

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 8407300200 DOC. DATE: 84/07/25 NOTARIZED: YES DOCKET #
 FACIL: 50-260 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2, Tennessee 05000260
 AUTH. NAME: MILLS, L.M. AUTHOR AFFILIATION: Tennessee Valley Authority
 REQIP. NAME: VENTON, H.R. RECIPIENT AFFILIATION: Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Director

SUBJECT: Forwards addl info supporting 840402 exemption request from test interval requirements of 10CFR50, App J, per 840717 telcon. Followup discussions indicate info re bellows & electrical penetrations adequately resolves NRC concerns.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: A017S COPIES RECEIVED: LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 4
 TITLE: OR Submittal: Append J Containment Leak Rate Testing

NOTES: NMSS/FCAF 1cy. 1cy NMSS/FCAF/PM. 05000260
 OL: 06/28/74

	RECIPIENT		COPIES			RECIPIENT		COPIES	
	ID	CODE/NAME	LTR	ENCL		ID	CODE/NAME	LTR	ENCL
	NRR	ORB2 BC	01	7	7				
INTERNAL:	ELD	HDS4	08	1	1	LFMB	R. DIGGS	1	0
	NRR	DSI/ASB		1	1	NRR	DSI/CSB	06	1
	<u>REG FILE</u>		04	1	1	RGN2		1	1
EXTERNAL:	AORS		07	10	10	LPDR	03	1	1
	NRC	PDR	02	1	1	NSIC	05	1	1
	NTIS			1	1				
NOTES:				2	2				

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

July 25, 1984

Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Denton:

In the Matter of the) Docket Nos. 50-260
Tennessee Valley Authority)

By my letter to you dated April 2, 1984, we submitted a request for exemption from the test interval requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant unit 2. In a July 17, 1984 telephone conference with members of your staff, we were requested to provide additional information in support of that request. The additional information requested is provided in the enclosure.

This information was provided by facsimile transmission to your staff on July 23, 1984. From followup discussions we understand that the information provided adequately resolves NRC concerns.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with us through the Browns Ferry Project Manager.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills

L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Licensing

Subscribed and sworn to before
me this 25th day of July, 1984.

Paulette J. White
Notary Public
My Commission Expires 9-5-84

Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
ATTN: James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Mr. R. J. Clark
Browns Ferry Project Manager
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
7920 Norfolk Avenue
Bethesda, Maryland 20814

8407300200 840725
PDR ADOCK 05000260
P PDR

A017
11

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

INVESTIGATION OF THE
ACTS AND OMISSIONS OF
THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
IN CONNECTION WITH THE
MURDER OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-100000)

RE: JAMES EARL RAY, AKA; ALLEGED ATTEMPT TO
OBTAIN PASSPORT FOR TRAVEL TO EUROPE;
ALLEGED ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN PASSPORT FOR TRAVEL
TO EUROPE; ALLEGED ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN PASSPORT
FOR TRAVEL TO EUROPE; ALLEGED ATTEMPT TO
OBTAIN PASSPORT FOR TRAVEL TO EUROPE.

On 10/10/68, SA [Name] advised that [Name] had
been contacted by [Name] who stated that [Name]
was attempting to obtain a passport for travel to
Europe. [Name] stated that [Name] was a
member of the [Name] and was attempting to
obtain a passport for travel to Europe.

[Name] stated that [Name] was a member of the
[Name] and was attempting to obtain a passport
for travel to Europe. [Name] stated that [Name]
was a member of the [Name] and was attempting to
obtain a passport for travel to Europe.

ADMINISTRATIVE

100-100000-1000

100-100000-1000

100-100000-1000

100-100000-1000

100-100000-1000

100-100000-1000

100-100000-1000

ENCLOSURE
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION SUPPORTING REQUEST FOR
APPENDIX J EXEMPTION
TVA LETTER DATED APRIL 2, 1984
BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT

Bellows (32 Bellows Total)

Sixteen (16) bellows located in the steam tunnel cannot be tested because of excessive heat stress. Temperatures in the steam tunnel during operation range from 150 to 160°F. BF 14.42 (stay time for heat stress graph) maximum temperature is 120°F and limits entry time to 10 minutes. The plant superintendent must authorize all entries in spaces where the temperature exceeds 115°F. Per the Safety Engineer, work has been attempted in spaces where the temperature was 160°F and the personnel could not withstand any exposure time. Estimated work times are 1/2-hour to remove each bellows cover, 1/4-hour to set up for each test, and 1/2-hour to replace each bellows cover.

