CP&L

Carolina Power & Light Company

FEB 28 1986

SERIAL: NLS-86-066

Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
UNIT NO. 1 - DOCKET NO. 50-400
COMMENTS ON PROOF AND REVIEW TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

Dear Mr. Denton:

Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L) submits comments on the Proof and Review Technical Specifications (TS) for the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (SHNPP). Attachment 1 provides comments on the TS as well as a justification for each item. The comments are categorized as either an error or improvement item. The term error is used to denote changes required to have the TS reflect the plant design, to correct typographical errors and changes needed to bring the TS into agreement with the FSAR and/or SER. One specific comment categorized as an error is our request to delete the limitation on operation of containment purge system. The SHNPP containment purge system is designed for continuous purge. If required to limit the operation of this system, design changes and procedure revisions will be necessary. CP&L identified this item as a plant specific backfit in accordance with 10CFR50.109 by letter dated February 6, 1986 to Mr. H. R. Denton from Mr. S. R. Zimmerman. Comments categorized as an error must at a minimum be incorporated into the SHNPP TS to allow CP&L to certify the accuracy of the TS.

Improvement items are additional changes that have been identified during the review process. Comments regarding improvement items that have been previously discussed with your staff, but not agreed to, have also been included. The improvement item having the largest impact on the TS is our proposal to delete several of the lengthy equipment lists in the TS and place them in the TS Equipment List Program. Request for approval of the concept of this program was submitted in a letter dated February 28, 1986 to Mr. H. R. Denton from Mr. S. R. Zimmerman.

Attachments 2 and 3 provide information on those discrepancies between the TS and the FSAR and/or SER that CP&L is aware of at this time. The FSAR/TS discrepancies will be resolved by CP&L through changes to the FSAR in future amendments. CP&L will work closely with the NRC to resolve SER/TS discrepancies. Attachment 4 provides a marked-up copy of the TS pages for each of the comments provided in Attachment 1.

411 Fayetteville Street • P. O. Box 1551 • Raleigh, N. C. 27602

~~8603100375~~ 20099

Analyses are currently in progress that may result in changes to the Moderator Temperature Coefficient and to the terms of the OTΔT equation. TS changes will be submitted as soon as possible after the analyses are completed. CP&L will also submit a proposal to delete fire protection TS. Additional comments on and changes to the TS will be submitted to the NRC as they are identified.

Although there are a fairly large number of comments attached, we believe the Proof and Review TS is basically a sound document. We appreciate the cooperation and effort that your staff has put forth to date and are looking forward to continued mutual efforts to complete the development of technically accurate and livable TS. The schedule demands that both CP&L and the NRC jointly and vigorously pursue the resolution of the attached CP&L comments as well those comments that will be provided by NRR and Region II. Your schedule indicates and CP&L expects to have the TS comments resolved to support the issuance of final draft TS by April 18, 1986.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Gregg A. Sinders at (919) 836-8168.

Yours very truly,

S. R. Zimmerman
Manager
Nuclear Licensing Section

SRZ/GAS/ljs (3447GAS)

Attachments

cc:
Mr. B. C. Buckley (NRC)
Mr. G. F. Maxwell (NRC-SHNPP)
Dr. J. Nelson Grace (NRC-RII)
Mr. Travis Payne (KUDZU)
Mr. Daniel F. Read (CHANGE/ELP)
Wake County Public Library
Mr. Wells Eddleman
Mr. John D. Runkle
Dr. Richard D. Wilson
Mr. G. O. Bright (ASLB)
Dr. J. H. Carpenter (ASLB)
Mr. J. L. Kelley (ASLB)
Mr. H. A. Cole
Mr. R. A. Benedict
Mr. L. S. Rubenstein
Mr. V. Benaroya
Mr. M. J. Virgilio

Attachment 1

Comments on Proof of Review TS

8603100371

(3447GAS/1js)

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 148

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: INDEX

Page Number: v

Section Number: 3/4.2

Comment:

PAGE NUMBERS IN THE INDEX FOR SECTION 3/4.2 ARE NOT CORRECT. PLEASE CORRECT PER THE RETYPED SPECIFICATIONS.

Basis :

TYPO

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 40 | Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: INDEX | Page Number: viii

Section Number: FIGURE 3.4-2

Comment:

IN THE TITLE FOR FIGURE 3.4-2 CHANGE THE WORD "HEATUP" TO "COOLDOWN".

Basis :

TYPO

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 41 Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: INDEX Page Number: viii

Section Number: FIGURE 3.4-3

Comment:

IN THE TITLE FOR FIGURE 3.4-3, CHANGE THE WORD "COOLDOWN" TO "HEATUP".

Basis

TYPO

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 149

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: INDEX

Page Number: ix

Section Number: 3/4.7

Comment:

CHANGE "TABLE 3.71" TO "TABLE 3.7-1" AND INSERT THE WORD "SAFETY" AFTER THE WORDS "STEAM LINE".
CHANGE "TABLE 3.72" TO "TABLE 3.7-2"
CHANGE "TABLE 4.71" TO "TABLE 4.7-1"

Basis

TYPOS

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 150

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: INDEX

Page Number: xv

Section Number: 3/4.7

Comment:

IN THE LISTING FOR 3/4.7.7 - ADD THE WORD "SYSTEM" TO THE END OF THE TITLE.

Basis

TYPO

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 217 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 2.01.01

Page Number: 2-2

Section Number: FIGURE 2.1-1

Comment:

REPLACE FIGURE 2.1-1 WITH THE ATTACHED.

Basis

A NEW FIGURE IS PROVIDED TO MAKE SEVERAL TYPOGRAPHICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES TO IMPROVE THE UTILITY OF THE FIGURE.



Figure 2.1-1 Reactor Core Safety Limits Three Loops in Operation

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 83 Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 2.02.01 Page Number: 2-4

Section Number: TABLE 2.2-1

Comment:

ITEM 7 - IN THE SENSOR ERROR COLUMN, CHANGE "2.8" TO "NOTE 5".
ON PAGE 2-10, ADD A NEW NOTE AS FOLLOWS:
Note 5: The sensor error for temperature is 2.1 and 0.7 for pressure.

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS PROPOSED BASED ON NSSS VENDOR RECOMMENDATION TO PROVIDE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUAL BASES FOR THE MULTIPLE PARAMETERS.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 84

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 2.02.01

Page Number: 2-5

Section Number: TABLE 2.2-1

Comment:

ITEM 14 EOR THE STEAM/FLOW MISMATCH, IN THE SENSOR ERROR COLUMN, CHANGE "3.15" TO "NOTE 6".
ON PAGE 2-10 ADD A NEW NOTE AS FOLLOWS:
Note 6: The sensor error for Steam Flow is 0.9, for Feed Flow is 1.5, and for Steam Pressure is 0.75.

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS PROPOSED BASES ON NSSS VENDOR RECOMMMENDATION TO PROVIDE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUAL BASES FOR THE MULTIPLE PARAMETERS.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 85 Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 2.02.01 Page Number: 2-7

Section Number: TABLE 2.2-1

Comment:

CHANGE THE EQUATION "K1 = 1.10" TO "K1 = LATER"

Basis

THE VALUE OF K1 WILL BE MADE A LATER BECAUSE IT IS STILL UNDER REVIEW BY THE NSSS VENDOR.

OK

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 1 Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 2.02 Page Number: 2-7

Section Number: TABLE 2.2-1

Comment:

CHANGE TAU 4 FROM "33 sec" TO "28 sec"

Basis

WESTINGHOUSE SETPOINT METHODOLOGY REV. 1. THIS ITEM WAS PERVIOUSLY ACCEPTED, BUT DID NOT APPEAR IN THE P&R TECH SPEC. IT IS THEREFORE CONSIDERED A TYPO.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 86 *

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 2.02.01

Page Number: 2-8

Section Number: TABLE 2.2-1

Comment:

NOTE 2 - CHANGE "1.6%" TO "1.9% DELTA T SPAN.".

Basis

THIS CLARIFICATION IS ADDED TO REMOVE ANY POSSIBLE AMBIGUITY ON WHICH INSTRUMENT SPAN TO USE WITH THIS MULTI-INSTRUMENT FUNCTION.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 87 *

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 2.02.01

Page Number: 2-10

Section Number: TABLE 2.2-1

Comment:

ADD TO THE END OF NOTE 4, THE WORDS "DELTA T SPAN.".

