EMPLOYEE CONCERNS

SPECIAL PROGRAM

VOLUME 5
WELDING CATEGORY

SUBCATEGORY REPORT 50300
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT

UPDATED

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TVA

NUCLEAR POWER

TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS
SPECIAL PROGRAM

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Preface, Glossary, and List of Acronyms
for ECTG Subcategory Reports

HISTORY OF REVISION

REV NUMBER	PAGES REVISED	REASON FOR CURRENT REVISION
3	i	To clarify that one or more attachments will help the reader find where a particular concern is evaluated

Preface

This subcategory report is one of a series of reports prepared for the Employee Concerns Special Program (ECSP) of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).. The ECSP and the organization which carried out the program, the Employee Concerns Task Group (ECTG), were established by TVA's Manager of Nuclear Power to evaluate and report on those Office of Nuclear Power (ONP) employee concerns filed before February 1, 1986. Concerns filed after that date are handled by the ongoing ONP Employee Concerns Program (ECP).

The ECSP addressed over 5800 employee concerns. Each of the concerns was a formal, written description of a circumstance or circumstances that an employee thought was unsafe, unjust, inefficient, or inappropriate. The mission of the Employee Concerns Special Program was to thoroughly investigate all issues presented in the concerns and to report the results of those investigations in a form accessible to ONP employees, the NRC, and the general public. The results of these investigations are communicated by four levels of ECSP reports: element, subcategory, category, and final.

Element reports, the lowest reporting level, will be published only for those concerns directly affecting the restart of Sequoyah Nuclear Plant's reactor unit 2. An element consists of one or more closely related issues. An issue is a potential problem identified by ECTG during the evaluation process as having been raised in one or more concerns. For efficient handling, what appeared to be similar concerns were grouped into elements early in the program, but issue definitions emerged from the evaluation process itself. Consequently, some elements did include only one issue, but often the ECTG evaluation found more than one issue per element.

Subcategory reports summarize the evaluation of a number of elements. However, the subcategory report does more than collect element level evaluations. The subcategory level overview of element findings leads to an integration of information that cannot take place at the element level. This integration of information reveals the extent to which problems overlap more than one element and will therefore require corrective action for underlying causes not fully apparent at the element level.

To make the subcategory reports easier to understand, three items have been placed at the front of each report: a preface, a glossary of the terminology unique to ECSP reports, and a list of acronyms.

Additionally, at the end of each subcategory report will be a Subcategory Summary Table that includes the concern numbers; identifies other subcategories that share a concern; designates nuclear safety-related, safety significant, or non-safety related concerns; designates generic applicability; and briefly states each concern.

Either the Subcategory Summary Table or another attachment or a combination of the two will enable the reader to find the report section or sections in which the issue raised by the concern is evaluated.

The subcategories are themselves summarized in a series of eight category reports. Each category report reviews the major findings and collective significance of the subcategory reports in one of the following areas:

- management and personnel relations
- industrial safety
- construction
- material control
- operations
- quality assurance/quality control
- welding
- engineering

A separate report on employee concerns dealing with specific contentions of intimidation, harassment, and wrongdoing will be released by the TVA Office of the Inspector General.

Just as the subcategory reports integrate the information collected at the element level, the category reports integrate the information assembled in all the subcategory reports within the category, addressing particularly the underlying causes of those problems that run across more than one subcategory.

A final report will integrate and assess the information collected by all of the lower level reports prepared for the ECSP, including the Inspector General's report.

For more detail on the methods by which ECTG employee concerns were evaluated and reported, consult the Tennessee Valley Authority Employee Concerns Task Group Program Manual. The Manual spells out the program's objectives, scope, organization, and responsibilities. It also specifies the procedures that were followed in the investigation, reporting, and closeout of the issues raised by employee concerns.

ECSP GLOSSARY OF REPORT TERMS*

classification of evaluated issues the evaluation of an issue leads to one of the following determinations:

Class A: Issue cannot be verified as factual

Class B: Issue is factually accurate, but what is described is not a problem (i.e., not a condition requiring corrective action)

Class C: Issue is factual and identifies a problem, but corrective action for the problem was initiated before the evaluation of the issue was undertaken

Class D: Issue is factual and presents a problem for which corrective action has been, or is being, taken as a result of an evaluation

Class E: A problem, requiring corrective action, which was not identified by an employee concern, but was revealed during the ECTG evaluation of an issue raised by an employee concern.

collective significance an analysis which determines the importance and consequences of the findings in a particular ECSP report by putting those findings in the proper perspective.

concern (see "employee concern")

corrective action steps taken to fix specific deficiencies or discrepancies revealed by a negative finding and, when necessary, to correct causes in order to prevent recurrence.

criterion (plural: criteria) a basis for defining a performance, behavior, or quality which ONP imposes on itself (see also "requirement").

element or element report an optional level of ECSP report, below the subcategory level, that deals with one or more issues.

employee concern a formal, written description of a circumstance or circumstances that an employee thinks unsafe, unjust, inefficient or inappropriate; usually documented on a K-form or a form equivalent to the K-form.

evaluator(s) the individual(s) assigned the responsibility to assess a specific grouping of employee concerns.

findings includes both statements of fact and the judgments made about those facts during the evaluation process; negative findings require corrective action.

issue a potential problem, as interpreted by the ECTG during the evaluation process, raised in one or more concerns.

K-form (see "employee concern")

requirement a standard of performance, behavior, or quality on which an evaluation judgment or decision may be based.

root cause the underlying reason for a problem.

*Terms essential to the program but which require detailed definition have been defined in the ECTG Procedure Manual (e.g., generic, specific, nuclear safety-related, unreviewed safety-significant question).

Acronyms

AI	Administrative Instruction
AISC	American Institute of Steel Construction
ALARA	As Low As Reasonably Achievable
ANS	American Nuclear Society
ANSI	American National Standards Institute
ASME	American Society of Mechanical Engineers
ASTM	American Society for Testing and Materials
AWS	American Welding Society
BFN	Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
BLN	Bellefonte Nuclear Plant
CAQ	Condition Adverse to Quality
CAR	Corrective Action Report
CATD	Corrective Action Tracking Document
CCTS	Corporate Commitment Tracking System
CEG-H	Category Evaluation Group Head
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CI	Concerned Individual
CMTR	Certified Material Test Report
COC	Certificate of Conformance/Compliance
DCR	Design Change Request
DNC	Division of Nuclear Construction (see also NU CON)

DNE	Division of Nuclear Engineering
DNQA	Division of Nuclear Quality Assurance
DNT	Division of Nuclear Training
DOE	Department of Energy
DPO	Division Personnel Officer
DR	Discrepancy Report or Deviation Report
ECN	Engineering Change Notice
ECP	Employee Concerns Program
ECP-SR	Employee Concerns Program-Site Representative
ECSP	Employee Concerns Special Program
ECTG	Employee Concerns Task Group
EEOC	Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
EQ	Environmental Qualification
EMRT	Emergency Medical Response Team
EN DES	Engineering Design
ERT	Employee Response Team or Emergency Response Team
FCR	Field Change Request
FSAR	Final Safety Analysis Report
FY	Fiscal Year
GET	General Employee Training
HCI	Hazard Control Instruction
HVAC	Heating, Ventilating, Air Conditioning
II	Installation Instruction
INPO	Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
IRN	Inspection Rejection Notice

L/R	Labor Relations Staff
M&AI	Modifications and Additions Instruction
MI	Maintenance Instruction
MSPB	Merit Systems Protection Board
MT	Magnetic Particle Testing
NCR	Nonconforming Condition Report
NDE	Nondestructive Examination
NPP	Nuclear Performance Plan
NPS	Non-plant Specific or Nuclear Procedures System
NQAM	Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NSB	Nuclear Services Branch
NSRS	Nuclear Safety Review Staff
NU CON	Division of Nuclear Construction (obsolete abbreviation, see DNC)
NUHARC	Nuclear Utility Management and Resources Committee
OSHA	Occupational Safety and Health Administration (or Act)
ONP	Office of Nuclear Power
OWCP	Office of Workers Compensation Program
PHR	Personal History Record
PT	Liquid Penetrant Testing
QA	Quality Assurance
QAP	Quality Assurance Procedures
QC	Quality Control
QCI	Quality Control Instruction

QCP	Quality Control Procedure
QTC	Quality Technology Company
RIF	Reduction in Force
RT	Radiographic Testing
SQN	Sequoyah Nuclear Plant
SI	Surveillance Instruction
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SRP	Senior Review Panel
SWEC	Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation
TAS	Technical Assistance Staff
T&L	Trades and Labor
TVA	Tennessee Valley Authority
TVTLC	Tennessee Valley Trades and Labor Council
UT	Ultrasonic Testing
VT	Visual Testing
WBECSP	Watts Bar Employee Concern Special Program
WBN	Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
WR	Work Request or Work Rules
WP	Workplans

Index

1.0 CHARACTERIZATION OF ISSUES

1.1 Introduction

The characterization of issues for this subcategory report are derived from 145 Employee Concerns. Of the 145 Employee Concerns, 30 were specific to SQN (107 specific to WBN, six specific to BLN, one specific to BFN, one non-plant specific). A detailed review of the 145 Employee Concerns indicates that 27 of the subject concerns that were made generically applicable to SQN (from WBN) are unique to WBN and are not applicable to SQN. These 27 employee concerns are addressed in Weld Project Evaluation Report WP-19-SQN and will not be addressed further in this report. The Employee Concerns were divided into 41 similar groups and were investigated by the Weld Project (WP), Quality Technology Company (QTC) and/or the Nuclear Safety Review Staff (NSRS). Each of the 41 groups was addressed by a Weld Project Evaluation Report. The Weld Project Evaluation Reports were processed as SQN element reports and were provided to the NRC as a portion of the Weld Project effort. |R5

Information and analysis provided in this report may be drawn from the aforementioned reports and the Weld Project's Phase I and Phase II Reports for SQN. The purpose of the Phase I Report was to ensure that the written TVA program (design documents, policies, and procedures) now in place correctly reflects TVA's commitments and regulatory requirements, and to identify and categorize concerns/deficiencies in the program. The purpose of the Phase II Report was to evaluate the implementation of the written welding program; verify that weldments made by TVA in the field meet requirements or are suitable for service; correct any problems, and implement changes to prevent recurrence.

The characterization of issues for this subcategory report was derived by arranging the 41 groups into ten general related issues. Each of the ten related issues was then subdivided (when appropriate) according to the previously issued evaluation report. |R5

1.2 Description of Issues

1.2.1 Control of Welding Filler Material |R5

1.2.2 Inspection

1.2.3 Welder Qualification, Continuity, and Procedures

1.2.4 Duct Installation and Documentation Requirements

1.2.5 SQN Implementation of QAE-2

1.2.6 Design Considerations of Box Anchors

1.2.7 Vendor Weld Quality

1.2.8 Effects of Laminations on Weld Quality

1.2.9 Effects of Weld Repair not Meeting ASME Codes

1.2.10 TVA Manufacture of a Dravo Class Spool Piece

2.0 METHODOLOGY

The procedure and specification histories of Sequoyah Nuclear Plant from the beginning of construction to the present were reviewed. These procedures and specifications were compared with the construction codes which were in effect during each phase of the procedure history. The Sequoyah Weld Project Phase I and Phase II Reports were reviewed. The expurgated text of the concerns was compared with the requirements defined in the construction codes and the commitments made in the Topical Report. A review was made of quality indicators such as USNRC Inspection Reports and TVA audit and deficiency reporting documents issued over the life of the plant. As appropriate to the issues discussions were held with cognizant TVA Construction, Engineering, Quality and Craft Supervisory personnel. |R5

3.0 ISSUES, FINDINGS, AND CONCLUSIONS

The findings and conclusions relative to the issues contained within this subcategory report are presented below and are summaries of the previously issued Weld Project Evaluation Reports and the results from the Phase I and Phase II reports. The findings and conclusions contained herein correspond to the applicable evaluation methodology which is detailed in Section 2.0 of this report. |R5

3.1 Control of Welding Filler Material |R5

Control of welding filler material addressed the issues of traceability, portable ovens to protect coated electrodes from moisture absorption, the quality of E-7018 coated electrodes, administrative practices for the return of unused and waste welding materials, and weld material substitution.

The traceability of welding filler material has been and continues to be in compliance with TVA stated commitments and has been independently verified through the Bechtel SQN Implementation Audit performed in January 1986.

Portable rod ovens are used at SQN to protect certain high strength electrodes from moisture absorption from the atmosphere. The most commonly used electrode, E-7018, is not required to be issued in portable ovens. Rather, the atmospheric exposure time limits prescribed by the Structural Welding Code, AWS D1.1, are adhered to. In the event that electrodes are exposed to the atmosphere beyond the specified time limit, they are disposed of or rebaked.

The investigation of this issue did not indicate a problem with control of filler material. Controls are in place to ensure that only qualified welders are issued welding materials and that welders consumed materials specified for the work being performed. Both Division of Nuclear Construction (DNC) and Office of Nuclear Power (ONP), formally Office of Construction (OC) and Nuclear Operations (NO) respectively, procedures provide for verification that unused electrodes are returned to the Issue Center or Tool Room by the individual welder.

The quality of coated electrodes has not been a problem at SQN. Some isolated complaints have been made, however, each complaint was investigated and satisfactorily resolved. One lot of coated electrodes was returned to the vendor from Watts Bar for a concentricity problem. This lot was not issued to Sequoyah.

Welding filler material used for permanent plant installations at SQN is purchased and tested in accordance with the requirements of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section II and III. Additionally, TVA performs operability tests beyond the code requirements for electrodes not already having a satisfactory performance history with TVA.

The administrative practices for return of unused and waste filler material have no welding related technical significance. This part of the filler material control issue is generically evaluated in Management and Personnel Subcategory Report number 70200, and is not addressed further by this report. |R5

Complete details of the evaluations of these issues are discussed in Weld Project Evaluation Reports WP-01-SQN, WP-12-SQN, WP-14-SQN, WP-21-SQN, WP-23-SQN, and NSRS Reports I-85-756-SQN and XX-85-013-001. |R5

3.2 Inspection

Inspection of Welds Through Paint

Evaluation showed that this issue is not applicable to Sequoyah. In early 1982 General Construction Specification G-29C, Process Specification 3.C.5.4 was revised to permit certain reinspections of structural welds which had been primed. This process |R5

specification is site unique to Watts Bar and was never implemented at SQN. Review of the DNC procedures used at SQN during construction specifically prohibited the practice of inspecting welds after painting.

A review of ONP preservice/inservice (PSI/ISI) Inspection Procedure (N-VT-1) indicated that welds in completed systems which have been originally installed, inspected, and documented to AWS requirements may be inspected without coating removal. This procedure is in accordance with ASME Section XI requirements for inservice inspection and applicable only to operational systems which have been previously certified to have been constructed and inspected in accordance with the construction requirements.

Complete details of the evaluation of this issue are discussed in Weld Project Evaluation Report WP-02-SQN. |R5

Availability of Weld Inspection Tools

As the science of welding inspection progressed, more sophisticated inspection tools were furnished to welding inspectors as they became commercially available. The lack of more sophisticated inspection tools had not been a problem as inspectors used more rudimentary instruments such as scales and other tools to adequately perform inspections. This does not indicate any shortcomings with the earlier |R5 inspection tools. TVA did provide inspection tools to welding inspectors throughout the construction era and continues to provide inspection tools today as required.

Complete details of the evaluation of this issue are discussed in Weld Project Evaluation Report WP-04-SQN. |R5

Training and Certification of Construction Welding Inspectors

The development of the Visual Welding Inspection Program for DNC has paralleled the evolution of the requirements for Visual Welding Inspection Programs in the nuclear industry. Qualification of personnel in construction parallels the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Standard N45.2.6, "Qualifications of Inspection, Examination, and Testing Personnel for the Construction Phase of Nuclear Plants." TVA has committed to ANSI N45.2.6 with certain exceptions as specified in the Topical Report (TVA-TR75-1A) which specifies TVA's commitments.

ANSI N45.2.6 allows the use of The American Society for Nondestructive Testing Recommended Practice SNT-TC-1A for certifying nondestructive testing personnel. In the absence of clear source document requirements regarding visual inspection, TVA interpreted ANSI N45.2.6 to apply to visual inspection personnel and modeled the details of the program, such as work time experience, on SNT-TC-1A recommendations for liquid penetrant and magnetic particle testing disciplines.

Certification in these disciplines required three months of work time experience prior to certification. Certification in these disciplines was a prerequisite for certification in the Visual Inspection Method. The initial classroom training, testing, and certification was done at the unit level by a certified Level III instructor. This practice continued through the construction era.

The requirements for training, qualification, and certification of nondestructive testing personnel are mandated in both AWS and ASME B&PV Code rules which reference SNT-TC-1A. DNC complied with the requirements of SNT-TC-1A for methods other than visual inspection from the beginning of construction through the end of construction in 1981.

The Bechtel Implementation Audit concludes that all training, qualification, and certification activities for both nondestructive testing and visual welding inspection personnel were accomplished through a program which was in compliance with code and standard requirements and that this program was effectively implemented during construction.

Complete details of the evaluation of this issue are discussed in Weld Project Evaluation Report WP-06-SQN. |R5

Painting Requirements Related to Welds

The concerns for this issue address welds that are not painted, that welds should be painted as soon as they are inspected, that rust causes welds to weaken, and that sandblasting removed metal from welds. These concerns are shared with Construction and are addressed by Construction Subcategory Report 10300.

There are no requirements which mandate a particular sequence of construction or modifications activities. The schedule is determined using prudent engineering judgment. DNC and ONP accomplishes coating operations based on a schedule intended to maximize efficiency in construction or modification activities.

All metallic materials oxidize (rust) to varying degrees. The engineering analysis of the need for coatings takes this characteristic into account. When a surface requires coating, the rust is removed.

Removal is primarily by sandblasting which has been and continues to be an industry-wide acceptable method of preparation of metallic surfaces for painting. The metal removed in this process is negligible.

The prime consideration for application of protective coatings in nuclear facilities is one of effective prevention of build-up of radioactive contamination on structures, components, and systems of the facility. A secondary consideration is to provide a smooth, impervious surface (via a paint system) which will permit subsequent decontamination activities. These two considerations are effectively met by using nuclear grade coating materials.

A comprehensive reinspection of protective coatings has been initiated as the result of a QA survey. The results of this survey are documented in SQN-CAR-86-01-001.

CATD WP-08-SQN-001 was issued to provide a tracking mechanism for SQN-CAR-86-01-001.

Corrective Action Plan For SQN-CAR-86-01-001.

A comprehensive protective coatings preventive maintenance program was established at SQN. An integral part of the program is to perform a 100 percent baseline coating inspection of the levels 1 and 2 coating areas. This inspection will initiate repairs of areas with degraded coatings.

A new Sequoyah Quality Manual (SQM) is being prepared to provide control of procedures, methods, responsibilities and documentation of aspects of surface coating application and maintenance of critically coated areas at SQN. This upper-tier document will incorporate the requirements of applicable specifications, design guides, standards, as-constructed drawings and will establish procedures for documenting compliance with the FSAR.

In addition to the implementation of the new SQM, lower-tier procedures, instructions etc., will be revised as applicable to implement the requirements of the new SQM.

Action to Prevent Recurrence

The implementation of the program described above should correct deficiencies noted by the CAR and should provide adequate control and consistent program guidance to correct other deficiencies that may exist and prevent recurrence.

Complete details of the evaluation of this issue are discussed in Weld Project Evaluation Report WP-08-SQN. |R5

Weld Inspection Criteria Used for SQN Construction

The issue addressed by the concern is that prior to 1979, there was no specific weld inspection criteria for use by inspection personnel. The base requirement for inspection procedures comes from Criteria V and X of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, and ANSI N45.2.5, "Supplementary Quality Assurance Requirements for Installation, Inspection, and Testing of Structural Concrete, Structural Steel, Soils, and Foundations During the Construction Phase of Nuclear Power Plants." The principle of inspection procedures is a basic and integral part of the TVA Quality Assurance Program. General Construction Specification G-29 was first formally transmitted to the implementing organizations on July 22, 1971. This specification contained the weld inspection acceptance criteria and technical documentation requirements.

The DNC Quality Assurance Program included the requirement for procedural control of quality affecting/quality assuring activities in Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Construction Procedure No P-1 "Preparation of Construction Procedures and Inspection Instructions," which was originally issued on December 16, 1971. Inspection procedures were generated in accordance with the provisions of this document and were issued for use.

Restructure of the Site Quality Assurance Procedures in 1977 resulted in specific inspection instructions conveying the welding inspection criteria by the type of inspection being performed (e.g., fit-up and cleanliness inspection, visual examination of welded joints, etc.).

Overviews by the TVA QA organization and by NRC inspectors were routinely performed during the construction. (These overviews have continued during the operational phase.) Procedural deficiencies noted by overviews were tracked, corrected, and closed during the appropriate timeframe.

