

Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Place Newark, N J. 07101, Phone 201, 430-7000

November 10, 1979

Mr. Boyce H. Grier Director of USNRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 79-58/01T SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1, we are submitting supplemental Licensee Event Report 79-58/01X-1.

Sincerely yours,

F. P. Librizzi General Manager -Electric Production

791129

CC: Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement (30 copies) Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control (3 copies)



Report Number:	79-58/01X-1	
Report Date:	11/10/79	
Occurrence Date:	9/07/79	
Facility:	Salem Generating Station Public Service Electric & Gas Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey	Company 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Qualification of Control Systems for Adverse Environmental Conditions

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Operational Mode 5

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

We have been notified by Westinghouse that a review of the environmental qualifications of NSSS equipment has been conducted which showed that several systems were identified which, if subject to an adverse environment, could potentially lead to control system operation which may impact protective functions. These systems are the steam generator power operated relief valve control, pressurizer power operated relief valve control, main feedwater control and automatic rod control. Each of the above systems could potentially malfunction if impacted by adverse environment due to a high energy line break inside or outside containment. In each case, a limited set of breaks, coupled with possible consequential control malfunction in an adverse direction, could result in degraded protective system function. The consequences could yield results which are more limiting than those presented in the plant Safety Analysis Report.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

This occurrence is due to the numerous investigations underway which are examining the licensing bases and operating procedures of nuclear generating stations as a result of the Three Mile Island accident.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

Three of the four potential interactions (pressurizer power operated relief values control, main feedwater control and rod control) do not require any action at Salem due to either equipment design, manufacturers specifications, physical layout, or a combination of the above. The potential adverse impact from interaction concerning the steam generator power operated relief values is precluded through procedural changes and operator training. Based on these considerations and the evaluations contained in our letter to Mr. Harold R. Denton of the NRC dated October 4, 1979, continued operation of Salem Unit No. 1 is justified and no modifications, suspension or revocation of the operating license is warranted.

LER 79-58/01X-1

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE (continued)

Concerning the Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valve Control System, the particular sequence of events as postulated by Westinghouse is not a safety consideration in that the loss of all auxiliary feedwater following a feedline rupture was factored into the Salem Safety Analysis. Operator action will assure auxiliary feedwater flow to the unaffected steam generators and can be accomplished within the alloted time frame. The Salem design basis considered operator action in recovery from feedwater/steam line break events. The indications and controls required for these operator actions are unaffected by the postulated break.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The Salem operating procedures and operator training program are being revised to address the concerns addressed in our evaluation of the Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valve Control System.

FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable

Prepared By A. W. Kapple

Lachila Generating Station Manager

SORC Meeting No. 82-79