Basis

THIS CLARIFICATION IS ADDED TO REMOVE ANY POSSIBLE AMBIGUITY ON WHICH SPAN TO USE WITH THIS MULTI-INSTRUMENT FUNCTION.

Record Number: 218

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: B 2.01.01

Page Number: B.2-1

Section Number: B 2.1.1

Comment:

IN THE SECOND PARAGRAPH, LINE 9 - INSERT THE WORD "CALCULATED" BEFORE THE WORDS "HEAT FLUX". IN THE SECOND PARAGRAPH, LINE 10 - INSERT THE WORD "ACTUAL" BEFORE THE WORDS "LOCAL HEAT".

Basis

THIS MINOR CHANGE SIGNIFICANTLY CLARIFIES THE DISCUSSION.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 42 Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: B 2.01.01 Page Number: B 2-1

Section Number: B 2.1

Comment:

IN THE FIFTH PARAGRAPH LINE 1 - INSERT THE WORD "CALCULATED" AFTER "HOT CHANNEL FACTOR, ".

Basis

TYPO

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 88 Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: B 2.02.01 Page Number: B 2-2

Section Number: B 2.2.1

Comment:

CHANGE THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 1 TO THE FOLLOWING:

For example, if a rack plus bistable has a trip setpoint of ≤100%, a span of 125%, and a calibration accuracy of 0.5%of span, then the rack plus bistable is considered to be adjusted to the trip setpoint as long as the "as measured" value for the rack plus bistable is ≤100.62%.

Basis

THE PROPOSED WORDING CHANGE IS MADE TO KEEP THE EXAMPLE FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE SETPOINT METHODOLOGY USED.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 89 Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: B 2.02.01 Page Number: B 2-5 & 6

Section Number: B 2.2.1

Comment:

LAST LINE OF PAGE B 2-5, UNDER THE REACTOR COOLANT FLOW SECTION - CHANGE THE VALUE OF "90%" TO "91.7%".
SECOND LINE ON PAGE B 2-6, UNDER THE REACTOR COOLANT FLOW SECTION - CHANGE THE VALUE OF "90%" TO "91.7%".

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS NECESSARY TO MAKE THE BASES CONSISTENT WITH THE CORRECT SETPOINT AS PROVIDED IN THE BODY OF THE TECH SPECS ON PAGE 2-5.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 209 Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: B 2.02.01 Page Number: B 2-6

Section Number: B 2.2.1

Comment:

IN THE TITLE OF THE UNDERVOLTAGE AND UNDERFREQUENCY-REACTOR COOLANT PUMP BUSSES - CHANGE THE SPELLING OF "BUSSES" TO "BUSES".

Basis

THIS CHANGE CORRECTS A TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 91

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: B 2.02.01

Page Number: B 2-6

Section Number: B 2.2.1

Comment:

UNDER STEAM/FEEDWATER FLOW MISMATCH AMD LOW STEAM
GENERATOR WATER LEVEL, LINE LINE 9 - CHANGE THE
VALUE OF "38.3%" TO "38.5%".

Basis

TYPO

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 90

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: B 2.02.01

Page Number: B 2-7

Section Number: B 2.2.1

Comment:

UNDER REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INTERLOCKS, IN THE P-7 DISCUSSION, ON LINE 3 - CHANGE "BUS UNDERVOLTAGE" TO "MOTOR UNDERVOLTAGE"

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS PROPOSED TO ENSURE THE DESCRIPTION IS A CORRECT REFLECTION OF THE ACTUAL PLANT CONDITIONS.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 53 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.00.02

Page Number: 3/4 0-1

Section Number: 3.0.2

Comment:

ADD TO THE END OF THE PARAGRAPH "UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED IN THE ACTION STATEMENT".

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS NECESSITATED BY THE FACT THE DIESEL GENERATOR ACTION STATEMENTS, WHEN ONE DIESEL IS INOPERABLE, REQUIRE THAT THE OTHER DIESEL BE TESTED. THIS TEST MUST BE COMPLETED REGARDLESS OF WHEN THE DIESEL IS RETURNED TO OPERABLE STATUS.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 287 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: GENERAL

Page Number: SEE ATTACHED

Section Number: SEE ATTACHED

Comment:

SEE ATTACHED PAGES FOR CHANGES ON TANK LEVEL AND VOLUME.

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS PROPOSED TO SUPPLY THE LATEST INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US.

BORATED WATER SOURCE - SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.2.5 As a minimum, one of the following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. A boric acid tank with:

1. A minimum contained borated water volume of ~~5400~~ 4330 gallons, which is equivalent to ~~10~~ 10% indicated level.

2. A minimum boron concentration of [7000] ppm, and

3. A minimum solution temperature of [65]°F.

b. The refueling water storage tank (RWST) with:

1. A minimum contained borated water volume of [~~61900~~] 85000 gallons, which is equivalent to [~~12~~] 4% indicated level.

2. A ~~minimum~~ boron concentration of between [2000] ppm and 2200ppm, and

3. A minimum solution temperature of [40]°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With no borated water source OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.2.5 The above required borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by:

1. Verifying the boron concentration of the water,

2. Verifying the contained borated water volume, and

3. Verifying the boric acid tank solution temperature when it is the source of borated water.

b. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the RWST temperature when it is the source of borated water and the outside air temperature is less than [40]°F.

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BORATED WATER SOURCES - OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.2.6 As a minimum, the following borated water source(s) shall be OPERABLE as required by Specification 3.1.2.2:

a. A boric acid tank with:

1. A minimum contained borated water volume of ~~16300~~ 16830 gallons, which is equivalent to ~~45~~ 52% indicated level.

2. A minimum boron concentration of [7000] ppm, and

3. A minimum solution temperature of [65]°F.

b. The refueling water storage tank (RWST) with:

1. A minimum contained borated water volume of [~~433000~~ 448000] gallons, which is equivalent to [~~84~~ 95]% indicated level.

2. A ~~minimum~~ boron concentration of between [2000] ppm and 2200 ppm,

3. A minimum solution temperature of [40]°F, and

4. A maximum solution temperature of [125]°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

a. With the boric acid tank inoperable and being used as one of the above required borated water sources, restore the boric acid tank to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 2000 pcm at 200°F; restore the boric acid tank to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours.

b. With the RWST inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

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3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.5.4 The refueling water storage tank (RWST) shall be OPERABLE with:

a. A minimum contained borated water volume of [~~433000~~] 448000 gallons, which is equivalent to ~~84%~~ 95 indicated level.

b. A ~~minimum~~ boron concentration of between [2000] ppm and 2200 ppm of boron,

c. A minimum solution temperature of [40]°F, and

d. A maximum solution temperature of [125]°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With the RWST inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.5.4 The RWST shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by:

1. Verifying the contained borated water volume in the tank; and
2. Verifying the boron concentration of the water.

b. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the RWST temperature when the outside air temperature is less than 40°F or greater than [125]°F.

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SPRAY ADDITIVE SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.2.2 The Spray Additive System shall be OPERABLE with:

a. A spray additive tank containing a volume of between [~~6000~~] 2705 and 2976 [~~6270~~] gallons ~~(which is equivalent to between [85] and [88%] indicated level)~~ of between [~~10~~] 28% and [~~20%~~] 30% by weight NaOH solution, and

b. Two spray additive eductors each capable of adding NaOH solution from the chemical additive tank to a Containment Spray System pump flow.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With the Spray Additive System inoperable, restore the system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours; restore the Spray Additive System to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.2.2 The Spray Additive System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position;

b. At least once per 6 months by:

1. Verifying the contained solution volume in the tank, and
2. Verifying the concentration of the NaOH solution by chemical analysis.

c. At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a containment spray or containment isolation phase A test signal as applicable; and ~~test signal, and~~

d. At least once per 5 years by verifying each eductor flow rate is greater than or equal to [later] gpm, using the RWST as the test source and throttled to [later] psig at the eductor inlet.

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Record 287

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CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.1.3 The condensate storage tank (CST) shall be OPERABLE with a contained water volume of at least [~~252,000~~] gallons of water, which is equivalent to [~~later~~] indicated level. 270,000 62%

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

With the CST inoperable, within 4 hours either:

a. Restore the CST to OPERABLE status or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours, or

b. Demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the Emergency Service Water System as a backup supply to the auxiliary feedwater pumps and restore the CST to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.1.3.1 The CST shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 12 hours by verifying the contained water volume is within its limits when the tank is the supply source for the auxiliary feedwater pumps.