The Bechtel Implementation Audit performed in January 1986 directly examined the adequacy of inspection procedures. The audit indicated that the review of the inspection procedures showed compliance with TVA program requirements and referenced codes and standards.

Complete details of the evaluation of this issue are discussed in Weld Project Evaluation Report WP-09-SQN. |R5

Surface Grinding of Welds

Grinding of welds is not a violation of codes, standards or SQN procedures. Rather, in many cases these standards require grinding to obtain suitable surfaces for the proper interpretation of the

specified NDE and to eliminate or reduce surface defects. Grinding is an acceptable practice during welding and during subsequent visual inspection and NDE examinations.

Complete details of the evaluation of this issue are discussed in Weld Project Evaluation Report WP-11-SQN. |R5

Performance of Pre-Weld Inspection/Verification

Review of construction procedures indicates that DNC implemented ANSI N45.2.5 requirements during the construction era through a network of procedures for the erection of structural steel, miscellaneous steel, and hanger features. These procedures required final visual inspections of welds on these features to be performed by certified QC inspectors. They also required a rigorous surveillance program which verified individual elements such as fit-up inspections, detailed weld procedure compliance, proper welder qualification practices, filler metal control, and workmanship on a daily surveillance basis. These daily surveillances were delineated and documented in accordance with construction procedures. Throughout the construction period, DNC properly implemented the ANSI N45.2.5 requirements for pre-weld inspection. |

ONP is committed to perform modification activities in a manner equivalent to the original construction requirements. They did, however, fail to recognize their role in implementation of ANSI N45.2.5 requirements as they relate to pre-weld inspection and did not implement a program to satisfy these requirements. This failure was recognized by ONP in late 1985, and the noncompliance was documented on Corrective Action reports NCO-CAR-86-001, DQA/OE-CAR-86-001, and SQ-CAR-86-03-01 in accordance with the Nuclear Quality Assurance Program prior to the ECTG program. It is important to note that the construction was complete when ONP modification activities began. |R5 |

The programmatic issue of pre-weld inspection had been evaluated by NSRS, and determined not to be in violation of the Structural Welding Code or ANSI N45.2.5. It was also evaluated for all TVA nuclear sites after being reported (in a Bellefonte Quality Assurance Audit) to the USNRC under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.55(e), and again found to be an acceptable practice.

Complete details of the evaluation of this issue are discussed in Weld Project Evaluation Report WP-16-SQN. |R5

Undersized Socket Welds on the Safety Injection System in Accumulator Room #5, Reactor II

Construction NCRs 2398, 2630, and the final 50.55 (e) report (A17 810406 022) document the identification and resolution of undersized socket welds for unit 2. This was completed prior to the ECTG program.

Complete details of the evaluation of this issue are discussed in Weld Project Evaluation Report WP-20-SQN. |R5

Quality Control (QC) Hold Point Sign Off

The Sequoyah Construction Procedures and Instructions were evaluated and determined that adequate controls were written to prohibit signoff of QC holdpoints by anyone other than a qualified, certified inspector.

The use of computerized operation checklists, individual inspection data cards, and shift inspection logs provided a crosscheck to ensure that inspections were properly done by qualified individuals. When holdpoints were missed, appropriate corrective actions were taken.

After the weld data cards were turned in, the QC Records Unit checked the cards for proper signoff by a qualified individual with up-to-date certifications and signature verification. Any discrepancies were returned to the Welding Inspection Unit for correction or resolution.

Complete details of the evaluation of this issue are discussed in NSRS Report I-85-346-SQN.

Documentation of Required On-The-Job-Training (OJT) for Nondestructive Examination (NDE) Personnel Certification

The written commitments made by TVA, with regard to the extent of OJT documentation in support of fulfilling certification requirements for NDE inspectors do not constitute a "hard" (i.e., explicit) requirement for maintaining detailed supporting records of backup data. Also, TVA did document general exceptions to qualification methodology endorsed by the NRC. However, it could be argued that since the 1975 version of SNT-TC-1A had the implied endorsement of the NRC early on and since no explicit exception was ever taken to the detailed OJT record wording, a "soft" (implied) requirement did exist until the commitment was made to the 1980 version. It could also be argued that the detailed OJT time requirements listed in Nuclear Training Program Procedure 0202.14 reasonably imply the need to record OJT experience data in at least detail comparable to the requirement.

The need for improvement in this area has been well recognized and is being addressed by a program which will entail detailed OJT record keeping, sufficient to satisfy the requirements of 0202.14 and SNT-TC-1A.

NDE management in TVA initially had a loose interpretation of OJT requirements, and many of the individuals who trained under that policy and were subsequently promoted have continued and extended that practice. This has apparently resulted in the production of a number of Exhibit Ds (a form that documents OJT) which are not correct and therefore both the documents themselves and any personnel actions taken on the basis of those documents must be readdressed. |R5

Corrective Action Plans |R5

1. CATD I-85-373-NPS-01-009, Adequacy of NDE OJT Documentation

   The OJT Manual is based on the guidelines provided by INPO document TQ-501. Any modifications made to the OJT manual will be consistent with TQ-501.

   Until the new QC and NDE OJT Program is implemented, the POTC should not certify inspectors without receipt of detailed OJT verification in the form of inspection listings, including item-by-item initialing by the training inspector. Since February 10, 1986, the NDE Level IIIs at the POTC have not issued initial certifications without detailed inspection listings validated by qualified inspectors.

2. CATD I-85-373-NPS-02-010, Validity of NDE OJT Documentation

   In the area of correction of incorrect qualification documents and premature certifications, two separate investigations have been performed to evaluate if incorrect qualification documents exist related to NDE inspections performed at SQN from 1980 to the present. One investigation pertained to the SQN site QC inspectors certified in NDE and the other to Inservice Inspection (ISI) NDE inspectors.

   Readdressment of inappropriate personnel actions such as premature promotions and/or Intimidation and Harassment (I&H) issues are currently being handled by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG).

   Perform an extension of records search to evaluate the adequacy of qualification documents and premature certifications for sites other than SQN.

3. CATD I-85-373-NPS-03-011, Resolution of Employee Response Barriers.

The Employee Concerns Program (ECP), currently in effect within the Office of Nuclear Power, provides a variety of reporting mechanisms whereby a concerned individual can freely report a concern and be assured that actions will be taken to provide an evaluation and the necessary corrective actions. This program has been staffed with select personnel who possess broad technical background, experience, and interpersonal skills.

There is the perception that promotions to higher grades is dependent upon the number of certifications held by an individual. To resolve this employee barrier new job descriptions for QC inspectors are being developed which emphasize inspector qualification in accordance with ANSI N45.2.6, ANSI 101.4 and SNT-TC-1A. These job descriptions will not prescribe a specific number of certifications in order to be promoted to a higher grade. Promotions in general will be based on an individual's performance and experience.

4. CATD-I-85-373-NPS-04-012, Power Operations Training Center (POTC) Resolution to Identified Quality Assurance Deficiencies. |R5

The QC/NDE OJT Manual has been issued and is on controlled distribution of affected supervisors.

Since February 10, 1986, the use of the Exhibit D (used to document OJT) has been supplemented with a detailed inspection listing validated by qualified inspectors in the field. A section instruction letter instituting document control of NDE certification records has been prepared which complies with QA Record Control requirements of the Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual, Par III, Section 4.1.

An evaluation of the adequacy of work-time experience documentation has been performed. The evaluation concluded that the work-time experience and associated documentation required by TVA procedure complies with TVA commitments. Adding the requirement for the detailed inspection listings validated by qualified inspection, as has been described in the responses above, has significantly increased the information documented in support of inspectors on-the-job experience and should preclude this type concern in the future. |R5

Eye examinations have been successfully completed for all individuals where certifications are current. In addition, eye examinations have been successfully completed where lapses have occurred. The ONP/NDE Training Section has implemented a system whereby responsible supervisors are notified when lapses occur.

In addition to the Corrective Action Plan (CAP), the ONP Quality Systems Staff Supervisor at the POTC prepares and distributes each month to each Quality Supervisor (at each site) a list of all current certifications. This list contains the expiration date(s) for the individual certification(s) and the expiration date for the eye examinations. The purpose of this list is to notify each supervisor when recertification and eye examinations are required. The CAP provides a mechanism to identify eye examinations that have expired and to provide appropriate QA action. |R5

Complete details of the evaluation of this issue are discussed in NSRS Report I-85-373-NPS.

NDE Inspectors Cannot Write Notices of Indication (NOI) for PSI Defects

NOIs are prepared for either preservice or inservice inspection detected defects that are found within the scope of the examination area. MRs are generated if the examination area is not suitable for examination. If a defect (i.e., arc strike) is found which is outside the scope of the examination area and is obviously not a service related flaw and can be readily corrected, the inspectors are instructed to prepare an MR. If significant items are found outside the examination area, reporting is done via other nonconforming reporting methods.

Defects found during examinations conducted after repairs of modifications for initial acceptance are recorded on the workplan data sheet, or the weld record data sheet, or on an MR depending on the type of work control document.

Complete details of the evaluation of this issue are discussed in NSRS Report I-85-735-SQN.

Acceptance of Previously Rejected NDE Items

It is important to note that the term NDE used for this issue refers to inspections (visual or nondestructive testing) performed under the rules of ASME Code Section XI.

NSRS reviewed regulatory requirements, ASME Code rules, ISI program procedures, and SQN instructions to determine programmatic controls. Additionally, a detailed inspection of all applicable unit 1 and 2 ISI NOIs and visual examination data sheets was made to identify any records which document the occurrence of this issue.

Previously rejected items have been accepted at times by a second examiner or a Level II examiner who was designated as acting NDE unit supervisor. On each occurrence, the examiner would note on the NOI and the corresponding data sheet the basis for acceptance of the item. In other cases, the examiner indicating acceptance of the item was a certified Level III examiner whereas the examiner initially rejecting the item was a certified Level II examiner.

This issue had been investigated by NSRS and determined that procedures, codes, standards, and/or commitments were not violated. |R5

Complete details of the evaluation of this issue are discussed in NSRS Report I-85-738-SQN.

Unrelated Issues Identified During the Investigation of Acceptance of Previously Rejected NDE Items

The NSRS investigation identified additional items that require corrective actions. One item addressed the voiding of NOIs which is not addressed by the governing procedures.

The second identified item addressed nomenclature differences between the NQAM and the site procedures.

The third item addressed one NOI that was improperly closed.

The fourth item addressed NDE inspectors whose names were not contained in the Summary of NDE Personnel Certifications for the respective outages.

Problem Description

NDE procedures lack completeness and consistency in detail that is necessary in some cases for effective implementation of the NDE program. There are discrepancies in ISI reports (NOI) that constitute a lack of completeness. Corrective action will be tracked on CAID Numbers I-85-738-SQN-01-015 and I-85-738-SQN-02-016.

Corrective Action Plan

The NDE Inspection Section is reconstructing voided NOIs for suitable disposition and closeout.

C. ITEM COMPLETED
DATE: 9-21-88

Procedures are being revised to provide added completeness and consistency to the NDE program.

A TVA Interoffice Mailing Slip (Form 3514) will be sent to Document Control to add the examiner's names to the respective ISI outage reports.

THIS ITEM COMPLETED DATE: 9-21-88

Complete details of the evaluation of this issue are discussed in NSRS Report I-85-738-SQN.

Performance of Remote Visual Inspection (Examination) Of Rigid Pipe Supports

The issue is whether two ISI examiners performed visual examinations (February or March 1, 1984, in the Auxiliary Building at elevation 669) from remote distances without actually verifying the mandatory inspection attributes on the inspection checklist.

NSRS reviewed a computer printout of hanger examinations performed during the SQN unit 2 cycle 2 outage. A determination was made as to which ERCW hangers on the 669 elevation could have been examined by the inspectors named by the CI. These inspection reports were then reviewed. Thirty ERCW hangers from the group inspected by one of the named inspectors were reexamined under the cognizance of the NSRS investigator. The results of this reexamination did not identify any major problems.

The two inspectors named by the CI did not work together on the ERCW hanger inspections. The two inspectors who did work together said it was impossible to do an adequate inspection remotely and recognized that it would be a violation of procedures to do so.

The CI may have witnessed an ISI inspector performing a preliminary walkdown of the ERCW system, prior to inspection, where a determination is made concerning the need for metal identification tags, insulation removal, and scaffolding and misconstrued this as a remote visual inspection of hangers. The actual documented inspection takes place at a later time when the identified preliminary findings have been addressed.

Complete details of the evaluation of this issue are discussed in NSRS Report I-85-750-SQN.

Socket Welds Not Inspected

The issue is that the construction weld inspection program was inadequate 9 or 10 years ago because it did not assure that all stainless steel socket welds were inspected as required, specifically the welds on 2" stainless steel pipe and hangers in unit 1 accumulator and/or fan rooms.

NSRS investigation reviewed the construction procedures and instructions related to weld inspection requirements and documentation at the time of interest. The construction procedures and instructions in place at the time of the concerns did require inspections and documentation; therefore, an adequate program was in place.

A review of mechanical drawings and flow diagrams for unit 1 was performed to determine what piping is present in the specified areas. A review of the weld map isometrics of those systems in the area of interest was performed to determine weld map numbers. A review of the weld report computer printouts was then performed for these weld maps. A random review of individual weld data sheets or computer data cards was also performed.

A review of the universal computer program printout for those piping systems within the unit 1 accumulator and fan rooms revealed that the above documentation system was utilized for class A, B, C, and D socket welds and that required socket weld inspections had been performed and the results were acceptable.

Complete details of the evaluation of this issue are discussed in NSRS Report I-85-776-SQN.

SQN Weld Inspection Not as Strict as WBN

The allegation that Sequoyah welds may not have been properly inspected was not substantiated because these welds were inspected under an inspection and QC program which meet the QA and Code requirements applicable to construction activities at Sequoyah.

Although the inspection requirements are essentially the same for both plants, the QA requirements at each specific location required the inspections to be implemented and documented differently. For example, at Watts Bar the inspection of each safety-related pipe weld for "fitup" and "release for welding" requires verification by an inspector of certain parameters (i.e., cleanliness, weld prep. gap, purge, preheat, etc.), and the inspection for fitup is broken down into several Quality Control (QC) holdpoints which may require multiple inspections and completion of more than one weld inspection data card for a given weld. Conversely, at Sequoyah all these parameters were accomplished under one QC holdpoint and documented on one weld data card.

Although different construction codes were in effect at each site, the installation requirements and level of inspections were essentially the same for both plants with the exception that portions of the Watts Bar plant are ASME Code stamped which requires verification by a third party inspector (Authorized Nuclear Inspector, [ANI]).

Complete details of the evaluation of this issue are discussed in NSRS Report I-85-652-SQN. |R5

3.3 Welder Qualification, Continuity and Procedures

Welder Qualification

This issue evolved from a misinterpretation of ASME Section IX, due to the omission of Article QW-302.3 from the 1974 edition.

The concern stated that welders qualified at Muscle Shoals may not have had the required number of bend tests. The misinterpretation resulted in only two guided bend tests being performed for certain qualifications where four bend tests were required.

Through the ongoing QA program and the issuance of CATD WP-24-SQN-018, three welders were identified as being tested by Muscle Shoals for SQN who were issued certifications based on two bend tests. All three welder's certifications and their production welds have been evaluated and found to be acceptable. |R5

Complete details of the evaluation of this issue are discussed in Weld Project Evaluation Report WP-24-SQN.

Welder Continuity

These issues include the possibility that the Welder Performance Qualification Continuity Program is inadequate due to backdated and/or falsification of records; there is no objective evidence to confirm actual process usage; continuity may be maintained by running one weld bead; welder performance tests have been reinstated based on one position test plate; and welding certifications were altered by the use of correction fluid before they were photographed in Knoxville.

Welder performance qualification continuity records have not been backdated or falsified. A detailed investigation of these issues was performed by NSRS and documented in NSRS Report I-85-135-SQN. The investigation did, however, discover that program implementation had been deficient and that ONP had already taken steps to correct identified deficiencies. CATDs I-85-135-SQN-01-006, I-85-135-SQN-02-007, and I-85-135-SQN-03-008 were issued to supplement the actions specified by CAR SQ-CAR-85-019-014. The Bechtel SQN Implementation Audit determined that both DNC and ONP programs for these activities had been effectively implemented prior to the ONP audit.

Corrective Action Plans for CATDs

CATD I-85-135-SQN-01-006 Evaluation of Previous Welder Continuity

THIS ITEM COMPLETED DATE 9-8-88

Evaluation of previous welder continuity records was performed through the January 1986 Bechtel Audit. This audit addressed welder's qualifications, maintenance/continuity update and renewal and verified that corrective actions as specified in CAR SQ-CAR-85-09-014 have been implemented.

CATD I-85-135-SQN-02-007 Corrective Action Backfit Evaluation

As part of the evaluation of corrective action of identified deficiencies on CARs, the SQN QA Organization now requires that corrective actions address not only the correction of the listed deficiency, but also actions to identify and correct similar adverse conditions. These additional actions will dictate on a case-by-case basis whether a backfit (historical) evaluation is appropriate and to what extent.

THIS ITEM COMPLETED DATE 9-8-88

I-85-135-SQN-03-008 Verification of Corrective Action taken on SQ-CAR-85-09-014

Plant personnel reviewed active and inactive welder qualification records maintained in the welder continuity file cabinet during the resolution of the CAR and documented discrepancies found and corrective action taken.

QC personnel reviewed the plant response to the CAR which included records of all discrepancies found and corrective action taken.

QC personnel performed a random sample to verify that corrective action taken was adequate prior to closing the CAR.

The issue of inadequacies in the welder continuity program because there is not objective evidence to confirm actual process usage was not substantiated because it related to a WBN practice. Nuclear Operations has completed a review of welders whose qualifications were transferred from other sites. Identified lapses of continuity have been identified and corrective actions have been taken (SO6 851206 800). SQN ONP welders who have transferred qualifications have successfully passed a requalification test administered at SQN to provide a positive start for subsequent welder performance qualification continuity. SQN ONP Procedure, Modifications and Additions Instructions, (M&AI-5) also has been revised to provide a positive method of welder performance qualification continuity. These actions correct any welder qualification continuity deficiencies for SQN ONP.

The issues of running one bead to maintain continuity and the one position test plate to reinstate all Welder Performance Qualification (WPQ) tests are acceptable practices. Simply stated, use of the welding process for which the welder is qualified is the basis for continuation of welder performance qualification. A minimum degree of usage is not specified nor required. Both AWS and ASME Codes allow the practice of reestablishment of all previous qualifications through the satisfactory passing of a one-position test.

The concerns addressing the use of correction fluid was not substantiated. The welding certifications located in Knoxville were reviewed and no correction fluid was found on the subject documents.

CATD I-85-101-006-019-SQN-01 was issued to change the FSAR. TVA's welders continuity was based on a 90 day usage until August 6, 1974. Subsequently, TVA adopted the option of continuing the welder's performance for a specific process which has not been used for up to six months when the welder has been employed on some other welding process within 90 days. The option of extending the welder qualifications to six months was adopted by the ASME Code Section IX in the 1971 Edition, 1971 Winter Addenda. TVA's FSAR had reflected utilization of ANSI B31.1.0-67 which specifies a 90 day usage requirement.

Complete details of the evaluation of these issues are discussed in Weld Project Evaluation Report WP-03-SQN and NSRS Reports I-85-135-SQN, XX-85-088-003 and XX-85-101-006. |R5

Inadequate Weld Procedure

A review of the work package identified during the investigation of the concern indicates a failure to incorporate either a cross reference to the appropriate weld detail drawing or a copy of the drawing in the work package. The Maintenance Request was revised to reference the drawing showing the joint configuration for a gamma plug to pipe weld. A review of the weld procedure utilized for welding gamma plugs in piping had determined the procedure to be adequate for the joint in question.

Complete details of the evaluation of this issue are discussed in Weld Project Evaluation Report WP-22-SQN. |R5

Improper Weld Repairs

The concern that an undetermined number of welds may have been repaired improperly was not substantiated at SQN. An investigation at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant substantiated an employee concern in which a Steamfitter General Foreman had instructed steamfitter welders to repair welds contrary to the requirements of the weld repair procedure. The Steamfitter General Foreman was quoted as saying "that this (type of weld repair) was done a lot at SQN...". The General Foreman was employed at SQN as a Steamfitter Foreman in 1977-78 and in 1979 became a superintendent. Objective evidence could not be obtained that could identify individuals who may have been under the subject individual. Interviews identified that the subject individual was a foreman of the Hanger Fabrication Shop at SQN, however, no one had direct knowledge of the content of his directions relative to improper weld repairs. |R5

Complete details of the evaluation of this issue are discussed in NSRS Report XX-85-100-001.

