

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: \_\_\_\_\_ (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | A | L | B | R | F | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | \_\_\_\_\_ | 5  
7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 CAT 58  
 LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE CAT 58

CON'T  
 01 | L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 9 | 6 | 7 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 8 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 8 | 8 | 0 | 9  
7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80  
 REPORT SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 | During normal operation an ice storm caused the loss of offsite power to the  
 03 | 4-kV bus tie board. After offsite power was restored there was a short period of  
 04 | time before reclosure of the bus tie board feeder breaker. Reference Technical  
 05 | Specification 3.9.B. The diesel generators started. There was no danger to health and  
 06 | safety of the public. No previous occurrences.  
 07 | \_\_\_\_\_  
 08 | \_\_\_\_\_

09 | SYSTEM CODE | CAUSE CODE | CAUSE SUBCODE | COMPONENT CODE | COMP. SUBCODE | VALVE SUBCODE  
9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20  
 E B (11) C (12) Z (13) Z Z Z Z Z (14) Z (15) Z (16)  
 17 | LER/RO REPORT NUMBER | EVENT YEAR | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. | OCCURRENCE CODE | REPORT TYPE | REVISION NO.  
21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32  
 8 0 | 0 0 7 | / | 0 3 | L | 0  
 ACTION TAKEN | FUTURE ACTION | EFFECT ON PLANT | SHUTDOWN METHOD | HOURS (22) | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED | NPRD-4 FORM SUB. | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER  
33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47  
 X (18) X (19) Z (20) Z (21) 0 0 0 (22) Y (23) N (24) Z (25) Z 9 9 9 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 | Loss of both 161-kV lines interrupted power to cooling tower transformers and 4-kV  
 11 | switchgear feeding bus tie board. The feeder breakers were reclosed. The apparent  
 12 | disagreement in time between return of 161-kV lines and reclosure of bus tie board  
 13 | feeder breakers is still being investigated.  
 14 | \_\_\_\_\_

15 | FACILITY STATUS | % POWER | OTHER STATUS (30) | METHOD OF DISCOVERY | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (37)  
7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80  
 E (28) 0 9 8 (29) NA (30) A (31) Events recorder printout (37)  
 16 | ACTIVITY CONTENT | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) | LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)  
7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80  
 Z (33) Z (34) NA (35) NA (36)  
 17 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES | NUMBER | TYPE | DESCRIPTION (39)  
7 8 9 11 12 13 80  
 0 0 0 (37) Z (38) NA (39)  
 18 | PERSONNEL INJURIES | NUMBER | DESCRIPTION (41)  
7 8 9 11 12 80  
 0 0 0 (40) NA (41)  
 19 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY | TYPE | DESCRIPTION (43)  
7 8 9 10 11 12 80  
 Z (42) NA (43)  
 20 | PUBLICITY ISSUED | DESCRIPTION (45)  
7 8 9 10 80  
 Y (44) Local press notified of loss of offsite power (45)  
68 69 80

NAME OF PREPARER \_\_\_\_\_

PHONE: \_\_\_\_\_

8004010 402

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LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50- 296 / 8007 Technical Specification Involved 3.9.B  
Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.b (2)  
Date of Occurrence 3/1/80 Time of Occurrence 1028 Unit 3

Identification and Description of Occurrence:

Due to an ice storm both 161-kV lines were lost causing a loss of power to the cooling tower transformers and 4-kV switchgear feeding the bus tie board. After offsite power was restored there was a short period of time before reclosure of the bus tie board feeder breakers.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

Unit 1 @ 0% refueling outage

Unit 2 @ 0% cold shutdown

Unit 3 @ 98%

Action specified in the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements met due to inoperable equipment. Describe.

Regulatory Guide 1.93 allows, under certain conditions, continued operation at full or reduced power for a limited time than to effect an immediate shutdown on the loss of required electric power sources.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The loss of offsite power was due to the ice and wind storm.

Analysis of Occurrence:

There was no damage to plant equipment. There was no activity release, no personnel exposure or injury and no danger to health or safety of the public.

Corrective Action:

Offsite power was restored and bus tie board feeder breakers reclosed. The apparent disagreement in time between return of offsite power and reclosure of feeder breakers is still being investigated.

Failure Data:

NA

\*Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Administrative Supervisor

\*Revision: 