4.7.1.3.2 The Emergency Service Water System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 12 hours by verifying that each valve, required to permit the Emergency Service Water System to supply water to the auxiliary feedwater pumps, is open whenever the Emergency Service Water System is the supply source for the auxiliary feedwater pumps.

MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT (Continued)

within its limits since this coefficient changes slowly due principally to the reduction in RCS boron concentration associated with fuel burnup.

3/4.1.1.4 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY

This specification ensures that the reactor will not be made critical with the Reactor Coolant System average temperature less than [551]°F. This limitation is required to ensure: (1) the moderator temperature coefficient is within it analyzed temperature range, (2) the trip instrumentation is within its normal operating range, (3) the pressurizer is capable of being in an OPERABLE status with a steam bubble, and (4) the reactor vessel is above its minimum RT_{NDT} temperature.

3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS

The Boron Injection System ensures that negative reactivity control is available during each mode of facility operation. The components required to perform this function include: (1) borated water sources, (2) charging/safety injection pumps, (3) separate flow paths, (4) boric acid transfer pumps, and (5) an emergency power supply from OPERABLE diesel generators.

With the RCS average temperature above 200°F, a minimum of two boron injection flow paths are required to ensure single functional capability in the event an assumed failure renders one of the flow paths inoperable. The boration capability of either flow path is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN from expected operating conditions of 1770 pcm after xenon decay and cooldown to 200°F. The maximum expected boration capability requirement occurs at EOL from full power equilibrium xenon conditions and requires ~~16300~~ 16830 gallons of [7000] ppm borated water be maintained in the boric acid storage tanks or [~~432,727~~] 448,000 gallons of 2000 ppm borated water be maintained in the refueling water storage tank (RWST).

With the RCS temperature below ~~200°F~~ 350°F, one boron injection flow path is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single boron injection flow path becomes inoperable.

The limitation for a maximum of one charging/safety injection pump (CSIP) to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all CSIPs except the required OPERABLE pump to be inoperable below [335°F] provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV.

The boron capability required below 200°F is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN of 1000 pcm after xenon decay and cooldown from 200°F to 140°F. This condition requires either ~~5400~~ 4330 gallons of [7000] ppm borated water be maintained in the boric acid storage tanks or [~~58,412~~] 85,000 gallons of 2000 ppm borated water be maintained in the RWST.

BORATION SYSTEMS (Continued)

, allowances for other identified needs,

an allowance for

The gallons given above are the amounts that need to be maintained in the tank in the various circumstances. To get the specified value, each value had added to it ~~(a)~~ the unusable volume of water in the tank ~~(2200 gallons for the BAT, 35,840 gallons for RWST)~~ and an ~~a 3%~~ allowance for possible instrument error ~~(1018 gallons for the BAT and 13,900 gallons for the RWST)~~. In addition, for human factors purposes, the percent indicated levels were then raised to either the next whole percent and the gallon figures rounded off. This makes the LCO values conservative to the analyzed values. The specified percent level and gallons differ by less than 0.1%.

or the next even per cent

The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST also ensure a pH value of between [8.5] and [11.0] for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.

The OPERABILITY of one Boron Injection System during REFUELING ensures that this system is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6.

3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES

The specifications of this section ensure that: (1) acceptable power distribution limits are maintained, (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, and (3) the potential effects of rod misalignment on associated accident analyses are limited. OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators is required to determine control rod positions and thereby ensure compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion limits.

The intent of Technical Specification 3.1.3.1 ACTION statement "a" is to ensure, before leaving ACTION statement "a" and utilizing ACTION statement "c," that the rod urgent Failure alarm is illuminated or that an obvious electrical problem in the rod control system is detected by minimal electrical troubleshooting techniques. Expeditious action will be taken to determine if rod immovability is caused by an electrical problem in the rod control system.

The ACTION statements which permit limited variations from the basic requirements are accompanied by additional restrictions which ensure that the original design criteria are met. Misalignment of a rod requires measurement of peaking factors and a restriction in THERMAL POWER. These restrictions provide assurance of fuel rod integrity during continued operation. In addition, those safety analyses affected by a misaligned rod are reevaluated to confirm that the results remain valid during future operation.

The maximum rod drop time restriction is consistent with the assumed rod drop time used in the safety analyses. Measurement with T_{avg} greater than or equal to [551]°F and with all reactor coolant pumps operating ensures that the measured drop times will be representative of insertion times experienced during a Reactor trip at operating conditions.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 67 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.01.01.01

Page Number: 3/4 1-1

Section Number: 4.1.1.1.1.b

Comment:

LINE 1 - DELETE THE WORDS "WITH Keff GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 1".

Basis

: TYPICALLY, MODE 2 WILL HAVE Keff GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 1. THIS CHANGE WILL MAKE THE TECH SPECS CLEARER AND IS MORE CONSERVATIVE.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 68

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.01.01.01

Page Number: 3/4 1-1

Section Number: 4.1.1.1.1.c

Comment:

LINE 1 - DELETE THE WORDS "WHEN IN MODE 2 WITH Keff LESS THAN 1"

Basis

ECP WILL BE PERFORMED AND CHECKED AQAINST LIMITS WHILE IN MODE 3. MODE 2 WILL BE EXTENDED OFFICIALLY PRIOR TO CRITICALITY OF COURSE, BUT IT COULD ONLY BE DETERMINED ANALYTICALLY. AS WRITTEN, THIS SPEC IMPLIES A HALT WHILE JUST BELOW CRITICAL TO RECHECK TO ECP. THIS DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE DESIRABLE OR NECESSARY. IT IS THE TIME PRIOR TO CRITICALITY THAT IS IMPORTANT, NOT THE MODE.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 3

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.01.02.01

Page Number: 3/4 1-7

Section Number: 3.1.2.1b

Comment:

LINE 2 - INSERT "PUMP" AFTER THE WORDS "SAFETY INJECTION"

Basis

TYPO

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 92 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.01.02.02

Page Number: 3/4 1-8

Section Number: 4.1.2.2.b & c

Comment:

DELETE SURVEILLANCE 4.1.2.2.c AND RENUMBER 4.1.2.2.d TO 4.1.2.2.c.
ADD "and" TO THE END OF 4.1.2.2.b.

Basis

SURVEILLANCE 4.1.2.2.c IS DELETED BECAUSE SURVEILLANCE 4.5.2.e.1 MORE THAN COVERS THIS REQUIREMENT WITH EXACTLY THE SAME MODE AND FREQUENCY REQUIREMENTS.

oK

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 2 Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.01.02.03 Page Number: 3/4 1-9

Section Number: APPLICABILITY

Comment:

CHANGE THE APPLICABILITY TO "MODES 4*, 5*, and 6*.".

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS PROPOSED BECAUSE THE LIMITATION OF THE FOOTNOTE IS EQUALLY VALID IN MODES 5 AND 6.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 180

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.01.02.05

Page Number: 3/4 1-11

Section Number: 3.1.2.5.b.2

Comment:

CHANGE "2000 ppm" TO "between 2000 ppm and 2200 ppm" AND DELETE "minimum".

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS MADE TO HAVE THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REFLECT THAT CERTAIN SHNPP ANALYSIS HAVE ASSUMED AN UPPER LIMIT ON BORON CONCENTRATION.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 269

Comment Type: FSAR/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3.01.02.06

Page Number: 3/4 1-12

Section Number: 3.1.2.6.b.1

Comment:

FSAR SECTION 6.2.2.3.2.3 (p 6.2.2-13) STATES THAT THE RWST IS DESIGNED FOR A 470,000 GALLON CAPACITY WITH A MINIMUM WATER INVENTORY OF 374,000 GALLONS MAINTAINED DURING ALL NORMAL MODES, AS INDICATED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. TS 3.1.2.6.b.1 AND 3.5.4.a STATE THAT THE RWST MINIMUM WATER VOLUME IS 448,000 GALLONS. FSAR SECTION 6.5.2.3.3 PROVIDES A VALUE OF 374,000 GALLONS. FSAR TABLE 6.2.2-9 ALSO PROVIDES THE MINIMUM VOLUME AS 374,000 GALLONS. THE FSAR WILL BE REVISED.

Basis

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 181

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.01.02.06

Page Number: 3/4 1-12

Section Number: 3.1.2.6.b.2

Comment:

CHANGE "2000 ppm" TO "between 2000 ppm and 2200 ppm" AND DELETE "minimum".

