating experience with the hazards.

If the equipment in the stated area was already inoperable, or out of service, before the event occurred, then this EAL should not be declared as it will have no adverse impact on the ability of the plant to safely operate or safely shutdown beyond that already allowed by Technical Specifications at the time of the event.

An asphyxiant is a gas capable of reducing the level of oxygen in the body to dangerous levels. Most commonly, asphyxiants work by merely displacing air in an enclosed environment. This reduces the concentration of oxygen below the normal level of around 19%, which can lead to breathing difficulties, unconsciousness or even death.

An uncontrolled release of flammable gasses within a facility structure has the potential to affect safe operation of the plant by limiting either operator or equipment operations due to the potential for ignition and resulting equipment damage/personnel injury. Flammable gasses, such as hydrogen and acetylene, are routinely used to maintain plant systems (hydrogen) or to repair equipment/components (acetylene - used in welding). This EAL assumes concentrations of flammable gasses which can ignite/support combustion.

Escalation of this emergency classification level, if appropriate, will be based on System Malfunction (S), Fission Product Barrier Degradation (F) or Abnormal Radiation Levels / Radioactive Effluent (A) ICs.

Initiating Condition - ALERT

Natural or destructive phenomena affecting VITAL AREAS

Operating Mode Applicability: All

Example Emergency Action Level(s): (1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 6)

1. a. Seismic event > Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) as indicated by annunciation of the 0.1g acceleration alarm.

<u>AND</u>

- b. Earthquake confirmed by any of the following:
 - Earthquake felt in plant
 - National Earthquake Center
 - Control Room indication of degraded performance of systems required for the safe shutdown of the plant

- Tornado striking or high winds > 67 mph (2 minute average) resulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE to any of the following structures/equipment containing safety systems or components <u>or</u> Control Room indication of degraded performance of those safety systems:
 - Reactor Building Intake Structure Ultimate Heat Sink Startup Transformers Diesel Fuel Vault Refueling Water Tank (RWT)

Turbine Building Q Condensate Storage Tank (QCST) Control Room Auxiliary Building Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST)

<u>OR</u>

 Internal flooding in any of the following areas resulting in an electrical shock hazard that precludes access to operate or monitor safety equipment <u>or</u> Control Room indication of degraded performance of those safety systems:

> Intake Structure Turbine Building Auxiliary Building

4. Turbine failure-generated PROJECTILES resulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE to or penetration of any of the structures/equipment containing safety systems or components <u>or</u> Control Room indication of degraded performance of those safety systems:

Control Room	Turbine Building
Startup Transformers	Auxiliary Building

5. Lake Dardanelle level < 335 feet and Emergency Cooling Pond inoperable.

- 6. Vehicle crash resulting in VISIBLE DAMAGE to any of the structures/equipment containing safety systems or components or Control Room indication of degraded performance of those safety systems:
 - Reactor Building Intake Structure Ultimate Heat Sink Startup Transformers Diesel Fuel Vault

Turbine Building QCST RWT Auxiliary Building BWST

Basis:

These EALs escalate from HU6 in that the occurrence of the event has resulted in VISIBLE DAMAGE to plant structures or areas containing equipment necessary for a safe shutdown, or has caused damage to the safety systems in those structures evidenced by Control Room indications of degraded system response or performance. The occurrence of VISIBLE DAMAGE and/or degraded system response is intended to discriminate against lesser events. The initial report should not be interpreted as mandating a lengthy damage assessment prior to classification. No attempt is made in this EAL to assess the actual magnitude of the damage. The significance here is not that a particular system or structure was damaged, but rather, that the event was of sufficient magnitude to cause this degradation.

Escalation of this emergency classification level, if appropriate, would be based on System Malfunction (S) ICs.

<u>EAL #1</u>

Seismic events of this magnitude can result in a VITAL AREA being subjected to forces beyond design limits, and thus damage may be assumed to have occurred to plant safety systems.

The National Earthquake Center can confirm if an earthquake has occurred in the area of the plant.

<u>EAL #2</u>

This EAL is based on a tornado striking (touching down) or high winds that have caused VISIBLE DAMAGE to structures containing functions or systems required for safe shutdown of the plant. The high wind value in EAL #2 is conservatively based on the SAR design basis for Unit 1 of 67 mph. Unit 2 Design basis is 80 mph.

<u>EAL #3</u>

This EAL addresses the effect of internal flooding caused by events such as component failures, equipment misalignment, or outage activity mishaps. It is based on the degraded performance of systems, or has created industrial safety hazards (e.g., electrical shock) that preclude necessary access to operate or monitor safety equipment. The inability to access, operate or monitor safety equipment represents an actual or substantial potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

Flooding as used in this EAL describes a condition where water is entering the room faster than installed equipment is capable of removal, resulting in a rise of water level within the room. Classification of this EAL should not be delayed while corrective actions are being taken to isolate the water source.

<u>EAL #4</u>

This EAL addresses the threat to safety related equipment imposed by PROJECTILEs generated by main turbine rotating component failures. Therefore, this EAL is consistent with the definition of an ALERT in that the potential exists for actual or substantial potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

<u>EAL #5</u>

EAL #5 addresses site specific phenomena which has the potential for the loss of primary and secondary heat sink.

<u>EAL #6</u>

This EAL addresses vehicle crashes within the PROTECTED AREA that result in VISIBLE DAMAGE to VITAL AREAS or indication of damage to safety structures, systems, or components containing functions and systems required for safe shutdown of the plant.

- 1. OP-1203.025, "Natural Emergencies"
- 2. OP-2203.008, "Natural Emergencies"
- 3. Unit 1 FSAR
- 4. Unit 2 FSAR

Initiating Condition - SITE AREA EMERGENCY

HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA

Operating Mode Applicability: All

Example Emergency Action Level(s):

1. A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the PROTECTED AREA as reported by ANO Security Shift Supervision.

Basis:

This condition represents an escalated threat to plant safety above that contained in the Alert in that a HOSTILE FORCE has progressed from the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA to the PROTECTED AREA.

This EAL addresses the contingency for a very rapid progression of events, such as that experienced on September 11, 2001. It is not premised solely on the potential for a radiological release. Rather the issue includes the need for rapid assistance due to the possibility for significant and indeterminate damage from additional air, land or water attack elements.

The fact that the site is under serious attack with minimal time available for further preparation or additional assistance to arrive requires Offsite Response Organization readiness and preparation for the implementation of protective measures.

This EAL addresses the potential for a very rapid progression of events due to a HOSTILE ACTION. It is not intended to address incidents that are accidental events or acts of civil disobedience, such as small aircraft impact, hunters, or physical disputes between employees within the PROTECTED AREA. Those events are adequately addressed by other EALs.