Welder Training

With appropriate training and experience, the subjourneyman may become a qualified welder through satisfactory performance testing under the rules of AWS D1.1 and/or ASME Section IX. These rules establish the ability of the welder to deposit sound weld metal within the parameters of the same performance qualification tests taken by journeyman welders. |R5

The TVA Welder Training Program, a voluntary off-duty course, was offered at SQN. The length of training was dependent on the progress of the individual trainee. When sufficient competence was demonstrated, the trainee was given a performance qualification test in accordance with the rules of the governing code.

Complete details of the evaluation of this issue are discussed in Weld Project Evaluation Report WP-07-SQN. |R5

Suitability of Welding Equipment for Construction and Modification Welding Activities.

There is no industry standard which mandates the use of specific welding equipment for specific jobs. The use of welding equipment with features such as remote current and high frequency arc starting control are basically convenience features which some welders prefer to have on their equipment.

Complete details of the evaluation of this issue are discussed in Weld Project Evaluation Report WP-13-SQN. |R5

Craft Welder Incapable of Making Proper Weld

The concern that the welder was passed by collusion between engineering and the general foreman resulting in falsified records was not substantiated. The individual (engineering) named by the CI as being part of the collusion was not the individual who signed the welder's qualification record. No anomalies were found with the welding performance qualification record.

Due to some out-of-position welding problems, the welder's performance was to be monitored closely for at least one month, and if his welds were not up to the required standards, the welder was to be retested per the corrective action plan submitted for CATD I-86-115-SQN-01-01. |R5

THIS ITEM COMPLETED DATE 8-4-88 |R5

Complete details of the evaluation of this issue are discussed in NSRS Report I-86-115-SQN.

3.4 Duct Installation and Documentation Requirements

The issues addressed are that HVAC piping is too close to the wall for adequate access for welding; welds should be welded and inspected from the inside of the pipe to assure adequacy; and the welding and brazing inspection may have been/was deleted from the QA program.

The WP-SQN Reinspection Program directly investigated the generic issues of this concern by the review of a comparable HVAC system. Three welds were investigated in the Containment Purge Air System. Welds in the system were chosen because of their accessibility, because they are representative of construction techniques used on all duct systems at SQN, and had areas of limited access to the outside diameter due to physical barriers such as walls. SQN Construction recognized the problem of accessibility on the Containment Purge Air System and implemented a program of welding on the inside diameter of the duct to assure adequate welding in areas of limited accessibility of the outside diameter. The observed weld quality was acceptable, indicating that the welds were originally inspected during installation. The Containment Purge Air System is not a safety-related system. It is reasonable to assume that at least the same level of quality and erection technique were exercised in safety-related duct systems.

Further support for the integrity of this duct system is found in the fact that after the original construction, a satisfactory leak check was performed on these ducts, thus providing additional evidence that the joints are welded to provide adequate sealing.

The issue of the deletion of the inspection is a WBN concern that does not apply to SQN.

Complete details of the evaluation of this issue are discussed in Weld Project Evaluation Report WP-05-SQN. |R5

3.5 SQN Implementation of QAE-2

The corrective actions specified in Quality Assurance Evaluation (QAE-2) of September 1980, may not have been implemented at SQN.

The evaluation was performed during the time period from June 16 to July 31, 1980, and covered Watts Bar and later nuclear construction sites which were active at that time. The report, QAE-2, identified recommended improvements that would make the overall welding and NDE program more effective.

SQN was specifically not included in this evaluation since the construction effort with regard to welding was nearing completion at SQN at this time.

Complete details of the evaluation of this issue are discussed in Weld Project Evaluation Report WP-10-SQN. |R5

3.6 Design Considerations of Box Anchors

The issues addressed are limited pipe movement due to weld configuration; inservice fatigue due to lack of expansion and continuous welding with large electrodes (excessive amperage); and the possibility of thermal stress due to large fillet welds. |R5

The Sequoyah 47B100 series drawings as designed, do show a butt weld on the rear plate of some seismic Class I supports that could extend to the pipe if made as the typical drawings specified. The NSRS Report identified eight box anchors with this detail at SQN and stated that only one had been installed (at the time of the NSRS report). The butt weld of the installed box anchor does not extend to the pipe.

Evaluation of the preparation for the remaining box anchors indicates that the butt weld could extend to the pipe.

Corrective Action Plan for CATDs I-85-560-SQN-01-013 and I-85-560-SQN-02-14

The scope of this program is to determine the extent of drawing and installation discrepancies at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) involving box anchor rear plate supports that may be identical to those identified by WBN NCR 6264.

This program will identify and evaluate the condition of the rear plate seam welds on box anchors at SQN and will consist of a review of the drawings, a walkdown of the piping systems containing these box anchors, documenting the conditions observed in the field, and evaluation of the conditions identified. The following tasks shall be performed:

1. DNE will identify and locate the box anchors to be inspected and initiate the required drawing changes to reflect the proper configuration of the rear plate seam weld to prevent fusion with the process piping.

2. Inspection shall be performed by the SQN Quality Assurance Staff to identify and document the field conditions of the identified rear plate seam welds.

3. Upon completion of items 1 and 2, an evaluation shall be made by the SQN Division of Nuclear Engineering to determine the significance, and provide recommendations that are consistent with evaluation results.

Complete details of the evaluation of this issue are discussed in Weld Project Evaluation Report WP-15-SQN and NSRS Report I-85-560-SQN.

3.7 Vendor Weld Quality

The issue addressed is that vendor welds are not of the same quality as TVA field welds and vendor welds are not inspected in the field.

Both the field and vendor welds are required to meet applicable code requirements. TVA field welds are visually inspected to a more conservative interpretation of code requirements relating to visual weld attributes. The final appearance of TVA field welds is generally superior to vendor-supplied equipment.

Materials and equipment were inspected in accordance with the applicable code requirements by the manufacturers and/or TVA, therefore, there is no hardware impact.

Complete details of the evaluation of this issue are discussed in Weld Project Evaluation Report WP-17-SQN. |R5

3.8 Effects of Laminations on Weld Quality

Laminations in pipe prevented the welder from making an acceptable weld in the Unit 2 Condenser.

Condensers are nonsafety-related equipment built to manufacturer's standard designs with custom specifications for fabrication and erection. They are constructed of carbon steel materials which conform to either ASTM or ASME Section II material requirements. Piping material for these applications is commonly A-53. This material specification makes no mention of laminations being injurious defects.

It is important to note that in piping applications where pipe is subject to internal pressures, laminations are of no consequence.

Laminations that are of sufficient size to create porosity are customarily ground back three eighths-inch and sealed off by welding. This is done as a convenience for subsequent nondestructive testing, if required. The net effect of welding over a lamination is simply to stop it and seal it off. Welding over laminations will usually evolve a small amount of oxides or gases into the molten weld puddle which will appear as porosity. This porosity is bothersome to the welder, but if repaired, is acceptable.

Complete details of the evaluation of this issue are addressed in Weld Project Evaluation Report WP-18-SQN. |R5

3.9 Effects of Weld Repair not Meeting ASME Codes

TVA makes repairs to their nuclear plants which are not in accordance with ASME Codes, such as overlays, patches, and even furmanite (a viscous fluid sealing compound). The furmanite issue is addressed in Operations Report No. 30800.

To date, TVA has performed weld overlay repairs at BFN and reinforcement patch repairs to raw water piping at Sequoyah. In these cases, design verification of the repair was well documented and structural integrity of the affected systems demonstrated. The repairs were performed in accordance with TVA's ASME Code, Section XI Repair and Replacement Program using detail weld procedures and welders qualified in accordance with ASME Code, Section IX.

Complete details of the evaluation of this issue are addressed in Weld Project Evaluation Report WP-25-SQN. |R5

3.10 TVA Manufacture of a Dravo Class Spool Piece

TVA may have manufactured a spool piece to replace, under ASME Section XI, a DRAVO-class spool piece.

Concerning this issue, Dravo was contacted and they (Dravo) have no record of supplying any spool pieces to SQN. Additionally, TVA records at the site and in the Chattanooga central offices show no contracts with Dravo for pipe or spool pieces.

Complete details of the evaluation of this issue are addressed in NSRS Report I-85-636-SQN.

4.0 COLLECTIVE SIGNIFICANCE

Through the subcategory overview of the evaluation report findings and the subsequent integration of information, no new significant items were identified. |R5

The evaluation report investigations and the subcategory overview indicated that the welding procedures and the practices used at SQN were consistent with good practices used throughout the nuclear industry. They were found to be generally in accordance with Code, Standard, Regulatory, and QA requirements.

TVA's welding control practices at SQN were adequate and reflected common industry practices. Some problems were identified, as one would expect with the size of the operation and the time frame, and were addressed by the ongoing QA program and the Weld Project Evaluation Report Investigations.

5.0 CAUSE

The cause of a perceived problem or the cause of a problem which initiated a CATD is limited to the cause identified in the evaluation report. |R5

6.0 CORRECTIVE ACTION

No corrective action is specified as a result of this subcategory report. Corrective actions for problems or perceived problems are limited to the CATDs issued as a portion of the Weld Project Evaluation Reports. The discussion of enhancements to the existing TVA system will be deferred to the category report. |R5

7.0 ATTACHMENTS

A. Subcategory Summary Table

B. Summary of Issues

8.0 REFERENCE

A. Welding Project Evaluation Reports |R5

CATEGORY: WE NON QA/QC WELDING SUBCATEGORY: 50301 TRACEABILITY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND CONDITIONING

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHR D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
EX -85-021-00101 T50069	WE	50301	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA	EX-85-021-001	QTC	WELD ROD ISSUE AND ACCOUNTABILITY IS INADEQUATE. ROD SLIPS DO NOT REFERENCE WHERE ROD WAS USED; WORK PACKAGES DO NOT REFERENCE ROD ISSUE SLIPS; THERE IS NO ROD STUB ACCOUNTABILITY; EXCESSIVE WELD ROD LAYING AROUND ON FLOORS, ETC., IN BUILDING(S). C/I STATED THAT ON ONE OCCASION, HE/SHE NOTICED SEVERAL RODS LAYING UNDER THE WINDOW OF THE ISSUE STATION IN THE AUX. BLDG., ELEV. 713. APPARENTLY THERE WAS NO ONE AT THE ISSUE STATION WHEN 3RD SHIFT WAS READY(SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-01-SQN R3)
02	WE	50401	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
EX -85-039-00101 T50146	WE	50301	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA	WI-85-053-004	QTC	WBNP: THERE ARE NO PORTABLE OVENS FOR STORING WELD ROD AFTER IT HAS BEEN ISSUED TO THE WELDER AND THE WELD ROD IS NOT ADEQUATELY ACCOUNTED FOR WHEN IT IS RETURNED, I.E. ROD STUBS AND UNUSED ROD. CONST. DEPT. CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. NO FOLLOWUP REQUIRED. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-01-SQN R3)
02	WE	50101	S	WBN	1 Y N N N 2 SR NA NA NA			
03	WE	50201	S	WBN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SR NA NA			
04	WE	50401	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
IN -85-234-00101 T50027	WE	50301	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA	EX-85-021-001	QTC	WELD RODS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO BE KEPT IN ROD OVENS AFTER ISSURANCE TO STEAMFITTER WELDERS. THE ROD CAN BE KEPT UNHEATED FOR 8 HOURS AT A TIME IN A LEATHER POUCH. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-01-SQN R3)
02	WE	50101	S	WBN	1 Y N N N 2 SR NA NA NA			
03	WE	50201	S	WBN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SR NA NA			
04	WE	50401	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
IN -85-337-00201 T50038	WE	50301	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA	EX-85-021-001	QTC	CONTROL OF WELD ROD IS INSUFFICIENT. WELDERS CAN KEEP ROD OUT OVERNIGHT (NO OVEN). THERE ARE NO PORTABLE OVENS ON SITE SO WELD ROD IS KEPT OUT FOR AT LEAST 8 HR. SHIFT. UNUSED ROD AND STUBS ARE TURNED IN (TOSSED IN) AT END OF SHIFT BUT NO COUNT IS MADE. WELDERS CERTIFICATION BOOK IS NOT ALWAYS CHECKED BEFORE ISSUING ROD. WELDERS CAN AND DO GET ROD FROM OTHER WELDERS TO FINISH WELD. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-01-SQN R3)
02	WE	50401	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			

CATEGORY: WE NON QA/QC WELDING
SUBCATEGORY: 50301 TRACEABILITY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND CONDITIONING

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHRD	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
IN -85-352-00201 T50040	WE	50301	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA	EX-85-021-001	QTC	NO PORTABLE OVENS ARE USED ON WATTS BAR. WELD ROD CAN BE KEPT OUT OF OVEN FOR AN ENTIRE SHIFT AND RETURNED TO OVEN FOR LATER USE. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT NP-01-SQN R3)
02	WE	50101	S	WBN	1 Y N N N 2 SR NA NA NA			
03	WE	50201	S	WBN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SR NA NA			
04	WE	50401	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
IN -85-424-00101 T50041	WE	50301	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA	EX-85-021-001	QTC	NO PORTABLE OVENS USED/REQUIRED ON WATTS BAR. THE ROD OFTEN COLLECTS MOISTURE AND SHOULD NOT BE USED. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN NP-01-SQN R3)
02	WE	50101	S	WBN	1 Y N N N 2 SR NA NA NA			
03	WE	50201	S	WBN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SR NA NA			
04	WE	50401	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
IN -85-424-00401 T50040	WE	50301	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA	EX-85-021-001	QTC	QA TRAINING CLASS, 6-5-85, INFORMED CRAFT THAT STEAMFITTERS COULD WITHDRAW AND CONTROL WELD ROD IF THEY HAD A WELDER SIGNED WELD SLIP AND THE WELDERS CARD. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT NP-01-SQN R3)
02	WE	50101	S	WBN	1 Y N N N 2 SR NA NA NA			
03	WE	50201	S	WBN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SR NA NA			
04	WE	50401	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			

CATEGORY: WE NON QA/QC WELDING
SUBCATEGORY: 50301 TRACEABILITY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND CONDITIONING

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHRD	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL / 2 SAF RELATED BF	BL	SQ	HB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
IN -85-424-00601 T50040	WE	50301	S	WBN	1 N	N	Y	N	EX-85-021-001	QTC	NO ACCOUNTABILITY OF WELD ROD DURING ISSUANCE OR RETURN OF UNUSED ROD AND STUBS. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-01-SQN R3)
					2 NA	NA	SR	NA			
02	WE	50101	S	WBN	1 Y	N	N	N			
					2 SR	NA	NA	NA			
03	WE	50201	S	WBN	1 N	Y	N	N			
					2 NA	SR	NA	NA			
04	WE	50401	S	WBN	1 N	N	N	Y			
					2 NA	NA	NA	SR			
IN -85-424-00701 T50102	WE	50301	S	WBN	1 N	N	Y	N	EX-85-021-001	QTC	LACK OF WELD ROD CONTROL: WELDORS GET ADDITIONAL ROD FROM OTHER WELDORS RATHER THAN GOING BACK TO THE ROD ROOM FOR MORE. SITE POLICY ALLOWS LEAVING ROD WITH OTHER WELDORS, OR LETTING SUB-JOURNEYMEN CHECK-OUT ROD AND RETURN ROD. (CAN ALSO LEAVE ROD IN TOOL BOXES). THE ROD ROOM DOES NOT COUNT ROD WHEN IT IS ISSUED, AND DOES NOT REQUIRE ACCOUNTING FOR ROD STUBS. OCCASSIONALLY, WELDORS ARE REPRIMANDED FOR NOT TURNING IN ROD WITHDRAWAL SLIPS, EVEN THOUGH (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-01-SQN R3)
					2 NA	NA	SR	NA			
02	WE	50101	S	WBN	1 Y	N	N	N			
					2 SR	NA	NA	NA			
03	WE	50201	S	WBN	1 N	Y	N	N			
					2 NA	SR	NA	NA			
04	WE	50401	S	WBN	1 N	N	N	Y			
					2 NA	NA	NA	SR			
IN -85-426-00101 T50065	WE	50301	S	WBN	1 N	N	Y	N	EX-85-021-001	QTC	PORTABLE OVENS ARE NOT REQUIRED. WELD ROD IS KEPT OUT OF OVEN FOR AN ENTIRE SHIFT. NO FOLLOW-UP. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-01-SQN R3)
					2 NA	NA	SR	NA			
02	WE	50101	S	WBN	1 Y	N	N	N			
					2 SR	NA	NA	NA			
03	WE	50201	S	WBN	1 N	Y	N	N			
					2 NA	SR	NA	NA			
04	WE	50401	S	WBN	1 N	N	N	Y			
					2 NA	NA	NA	SR			

CATEGORY: WE NON QA/QC WELDING
SUBCATEGORY: 50301 TRACEABILITY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND CONDITIONING

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHR D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
IN -85-441-00301 T50040	WE	50301	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA	EX-85-021-001	QTC	NO PORTABLE OVENS ON WATTS BAR. THE ROD SOMETIMES COLLECTS MOISTURE BY THE END OF THE SHIFT AND CAN NOT BE USED. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-01-SQN R3)
02	WE	50101	S	WBN	1 Y N N N 2 SR NA NA NA			
03	WE	50201	S	WBN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SR NA NA			
04	WE	50401	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
IN -85-453-00901 T50030	WE	50301	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA	EX-85-021-001	QTC	WELDERS FREQUENTLY GIVE WELD ROD TO OTHER WELDERS. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-01-SQN R3)
02	WE	50101	S	WBN	1 Y N N N 2 SR NA NA NA			
03	WE	50201	S	WBN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SR NA NA			
04	WE	50401	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
IN -85-454-00401 T50030	WE	50301	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA	EX-85-021-001	QTC	WELDERS FREQUENTLY GET ROD FROM EACH OTHER INSTEAD OF WITHDRAWING FOR ROD ROOM. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-01-SQN R3)
02	WE	50101	S	WBN	1 Y N N N 2 SR NA NA NA			
03	WE	50201	S	WBN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SR NA NA			
04	WE	50401	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			

CATEGORY: WE WON QA/QC WELDING
SUBCATEGORY: 50301 TRACEABILITY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND CONDITIONING

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHR D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
IN -85-672-00301 T50207	WP	70202	S	WBN	1 N N N N 2 NA NA NA NA		QTC	AT SHIFT END, WELD ROD SLIPS ARE TURNED IN. THE SLIPS ARE CHECKED THEN THROWN AWAY. IF THE ISSUE ROOM DETERMINES AT A LATER DATE THAT A WELDER DID NOT CONFORM TO "TURN IN" PROCEDURES, IT IS HIS WORD AGAINST THEIRS AND HE GETS THE WARNING LETTER. THESE LETTERS HAVE BEEN ISSUED WITHOUT PROOF OF WRONGDOING. CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-01-SQN R3)
02	WE	50301	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			
03	WE	50101	S	WBN	1 Y N N N 2 SR NA NA NA			
04	WE	50201	S	WBN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SR NA NA			
05	WE	50401	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
IN -86-150-00101 T50127	WE	50301	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA	EX-85-021-001	QTC	THERE IS NO PROGRAM FOR MATERIAL TRACEABILITY OF WELDING ROD AT WBNP. WHEN WELDING ROD IS DRAWN, IT COULD BE USED ANY PLACE IN THE PLANT. MATERIAL TRACEABILITY IS NOT EVEN ATTEMPTED. CONSTRUCTION DEPT CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-01-SQN R3)
02	WE	50401	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
IN -86-167-00101 T50131	WE	50301	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA	EX-85-021-001	QTC	CI IS CONCERNED THAT THERE IS NO TRACEABILITY OF WELD RODS TO ACTUAL JOB PERFORMED. CI HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. CONST DEPT CONCERN. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-01-SQN R3)
02	WE	50401	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
WI -85-041-00101 T50103	WE	50301	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA	EX-85-021-001	QTC	WELD (AWS & ASME) FILLER MATERIAL (ROD) CONTROL RECORDS/DOCUMENTATION IS INADEQUATE FOR AWS WELDS; ROD SLIPS ARE NOT RETAINED AS RECORDS AND DO NOT IDENTIFY HEAT/LOT NUMBERS AND LOCATION OF USE; FOR ASME WELDS, ROD SLIPS DO NOT IDENTIFY HEAT/LOT NUMBERS AND LOCATION OF USE. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. NO FOLLOW UP REQUIRED. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-01-SQN R3)
02	WE	50401	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			

CATEGORY: WE NON QA/QC WELDING SUBCATEGORY: 50301 TRACEABILITY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND CONDITIONING

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHRD	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
WI -85-053-00401 T50135	WE	50301	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SS NA	WI-85-053-004	QTC	WELD ROD CONTROL DOES NOT SATISFY CODE REQUIREMENTS. TVA ATTITUDE IS "ALL MATERIAL IS CODE MATERIAL". CONSTRUCTION DEPT CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-01-SQN R3)
02	WE	50101	S	WBN	1 Y N N N 2 SS NA NA NA			
03	WE	50201	S	WBN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SS NA NA			
04	WE	50401	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SS			
XX -85-068-00601 T50138	WE	50301	S	BLN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SS NA		QTC	BELLEFONTE - WELD ROD CONTROL DOES NOT SATISFY CODE REQUIREMENTS. TVA ATTITUDE IS "ALL MATERIAL IS CODE MATERIAL". CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. NO FOLLOW UP REQUIRED. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-01-SQN R3)
02	WE	50201	S	BLN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SS NA NA			

