



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 125 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-33

AMENDMENT NO. 120 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-52

AMENDMENT NO. 96 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-68

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1, 2 AND 3

DOCKET NOS. 50-259, 50-260 AND 50-296

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated April 8, 1985 (TVA BFNP TS-208), the Tennessee Valley Authority (the licensee or TVA) requested amendments to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68 for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2 and 3. The proposed amendments would (1) clarify requirements relating to main steam line flow instruments, (2) delete expired requirements added August 15, 1984 to provide emergency temporary relief of operability requirements for a containment air dilution valve, (3) clarify wording used to refer to various fire protection systems, (4) correct an error in a table describing whether scram discharge tank switches are analog or digital, and (5) update and correct the table of "Testable Penetrations with Double O-Ring Seals".

2.0 DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION

Main Steam Line Flow Instrumentation

The proposed change would revise a note in Technical Specifications Table 3.2.A to require that the high main steam line flow detection trip function contain at least one operable sensor per trip system in place of requiring simply any two sensors to be operable. This change is needed to ensure that FSAR (Section 7.3.3.7.a) single failure criteria are satisfied and is acceptable. High main steam line flow must actuate both trip systems to initiate main steam line isolation.

Containment Air Dilution (Unit 1 only)

On August 15, 1984 the staff issued Amendment No. 109 to the Unit 1 Technical Specifications. This amendment added Sections 3.7.G.6, 3.7.G.7, and 4.7.G.2 which temporarily permitted Train A of the CAD system to be considered operable with valve FCV 84-8B inoperable. This provision was

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stated to be effective until "the first cold shutdown of Unit 1 after July 20, 1984 or until January 17, 1985, whichever occurs first". These events have since occurred and the amendment is thus no longer effective. Deletion of 3.7.G.6, 3.7.G.7, and 4.7.G.2 will restore the CAD system Technical Specifications to their prior requirements. This change is therefore acceptable.

Fire Protection Systems

The proposed change would revise the "Applicability" section of the Fire Protection Systems Technical Specifications to delete references to "high pressure water", "CO₂", and "fixed spray systems", and replace them with references to the "applicable fire suppression and/or detection system." The purpose this change is to preclude a possible misinterpretation that there is an automatic fire suppression system in the cable tunnel leading to the Intake Pumping Station, and fixed spray for all cable trays along the south wall of the Turbine Building on elevation 586. The existence of such systems may be inferred from the wording of the current Technical Specifications; however, the cable tunnel to the Intake Pumping Station has fire detectors only, and the Unit 3 cable tray penetrations into the Turbine Building, (which are less congested than those of Units 1 and 2) do not have fixed spray systems. This change provides clarifications necessary to make the Technical Specifications consistent with the installed fire protection system, and is acceptable based on consistency with the licensee's approved "Plan for Evaluation, Repair and Return to Service of Browns Ferry (March 22, 1975 fire)."

SDJV Level Switches (Unit 1 only)

Amendment No. 92 approved modifications to the scram discharge instrument volume (SDJV) level switches. The revised Technical Specification pages submitted by the licensee and issued by the staff incorrectly indicate that the replacement switches are of a Group B (analog) design. The switches are actually Group A (digital) switches. The proposed amendment corrects the error and is therefore acceptable.

Testable Penetrations with Double O-Ring Seals (Unit 1 only)

The requested amendments would revise Table 3.7.B "Testable Penetrations with Double O-Ring Seals". Fourteen penetrations would be added, reflecting modifications to flanges to make them testable. The modifications were required to enable the penetrations to be local leak rate tested as required by 10 CFR 50 Appendix J. The changes are therefore acceptable. The nomenclature for penetration X-35g would be changed from "TJP Drive" to "Spare". This is consistent with the as-constructed facility, as described in FSAR Fig. 7.5-23a, and is acceptable. Penetration X-213A would be deleted from the Table. The penetration, originally described as a "Construction Drain" in the original (June 1973) Technical Specifications, has been welded-up and no longer exists. This

change is therefore acceptable. Other minor changes in nomenclature for various penetrations have been requested. These changes are consistent with changes made by Amendment 78 for Unit 3 and are acceptable.

3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

The amendments involve a change in the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes in test requirements. The staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

4.0 CONCLUSION

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

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Dated: December 18, 1985