Escalation of this emergency classification level, if appropriate, would be based on actual plant status after impact or progression of attack.

Initiating Condition - SITE AREA EMERGENCY

Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the SM / ED warrant declaration of a Site Area Emergency

Operating Mode Applicability: All

Example Emergency Action Level(s):

1. Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the SM / ED indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts; (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or; (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the site boundary.

Basis:

This EAL addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the SM / ED to fall under the emergency classification level description for Site Area Emergency.

Initiating Condition - SITE AREA EMERGENCY

Control Room evacuation has been initiated and plant control cannot be established

Operating Mode Applicability: All

Example Emergency Action Level(s):

Control room evacuation has been initiated 1. a.

AND

b. Control of the plant cannot be established in accordance with the following procedures within 15 minutes:

Unit 1: 1203.002, "Alternate Shutdown"

Unit 2: 2203.014, "Alternate Shutdown"

Basis:

The intent of this IC is to capture those events where control of the plant cannot be reestablished in a timely manner. In this case, expeditious transfer of control of safety systems has not occurred (although fission product barrier damage may not vet be indicated).

The intent of the EAL is to establish control of important plant equipment and knowledge of important plant parameters in a timely manner. Primary emphasis should be placed on those components and instruments that supply protection for and information about safety functions such as reactivity control (ability to shutdown the reactor and maintain it shutdown), RCS inventory (ability to cool the core), and decay heat removal (ability to maintain a heat sink).

The determination of whether or not control is established is based on SM / ED judgment. The SM / ED is expected to make a reasonable, informed judgment within 15 minutes that the plant staff has control of the plant .

Escalation of this emergency classification level, if appropriate, would be by Fission Product Barrier Degradation (F) or Abnormal Radiation Levels/Radiological Effluent (A) EALs.

Initiating Condition - GENERAL EMERGENCY

HOSTILE ACTION resulting in loss of physical control of the facility

Operating Mode Applicability: All

Example Emergency Action Level(s): (1 or 2)

1. A HOSTILE ACTION has occurred such that plant personnel are unable to operate equipment required to maintain safety functions.

2. A HOSTILE ACTION has caused failure of Spent Fuel Cooling Systems and IMMINENT fuel damage is likely for a freshly off-loaded reactor core in pool.

Basis:

<u>EAL #1</u>

This EAL encompasses conditions under which a HOSTILE ACTION has resulted in a loss of physical control of VITAL AREAS (containing vital equipment or controls of vital equipment) required to maintain safety functions and control of that equipment cannot be transferred to and operated from another location. These safety functions are reactivity control (ability to shut down the reactor and keep it shutdown) RCS inventory (ability to cool the core), and secondary heat removal (ability to maintain a heat sink).

Loss of physical control of the Control Room or remote shutdown/alternate shutdown capability alone may not prevent the ability to maintain safety functions per se. Design of the remote shutdown/alternate shutdown capability and the location of the transfer switches should be taken into account. Primary emphasis should be placed on those components and instruments that supply protection for and information about safety functions.

If control of the plant equipment necessary to maintain safety functions can be transferred to another location, then the threshold is not met.

<u>EAL #2</u>

This EAL addresses failure of spent fuel cooling systems as a result of HOSTILE ACTION if IMMINENT fuel damage is likely, such as when a freshly off-loaded reactor core is in the spent fuel pool. At ANO, the term "freshly off-loaded reactor core" refers to fuel that has been discharged from the core and stored in the spent fuel pool for a period of LESS THAN one year.

Initiating Condition - GENERAL EMERGENCY

Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the SM / ED warrant declaration of a General Emergency

Operating Mode Applicability: All

Example Emergency Action Level(s):

 Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the SM / ED indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.

Basis:

This EAL addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the SM / ED to fall under the emergency classification level description for General Emergency.

PROC./WORK PLAN NO.	PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE:	PAGE:	158 of 181
1903.010	EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL CLASSIFICATION	CHANGE:	054

Initiating Condition - NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT

Loss of all offsite AC power to Vital 4.16 KV busses \geq 15 minutes

Operating Mode Applicability: Power Operations (Mode 1) Startup (Mode 2) Hot Standby (Mode 3) Hot Shutdown (Mode 4)

Example Emergency Action Level(s):

- **Note:** The SM should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition has exceeded, or will likely exceed, the applicable time.
- 1. Loss of all offsite AC power to Vital 4.16 KV busses \geq 15 minutes.

Basis:

Prolonged loss of offsite AC power reduces required redundancy and potentially degrades the level of safety of the plant by rendering the plant more vulnerable to a complete loss of AC power to emergency busses.

Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses of off-site power.

- 1. 1202.007, "Degraded Power"
- 2. 1202.008, "Blackout"
- 3. 2202.007, "Loss of Off-Site Power"
- 4. 2202.008, "Station Blackout"

Initiating Condition - NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT

UNPLANNED loss of safety system annunciation or indication in the Control Room ≥ 15 minutes

Operating Mode Applicability: Power Operations (Mode 1) Startup (Mode 2) Hot Standby (Mode 3) Hot Shutdown (Mode 4)

Example Emergency Action Level(s):

- **Note:** The SM should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition has exceeded, or will likely exceed, the applicable time.
- 1. UNPLANNED Loss of > approximately 75% of the following \geq 15 minutes:
 - a. Control Room annunciators associated with safety systems.

b. Control Room safety system indication.

Basis:

This IC and its associated EAL are intended to recognize the difficulty associated with monitoring changing plant conditions without the use of a major portion of the annunciation or indication equipment.

Recognition of the availability of computer based indication equipment is considered e.g., SPDS, plant computer, etc.

"Planned" loss of annunciators or indicators includes scheduled maintenance and testing activities.

Quantification is arbitrary, however, it is estimated that if approximately 75% of the safety system annunciators or indicators are lost, there is an increased risk that a degraded plant condition could go undetected. It is not intended that plant personnel perform a detailed count of the instrumentation lost but use the value as a judgment threshold for determining the severity of the plant conditions.

It is further recognized that most plant designs provide redundant safety system indication powered from separate uninterruptible power supplies. While failure of a large portion of annunciators is more likely than a failure of a large portion of indications, the concern is included in this EAL due to difficulty associated with assessment of plant conditions. The loss of specific, or several, safety system indicators should remain a function of that specific system or component operability status. This will be addressed by the specific Technical Specification. The initiation of a Technical Specification imposed plant shutdown related to the instrument loss will be reported via 10 CFR 50.72. If the shutdown is not in compliance with the Technical Specification action, the NUE is based on SU11 "Inability to reach required operating mode within Technical Specification limits."

Indicators associated with safety systems are those indicators for reactivity control, core cooling, maintaining reactor coolant system integrity or maintaining containment integrity.

Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

This NUE will be escalated to an Alert based on a concurrent loss of compensatory indications or if a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT is in progress during the loss of annunciation or indication (SA6).

- 1. 1203.043, "Loss Control Room Annunciators"
- 2. 2203.042, "Loss of Control Room Annunciators"

Initiating Condition - NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT

RCS leakage

Operating Mode Applicability: Power Operations (Mode 1) Startup (Mode 2) Hot Standby (Mode 3) Hot Shutdown (Mode 4)

Example Emergency Action Level(s): (1 or 2)

1. Unidentified or pressure boundary leakage > 10 gpm.

2. Identified leakage > 25 gpm.

Basis:

With respect to this IC, RCS leakage is defined as a loss of RCS inventory due to a leak in the RCS or a supporting system that is not or cannot be isolated within 10 minutes. For example, isolation of the RCS Letdown (purification) system is a standard abnormal operating procedure action and may prevent unnecessary classifications when a non-RCS leakage path leak exists. However, the intent of this condition is met if attempts to isolate the RCS leak are NOT successful.

This IC is included as an NUE because it may be a precursor of more serious conditions and, as result, is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. The 10 gpm value for the unidentified or pressure boundary leakage was selected as it is observable with normal Control Room indications. Lesser values must generally be determined through time-consuming surveillance tests (e.g., mass balances).

Relief valve normal operation should be excluded from this IC. However, a relief valve that operates and fails to close per design should be considered applicable to this IC if the relief valve cannot be isolated.

The EAL for identified leakage is set at a higher value due to the lesser significance of identified leakage in comparison to unidentified or pressure boundary leakage. Steam generator tube leakage is identified leakage. In either case, escalation of this IC to the Alert level is via Fission Product Barrier Degradation (F) ICs.

Initiating Condition - NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT

Loss of all onsite or offsite communications capabilities

Operating Mode Applicability: Power Operations (Mode 1) Startup (Mode 2) Hot Standby (Mode 3) Hot Shutdown (Mode 4)

Example Emergency Action Level(s): (1 or 2)

1. Loss of all Table M1 onsite communications methods affecting the ability to perform routine operations.

2. Loss of all Table M2 offsite communications methods affecting the ability to perform offsite notifications.

Table M1 Onsite Communications Methods	
Station radio system	
Plant paging system	
In-plant telephones	
Gaitronics	



Basis:

The purpose of this IC and its associated EALs is to recognize a loss of communications capability that either defeats the plant operations staff ability to perform routine tasks necessary for plant operations or the ability to communicate issues with offsite authorities.

The availability of one method of ordinary offsite communications is sufficient to inform federal, state, and local authorities of plant problems. This EAL is intended to be used only when extraordinary means (e.g., relaying of information from non-routine radio transmissions, individuals being sent to off-site locations, etc.) are being used to make communications possible.

Reference Documents:

1. 1903.062, "Communications System Operating Procedure"

Initiating Condition - NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT

Fuel clad degradation

Operating Mode Applicability: Power Operations (Mode 1) Startup (Mode 2) Hot Standby (Mode 3) Hot Shutdown (Mode 4)

Example Emergency Action Level(s): (1 or 2)

1. Failed Fuel lodine radiation monitor reading indicates fuel clad degradation > Technical Specification allowable limits:

<u>Unit 1:</u>

RI-1237S reads > 1.3×10^5 counts per minute

<u>Unit 2:</u>

2RITS-4806B reads > .65 x 10^5 counts per minute

- 2. RCS sample activity value indicating fuel clad degradation > Technical Specification allowable limits:
 - > 1.0 uCi/gm Dose Equivalent I-131 for more than 48 hours

 Unit 1: ≥ 60 uCi/gm Dose Equivalent I-131

<u>Unit 2:</u>

> 60 uCi/gm Dose Equivalent I-131

<u>Unit 1:</u>

> 2200 $\mu Ci/gm$ Dose Equivalent Xe-133 for more than 48 hours

<u>Unit 2:</u>

> 3100 $\mu Ci/gm$ Dose Equivalent Xe-133 for more than 48 hours

Basis:

This IC is included because it is a precursor of more serious conditions and, as result, is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

<u>EAL #1</u>

This threshold addresses the Letdown Radiation Monitor readings that provide indication of a degradation of fuel clad integrity.

<u>EAL #2</u>

This EAL addresses coolant samples exceeding coolant technical specifications for transient iodine spiking limits and coolant samples exceeding coolant Technical Specifications for nominal operating limits for the time period specified in the Technical Specifications.

Escalation of this IC to the Alert level is via the Fission Product Barriers (F).

- 1. ANO1 Technical Specifications
- 2. ANO2 Technical Specifications

Initiating Condition - NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT

Inadvertent criticality

Operating Mode Applicability: Hot Standby (Mode 3) Hot Shutdown (Mode 4)

Example Emergency Action Level(s):

1. UNPLANNED sustained positive startup rate observed on nuclear instrumentation.

Basis:

This IC addresses inadvertent criticality events. This IC indicates a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant, warranting an NUE classification. This IC excludes inadvertent criticalities that occur during planned reactivity changes associated with reactor startups (e.g., criticality earlier than estimated).

This condition can be identified using the startup rate meter. The term "sustained" is used in order to allow exclusion of expected short term positive startup rates from planned control rod movements for (such as shutdown bank withdrawal). These short term positive startup rates are the result of the rise in neutron population due to subcritical multiplication.

Escalation would be by the Fission Product Barrier Table (F), as appropriate to the operating mode at the time of the event.

- 1. 1203.012G, "Annunciator K08 Corrective Action"
- 2. 2203.012D, "Annunciator 2K04 Corrective Action"

Initiating Condition - NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT

Inability to reach required operating mode within Technical Specification limits

Operating Mode Applicability: Power Operations (Mode 1) Startup (Mode 2) Hot Standby (Mode 3) Hot Shutdown (Mode 4)

Example Emergency Action Level(s):

1. Plant is not brought to required operating mode within Technical Specifications LCO Action Statement time.

Basis:

Limiting Conditions of Operation (LCOs) require the plant to be brought to a required operating mode when the Technical Specification required configuration cannot be restored. Depending on the circumstances, this may or may not be an emergency or precursor to a more severe condition. In any case, the initiation of plant shutdown required by the site Technical Specifications requires a four hour report under 10 CFR 50.72 (b) Non-emergency events. The plant is within its safety envelope when being shut down within the allowable action statement time in the Technical Specifications. An immediate NUE is required when the plant is not brought to the required operating mode within the allowable action statement time period elapses under the site Technical Specifications. Specifications and is not related to how long a condition may have existed.