19 CONCERNS FOR CATEGORY WE SUBCATEGORY 50301

CATEGORY: WE NON QA/QC WELDING SUBCATEGORY: 50302 INSPECTION OF WELDS THROUGH PAINT

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHRD	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL / 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
IN -85-458-00101 T50105	WE	50102	S	WBN	1 Y N N N 2 SS NA NA NA	IN-85-458-001	QTC	TVA USED IMPROPER INSPECTION CRITERIA FOR AWS WELDS - MEMO FROM KNOXVILLE (POSSIBLY ENDES, 1980 OR 1981) ALLOWED INSPECTION THROUGH PAINT. INDIVIDUAL FROM KNOXVILLE (KNOWN) INVESTIGATED THIS, BUT RESULTS ARE UNKNOWN. CI HAS NO MORE INFORMATION. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-02-SQN R2)
02	WE	50202	S	WBN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SS NA NA			
03	WE	50302	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SS NA			
04	WE	50402	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SS			
IN -85-767-00301 T50171	WE	50302	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA	IN-85-458-001	QTC	CI EXPRESSED CONCERN REGARDING THE INSPECTION OF PAINTED WELDS. CI FEELS NRC IS INVOLVED DUE TO HAVING APPROVED THE PROCEDURE OF INSPECTING WELDS THAT ARE PAINTED. DETAILS KNOWN TO QTC, WITHHELD DUE TO CONFIDENTIALITY. CONSTRUCTION DEPT CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-02-SQN R2)
02	WE	50402	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
IN -86-019-00101 T50219	WE	50102	S	WBN	1 Y N N N 2 SR NA NA NA		QTC	CI IS CONCERNED THAT WELDS WERE ACCEPTED THROUGH CARBO-ZINC. INSPECTORS WERE DIRECTED VIA MEMO TO ACCEPT WELDS THROUGH PAINT. CI COULD NOT PROVIDE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. UNIT 1. CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-02-SQN R2)
02	WE	50202	S	WBN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SR NA NA			
03	WE	50302	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			
04	WE	50402	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
NS -85-001-00101 T50022	WE	50102	S	WBN	1 Y N N N 2 SR NA NA NA	NS-85-001-001	QTC	WELDS (AWS) INSPECTED SUBSEQUENT TO PROTECTIVE COATING (CARBOZINC PRIMER) APPLICATION; FINAL VISUAL WELD EXAMINATION OF STRUCTURAL WELDS IN CATEGORY I STRUCTURES, INCLUDING PIPE HANGERS, CABLE TRAY SUPPORTS AND DUCT SUPPORTS; UNIT 1 & 2 (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-02-SQN R2)
02	WE	50202	S	WBN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SR NA NA			
03	WE	50302	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			
04	WE	50402	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			



CATEGORY: WE NON QA/QC WELDING
SUBCATEGORY: 50302 INSPECTION OF WELDS THROUGH PAINT

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHRD	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
PH -85-040-00101 T50203	WE	50102	S	WBN	1 Y N N N 2 SR NA NA NA	IN-85-458-001	QTC	QA HANGERS WERE FREQUENTLY PAINTED BEFORE THE WELDS WERE INSPECTED. AUX. BUILDING, REACTOR BUILDING #1, ELEV. 742'-0", & 745'-0". 1983. CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER DETAILS. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-02-SQN R2)
02	WE	50202	S	WBN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SR NA NA			
03	WE	50302	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			
04	WE	50402	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
WI -85-013-00301 T50114	WE	50102	S	WBN	1 Y N N N 2 SS NA NA NA	WI-85-013-003	QTC	G29C (CONSTRUCTION SPECIFICATIONS)ALLOWED WELDS TO BE INSPECTED AFTER PAINTING FROM 1981 THROUGH THE END OF THE WELDING SAMPLING PROGRAM. THIS IS IN VIOLATION OF AWS D1.1. CI HAS NO MORE INFORMATION. (NOTE: THIS ITEM IS CURRENTLY UNDER INVESTIGATION BY ERT. THE REVISION WAS MADE TO SEPARATE THE ORIGINAL 003 CONCERN INTO TWO DISTINCT CONCERNS.) (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-02-SQN R2)
02	WE	50202	S	WBN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SS NA NA			
03	WE	50302	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SS NA			
04	WE	50402	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SS			
WI -85-041-00601 T50193	WE	50102	S	WBN	1 Y N N N 2 SS NA NA NA	EX-85-052-005	QTC	AWS WELD INSPECTOR(S) (UNKNOWN) DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE "5 MIL" PROVISION FOR INSPECTION OF COATED (CARBO-ZINC PRIMER) WELDS AS CONTAINED IN REVISIONS OF SPECIFICATION G-29C, PROCEDURE QCP-4.13, AND MEMORANDUM DATED NOVEMBER 1981. INSPECTOR(S) REFERRED TO CRITERIA AS "MILLIAMPS" AND THEREFORE COULD NOT HAVE IMPLEMENTED/INSPECTED FOR CONFORMANCE. CI HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. NUC POWER DEPT. CONCERN. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-02-SQN R2)
02	WE	50202	S	WBN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SS NA NA			
03	WE	50302	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SS NA			
04	WE	50402	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SS			

REFERENCE - ECPS120J-ECPS121C
FREQUENCY - REQUEST
ONP - ISSS - RNM

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR POWER
EMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM SYSTEM (ECPS)
EMPLOYEE CONCERN INFORMATION BY CATEGORY/SUBCATEGORY

CATEGORY: WE NON QA/QC WELDING SUBCATEGORY: 50302 INSPECTION OF WELDS THROUGH PAINT

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHRD	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
WI -85-041-00801 T50193	WE	50102	S	WBN	1 Y N N N 2 SS NA NA NA	IN-85-458-001	QTC	PROCESS SPECIFICATION #3.C.5.4 OF G-29C PERMITTED INSPECTION OF AWS WELDS THROUGH COATING (CARBO-ZIN C PRIMER) FOR ELEVEN MONTHS AFTER ENGINEERING EVAL UATION/TEST SHOWED THAT WELD QUALITY (POROSITY, CR ACKS, ETC) COULD NOT BE INSPECTED THROUGH PAINT. NUC POWER DEPT. CONCERN. CI HAS NO ADDITIONAL INF ORMATION. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-02-SQN R 2)
02	WE	50202	S	WBN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SS NA NA			
03	WE	50302	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SS NA			
04	WE	50402	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SS			

8 CONCERNS FOR CATEGORY WE SUBCATEGORY 50302



CATEGORY: WE NON QA/QC WELDING
SUBCATEGORY: 50303 WELDER PERFORMANCE QUALIFICATION CONTINUITY

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHR D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL RELATED 2 SAF BF	BL	SQ	WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
EX -85-021-00201 T50069	WE	50103	S	WBN	1 Y 2 SR	N NA	N NA	N NA	IN-85-352-001	QTC	THERE IS NO METHOD/OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE TO VERIFY TH AT A WELDER HAS USED A SPECIFIC PROCESS WHEN THEIR WELD CARDS ARE STAMPED/UP-DATED BY QC. NO FOLLOW -UP REQUIRED - NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AVAILABLE . (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-03-SQN R3)
02	WE	50203	S	WBN	1 N 2 NA	Y SR	N NA	N NA			
03	WE	50303	S	WBN	1 N 2 NA	N NA	Y SR	N NA			
04	WE	50403	S	WBN	1 N 2 NA	N NA	N NA	Y SR			
EX -85-042-00301 T50158	WE	50303	S	WBN	1 N 2 NA	N NA	Y SR	N NA	EX-85-042-003	QTC	WELDERS ARE BEING REQUALIFIED ON CARBON PLATE WITH A CARBON BACKING STRIP. THE TEST PLATE IS SET AT 33 DEGREE FOR THE TEST AND THIS ONE TEST REQUALIF IES THE WELDER FOR EVERY PROCESS HE HAD BEFORE, IN CLUDING PIPE. CI DOES NOT FEEL THIS IS PROPER. C ONSTR. DEPT. CONCERN. CI HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORM ATION. NO FOLLOWUP REQUIRED. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSE D IN RPT WP-03-SQN R3)
02	WE	50403	S	WBN	1 N 2 NA	N NA	N NA	Y SR			
IN -85-113-00301 T50020	WE	50203	S	WBN	1 N 2 NA	Y SR	N NA	N NA	IN-85-113-003	QTC	WELDERS ONLY HAVE THEIR CERTIFICATION CARDS STAMPE D EVERY 90 DAYS. WELDERS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO BURN ROD AND HAVE IT INSPECTED IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN TH EIR CERTIFICATION. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP -03-SQN R3)
02	WE	50303	S	WBN	1 N 2 NA	N NA	Y SR	N NA			
03	WE	50403	S	WBN	1 N 2 NA	N NA	N NA	Y SR			
IN -85-346-00301 T50026	WE	50103	S	WBN	1 Y 2 SR	N NA	N NA	N NA	IN-85-352-001	QTC	WELDER CERTIFICATIONS ARE UPDATED ON EVIDENCE OF R OD WITHDRAWAL SLIPS. THE PROCESS MAY NOT HAVE BEE N USED IN THE APPLICABLE TIME PERIOD, 90 DAY OR/80 DAY, DEPENDING ON ASME OR AWS. (SQN ISSUES ADDRES SED IN RPT WP-03-SQN R3)
02	WE	50303	S	WBN	1 N 2 NA	N NA	Y SR	N NA			
03	WE	50403	S	WBN	1 N 2 NA	N NA	N NA	Y SR			

CATEGORY: WE NON QA/QC WELDING SUBCATEGORY: 50303 WELDER PERFORMANCE QUALIFICATION CONTINUITY

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHRD	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
IN -85-352-00101 T50040	WE	50303	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA	IN-85-352-001	QTC	WELDER UPDATES CERTIFICATION BY GOING TO QC WELDING AND BURNING AROD OR JUST STRIKING AN ARC. NO WELD USING THE PROCESS IS DONE OR VERIFICATIONTHAT THE PROCESS HAD BEEN USED ONCE DURING THE 90/180 DAY PERIOD IS REQUIRED. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-03-SQN R3)
02	WE	50403	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
IN -85-424-01101 T50115	WE	50303	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA	IN-85-352-001	QTC	WELDER CERTIFICATION UPDATING PROCESS IS INADEQUATE, AND BASING DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS ON FAILING TO COMPLY WITH THE PROCESS IS UNFAIR. (EG., WELDORS WHO FIL TO RENEN CERTS. ARE GIVEN TWO WEEKS OFF, BUT RECERTIFICATION CONSISTS ONLY OF GETTING CARD STAMPED--NOWELDING IS INVOLVED.) DETAILS OF SPECIFIC CASE KNOWN TO QTC-WITHELD TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENTIALITY. CONSTRUCTION DEPARTMENT CONCERN. NO FOLLOW UP REQUIRED. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-03-SQN R3)
02	WE	50403	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
IN -85-426-00201 T50065	WE	50103	S	WBN	1 Y N N N 2 SR NA NA NA	IN-85-352-001	QTC	UPDATING OF WELDER CERTIFICATIONS IS INADEQUATE IN THAT A WELDER IS ONLY REQUIRED TO PRESENT THEIR CARD FOR UPDATING AND SOMETIMES IS ASKED TO RUN A BEAD- NEVER A COMPLETE WELD. NO FOLLOW-UP. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-03-SQN R3)
02	WE	50203	S	WBN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SR NA NA			
03	WE	50303	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			
04	WE	50403	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
IN -85-480-00401 T50031	WE	50103	S	WBN	1 Y N N N 2 SR NA NA NA	IN-85-770-002	QTC	WELDER CERTIFICATION UPDATE IS INADEQUATE. PERSONNEL MAY WORK IN A POSITION THAT DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY WELDING FOR 5-6 YEARS BUT CERTIFICATIONS ARE CONTINUALLY UPDATED. WHEN THESE PERSONS RETURN TO WELDING NO TESTS ARE CONDUCTED. THEY JUST RUN STRINGERS TO UPDATE CERTIFICATIONS. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-03-SQN R3)
02	WE	50203	S	WBN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SR NA NA			
03	WE	50303	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			
04	WE	50403	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			

CATEGORY: WE NON QA/QC WELDING
SUBCATEGORY: 50303 WELDER PERFORMANCE QUALIFICATION CONTINUITY

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHRD	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ HB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
IN -85-493-00401 T50027	WE	50303	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA	IN-85-352-001	QTC	WELDER CERTIFICATION UPDATE IS INADEQUATE TO VERIFY THAT THE WELDER CAN CONTINUE TO WELD A PARTICULAR PROCESS. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-03-SQN R3)
02	WE	50403	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
IN -85-532-00501 T50042	WE	50303	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA	IN-85-352-001	QTC	WELDERS ARE RE-CERTIFIED WITHOUT VERIFICATION THAT WELDERS HAVE PERFORMED SPECIFIC WELD TECHNIQUE. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-03-SQN R3)
02	WE	50403	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
IN -85-627-03601 T50219	WE	50303	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA	IN-85-352-001	QTC	SOME WELDERS HAVE HAD THEIR RECERTIFICATION CARDS BACKDATED. CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-03-SQN R3)
02	WE	50403	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
IN -85-770-00201 T50115	WE	50303	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA	IN-85-770-002	QTC	UPDATE OF WELDER CERTIFICATION RECORDS ARE NOT PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURE, IN THAT OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE OF PROCESS USE IN PROCEEDING 90 DAY PERIOD IS NOT OBTAINED OR VERIFIED PRIOR TO UPDATE OF CERTIFICATIONS. WELDS HAVE BEEN MADE BY UNCERTIFIED WELDERS. DETAILS KNOWN TO QTC, WITHELD DUE TO CONFIDENTIALITY. CONSTRUCTION DEPARTMENT CONCERN. NO FOLLOW UP REQUIRED. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-03-SQN R3)
02	WE	50403	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
IN -85-778-00101 T50080	WE	50303	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA	IN-85-352-001	QTC	WELDER CERTIFICATIONS HAVE BEEN IMPROPERLY UPDATED. NO FURTHER DETAILS AVAILIBLE. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-03-SQN R3)
02	WE	50403	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
IN -85-815-00101 T50071	WE	50303	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA	IN-85-352-001	QTC	RE-CERTIFICATION OF SOME WELDERS CONSISTS ONLY OF COMPLETING PAPERWORK. THESE EMPLOYEES DO NOT HAVE TO PROVE WELDING ABILITY. THIS IS DONE FOR SOME EMPLOYEES WHO HAVE NOT WELDED FOR YEARS. NO FURTHER DETAILS AVAILABLE. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-03-SQN R3)
02	WE	50403	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			

CATEGORY: WE NON QA/QC WELDING SUBCATEGORY: 50303 WELDER PERFORMANCE QUALIFICATION CONTINUITY

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHRD	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ NB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
IN -85-835-00201 T50084	WE	50303	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA	IN-85-352-001	QTC	WELDERS RE-CERTIFICATION CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED BY SIMPLY HAVING ONES CARD STAMPED. NO PERFORMANCE TEST IS REQUIRED OR CONDUCTED IN THE PROCESS. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-03-SQN R3)
02	WE	50403	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
IN -85-940-X0401 T50258	WE	50203	S	WBN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SR NA NA		QTC	UNTIL RECENTLY, A WELDER COULD HAVE WELDING CERTIFICATIONS UPDATED BY MERELY HAVING THE CERTIFICATION CARD INITIALED BY AN INSPECTOR. THIS PRACTICE MAY NOT HAVE ASSURED THAT THE UPDATE WAS BASED ON OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE OF UTILIZATION OF THE REQUIRED PROCESS WITHIN THE SPECIFIED TIME PERIOD. CONSTRUCTION DEPARTMENT CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-03-SQN R3)
02	WE	50303	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			
03	WE	50403	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
PH -85-052-X0301 T50184	IH	60300	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO	PH-85-052-X03	QTC	WELDER RECERTIFICATIONS HAVE BEEN FALSIFIED. DETAILS KNOWN TO QTC, WITHHELD DUE TO CONFIDENTIALITY. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-03-SQN R3)
02	WE	50303	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			
03	WE	50403	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
PH -85-052-00201 T50216	WE	50303	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA	PH-85-052-002	QTC	CI'S WELDER RE-CERTIFICATIONS WERE BACK DATED. DETAILS KNOWN TO QTC, WITHHELD DUE TO CONFIDENTIALITY. NO FURTHER INFORMATION MAY BE RELEASED. CONST. DEPT CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-03-SQN R3)
02	WE	50403	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
XX -85-049-X0301 T50133	IH	60300	S	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA NO NA	I-85-135-SQN	QTC	SEQUOYAH: WELDER CERTIFICATION CARD FALSIFIED. CONSTRUCTION DEPT CONCERN. CI HAS NO MORE INFORMATION. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN NSRS RPT I-85-135-SQN)
02	WE	50303	S	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SS NA			

CATEGORY: WE NON QA/QC WELDING
SUBCATEGORY: 50303 WELDER PERFORMANCE QUALIFICATION CONTINUITY

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHRD	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ NB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
XX -85-049-00101 T50230	IH	60300	S	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA NO NA	I-85-135-SQN	QTC	SEQUOYAH: WELDER CERTIFICATIONS HAVE BEEN UPDATED FOR WELDERS WHO DID NOT MEET UPDATE REQUIREMENTS O R BACKDATED TO GIVE THE APPEARANCE OF REQUIREMENT COMPLIANCE. CONSTRUCTION DEPARTMENT CONCERN. CI DECLINED TO PROVIDE FURTHER INFORMATION. NO FOLLO W UP REQUIRED. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN NSRS RPT I -85-135-SQN)
02	WE	50303	S	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SS NA			

20 CONCERNS FOR CATEGORY WE SUBCATEGORY 50303

CATEGORY: HE NON QA/QC WELDING
SUBCATEGORY: 50304 AVAILABILITY OF WELD INSPECTION TOOLS

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHRD	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
IN -85-007-00101 T50001	HE	50104	S	WBN	1 Y N N N 2 SR NA NA NA		QTC	INSPECTION TOOLS FOR WELDING INSPECTORS WERE NEVER ISSUED. I.E. FILLET WELD SIZE GAGES, FIT-UP GUAGES, ETC. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-04-SQN R2)
02	HE	50204	S	WBN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SR NA NA			
03	HE	50304	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			
04	HE	50404	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
IN -85-134-00201 T50050	HE	50104	S	WBN	1 Y N N N 2 SS NA NA NA		QTC	UNTIL RECENTLY (PAST 2 YEARS), TVA DID NOT PROVIDE QC INSPECTORS WITH WELDING INSPECTION TOOLS. SOME INSPECTORS PROVIDED THEIR OWN TOOLS BUT OTHERS DID NOT. CI HAS PASSED AWAY, NO FURTHER DETAILS AVAILABLE. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-04-SQN R2)
02	HE	50204	S	WBN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SS NA NA			
03	HE	50304	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SS NA			
04	HE	50404	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SS			
IN -85-406-00301 T50013	HE	50104	S	WBN	1 Y N N N 2 SS NA NA NA		QTC	PRIOR TO 1979, NO WELD INSPECTION TOOLS WERE ISSUED TO INSPECTORS. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-04-SQN R2)
02	HE	50204	S	WBN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SS NA NA			
03	HE	50304	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SS NA			
04	HE	50404	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SS			

3 CONCERNS FOR CATEGORY HE SUBCATEGORY 50304



CATEGORY: WE NON QA/QC WELDING SUBCATEGORY: 50305 DUCT INSTALLATION AND DOCUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHRD	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
IN -85-339-00502	WE	50305	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA		QTC	WBNP, UNIT #2, EGT PIPING IS GENERICALLY INSTALLED TOO CLOSE TO WALL TO PERMIT ADEQUATE ACCESS FOR WELDING. WELDS SHOULD BE WELDED/INSPECTED FROM INSIDE OF PIPE TO ASSURE ADEQUACY. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-05-SQN R1)
03	WE	50405	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
PH -85-012-X0301 T50077	WE	50135	S	WBN	1 Y N N N 2 SR NA NA NA	PH-85-012-X03	QTC	WELDING AND BRAZING INSPECTION OF SAFETY-RELATED HVAC DUCTWORK WAS DELETED SUBSEQUENT TO 1981 FROM THE QA PROGRAM WITHOUT ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION. WATTS BAR UNITS 1 & 2, SAFETY RELATED DUCTWORK. ADDITIONAL DETAILS ARE AVAILABLE IN FILE. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-05-SQN R1)
02	WE	50305	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			
03	WE	50235	S	WBN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SR NA NA			
04	WE	50405	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			

