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 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 RHODE, G.K. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

mr/1

SUBJECT: Final deficiency rept re environ & seismic qualifications of electrical equipment. During audit of steam supply sys, found qualification documentation in wrong file. Steam supply sys will be modified to cross-ref records.

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 TITLE: Construction Deficiency Report (10CFR50.55E)

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AUG 15 1980

**NIAGARA
MOHAWK**

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION/300 ERIE BOULEVARD WEST, SYRACUSE, N.Y. 13202/TELEPHONE (315) 474-1511

August 5, 1980

Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region I
Attention: Mr. R. T. Carlson
Reactor Construction and Engineering
Support Branch
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406


Dear Mr. Carlson:

Re: Nine Mile Point Unit 2
Docket No. 50-410

On April 10, 1980, your staff was informed by telephone of a potential reportable deficiency in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e). This deficiency concerns the environmental and seismic qualifications of some electrical equipment to be used at Nine Mile Point Unit 2. In accordance with paragraph 50.55(e)(3) of the Commission's Regulations, attached is a final report which provides a description of the deficiency, an analysis of the safety implications and the corrective action taken.

Very truly yours,

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION


Gerald K. Rhode
Vice President

System Project Management

PEF/kmb
Attachment

cc: Director of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

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FINAL REPORT

Potential Reportable 50.55(e) Deficiency Involving Qualification of Electrical Equipment

I. Description of the Deficiency

During an audit of our nuclear steam supply system Vendor conducted the week of March 26, 1980, no evidence (lack of documentation) was found to indicate that the three electrical instruments indicated below were adequately qualified:

<u>Instrument</u>	<u>MPL No.</u>	<u>Qualification Lacking</u>
Conductivity Element	E12-N001	Environmental and Seismic
Level Transmitter	E12-N008	Environmental and Seismic
Rosemount Model 1151DP Differential Pressure Transmitter	E12-N058	Environmental Test Incomplete

II. Subsequent Findings and Corrective Action

As indicated in our interim report dated May 12, 1980 for the Rosemount Model 1151DP differential pressure transmitter, an additional search of the qualification records following the audit located the qualification documentation in another record file. To prevent the recurrence of being unable to retrieve documentation in a timely manner, the nuclear steam supply system Vendor's Quality Assurance Program is being modified to cross-reference qualification records and vendor-supplied documentation.

Regarding conductivity element E12-N001 and level transmitter E12-N008, it has been determined that no corrective action is required. These instruments are considered to be passive and are not required to function either during or after a design basis accident. Since a failure analysis shows that an electrical short circuit or open circuit in the instrument can damage the power source, no additional qualification is required.

III. Analyses of the Safety Implications

The electrical instruments have been shown to be adequately qualified to satisfy their intended design function. Therefore, this condition could not have adversely affected the safety of operation of Nine Mile Point Unit 2 at anytime throughout its expected lifetime.



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