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SUBJECT: LER 92-004-00:on 921104, chemical release in reactor bldg forced evacuation of compensatory action fire watches. Caused by unexpected exothermic chemical reaction.Mfg (Master Builders, Inc) conducted training.W/921204 ltr.

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Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Decatur, Alabama 35609-2000

O. J. "Ike" Zeringue Vice President, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

DEC 0 4 1992

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

TVA - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) UNITS 1, 2, 3 - DOCKET NOS. 50-259, 260, AND 296 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-33, 52, 68 - LICENSEE EVENT REPORT LER 50-296/92004

The enclosed report provides details concerning a chemical release in the Unit 3 Reactor Building that forced an evacuation of compensatory action fire watches leading to a violation of fire watch technical specifications.

This report is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).


Sincerely,

Q. J. Zeringue

Enclosure cc: See page 2

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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
cc (Enclosure): INPO Records Center Suite 1500 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, Georgia 30339

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NRC Resident Inspector Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Route 12, P.O. Box 637 Athens, Alabama 35609-2000

Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Thierry M. Ross U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852



) NRC Form 366 (6–89)	<i>v.s</i> .	CLEAR REGULATORY C	OMMISSION		Approved OMB No. 3150-0104 Expires 4/30/92
(° ° ° ° ) ,	LICE	ISEE EVENT REPORT (	LER)		
FACILITY NAME (1) Browns Ferry Nucle	ear Plant (BFN) Unit	3			DOCKET NUMBER (2)   PAGE (3) 01510101012   91 6110F1 015
TITLE (4) Chemica	l Release in Unit 3 ion of Technical Spe	Reactor Building F	orced an Evac	uation of Compe	nsatory Action Fire Watches
EVENT DAY (5)	LER_NUMBER		RT DATE (7)		LITIES INVOLVED (8)
	SEQUENTIAL	REVISION		FACILITY NAME	S  DOCKET NUMBER(S)  0 5 0 0 0 _ _ _
MONTH DAY YEAR	YEAR   NUMBER    9  2   0   0   4				
	THIS REPORT IS SUBMI				
MODE		of the following)	(11)		
(9)N		20.405(c)		(a)(2)(iv) (a)(2)(v)	73.71(b)   73.71(c)
POWER	[20.405(a)(1)(i)] [20.405(a)(1)(ii)]	[[50.36(c)(1) [[50.36(c)(2)		(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in
		X 50.73(a)(2)(i		(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(i	· · · ·	(a)(2)(viii)(B)	Text, NRC Form 366A)
·	20.405(a)(1)(v)	1 [50.73(a)(2)(i LICENSEE_CONTACT		<u>(a)(2)(x)</u>	
NAME	<u></u>	LICENSEE CONTACT	TUR INIS CER		ELEPHONE NUMBER
				AREA CODE	
<u>S. W. Austin, Com</u>	pliance Licensing En	gineer	<u> </u>		
	COMPLETE ONE LINE F	OR EACH COMPONENT	FAILURE DESCR	I IN THIS REI	REPORTABLE
CAUSE SYSTEM COMP	ONENT MANUFACTURER	-	CAUSE SYSTEM	COMPONENT MAI	NUFACTURER TO NPRDS
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	SUPPLEMENTAL F	EPORT EXPECTED (14	!!! )	······	EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR
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YES (If yes.	complete EXPECTED SL	BMISSION DATE)	<u>x   no</u>		
ABSTRACT (Limit to	1400 spaces, i.e.,	approximately fift	een single-sp	ace typewritten	lines) (16)
On November	4, 1992, at 190	0 hours, all co	mnensatorv	action fire	watches were
temporarilv	evacuated from	the Unit 3 Read	tor Buildi	ng due to a	chemical release.
This result	ed in a violatio	n of technical	specificat	ions. The c	hemical release was 🛛 🛛
due to an u	nexpected exothe	rmic chemical r	eaction th	at occurred	during the use of an
	compound, Ceilc	ote 658N Grout,	manufactu	red by Maste	r Builders,
Incorporate	d.				
The root ca	use of this even	t was lack of a	ppropriate	warning inf	ormation and proper
instruction	s for safe use o	f the epoxy gro	out compoun	d. The info	rmation provided by
the manufac	turer did not ca	ution the user	that leavi	ng the epoxy	grout compound in a
confining c	ontainer would c	ause the compou	ind to heat	up producin	g smoke and vapors.
manufacture		t recurrence in will be added	cluded han to the pro	ds on traini cedure gover	ng by the ning the use of such
epoxy compo	unds.				