2 CONCERNS FOR CATEGORY WE SUBCATEGORY 50305

CATEGORY: WE NON QA/QC WELDING
SUBCATEGORY: 50306 TRAINING & CERTIFICATION OF CONST WELD INSPECTORS

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHR D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ NB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
IN -85-476-00402 T50037	WE	50206	S	WBN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SR NA NA	EX-85-052-005	QTC	APPROX. 1980, TVA IMPLEMENTED A WELDING INSPECTORS TRAINING PROGRAM AND PEOPLE WITH A GROCERY CLERK BACKGROUND WERE INSPECTING WELDS WITHIN TWO WEEKS. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-06-SQN R0)
03	WE	50106	S	WBN	1 Y N N N 2 SR NA NA NA			
04	WE	50306	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			
05	WE	50406	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
IN -85-981-00102 T50111	WE	50206	S	WBN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SR NA NA	EX-85-052-005	QTC	WELDING INSPECTORS WERE INADEQUATELY TRAINED PIROR TO 1981, I.E., PERSONNEL WITH NO EXPERIENCE INVOLVING WELDING WERE SENT TO A TWO WEEK TRAINING CLASS AND THEN FUNCTIONED AS A WELDING INSPECTOR. CI HAS NO MORE INFORMATION. NO FOLLOW UP REQUIRED. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-06-SQN R0)
03	WE	50106	S	WBN	1 Y N N N 2 SR NA NA NA			
04	WE	50306	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			
05	WE	50406	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
WI -85-041-00202 T50103	WE	50206	S	WBN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SS NA NA	EX-85-052-005	QTC	QUALIFICATION/TRAINING OF INSPECTORS FOR STRUCTURAL (AWS) WELD VISUAL EXAMINATION IS QUESTIONABLE; LEVEL II CERTIFICATION IS GRANTED WITH ONLY TWO MONTHS OF OJT, WHICH IS NOT DOCUMENTED; THE TOPICAL REPORT HAS "BASTARDIZED" ANSI N45.2.6, REGARDING QUALIFICATION OF INSPECTION/EXAMINATION PERSONNEL. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. NO FOLLOW UP REQUIRED. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-06-SQN R0)
03	WE	50106	S	WBN	1 Y N N N 2 SS NA NA NA			
04	WE	50306	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SS NA			
05	WE	50406	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SS			

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR POWER
EMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM SYSTEM (ECPS)
EMPLOYEE CONCERN INFORMATION BY CATEGORY/SUBCATEGORY

CATEGORY: HE NON QA/QC WELDING SUBCATEGORY: 50306 TRAINING & CERTIFICATION OF CONST WELD INSPECTORS

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHRD	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ HB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
HI -85-081-00702 T50237	HE	50206	S	HBN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SR NA NA	EX-85-052-005	QTC	CI EXPRESSED THAT WELDING INSPECTORS ARE NOT QUALIFIED FOR THE JOB. CI STATED THAT AN INSPECTOR NEEDED TO BE A WELDER SO THE INSPECTOR WOULD KNOW WHAT TO LOOK FOR IN A GOOD WELD. CI DECLINED TO PROVIDE ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. CONSTRUCTION DEPARTMENT CONCERN. NO FOLLOW UP REQUIRED. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-06-SQN R0)
03	HE	50106	S	HBN	1 Y N N N 2 SR NA NA NA			
04	HE	50306	S	HBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			
05	HE	50406	S	HBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			

4 CONCERNS FOR CATEGORY HE SUBCATEGORY 50306

CATEGORY: HE HON QA/QC HELDING SUBCATEGORY: 50307 HELDER TRAINING PROGRAM FOR CONST & NUC OPERATIONS

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHRD	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ NB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
EX -85-008-00101 T50051	HE	50107	S	HBN	1 Y N N N 2 SR NA NA NA	EX-85-010-002	QTC	SUBJOURNEYMEN USED TO DO WORK THAT THEY'RE NOT QUALIFIED TO DO: THEY NEEDN'T HAVE ANY SPECIFIC TRAINING, BUT DO WORK (EG PIPE FIT-UPS AND HELDS ON 1/4" LINES) NORMALLY DONE BY A JOURNEYMAN WITH 5 YEARS MINIMUM EXPERIENCE. SUBJOURNEYMEN REQUIRE CLOSER TECHNICAL SUPERVISION THAN TVA PROVIDES. WHEN CRAFTS COMPLAIN, THEY ARE "CHEWED OUT" BEYOND ALL REASONABLE LIMITS. NO MORE DETAILS KNOWN. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-07-SQN R1)
02	HE	50207	S	HBN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SR NA NA			
03	HE	50307	S	HBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			
04	HE	50407	S	HBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
IN -85-706-00101 T50064	HE	50107	S	HBN	1 Y N N N 2 SR NA NA NA		QTC	HELDERS WHO WENT THROUGH TVA'S HELDER TRAINING PROGRAM HAVE INSUFFICIENT TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE TO HANDLE ALL VARIABLES INVOLVED TO PERFORM ADEQUATE HELDS FOR A NUCLEAR INSTALLATION. THIS INADEQUACY HAS CREATED A LOT OF REWORK. CI HAS NO MORE DETAILS. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-07-SQN R1)
02	HE	50207	S	HBN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SR NA NA			
03	HE	50307	S	HBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			
04	HE	50407	S	HBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
XX -85-045-00101 T50075	MP	71701	S	BLN	1 N N N N 2 NA NA NA NA		QTC	BELLEFONTE-TVA POLICY ALLOWS FOR PERSONEL TO BE SENT TO THE TEST SHOP AND IN A SHORT TIME BE CERTIFIED AS AN ELECTRICAL HELDER. THESE HELDERS DO PASS A STRICT TEST BUT THE TEST DOES NOT TEST THEIR ABILITY WHEN DEALING WITH ALL THE VARIABLES AN EXPERIENCED HELDER CAN HANDLE. INSUFFICIENT HELDER TRAINING. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-07-SQN R1)
02	HE	50207	S	BLN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SR NA NA			
03	HE	50307	S	BLN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			

3 CONCERNS FOR CATEGORY HE SUBCATEGORY 50307

CATEGORY: WE NON QA/QC WELDING SUBCATEGORY: 50308 PAINTING REQUIREMENTS RELATED TO WELDS

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHR D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ NB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
EX -85-059-00101 T50179	CO	10300	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO		QTC	WHY AREN'T HANGER WELDS AND PIPE WELDS PAINTED AS SOON AS THEY ARE FINALIZED BY THE QC INSPECTOR AS COMPLETE AND ACCEPTABLE. THE DELAY CAUSES WELDS T O RUST, AND THE PASSAGE OF TIME OR THE PROCESS OF CLEANING THE WELDS MIGHT BREAK THE "PINK" PAINT ON BOLTS. RUSTING WEAKENS THE WELDS AND SANDBLASTIN G WILL REMOVE METAL, AND IS AN UNNECESSARY STEP (C OST) IF WELDS WERE PAINTED IMMEDIATELY. (CONSTRUC TION DEPARTMENT CONCERN). C/I HAS NO MORE INFORMA TION. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-08-SQN R1)
02	WE	50308	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA NO NA			
IN -85-192-00201 T50021	CO	10300	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR	IN-85-149-002	QTC	NUMEROUS UNPAINTED WELDS ON CONDUIT AND PIPING SUP PORTS THROUGHOUT PLANT ARE RUSTED. POSSIBLE LACK OF PROTECTIVE COATING. EXAMPLE: REACTOR BLDG UNIT 1 AZ.170 DEGREES, EL 720'. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-08-SQN R1)
02	WE	50308	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			
IN -85-273-00101 T50115	CO	10300	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR	IN-85-149-002	QTC	IN UNIT 1 REACTOR AND AUX BLDGS., WELDS ON PIPE SU PPORTS, SPECIFICALLY PIPE SUPPORTS INSTALLED OVER 6 FEET OFF THE FLOOR, HAVE NOT BEEN PAINTED AFTER SUPPORTS WERE COMPLETED AND QC ACCEPTED. CI IS CO NCERNED THAT RUST/CORROSION WILL OCCUR TO THESE UN PAINTED WELDS AND WEAKEN THE PIPE SUPPORTS THUS PR EVENTING THESE PIPE SUPPORTS FROM PERFORMING INTEN DED FUNCTIONS THEY WERE DESIGNED FOR. CI DID NOT SPECIFY ANY PARTICULAR AREAS IN REACTOR BUILDING B UT STAT (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-08-SQN R1)
02	WE	50308	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SS NA			
IN -85-451-00101 T50034	CO	10300	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR	IN-85-149-002	QTC	CI STATED IN 1984 THEY (PAINTERS) WERE INSTRUCTED NOT TO PAINT ANYTHING ABOVE 6 FT. IN RB1 PRESENTL Y THERE ARE RUSTY WELDS THROUGHOUT RB1. (SQN ISSUE S ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-08-SQN R1)
02	WE	50308	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			

4 CONCERNS FOR CATEGORY WE SUBCATEGORY 50308

CATEGORY: WE NON QA/QC WELDING SUBCATEGORY: 50309 WELD INSPECTION CRITERIA USED FOR CONSTRUCTION

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHRD	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
IN -85-406-00201 T50013	WE	50135	S	WBN	1 Y N N N 2 SS NA NA NA		QTC	PRIOR TO 1979 THERE WAS NO SPECIFIC WELD INSPECTIO N CRITERIA FOR USE BY INSPECTION PERSONNEL. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THIS PROBLEM WAS VALID TVA SYSTEM W IDE- ALL PLANTS. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-0 9-SQN R1)
02	WE	50309	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SS NA			
03	WE	50243	S	WBN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SS NA NA			
04	WE	50432	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SS			

1 CONCERNS FOR CATEGORY WE SUBCATEGORY 50309

CATEGORY: WE NON QA/QC WELDING
SUBCATEGORY: 50310 IMPLEMENTATION OF QAE-80-2

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHR D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
WI -85-030-01001 T50185	QA	80415	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR		QTC	WELDING AND NDE PROGRAM CORRECTIVE ACTION, AS IDENTIFIED IN OEDC QUALITY ASSURANCE EVALUATION NO. QAE02, DATED SEPTEMBER 1980, MAY NOT HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED FOR WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT. THE SAME UNCORRECTED PROBLEMS WERE FOUND TO EXIST YEARS LATER AND STILL MAY EXIST TODAY. NUC. POWER DEPT. CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-10-SQN R0)
02	WE	50310	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			
03	QA	80463	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			

1 CONCERNS FOR CATEGORY WE SUBCATEGORY 50310

CATEGORY: WE NON QA/QC WELDING SUBCATEGORY: 50311 SURFACE GRINDING OF WELDS

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHRD	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
IN -85-271-00102 T50047	WE	50311	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA	IN-85-271-001	QTC	WELD BEING GROUND DOWN THROUGHOUT UNIT II TO SATISFY THE INSPECTORS. THE PRIMARY CONCERN AT THE PRESENT TIME IS FOR THE WELDS TO "LOOK PRETTY". NO SPECIFIC LOCATION GIVEN. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-11-SQN R1)
03	WE	50411	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
IN -85-282-00202 T50014	WE	50111	S	WBN	1 Y N N N 2 SR NA NA NA	IN-85-282-002	QTC	UNTIL RECENTLY, TVA WELD INSPECTORS REQUIRED ALL PIPE WELDS TO BE SURFACE GROUND TO A SMOOTH FINISH. THE CONCERN IS THAT SMOOTH GRINDING MAY ACTUALLY MASK A SURFACE DEFECT WHICH WOULD OTHERWISE BE DETECTABLE. NO FURTHER DETAILS WERE AVAILABLE. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-11-SQN R1)
03	WE	50234	S	WBN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SR NA NA			
04	WE	50311	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			
05	WE	50411	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			

2 CONCERNS FOR CATEGORY WE SUBCATEGORY 50311



REFERENCE - ECPS120J-ECPS121C
FREQUENCY - REQUEST
ONP - ISSS - RNM

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR POWER
EMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM SYSTEM (ECPS)
EMPLOYEE CONCERN INFORMATION BY CATEGORY/SUBCATEGORY

RUN TIME - 11:45:02
RUN DATE - 12/17/87

CATEGORY: WE NON QA/QC WELDING
SUBCATEGORY: 50312 WELDING ELECTRODE QUALITY

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHRD	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
IN -85-247-00101 T50022	WE	50312	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA	IN-85-284-001	QTC	7018 RODS (PURCHASED) ARE OF POOR QUALITY. THIS CONTRIBUTES TO POROSITY AND PINHOLES. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-12-SQN R2)
02	WE	50101	S	WBN	1 Y N N N 2 SR NA NA NA			
03	WE	50412	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
04	WE	50201	S	WBN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SR NA NA			
IN -85-411-00201 T50018	WE	50312	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA	IN-85-284-001	QTC	WELDING RODS (7018, 3/32 ONLY) ARE NOT OF GOOD QUALITY. MOST OF THE WELDS ARE MADE WITH THESE RODS. THESE RODS ARE BEING USED BY ALL THE CRAFTSMAN. THESE RODS ARE MADE BY ARCO. (BOTH UNITS). (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-12-SQN R2)
02	WE	50412	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
IN -85-600-00101 T50065	WE	50312	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA	IN-85-284-001	QTC	E7018 WELD ELECTRODE PURCHASED BY TVA ARE OF POOR QUALITY. STEAMFITTER WELDERS EXPERIENCED PROBLEMS WITH FLUX FALLING AND FLAKING OFF ROD AND WITH ROD NOT BEING IN THE CENTER OF THE FLUX. WORST PROBLEMS OCCURRED IN 1982 WITH ROD TVA SPECIALLY PURCHASED FROM HOBART CO. C/I COULD NOT PROVIDE HEAT, LOT OR PURCHASE ORDER NUMBER OF RODS. NO FOLLOW-UP REQUIRED. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-12-SQN R2)
02	WE	50412	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			

3 CONCERNS FOR CATEGORY WE SUBCATEGORY 50312

REFERENCE - ECPS120J-ECPS121C
FREQUENCY - REQUEST
OMP - ISSS - RHM

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR POWER
EMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM SYSTEM (ECPS)
EMPLOYEE CONCERN INFORMATION BY CATEGORY/SUBCATEGORY

RUN TIME - 11:45:02
RUN DATE - 12/17/87

CATEGORY: WE NON QA/QC WELDING
SUBCATEGORY: 50313 SUITABILITY OF WELDING EQPT FOR CONST & MOD WELDS

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHRD	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ NB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
IN -85-247-00201 T50022	WE	50113	S	WBN	1 Y N N N 2 SR NA NA NA		QTC	WELDING MACHINES (MCKAY & HOBART) USED IN FIELD BY STEAM FITTERS HAVE 2 SETTINGS 50 & 100 AMPS BOTH OF WHICH ARE UNSUITABLE FOR WELDING WITH 3/32" ROD . THIS CONTRIBUTES TO POROSITY AND PINHOLES. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-13-SQN R0)
02	WE	50213	S	WBN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SR NA NA			
03	WE	50313	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			
04	WE	50413	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
IN -85-303-00101 T50021	WE	50113	S	WBN	1 Y N N N 2 SR NA NA NA		QTC	ALL THE WELDING MACHINES SHOULD HAVE REMOTE SWITCHES SO THAT THE TUNGSTEN TIP DOESN'T HAVE TO TOUCH THE BASE METAL TO START THE WELD. PRESENTLY THE NON-HOBART WELDERS, WHEN USED, MAY CAUSE TUNGSTEN TO BE LEFT IN THE WELD. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-13-SQN R0)
02	WE	50213	S	WBN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SR NA NA			
03	WE	50313	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			
04	WE	50413	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			

2 CONCERNS FOR CATEGORY WE SUBCATEGORY 50313

CATEGORY: WE NON QA/QC WELDING SUBCATEGORY: 50314 ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	S H R D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
IN -86-047-00101 T50110	WE	50314	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA		QTC	A SYSTEM IS NEEDED THAT VERIFYS THAT THE WELDER DI D RETURN THE UNUSED WELD ROD AND STUBS AND WILL PR OVIDE THE WELDER A RECEIPT SO THAT THE WELDER CAN PROVE HE DID RETURN THE MATERIAL IN CASE AN ERROR WAS MADE. CI HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. CONS TRUCTION DEPARTMENT. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-14-SQN R1)
02	WE	50101	S	WBN	1 Y N N N 2 SR NA NA NA			
03	WE	50201	S	WBN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SR NA NA			
04	WE	50401	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
IN -86-158-00601 T50180	WE	50314	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA		QTC	UNTIL 1973 TVA DID NOT LET THEIR APPRENTICESHIP PE OPLE WELD. DURING THAT YEAR, EVEN WITH TWO OR THR EE MONTHS EXPERIENCE, AN APPRENTICE COULD TAKE THE TEST, PASS, AND BE ABLE TO WELD IN THE FIELD. TH E SYSTEM HAS WORKED THAT WAY EVEN SINCE 1973. CON ST. DEPT. CONCERN. C/I HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION . (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-14-SQN R1)
02	WE	50107	S	WBN	1 Y N N N 2 SR NA NA NA			
03	WE	50207	S	WBN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SR NA NA			
04	WE	50407	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			

2 CONCERNS FOR CATEGORY WE SUBCATEGORY 50314

CATEGORY: WE NON QA/QC WELDING
SUBCATEGORY: 50315 DESIGN CONSIDERATION ON BOX ANCHORS

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	S H R D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
EX -85-039-00301 T50146	EN	22201	S	WBN	1 Y Y N Y 2 SR SR NA SR	I-85-541-WBN	QTC	WATTS BAR: ADESIGN DEFICIENCY HAS A "WRONG WELD" REQUIRED ON BOX HANGERS WHICH, IF PERFORMED PER DE SIGN, CAUSES THE WELD TO RUN INTO THE PIPE (SS OR CARBON STEEL CODE PIPE). CONST. DEPT. CONCERN. C I HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSE D IN RPT WP-15-SQN R1)
02	WE	50315	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			
IN -85-405-00101 T50098	EN	22202	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SS		QTC	POSSIBLITY OF METAL FATIGUE/IN-SERVICE FAILURE IN CIRCUMFERENTIAL WELDS CONNECTING SS PIPE TO "BOX" HANGERS. PRODUCTION PRESSURE TO MEET WEEKLY QUOTA S. CAUSES WELDING CONTINUOUSLY RATHER THAN ALLOWING WELDMENT TO COOL.. THIS MIGHT ENCOURAGE USING EX CESSIVE AMPERAGE AND LARGER WELD ROD. MANY OF THE SE HANGERS HAVE EXCESSIVE WELD METAL (EG 1" WELD F OR 6" PIPE). HANGER DESIGN DOESN'T ALLOW FOR PIPE EXPANSION. BOTH UNITS REACTOR BLDG, AUX, AND "RA CEWAY". (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-15-SQN R1)
02	WE	50315	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SS NA			
03	EN	22201	S	WBN	1 Y Y N Y 2 SS SS NA SS			
IN -85-613-00101 T50058	EN	22202	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR		QTC	THERMAL STRESS CAUSED BY 1/2" - 1" CIRCUMFERENTIAL WELD ON PIPE TO INSTALL BOX HANGER. (GENERIC CON CERN) (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-15-SQN R1)
02	WE	50315	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			
WBP-86-007-00101 T50239	EN	22202	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR		QTC	BOX ANCHORS ARE IMPROPERLY DESIGNED PLANT-WIDE. T HE DESIGN REQUIRES AN EXCESSIVE AMOUNT OF WELD MET AL TO BE APPLIED WHICH COULD RESULT IN OVERHEATING OF THE MATERIAL AND RESULTANTLY WEAKEN THE MATERI AL. CONSTRUCTION DEPARTMENT CONCERN. CI HAS NO F URTHER INFORMATION. NO FOLLON UP REQUIRED. (SQN I SSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-15-SQN R1)
02	WE	50315	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			

4 CONCERNS FOR CATEGORY WE SUBCATEGORY 50315

REFERENCE - ECPS120J-ECPS121C
FREQUENCY - REQUEST
ONP - ISSS - RHM

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR POWER
EMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM SYSTEM (ECPS)
EMPLOYEE CONCERN INFORMATION BY CATEGORY/SUBCATEGORY