Basis

SEE ITEM No. 180 FOR BASES.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 4

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.01.03.01

Page Number: 3/4 1-14

Section Number: ACTION C

Comment:

DELETE "FOR GREATER THAN 36 HOURS" FROM THE FIRST LINE. INSERT "EXISTING FOR GREATER THAN 36 HOURS" IN THE THIRD LINE AFTER THE WORDS "ROD CONTROL SYSTEM".

Basis

THIS ITEM WAS CHANGED IN THE RETYPE OF THE TECH SPECS FOR P&R REVIEW. AS WRITTEN IN THE P&R TECH SPECS, THE ROD CONTROL URGENT FAILURE ALARM WOULD NOT NEED TO BE ACTED UPON FOR 36 HOURS. SINCE THIS IS AN URGENT FAILURE ALARM, THE 36 HOURS SHOULD ONLY APPLY TO THE OBVIOUS ELECTRICAL PROBLEM.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 129

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.01.03.06

Page Number: 3/4 1-21

Section Number: ACTION B

Comment:

LINE 3 - CHANGE "USING THE ABOVE FIGURES" TO "USING FIGURE 3.1-1".

Basis

THE CHANGE IS MADE FOR BETTER CLARITY.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 95 *

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.02.01

Page Number: 3/4 2-1

Section Number: APPLICABILITY

Comment:

ADD FOOTNOTE "**" TO THE END OF THE APPPLICABILITY STATEMENT.
FROM ACTION b.2, DELETE "* **".

Basis

THE PROPER POSTION FOR THESE FOOTNOTES IS IN THE APPLICABILITY SECTION. THE FOOTNOTES HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH THE ACTION STATEMENTS.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 50 Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.02.02 Page Number: 3/4 2-8

Section Number: FIGURE 3.2-2

Comment:

NEW FIGURE 3.2-2 PROVIDED.

Basis

A NEW CURVE HAS BEEN PROVIDED TO CORRECT DRAFTING INACCURACY AND TYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORS. THE TITLE HAS BEEN REVISED TO CORRECTLY STATE WHAT K(z) IS.



Figure 3.2-2 K (z) Local Axial Penalty Function for $F_Q(z)$

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CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 96 *

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.02.03

Page Number: 3/4 2-9

Section Number: 3.2.3.a

Comment:

CHANGE "C1" TO "(1.0 + C1)".

Basis

THIS CORRECTION IS MADE SINCE C1, AS DEFINED, IS IN PERCENT. THIS CHANGE CONVERTS THE VALUE INTO AN APPROPRIATE MULTIPLIER.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 213 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.02.03

Page Number: 3/4 2-10

Section Number: 4.2.3.4

Comment:

MOVE THE SECOND SENTENCE OF 4.2.3.4 TO THE SECOND SENTENCE OF 4.2.3.5.

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS PROPOSED TO CORRECT WHAT APPEARS TO BE TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN THE STANDARD TECH SPEC. THE CALORIMETRIC REFERRED TO IN THIS SENTENCE APPEARS TO BE THAT OF 4.2.3.5, SINCE 4.2.3.4 DOESN'T INVOLVE ONE.

OK

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 5 Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.02.03 Page Number: 3/4 2-10

Section Number: ACTION C

Comment:

LINE 6 - INSERT "PRIOR" AFTER THE WORDS "ACCEPTABLE LIMITS".

Basis

TYPO

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 122

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.02.04

Page Number: 3/4 2-12

Section Number: ACTION B.2

Comment:

LINE 3 - CHANGE "1," TO "1.00,".

Basis

THIS CHANGE SIMPLY CLARIFIES FOR THE READER THAT "1" IS A VALUE IN THE ACTION STATEMENT AND NOT A SUBHEADING.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 94 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.2.5

Page Number: 3/4 2-14

Section Number: LCO

Comment:

A) CHANGE 590.8 TO 592.6 AND ADD "AFTER ADDITION OR INSTRUMENT UNCERTAINTY"
B) CHANGE 2213 TO 2205 AND ADD "AFTER SUBTRACTION FOR INSTRUMENT UNCERTAINTY"

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS MADE TO RECOGNIZE THAT DIFFERENT TYPES OF MEASUREMENT, COMPUTER, BOARD METER, ETC., HAVE DIFFERENT UNCERTAINTIES. THIS CHANGE WILL PERMIT US TO COMPARE TO THE PROPER ANALYTICAL LIMITS FOR ALL AVAILABLE DATA SOURCES.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 145 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.02.05

Page Number: 3/4 2-14

Section Number: FOOTNOTE *

Comment:

IN THE FOOTNOTE, ADD "+ or -" BEFORE "5%"
IN THE FOOTNOTE, ADD "+ or -" BEFORE "10%"
IN THE FOOTNOTE, CHANGE THE WORD "INCREASE" TO "CHANGE".

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS PROVIDED TO CLARIFY THAT POWER CHANGES IN EITHER DIRECTION COULD CAUSE ONE TO REACH THESE LIMITS FOR A BRIEF PERIOD OF TIME.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 174

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: B 3/4.02.04

Page Number: B 3/4 2-5

Section Number: B 3/4 2.4

Comment:

IN PARAGRAPH 3, LINE 3, DELETE THE ONE OF THE WORD "ACTION".

Basis

TYPO

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 98 * Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.03.01 Page Number: 3/4 3-2

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-1

Comment:

ITEM 6.b - IN THE APPLICABLE MODES COLUMN, CHANGE "3*, 4*, 5*" TO "3, 4, 5".

Basis

THIS CHANGE TO DELETE THE ASTERISKS IS BEING MADE BECAUSE PORTIONS OF THE SOURCE RANGE DETECTOR CIRCUITS SHOULD BE AVAILABLE EVEN IF THE REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS ARE OPEN.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 99 | Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.03.01 | Page Number: 3/4 3-3

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-1

Comment:

ITEM 15 - CHANGE THE FUNCTIONAL UNIT TO "Undervoltage--Reactor Coolant Pumps (above P-7)".

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS MADE TO CLARIFIY THE ACTUAL APPLICATION OF THE FUNCTIONAL UNIT INVOLVED.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 130 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.03.01

Page Number: 3/4 3-3

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-1

Comment:

ITEM 15 & 16 - CHANGE THE TOTAL NUMBER OF CHANNELS TO "2/pump/train., CHANGE THE CHANNELS TO TRIP TO "2/train", AND CHANGE THE MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE TO "2/train".

Basis

THESE CHANGES ARE PROPOSED TO CLARIFY THE AS-BUILT CONFIGURATION FOR THIS INSTRUMENTATION.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 100 Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.03.01 Page Number: 3/4 3-4

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-1

Comment:

ITEM 16 - CHANGE THE FUNCTIONAL UNIT TO "Underfrequency--Reactor Coolant Pumps (above P-7)".

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS MADE TO CLARIFY THE ACTUAL APPLICATION OF THE FUNCTIONAL UNIT INVOLVED.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 65 | Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.03.01 | Page Number: 3/4 3-5 & 6

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-1

Comment:

PAGE 3/4 3-6 - DELETE THE NOTATION "**" AND REDESIGNATE THE "***" AS "**".
PAGE 3/4 3-5 ITEM 22 - IN THE APPLICABLE MODES COLUMN, CHANGE "***" TO "**".

Basis

THE ORGINAL "**" NOTE WAS NOT USED IN THE TABLE. DELETION OF THE NOTE AND REDESIGNATION OF THE SUBSEQUENT NOTE IS AN IMPROVEMENT ITEM.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 101 Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.03.01 Page Number: 3/4 3-8

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-1

Comment:

ACTION 11, LINE 3 - CHANGE "HOUS" TO "HOURS".

Basis

TYPO

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 102 Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.03.01 Page Number: 3/4 3-8

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-1

Comment:

ACTION 11, LINE 4 - CHANGE "ACTION 10" TO "ACTION 8".

Basis

THE CHANGE CORRECTS THE REFERENCE TO THE PROPER ACTION STATEMENT. THIS ERROR OCCURRED DUE TO AN OVERSIGHT IN THE RENUMBERING OF THE TABLE NOTATIONS FOR PLANT SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 103

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.03.01

Page Number: 3/4 3-10

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-2

Comment:

ITEM 15 - ADD "(above P-7)" TO THE END OF THE FUNCTIONAL UNIT DESCRIPTION.
ITEM 16 - ADD "(above P-7)" TO THE END OF THE FUNCTIONAL UNIT DESCRIPTION.

