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September 29, 1980

Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

NRC IE BULLETIN 80-18
MAINTENANCE OF ADEQUATE MINIMUM FLOW THROUGH
CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMPS FOLLOWING SECONDARY
SIDE HIGH ENERGY LINE RUPTURE
NO. 1 AND 2 UNITS
SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION

The problem of reactor coolant system (RCS) repressurization due to operation of the centrifugal charging pumps (CCP) following an at-power steam or feedwater line break is identified in the Bulletin. Results of the calculations described in the Bulletin indicate that this repressurization would result in the lack of CCP minimum flow at Salem for the conditions stated in the Bulletin.

The interim solutions suggested by Westinghouse reflect an intent to not modify existing safety-injection termination criteria which has been approved by the NRC Staff.

At-power events similar to those described in this Bulletin have previously been addressed in the Salem FSAR, Chapter 14. These existing analyses indicate that no credit is taken for the operation of emergency-core-cooling-systems (ECCS) during feedwater line breaks, and the auxiliary feedwater system provides sufficient plant protection. Therefore, the conditions described in the Bulletin reflect a situation which does not require operation of the ECCS during feedwater line break situations. Westinghouse has informed us that steamline breaks from at-power conditions require the use of the ECCS to provide for an initial repressurization of the RCS and that continued operation of the pumps is not required.

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It is recognized that secondary line breaks normally result in the initiation of a safety injection signal. It should also be recognized that the CCP's are significant contributors to the repressurization. Shutdown of the pumps would eliminate the CCP deadhead concern addressed by the Bulletin. Such action requires modification of the safety injection termination criteria to provide for pump shutdown if reactor coolant pressure exceeds 2335 psig and the pressure cannot be relieved by the PORV's.

It is our intent to instruct our operating personnel to shutdown any operating CCP if the RCS pressure cannot be maintained below 2335 psig during secondary system line breaks. This should not be viewed as a total termination of the safety injection function since only the CCP's are affected.

We plan to pursue a long-term resolution of this situation with Westinghouse. Any plant design modifications will be brought to your attention as a supplemental response to this Bulletin.

Very truly yours,



CC Director
Div. of Reactor Operations Inspection
Washington, DC