

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 8706230102 DOC. DATE: 87/06/15 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
 FACIL: 50-410 Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Niagara Moha 05000410
 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 RANDALL, R. G. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.
 LEMPGES, T. E. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 87-025-00: on 870519, secondary containment isolation signal generated due to technician relanding lifted lead prematurely. Caused by breakdown in communications between control room & technicians in field. W/870615 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 8
 TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:

	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR ENCL	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR ENCL
	PD1-1 LA	1 1	PD1-1 PD	1 1
	NEIGHBORS, D	1 1	MINER, S	1 1
INTERNAL:	ACRS MICHELSON	1 1	ACRS MOELLER	2 2
	AEOD/DDA	1 1	AEOD/DSP/ROAB	2 2
	AEOD/DSP/TPAB	1 1	DEDRO	1 1
	NRR/DEST/ADE	1 0	NRR/DEST/ADS	1 0
	NRR/DEST/CEB	1 1	NRR/DEST/ELB	1 1
	NRR/DEST/ICSB	1 1	NRR/DEST/MEB	1 1
	NRR/DEST/MTB	1 1	NRR/DEST/PSB	1 1
	NRR/DEST/RSB	1 1	NRR/DEST/SGB	1 1
	NRR/DLPQ/HFB	1 1	NRR/DLPQ/QAB	1 1
	NRR/DOEA/EAB	1 1	NRR/DREP/RAB	1 1
	NRR/DREP/RPB	2 2	NRR/PMAS/ILRB	1 1
	NRR/PMAS/PTSB	1 1	<u>REG FILE</u> 02	1 1
	RES DEPY GI	1 1	RGN1 FILE 01	1 1
EXTERNAL:	EG&G GROH, M	5 5	H ST LOBBY WARD	1 1
	LPDR	1 1	NRC PDR	1 1
	NSIC HARRIS, J	1 1	NSIC MAYS, G	1 1



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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Nine Mile Point Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 4 1 1 0	PAGE (3) 1 OF 3
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TITLE (4)
Secondary Containment Isolation Initiation due to Communications Breakdown

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
05	19	87	87	025	00	06	15	87	N/A		0 5 0 0 0
									N/A		0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9) 5	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																						
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 1 0 1 0	20.402(b)	20.405(a)(1)(i)	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	20.405(a)(1)(v)	20.405(c)	50.38(c)(1)	50.38(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)	73.71(b)	73.71(c)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)		
													<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>										

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME Robert G. Randall, Supervisor Technical Support	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE: 3 1 5 NUMBER: 3 4 9 - 2 4 4 5

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15) MONTH: DAY: YEAR:
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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On May 19, 1987 at 1655 with the reactor at 0% power with all rods inserted and the mode switch in "REFUEL" Nine Mile Point Unit 2 experienced an Engineered Safety Feature Actuation. A secondary containment isolation signal was generated as a result of technicians, who while performing a surveillance procedure, re-landed a lifted lead prior to the step in the procedure which requires the lead landed. This was a direct result of a communications breakdown between the technicians performing this surveillance test. The early replacement of the lead produced a Secondary Containment Isolation signal which subsequently caused the reactor building ventilation system to isolate and all associated dampers to close. All equipment operated as designed.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

A modification has been generated which will add a Gaitronics phone and/or headset jack in the immediate area. This modification is scheduled to be completed prior to the first refueling outage.

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FACILITY NAME (1) Nine Mile Point Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 4 1 0	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		87	025	010	02	OF	03

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

I. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On May 19, 1987 at 1655 with the reactor at 0% power with all rods inserted and the mode switch in "REFUEL" Nine Mile Point Unit 2 experienced an Engineered Safety Feature actuation. A secondary containment isolation signal was generated as a result of a Niagara Mohawk Instrument and Control (I&C) technician who, while performing a surveillance procedure, re-landed a lifted lead prior to the step in the procedure which requires the lead landed. The procedure which the technicians were performing is N2-RSP-RMS-R107, "Channel Calibration Test of the Reactor Building Below the Refuel Floor Process Radiation Monitors". Radiation Protection technicians were performing the surveillance test with the Instrument & Control technicians as a support group. While in the process of finishing up the 2HVR*RE32A channel test a communications breakdown occurred between the technician in the control room and the technician in the field. The technician in the field questioned if it was time to re-land the lead. The response was only partially received, which subsequently resulted in the re-landing of the lead. The early replacement of the lead produced a secondary containment isolation signal which caused the reactor building ventilation system to isolate and all associated dampers to close. No emergency ventilation systems initiated due to them being in the pull-to-lock position for this particular test. All equipment operated as designed.

II. CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause of the event was a breakdown in communications between the technician in the control room and the technicians in the field. The technician in the control room had to convey messages through a hand held radio to a technician in the field on another radio. This technician then in turn had to convey that message to the technician performing the work, approximately 75 feet away. This poor method of communications allowed the technician performing the work to proceed ahead of the technician in the control room resulting in the lifted lead being landed prior to the step in the procedure.

III. ANALYSIS OF EVENT

There were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event, since the reactor mode switch was in Refuel and all rods were fully inserted. The procedure which the technicians were performing is used to test the automatic trip functions which result from exceeding the high radiation trip setpoint. This includes isolation of the Normal Reactor Building Ventilation System and activation of the Standby Gas Treatment System. Since the intention of this test was to generate signals and not actuate equipment, the emergency ventilation systems were in the pull-to-lock position. If emergency ventilation systems were deemed necessary operations personnel could have taken the fans out of pull-to-lock. In addition, all equipment and associated dampers operated as designed and no significant safety hazards occurred as a result of this event.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTION

A modification has been generated (N2Y87MX038) which will add a Gaitronics phone and/or headset jack in the immediate area. This modification is scheduled to be completed prior to the first refueling outage.



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11/11/11

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) Nine Mile Point Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 4 1 0	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		8 7	- 0 2 5	- 0 0	0 3	OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

V. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Identification of Components Referred to in this LER

Component	IEEE 803 EIIIS Funct	IEEE 805 System ID
Secondary Containment Isolation System	N/A	VA
Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS)	N/A	BH
Radiation Monitors	MON	IL
Dampers	DMP	VA

There have been no previous similar events as a result of poor communications between technicians.



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
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NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

NIAGARA  MOHAWK301 PLAINFIELD ROAD
SYRACUSE, NY 13212THOMAS E. LEMPGES
VICE PRESIDENT—NUCLEAR GENERATION

June 15, 1987

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555RE: Docket No. 50-410
LER 87-25

Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, we hereby submit the following Licensee
Event Report:

LER 87-25 Is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73
(a) (2) (iv), "Any event or condition that resulted in manual
or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature
(ESF), including the Reactor Protection System (RPS).
However, actuation of an ESF, including the RPS, that
resulted from and was part of the preplanned sequence during
testing or reactor operation need not be reported."

A telephone notification was made at 1835 hours on May 19, 1987 per
10 CFR 50.72 part (b) (2) (iv).This report was completed in the format designated in NUREG-1022,
Supplement 2, dated September 1985.

Very truly yours,

Thomas E. Lempges
Vice President
Nuclear Generation

TEL/SCN/mjd

Attachments

cc: Regional Administrator, Region 1
Sr. Resident Inspector, W. A. Cook



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

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05	19	87	87	025	00	06	15	87	N/A		
									DOCKET NUMBER(S)		
									0 5 0 0 0		
									N/A		
									0 5 0 0 0		

OPERATING MODE (9) 5	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)									
POWER LEVEL (10) 01010	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(c)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.38(e)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.38(e)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)							
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)							
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(x)							

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)		TELEPHONE NUMBER	
NAME Robert G. Randall, Supervisor Technical Support	AREA CODE 315	NUMBER 349	EXTENSION 1-2445

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)										
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO			

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
		8 7	- 0 2 5	- 0 1 0	0 2	OF 0 3

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER), TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) Nine Mile Point Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 4 1 0	LER NUMBER (8)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		8 7	- 0 2 5	- 0 0	0 3	OF	0 3


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NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

NIAGARA  MOHAWK

301 PLAINFIELD ROAD
SYRACUSE, NY 13212

THOMAS E. LEMPGES
VICE PRESIDENT—NUCLEAR GENERATION

June 15, 1987

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

RE: Docket No. 50-410
LER 87-25

Gentlemen:

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LER 87-25 Is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (iv), "Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), including the Reactor Protection System (RPS). However, actuation of an ESF, including the RPS, that resulted from and was part of the preplanned sequence during testing or reactor operation need not be reported."

A telephone notification was made at 1835 hours on May 19, 1987 per 10 CFR 50.72 part (b) (2) (iv).

This report was completed in the format designated in NUREG-1022, Supplement 2, dated September 1985.

Very truly yours,

Thomas E. Lempges
Vice President
Nuclear Generation

TEL/SCN/mjd

Attachments

cc: Regional Administrator, Region 1
Sr. Resident Inspector, W. A. Cook

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