Basis

THE CHANGES ARE MADE TO CLARIFY THE ACTUAL APPLICATION OF THESE TWO FUNCTIONAL UNITS AND TO BE CONSISTENT IN NOMENCLATURE WITH TABLE 3.3-1.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 202 * Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.03.01 Page Number: 3/4 3-11

Section Number: TABLE 4.3-1

Comment:

ITEM 1 - IN THE TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST COLUMN, DELETE THE NOTE "(12)" IN THE FREQUENCY.

Basis

WE PROPOSE TO DELETE NOTE 12 ON INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF BOTH SHUNT AND UNDERVOLTAGE TRIP CIRCUITS, BECAUSE WE FEEL THAT THIS TESTING DOES NOT PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT ADDED ASSURANCE OF SYSTEM RELIABILITY. IT DOES REQUIRE ACTIONS WHICH WE FEEL ARE DETRIMENTAL TO OVERALL PLANT SAFETY. THE MANUAL REACTOR TRIP CIRCUITRY IS SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT THAN THAT OF THE AUTOMATIC TRIPS AND THUS BYPASSES THE SPECIAL TESTING CIRCUITS WHICH HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED AND INSTALLED AS A RESULT OF GENERIC LETTER 83-28. THE ONLY WAY TO PERFORM THIS TEST IS WITH THE USE OF JUMPERS IN THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM. THE USE OF JUMPERS IS CONTRARY TO PORTIONS OF REG. GUIDE 1.118 AND IEEE STANDARD 279 AND IS A HIGHLY UNDESIRABLE METHOD OF TESTING. EVEN THOUGH IT IS REQUIRED ONLY ON AN 18 MONTH BASIS, CP&L BELIEVES THAT THEIR USE HERE IS UNWARRANTED AND NOT IN THE OVERALL BEST INTEREST OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 44

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.03.01

Page Number: 3/4 3-11, 3-12

Section Number: TABLE 4.3-1

Comment:

ITEM 9 & 13-IN THE MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED COLUMN, ADD NOTE (16).

Basis

NEW INFORMATION.
ITEM 9 - THIS NOTE SHOULD ALSO APPLY TO THIS ITEM.

ITEM 13 - NOTE 16 APPEARS IN THE FREQUENCY COLUMN FOR THIS ITEM, BUT THE NOTE STATES THAT THE FREQUENCY AND/OR MODE IS MORE RESTRICTIVE IN TABLE 4.3-2. THEREFORE, THE NOTE SHOULD ALSO APPEAR IN THE MODE COLUMN.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 202 * Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.03.01 Page Number: 3/4 3-11 & 3-14

Section Number: TABLE 4.3-1

Comment:

ITEM 1 - IN THE TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST COLUMN, DELETE THE NOTE "(12)" IN THE FREQUENCY AND IN THE NOTES.

Basis

WE PROPOSE TO DELETE NOTE 12 ON INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION OF BOTH SHUNT AND UNDERVOLTAGE TRIP CIRCUITS, BECAUSE WE FEEL THAT THIS TESTING DOES NOT PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT ADDED ASSURANCE OF SYSTEM RELIABILITY. IT DOES REQUIRE ACTIONS WHICH WE FEEL ARE DETRIMENTAL TO OVERALL PLANT SAFETY. THE MANUAL REACTOR TRIP CIRCUITRY IS SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT THAN THAT OF THE AUTOMATIC TRIPS AND THUS BYPASSES THE SPECIAL TESTING CIRCUITS WHICH HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED AND INSTALLED AS A RESULT OF GENERIC LETTER 83-28. THE ONLY WAY TO PERFORM THIS TEST IS WITH THE USE OF JUMPERS IN THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM. THE USE OF JUMPERS IS CONTRARY TO PORTIONS OF REG. GUIDE 1.118 AND IEEE STANDARD 279 AND IS A HIGHLY UNDESIRABLE METHOD OF TESTING. EVEN THOUGH IT IS REQUIRED ONLY ON AN 18 MONTH BASIS, CP&L BELIEVES THAT THEIR USE HERE IS UNWARRANTED AND NOT IN THE OVERALL BEST INTEREST OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 45

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.03.01

Page Number: 3/4 3-12

Section Number: TABLE 4.3-1

Comment:

ITEM 15 - DELETE NOTE (16) FROM THE TRIP ACUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST COLUMN.

Basis

THIS ITEM DOES NOT APPEAR IN THE TABLE 4.3-2 AND THEREFORE NOTE 16 DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS ITEM.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

OK

Record Number: 6 Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.03.01 Page Number: 3/4 3-13

Section Number: TABLE 4.3-1

Comment:

IN THE TITLE LINES, CHANGE "CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST" TO "ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST".

Basis

TYPO

OK

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 7 * Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.03.01 Page Number: 3/4 3-13

Section Number: TABLE 4.3-1

Comment:

ITEM 22 - IN THE TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST COLUMN, CHANGE "M(13,14)" TO "M(7, 13), R(14)".

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS FROM NRC GENERIC LETTER 85-09. THE CHANGE TO M(13) ,R(14) WAS IN THE CP&L OCTOBER, 1985 SUBMITTAL AND WE ARE THEREFORE CONSIDERING THIS ITEM AS A TYPO.
THE ADDITION OF NOTE 7 TO THE MONTHLY FREQUENCY WAS ADDED TO CLARIFY THAT THEY BYPASS BREAKERS ARE TESTED AT THE SAME FREQUENCY AS THE REACTOR TRIP BREAKERS. THIS IS CLEARLY THE INTENT OF GENERIC LETTER 85-09, BUT THE MONTHLY FREQUENCY MAY CONFUSE THE ISSUE.

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 133 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.03.01

Page Number: 3/4 3-15

Section Number: TABLE 4.3-1

Comment:

CHANGE TABLE NOTE (13) TO READ:
(13) Remote Manual Shunt Trip prior to placing breaker in service.

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS MADE FOR CONSISTENCY WITH GENERIC LETTER 85-09 AND TO CORRECT AN ADMINISTRATIVE ERROR ON OUR PART.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 104 Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.03.02 Page Number: 3/4 3-20

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-3

Comment:

ITEM 3.c.4) - UNDER THE TOTAL NUMBER OF CHANNELS COLUMN, INSERT "4".
CHANGE THE NOTE TO READ AS FOLLOWS AND START THE NOTE IN THE CHANNELS TO TRIP COLUMN:
See Table 3.3-6, Item 1.a for Containment Radioactivity--High initiating functions and requirements.

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS MADE TO PROVIDE THE TOTAL NUMBER OF CHANNELS DATA WHICH IS NOT PROVIDED IN THE REFERENCED TABLE.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 126 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.03.02

Page Number: 3/4 3-21

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-3

Comment:

ITEM 4.a.1) - CHANGE "INDIVIDUAL" TO "INDIVIDUAL MSIV CLOSURE".

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS PROPOSED TO CLARIFY THE ACTION WHICH WILL OCCUR.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 105

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.03.02

Page Number: 3/4 3-23

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-3

Comment:

ITEM 6.g - CHANGE THE SECOND DESCRIPTION TO THE FOLLOWING:
Coincident With: Main Steam Isolation (causes AFW Isolation)

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS MADE TO CLARIFY THE INTENT OF THIS SIGNAL.

Record Number: 106 Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.03.02 Page Number: 3/4 3-24

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-3

Comment:

ITEM 10.b - IN THE TOTAL NUMBER OF CHANNELS COLUMN, CHANGE "4" TO "3" AND IN THE MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE COLUMN, CHANGE "3" TO "2".

Basis

THESE CHANGES ARE MADE TO CORRECT TYPOGRAPHICAL ERRORS ON OUR PART.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 182 Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.03.02 Page Number: 3/4 3-29

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-4

Comment:

CHANGE "RADIOACTIVITY--HIGH" TO "VENTILATION ISOLATION SIGNAL AREA MONITORS". DELETE "AND ALLOWABLE VALUES".

Basis

THESE CHANGES CORRECT THE NOMENCLATURE AND ACCURATELY INDICATE THAT ALLOWABLE VALUES ARE NOT AVAILABLE FOR THESE RADIATION MONITORS.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 107 Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.03.02 Page Number: 3/4 3-30

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-4

Comment:

ITEM 6.c - IN THE Z COLUMN, CHANGE "18.2" TO "18.18".

