


TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT ON THE
MONITORING OF ELECTRIC POWER
TO THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM FOR THE
NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1

(Docket No. 50-220)

James C. Selan

March 16, 1984



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
(Docket No. 50-220)

March 16, 1984

By

James C. Selan

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ABSTRACT

This report documents the technical evaluation of the monitoring of electric power to the reactor protection system (RPS) at the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 1. The evaluation is to determine if the proposed design modification will protect the RPS from abnormal voltage and frequency conditions which could be supplied from the power supplies and will meet certain requirements set forth by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

The proposed design modifications will protect the RPS from sustained abnormal voltage and frequency conditions from the supplying sources.

FOREWORD

This report is supplied as part of the Selected Operating Reactor Issues Program II being conducted for the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Licensing, by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

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1. INTRODUCTION

During the operating license review for Hatch 2, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff raised a concern about the capability of the Class 1E reactor protection system (RPS) to operate after suffering sustained, abnormal voltage or frequency conditions from a non-Class 1E power supply. Abnormal voltage or frequency conditions could be produced as a result of one of the following causes: combinations of undetected, random single failures of the power supply components, or multiple failures of the power supply components caused by external phenomena such as a seismic event.

The concern for the RPS power supply integrity is generic to all General Electric (GE) boiling water reactors (BWR) MARK 3's, MARK 4's, and MARK 5's and all BWR MARK 6's that have not elected to use the solid state RPS design. The staff therefore pursued a generic resolution. Accordingly, GE proposed a revised design, in conceptual form, for resolution of this concern [Ref. 1]. The proposed modification consists of the addition of two Class 1E "protective packages" in series between each RPS motor-generator (M-G) set and its respective RPS bus, and the addition of two similar packages in series in the alternate power source circuit to the RPS buses. Each protective package would include a breaker and associated overvoltage, undervoltage and underfrequency relaying. Each protective package would meet the testability requirements for Class 1E equipment.

With the protective packages installed, any abnormal output type failure (undetectable random or seismically caused) in either of the two RPS M-G sets (or the alternate supply) would result in a trip of either one or both of the two Class 1E protective packages. This tripping would interrupt the power to the effected RPS channel, thus producing a scram signal on that channel, while retaining full scram capability by means of the other channel. Thus, fully redundant Class 1E protection is provided, bringing the overall



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RPS design into full conformance with General Design Criteria (GDC)-2 [Ref. 2], and GDC-21 [Ref. 3] (including IEEE-279 [Ref. 4] and the standard review plan [Ref. 5]). The NRC staff reviewed the proposed GE design and concluded that the modification was acceptable [Ref. 6], and should be implemented in conformance with the applicable criteria for Class 1E systems.

The NRC requires that the components of the RPS not be exposed to unacceptable electric power of any sustained abnormal quality that could damage the RPS. This involves providing means to detect any overvoltage, undervoltage, or underfrequency condition that is outside the design limits of the RPS equipment and to disconnect the RPS from such abnormal electric power before damage to the RPS can occur. The equipment which performs these functions must satisfy the single failure criterion and be seismically qualified. The NRC issued a generic letter [Ref. 7] to all operating BWR's requesting the licensees to submit design modification details and Technical Specifications for post implementation review.

By letters dated December 1, 1982 [Ref. 8], July 22, 1983 [Ref. 9], December 15, 1983 [Ref. 10], and January 13, 1984 [Ref. 11], Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation, the licensee, submitted design modification details regarding the monitoring of electrical power to the RPS at the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 1.

The purpose of this report is to evaluate the licensee's submittal with respect to the NRC criteria and present the reviewer's conclusion on the adequacy of the design modifications to protect the RPS from abnormal voltage and frequency conditions.

2. DESIGN DESCRIPTION

The licensee has proposed to install two Class 1E detection and isolating packages (similar to the approved GE conceptual design) to monitor the electric power in each of the sources of power (four M-G sets and an alternate source) to the RPS. Each package consists of a contactor (size NEMA 5), auxiliary relay, undervoltage relay, overvoltage relay, and an underfrequency relay. The time delay to open the contacts in the output is defined by each monitoring relay's selected operating characteristic. There is no time delay associated with the operation of the auxiliary relay in the contactor circuit since it is energized at all times and operation of any monitoring relay after its selected time delay de-energizes this relay causing the contacts of the respective contactor to open.



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3. EVALUATION

The NRC stated several requirements that the licensee must meet in their design modification to monitor the power to the RPS. A statement of these requirements followed by an evaluation of the licensee's submittals is as follows:

- (1) "The components of the RPS shall not be exposed to unacceptable electric power of any sustained abnormal quality that could damage the RPS."

