CATEGORY 1

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MORRIS,B.C. Tennessee Valley Authority
MACHON,R.D. Tennessee Valley Authority
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 96-002-00:on 960421,unit scrammed following loss of reactor feed pump 3c.Caused by personnel error.Personnel stabilized reactor & feed pump isolated & oil tank refilled.

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R. D. (Rick) Machon
Vice President, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

May 21, 1996

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

10 CFR 50.73

Dear Sir:

BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) - UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 - DOCKET NOS. 50-259, 260, and 296 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-33, 52, AND 68 - LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 50-296/96002

The enclosed report provides details concerning a reactor scram. The scram occurred following the loss of reactor feedpump 3C that was caused by a valve alignment error.

The discharge check valve on the affected reactor feedpump was damaged during the pump trip transient and failed to fully seat. The remaining two operable reactor feedpumps were unable to provide sufficient feed flow to maintain vessel water level due to back flow through reactor feedpump 3C, and the unit subsequently scrammed on low reactor water level. TVA is performing a failure evaluation of the reactor feedpump discharge valve to determine what modifications are needed to improve the performance of the check valves.

This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv) as a condition that resulted in automatic actuation of any engineered safety feature including the reactor protection system.

Sincerely,

R. D. Machon

Enclosure
cc: See page 2

IE22
1/1

Enclosure
cc (Enclosure):

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NRC Resident Inspector
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NRC FORM 366 (4-95) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES 04/30/98

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6 F33), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) Unit 3	05000296	1 OF 8

TITLE (4)

Unit 3 Scram Following Loss Of Reactor Feedpump 3C.

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
4	21	96	96	– 002 –	00	05	21	96	NA	
									FACILITY NAME: NA	DOCKET NUMBER

OPERATING MODE (9)	N
POWER LEVEL (10)	100

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)

	20.2201(b)		20.2203(a)(2)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)
	20.2203(a)(1)		20.2203(a)(3)(i)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(x)
	20.2203(a)(2)(i)		20.2203(a)(3)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		73.71
	20.2203(a)(2)(ii)		20.2203(a)(4)	X	50.73(a)(2)(iv)		OTHER
	20.2203(a)(2)(iii)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form A
	20.2203(a)(2)(iv)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)
B. C. Morris, Licensing Engineer	(205) 729-7909

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS
B	SJ	FCV	A365	Y					
B	CE	HX	P160	N					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)			EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).	X	NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On April 21, 1996, at 0351 hours, a low reactor water level scram occurred on Unit 3. The event was initiated by the loss of reactor feedwater pump (RFP) 3C while aligning RFP 3C's oil tank to the oil purification system. The discharge check valve on RFP 3C was damaged during the pump trip transient and was not fully seated. This allowed back flow from the discharge of the two operable RFPs through RFP line 3C. Thus, RFPs 3A and 3B were unable to maintain vessel water level and the unit scrammed. The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system auto-started on low reactor water level and restored vessel level. All automatic Engineered Safeguard Features and all automatic isolations or actuations of primary and secondary containment group logic systems functioned as expected.

The RFP trip was caused by personnel error. An Assistant Unit Operator improperly aligned oil valves resulting in draining the RFP 3C oil tank. Appropriate personnel corrective action was taken. A human performance evaluation is also being performed to determine if additional actions are needed. Due to the nature of the pump trip, RFP 3C experienced a faster than normal closure of the discharge check valve which damaged the valve. Inspection of the valve also showed operational wear was present. Engineering is performing a failure evaluation on the valve wear to determine what modifications are needed to improve the performance of the valves.

I. PLANT CONDITIONS

Prior to this event Unit 3 was operating at 100 percent power. Unit 1 was shutdown and defueled. Unit 2 was shutdown for a scheduled refueling outage.

II. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

A. Event:

On April 21, 1996, at 0351 hours, a low reactor water level scram occurred on Unit 3.

At approximately 0345 hours, activities were in progress in the turbine building to align the reactor feedpump [SJ] 3C oil tank to the turbine oil purifier system [TD]. This was a scheduled activity assigned to an Assistant Unit Operator (AUO) [utility , nonlicensed]. A low reactor feedwater pump 3C oil tank level alarm [ALM] was received in the main control room followed by alarms indicating low oil header pressure on reactor feedpump 3C. The speed of reactor feedpump 3C decreased and reactor feedpumps 3A and 3B increased discharge flow due to the loss of flow from the reactor feedpump 3C. Reactor recirculation pumps 3A and 3B [AD] automatically ran back to reduce power. Reactor feedpumps 3A and 3B were unable to maintain water level and the reactor scrammed. Water level continued to decrease and the High Pressure Coolant Injection system (HPCI) [BJ] and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system (RCIC) [BN] auto-started and assisted reactor feedpumps 3A and 3B in restoring vessel level. Reactor water level continued to increase and HPCI and RCIC, and reactor feedpumps 3A and 3B tripped on high reactor water level as would be expected. An Assistant Shift Operations Supervisor (ASOS) [utility, licensed] had been dispatched to investigate the oil alarms and reported that the reactor feedpump 3C discharge check valve had a steam/water leak and requested the Unit Operator (UO) [utility, licensed] to isolate reactor feedpump 3C. The UO then closed the motor operated discharge valve on reactor feedpump 3C.