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NRC Form 366A (6-89)

#### U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Approved OMB No. 3150-0104 Expires 4/30/92

# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER_NUMBER_(6)	PAGE (3)
		SEQUENTIAL REVISION	
Browns Ferry Unit 3	i i	YEAR NUMBER NUMBER	
	01510101012 19 6	9 2 - 0 0 4 - 0 0	0 2 10F 015

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

#### I. PLANT CONDITIONS

Unit 2 was at 2866 megawatts thermal or 87 percent power. Units 1 and 3 are defueled.

#### **II. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT**

#### A. Event:

On November 4, 1992, at 1900 hours, all compensatory action fire watches were evacuated from the Unit 3 Reactor Building (U3 Rx Bld) [NG] due to a chemical release. The release was caused by an unexpected exothermic reaction that occurred during the use of an epoxy grout compound, Ceilcote 658N Grout, manufactured by Master Builders, Incorporated.

On November 4, 1992, at approximately 1822 hours, contract craft personnel mixed an epoxy grout compound and readied it for injection under the Unit 3 Reactor Water Cleanup System Pump B [CE] baseplate. Approximately one fourth of the grout compound, or 7.5 pounds, was used to grout the pump baseplate and the leftover compound, approximately 21.5 pounds, remained in the mixing container. At approximately 1850 hours, the craft foreman noted the remainder of the epoxy compound in the container was smoking profusely. At that time, he initiated a report to the Shift Operations Supervisor (SOS) on the plant Fire/Medical Emergency Alarm telephone number. At 1852 hours, Operations Fire Protection and the SOS received a call informing them of the smoke in the U3 Rx Bld elevation 593. Subsequently, they further identified that the smoke had propagated to all elevations of the U3 Rx Bld and Refuel Floor [ND].

At 1900 hours, all personnel were ordered evacuated from U3 Rx Bld by the SOS including all compensatory action fire watches for personnel safety. At 1932 hours, the "A" Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System [BH] was placed in service to remove smoke and fumes from the building and at 1948 hours the smoking container of epoxy was removed from the building. Operations Fire Protection remained on the scene until 2100 hours ensuring all personnel had safely evacuated the building. At 2130 hours the U3 Rx Bld and Refuel Floor were declared safe for return to work and at that time the continuous fire watches returned to their stations. On November 5, 1992, at 0001 hours, the roving fire watch was reestablished.

TVA reports this event in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), as an operation or condition prohibited by the plant's technical specifications.



NRC	Form	366A.
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
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# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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FACILITY NAME ( Browns Ferry U	nit 3	NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)   SEQUENTIAL REVISION        YEAR NUMBER NUMBER				
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B.	•	ents, or Systems that Contributed to the				
20	Event:	<u>CARGO V DIDECTO CARE VOMERZDURCA CO CAR</u>				
	event. If the system had been	ormal ventilation was inoperable during this n operable, the smoke from the epoxy compound general area of the work being performed.				
C.	Dates and Approximate Times of	E Major Occurrences:				
	November 4 at 1900 CST	Smoke and fumes from an exothermic reaction in an epoxy grout mix in U3 Rx Bld force evacuation of all personnel including compensatory action fire watches.				
	November 4 at 2130 CST	Unit 3 Reactor Building is declared safe for return to work and continuous compensatory action fire watches are reestablished.				
	November 5 at 0001 CST	Roving fire watch makes his first rounds.				
D.	Other Systems or Secondary Fu	actions_Affected:				
	None.					
E.	Method of Discovery:	·				
	The SOS was informed of the entelephone.	ergency via Emergency/Medical Alarm				
F.	Operator Actions:	· .				
	None.					