- 1. ANO2 Technical Specifications
- 2. ANO1 Technical Specifications

Initiating Condition - ALERT

AC power capability to Vital 4.16 KV busses reduced to a single power source \geq 15 minutes such that any additional single power source failure would result in station blackout

Operating Mode Applicability:	Power Operations (Mode 1)
	Startup (Mode 2)
	Hot Standby (Mode 3)
	Hot Shutdown (Mode 4)

Example Emergency Action Level(s):

- **Note:** The SM / ED should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition has exceeded, or will likely exceed, the applicable time.
- 1. a. AC power capability to Vital 4.16 KV busses reduced to a single power source \geq 15 minutes.

<u>AND</u>

b. Any additional single power source failure will result in station blackout.

Basis:

The condition indicated by this IC is the degradation of the offsite and onsite AC power systems such that any additional single power source failure would result in a station blackout. This condition could occur due to a loss of offsite power with a concurrent failure of all but one emergency generator to supply power to its emergency busses. Another related condition could be the loss of all offsite power and loss of onsite emergency generators with only one train of emergency busses being backfed from the unit main generator, or the loss of onsite emergency generators with only one train of emergency busses being backfed from offsite power. The subsequent loss of this single power source would escalate the event to a Site Area Emergency in accordance with **SS1**.

Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses of power.

The EAL allows credit for operation of the Alternate AC Diesel Generator.

- 1. 1202.007, "Degraded Power"
- 2. 1202.008, "Blackout"
- 3. 2202.007, "Loss of Off-Site Power"
- 4. 2202.008, "Station Blackout"
- 5. 2104.037, "Alternate AC Diesel Generator Operations"

Initiating Condition - ALERT

Automatic trip fails to shutdown the reactor and the manual actions taken from the reactor control console are successful in shutting down the reactor

Operating Mode Applicability: Power Operations (Mode 1) Startup (Mode 2)

Example Emergency Action Level(s):

1. a. An automatic trip failed to shutdown the reactor as indicated by reactor power \geq 5%.

<u>AND</u>

b. Manual actions taken at the reactor control console successfully shutdown the reactor as indicated by reactor power < 5%.

Basis:

Manual trip actions taken at the reactor control console are any set of actions by the Reactor Operator(s) which causes or should cause control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core and shuts down the reactor. Any action taken to trip the reactor from any location other than panel C03 (Unit 1) or 2C03/2C14 (Unit 2) constitutes a failure of the manual trip function. Failure of manual trip would escalate the event to a Site Area Emergency (**SS3**).

This condition indicates failure of the automatic protection system to trip the reactor. This condition is more than a potential degradation of a safety system in that a front line automatic protection system did not function in response to a plant transient. Thus the plant safety has been compromised because design limits of the fuel may have been exceeded. An Alert is indicated because conditions may exist that lead to potential loss of fuel clad or RCS and because of the failure of the Reactor Protection System to automatically shutdown the plant. This EAL applies whether or not a mode change has occurred. (Reference "**Operating Mode Applicability**" page 72)

If manual actions taken at the reactor control console fail to shutdown the reactor, the event would escalate to a Site Area Emergency.

Initiating Condition - ALERT

UNPLANNED loss of safety system annunciation or indication in the Control Room with either (1) a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress, or (2) compensatory indicators unavailable

Operating Mode Applicability: Power Operations (Mode 1) Startup (Mode 2) Hot Standby (Mode 3) Hot Shutdown (Mode 4)

Example Emergency Action Level(s):

- **Note:** The SM/ED should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition has exceeded, or will likely exceed, the applicable time.
- 1. a. UNPLANNED loss of > approximately 75% of the following \geq 15 minutes:
 - Control Room annunciators associated with safety systems

• Control Room safety system indication

<u>AND</u>

- b. Either of the following:
 - A SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT is in progress

• Compensatory indications are unavailable.

Basis:

This IC is intended to recognize the difficulty associated with monitoring changing plant conditions without the use of a major portion of the annunciation or indication equipment during a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT.

Recognition of the availability of computer based indication equipment is considered (e.g., SPDS, plant computer, etc.).

"Planned" loss of annunciators or indicators includes scheduled maintenance and testing activities.

Quantification is arbitrary, however, it is estimated that if approximately 75% of the safety system annunciators or indicators are lost, there is an increased risk that a degraded plant condition could go undetected. It is not intended that plant personnel perform a detailed count of the instrumentation lost but use the value as a judgment threshold for determining the severity of the plant conditions. It is also not intended that the Shift Manager be tasked with making a judgment decision as to whether additional personnel are required to provide increased monitoring of system operation.

It is further recognized that most plant designs provide redundant safety system indication powered from separate uninterruptible power supplies. While failure of a large portion of annunciators is more likely than a failure of a large portion of indications, the concern is included in this EAL due to difficulty associated with assessment of plant conditions. The loss of specific, or several, safety system indicators should remain a function of that specific system or component operability status. This will be addressed by the specific Technical Specification. The initiation of a Technical Specification imposed plant shutdown related to the instrument loss will be reported via 10 CFR 50.72. If the shutdown is not in compliance with the Technical Specification action, the NUE is based on SU11 "Inability to reach required operating mode within Technical Specification limits."

Indicators associated with safety systems are those indicators for reactivity control, core cooling, maintaining reactor coolant system integrity or maintaining containment integrity.

"Compensatory indications" in this context includes computer based information such as SPDS, QSPDS, COLSS, etc. If both a major portion of the annunciation system and all computer monitoring are unavailable, the Alert is required.

Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

This Alert will be escalated to a Site Area Emergency if the operating crew cannot monitor the transient in progress due to a concurrent loss of compensatory indications with a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress during the loss of annunciation or indication.

- 1. 1015.037, "Post Transient Review"
- 2. 1203.043, "Loss of Control Room Annunciators"
- 3. 2203.042, "Loss of Control Room Annunciators"

Initiating Condition - SITE AREA EMERGENCY

Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to Vital 4.16 KV busses \geq 15 minutes

Operating Mode Applicability: Power Operations (Mode 1) Startup (Mode 2) Hot Standby (Mode 3) Hot Shutdown (Mode 4)

Example Emergency Action Level(s):

- **Note:** The SM / ED should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition has exceeded, or will likely exceed, the applicable time.
- 1. Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to Vital 4.16 KV busses \geq 15 minutes.

Basis:

Loss of all AC power to emergency busses compromises all plant safety systems requiring electric power including Shutdown Cooling, ECCS, Containment Heat Removal and the Ultimate Heat Sink. Prolonged loss of all AC power to emergency busses will lead to loss of Fuel Clad, RCS, and Containment, thus this event can escalate to a General Emergency.

Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary losses of offsite power.

