

50-259

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

400 Chestnut Street Tower II

August 29, 1979

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II - Suite 3100
101 Marietta Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

SEP 6 10:34
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION


Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Enclosed is our response to R. C. Lewis' August 7, 1979, letter, RII:HDJ 50-259/79-14, 50-260/79-14, and 50-296/79-14, which requested a supplementary response to TVA's July 30, 1979, letter concerning the same subject.

We have reviewed the enclosed supplementary response and find no proprietary information in it. If we can provide additional information, please get in touch with us.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosure

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Corrective Steps Taken to Avoid Further Noncompliance

These actions taken as described above will avoid further noncompliance.

Date Full Compliance Achieved

Valves were verified to be in proper position on June 24, 1979. All core Cooling Instructions will be revised and approved for second-person verification of valve checklists by November 1, 1979. Group Supplemental Training will be completed by September 14, 1979.



ENCLOSURE

SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO NRC-OIE LETTER
FROM R. C. LEWIS TO H. G. PARRIS DATED AUGUST 7, 1979,
(REFERENCE RII:BTM 50-259/79-14, 50-260/79-14, AND 50-296/79-14)

Infraction

As required by Technical Specification 6.3.a.1, detailed written procedures, including applicable checkoff lists covering normal operation and components involving nuclear safety of the facility shall be prepared, approved, and adhered to. Operation Instruction 74, "RHR Systems", drawing No. 47W811-1, "Flow Diagram RHR System", and drawing No. 47W859-1, "Flow Diagram, Emergency Equipment Cooling Water" require certain valves lined up for LPCI mode during normal operation are locked open.

Contrary to the above, two outlet valves (HCV 74-33 and HCV 74-44) at the discharge side of RHR Heat Exchangers 3B and 3D were not locked during the normal operation on May 24, 1979. Other ESF valves not locked during the operation were EECW RHR Pump Seal Heat Exchanger Valves Nos. 561, 572, and 614.

Supplemental Response

Corrective Steps Taken and Results Achieved

The item of noncompliance is being emphasized in Group Supplementary Training for all operating groups. With reference to the outlet valves on the RHR system, these valves were locked immediately after discovery of being in the unlocked condition; and similar valves on the other units were checked and verified to be correctly locked. The valve checklist in Operation Instructions is being revised to include second-party verification for the valves. This includes not only valves on the RHR, but all emergency core cooling systems. This will prevent recurrence of this type of item of noncompliance.