# G. Safety System Responses:

None.



NRC Form 366A (6-89)

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER	(2)	LER NUMBER (6)	1	PAGE (3)
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Browns Ferry Unit 3	j –		YEAR NUMBER	NUMBER	
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

#### III. CAUSE OF THE EVENT

#### A. <u>Immediate Cause:</u>

The immediate cause of this event was allowing the unused grout mixture to remain in a confining container without sufficient provision to dissipate the heat generated by the exothermic hardening reaction.

### B. <u>Root Cause:</u>

The root cause of this event was lack of appropriate warning information and proper instructions for safe use of the epoxy grout compound. The information provided by the manufacturer did not caution the user that ' leaving the epoxy grout compound in a confining container would cause the compound to attain a high temperature producing smoke and vapors.

#### C. <u>Contributing Factors:</u>


The manufacturer's specified mix ratio was 100 parts resin to 14 parts hardener and emphasized accurate mixing of the parts. The epoxy is supplied as a 30 pound kit with premeasured parts. Making a smaller batch was not recommended by the manufacturer. Craft performing the work expected that the unused portion of the grout would solidify and be discarded. Therefore, they mixed an entire kit (26 pounds 5 ounces Part A and 3 pounds 11 ounces of Part B) in one batch.

#### IV. ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT

There were no safety system responses during the event. The exothermic chemical reaction that occurred during the event generated excessive smoke and vapors filling all elevations of the U3 Rx Bld and necessitated evacuation of personnel for safety. Because of the ongoing Unit 3 restart construction activities, such as installation of scaffolding blocking fire protection system spray patterns, the Unit 3 sprinkler systems had been declared inoperable. In addition, because of NRC Bulletin 92-01, Thermo-Lag fire barrier material utilized for protection and separation of conduits necessary to support Unit 2 operation had been declared inoperable. For these reasons, various fire watches were in place in Unit 3.

Although the fire protection systems had been declared inoperable as a result of the conditions described above, they were available during this event. Therefore, this event had minimal impact on plant safety.

During the event, the "A" SGT was placed in service for removal of smoke and vapor. Due to potential contamination of the charcoal filter beds, TVA conservatively declared "A" SGT inoperable and the charcoal beds replaced. Subsequent charcoal analysis has proven that "A" SGT was not compromised.



NRC Form 366A (6-89)

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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)	PAGE (3)
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Browns Ferry Unit 3	. [	YEAR NUMBER NUMBER	
		9 2 0 0 4 0 0	10 15 10F1 015
TEXT (If more space is required,	use additional NRC Form 366A's)	(17)	
<b>V.</b> CORRECTIVE ACTION	15		

### A. <u>Immediate Corrective Actions</u>:

All personnel were evacuated from Unit 3 reactor building. The container of epoxy grout was removed from the Unit 3 Reactor Building. The smoke and vapors were removed by placing a SGT train in service. The remaining epoxy grout compound was accounted for and placed on administrative hold pending evaluation of the incident.

# B. <u>Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence</u>:

- 1. Personnel involved in the use of Ceilcote 658N Grout were provided hands-on training by the manufacturer.
- 2. A precaution regarding the handling of epoxy grout compounds will be added to the appropriate instruction.

#### VI. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

A. Failed Components:

None.

B. <u>Previous LERs on Similar Events</u>:

None.

#### VII. COMMITMENTS

A precaution regarding the handling of epoxy grout compounds will be added to the appropriate plant instruction. This will be completed by January 18, 1993.

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].