Escalation to General Emergency is via Fission Product Barrier Degradation (F) or IC SG1, "Prolonged loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to Vital 4.16 KV busses."

- 1. 1202.007, "Degraded Power"
- 2. 1202.008, "Blackout"
- 3. 2202.007, "Loss of Off-Site Power"
- 4. 2202.008, "Station Blackout"
- 5. 2104.037, "Alternate AC Diesel Generator Operations"

Initiating Condition - SITE AREA EMERGENCY

Automatic trip fails to shutdown the reactor and manual actions taken from the reactor control console are not successful in shutting down the reactor

Operating Mode Applicability: Power Operations (Mode 1) Startup (Mode 2)

Example Emergency Action Level(s):

1. a. An automatic trip failed to shutdown the reactor.

<u>AND</u>

b. Manual actions taken at the reactor control console do not shutdown the reactor as indicated by reactor power $\ge 5\%$.

Basis:

Under these conditions, the reactor is producing more heat than the maximum decay heat load for which the safety systems are designed and efforts to bring the reactor subcritical are unsuccessful. A Site Area Emergency is warranted because conditions exist that lead to IMMINENT loss or potential loss of both fuel clad and RCS.

Manual trip actions taken at the reactor control console are any set of actions by the Reactor Operator(s) which causes or should cause control rods to be rapidly inserted into the core and shuts down the reactor.

Manual trip actions are not considered successful if action away from panel C03 (Unit 1) or panels 2C03/2C14 (Unit 2) is required to trip the reactor. This EAL is still applicable even if actions taken away from panel C03 (Unit 1) or panels 2C03/2C14 (Unit 2) are successful in shutting the reactor down because the design limits of the fuel may have been exceeded or because of the gross failure of the Reactor Protection System to shutdown the plant. This EAL applies whether or not a mode change has occurred. (Reference "**Operating Mode Applicability**" page 72)

Escalation of this event to a General Emergency would be due to a prolonged condition leading to an extreme challenge to either core-cooling or heat removal.

Initiating Condition - SITE AREA EMERGENCY

Loss of all vital DC power ≥15 minutes

Operating Mode Applicability: Power Operations (Mode 1) Startup (Mode 2) Hot Standby (Mode 3) Hot Shutdown (Mode 4)

Example Emergency Action Level(s):

- **Note:** The SM / ED should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition has exceeded, or will likely exceed, the applicable time.
- 1. <105 volts on all Vital DC busses ≥15 minutes.

Basis:

Loss of all DC power compromises ability to monitor and control plant safety functions. Prolonged loss of all DC power will cause core uncovering and loss of containment integrity when there is significant decay heat and sensible heat in the reactor system.

Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

Escalation to a General Emergency would occur by Abnormal Radiation Levels/Radiological Effluent (A), Fission Product Barrier Degradation (F).
SYSTEM MALFUNCTION SS6

Initiating Condition - SITE AREA EMERGENCY

Inability to monitor a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress

Operating Mode Applicability: Power Operations (Mode 1) Startup (Mode 2) Hot Standby (Mode 3) Hot Shutdown (Mode 4)

Example Emergency Action Level(s):

Note: The SM / ED should not wait until the applicable time has elapsed, but should declare the event as soon as it is determined that the condition has exceeded, or will likely exceed, the applicable time.

- 1. a. Loss of > approximately 75% of the following \geq 15 minutes:
 - Control Room annunciators associated with safety systems

• Control Room safety system indication

<u>AND</u>

b. A SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT is in progress.

<u>AND</u>

c. Compensatory indications are unavailable.

Basis:

This IC is intended to recognize the threat to plant safety associated with the complete loss of capability of the control room staff to monitor plant response to a SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT.

"Planned" and "UNPLANNED" actions are not differentiated since the loss of instrumentation of this magnitude is of such significance during a transient that the cause of the loss is not an ameliorating factor.

Quantification is arbitrary, however, it is estimated that if approximately 75% of the safety system annunciators or indicators are lost, there is an increased risk that a degraded plant condition could go undetected. It is not intended that plant personnel perform a detailed count of the instrumentation lost but use the value as a judgment threshold for determining the severity of the plant conditions. It is also not intended that the Shift Manager be tasked with making a judgment decision as to whether additional personnel are required to provide increased monitoring of system operation.

SYSTEM MALFUNCTION SS6

It is further recognized that most plant designs provide redundant safety system indication powered from separate uninterruptible power supplies. While failure of a large portion of annunciators is more likely than a failure of a large portion of indications, the concern is included in this EAL due to difficulty associated with assessment of plant conditions. The loss of specific, or several, safety system indicators should remain a function of that specific system or component operability status. This will be addressed by the specific Technical Specification. The initiation of a Technical Specification imposed plant shutdown related to the instrument loss will be reported via 10 CFR 50.72. If the shutdown is not in compliance with the Technical Specification action, the NUE is based on SU11 "Inability to reach required operating mode within Technical Specification limits."

A Site Area Emergency is considered to exist if the Control Room staff cannot monitor safety functions needed for protection of the public while a significant transient is in progress.

Site specific indications needed to monitor safety functions necessary for protection of the public must include Control Room indications, computer generated indications and dedicated annunciation capability.

Indicators associated with safety systems are those indicators for reactivity control, core cooling, maintaining reactor coolant system integrity or maintaining containment integrity.

"Compensatory indications" in this context includes computer based information such as SPDS, QSPDS, COLSS, etc. This should include all computer systems available for this use depending on specific plant design and subsequent retrofits.

Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

Reference Documents:

- 1. 015.037, "Post Transient Review"
- 2. 1203.043, "Loss of Control Room Annunciators"
- 3. 2203.042, "Loss of Control Room Annunciators"

SYSTEM MALFUNCTION SG1

Initiating Condition - GENERAL EMERGENCY

Prolonged loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to Vital 4.16 KV busses

Operating Mode Applicability: Power Operations (Mode 1) Startup (Mode 2) Hot Standby (Mode 3) Hot Shutdown (Mode 4)

Example Emergency Action Level(s):

1. a. Loss of all offsite and all onsite AC power to Vital 4.16 KV busses.

<u>AND</u>

- b. Either of the following:
 - Restoration of at least one Vital 4.16 KV bus in <4 hours is not likely.

 Continuing degradation of core cooling based on Fission Product Barrier monitoring as indicated by CETs ≥700 °F.

Basis:

Loss of all AC power to Vital 4.16 KV busses compromises all plant safety systems requiring electric power including Shutdown Cooling, ECCS, Containment Heat Removal and the Ultimate Heat Sink. Prolonged loss of all AC power to Vital 4.16 KV busses will lead to loss of fuel clad, RCS, and containment, thus warranting declaration of a General Emergency.