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS MADE TO CORRECT A VALUE INCORPORATED BY ADMINISTRATIVE ERROR.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 196 Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.03.02 Page Number: 3/4 3-30

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-4

Comment:

ITEM 6e - CHANGE THE LAST WORD OF THE SETPOINT STATEMENT FROM "VALVES" TO "VALUES".

Basis

TYPO

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 107 Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.03.02 Page Number: 3/4 3-30

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-4

Comment:

ITEM 6.c - IN THE Z COLUMN, CHANGE "18.2" TO "18.18".

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS AMDE TO CORRECT A VALUE INCORPORATED BY ADMINISTRATIVE ERROR.

OK

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 8

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.03.02

Page Number: 3/4 3-32

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-4

Comment:

ITEM 9a - CHANGE "101 sec" TO "1.01 sec.

Basis

TYPO

OK

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 9 Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.03.02 Page Number: 3/4 3-34

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-5

Comment:

ITEM 2a3 - CHANGE "17" TO "12" AND CHANGE "27" TO "22.5"

Basis

NEW DATA

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 10 Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.03.02 Page Number: 3/4 3-34

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-5

Comment:

ITEM 3a3 - CHANGE "17" TO "12" AND CHANGE "27" TO "22.5"

Basis

TO INCORPORATE NEW INFORMATION.

01C

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 11

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.03.02

Page Number: 3/4 3-34

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-5

Comment:

ITEM 3a4 - DELETE "[25](1) / [10](2)"

Basis

TYPO.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 185 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.03.02

Page Number: 3/4 3-34 & 35

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-5

Comment:

ITEMS 2a4, 3a4 and 4a4 - CHANGE "5(6)" TO "4.75(6)"

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS MADE TO INCORPORATED THE LATEST INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 220 Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.03.02 Page Number: 3/4 3-34,35,36

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-5

Comment:

ITEMS 2a6, 2a7, 3a6, 3a7, 4a6, 4a7 and 5a - CHANGE NOTE "(2)" TO NOTE "(8)".
ITEM 5a - CHANGE "LATER" TO "18.5".
ADD NEW NOTE TO PAGE 3/4 3-37 AS FOLLOWS:
(8) Diesel Generator starting delay not included but sequencer loading delays are included.

Basis

THESE CHANGES ARE MADE TO CLARIFY WHAT IS COVERED BY THE TIMES AND TO SUPPLY ADDITIONAL DATA.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 12 Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.03.02 Page Number: 3/4 3-35

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-5

Comment:

ITEM 4a3 - CHANGE "17" TO "12" AND CHANGE "27" TO "22.5".

Basis

TO INCORPORATE NEW INFORMATION.

OK

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 13

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.03.02

Page Number: 3/4 3-35

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-5

Comment:

ITEM 4.a.6 - THE FOOTNOTE NUMBERS ARE REVERSED.
CHANGE "(1)" TO "(2)" AND CHANGE "(2)" TO "(1)".

Basis

TYPO

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 205

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.03.02

Page Number: 3/4 3-35

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-5

Comment:

DELETE FOOTNOTE (3) FROM 4B, 6, AND 7

Basis

THIS FOOTNOTE APPLIES ONLY TO FEEDWATER ISOLATIONS AND SHOULD NOT BE ASSOCIATED WITH STEAM LINE ISOLATIONS AS IS CURRENTLY SHOWN.

Record Number: 146 Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.03.02 Page Number: 3/4 3-36

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-5

Comment:

ITEM 10 - CHANGE "TURBINE-DRIVEN" TO "MOTOR AND TURBINE-DRIVEN".

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS PROPOSED TO CLARIFY THAT THE RESPONSE TIME APPLIES TO BOTH MOTOR AND TURBINE DRIVEN PUMPS.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 207

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.03.02

Page Number: 3/4 3-36

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-5

Comment:

ITEM 14 - DELETE THE WORDS "CONTAINMENT ISOLATION" AND ADD A SECOND LINE "A CONTAINMENT PURGE ISOLATION"

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS TO CLARIFY THE ACTION OCCURRING WITHIN THE RESPONSE TIME.

OK

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 15 *

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.03.02

Page Number: 3/4 3-38,39,42

Section Number: TABLE 4.3-2

Comment:

ITEMS 1b, 3a2, 7a, 7b & 8a - IN THE SLAVE RELAY TEST COLUMN, CHANGE THE FREQUENCY TO "Q(3)"

Basis

THIS ITEM WAS IN THE CP&L OCTOBER SUBMITTAL. THE LETTER REQUESTING RELIEF FOR THIS CHANGE HAS BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE COMMISSION.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 16 * Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.03.02 Page Number: 3/4 3-44

Section Number: TABLE 4.3-2

Comment:

INSERT A NEW NOTE
(3) Except for relays K602, K636, K739, K740 and K741 which shall be tested at least once per 18 months and during each COLD SHUTDOWN exceeding 72 hours unless tested within the previou 90 days.

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS PROVIDED TO LIMIT THE UNDESIRABLE TESTING OF CERTAIN RELAYS. THIS PROPOSAL WAS SUBMITTED TO THE STAFF IN NLS-86-047.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 17 Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.03.03.01 Page Number: 3/4 3-46

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-6

Comment:

ITEM 1b - IN THE ALARM/TRIP COLUMN, CHANGE THE VALUE TO "N.A.".

Basis

THESE VALUES WERE PREVIOUSLY ENTERED BY ADMINISTRATIVE ERROR. THE SETPOINTS GIVEN ARE THOSE CURRENTLY ESTABLISHED, BUT SINCE THEY MAY NEED TO VARY DEPENDING ON PLANT CONDITIONS, IT IS NOT APPROPRIATE TO PUT IN SPECIFIC VALUES. THIS IS THE SAME AS OTHER RECENT PLANT SPECIFICATIONS WE HAVE EXAMINED.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 18 Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.03.03.01 Page Number: 3/4 3-46

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-6

Comment:

ITEM 1c - IN THE ALARM/TRIP COLUMN, CHANGE THE VALUE TO "N.A.".

Basis

SEE ITEM No. 17 FOR BASES.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 64 | Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.03.03.01 | Page Number: 3/4 3-48

Section Number: TABLE 4.3-3

Comment:

ITEM 1a - CHANGE THE INSTRUMENT NAME TO "CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION SIGNAL AREA MONITORS".

Basis

TYPO
THIS CHANGE WAS TO BE MADE FOR CONSISTENCY BETWEEN TABLE 3.3-6 OR 4.3-3.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 19 | Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.03.03.02 | Page Number: 3/4 3-49

Section Number: 3.3.3.2a

Comment:

IN THE FIRST LINE, DELETE "% OF THE".

Basis

TYPO

Record Number: 120

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.03.03.02

Page Number: 3/4 3-49

Section Number: APPLICABILITY

Comment:

IN APPLICABILITY c., AND IN 4.3.3.2.c, CHANGE "FQ(Z)" TO "Fq(Z)".

Basis

TYPO

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 108 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.03.03.02

Page Number: 3/4 3-49

Section Number: 4.3.3.2

Comment:

CHANGE THE SURVEILLANCE TO THE FOLLOWING:
The Movable Incore Detection System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE within 24 hours prior to use by irradiating each detector used and determining the acceptability of its voltage curve when required for:

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS PROPOSED TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL CLARIFICATION OF WHAT MUST ACTUALLY BE DONE TO DEMONSTRATE OPERABILITY OF THE MOVABLE DETECTORS.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 179

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.03.03.03

Page Number: 3/4 3-50

Section Number: 4.3.3.3.1

Comment:

LINE 3 - SPELLING OF "ANALOG" IS INCORRECT.
CORRECT TO "ANALOG".

Basis

TYPO

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 198 Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.03.03.03 Page Number: 3/4 3-51

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-7

Comment:

ITEM 3a - IN THE MEASUREMENT RANGE COLUMN, CHANGE THE RANGE TO "0.005-0.05 g". DELETE "(H or V)".
ITEM 3b - IN THE MEASUREMENT RANGE COLUMN, CHANGE THE RANGE TO "0.025-0.25 g". DELETE THE DIRECTIONAL DESIGNATORS.
DELETE THE ** FOOTNOTE AT THE BOTTOM OF THE PAGE.

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS MADE TO REFLECT THE INSTRUMENT RANGE FOR THESE INSTRUMENTS.