Bellows in this category are:

X-7A IB&OB, X-7B IB&OB, X-7C IB&OB, X-7D IB&OB X-8 IB&OB, X-9A IB&OB,
X-9B IB&OB, X-10 IB&OB

Sixteen bellows can be tested, however, 8 of these are in areas where the temperature is expected to exceed 100°F which will present heat fatigue and heat stroke risk situations. Two other bellows are in a high heat and high radiation area (RWCU Hx room) the radiations level in the RWCU Hx room are 200 MR/HR general area with 10 R/HR contact on the RWCU Hx's. Estimated total exposure for the bellows in the RWCU Hx room is 600 MR versus 100 MR when tested during shutdown. The remaining 6 bellows are in relatively moderate heat and radiation areas, however, these bellows will be tested again after shutdown resulting in a doubling of the radiation exposure.

Bellows in high heat stress areas are:

X-11 IB&OB, X-12 IB&OB, X-13A IB&OB, X-13B IB&OB

Bellows in high heat and radiation areas are:

X-16A IB&OB, X-16B IB&OB, X-17 IB&OB,

Electrical Penetrations (32 Total)

Twenty-six (26) electrical penetrations are in relatively moderate temperatures and radiation areas. These penetrations can be tested during operation. However testing these penetrations during operation creates a risk of disrupting steady-state operation, thereby creating a possibility of unnecessary challenges to safety systems.

The electrical penetrations that are testable are:

X-100A, X-110B, X-110C, X-100D, X-100E, X-100F, X-100G, X-102, X-103, X-140A, X-104B, X-104C, X-104D, X-104E, X-104F, X-105D, X-106A, X-106B, X-107A, X-107B, X-108A, X-108B, X-109, X-110A, X-110B, X-219.

12

Six (6) electrical penetrations can not be tested at power. They are on the supply to the recirculation pumps. Power must be removed by opening the MG breakers. Pursuant to current technical specifications, the plant cannot be operated with only one recirculation loop in service for more than 24 hours.

The electrical penetrations that are not testable are: X-101A, X-101B, X-101C, X-101D, X-105B, X-105C.

T.I.P. Penetrations (3 Total)

Can test T.I.P. penetrations. General area is about 50 MR/HR (if T.I.P. have not been moved). Exposure is estimated at 150 MR for testing the 3 T.I.P. penetrations versus 20 MR for testing all 7 T.I.P. penetrations when shutdown. We believe the additional incremental exposure incurred by testing at power is unnecessary and not consistent with ALARA principles. T.I.P. penetrations to be tested are X-35D, X-35E, X-35E.

X-47 Power Operation Test can be tested. Will require about 200 MR total exposure versus 25 MR when tested during shutdown. General area is 200 MR/HR; maximum dose rate is 10 R/HR (on contact) at the RWCU HX.

The 8 shear lug inspections cover hatches can not be tested during operation. The unit will have to be shutdown and the drywell de-inerted before the shear lugs can be accessed.

Valves (66 Total)

Thirty-two (32) valves can not be tested because: (1) The unit must be shut down and the containment de-inerted to facilitate access to the valves, or (2) the unit must be shut down so that affected systems can be properly vented for testing.

The following valves are in this category:

2-1192, 2-1383, 33-785, 33-1070, 43-13, 43-14, 63-525, 63-526, 71-2, 71-3, 73-2, 73-3, 73-81, 74-54, 74-67, 74-68, 75-25, 75-26, 75-53, 75-54, 76-49, 76-50, 76-51, 76-52, 76-53, 76-55, 76-57, 76-59, 76-60, 76-61, 76-62, 76-67.

Ten (10) valves can not be tested because it would required entering a LCO condition of technical specifications in order to perform the local leak rate tests. In addition SIs must be performed on related safety systems in order to prove their operability. Performance of these SIs to accommodate local leak rate testing represents an unnecessary challenge to plant safety systems.

The following valves are in this category: 71-32, 71-592, 73-24, 73-609, 74-71, 74-72, 74-74, 74-75, 75-57, 75-58.

Three (3) valves present a potential technical specification problem in that they are part of the drywell ΔP system which must be inoperative during testing. There is a real risk of problems in maintaining the drywell ΔP within technical specification limits if those valves are tested during operation. These valves are 32-62, 32-63, 32-336.

Twenty-one (21) valves can be tested during operation, however, these valves will be tested again after shutdown in September. This will result in a doubling of the exposure incurred during conduct of the tests.

The following valves are in this category: 2-1143, 12-738, 12-742, 43-28A, 43-28B, 43-29A, 43-29B, 76-17, 76-18, 76-19, 84-8B, 84-8C, 84-8D 84-601, 84-602, 84-603, 90-254A, 90-254B, 90-255, 90-257A, 90-257B.