This IC is specified to assure that in the unlikely event of a prolonged station blackout, timely recognition of the seriousness of the event occurs and that declaration of a General Emergency occurs as early as is appropriate, based on a reasonable assessment of the event trajectory.

The likelihood of restoring at least one Vital 4.16 KV bus should be based on a realistic appraisal of the situation since a delay in an upgrade decision based on only a chance of mitigating the event could result in a loss of valuable time in preparing and implementing public protective actions.

In addition, under these conditions, fission product barrier monitoring capability may be degraded.

SYSTEM MALFUNCTION SG1

Although it may be difficult to predict when power can be restored, it is necessary to give the SM / ED a reasonable idea of how quickly (s)he may need to declare a General Emergency based on two major considerations:

- 1. Are there any present indications that core cooling is already degraded to the point that loss or potential loss of Fission Product Barriers is IMMINENT?
- 2. If there are no present indications of such core cooling degradation, how likely is it that power can be restored in time to assure that a loss of two barriers with a potential loss of the third barrier can be prevented?

Thus, indication of continuing core cooling degradation must be based on Fission Product Barrier monitoring with particular emphasis on SM / ED judgment as it relates to IMMINENT loss or potential loss of fission product barriers and degraded ability to monitor fission product barriers.

Reference Documents:

- 1. Unit 1 Calculation 85-E-0072-02, "Time from Loss of All AC Power to Loss of Subcooling"
- 2. Unit 2 Calculation 85-E-0072-01, "Time from Loss of All AC Power to Loss of Subcooling"

SYSTEM MALFUNCTION SG3

Initiating Condition - GENERAL EMERGENCY

Automatic trip and all manual actions fail to shutdown the reactor and indication of an extreme challenge to the ability to cool the core exists

Operating Mode Applicability: Power Operations (Mode 1) Startup (Mode 2)

Example Emergency Action Level(s):

1. a. An automatic trip failed to shutdown the reactor

<u>AND</u>

b. All manual actions do not shutdown the reactor as indicated by reactor power $\geq 5\%$.

<u>AND</u>

- c. Either of the following exist or have occurred due to continued power generation:
 - CET temperatures at or approaching 1200 °F

• Feedwater flow rate less than:

Unit 1: 430 gpm Unit 2: 485 gpm

Basis:

Under these conditions, the reactor is producing more heat than the maximum decay heat load for which the safety systems are designed and efforts to bring the reactor subcritical are unsuccessful.

In the event either of these challenges exists at a time that the reactor has not been brought below the power associated with the safety system design a core melt sequence exists. In this situation, core degradation can occur rapidly. For this reason, the General Emergency declaration is intended to be anticipatory of the fission product barrier table declaration to permit maximum off-site intervention time.

PROCEDURE/WORK PLAN TITLE:

CHANGE: 054

Attachment 3 EAL Matrix Chart

Attachment 3 EAL Matrix Chart 1900.010 Rev054	
CONERAL EMERGENCY STE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT CONERAL EMERGENCY STE AREA EMERG	UNUSUAL EVENT
ABNOMAL RADIO LOGCAL EFFLUENTS MALZARES AND OTHER CONTINUES AFECTING FLAT Security MALAGET AFEC	Unit Unit
	Doo of an other we power to the color to use of the second state o
	An Helding All Devices Including Partnesse/MSIV Room
	Balance that a cost mean of the second se
	Turble Felding
	Including Departmentation Ppachase under ICW Coolers
	CED Pump PE/T-2Billison/Asia under EW Pumps
	Matholas adjacent to Startup/CADMR.001603/031040 Matholas adjacent to Intular Structure (ABIO3/031040
	Disast Distance (5.4 and 2007) Disast Paul Yanh Disast Paul Yanh Dang Manholas MB02 and MB10
	of the line of the
	Storage Tank, 22-41A)
	Buscier Building
	AI Dentions
A State Control And A Stat	All Devitions including Aux Extansions
ROOT HETERATIONS USed 2 Image: Control of the control of	Tables Bubling All Devalues
1. Software and water space of the space Mark 2018 of gradual 1. Software and water space of the space 1. Software and water space of the space 1. Software and water space of the space 1. Software and water space of the space of	Datable Arms Intole Structure (254 and 268)
ABNORMAL RADUATION LEVELS De 2017 Vielle talier de 2017 Vielle tal	Concrete Mathlole DardNE of Initialia Concrete Mathlole Dard of Tarbine building next to train hay Proceed Word Vision
	Dised Fuel Vash Pamp Matholas MB69and MB9 Olashola, MB92a Jonatholas JB69and MB90 Olashola, MB92a Jonatholas JB69a
MAARDS AND OTHER CONCIDENCE THE PLAN ARE TO THE CONCERNMENT OF	northeast of the Unit I QCST, Matchelig MEH9, is located approximately 9 feet work of Unit 2. Condemark Stream on The Table 3.
1 - Starting and a st	
	THE INCOME INCOME AND ADDRESS OF
HIGH AND	Padadoria Na Collo Yool 10 Littlenades
Note: Market Mar Market Market Mark	Nons The 2014 Discout softwar with the applicable time has required build about disclose the word as some as it is
Territoria de la construcción de	Determined the induction has according or will faily excencible according to will faily to the control of the induction of the other to the control of the induction of the other
Demo Demo <thdemo< th=""> Demo Demo <thd< td=""><td>Mining 2004-044 Control Non-second account with safety Provide Second S</td></thd<></thdemo<>	Mining 2004-044 Control Non-second account with safety Provide Second S
Participant Statistical Statist	E Contra Norm Anthe Anthe Anthe
Image: Control (Control (Contro(Control (Contro) (Control (Control (Control (Control (Control (Co	
1 Star das - Data har fr Manager and Parkal Valuation for and park	
	540 1 2 2 4
PISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DE GRADATION. Barriers PISSION PRODUCT BARRIER DE GRADATION. BARRIER PISSION PRODUCT BA	RC3 biologi Emilipsion Action Law RC
	1. Smitherful is process for they realize in TCBP1
In the second se	2. Outstad kontage i Toggers
Page Call Darman Eduar Obst Darman Eduar Constrained Eduar Constrained Eduar System MalLPURCTION-Loss of Communications 1006 EXPENSION Eduards Eduards System MalLPURCTION-Loss of Communications	
Phane Collect Adds (Level COB) K InSt. Level COB) Contract Parameter CABP Contract Parameter CAB	Loss of an investigation of the communications laboration
Beneficial (Construction) (Construct	1 Loss of all Table Millionals communications methods advances for a control of a particum success approximate
1 Marcover Transformer Part Strandbarring Processing Strandbarring Proc	Tudo Mil Diveto Constructuosen Northela Materia Northela Societa
	Processo and a second s
The second	2. Loss el el Talle Molfale unerusable el métude articular de altres se partem sites unerusable.
None 2019/04 Control C	Table MP Office Companying Methods of the Companying of the compan
	Ram 1121214
andre 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 20	Pueroad degradeor
inter Light number	Compared has been applied whether heads includes Service applied on the been applied by the been applied on the been applied by the been
Leve (graphine)* Provide the second s	UNITY KUTTO HALL: The Trans UNITY KUTTO HALL: The Trans UNITY AND INTERNAL THE TOP OF
Austral Visual Wale Level (PCB) A Containment Relation Nonvision(PCB) B 405 Secondly 556 Relation Nonvision Containment Relation Nonvision(PCB) B 405 Secondly 556 Relation Nonvision Containment Relation Nonvision(PCB) Containment Relation(PCB) Containme	CB. 2. CD server all very very including for and segmentation methods by which all very servers being
	TSUCSED Don Sponses H 2 for most tran- offman
Part of the instrumentation of the instrument	Berg LROutin too Surger1331 Berg LROutin too Surger1331
SEP • EXTERNATION CONTRACTOR CON	E
Contravent Ration Northing (2004 A. Ensured Scale)	Break Transmission Statement AM 20 Statement AM 20 Statement AM 20
Description Description <thdescription< th=""> <thdescription< th=""></thdescription<></thdescription<>	15010
Concentrative Concentration Co	notwork with the second s
Newspace Via Description	T. In CMP. ArticleT. Instance (public Raha) (Ide Ideal and in-Schuler Indonesialian)
S Thread Contraction Contracti	
Transfer and the second	T 2 2 4
	Sumplex Action Transfer
Not transform Provide the second sec	 Head and brought to spaces specify mote with in the set of sound to obtain a specific the set time.
R CUED Analogica Marine B CUED Analogica B CUED Analogi	
2009 Automptower Party Control	

