NIAGARA MOHAWK

07-604-91

NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION / P.O. BOX 32 LYCOMING, NEW YORK 13093 / TELEPHONE (315) 343-2110

oseph F. Firlit
Ice President
uclear Generation

NMP81983
September 11, 1991

Mr. Steven A. Varga
Director, Division of Reactor Projects-I,II
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Mr. Varga:

Niagara Mohawk responded to your request for additional information on Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) issues in letter NMP2L 1315 dated September 10, 1991. A number of follow-up discussions have taken place with the NRC staff on Item 4 (Procedures and Training) of that response. The purpose of this letter is to provide additional information on Item 4 regarding means available to the operators to determine if a reactor scram has occurred when control rod indication is lost due to loss of UPS1A. Furthermore, we are providing additional detail regarding our efforts to develop an alternate method to verify control rod position when indication is lost.

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~~9-1-091-8015~~ 3pp.

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Mr. D. S. Brinkman, Project Manager, NRR
Mr. C. W. Hehl, Director, Reactor Projects
Mr. D. R. Haverkamp, Chief Reactor Projects, Section 1B
Records Management

file

WORK REQUEST

DATE: 9/13/91 DATE REQUIRED: _____

NAME OF REQUESTOR: R Conte (from Don Brinkman, PM)

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: (1) Record & File in Biblio

* URGENT: (2) cc: Technical ITT Members

COMPLETED BY: _____

DATE COMPLETED: _____

COMMENTS:

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NRC RESPONSE

INSPECTOR: Jose Ibarra/NRC

Question/Request

What rad monitors were available to monitor radiation release out of the stack? Other effluents? (gaseous and liquid, concentrations, concentrate on SR and T.S. monitors)

NMPC Response

The following release pathways with a description of effluent monitoring operability is discussed below. In addition, other steps were taken to help conclude that no releases of radioactive material on site or to the environment occurred.

Stack

Systems Operable:

The Stack Gaseous Effluent Monitoring System, GEMS was operable prior to and during the event. At the time of the event the stack GEMS lost communication with the chart recorder in the main control room after the computer experienced an apparent power interruption. However, local indication was available on Turbine Building 306 and was monitored by a chem tech by approximately 0700. A computer reboot was initiated at 0805 to resolve the communication problem with the control room chart recorder. Communication between stack GEMS and the control room recorder was restored at 0825.

Systems Inoperable:

None

Alternate Sampling Capabilities:

- GTS-105, Standby Gas Treatment System Gas Monitor, however at the time of the power loss, this monitor was not being polled by the mini computer.
- Inplant AMS-3s with continuous readout, chart recorders and local alarm located in the Turbine Building.
- Low volume air samples were available and running during the event providing the capability of obtaining grab samples of Turbine Building atmosphere.

Vent

Systems Inoperable:

The vent GEMS was inoperable for scheduled calibration. The vent GEMS was inop on 8/12/91 under equipment status log entry 91-458A and returned to operable on 8/14/91.

Additional Information Sources:

- Chemistry grab samples

- Above and Below Refuel Floor gas and particulate monitors.
- Drywell atmosphere gas and particulate continuous air monitors.
- Inplant AMS-3s with continuous readout, chart recorders and local alarm located at various locations in the Reactor Building and Rad Waste Buildings.
- Low volume air samples were available and running during the event providing the capability of obtaining grab samples of Reactor Building and Rad Waste Building atmosphere.

Service Water Effluent Monitoring

System Operable:

Service Water monitor SWP*146B was administratively inoperable due to repeated pump trips caused by flow switch failures. LCO grab samples were being taken. The monitor was running normally and providing information during the event.

RHR service water monitor SWP*23B was operable and available for service should operations require RHR heat exchangers to be used.

System Inoperable:

Service Water monitor SWP*146A was inoperable during the event. ESL 91-456 was entered on 9/11/91 due to flow switch problems and returned to service on 8/16/91.

SWP*CAB23A was inoperable due to flow switch problems. It was declared inoperable on 8/9/91 under ESL entry 91-455 and returned to service on 8/23/91. However, this monitor was not needed since operations elected to run the B RHR loop.

Liquid Radioactive Waste Monitoring

Systems Operable:

The liquid rad waste monitor LWS-206 was operable but no waste releases were in progress. However, at the time of the power loss the mini computer stopped polling for information.

Cooling Tower Blowdown Monitor

Systems Operable:

The cooling tower blowdown monitor CWS-157 was operable however, at the time of the power loss the mini computer stopped polling this non 1E monitor.

The initial response by radiation protection was in accordance with S-RPIP-10.1, "Radiation Protection Startup and Shutdown Activities". Actions included notifying supervisions, reporting to the control room, verifying operability of control room monitors, and assigning technicians to perform plant walkdowns to report results back to the SSS an RP supervision. Radiation Monitors on Panel 880 in the control room were noted to be operating as expected with no abnormal radiation readings.

The following were utilized to gather information to assure the Emergency Director of no release of radioactive material.

- Above and below refuel floor monitors
- Containment atmosphere monitors
- Drywell high range monitors
- Scram walkdown surveys of reactor building
- AMS-3 portable continuous air monitors
- Control Room air intake monitors
- Post Accident Samples of reactor coolant
- Down wind survey sample teams continuously obtaining air, soil and water samples.

/mak