



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report Nos. 50-259/80-05, 50-260/80-05 and 50-296/80-05

Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority
500A Chestnut Street
Chattanooga, TN 37401

Facility Name: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

Docket Nos. 50-259, 50-260 and 50-296

License Nos. DPR-33, DPR-52 and DPR-68

Inspection at Browns Ferry near Decatur, Alabama

Inspector:

L. Modenos

3/4/80
Date Signed

Approved by:

A. Herdt
A. Herdt, Section Chief, RC&ES Branch

3/4/80
Date Signed

SUMMARY

Inspection on February 6-8, 1980

Areas Inspected

This special, announced inspection involved 16 inspector-hours on site in the area of seismic analysis for as-built safety-related piping systems (IE Bulletin 79-14).

Results

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

- *J. L. Harness, Assistant Plant Superintendent
- *G. T. Jones, Outage Director
- *D. N. Jent, Assistant Outage Director
- *J. B. Studdard, Operations Supervisor
- *J. R. Pittman, Instrumentation Maintenance Supervisor
- *R. T. Smith, QA Supervisor
- *R. Summers, Outage Engineer

NRC Resident Inspector

- *R. F. Sullivan

*Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on February 8, 1980 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

Not inspected.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5. (Open) Seismic Analysis for As-Built Safety-Related Piping System (IE Bulletin 79-14)

On January 29, 1980, while Unit 1 was down for refueling, the resident inspector at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFNP) identified to the licensee deficiencies with supports on instrumentation lines in the HPCI room. The licensee and their Engineering Design (EN DES) group reported that under a seismic event the instrumentation lines would fail and it would jeopardize the continued operation of the system. The licensee then instructed their Instrumentation and Operations personnel to inspect instrumentation panels and lines leading into safety-related systems for all 3 units. The NRC inspector reviewed the inspection findings and asked the licensee to verify the following items:

- a. Verify that all instrumentation systems lines had been inspected.



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- b. Verify that the present supports existing for the instrumentation lines are adequate.

The plant management agreed and issued a memorandum dated February 7, 1980 asking assistance from EN DES to verify that all the instrumentation lines had been inspected and to assign a designer to walk the lines and verify the supports.

The inspector reviewed the following LER's and documentation for corrective action as issued by BFNP:

BFRO - 50-259/79-18
BFRO - 50-259/79-32
BFRO - 50-259/80-05

Of the three LER's identified the inspector was not satisfied with the documentation presented on BFRO-50-259/80-05. The RBCCW system in Unit 1 was found to be missing 16 safety related supports. Since Unit 1 was down for refueling outage, and Unit 3 having just completed their inspections for the requirements of IEB 79-14, the concern was for Unit 2 which was operating without any inspection conducted in the inaccessible areas. TVA provided within their LER reasons why they felt confident that the supports in Unit 2 were installed. The reasoning was that Engineering Change Notice (ECN) No. L 1253 dated August 4, 1974 was issued for Units 2 and 3 to include the seismic restraints to the RBCCW system. Unit 1 restraints were under ECN No. L 1382. Since Unit 3 supports had recently been verified by inspection and that the same crew installed the supports, they reasoned that the supports in Unit 2 had been installed. Review of the ECN's by the inspector revealed that ECN No. L 1253 was improperly documented. The ECN was written to read that it affected both Units 2 and 3, when in fact, it was applicable to only Unit 2. Further investigation revealed that Unit 3 had ECN No. 1178 issued on September 9, 1974. The licensee could not locate documentation of installation of the safety related supports in Unit 2 for the RBCCW system. However, the licensee did provide the following photographs taken during past outages that identified some of the supports in question:

Roll 6 Enclosure 34
Roll 6 Enclosure 19
Roll 5 Enclosure 19
Roll 7 Enclosure 4
Roll 7 Enclosure 3
Roll 6 Enclosure 36
Roll 6 Enclosure 37

The following detail support drawings were reviewed by the inspector: Mk1, Mk2 and Mk3. It was verified through the support details that these photographs were for Unit 2 in the area in question, because of the unique design of these supports. The licensee agreed that during any future shutdown of Unit 2 which allows access to the Drywell, these supports will be inspected and verified to the design.



IE Bulletin 79-14 remains open until all inspections and evaluations are completed and subsequently reviewed by the NRC.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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