

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: \_\_\_\_\_ (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | A | L | B | R | F | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5  
7 8 9 14 15 25 26 57 CAT 58

CON'T  
01 | L | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 9 | 6 | 7 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 6 | 7 | 9 | 8 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 8 | 7 | 9 | 9  
7 8 60 61 68 69 74 75 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 | During normal unit 3 operation, the RHR service water supply to the 2B RHR heat ex-  
03 | changer was isolated for maintenance. The isolation of the water supply also isolated  
04 | the standby coolant supply to unit 3. (T.S. 3.5.C.3 and 3.5.C.5) There was no hazard  
05 | to the public health or safety. Previous occurrences: None.  
06 |  
07 |  
08 |

09 | C | F | 11 | D | 12 | A | 13 | H | T | E | X | C | H | 14 | C | 15 | Z | 16  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20

17 | LEI/RO REPORT NUMBER | EVENT YEAR | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. | OCCURRENCE CODE | REPORT TYPE | REVISION NO.  
21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

ACTION TAKEN | FUTURE ACTION | EFFECT ON PLANT | SHUTDOWN METHOD | HOURS | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED | NPRD-4 FORM SUB. | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER  
33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 | The isolation of the unit 3 water supply during unit 2 maintenance was caused by a  
11 | lack of administrative control over system cross connect valves. Upon discovery of  
12 | the error, RHR heat exchanger 2B was returned to service within four hours and the  
13 | water supply restored. Administrative controls have been improved.  
14 |

15 | E | 28 | 0 | 7 | 5 | 29 | NA | 30 | B | 31 | Operator Inspection Tour | 32  
7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80

16 | Z | 33 | Z | 34 | NA | 35 | NA | 36  
7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80

17 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | Z | 38 | NA | 39  
7 8 9 11 12 13 80

18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | NA | 41  
7 8 9 11 12 80

19 | Z | 42 | NA | 43  
7 8 9 10 80

20 | N | 44 | NA | 45  
7 8 9 10 80

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NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER \_\_\_\_\_

PHONE: \_\_\_\_\_

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50- 296 / 795 Technical Specification Involved 3.5.C.3 and 3.5.C.5

Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.A.2

Date of Occurrence 5/6/79 Time of Occurrence 1300 Unit 3

Identification and Description of Occurrence:

The RHR service water supply to the 2B RHR heat exchanger was isolated for maintenance. The isolation of the water supply also isolated the standby coolant supply to unit 3.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

Unit 2 - refueling outage in progress  
Unit 3 - operating normally at 75% power

Action specified in the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements met due to inoperable equipment. Describe.

Place the unit in cold shutdown with 24 hours.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The isolation of the water supply for maintenance was the direct cause; however, lack of administrative controls over cross connect valves was the proximate cause of the incident.

Analysis of Occurrence:

There was no hazard to the public health or safety.

Corrective Action: Upon determining that the standby coolant supply had been isolated, action was immediately taken to restore the heat exchanger to an operable status so the service water supply to the standby coolant could be reopened. Standby coolant was returned to service in four hours. The standby coolant supply valve has been painted a distinctive color and strict administrative controls imposed on its operation. System piping changes to permanently prevent recurrence are planned during the next unit 3

Failure Data:

None previous.