Record Number: 63

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.03.03.03

Page Number: 3/4 3-52

Section Number: TABLE 4.3-4

Comment:

ITEM 2 - CHANGE THE TITLE TO "TRIAXIAL PEAK ACCELEROGRAPH RECORDERS"

Basis

TITLE REWORDING IS PROPOSED FOR CONSISTENCY BETWEEN TABLES 3.3-7 AND 4.3-4.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 49

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.03.03.03

Page Number: 3/4 3-52

Section Number: TABLE 4.3-4

Comment:

ITEM 3b - ADD "***" TO THE FREQUENCY LISTED IN THE ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST COLUMN.

Basis

TYPO

ok

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 20 *	Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.03.03.05	Page Number: 3/4 3-57

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-9

Comment:

ITEM 3 - IN THE TOTAL NUMBER OF CHANNELS COLUMN, CHANGE "1-SSA CHANNEL**" TO ONLY THE VALUE "2".
ITEM 7 - IN THE TOTAL NUMBER OF CHANNELS COLUMN, INSERT "2" AND IN THE MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE COLUMN INSERT "1".
ITEM 8 - IN THE MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE COLUMN, CHANGE "1/STEAM GENERATOR" TO "NA (Note 3)".
ITEMS 9 & 10 - IN THE TOTAL NUMBER OF CHANNELS COLUMN, CHANGE "1-SSA CHANNEL**" TO "2" FOR BOTH.
ITEMS 11, 12 ,13a & 14 - IN THE MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE COLUMN, CHANGE "1" TO "1-SSA CHANNEL**" FOR EACH ITEM.
ADD NEW NOTE AT BOTTOM OF PAGE AS FOLLOWS:
Note 3 - Steam Generator level is used.

Basis

THESE VALUES ARE CHANGED TO REFLECT THE LATEST INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 46 * | Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.03.03.06 | Page Number: 3/4 3-59

Section Number: ACTION B & C

Comment:

ACTION A AND B - ADD TO THE END OF ACTION STATEMENTS A AND B THE WORD "OR".

ACTION B AND C - INSERT THE WORDS "THE PRESSURIZER SAFETY VALVE POSITION INDICATOR, OR THE SUBCOOLING MARGIN MONITORS" AFTER THE WORDS "RADIATION MONITORS" IN BOTH ACTION STATEMENTS.

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS MADE BECAUSE INCLUSION OF THE SUBCOOLING MARGIN MONITORS INTO THE PROVISIONS OF ACTION A OR B COULD RESULT IN AN UNNECESSARY PLANT SHUTDOWN. SUBCOOLING MARGIN, WHILE AN IMPORTANT PARAMETER, IS ALSO AN EXTREMELY SIMPLE PARAMETER TO MONITOR EVEN WITHOUT SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT. CONTROL ROOM PERSONNEL ARE THOUGHLY TRAINED AND HAVE SPECIAL AIDS AVAILABLE TO THEM FOR THIS PURPOSE. IN FACT, SPECIFICATION 6.8.4d REQUIRES THAT WE MAINTAIN SPECIAL PLANT PROGRAMS TO CONTROL PERSONNEL TRAINING AND PROCEDURES. WHEN THESE FACTS ARE CONSIDERED, IT CAN BE SEEN THAT THE CASE OF THE SUBCOOLING MONITOR IS THE SAME AS THAT OF THE VARIOUS RADIATION MONITORS WHERE IMPLEMENTATION OF A PREPLANNED ALTERNATE METHOD AND SPECIAL REPORTING ARE ACCEPTABLE.

THE CHANGE TO NOT REQUIRE THE PRESSURIZER SAFETY VALVE POSTION INDICATORS IS MADE BECAUSE THE INDICATORS HAVE A REDUNDANT BACKUP IN THE FORM OF THE SEAL LOOP TEMPERATURE INDICATORS. THEREFORE, SINCE INDICATION IS AVAILABLE, A PLANT SHUTDOWN SHOULD NOT BE REQUIRED.

THE "OR's" HAVE BEEN ADDED IN ORDER TO PROPERLY CARRY THROUGH THE LOGIC OF THE ESTABLISHED ACTION STATEMENTS.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 43 *

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.03.03.06

Page Number: 3/4 3-60

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-10

Comment:

ITEM 10 - IN THE TOTAL NUMBER OF CHANNELS COLUMN, CHANGE "2/STEAM GENERATOR" TO "1/STEAM GENERATOR".
ITEM 7 - IN THE TOTAL NUMBER OF CHANNELS COLUMN, CHANGE "1/STEAM GENERATOR" TO "4/STEAM GENERATOR".
ITEM 12 - IN THE TOTAL NUMBER OF CHANNELS COLUMN, CHANGE "1/VALVE" TO "2/VALVE".
ITEM 13 - IN THE TOTAL NUMBER OF CHANNELS COLUMN, CHANGE "1/VALVE" TO "2/VALVE".

Basis

THESE CHANGES ARE TO INCORPORATE THE LATEST INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US AND ARE PLANT SPECIFIC INFORMATION.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 159 | Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.03.03.06 | Page Number: 3/4 3-61

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-10

Comment:

MOVE THE MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE COLUMN TOWARD THE RIGHT EDGE OF THE PAGE.

Basis

TYPO - THE COLUMNS SHOULD BE LINED UP.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 160 — Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.03.03.06 — Page Number: 3/4 3-63

Section Number: TABLE 4.3-7

Comment:

ITEM 24 - DELETE THE FREQUENCIES NEXT TO ITEM 24.
KEEP THE FREQUENCIES SPECIFIED FOR ITEMS 24.a & b.

Basis

TYPO - THE FREQUENCIES ARE COVERED BY THE
SUB-ITEMS.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 21

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.03.03.07

Page Number: 3/4 3-64

Section Number: 3.3.3.7

Comment:

LINE 3 - CHANGE "LATER" TO THE NUMBER "5".

Basis

TO INCORPORATE NEW INFORMATION.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 22 *

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.03.03.08

Page Number: 3/4 3-66

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-11

Comment:

THE TITLE BLOCK OF THE TABLE HAS THE INCORRECT NUMBER LISTED. CHANGE THE TABLE NUMBER TO "3.3-11".
ADDITIONALLY CHANGE THE INFORMATION MARKED IN THE TABLE TO CORRESPOND TO THE ATTACHED MARKED UP PAGES.

Basis

THESE CHANGES ARE MADE TO CORRECT CLERICAL ERRORS AND TO SUPPLY THE LATEST INFORMATION AVAILABE TO US.

DRAFT

TO

Record 22

TABLE 3.3-11a

HVAC DUCT FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS

Supply Fan Zone	HVAC System	Smoke Detector Tag No.
2.0 Fuel Handling Building (Cont'd)		
5-F-3-HV EL. 261	Normal Supply (North) AH-22A (NNS), AH-22B (NNS)	FAD-1FP-8657-B01 FAD-1FP-8657-B02 FAD-1FP-8657-B03
12-A-7-HV EL. 324	Normal Supply (Oper Fl) AH-56 (NNS), AH-57 (NNS)	FAD-1FP-8657-C01 FAD-1FP-8657-C02
12-A-7-HV EL. 324	Normal Supply (Oper Fl) AH-58 (NNS), AH-59 (NNS)	FAD-1FP-8657-D01 FAD-1FP-8657-D02
3.0 Diesel Generator Building		
1-D-3-DGA-HVR EL. 292	Electric Equip. Rm. A HVAC AH-85, (1A-SA), AH-85 (1B-SA)	FAD-1FP-8658-A01 FAD-1FP-8658-A02
1-D-3-DGB-HVR EL. 292	Electric Equip Rm B HVAC AH-85 (1A-SB), AH-85 (1B-SB)	FAD-1FP-8658-B01 FAD-1FP-8658-B02