Attachment 3 EAL Matrix Chart

					Attachment 3 EAL Matrix Chart Procedure 1903.010 Rev 054
CENERAL EMERGENCY	SITE AREA EMERGENCY	ALBRY	U	NUSUAL EVENT	GENERAL ENERGENCY SITE AREA EMERGENCY ALERT UNUSUAL EVENT
		CAL DIS UNCONCOLOUS	1004		
Loss of MCCI water water shared of all the con-	Los d'X25/haddr-ward methoy shabis com Book hed remotropations	List of PETCHARD view (webs)	ACE PRIMA		York's bounds to be bounded by Permanents
Entropy of Alline Long C.	NUT DE COMPANY	NTTO TO A DECIMAL	NOTE	ar to mag	Barrays to a source pain downershift accessory
The DMTED anostation was with the explosite time that informs, but about allocare the event as a core as it is advanced that the condition will study expectities sectorates then	The DM TEC incuts of war with the applicable bine that internet but incuts access the week as soon as it is administered that the condition with their access the another bine.	The DM TEC HOUR NET will writte approache the fact statistical but about declaration event as anni au fill definition that the conduct withheir according approaches the	the SM should be engined but sho determined that it	or your unit the approach time has all declare the avent as approach of the condition with their in condition.	Constants Allocated 1 Demand on Constants 1 Demand on Constants
1 . Doe exthem coopleandum equilities for 1.22 million.	1 MR CONTAMERST CLOCIPE BOSHICOM	1 Line of REDCHarles recommentary or indicated by	1.000 billion	NULLIN THREE IS NOT AN A REAL OF THE REAL	
	Loss of PCUP leader wand had an industry Event Works Laws Throughtheads DVT Event Works Laws Throughtheads DVT	Dwith Pytht Leves Throughbridges CH7	Send Gr 115	intudes	
 CONTAMADIF CUODURE As edide/red Expone miture netre sofarment 	C.B.	GE Death was hear and the			
	25	Swith Beader wood lover 2007, 13 n.			Definitions
 NOT WARD was been and benoticed for a possible with a tool OPPE Weathr recoil inventory semiduated to stop other following 	 BCM leader wood level cannot be montaned for 	25 2 PCD heads were and the condition method for			CONTRIMENT INCLUSIVE: The connect product areas containing before a substance and the environment CONTRIMENT CLOSURE The options to secure primary emforment and to associated structures, substance, and components as a functional parties to fasce product researce under earling
 Containent High Plange Plastellium Montor Inschrigt 10 Mar. Fallet Anne Anne Anne Anne Visionaler 	Extension of the second s	methics as indicated to an unsegment lover main the fracture business business from the main business business than the main business.			plant conditions. Contervent closure must be apable of leng set within Strengtes. Contervent Closure is bet when the penetrations are asided by messatur automatic asidem native bind thereig or equivalent
 Desplayed two main Photo Turking Sung Reader Draw Tark, Quench Tark, Aux, Burbing Europeon Order Tark, an Aux, Burbing Sung 	Needer Drain Tarry Duench Tarry Hux Building Equipment Drain Tarry of Hux Building During	ir Gueldi Yanı			EXPLOREM A spip where incomined controller or obsidents lature of pressurged response that imparts energy of sufficient time to obsidently demage permanent shockers spitems or components
AND In the office Strains portainment distance					PAULTED In a shear permitted the obtaines of secondary side leakage that results in an uncontrolled drop in shearn presenter presents of the shearn generativ being correlativity from more time]
 DONTAMMENT CLOSURE AS established Expense miture methic containant 					EXE Contractor characterized by heat and light Bources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical exagement to not constitute FIREs
CAPCONES for a contained process			CUZ	TITTPT	EXTLA ACTION And Lawred a factor Traver Their or to presente that includes the use of solers from to other something and information the location of energy and an analysis of the relation of the solers of the relation of the relation of the solers of the relation of the relation of the relation of the solers of the relation of the
			INFLAMED G	e of RCM Nacion vision (Swedury	ahould be used to address such address Such address Such as between individuals in the OWREY CONTRELED ARES. HOSTLE FORCE One or new individuals who are engaged in a determined assault and for all determines address with a balance and and the organized and address and an organized and address address address of Ming meming, or
			9715	on Levelle:	te wing destruction.
			Horney Sur Joo. Machined Surg Harroday Sing	er deuters (Ne sewert als soon als 7.0 Ne condition with Really in condition	MULTERT Instrume are specifically while decky
			1. IPPEAMED	Consider Assessment Process	ELPTLIFED It a shear provide, endorree of primer-Assessment y longer of a magnitude software to require or sector to and whity repotent
			* #CD/160	or recent wider to ret drug to the The set Range for 20 March 20 a March 20	RECIPITY CONSIDER Any Security Event as load in the oppowed security configurary pain that conditions as threadow provide to site security threadow to site personnel, or a potential deposition to the load of solely of the paint A VECURITY CONSIDER AN OPPOWER A VECURITY CONSTITUTION does not involve a HOSTILE ACTION.
			RED-MAR	or receiver the sector of the sector receiver the sector receiver the sector	EXEMPLEAT TRANSPORT for UNPLANECO event involving one or more of the following (D automatic turbre susteels = 25% Permit reador server, C) identical load repetitions 25% Pathematic Research (C) identical load repetitions 25% Pathem