The high reactor water level trips on reactor feedpumps 3A and 3B were reset after water level decreased and reactor water level control was maintained using reactor feedpumps.

At 0407 hours, HPCI auto-started following an improper reset of the trip logic. HPCI was immediately secured by the operator.

The post-trip evaluation concluded the AUO had made a valve alignment error that resulted in oil being inadvertently gravity drained to the main turbine oil tank from the reactor feedpump 3C oil tank. The oil loss caused a loss of reactor feedpump 3C hydraulic pressure resulting in closure of the turbine stop and

control valves, and caused the speed of reactor feedpump 3C pump to decrease. The loss of oil also resulted in damage to journal bearings on the reactor feedpump 3C turbine.

Browns Ferry's feedwater system is designed such that the loss of a single reactor feedpump can be compensated for by increased output of the other two reactor feedpumps in combination with an automatic run back of the reactor recirculation system pumps. The transient data showed part of the reactor feedpump discharge flow from the two operable reactor feedpumps was in reverse flow through reactor water feedpump line 3C. With this back flow, reactor feedpumps 3A and 3B were unable to provide sufficient feedwater flow to the reactor to maintain vessel level.

Reactor feedpump 3C discharge check valve was disassembled and inspected. The inspection revealed that the disk pin was sheared detaching the disc from the swing arm. In this configuration, the discharge check valve was not fully seated and a reverse flow path existed through the reactor feedpump 3C pump line and the associated minimum flow line. The antirotation pin was not intact and the disk nut was backed off the disc pin two to three threads. There was also evidence of disc rotation.

The sequence of events likely contributed to the damaged check valve. Closure of this valve is normally assisted by a spring loaded actuator that is released in conjunction with reactor feedpump trip signals. For this transient a normal trip signal was not generated and the rapid flow reversal may have caused a faster than normal closure resulting in damage to the check valve, the observed steam leak on the check valve packing, and a broken air line found on the actuator for the discharge check valve.

All automatic Engineered Safety Features (ESF) [JE] actuations and the primary and secondary containment system isolations and actuations occurred as expected. Restoration of the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) [CE] system to service was delayed due to a leak from a head flange on the regenerative heat exchanger.

The event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv) as any event that resulted in automatic actuation of an ESF. The second HPCI start is not considered a reportable event since the start signal was not valid and HPCI had completed its safety function.

B. **Inoperable Structures, Components, or Systems that Contributed to the Event:**

None.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Browns Ferry Unit 3	05000296	96 --	002 --	00	4 of 8

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form A) (17)

C. **Dates and Approximate Times of Major Occurrences:**

April 21, 1996,

at 0145 hours CST - An Assistant Unit Operator (AUO) isolated the Unit 3 main turbine oil tank from the turbine lube oil purification system.

at 0345 hours CST - The AUO opened the reactor feedpump 3C oil tank valves.

at 0348 hours CST - RFP 3C Oil Tank Level Abnormal annunciation was received in the control room.

at 0351 hours CST - RFP 3C Trip alarm was received on the alarm recorder.

at 0351 hours CST - Reactor water level decreased resulting in a reactor scram.

at 0351 hours CST - Reactor water level continued to decrease resulting in a HPCI and RCIC system initiation.

at 0353 hours CST - Reactor feedpumps 3A and 3B and HPCI/RCIC tripped on high vessel water level.

at 0354 hours CST - ASOS reported steam/water leak on the reactor feedpump 3C discharge check valve. UO closed the reactor feedwater pump 3C motor operated discharge valve.

at 0358 hours CST - Scram was reset.

at 0402 hours CST - Reactor feedpumps 3A and 3B high reactor water level trips were reset.

at 0407 hours CST - HPCI auto-started and was immediately secured.

at 0450 hours CST - TVA made a 1-hour notification to NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(1)(iv) for HPCI injection.

D. **Other Systems or Secondary Functions Affected:**

The following additional equipment problems were observed:

Three low pressure feedwater heater strings and two high pressure strings isolated following the trip of the main turbine.

Engineering is currently evaluating corrective actions.

Two high pressure heater discharge valves stalled while attempting to return the feedwater heaters to service. A problem report was written to evaluate this further.

The HPCI steam line drain pots took longer to drain than anticipated. A work order was written and no problems were found. Also, Engineering walked down the HPCI steam lines and no problems were found.

Following the event, a steam leak was identified coming from the head flange on RWCU regenerative heat exchanger 3A. This delayed the return of the RWCU system to service. See Section V.B for additional details.