The monitoring package will detect overvoltage, undervoltage, and underfrequency conditions with the following setpoints.

Nominal voltage 120 volts, 60 Hz nominal

<u>Condition</u>	<u>Setpoint</u>	<u>Time Delay</u>
Overvoltage	< 132 volts	< 4.0 seconds
Undervoltage	> 108 volts	< 4.0 seconds
Underfrequency	> 57 Hz	< 2.0 seconds

With these chosen setpoints, a maximum voltage drop of 4.5 to 5.0 volts ensures that the GE verified operating voltage limits of $\pm 10\%$ of 115 volts at the RPS components are not exceeded. The licensee has not verified these voltage drops. If field measurements result in larger voltage drops, then circuit modifications as indicated in Reference 10 will be required to maintain these chosen setpoints.

- (2) "Disconnecting the RPS from the abnormal power source shall be automatic."

The monitoring package will automatically disconnect the RPS buses from the abnormal power supply after the set time delay should the parameters setpoints be exceeded.

- (3) "The power monitoring system shall meet the requirements of IEEE 279-1971, GDC-2 and GDC-21."

The monitoring packages meet the Class 1E requirements of IEEE 279, the single failure criteria of GDC-21, and the seismic qualifications of GDC-2.


- (4) "Technical Specifications shall include limiting conditions of operation, surveillance requirements, and trip setpoints."

The licensee submitted Technical Specification changes [Ref. 11] which included limiting conditions for operation when the number of operable monitoring channels is less than required and surveillance requirements which include a functional test, channel calibration and verification of setpoints.

4. CONCLUSION

Based on the information submitted by Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation for the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 1, it is concluded that:

- (1) The proposed setpoints of the relays in the two protective packages to be installed in series, in each of the power sources to the RPS buses, will automatically protect the RPS components from sustained abnormal overvoltage, undervoltage, and underfrequency conditions outside the design limits of the RPS components.
- (2) The protective packages meet the requirements of Class 1E equipment (IEEE 279), single failure criteria (GDC-21), and seismic qualification (GDC-2).
- (3) The proposed time delay before contactor opening will not result in damage to components of the RPS or prevent the RPS from performing its safety functions.
- (4) The following minimum and maximum limits to the trip setpoints, limiting conditions for operation (LCO), and surveillance requirements, as proposed by the licensee in accordance with the Standard Technical Specifications, will protect the RPS components from sustained abnormal power:
 - (a) Overvoltage \leq 132 volts, time delay \leq 4.0 seconds
Undervoltage \geq 108 volts, time delay \leq 4.0 seconds
Underfrequency \geq 57 Hz, time delay \leq 2.0 seconds
 - (b) With one electric power monitoring channel for an inservice MG set or alternate supply inoperable, restore the inoperable channel to operable status within 72 hours or remove the associated MG set or alternate supply from service.
 - (c) With both electric power monitoring channels for the inservice MG set or alternate supply inoperable, restore at least one to operable status within 30 minutes or remove the associated MG set or alternate supply from service.
 - (d) A functional test at least once per 6 months and a channel calibration once per operating cycle to determine the operability of the protective instrumentation including simulated automatic actuation, tripping logic, output circuit breaker tripping, and verification of the setpoints.



REFERENCES

1. General Electric Company letter, MFN 408-78 (G. G. Sherwood) to NRC (R. S. Boyd), dated October 31, 1978.
2. General Design Criteria-2 (GDC-2), "Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena," of Appendix A, "General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," in the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50 (10 CFR 50).
3. General Design Criteria-21 (GDC-21), "Protection System Reliability and Testability," of Appendix A, "General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," in the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 50 (10 CFR 50).
4. IEEE Std. 279-1971, "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."
5. NUREG-75/087, "Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants."
6. NRC memorandum from Faust Rosa to J. Stolz, T. Ippolito, and G. Lainas, dated February 19, 1979.
7. NRC letter to Operating BWR's, dated September 24, 1980.
8. Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation letter (C. V. Mangan) to the NRC (D. B. Vassallo), dated December, 1982.
9. Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation letter (T. E. Lempges) to the NRC (D. B. Vassallo), dated July 22, 1983.
10. Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation letter (T. E. Lempges) to the NRC (D. B. Vassallo), dated December 15, 1983.
11. Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation letter (C. V. Mangan) to the NRC (D. B. Vassallo), dated January 13, 1984.



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