RUN TIME - 11:45:02
RUN DATE - 12/17/87

CATEGORY: WE NON QA/QC WELDING
SUBCATEGORY: 50316 PERFORMANCE OF PRE-WELD INSPECTION

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHRD	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
BEM-85-001-00101 T50227	WE	50116	S	BLN	1 Y N N N 2 SR NA NA NA		QTC	BELLEFONTE - THE GENERAL CONST. SPEC. G-29C, PROCESS SPEC. O.C.1.1 IS IN CONFLICT WITH THE TVA QUALITY ASSURANCE COMMITMENTS AS STATED BY THE TVA TOPICAL REPORT, TVA-TR75-1A, IN THAT PROCESS SPEC. O.C.1.1, SECTION 6.0 ALLOWS UNCERTIFIED WELDER FOREMEN, WHO HAVE DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE INSTALLATION, TO PERFORM PREWELD INSPECTIONS. NUCLEAR POWER CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-16-SQN R2)
02	WE	50216	S	BLN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SR NA NA			
03	WE	50316	S	BLN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			
04	WE	50416	S	BLN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
BEM-85-001-00201 T50227	WE	50116	S	BLN	1 Y N N N 2 SR NA NA NA		QTC	BELLEFONTE - UNCERTIFIED WELDER FOREMEN ARE REQUIRED BY TVA TO PERFORM PREWELD INSPECTIONS ON INSTALLATIONS THEY ARE DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR WHICH IS A VOILATION OF ANSI REQUIREMENTS. NUCLEAR POWER CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-16-SQN R2)
02	WE	50216	S	BLN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SR NA NA			
03	WE	50316	S	BLN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			
04	WE	50416	S	BLN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
BFM-85-001-00101 T50221	WE	50116	S	BLN	1 Y N N N 2 SR NA NA NA		QTC	BELLEFONTE - THE GENERAL CONST. SPEC. G-29C, PROCESS SPEC.O.C.1.1 IS IN CONFLICT WITH THE TVA QUALITY ASSURANCE COMMITMENTS AS STATED BY THE TVA TOPICAL REPORT, TVA-TR75-1A, IN THAT PROCESS SPEC. O.C.1.1, SECTION 6.0 ALLOWS UNCERTIFIED WELDER FORMEN, WHO HAVE DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE INSTALLATION, TO PERFORM PREWELD INSPECTIONS. NUCLEAR POWER CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-16-SQN R2)
02	WE	50216	S	BLN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SR NA NA			
03	WE	50316	S	BLN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			
04	WE	50416	S	BLN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			

REFERENCE - ECPS120J-ECPS121C
FREQUENCY - REQUEST
ONP - ISSS - RIM

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR POWER
EMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM SYSTEM (ECPS)
EMPLOYEE CONCERN INFORMATION BY CATEGORY/SUBCATEGORY

RUN TIME - 11:45:02
RUN DATE - 12/17/87

CATEGORY: WE NON QA/QC WELDING
SUBCATEGORY: 50316 PERFORMANCE OF PRE-WELD INSPECTION

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHRD	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
BFM-85-001-00201 T50221	WE	50116	S	BFN	1 Y N N N 2 SR NA NA NA		QTC	BROWN'S FERRY - UNCERTIFIED WELDER FOREMEN ARE REQ UIRED BY TVA TO PERFORM PRE-WELD INSPECTIONS ON IN STALLATIONS THEY ARE DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR WHIC H IS A VIOLATION OF ANSI REQUIREMENTS. NUCLEAR PO WER CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-16-SQN R2)
02	WE	50216	S	BFN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SR NA NA			
03	WE	50316	S	BFN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			
04	WE	50416	S	BFN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
IN -85-212-00101 T50152	WE	50216	S	WBN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SR NA NA	I-85-444-WBN	QTC	*WELD FIT-UP INSPECTION WHICH WERE PERFORMED BY QC DURING 1978-1980 ON DUCT SUPPORTS IN REACTOR BUIL DINGS #1 AND 2 ARE NOT BEING PERFORMED ON DUCT SUP PORTS PRESENTLY BEING INSTALLED IN REACTOR BLDG. # 2. CI QUESTIONS WHY THESE FIT-UP INSPECTIONS WERE REQUIRED DURING 1978-1980 AND NOT REQUIRED AT PRE SENT TIME. CONSTR. DEPT. CONCERN. FURTHER INFORM ATION AVAILABLE, WITHHELD DUE TO CONFIDENTIALITY. NO FOLLOWUP REQUIRED. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RP T WP-16-SQN R2)
02	WE	50316	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			
03	WE	50416	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
SQM-85-001-00101 T50221	WE	50316	N	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SS NA	I-85-768-SQN	QTC	SEQUOYAH - THE GENERAL CONST. SPEC. G-29C, PROCESS SPEC. O.C.1.1 IS IN CONFLICT WITH THE TVA QUALITY ASSURANCE COMMITMENTS AS STATED BY THE TVA TOPICA L REPORT, TVA-TR75-1A, IN THAT PROCESS SPEC. O.C.1 .1, SECTION 6.0 ALLOWS UNCERTIFIED WELDER FOREMEN, WHO HAVE DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE INSTALLATI ON, TO PERFORM PRE-WELD INSPECTIONS. NUCLEAR POWE R CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. (SQN IS SUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-16-SQN R2)
SQM-85-001-00201 T50217	WE	50316	N	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SS NA	I-85-768-SQN	QTC	SEQUOYAH - UNCERTIFIED WELDER FOREMEN ARE REQUIRED BY TVA TO PERFORM PREWELD INSPECTIONS ON INSTALLA TIONS THEY ARE DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR WHICH IS A VIOLATION OF ANSI REQUIREMENTS. NUCLEAR POWER CO NCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-16-SQN R2)

CATEGORY: HE HON QA/QC HELDING
SUBCATEGORY: 50316 PERFORMANCE OF PRE-HELD INSPECTION

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHR D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ HB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
WBM-85-001-00102 T50227	HE	50116	S	WBN	1 Y N N N 2 SR HA HA HA		QTC	WATTS BAR - THE GENERAL CONST. SPEC. G-29C, PROCES S SPEC. G.C.1.1 IS IN CONFLICT WITH THE TVA QUALIT Y ASSURANCE COMMITMENTS AS STATED BY THE TVA TOPIC AL REPORT, TVA-TR75-1A, IN THAT PROCESS SPEC. G.C. 1.1, SECTION 6.0 ALLOWS UNCERTIFIED WELDER FOREMEN , WHO HAVE DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE INSTALLAT ION, TO PERFORM PREWELD INSPECTIONS. NUCLEAR POWE R CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. (SQN IS SUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-16-SQN R2)
03	HE	50216	S	WBN	1 N Y N N 2 HA SR HA HA			
04	HE	50316	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 HA HA SR HA			
05	HE	50416	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 HA HA HA SR			
WBM-85-001-00201 T50227	HE	50116	S	SQN	1 Y N N N 2 SR HA HA HA		QTC	SEQUOYAH - UNCERTIFIED WELDER FOREMEN ARE REQUIRED BY TVA TO PERFORM PREWELD INSPECTIONS ON INSTALLA TIONS THEY ARE DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR WHICH IS A VIOLATION OF ANSI REQUIREMENTS. NUCLEAR POWER CO NCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. (TRANSFERRE D TO WBM-85-001-003, CONCERN WAS ADDRESSED BY WELD ING CATEGORY BEFORE TRANSFER WAS DOCUMENTED, AND W ILL NOT BE INPUT TO GN CATEGORY, SQN ISSUES ADDRES SED IN RPT WP-16-SQN R2)
02	HE	50216	S	SQN	1 N Y N N 2 HA SR HA HA			
03	HE	50316	S	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 HA HA SR HA			
04	HE	50416	S	SQN	1 N N N Y 2 HA HA HA SR			
WI -85-030-00701 T50185	HE	50116	S	WBN	1 Y N N N 2 SR HA HA HA		QTC	THE WBN FSAR COMMITS TVA TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF AN S D.1.1 FOR STRUCTURAL WELDING. CONTRARY TO THESE REQUIREMENTS, THE G-29C PROCESS SPECIFICATION WAS MODIFIED TO REFLECT LESS STRINGENT INSPECTION REQ UIREMENTS (E.G. VISUAL INSPECTION OF WELDS THROUGH PAINT (CARBO ZINC PRIMER) AND NO DOCUMENTED INSPE CTION BY CERTIFIED VISUAL INSPECTORS (FIT-UP, IN-P ROCESS) PRIOR TO FINAL INSPECTION.) CI HAS NO ADDI TIONAL INFORMATION. NUC. POWER DEPT. CONCERN. (SQ N ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-16-SQN R2)
02	HE	50102	S	WBN	1 Y N N N 2 SR HA HA HA			
03	HE	50216	S	WBN	1 N Y N N 2 HA SR HA HA			
04	HE	50316	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 HA HA SR HA			
05	HE	50416	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 HA HA HA SR			
06	HE	50202	S	WBN	1 N Y N N 2 HA SR HA HA			
08	HE	50402	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 HA HA HA SR			

10 CONCERNS FOR CATEGORY IIE SUBCATEGORY 50316



REFERENCE - ECPS120J-ECPS121C
FREQUENCY - REQUEST
ONP - ISSS - RUM

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
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EMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM SYSTEM (ECPS)
EMPLOYEE CONCERN INFORMATION BY CATEGORY/SUBCATEGORY

RUN TIME - 11:45:02
RUN DATE - 12/17/87

CATEGORY: WE NON QA/QC WELDING
SUBCATEGORY: 50317 VENDOR WELD QUALITY

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHRD	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
IN -85-007-00301 T50011	QA	80203	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SS	I-85-753-WBN	QTC	GENERAL LOOK OVER VENDOR WELDS SHOULD BE PERFORMED . VENDOR WELDS ARE NOT INSPECTED AT WBNP 1 OR 2. THEY ARE EASILY DISTINGUISHABLE FROM FIELD WELDS BECAUSE OF THE BAD QUALITY OF THE VENDOR WELDS. V ENDOR WELDS WOULD NOT PASS THE SAME ACCEPTANCE. (S QN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-17-SQN R0)
02	WE	50317	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SS NA			
03	QA	80252	S	WBN	1 N N Y Y 2 NA NA SS SS			
IN -85-127-00101 T50105	QA	80203	S	WBN	1 N Y N Y 2 NA SS NA SS		QTC	INCONSISTENCY IN CRITERIA USED FOR WELD INSPECTION OF BERGEN-PATERSON AND TVA HANGER WELDS. B.P. WE LDS LOOK BAD, WHILE BETTER LOOKING TVA WELDS ARE R EJECTED FOR COSMETIC REASONS. HANGER FAB SHOP, LO CATED AT SOUTH EAST CORNER OF TURBINE BLDG., HAS B INS FULL OF B.P. HANGER PARTS WHICH EXEMPLIFIES TH IS CONCERN. CI DOES NOT KNOW SPECIFIC HANGER #'S OR AREAS IN THE PLANT WHERE THIS CONDITION EXISTS. NO FURTHER FOLLOW UP REQUIRED. (SQN ISSUES ADDRE SSED IN RPT WP-17-SQN R0)
02	WE	50317	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SS NA			
03	QA	80252	S	WBN	1 N Y Y Y 2 NA SS SS SS			
IN -85-657-00101 T50131	QA	80203	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR		QTC	SEVERAL VENDOR WELDS HAVE BEEN INSTALLED IN THE VA RIOUS LOCATIONS OF POWER HOUSE UNIT 1 & 2 WHICH DI D NOT MEET THE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA (G-29 M) OF TV A WELDING SPECIFICATIONS. AS AN EXAMPLE: HEATER C 1 LOCATED AT T15 & G LINE ELEV 708'-0" TURBINE BUI LDING. NAME OF VENDOR: YUBA, HEAT TRANSFER CORP. CONSTRUCTION DEPT CONCERN. CI HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-17-SQ N R0)
02	WE	50317	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			
03	QA	80252	S	WBN	1 N N Y Y 2 NA NA SR SR			

3 CONCERNS FOR CATEGORY WE SUBCATEGORY 50317

REFERENCE - ECPS120J-ECPS121C
FREQUENCY - REQUEST
ONP - ISSS - RHN

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR POWER
EMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM SYSTEM (ECPS)
EMPLOYEE CONCERN INFORMATION BY CATEGORY/SUBCATEGORY

RUN TIME - 11:45:02
RUN DATE - 12/17/87

CATEGORY: WE NON QA/QC WELDING SUBCATEGORY: 50318 EFFECTS OF LAMINATION ON WELD QUALITY

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHRD	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
XX -85-098-00101 T50181	WE	50318	N	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA NO NA	XX-85-098-001	QTC	SEQUOYAH: THERE WAS A LAMINATED PIPE 12" OR 14" DIAMETER COMEING OUT OF THE CONDENSER IN UNIT 2 TURBINE BUILDING. THE CRAFT COULD NOT GET A GOOD WELD DUE TO LAMINATION. OCCURRED IN 1977. DETAILS KNOWN TO QTC, WITHHELD DUE TO CONFIDENTIALITY. CONST. DEPARTMENT CONCERN. C/I HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-18-SQN R1)

1 CONCERNS FOR CATEGORY WE SUBCATEGORY 50318

CATEGORY: WE NON QA/QC WELDING SUBCATEGORY: 50319 WBN CONCERNS WITH NO GENERIC APPLICABILITY TO SQN

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHR D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF	BL	SQ	WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
IN -85-021-X0501 T50134	IH	60300	S	WBN	1 N 2 NA	N NA	N NA	Y NO	IN-85-770-002	QTC	WELDERS CERTIFICATION CARDS WERE FALSIFIED. (DETAILS OF SPECIFIC CASE ARE KNOWN TO QTC AND WITHHELD TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENTIALITY) CONSTRUCTION CONCERN. CI HAS NO MORE INFORMATION. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-19-SQN R1)
02	QA	80519	S	WBN	1 N 2 NA	N NA	N NA	Y SR			
03	WE	50319	S	WBN	1 N 2 NA	N NA	Y SR	N NA			
04	WE	50403	S	WBN	1 N 2 NA	N NA	N NA	Y SR			
05	QA	80551	S	WBN	1 N 2 NA	N NA	N NA	Y SR			
IN -85-021-00301 T50038	IH	60300	S	WBN	1 N 2 NA	N NA	N NA	Y NO	IN-85-021-003	QTC	STEAMFITTER'S WELDER CERTIFICATION CARDS HAVE BEEN BACK DATED 1 OR 2 WEEKS TO COVER WELDERS WHO CERTIFICATION CARDS WERE NOT RE-STAMPED AFTER THE 90 DAY CERTIFICATION PERIOD HAD EXPIRED. THIS OCCURRED WITH SEVERAL S/F WELDERS WHO WELDED DURING THE 90 DAY PERIOD. IN NOVEMBER 1984 CI WAS GIVEN 2 WEEKS OFF BY GENERAL FOREMAN FOR LETTING CI'S 90 DAY CERTIFICATION CARD EXPIRE. CI STATED HE HAD MADE 96 ASME CODE CLASS 2 WELDS DURING THE 90 DAY TIMEPER (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN REPORT WP-19-SQN R1)
02	WE	50319	S	WBN	1 N 2 NA	N NA	Y SR	N NA			
03	WE	50403	S	WBN	1 N 2 NA	N NA	N NA	Y SR			
IN -85-299-00301 T50188	WE	50319	S	WBN	1 N 2 NA	N NA	Y SR	N NA		QTC	SS WELDS SEEM TO HAVE EXCESS METAL REMOVED AT BUTT WELD JOINTS, ALSO THE WELDS EXHIBIT EXCESSIVE SHRINKAGE AT JOINTS. THIS CONCERN IS GENERIC BUT HAVE EXAMPLES. THIS HAS BEEN NOTICED FOR THE PAST 6 YEARS IN BOTH UNITS. DETAILS KNOWN TO QTC, WITHHELD DUE TO CONFIDENTIALITY. CONSTRUCTION DEPT CONCER. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-19-SQN R1)
02	WE	50234	S	WBN	1 N 2 NA	Y SR	N NA	N NA			
03	WE	50111	S	WBN	1 Y 2 SR	N NA	N NA	N NA			
04	WE	50432	S	WBN	1 N 2 NA	N NA	N NA	Y SR			
05	WE	50411	S	WBN	1 N 2 NA	N NA	N NA	Y SR			

CATEGORY: WE NON QA/QC WELDING SUBCATEGORY: 50319 WBN CONCERNS WITH NO GENERIC APPLICABILITY TO SQN

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHRD	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
IN -85-335-00201	IH	60400	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO	IN-85-335-002	QTC	WELDERS ON "RESTRICTIONS" (NOT ALLOWED TO WELD) ARE TOLD TO KEEP THEIR CERTIFICATIONS UPDATED EVEN WITHOUT USING THE PROCESS OR TIME IN THE TEST SHOP. (NAMES ARE KNOWN) (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-19-SQN R1)
02	WE	50319	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			
03	WE	50203	S	WBN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SR NA NA			
04	WE	50403	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
IN -85-424-X1301 T50133	IH	60300	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO	IN-85-770-002	QTC	MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL FALSIFIED WELDER'S CERTIFICATION CARD. (DETTAILS OF SPECIFIC CASE KNOWN TO QTC AND WITHELD TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENTIALITY). CONSIRUCTION CONCERN. CI HAS NO MORE INFORMATION. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-19-SQN R1)
02	WE	50319	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SS NA			
03	WE	50403	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SS			
IN -85-501-00101 T50031	WE	50319	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA	IN-85-501-001	QTC	UNUSED BUNDLES OF WELD ROD FREQUENTLY FOUND IN TRASH CANS I.E. TURBINE BLDG., 708', 729', AND 755' ELEVATIONS, UNIT #2 (15-20 RODS FOUND 6-7-85) (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-19-SQN R1)
02	WE	50101	S	WBN	1 Y N N N 2 SR NA NA NA			
03	WE	50201	S	WBN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SR NA NA			
04	WE	50401	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
IN -85-503-00101 T50043	MP	70203	S	WBN	1 N N N N 2 NA NA NA NA	IN-85-352-001	QTC	INDIVIDUAL (NAME KNOWN) IN CONCERNED INDIVIDUAL'S (HEREAFTER CI) CREW HAS GIVEN 2 WEEKS OFF FOR FAILING TO HAVE WELDING CARD UPDATED BY WELD ENGINEERING. INDIVIDUAL HAD PERFORMED REQUIRED WELDS BUT WAS OUT SICK ON THE DAY UPDATE WAS REQUIRED. OTHER INDIVIDUALS IN CI'S CREW WHO HAD FAILED TO GET THEIR CARDS UPDATED RECEIVED NO DISCIPLINARY ACTION OR HAD RECEIVED ONLY AN ORAL WARNING. (ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AVAILABLE) (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-19-SQN R1)
02	WE	50319	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA NO NA			

REFERENCE - ECPS120J-ECPS121C
FREQUENCY - REQUEST
ONP - ISSS - RUN

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR POWER
EMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM SYSTEM (ECPS)
EMPLOYEE CONCERN INFORMATION BY CATEGORY/SUBCATEGORY

RUN TIME - 11:45:02
RUN DATE - 12/17/87

CATEGORY: WE NON QA/QC WELDING SUBCATEGORY: 50319 WBN CONCERNS WITH NO GENERIC APPLICABILITY TO SQN

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHR D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
IN -85-532-00601 T50042	WE	50416	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR	I-85-234-WBN	QTC	QCP 4.13 VTC STATES THAT HANGER FILLET WELDS ARE TO BE 1/8-3/16" MAX. DWG. 47A050, SHEET IN, NOTE 5 0 STATES THAT WELDS MAY BE 100% OVERSIZE. THE QC HANGER CARDS STATE THAT THE INSTALLATION WAS INSPECTED PER QCP 4.13 VTC. PROCEDURE DWG NOT CONFLICTS WITH OVERSIZE WELDS THAT HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED. (NO SPECIFIC CASES GIVEN) (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-19-SQN R1)
02	WE	50319	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			
IN -85-540-00101 T50045	WE	50319	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA	IN-85-352-001	QTC	INADEQUATE WELDER CERTIFICATION UPDATE. WELDER IS "PUNISHED" IF HE/SHE FORGETS TO UPDATE ON TIME YET THE UPDATE IS A FORMALITY. THERE IS NO VERIFICATION THE PROCESS WAS USED DURING THE 90 DAY PERIOD. EMPLOYEES ARE KEPT UPDATED EVEN THOUGH THEY DO NOT WELD FOR YEARS AT AT TIME. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-19-SQN R1)
02	WE	50403	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
IN -85-543-00201 T50045	WE	50319	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA	IN-85-352-001	QTC	WELDER CERTIFICATION UPDATE PROCEDURE IS INADEQUATE. WELDERS CAN BE OFF WORK OVER 90 DAYS AND NOT BE REQUIRED TO RE-TEST UPON RETURNING TO WORK. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-19-SQN R1)
02	WE	50403	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
IN -85-612-X0701 T50137	IH	60300	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO	IN-85-770-002	QTC	WELDER CERTIFICATION CARD FALSIFIED. (DETAILS TO THE SPECIFIC CASE KNOWN TO QTC AND WITHHELD TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENTIALITY). CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN. CI HAS NO MORE INFORMATION. NO FOLLOW-UP REQUIRED. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-19-SQN R1)
03	QA	80519	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
04	WE	50319	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			
05	QA	80504	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			
06	QA	80551	S	WBN	1 N N Y Y 2 NA NA SR SR			

