•••	NRC 701	RM 366 U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
	<i>.</i>	LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
		CONTROL BLOCK:
	01	$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c } \hline A & L & B & R & F & 3 \\ \hline 9 & \text{LICENSEE CODE} & 14 \\ \hline 15 & \text{LICENSE NUMBER} \\ \hline 15 & \text{LICENSE NUMBER} \\ \hline 25 & 26 \\ \hline 26 & \text{LICENSE TYPE} \\ \hline 30 & \text{LICENSE TYPE \\ \hline 30 & \text{LICENSE TYPE} \\ \hline 30 & \text{LICENSE TYPE} \\ \hline 30 & \text{LICENSE TYPE \\ \hline 30 & \text{LICENSE TYPE \\ \hline 30 & \text{LICENSE TYPE } \\ \hline 30 & \text{LICENSE TYPE \\ \hline 30 & \text{LICENSE TYPE } \\ \hline 30 & \text{LICENSE TYPE \\ \hline 30 & \text{LICENSE TYPE } \\ \hline 30 & \text{LICENSE TYPE \\ \hline 30 & \text{LICENSE TYPE } \\ \hline 30 & \text{LICENSE TYPE \\ \hline 30 & \text{LICENSE TYPE } \\ \hline 30 & \text{LICENSE TYPE \\ \hline 30 & \text{LICENSE TYPE } \\ \hline 30 & \text{LICENSE TYPE \\ \hline 30 & \text{LICENSE TYPE \\ \hline 30 & \text{LICENSE TYPE } \\ \hline 30 & $
		$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $
		was found on signal lead for RCTC turbine high steam flow switch PDIS-71-1B which
	0 3	was found on organization. This did not fulfill the requirements of T.S. table
	04	provides RCIC isolation. Inis ald not fulfill the requirements of 1.5. table
	05	3.2.B. A redundant circuit was operable. There was no hazard to public health
	06	or safety and no previous occurrences.
	07	
	08	
-	7 8	SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE CAUSE COMPONENT CODE COMP. VALVE SUBCODE SUBCODE
	7 8	
×		$ \begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $
ų		ACTION FUTURE EFFECT SHUTDOWN HOURS (2) ATTACHMENT NORDAL PRIME COMP. COMPONENT METHOD HOURS (2) ATTACHMENT NORDAL PRIME COMP. COMPONENT MANUFACTURER SUBMITTED FORM SUB SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER $[B]_{33}$ $[B]_{34}$ $[C]_{35}$ $[C]_{36}$ $[C]_{37}$ $[C]_{40}$ $[C]_{40}$ $[C]_{41}$ $[C]_{42}$ $[C]_{43}$ $[C]_{43}$ $[C]_{43}$ $[C]_{44}$ $[$
	10	Cause of the broken wire was a loose connection where the two switch contacts are
		spliced. The loose connection was repaired and functionally tested satisfactorily
	12	within 24 hours preventing the system from being declared inoperable.
	13	
	114	
	7 8	FACILITY SPOWER OTHER STATUS OF DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
		$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $
	16 78	Image: Second
		NUMBER Type Description (39) 0 0 (37) Z (38) NA 9 11 12 13 80
	1	
	7 8	9 11 12 80 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)
	19	
	, s	PUBLICITY NRC USE ONLY
	20	
		NAME OF PREPARER John R. Pittman PHONE: 168

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LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50-296 / 7824 Technical Specification Involved Table 3.2	2.B
Reported Under Technical Specification <u>T.S. 6.7.2.b.2</u>	
Date of Occurrence 9/11/78 Time of Occurrence 1700 Unit	
Identification and Description of Occurrence:	
SI 4.2.B-31 detected broken signal lead to PDIS-71-1B (both switches), turbine high steam flow.	RCIC

Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

Refueling outage.

Action specified in the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements met due to inoperable equipment. Describe.

The repair was completed within 24 hours preventing the system from being declared inoperable.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

Faulty splice.

Analysis of Occurrence:

Effectively gave an indication of an open switch which would prevent proper circuit operation.

Corrective Action:

Installed new splice.

Failure Data:

No previous occurrences.

Tennessee Valley Authority - Browns' Ferry Nuclear Plant

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