

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401  
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

November 18, 1981



Director of Licensing  
Attention: Mr. Thomas A. Ippolito, Chief  
Operating Reactors Branch No. 2  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Mr. Ippolito:

In the Matter of the ) Docket No. 50-259  
Tennessee Valley Authority ) 50-260  
50-296

Your letter to H. G. Parris dated October 2, 1981 requested that TVA provide additional information regarding proposed technical specifications for scram discharge volume surveillance requirements (TVA BFNP TS 153). We have reviewed the Franklin Research Center request which was provided as an enclosure to your October 12, 1981 letter and are enclosing our response to the three items identified as requiring additional information.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

*L. M. Mills*  
L. M. Mills, Manager  
Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Subscribed and sworn to before  
me this 18<sup>th</sup> day of November 1981.

Paulette H. White  
Notary Public

My Commission Expires 9-5-84

Enclosure

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## ENCLOSURE

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION  
BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT  
TVA BFP TS 153

In response to your letter dated October 2, 1981 to H. G. Parris which transmitted Franklin Research Center's (FRC) request for information regarding TS 153, the FRC requests and each request's resolution are identified below.

Item

Provide a reference to that section of the Technical Specifications for Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station Units 1, 2, and 3 which indicates that the reactor protection system SDV water level-high consists of 2 OPERABLE channels containing two limit switches per trip system, for a total of 4 OPERABLE channels containing 4 limit switches per two trip system, making 1-out-of-2 taken twice logic.

Response

Browns Ferry Technical Specification Section 3.1 in conjunction with Table 3.1.A and Note 1 to Table 3.1.A indicate that the SDV water level high reactor scram function consists of four operable channels containing four switches for two trip systems, making 1-out-of-2 twice logic.

Item

1. Provide a reference to the pages of the Technical Specifications where CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations each refueling outage is specified, or
2. Provide technical bases why the CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations each refueling outage should not be performed.

Response

Browns Ferry Technical Specifications Table 4.1.B and Note 5 to that table require physical inspection and actuation of each channel once each operating cycle. Physical actuation upon the presence of liquid at the switch serves the purpose of a calibration.

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Item

Since the number of the operable channels per trip function is less than requested in the Model Technical Specifications, provide technical bases for it.

Response

Browns Ferry Technical Specification Table 3.2.C and Note 1 to this table require that there shall be two operable or tripped channels for each function. There is one switch per trip system with two trip systems. One of these switches may be inoperable for up to seven days while remaining in the untripped condition. These seven days are justified since the other operable channel must be functionally tested daily thereafter. Note 12 of Table 3.2.C allows this function to be bypassed in shutdown on refuel mode. In these modes, control rod withdrawal is limited to a maximum of one rod at one time and thus the requirements for a scram discharge volume are greatly reduced.

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