CATEGORY: WE NON QA/QC WELDING SUBCATEGORY: 50319 WBN CONCERNS WITH NO GENERIC APPLICABILITY TO SQN

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHRD	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
IN -85-612-00601 T50137	WE	50319	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA	IN-85-352-001	QTC	WELDER CERTIFICATION UPDATE IS INADEQUATE AND NOT ENFORCED PER AN ESTABLISHED SET OF CRITERIA. WELDERS GIVEN TIME OFF WITHOUT PAY FOR FAILURE TO UPDATE CERTIFICATIONS. (NAMES/DETAILS TO THE SPECIFIC CASE ARE KNOWN TO QTC AND WITHHELD TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENTIALITY). CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN. CI HAS NO MORE INFORMATION. REASON: THIS CONCERN WAS REVISED TO DELETE AN ADDITIONAL CONCERN THAT HAS BEEN ADDRESSED. NO FOLLOW-UP REQUIRED. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-19-SQN R1)
02	WE	50403	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
IN -85-725-X1401 T50167	WE	50319	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA	IN-85-725-X14	QTC	WELDER RECERTIFICATION PROGRAM HAD INADEQUATE SUPERVISORY OVERSIGHT: IT COULD HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE FOR A GOOD WELDER TO WELD THE TEST PLATES FOR AN INCAPABLE WELDER. DETAILS KNOWN TO QTC, WITHELD TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENTIALITY. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-19-SQN R1)
02	WE	50103	S	WBN	1 Y N N N 2 SR NA NA NA			
03	WE	50403	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
IN -85-725-X1501 T50167	WE	50319	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA	IN-85-725-X15	QTC	THE CONTROL OF WELDER RECERTIFICATION TEST PLATES WAS INADEQUATE: TEST PLATES BEGUN BY ONE WELDER COULD HAVE BEEN COMPLETED BY ANOTHER WELDER. DETAIL KNOWN TO QTC-WITHELD TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENTIALITY. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-19-SQN R1)
02	WE	50103	S	WBN	1 Y N N N 2 SR NA NA NA			
03	WE	50203	S	WBN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SR NA NA			
04	WE	50403	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
IN -85-770-X0701 T50137	IH	60300	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO	IN-85-770-002	QTC	WELDERS (8) CERTIFICATION CARDS WERE FALSIFIED. (DETAILS TO THE SPECIFIC CASE ARE KNOWN TO QTC AND WITHHELD TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENTIALITY). CI HAS NO MORE INFORMATION. CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN. NO FOLLOW-UP REQUIRED. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-19-SQN R1)
02	QA	80519	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
03	WE	50319	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			
04	QA	80551	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			

CATEGORY: WE NON QA/QC WELDING
SUBCATEGORY: 50319 WBN CONCERNS WITH NO GENERIC APPLICABILITY TO SQN

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHRD	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
IN -85-770-00301 T50115	WE	50319	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA	IN-85-352-001	QTC	INDIVIDUALS POSSESSING INVALID WELDER CERTIFICATIONS. DETAILS KNOWN TO QTC, WITHELD DUE TO CONFIDENTIALITY REQUIREMENTS. CONSTRUCTION DEPARTMENT CONCERN. FOLLON UP REQUIRED. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-19-SQN R1)
02	WE	50403	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
IN -85-778-X0701 T50137	IH	60300	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO	IN-85-770-002	QTC	WELDER CERTIFICATION CARD FALSIFIED, (DETAILS TO SPECIFIC CASE ARE KNOWN TO QTC AND WITHHELD TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENTIALITY). CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN. CI HAS NO MORE INFORMATION. NO FOLLOW-UP REQUIRED. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-19-SQN R1)
02	QA	80519	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
03	WE	50319	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			
04	QA	80551	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
IN -85-965-00101 T50104	WE	50319	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA	IN-85-770-002	QTC	A WELDORS CERTIFICATION (NAME KNOWN) EXPIRED ON A WEDNESDAY. THIS WELDOR WAS RE-CERTIFIED THE NEXT MONDAY, BUT THE CERTIFICATION WAS BACK-DATED TO PREVENT THE WORK PERFORMED BY THIS WELDOR FROM BEING REJECTED. THIS WAS DONE ABOUT 12-16-80. CI HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. NO FOLLOW UP REQUIRED. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-19-SQN R1)
02	WE	50403	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
IN -86-143-00201 T50126	IH	60300	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO	IN-85-770-002	QTC	WELDER'S CERTIFICATION CARD WAS BACK-DATED AROUND 30 DAYS AFTER WELDER FAILED TO HAVE HIS CARD UP-DATED. CONSTRUCTION CONCERN. (NAMES/DETAILS KNOWN TO QTC AND RELEASE OF THIS INFORMATION COULD JEOPARDIZE CI'S CONFIDENTIALITY). CI HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-19-SQN R1)
02	WE	50319	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			
03	WE	50403	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
IN -86-167-X0601 T50137	IH	60300	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO	IN-85-770-002	QTC	WELDER CERTIFICATION CARD HAS BEEN FALSIFIED. (DETAILS TO THE SPECIFIC CASE ARE KNOWN TO QTC AND WITHHELD TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENTIALITY). CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN. CI HAS NO MORE INFORMATION. NO FOLLOW-UP REQUIRED. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-19-SQN R1)
02	WE	50319	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SS NA			
03	WE	50403	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SS			

CATEGORY: WE NON QA/QC WELDING
SUBCATEGORY: 50319 WBN CONCERNS WITH NO GENERIC APPLICABILITY TO SQN

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHR D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
IN -86-167-00501 T50130	IH	60300	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO	IN-85-770-002	QTC	CI IS CONCERNED THAT WELDER RE-QUALS (UPDATES) HAV E BEEN BACK DATED. (DETAILS ARE KNOWN TO QTC, WIT HELD DUE TO CONFIDENTIALITY.) CONSTR. DEPT. CONCE RN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. FOLLOW UP REQ UIRED. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-19-SQN R1)
02	WE	50319	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			
03	WE	50403	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
WI -85-003-X0201 T50136	IH	60300	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO	IN-85-770-002	QTC	WELDER CERTIFICATION CARD FALSIFIED. (DETAILS TO THE SPECIFIC CASE ARE KNOWN TO QTC AND WITHHELD TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENTIALITY). CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CON CERN. CI HAS NO MORE INFORMATION. NO FOLLOWUP RE QUIRED. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-19-SQN R1)
02	WE	50319	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			
03	WE	50403	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
WI -85-003-00101 T50137	IH	60300	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA NO	IN-85-770-002	QTC	WELDER'S CERTIFICATION CARD UPDATE IS INCORRECT (B ACKDATED). TIME FRAME MAY 27-JUNE 3, 1985. WELDER PERFORMING DUTIES IN TURBINE BLDG. UNIT #2. (NAMES /DETAILS TO THE SPECIFIC CASE ARE KNOWN TO QTC AND WITHHELD TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENTIALITY). CONSTRUCTI ON DEPT. CONCERN. CI HAS NO MORE INFORMATION. THIS CONCERN HAS BEEN REVISED TO DELETE AN ADDITIONAL CONCERN WHICH HAS BEEN ADDRESSED. (SQN ISSUES ADDR ESSED IN RPT WP-19-SQN R1)
02	QA	80519	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
03	WE	50319	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			
04	QA	80551	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
WI -85-030-00801 T50185	WE	50319	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA		QTC	THERE MAY HAVE BEEN THOUSANDS OF WELDS INSPECTED T HROUGH CARBO-ZINC PRIMER. HOWEVER, TVA REPORTS IN DICATE THAT ONLY 100-150 WELDS WERE INSPECTED IN T HIS MANNER EVEN THOUGH THERE IS NO DOCUMENTATION I DENTIFYING WHICH WELDS WERE INSPECTED THROUGH CARB O-ZINC PRIMER. NUC. POWER CONCERN. CI HAS NO ADDI TIONAL INFORMATION. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT W P-19-SQN R1)
02	WE	50102	S	WBN	1 Y N N N 2 SR NA NA NA			
03	WE	50202	S	WBN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SR NA NA			
04	WE	50402	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			

CATEGORY: WE NON QA/QC WELDING SUBCATEGORY: 50319 WBN CONCERNS WITH NO GENERIC APPLICABILITY TO SQN

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHR D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
WI -85-055-00101 T50135	WE	50319	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA	WI-85-055-001	QTC	THE WELDER CERTIFICATION TEST PRESENTLY BEING ADMINISTERED TO WELDERS AT WATTS BAR, IN THE RECERTIFICATION EFFORTS FOLLOWING A RECENT STOP WORK ORDER (NO. 25), IS NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH CODE (ASME SECTION 9). CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. NO FOLLOW-UP REQUIRED. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-19-SQN R1)
02	WE	50403	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
WI -85-056-00101 T50144	WE	50319	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA	WI-85-055-001	QTC	CI WAS TOLD (BY WELDERS WHO ARE IN THE PROCESS OF RETESTING) THAT THEY ARE BEING TESTED ON FLAT PLATE, IN THE FLAT POSITION, FOR WELDING PIPE USING THE T.I.G. AND S.M.A.W. PROCESSES. THIS IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ASME CODE REQUIREMENTS. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. NO FOLLOW UP REQUIRED. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-19-SQN R1)
02	WE	50403	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
WI -85-084-00101 T50178	WE	50319	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA	WI-85-084-001	QTC	CI REPORTED THAT A WELDER, WHOSE CERTIFICATIONS HAD EXPIRED, WAS ALLOWED TO CHECK OUT ROD FROM THE ROD SHACK. CI EXPRESSED THAT THIS INDICATES THAT THE "NEW" WELDER RECERTIFICATION PROGRAM STILL DOES NOT WORK. NAMES KNOWN. CONSTRUCTION DEPT CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. INCIDENT OCCURRED 10/85. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-19-SQN R1)
02	WE	50403	S	WBN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			

27 CONCERNS FOR CATEGORY WE SUBCATEGORY 50319

REFERENCE - ECPS120J-ECPS121C
FREQUENCY - REQUEST
ONP - ISSS - RHM

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR POWER
EMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM SYSTEM (ECPS)
EMPLOYEE CONCERN INFORMATION BY CATEGORY/SUBCATEGORY

RUN TIME - 11:45:02
RUN DATE - 12/17/87

CATEGORY: WE NON QA/QC WELDING
SUBCATEGORY: 50320 UNDERSIZE SOCKET WELDS ON THE SAFETY INJECTION SYS

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHRD	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
SQM-86-008-00101 T50263	WE	50320	N	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SS NA		QTC	WELDS ON PIPING IN ACCUMULATOR ROOM #5, REACTOR II , SPECIFICALLY SOCKET WELDS OF THE SAFETY INJECTIO N SYSTEM, ARE UNDERSIZED. NUCLEAR POWER DEPARTMEN T CONCERN. NO FURTHER INFORMATION IN FILE. (SQN I SSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-20-SQN R1)

1 CONCERNS FOR CATEGORY WE SUBCATEGORY 50320

CATEGORY: HE NON QA/QC WELDING
SUBCATEGORY: 50321 WELD MATERIAL SUBSTITUTION AND QUALITY

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHRD	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
DHT-85-001	01	HE	50321	N SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SS NA		OECP	WELDING RODS ARE OF POOR QUALITY. WELD PROCEDURES CALL FOR E705-3 WELD ROD BUT ONLY E705-6 WELD RODS ARE ON SITE. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-21-SQN R0)

1 CONCERNS FOR CATEGORY HE SUBCATEGORY 50321

CATEGORY: WE NON QA/QC WELDING
SUBCATEGORY: 50322 INADEQUATE WELD PROCEDURE

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHRD	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
JLH-85-003	01	WE	50322	N SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA		OECP	THIS CONCERN WAS NOT DOCUMENTED PER SQA166 BUT HAS BEEN INCLUDED IN THE EMPLOYEE CONCERN LOG. A WELD PROCEDURE UTILIZED FOR WELDING GAMMA PLUGS IN PIPING IS ADEQUATE FOR THE JOINT IN QUESTION. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-22-SQN R0)

1 CONCERNS FOR CATEGORY WE SUBCATEGORY 50322



CATEGORY: WE NON QA/QC WELDING SUBCATEGORY: 50323 CONTROL OF UNUSED WELD MATERIAL

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHR D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
XX -85-124-00101 T50205	MP	71101	S	SQN	1 N N N N 2 NA NA NA NA	XX-85-124-001	QTC	SEVERAL 55 GALLON BARRELS OF UNUSED WELD RODS WERE BURIED ON A HILL NEXT TO THE CEMETARY AT SEQUOYAH . AS SOON AS THE BARRELS WERE DUMPED, THEY HAD A DOZER COVER THEM OVER. 1980, 1981. CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN. CI HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. -GENERIC CONCERN- (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP -23-SQN R0)
02	WE	50323	S	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA NO NA			

1 CONCERNS FOR CATEGORY WE SUBCATEGORY 50323

REFERENCE - ECPS120J-ECPS121C
FREQUENCY - REQUEST
ONP - ISSS - RHM

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
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EMPLOYEE CONCERN INFORMATION BY CATEGORY/SUBCATEGORY

RUN TIME - 11:45:02
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CATEGORY: WE NON QA/QC WELDING
SUBCATEGORY: 50324 IMPROPER WELDING CERTIFICATION

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHRD	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ NB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
JLH-85-002	01	WE	50124	S SQN	1 Y N N N 2 SS NA NA NA		OECP	THIS CONCERN WAS NOT DOCUMENTED PER SQA166 BUT HAS BEEN INCLUDED IN THE EMPLOYEE CONCERN LOG. WELDERS FROM MUSCLE SHOALS MAY NOT HAVE RECEIVED THE APPROPRIATE NUMBER OF BEND TESTS WHEN TAKING WELD QUALIFICATION TESTS. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-24-SQN R0)
	02	WE	50203	S SQN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SS NA NA			
	03	WE	50324	S SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SS NA			
	04	WE	50424	S SQN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SS			

1 CONCERNS FOR CATEGORY WE SUBCATEGORY 50324



REFERENCE - ECPS120J-ECPS121C
FREQUENCY - REQUEST
ONP - ISSS - RWM

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EMPLOYEE CONCERN INFORMATION BY CATEGORY/SUBCATEGORY

RUN TIME - 11:45:02
RUN DATE - 12/17/87

CATEGORY: WE NON QA/QC WELDING SUBCATEGORY: 50325 IMPROPER WELD REPAIR

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHRD	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
2850162005	01	OP 30803	S	NPS	1 Y Y Y Y 2 SS SS SS SS		NRC	TVA MAKES REPAIRS TO THEIR NUCLEAR PLANTS WHICH ARE NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ASME CODES, SUCH AS OVERLAYS, PATCHES, AND EVEN FURNATITE (SOPHISTICATED GLUE). (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN RPT WP-25-SQN R0)
	02	WE 50125	S	NPS	1 Y N N N 2 SS NA NA NA			
	03	WE 50236	S	NPS	1 N Y N N 2 NA SS NA NA			
	04	WE 50325	S	NPS	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SS NA			
	05	WE 50425	S	NPS	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SS			

1 CONCERNS FOR CATEGORY WE SUBCATEGORY 50325

CATEGORY: HE NON QA/QC WELDING SUBCATEGORY: 50399 SITE SPECIFIC REPORTS

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHRD	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ HB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
SQM-86-005-X0201 T50259	IH	60300	S	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA NO NA	I-86-115-SQN	QTC	WELDER CERTIFICATION TEST RECORDS WERE POTENTIALLY FALSIFIED FOR AN INDIVIDUAL (KNOWN), BY AGREEMENT BETWEEN ENGINEERING (KNOWN) AND GENERAL FOREMAN (KNOWN). OCCURRED IN MARCH 1985. ADDITIONAL DETAILS KNOWN. ANONYMOUS CONCERN. NO FOLLOW-UP REQUIRED. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN NSRS RPT I-85-115-SQN)
02	HE	50399	S	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SS NA			
SQM-86-005-00101 T50259	HE	50399	N	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SS NA	I-86-115-SQN	QTC	CRAFT INDIVIDUAL (KNOWN) WAS PASSED THROUGH THE WELDING TEST IN MARCH 1985, BY AGREEMENT BETWEEN ENGINEERING (KNOWN) AND THE GENERAL FOREMAN (KNOWN). THE INDIVIDUAL IS ALLEGED AS BEING INCAPABLE OF MAKING A PROPER WELD, AND EVERY WELD THE INDIVIDUAL HAS MADE IN THE CONTAINMENT AREA OF THE REACTOR BUILDING HAS HAD TO BE REDONE. ADDITIONAL DETAILS ARE KNOWN. ANONYMOUS CONCERN. NO FOLLOW-UP REQUIRED. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN NSRS RPT I-86-115-SQN)
XX -85-013-00101 T50039	HE	50399	N	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SS NA	XX-85-013-001	QTC	309 WELD ROD WAS USED TO WELD 316 STAINLESS PIPE AT SEQUOYAH UNIT 1. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN ERT RPT XX-85-013-001)
XX -85-041-00101 T50167	HE	50399	N	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SS NA	I-85-756-WBN	QTC	AT SEQUOYAH, A WELD WAS MADE IN '79 OR '80 IN DIESEL GENERATOR BUUILDING, UNIT 1, USING THE WRONG TYPE ROD TO WELD CARBON STEEL PIPE TO STAINLESS STEEL PIPE. A COVER PASS USING THE CORRECT ROD WAS RUN OVER THE EXISTING WELD. CONSTRUCTION DEPT CONCERN. CI HAS NO MORE INFORMATION. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN NSRS RPT I-85-756-SQN)
XX -85-054-00101 T50092	IH	60300	S	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA NO NA	I-85-346-SQN	QTC	SEQUOYAH- QC HOLDPOINTS ARE SIGNED OFF BY CRAFTSMEN(CRAFT KNOWN) PERFORMING THE WORK. PERSONAL FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN INSPECTORS & CRAFT ALLOW THIS TO OCCUR WITHOUT BEING REPORTED. TIME FRAME IS BETWEEN 1979 TO 1984. NO SPECIFICES PROVIDED. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN NSRS RPT I-85-346-SQN)
02	HE	50399	S	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SS NA			



REFERENCE - ECPS120J-ECPS121C
FREQUENCY - REQUEST
ONP - ISSS - RHH

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR POWER
EMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM SYSTEM (ECPS)
EMPLOYEE CONCERN INFORMATION BY CATEGORY/SUBCATEGORY

RUN TIME - 11:45:02
RUN DATE - 12/17/87

CATEGORY: WE NON QA/QC WELDING
SUBCATEGORY: 50399 SITE SPECIFIC REPORTS

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHRD	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ NB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
XX -85-065-00101 T50163	WE	50399	N	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SS NA	I-85-750-SQN	QTC	DURING SPRING OUTAGE (FEB. OR MAR. 1984) AT SEQUOYAH, CI WITNESSED 2 ISI INSPECTORS (NAMES KNOWN) FROM BASELINE GROUP PERFORMING "REMOTE VISUAL INSPECTIONS" ON ERCW SYSTEM RIGID PIPE SUPPORTS IN AUXILIARY BUILDING ELEVATION 669' ON HORIZONTAL PIPE RUNS OFF THE CEILING. CI DEFINES "REMOTE VISUAL INSPECTIONS" AS PERFUNCTORY, POORLY PERFORMED VISUAL INSPECTIONS MADE FROM REMOTE DISTANCES WITHOUT ACTUALLY VERIFYING THE MANDATORY INSPECTION ATTRIBUTES (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN NSRS RPT I-85-750-SQN)
XX -85-068-00701 T50138	WE	50399	N	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SS NA	I-85-636-SQN	QTC	SEQUOYAH - TVA MAY HAVE MANUFACTURED A SPOOL PIECE TO REPLACE, UNDER ASME SECTION XI, A DRAVO ASME-CLASS SPOOL PIECE. WHEN THE SPOOL PIECE WAS REPLACED, THE CODE NAMEPLATE FROM THE DRAVO SPOOL PIECE WAS REMOVED, AND AFFIXED TO THE TVA MANUFACTURED SPOOL. THIS MAY HAVE BEEN NOTED BY A COGNIZANT INSPECTION INDIVIDUAL (POSITION KNOWN), AND NOT REPORTED DUE TO THE INDIVIDUAL NOT WANTING TO GET INVOLVED. CONST DEPT CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFO. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN NSRS RPT I-85-636-SQN)
XX -85-069-X1301 T50216	IH	60300	S	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA NO NA	I-85-373-NPS	QTC	CHATTANOOGA: EMPLOYEES' OJT (ON THE JOB TRAINING) RECORDS HAVE BEEN FALSIFIED. (DETAILS TO THE SPECIFIC CASE ARE KNOWN TO QTC AND WITHHELD TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENTIALITY). NUCLEAR POWER CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN NSRS RPT I-85-373-NPS)
02	WE	50399	S	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SS NA			
XX -85-069-00101 T50180	IH	60300	S	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA NO NA	I-85-373-NPS	QTC	SEQUOYAH. MANY EMPLOYEES ARE CERTIFIED BUT ARE NOT QUALIFIED. THEY DO NOT HAVE ENOUGH ON THE JOB TRAINING (OJT) EVEN THOUGH IT IS DOCUMENTED THAT THEY DO HAVE ENOUGH OJT. THE CONCERN EXISTED FROM 1980 TO PRESENT. DETAILS KNOWN TO QTC, WITHHELD TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENTIALITY. NUC POWER CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. NO FOLLOW UP REQUIRED. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN NSRS RPT I-85-373-NPS)
02	QA	80351	S	SQN	1 Y Y N Y 2 SS SS NA SS			
03	WE	50399	S	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SS NA			
04	QA	80351	S	SQN	1 Y Y Y Y 2 SS SS SS SS			

