



UNITED STATES
 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 REGION II
 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

JAN 2 1980

Report Nos. 50-259/79-42, 50-260/79-42, and 50-296/79-42

Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority
 500A Chestnut Street
 Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401

Facility Name: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

Docket Nos. 50-259, 50-260, and 50-296

License Nos. DPR-23, DPR-52, and DPR-68

Inspection at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant near Decatur, Alabama

Inspector: *L. Modenos* 12/13/79
 L. Modenos Date Signed

Approved by: *A. Herdt* 12/14/79
 A. Herdt, Section Chief, RC&ES Branch Date Signed

SUMMARY

Inspection on November 26-27, 1979

Areas Inspected

This special, unannounced inspection involved 14 inspector-hours onsite in the area of seismic analysis for as-built safety-related piping systems (IE Bulletin 79-14).

Results

Of the one area inspected, one item of noncompliance was found in one area (Infraction-Failure to take corrective action-Paragraph 5).

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

- *H. L. Abercrombie, Plant Superintendent
- *J. L. Harness, Assistant Plant Superintendent
- *G. J. Jones, Outage Director
- *R. Cole, QA Coordinator
- *R. Summers, Mechanical Engineer - Outage

Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, and engineers.

NRC Resident Inspector

- *R. F. Sullivan

*Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on November 27, 1979 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

Not inspected.

4. Unresolved Item

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5. (Open) Seismic Analysis for As-Built Safety-Related Piping Systems (IE Bulletin 79-14)

TVA reported to the inspector as of November 26, 1979 the following status on IE Bulletin 79-14:

Unit 1: Approximately 75% of accessible systems and supports have been inspected.

Unit 2: No inspections had been performed.

Unit 3: Inspections are 100% complete in all inaccessible areas, with a few repairs to be accomplished by November 30, 1979. Approximately 15% of accessible systems and supports have been inspected. Guideline "Instructions for the Implementation of NRC IE Bulletin 79-14" Rev. 0, was reviewed for



adequacy and compliance with the requirements of the Bulletin. The inspector reviewed the inspection data of system No. 71 in the RCIC system for compliance with the requirement of the Bulletin. A support RD-1 identified by the TVA inspector on a 6" line at EL.528'-0" was not called for in the Mechanical RCIC System hanger drawing NOS. 47W456-H-4 Rev. 0, 47W456-H-3 Rev. 1 and 47W456-H-1 Rev. 1 of unit 1. This support identified as a horizontal restraint on a vertical run was not reported to the EN DES engineer at the site or to the EN DES coordinator (CEB) at Knoxville for their evaluations. It was determined by EN DES in Knoxville after the NRC inspector inquired about this discrepancy that this support does not exist in their analysis of this system.

Review of the signed off pipe support checklist on RCIC system of Unit 3 revealed that on November 11, 1979 the TVA inspectors identified three hangers 47W456-H-1, H-2, H-3 with U-bolt connections tighten down creating a two-way restraint. The design detail of the supports required a one-way restraint in the vertical direction with slotted holes in the supporting member to allow for lateral movement of 2.75" on H-3, 1.125" on H-2 and 0.125 on H-1. These details showed that the same design and support were typical for Unit 2 on the same system. The improper installation and a trouble report (TR) 132910 was issued November 11, 1979 to loosen the nuts to allow movement in the lateral direction for Unit 3. This discrepancy was not identified to the EN DES engineer at the site or to the EN DES coordinator in Knoxville for their evaluations. Unit 2 hangers were not inspected until after the NRC inspector inquired about the discrepancy.

The failure to inform EN DES of these discrepancies as described in TVA's memorandum dated October 4, 1979 entitled, program to resolve NRC IE Bulletin 79-14, appears to be in noncompliance with Criterion V of Appendix B to 10CFR50 and is identified as an infraction, 259/260/296/79-42-01.

The inspector noted to the Outage Director and the Plant Superintendent that re-evaluation of how their work packages should be broken down and methods of reporting discrepancies to EN DES was required as is evident with the above examples.

The reason provided by the licensee for not providing the information to design was that the piping drawing was not 100% complete. It was pointed out to the management that if a system or a line is 100% complete and a discrepancy is identified then it should be reported immediately not to wait until the piping drawing is completed. TVA's management acknowledged this and agreed to look into revising their procedure and methods of reporting future discrepancies.

LER 79-18 reported on September 9, 1979 that restraints on certain CSSC Systems were inoperable in that their configuration did not conform to the design specifications. The inspector reviewed the corrective action taken and found that 42 supports on RHRSW, EECW and RCW systems had been inspected with 28 deviations identified, 15 of these had been repaired, 4 remained to be repaired and 9 not requiring any repairs were analyzed to be acceptable as is. This LER 79-18 remains open.



The inspector noted that QA audits had not been performed in relation to this work effort. The QA coordinator and Plant Superintendent were informed that a project of the scope and importance of IE Bulletin 79-14 warrants a deeper involvement by the QA department.

This IE Bulletin 79-14 remains open until all inspections and evaluations are completed and subsequently reviewed by the NRC.

