

Frederick W. Schneider
Vice President
Production

Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Place Newark, N.J. 07101 201/430-7373

272 CENTRAL FILES
June 1, 1979

Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

NRC IE BULLETIN NO. 79-06A, REV. 1
NO. 1 AND 2 UNITS
SALEM GENERATING STATION

In response to your letter of April 18, 1979 transmitting NRC IE Bulletin No. 79-06A, Revision No. 1, which was received on April 23, 1979, we offer the following in respect to Item 13:

A change to Technical Specification Tables 3.3-3, 3.3-4, 3.3-5 and 4.3-2 has been forwarded to Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief, NRC Operating Reactors, Branch 1, on May 16, 1979. The change reflects deletion of coincident Pressurizer Low Level and Low Pressure Signals for initiating safety injection. The proposed design consists of a 2-of-3 coincidence of Pressurizer Low Pressure Signals.

Design changes identified to date as a result of our evaluation of the Three Mile Island incident are as follows:

1. Provision of additional control room alarms to indicate a "non-closed" condition of any pressurizer PORV's.
 2. Incorporation of a computer calculation with CRT display of reactor coolant system temperature and pressure information. This program will display the temperature of the hottest in-core thermocouple, a corresponding saturation pressure, actual pressure, degree of sub-cooling, and the margin to saturated pressure.
 3. Modification of runout protection for the motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps. This change will improve the reliability of the auxiliary feedwater system by allowing a manual override of the pump discharge pressure runout protection.
- 102
ccp

7908010 149 Q

6/1/79

4. Revision of the control circuitry for valve WL12 (reactor coolant drain tank to waste hold-up tank isolation valve). This change will insure that reset of the containment isolation signal will not result in inadvertent transfer of fluids from the RCDT to the waste hold-up tank. Redundant isolation valves already exist on this path to the waste hold-up tank, but a specific set of abnormal operating conditions, coupled with a failure of the valve redundant to WL12, could have resulted in an automatic opening of WL12 and subsequent pumping of reactor coolant drain tank contents to the waste hold-up tank. The proposed change will prevent an automatic opening of valve WL12.

The above changes do not require changes in the Technical Specifications. If additional changes in design or Technical Specifications are deemed necessary in the future, we will notify you with subsequent amendments to this bulletin response.

Sincerely,



CC NRC Office of Inspection and
Enforcement
Div. of Reactor Operations Inspection
Washington, D. C.

Mr. L. J. Norrholm
NRC, Hancocks Bridge, N.J.