E. **Method of Discovery:**

Reactor feedpump 3C low oil level and pressure alarms were received in the main control room followed by the reactor scram and ESF actuations.

F. **Operator Actions:**

Operations personnel [utility, licensed and nonlicensed] responded to the reactor scram according to applicable reactor scram procedures. An ASOS was dispatched to the turbine building to assess the physical status of the reactor feedpump 3C oil system. Operators closed the motor operated discharge valve on the problem reactor feedpump within approximately four minutes of the scram. This action isolated the backflow path through feedpump 3C pump line. The reactor was stabilized in a hot shutdown condition with reactor process parameters at normal values using reactor feedpumps for vessel level control per routine shutdown procedures.

G. **Safety System Responses:**

All safety systems responded as designed for this type of event.

III. CAUSE OF THE EVENT

A. **Immediate Cause:**

The immediate cause for the scram was the low reactor water level following the loss of reactor feedpump 3C.

B. **Root Cause:**

The event was initiated by a personnel error. An AUO improperly aligned oil valves which resulted in draining the oil from reactor feedpump 3C to the main turbine oil tank causing a pump trip.

The feedwater system can tolerate the loss of a single feedpump without scramming the plant. In this case, the discharge check valve on pump 3C sustained damage when it closed and was unable to properly seat. This resulted in the scram since the two active feedpumps were unable to provide sufficient feedwater flow to maintain vessel level. A faster than normal closure of the check valve caused the damage to the valve.

IV. ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT

Plant safety systems and associated components performed as designed. The event is categorized as a partial loss of feedwater event. Full loss of feedwater is an analyzed plant transient and bounds the circumstances associated with this event. Therefore, the event did not affect the health and safety of plant personnel or the public.

V. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

A. **Immediate Corrective Actions:**

Operations personnel promptly stabilized the reactor. Reactor feedpump 3C was isolated and reactor feedpump 3C oil tank was refilled.

B. **Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence:**

Appropriate personnel corrective action was taken with the AUO responsible for the valve misalignment. A human performance evaluation is being performed to evaluate the oil alignment problem to determine any additional follow-up corrective actions.

The damaged valve internals on the reactor feedpump 3C discharge check valve were replaced and the damaged turbine journal bearings were repaired. The steam leak and broken air line on reactor feedpump 3C discharge valve were also repaired.

The discharge check valves for reactor feedpumps 3A, 3B, 2A, 2B, and 2C were inspected. The valves showed varying degrees of operational wear requiring correction. Wear problems included damaged or missing nut locking pins, damaged disc post threads, and worn antirotation pins. On two valves there was evidence of valve disc rotation and excessive wear in the disk pin to lever

arm interface.

Maintenance and modification records show these valves have a history of wear problems and damaged stems. Past modifications included going to an integral stem design and addition of antirotation pins to prevent disc rotation. The recent inspections demonstrate these modifications have not been successful in limiting valve wear. The valve vendor indicates that design improvements were issued in 1988 recommending a different material for the antirotation pin and seal welding the nut. There is not a specific process in place for utilities to be notified of product improvements on non-safety components and TVA was unaware of these recommendations. The vendor was also consulted on whether mounting the check valve in a vertical piping run, as is the case at Browns Ferry, would cause problems. The vendor stated that, while a horizontal installation was recommended, other plants used the valve in vertical runs with no apparent adverse effects.

TVA Site Engineering is performing an evaluation of the discharge check valves to determine what modifications must be implemented to improve performance. Vendor recommendations will be considered in this evaluation. In the interim, the inspection frequency of the valves is being changed to require an inspection at once per outage.

The cause for the second HPCI start was personnel error. The reset sequence error associated with the second start of HPCI was discussed with the involved operator. This event will be reviewed during operator classroom training and the proper sequence to reset the trip logic emphasized in simulator training.

The RWCU heat exchanger has a history of gasket leaks between the shell head and channel head. Leakage from this type of heat exchanger in this application has been an industry problem. A permanently designed external clamp had been previously installed as a supplemental leak seal to the gasket. The RWCU heat exchanger leak was reduced by injecting leak sealant into the valve flange.[1]

[1]Actions described in Section V are being tracked by TVA's Corrective Action Program and are not considered regulatory commitments.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Browns Ferry Unit 3	05000296	96 --	002 --	00	8 of 8

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form A) (17)

VI. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

A. Failed Components:

The feedwater discharge check valve is an 18-inch swing check valve Model 828A with air assisted actuator manufactured by Ametek, Schutte and Koerting Division.

The RWCU heat exchanger is a Perfex Model CEU fitted with an engineered clamp assembly.

B. Previous LERs on Similar Events:

No other LERs were identified which were caused by failure of a reactor feedpump discharge check valve.

VII. COMMITMENTS

None.

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) system and component codes are identified in the text with brackets (e.g., [XX]).