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their children.

November 5, 1976

Mr. J. P. O'Reilly
Director-Region I
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
931 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION (SSES)
INTERIM REPORT OF REPORTABLE DEFICIENCY
DEFECT IN RPV UNIT #2 BOTTOM HEAD SIDE PLATE
DOCKET NO: 50-388
LICENSE NO: CPPR-102
ERs 100450/100508 FILE 840-4
PLA-142

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

This relates to a deficiency resulting from a defect in the RPV Unit #2 bottom head side plate. The contractor has reported that the defect was caused during the removal of a temporary support strut. The deficiency was evaluated and reported to Mr. Mattia on October 1, 1976 as being of such consequence as to be considered as a significant deficiency in construction and, therefore, reportable under the provisions described in 10CFR Part 50.55 (e), (iii).


The impact of this defect is being analyzed by PL, its contractors, and a technical consultant, and will be fully addressed in the final, definitive report regarding the deficiency. It is anticipated that the definitive report will be submitted within 30 days after the defect has been removed and blended. Should it become apparent that this schedule cannot be met, you will be promptly advised.

The following is an account of the relevant details of the deficiency, the investigation pursued and the data which have been established to date:

A. Chronology of Events

1. The defect in the RPV Unit #2 bottom head side plate is believed to have been created about four months ago when a temporary attachment between the vessel and the support skirt was burned off according to CBI Procedure LRP-1.

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2. Due to manpower considerations, the clean up of the attachment area was delayed until September 28, 1976. In the interim, the activity was under the control of Travel Folder RTA-20, Item 21A. On September 28, 1976, CBI personnel began removing metal in the area of the defect. Rework is allowed by GE Specification 21A9340 which provides for excavation of surface defects to determine their depth.
3. The area was excavated to a depth of 15/16" and on September 29, 1976 CBI entered the condition as a defect in their Nonconformance Log.
4. On September 30, 1976, GE San Jose notified PL of the defect. After evaluation of the incident, PL unsuccessfully attempted to reach Mr. Heishman of NRC Region I at 3:00 p.m. A message was left to return the call.
5. Mr. Mattia returned the call at 8:05 a.m. on October 1, 1976 and was advised of the incident. He was informed that the reportability of the defect was being evaluated, and that an interim report or final definitive report, if warranted, would be submitted to the NRC by November 1, 1976.
6. On November 1, 1976, PL advised Mr. Mattia that the evaluation was not complete and asked for an extension of the report date until November 8, 1976. This extension was granted.

B. Analysis of Safety Implications

1. Evaluation of the impact of the depth of the defect on the nominal material thickness including reconciliation of the thickness reduction with the stress report is being pursued.
2. The consideration of low cycle, high stress fatigue, due to thermal stress or deterioration of the microstructure within the heat affected zone is being studied from a metallurgical aspect.

C. Corrective Measures Taken

1. On October 10, 1976 CBI issued Request For Acceptance Of Nonconformity As A Deviation (RAD) #8.
2. A specific rework procedure is being prepared to govern the operation. It is anticipated that the area will be excavated to sound base metal, contour blended, examined by nondestructive examination, acid etched to determine that the heat affected zone has been removed, and then final inspected.

D. Conclusion


This deficiency was discovered during a routine work operation and the inspection activity is under the control of the CBI Quality Assurance Program. This control is assured by the use of the CBI traveler folder which is sequenced such that work will not progress until the defect is properly dispositioned.

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The disposition of the defect is being given full design consideration, including the technical services of a metallurgical consultant. Rework will be done in accordance with applicable code and regulatory requirements and will be monitored by PL to assure compliance.

In the interim, the Commission will be advised of any significant issue which may arise.

Very truly yours,


N. W. Curtis
Vice President-Engineering & Construction

JJU:mcb

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