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SUBJECT: Comments on SER, withdrawing 810623 comments. Format of original comments resulted in confusion & interpretation problems. Eight items require addl clarification, including actions specified in IE Bulletin 79-26, Revision 1.

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
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
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NORMAN W. CURTIS
Vice President-Engineering & Construction-Nuclear
770-5381

July 16, 1981



Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief
Licensing Branch No. 2
Division of Project Management
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION
SER REVIEW COMMENTS
ER 100450 FILE 841-2
PLA-880

Dear Mr. Schwencer:

On June 23, 1981, we sent you a letter (PLA-858) listing comments on the Safety Evaluation Report issued in June. After rereview, we have decided to withdraw that letter. We have concluded that the comments were insignificant (i.e. typographical errors), were resolved in subsequent documents such as Supplement No. 1 to the SER and FSAR revisions or were the subject of separate letters. In addition the formatting of the comments resulted in confusion and problems in interpretation.

There are, however, 8 items that require additional clarification. These are:

1. On page 4-12, in the third paragraph, the staff states that Susquehanna will take the actions specified in IE Bulletin 79-26, Revision 1, including destructive examinations of control blades. In our response to the Bulletin (PLA-623, February 11, 1981), we stated that no destructive examinations would be made because NRC would have sufficient data from current operating reactors long before Susquehanna reaches its first refueling outage. We believe that this approach satisfies NRC's concerns.
2. On page 6-29, in the second paragraph, the staff states that PP&L will use the LaSalle in-plant safety relief valve test to confirm the adequacy of the piping system design. In our response to a question generated by the Containment Systems Branch (PLA-805, June 10, 1981) we confirmed our verbal commitments to use the LaSalle test data to establish the difference between local and bulk pool temperatures to demonstrate that a maximum local pool temperature specification of 200 degrees fahrenheit will not be exceeded. These commitments did not include a commitment to confirm the adequacy of the Susquehanna piping system design.

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PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

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Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief
Page 2
July 16, 1981

3. On page 7-3, paragraph 6, the staff indicates that the Susquehanna Power Generation Control Complex design complies with R.G.1.75. While the design meets portions of R.G.1.75, it does not comply entirely since the design predated the regulatory guide. The exceptions to R.G.1.75 have been identified in FSAR Sections 3.13, 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3.
4. On page 9-22, Subsection 9.5.4.1, paragraph 2, the staff states that smoke detection has been provided in the main control board. The main control boards are small, ventilated cabinets containing primarily fire retardant cables. We believe that there is no need for additional smoke detection equipment, that the operators will readily detect a fire in the unlikely event that one should occur.
5. On page 9-23, in the first paragraph of Subsection 9.5.4.3, the staff indicates that certain fire protection features are installed within the containment. Since the containment will be inerted, we see no requirement to install additional features.

In the second paragraph, the staff states that PL agreed to provide an engineered oil collection system. Since the containment will be inerted, we see no requirement for this system, and we have not committed to it.

6. On page 22-3, second last paragraph, the staff indicates that the STA's will hold a bachelor's degree in engineering or related sciences. We have stated our commitment in terms of a bachelor's degree in engineering or science or its equivalent (PLA-659, March 16, 1981).
7. On page 22-53, item (b)(i), the staff states that the lines supplying the recirc pump seals are provided with remote manual isolation capability. The Susquehanna design does not currently contain remote manual valves on these lines, however they are automatically isolated.
8. On page 22-54, partial paragraph at top, the staff states that non-essential containment instrument lines contain automatic isolation valves. As described in the FSAR, the Susquehanna design does not use automatic isolation valves on instrument lines, however isolation protection is provided. Each instrument line contains an excess flow check valve immediately outside containment which isolates if too much flow passes through the line (as during a line break).

Very truly yours,



N. W. Curtis
Vice President-Engineering & Construction-Nuclear

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