			5 COne	or water with love drug better the or water to end on the total better the	LARSOLARLY A treach or last that connet be promptly isolated
			Matchine S	CE challor view free bards betwith reador view flangs	LAPLACEED A parameter sharpe or an over that is not the result of an interded evaluation and sequences satisfactor or integrative actions.
			2. RCD/Hellor Set of PCD/	result out panel be horizoid with a salar result of the salar sectory as indicated by	intervation by plant personnel, such Their doubt holders to the indicator's operability, the condition's environe, or the resol's accuracy is removed, implicit in this admittor is the need to limitly assessment.
			Building Sung Building Sung Building String Building String	Reador Chain Tamity Aux Building In Tamp Hux Building Strategy In Tamp Hux Building Strategy of Cuench	VSIBLE CAMAGE: Damage to exugnment or structures that is readily observable vellocal measurement, testing or analysis Damage is sufficient to cause concern regarding the certificate sensibility or initiativity of effected structure, system, or concernent. Damate damage includes determination due to heat or impact denting perchaticity sustains analysis percentility and testing.
COLD SHUT	DOWN/REFUELING SYSTEM N	ALFUNCTION - Loss of Decay F	leat Remov	al	Earlace bemakes PIG- solit choping solitablegatesid not be included
		<u>مەر المالما</u>	<u>cus</u>		1089 FORBYTHL1089 L089 FORBYTHL1089 L089 FORBYTHL1088
		Constant Alice Long R.	rubac tet h	To body year	1911.0.40 RC0 CONTINUET
		 SET # * The polyhold duration in Fabric 1. 	NOTE THE REAL	or war unt the applicable time has	REVEAL DRIVENEY
		KO Kara Calify Tuning	etapored for ano determined the second st expected to the	If below the event to store act of the sonething with the exception with the exception.	BAVERIERS ÁVECTUR T 2 2 4 Les LANYING SAME ANDORE / CONTRACTOR / CONTR
		Consideration Mr. BOrnaut	10404013 102607427	exclusion excellence and a	the factory
		General membry indication of the first of th	2. Loss of M HZ Kind models	Disnowling and RED reador verse in for L10 employ	1099 FOTBYTHL1099 L099 FOTBYTHL1099 L099 FOTBYTHL1099
		Induced for EPC, in hit approximation			
		NTTP EPLACENCOL AND A DECEMPTION			BOORDERS APPECTU2
		2 NO DECOMPLEMENT AND			21.000 21.00011 POTENTIAL LOOD
COLD	SHUTDOWN/ REFUELING SYST	EM MALFUNCTION -Loss of AC	Power		
		Design and an onesting power to rest 40000	PC 20HE ODD	Ry 5 YER 41555 Summer to Kost In a	1089 PC19144 2088 1099 PC18194 1089
			Home porte inte Home ange Home of ange	power marks there would result in	
		Energency Alton Lengh	Emiliance Auto NOTIS	Co Looke	
		Happed but about declarative event as any as Fill deletiment that the condition with help access the associate time	etapored had also determined that it associates these	of decises the event as abor as if is the condition with they in condition	dem suici a very pobularius vystreist fue bat in 150
		 Loss of all effects and all controls AC power for VER 4100V Doceme L10D member. 	1. 4. HC power Mitcal In	and the second sec	1088 POPERALIDE
			602 1. 703 1000	nar angle power source filterie wit	CONTRACTORY 1
COLD	SHUTDOWN/ REFUELING SYST	EN MALFUNCTION -Loss of DO	Power		BIT SOLVE, STREET
			CLE		110002 19 OF THE 10 OF THE OWN DESIGNMENT OF
			Energence Art	to Leave the	
			NOTE THE SM ADULT OF	er var unt he applade trie hat It bedre the event as and as F o	Direl Country Mode Linear for DIOPA v
			automatic the second to a seco	Hard Via CC bash 10kmaber.	UNIT:
COLD SI	UTDOWN/ REFUELING SYSTE	MALFUNCTION -Inadvectant	Criticality		Mode 1 = Power Operation—Kell 2 CD23 Reactor Power>5%
			<u>eur</u>	LITTE	Mode 3 = Hot Standoy - Kell < 30 RCS 2 2001F
			neowhert allo	any constant	Mode 4 = Hot Shubborn - Kell < 28, 280 / F > RCS > 200 / F Mode 5 = Cold Shubborn - Kell < 30, RCS > 200 / F
			1 INFLORED IN NOME TH	nutranut jost-a datus obi ideariat Putratubor	Mode 6 = RehabingOne or more reactor vessel head closure both less than fully tensioned Debuged (TD- All reactor for the removed from searche removes analytical during reflection or extended or provide the second
					designation by Technical Specifications
0010-001	ITROWN/ PERIOD ING STATES	MALEUNCTION Loss of Come	unication		Part Country Mote Usage for AND PAux
COLDISH	I STORE AND A STOLEN	sous one non-coss of comm	CLB	, 	UNITE
			LOSS IF M COURS	or other communications capabilities	Mode 1 = Power Operation—Kell 2 CBQ Reactor Power?554, RCS 2 300 1 F Mode 2 = Startup—Kell 2 SQ Reactor Power 35%, RCS 2 300 1 F
			CORPT AND MOTOR NO.	ALCONEL CONTRACTOR REPORT DECEMBER CONTRACTOR REPORT DESTRUCTION CONTRACTOR REPORT	Mode 3 = Not Standay – Kelf < 29 Reactor PowerQ RCS 2300 °F Mode 4 = Mel Electron - Kelf C D. Reactor Reveal Q 2007 2017
			Dist.	Fable & Constructed and Statighteet Mader rade option	Mode 5 - Cold Shutdown - Kell-(59, Reactor Power 0, NUS 5200 °F
				Resid Michael Saltonica	Mode (5 = Rehabing - Kell 5 .25, Reactor PowerQ, RCS 5 140 'F Reactor vessel head unbolied or removed and had in the vessel Dehaeled (D) - All reactor had removed from reactor pressure vessel (full core official during reflecting or extended outsec). This is not an operating mode
			25. 2. 100 of 10 TH	N Coffin annuactio teleb	designation by Technical Specifications.
			ence her	Table D Connunciations Balanteet	
			#1 Selector	the goon ect and inclose 4	