REFERENCE - ECPS120J-ECPS121C
FREQUENCY - REQUEST
ONP - ISSS - RUN

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR POWER
EMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM SYSTEM (ECPS)
EMPLOYEE CONCERN INFORMATION BY CATEGORY/SUBCATEGORY

RUN TIME - 11:45:02
RUN DATE - 12/17/87

CATEGORY: WE NON QA/QC WELDING
SUBCATEGORY: 50399 SITE SPECIFIC REPORTS

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHRD	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL / 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ NB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
XX -85-069-00301 T50180	QA	80113	S	SQN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SS	I-85-373-NPS	QTC	SEQUOYAH: VERY OFTEN, REJECTED ITEMS ARE ACCEPTED BY SOME ONE OTHER THAN A SUPERVISOR OR A HIGHER L EVEL (GRADE). TO ILLUSTRATE THE POINT, C/I STATED THAT THE SUPERVISOR WILL SEND ANOTHER EXAMINER/IN SPECTOR WITH LESS QUALIFICATION AND EXPERIENCE TO RE-EXAMINE THE ONCE REJECTED ITEMS AND WILL GET AC CEPTANCE. C/I HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. NUC. P OWER CONCERN. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN NSRS RPT I-85-738-SQN)
02	WE	50399	S	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SS NA			
03	QA	80125	S	SQN	1 Y Y N N 2 SS SS NA NA			
04	QA	80161	S	SQN	1 Y Y N Y 2 SS SS NA SS			
XX -85-069-00701 T50180	QA	80301	S	BLN	1 Y Y N N 2 SR SR NA NA	I-85-373-NPS	QTC	BELLEFONTE:MANY EMPLOYEES ARE CERTIFIED BUT ARE NO T QUALIFIED. THEY DO NOT HAVE ENOUGH ON THE JOB T RAINING (OJT) EVEN THOUGH IT IS DOCUMENTED THAT TH EY DO HAVE ENOUGH OJT. DETAILS KNOWN TO QTC, WITH HELD DUE TO CONFIDENTIALITY. NUC POWER CONCERN. C/I HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. (SQN ISSUES ADDRES SED IN NSRS RPT I-85-373-NPS)
02	WE	50399	S	BLN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			
03	QA	80351	S	BLN	1 Y Y Y Y 2 SR SR SR SR			
XX -85-083-00101 T50144	WE	50399	N	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA	I-85-652-SQN	QTC	SEQUOYAH: INDIVIDUAL EXPRESSED THAT DURING PREVIOU S EMPLOYMENT AT SEQUOYAH, WELDING INSPECTION WAS N OT AS STRICT AS IT IS AT WBNP. THE CONCERN IS THA T EITHER SEQUOYAH WAS NOT PROPERLY INSPECTED, OR T HAT WBNP IS EXCESSIVELY INSPECTED, AND UNDULY INCR EASES THE COST OF WELDING. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFO RMATION. NO FOLLOW UP REQUIRED. (SQN ISSUES ADDRE SSED IN NSRS RPT I-85-652-SQN)
XX -85-086-00301 T50147	EN	22201	S	SQN	1 Y Y N Y 2 SR SR NA SR	I-85-560-SQN	QTC	SEQUOYAH: A DESIGN DEFICIENCY HAS A WRONG WELD REQ UIRED ON BOX HANGERS WHICH, IF PERFORMED PER DESIG N, CAUSES THE WELD TO RUN INTO THE PIPE (SS OR CAR BON STEEL CODE PIPE). CONSTRUCTION DEPT CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. NO FOLLOWUP REQUI RED. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN NSRS RPT I-85-560-SQ N)
02	WE	50399	S	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			

CATEGORY: WE NON QA/QC WELDING
SUBCATEGORY: 50399 SITE SPECIFIC REPORTS

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHRD	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
XX -85-088-00301 T50230	IH	60300	S	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA NO NA	XX-85-088-003	QTC	KNOXVILLE: SEQUOYAH WELDING CERTIFICATIONS WERE AL TERED BY THE USE OF CORRECTION FLUID BEFORE THEY W ERE PHOTOGRAPHED IN KNOXVILLE. PROCESS MARKINGS S UCH AS FILE INDEXES AND PAGE COUNTS, AS WELL AS A NY MARKS, NOTATIONS, OR ANY DATA THAT DID NOT LOOK LIKE ENGINEERING DATA ON THE BACK OF THE DOCUMENT , WERE DELETED WITH CORRECTION FLUID. DEPARTMENT KNOWN. CONSTRUCTION DEPARTMENT CONCERN. CI HAS N O FURTHER INFORMATION. NO FOLLOW UP REQUIRED. (SQ N ISSUES ADDRESSED IN ERT RPT XX-85-088-003)
02	WE	50399	S	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			
XX -85-100-00101 T50158	IH	60300	S	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA NO NA	XX-85-100-001	QTC	SEQUOYAH: AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF WELDS MAY HAVE BEEN IMPROPERLY REPAIRED. DETAILS KNOWN TO QTC, WITHHELD DUE TO CONFIDENTIALITY. CONSTR. DEPT. CO NCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. NO FOLLOWU P REQUIRED. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN ERT RPT XX-85 -100-001)
02	WE	50399	S	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			
XX -85-101-00601 T50162	WE	50399	N	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA	XX-85-101-006	QTC	SEQUOYAH: A WELDER PERFORMED WELDS WITHOUT HAVING THE PROPER CERTIFICATION. DETAILS KNOWN TO QTC, WITHELD DUE TO CONFIDENTIALITY. CONSTRUCTION DEPT CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. NO FOLL OWUP REQUIRED. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN ERT RPT XX -85-101-006)
XX -85-102-01101 T50172	WE	50243	S	SQN	1 N Y N N 2 NA SR NA NA	I-85-735-SQN	QTC	SEQUOYAH: NDE INSPECTORS CAN ONLY WRITE A NOTICE O F INSPECTION ON IN-SERVICE RELATED DEFECTS. PRESE RVICE RELATED DEFECTS CAN ONLY BE IDENTIFIED BY A MAINTENANCE REQUEST. NUCLEAR POWER DEPT. CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. NO FOLLOW UP REQU IRED. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN NSRS RPT I-85-735-S QN)
02	WE	50399	S	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA			
03	WE	50135	S	SQN	1 Y N N N 2 SR NA NA NA			
04	WE	50426	S	SQN	1 N N N Y 2 NA NA NA SR			
XX -85-108-00101 T50175	WE	50399	N	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SS NA	I-85-776-SQN	QTC	SEQUOYAH: C/I STATES WELDS IN UNIT #1 ACCUMULATOR ROOMS AND/OR FAN ROOMS WERE NEVER INSPECTED. TIME FRAME IS NINE OR TEN YEARS AGO. WELDS ON 2" STAIN LESS STEEL (SOCKET WELDS) AND HANGERS ON THE RADIU S PIPE IN THOSE AREAS. CONST. DEPT. CONCERN. C/I HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFO. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN N SRS RPT I-85-776-SQN)

CATEGORY: WE NON QA/QC WELDING SUBCATEGORY: 50399 SITE SPECIFIC REPORTS

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHRD	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
XX -85-108-00201 T50175	WE	50399	N	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SS NA	I-85-776-SQN	QTC	SEQUOYAH: PROGRAMATIC BREAKDOWN ON THE WELD INSPECTION PROCESS. NINE OR TEN YEARS AGO C/I STATES THAT SOME WELDS ON 2" STAINLESS STEEL SOCKET WELDS WERE NOT INSPECTED AS REQUIRED. CONST. DEPT. CONCERN. C/I HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFO. (SQN ISSUES ADDRESSED IN NSRS RPT I-85-776-SQN)

19 CONCERNS FOR CATEGORY WE SUBCATEGORY 50399

ATTACHMENT B

CONCERN	DESCRIPTION OF ISSUES	COMMENTS
EX-85-021-001 EX-85-039-001 IN-85-234-001 DHT-85-001 IN-85-247-001 IN-85-337-002 IN-85-352-002 IN-85-411-002 IN-85-424-001 IN-85-424-004 IN-85-424-006 IN-85-424-007 IN-85-426-001 IN-85-441-003 IN-85-453-009 IN-85-454-004 IN-85-600-001 IN-85-672-003 IN-86-047-001 IN-86-150-001 IN-86-158-006 IN-86-167-001 WI-85-041-001 WI-85-053-004 XX-85-013-001 XX-85-041-001 XX-85-068-006 XX-85-124-001	Weld rod program does not meet code requirements for traceability. Inadequate control of weld rod. Lack of portable rod ovens to protect coated electrodes from moisture absorption. Several 55 gallon barrels of weld rod were buried. Poor quality E-7018 electrodes. Administrative practices for return of filler material. Weld material substitution and improper rod usage.	The SQN program for traceability and control of weld material meets the requirements of ANSI/AWS D1.1 Section 4, ASME Section III NB-4000 and ASME Section XI IWB-4000. The quality of the electrodes purchased meets the requirements of ASME Sections II and III. These issues have been addressed by Weld Project Evaluation Reports WP-01, 12, 14, 21, 23-SQN, NSRS reports I-85-756-SQN and XX-85-013-001.
BEM-85-001-001 BEM-85-001-002 BFM-85-001-001 BFM-85-001-002 EX-85-059-001 IN-85-007-001 IN-85-134-002 IN-85-192-002 IN-85-212-001 IN-85-271-001 IN-85-273-001	The process specification permitted inspection of AWS welds through carbo-zinc primer. Inspectors did not understand the coating thickness limit for inspecting primed welds. There may have been/were welds inspected through paint.	Process Specification 3.C.5.4 is site unique to Watts Bar, and was not implemented at SQN. This issue has been addressed by Weld Project Evaluation Report WP-02-SQN.

CONCERN	DESCRIPTION OF ISSUES	COMMENTS
IN-85-282-002 IN-85-406-002 IN-85-406-003 IN-85-451-001 IN-85-458-001 IN-85-476-004 IN-85-767-003 IN-85-981-001 IN-86-019-001 NS-85-001-001 PH-85-040-001 SQM-85-001-001	Welding inspection tools were not issued to welding inspectors.	TVA did provide inspection tools to welding inspectors through the construction era and continues to provide inspection tools today as required. This issue has been addressed by Weld Project Evaluation Report WP-04-SQN.
SQM-85-001-002 SQM-86-008-001 WBM-85-001-001 WBM-85-001-002 WI-85-013-003 WI-85-030-007 WI-85-041-002 WI-85-041-006 WI-85-041-008 WI-85-081-007 XX-85-054-001 XX-85-065-001 XX-85-069-001	Qualification of welding inspectors. Topical Report not in accordance with ANSI N45.2.6.	TVA's welding inspectors were certified in accordance with TVA's commitments as specified in the Topical Report. This issue has been addressed by Weld Project Evaluation Report WP-06-SQN.
XX-85-069-001 R1 XX-85-069-003 R1 XX-85-069-007 XX-85-069-X13 XX-85-083-001 XX-85-102-011 XX-85-108-001 XX-85-108-002	Welds over 6 feet off the floor have not been painted. Unpainted welds on conduit and supports. Rust weakened welds. Sandblasting removes metal from welds.	A comprehensive reinspection of the coatings program is addressed by CAR-86-01-001 and CATD WP-08-SQN-001. This issue has been addressed by Weld Project Evaluation Report WP-08-SQN.
	Prior to 1979, there was no inspection criteria for use by inspection personnel.	Construction Specification G-29 (issued 07-22-71) contained the weld inspection and documentation

CONCERN	DESCRIPTION OF ISSUES	COMMENTS
		requirements. This issue has been addressed by Weld Project Evaluation Report WP-09-SQN.
	Surface grinding of welds may mask surface defects.	Surface grinding of welds is permitted by the ASME and AWS Codes. This issue has been addressed by Weld Project Evaluation Report WP-11-SQN.
	Foremen perform pre-weld inspections, which is not in accordance with The Topical Report, ANSI N45.2.5 or AWS D1.1.	This issue had been evaluated by NSRS and determined not to be in violation of AWS D1.1 and ANSI N45.2.5. This issue was also reported to the USNRC under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.55(e), and again found to be an acceptable practice. However, SQN ONP did not perform the pre-weld fit up surveillances as required. This item is addressed by SQN-CAR-86-03-01. This issue has been addressed by Weld Project Evaluation Report WP-16-SQN.
	Undersized socket welds on the safety injection system.	Construction NCRs 2398, 2630 and the final 50.55(e) report (A17 810406 022) document the identification and

CONCERN	DESCRIPTION OF ISSUES	COMMENTS
		resolution of this issue. This issue has been addressed by Weld Project Evaluation Report WP-20-SQN.
	QC holdpoints are signed off by craftsman performing the work.	The use of computerized operation checklists, individual inspection data cards, and shift inspection logs ensure that inspections were properly performed by qualified individuals. This issue has been addressed by NSRS Report I-85-346-SQN.
	Inadequate OJT records for inservice inspection and QC personnel for ONP. Employee's OJT records have been falsified.	The need for improvement in this area is recognized and is being evaluated under CATDs I-85-373-NPS-01-009, 02-010, 03-011, & 04-012. This issue has been addressed by NSRS Report I-85-373-NPS.
	NDE inspectors cannot write a notice of indication for PSI defects.	NOIs are prepared for either preservice or inservice defects that are in the scope of the examination area. This issue has been addressed by NSRS Report I-85-735-SQN.
	Acceptance of previously rejected NDE items.	This issue had been investigated by NSRS and determined that no violation has occurred.

CONCERN	DESCRIPTION OF ISSUES	COMMENTS
		However, NSRS did find some procedure weaknesses. Corrective action is tracked on CATDs I-85-738-01-015 and I-85-738-02-016. This issue has been addressed by NSRS Report I-85-738-SQN.
	Performance of remote visual inspection of rigid pipe supports.	NSRS investigated this issue and found no violations. This issue has been addressed by NSRS Report I-85-750-SQN.
	2" stainless steel socket welds and hangers in unit 1 accumulator and/or fan room not inspected. 9 or 10 years ago the inspection program did not insure that all stainless steel socket welds were inspected.	NSRS investigated this issue and determined that controls existed to insure that all welds requiring inspection were inspected. This issue has been addressed by NSRS Report I-85-776-SQN.
	SQN weld inspection was not as strict as WBN.	Welds were inspected under an inspection and QC program which meet the QA and Code requirements. This issue has been addressed by NSRS Report I-85-652-SQN.
EX-85-008-001 EX-85-021-002 EX-85-042-003 IN-85-113-003	Welders performance qualification continuity records have been backdated and falsified.	A detailed review by NSRS did not find any evidence of falsification,

CONCERN	DESCRIPTION OF ISSUES	COMMENTS
IN-85-247-002 IN-85-303-001 IN-85-346-003 IN-85-352-001 IN-85-424-011 IN-85-426-002 IN-85-480-004 IN-85-493-004 IN-85-532-005 IN-85-627-036 IN-85-706-001 IN-85-770-002 IN-85-778-001 IN-85-815-001 IN-85-835-002 IN-85-940-X04 JLH-85-002 JLH-85-003 PH-85-052-002 PH-85-052-X03 SQM-86-005-001	Inadequate basis for welder's qualification continuity updates. SQN welding certifications were altered by the use of correction fluid.	backdating, or use of correction fluid. Implementation errors by ONP were found which are being addressed by SQ-CAR-85-019-014. The basis for qualification updates satisfies requirements and parallels industry practice. These issues have been addressed by Weld Project Evaluation Report WP-03-SQN and NSRS Reports I-85-135-SQN, XX-85-088-003, and XX-85-101-006.
SQM-86-005-X02 XX-85-045-001 XX-85-049-001 XX-85-049-X03	Welders performance tests do not test a welders ability.	Welders are tested in accordance with the governing codes.
XX-85-088-003 XX-85-100-001 XX-85-101-006	Adequacy of TVA welder training program.	Welder training was performed at SQN. When sufficient competence was demonstrated, the trainee was given a performance qualification test in accordance with the rules of the governing code. This issue has been addressed by Weld Project Evaluation Report WP-07-SQN.
	Suitability of welding equipment.	There are no industry standards which mandate the use of specific welding equipment. This issue has been addressed by Weld Project Evaluation Report WP-13-SQN.

CONCERN	DESCRIPTION OF ISSUES	COMMENTS
	Craft passed through welding test shop and not capable of making proper weld.	Due to some out-of-position welding problems, a welder's performance was being monitored closely for at least 1 month, and if his welds were not up to the required standards, the welder was to be retested per CATD I-86-115-SQN-01-017.
	Welder's certification test record falsified.	No falsification was found by NSRS. This issue has been addressed by NSRS Report I-86-115-SQN.
	Welders tested at Muscle Shoals for SQN ONP did not have appropriate number of bend specimens. Welder performed welds without the proper certification.	Through the ongoing QA program and the issuance of CATD WP-24-SQN-018, three welders were identified as being tested by Muscle Shoals for SQN ONP who were issued certifications based on two bend tests. This issue has been addressed by Weld Project Evaluation Report WP-24-SQN.
	Inadequate weld procedure for gamma plug.	Weld procedure utilized for welding gamma plugs in piping is adequate. Maintenance request was revised to reference this procedure. This issue has been addressed by Weld Project Evaluation Report WP-22-SQN.

CONCERN	DESCRIPTION OF ISSUES	COMMENTS
	Improper weld repairs	This concern was not substantiated during a NSRS investigation. This issue has been addressed by NSRS Report XX-85-100-001.
IN-85-339-005 PH-85-012-X03	Emergency Gas Treatment (EGT) piping is too close to wall for access for welding. Welds should be made and inspected from the I.D. Welding and brazing inspections may have been deleted from the QA Program.	Duct piping was inspected from the I.D. and found acceptable. This issue has been addressed by Weld Project Evaluation Report WP-05-SQN.
WI-85-030-010	Corrective actions specified in QAE-2 may not have been implemented at SQN.	SQN was specifically not included in this evaluation. This issue has been addressed by Weld.Project Evaluation Report WP-10-SQN.
EX-85-039-003 IN-85-405-001 IN-85-613-001 WBP-86-007-001 XX-85-086-003	Box anchor weld configuration limits pipe movement. Lack of provisions for expansion may cause inservice fatigue. Possibility of thermal stress degrading piping where large fillet welds on box anchors attach to pipe. Possibility of fatigue in service and material degradation due to continuous welding using large diameter electrodes.	WBN NCR 6264 and CATDs I-85-560-SQN-01-13 and I-85-560-SQN-02-14 have been issued to address these issues at all TVA nuclear facilities. These issues have been addressed by Weld Project Evaluation Report WP-15-SQN and NSRS Report I-85-560-SQN.

CONCERN	DESCRIPTION OF ISSUES	COMMENTS
IN-85-007-003 IN-85-127-001 IN-85-657-001	Vendor welds are not of the same quality as TVA field welds. Vendor welds are not inspected in the field.	Both the field and vendor welds are required to meet applicable code requirements although the final appearance of TVA field welds is generally better than vendor welds. This issue has been addressed by Weld Project Evaluation Report WP-17-SQN.
XX-85-098-001	Laminations in pipe prevented making an acceptable weld.	Laminations of sufficient size to cause porosity during welding are ground back and sealed-off by welding. This issue has been addressed by Weld Project Evaluation Report WP-18-SQN.
2850162005	TVA makes repairs to their nuclear plants which are not in accordance with ASME Codes, such as overlays, patches, and even furmanite.	To date, TVA has performed weld overlay repairs at BFN and reinforcement patch repairs at SQN. The repairs were performed in accordance the ASME Section XI Code. This issue has been addressed by Weld Project Evaluation Report WP-25-SQN. The Furmanite issue is addressed by Operations Subcategory Report 30800.

CONCERN	DESCRIPTION OF ISSUES	COMMENTS
XX-85-068-007	TVA manufactured a spool piece to replace, under Section XI, a Dravo spool piece.	Dravo did not supply spool pieces for SQN. This issue has been addressed by NSRS Report I-85-636-SQN.