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 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
 Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)

SUBJECT: Responds to NRC 960719 ltr re violations noted in insp rept
 50-259/96-07, 50-260/96-07 & 50-296/96-07. C/A: stopped test,
 removed two members of security force (MSF) from duty &
 counseled & retrained MSFs re package searches.

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Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Decatur, Alabama 35609-2000

R. D. (Rick) Machon
Vice President, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

August 12, 1996

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

10 CFR 2
Appendix C

Dear Sir:

**BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) - NRC INSPECTION REPORT
50-259, 50-260, 50-296/96-07 - REPLY TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION
(NOV)**

This letter provides our reply to the subject NOV transmitted by letter from Paul E. Fredrickson, NRC, to Oliver D. Kingsley, TVA, dated July 19, 1996. This NOV involved a failure to follow procedures during a security access search. TVA admits the violation.

The enclosure provides our response to the NOV. No commitments are made in this letter. If you have any questions regarding this reply, please contact Pedro Salas at (205) 729-2636.

Sincerely,

R. D. Machon

Enclosure
cc: See page 2

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Page 2
August 12, 1996

Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):

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ENCLOSURE

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN)
UNITS 1, 2, AND 3

INSPECTION REPORT NUMBER 50-259, 50-260, 50-296/96-07
REPLY TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NOV)

RESTATEMENT OF THE VIOLATION

"During an NRC inspection conducted on June 17-20, 1996, a violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the 'General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions,' NUREG-1600, the violation is listed below:

Paragraph 5.6.1, Revision 0, dated July 28, 1995, of the Physical Security Plan (PSP) requires that the 'Hand-carried items shall be searched by a Member Security Force (MSF) (either physically searched by hand or electronically searched by x-ray devices) prior to entrance to the PA for unauthorized firearms, explosives, incendiary devices, or other items that could be used for radiological sabotage.'

Paragraph 3.4.1, Section 101, Revision 5, dated April 23, 1996, Physical Security Instruction Manual, requires that 'Items that are not clearly visible on the x-ray monitor will be physically searched prior to entry into the PA.'

Paragraph 3.4.5, Section 101, Revision 5, dated April 23, 1996, of the Physical Security Instruction Manual, requires that 'Upon discovery of unauthorized material while performing searches of personnel, vehicles or packages, the search MSF shall implement immediate and concurrent measures to neutralize the possibility of a threat, to include but not limited to: Deny the person and/or the material access to the PA. Notify the CAS and the appropriate security supervisory personnel...and take possession/control of the unauthorized material.'

Contrary to the above, on June 18, 1996, during a test two members of the security force failed to detect a firearm that was clearly visible on the x-ray and even though they identified part of the firearm while hand-searching the packages, they failed to take actions to neutralize the possibility of a threat.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement III)."



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TVA'S REPLY TO THE VIOLATION

1. Reason For The Violation

This violation was caused by personnel error. Specifically, members of the security force (MSF) responsible for conducting access searches failed to perform a thorough search and did not detain individuals in accordance with Security procedures.

During a test, a gun was disassembled and placed in two backpacks which had numerous other metal parts in them. These backpacks were then placed for searching on the x-ray machine. The MSF operating the x-ray machine observed an object in one of the backpacks that resembled a piece of the disassembled gun.

At that time, the x-ray machine operator took one of the backpacks and handed the second backpack to an assisting MSF. However, the x-ray machine operator only performed a cursory search of the first backpack and did not find two parts of the disassembled gun that were in the backpack.

Additionally, the assisting MSF, while searching the second backpack, found a spring to the gun. The spring was then taken to a Security supervisor. The supervisor told the assisting MSF to follow procedures. The MSF performed a thorough search of the backpack but failed to control the unauthorized material and did not properly detain the individuals. During interviews with the assisting search officer, it was determined that the failure to control the individuals and the unauthorized material was due to the fact that the individuals were members of an Operational Safeguards Readiness Evaluation Regional Assist Team assigned to BFN to test security equipment. The individuals had been inside the protected area several times during the day with these backpacks. Because of their position and the assisting officer's familiarization with the individuals and their backpacks, the assisting officer did not perceive this event as a threatening situation. Therefore, the assisting officer did not strictly enforce access control requirements. TVA considers these actions unacceptable and has taken corrective actions as discussed in Section 2 below to prevent recurrence of this type of event.

2. Corrective Actions Taken And Results Achieved

The test was stopped. The MSFs were questioned about what corrective actions should have been implemented. Based on their verbal answers, it was apparent that both MSFs knew the actions they should have taken. They then acknowledged

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that their actions were not in accordance with Security procedures.

These two MSFs were removed from duty. The two MSFs were counseled and retrained on package searches as identified in the Security Training and Qualification Plan to include challenging all individuals regardless of their position or assignment at BFN.

Additional administrative corrective actions were taken against the MSFs involved in this event.

TVA will provide training which will enhance the abilities of MSFs to recognize/detect unauthorized material during searches at the protected area boundary as well as actions to be taken if unauthorized material is identified.¹ This enhancement is designed to heighten the awareness of package searches performed by MSFs. TVA plans to complete this training by August 30, 1996.

3. Corrective Steps That [Have Been Or] Will Be Taken To Avoid Further Violations

No further corrective actions are required to ensure full compliance with federal regulations.

4. Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved

Full compliance was achieved when the two MSFs were removed from performing package searches and retraining was completed.

¹ This action is an enhancement. TVA does not consider it a regulatory requirement.

12



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