86768

DRAFT

Add this table

Reco

TABLE 3.3-11a

HVAC DUCT FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS

Supply Fan Zone	HVAC System	Smoke Detector Tag No.
1.0 Reactor Auxiliary Building		
1-A-5-HVA EL. 286	Switchgear Room A AH-12 (1A-SA) (1B-SA)	FAD-1FP-8655-A01 FAD-1FP-8655-A02 FAD-1FP-8655-A03
1-A-5-HVB EL. 286	Switchgear Room B AH-13 (1A-SB) (1B-SB)	FAD-1FP-8655-B01 FAD-1FP-8655-B02 FAD-1FP-8655-B03 FAD-1FP-8655-B04
12-A-6-HV7 EL. 305	Electrical Equipment Protection Rooms HVAC AH-16 (1A-SA) (1B-SB)	FAD-1FP-8655-C01 FAD-1FP-8655-C02
12-A-7-HV EL. 324	NNS Ventilation AH-14 (NNS)	FAD-1FP-8655-D01 FAD-1FP-8655-D02 FAD-1FP-8655-D03 FAD-1FP-8655-D04 ~~FAD-1FP-8655-D05~~
1-A-5-HV3 EL. 286	Normal Supply S-3A (NNS) S-3B (NNS)	FAD-1FP-8655-E01 FAD-1FP-8655-E02 FAD-1FP-8655-E03 FAD-1FP-8655-E04 FAD-1FP-8655-E05
12-A-6-HV7 EL. 305	Control Room HVAC AH-15 (1A-SA), (1B-SB)	FAD-1FP-8655-F01 FAD-1FP-8655-F02 FAD-1FP-8655-F03 FAD-1FP-8655-F04
(Later) EL. 324	Computer & Communication RM HVAC AH-97A(NNS) AH-97B(NNS)	FAD-1FP-8655-G01 FAD-1FP-8655-G02
(Later) EL. 324	Computer Battery & Aux Electric Protection Rms HVAC AH-98A (NNS), AH-98B (NNS)	FAD-1FP-8655-H01 FAD-1FP-8655-H02
2.0 Fuel Handling Building		
1-A-4-CHFA EL. 261	Normal Supply (South) AH-21A (NNS), AH-21B (NNS)	FAD-1FP-8657-A01 FAD-1FP-8657-A02

8676g

PROOF AND REVIEW COPY

(Reco

TABLE 3.3-11 (Continued)

ZONE	INSTRUMENT LOCATION	ELEVATION (FT)	TOTAL NUMBER OF INSTRUMENTS HEAT (A/B)*	FLAME (A/B)*	SMOKE (A/B)*
5.0 Diesel Oil Storage Tank Area					
1-0-PA	Diesel Fuel Oil Pump Room 1A	242.25	0/2	2/0	---
1-0-PB	Diesel Fuel Oil Pump Room 1B	242.25	0/2	2/0	---
5-0-BAL	Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank Area--Balance	242.25	---	7/0	---
6.0 Emergency Service Water Intake Structure					
12-1-ESWPA	Electrical Equipment Room SA	251.7/ 262.0	---	---	~~10~~ 8/0
	Pump Room SA	262.0	---	2/0	---
12-1-ESWPB	Electrical Equipment Room SB	251.7/ 262.0	---	---	~~10~~ 8/0
	Pump Room SB	262.0	---	2/0	---

ADD THE FOLLOWING 2 PAGES TO THIS TABLE (PAGES 3/4 3-69a & 3-69B)

PROOF AND REVIEW COPY

(Rev 2)

Table 3.3-11 (Continued)

ZONE	INSTRUMENT LOCATION	ELEVATION (FT)	TOTAL NUMBER OF INSTRUMENTS HEAT (A/B)*	FLAME (A/B)*	SMOKE (A/B)*
2.0	Reactor Auxiliary Building (Continued)				
12-A-6-PICR1	Process Instruments & Control Racks	305.0	---	---	8/0
12-A-6-HV7	HVAC Equipment Room	305.0	0/~~4~~ 8	---	24 ~~12~~/0
3.0	Fuel Handling Building				
5-F-2-FPC	Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps & Heat Exchangers	236.0	0/16	---	2/0 ~~---~~
5-F-3-CHFA	Emergency Exhaust Charcoal Filter A	261.0	0/8	---	8/0
5-F-3-CHFB	Emergency Exhaust Charcoal Filter B	261.0	0/8	---	8/0
5-F-3-CHF-BAL	Emergency Exhaust Balance	261.0	---	---	4/0
5-F-3-DMNZ	1/2 GENERAL Co. 36 TO 50	261.0	---	---	12/0
4.0	Diesel Generator Building				
1-D-1-DGA-RM	Diesel Generator 1A	261.0	0/10	4 ~~8~~/0	---
1-D-1-DGB-RM	Diesel Generator 1B	261.0	0/10	4 ~~8~~/0	---
1-D-1-DGA-ASU	Diesel Generator Air Starting Unit 1A	261.0	2/0	---	---
1-D-1-DGB-ASU	Diesel Generator Air Starting Unit 1B	261.0	2/0	---	---
1-D-1-DGA-TK	Diesel Fuel Oil Day Tank 1A	280.0	0/2 ~~2/0~~	---	---
1-D-1-DGB-TK	Diesel Fuel Oil Day Tank 1B	280.0	0/2 ~~2/0~~	---	---
1-D-1-DGA-ER	Diesel Generator MCC & Control Panel 1A	261.0	---	---	2/0
1-D-1-DGB-ER	Diesel Generator MCC & Control Panel 1B	261.0	---	---	2/0
1-D-3-DGA-ES	Diesel Exhaust Silencer 1A	292.0	---	2/0	---
1-D-3-DGB-ES	Diesel Exhaust Silencer 1B	292.0	---	2/0	---

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Recom. 122

TABLE 3.3-11 (Continued)

FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION

ZONE	INSTRUMENT LOCATION	ELEVATION (FT)	TOTAL NUMBER OF INSTRUMENTS HEAT (A/B)*	FLAME (A/B)*	SMOKE (A/B)*
2.0	Reactor Auxiliary Building (Continued)				
1-A-4-CHLR	HVAC Chiller Equipment Area & Cable Trays	261.0	0/~~42~~ 44	---	~~42~~ 44/0
1-A-4-~~COMB~~ COM-B	Boric Acid Equipment Area & Corridor Cable Trays	261.0	0/12	---	13/0
1-A-4-~~COME~~ COM-E	Corridor Cable Trays	261.0	0/~~6~~ 7	---	12/0
1-A-4-~~COMI~~ COM-I	Corridor Cable Trays	261.0	0/~~4~~ 3	---	7/0
1-A-4-CHFA	Charcoal Filter Room 1A	261.0	0/5	---	10/0
1-A-4-CHFB	Charcoal Filter Room 1B	261.0	0/4	---	8/0
1-A-EPA	Electrical Penetration Area SA	261.0	0/15	---	15/0
1-A-EPB	Electrical Penetration Area SB	261.0	0/15	---	15/0
1-A-5-HVA	HVAC Room 1A	286.0	---	---	14/0
1-A-5-HVB	HVAC Room 1B	286.0	---	---	15/0
1-A-SWGRA	Switchgear Room A	286.0	---	---	18/0
1-A-SWGRB	Switchgear Room B	286.0	---	---	17/0
1-A-BATA	Battery Room 1A	286.0	---	---	2/0
1-A-BATB	Battery Room 1B	286.0	---	---	2/0
1-A-CSRA	Cable Spreading Room A	286.0	0/~~21~~ 27	---	~~21~~ 27/0
1-~~B~~ A-CSRB	Cable Spreading Room B	286.0	0/15	---	15/0
1-A-ACP	Auxiliary Control Panel	286.0	---	---	2/0
1-A-CSRA	PIC Room A	286.0	---	---	2/0
12-A-6-RT1	Terminal Cabinet Room	305.0	---	---	14/0
12-A-6-RCC1	Rod Control Cabinets Room	305.0	---	---	~~7~~ 9/0
12-A-6-CR1	MAIN Control Room AREA	305.0	---	---	~~18~~ 20/0
12-A-6-APR1	Auxiliary Relay Panels	305.0	---	---	6/0
12-A-6-CR1	CONTROL ROOM PANELS	305.0	---	---	9/0

PROOF AND REVIEW COPY

TABLE 3.3-11

FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION

(Record)

ZONE	INSTRUMENT LOCATION	ELEVATION (FT)	TOTAL NUMBER OF INSTRUMENTS HEAT (A/B)*	FLAME (A/B)*	SMOKE (A/B)*
1.0 Containment Building**					
1-C-1-RCP-1A	Reactor Coolant Pump 1A	256.33	12/0	---	---
1-C-1-RCP-1B	Reactor Coolant Pump 1B	256.33	12/0	---	---
1-C-1-RCP-1C	Reactor Coolant Pump 1C	256.33	12/0	---	---
1-C-1-CHFA	Airborne Radioactivity Removal Unit 1A	221.0	0/5	---	---
1-C-1-CHFB	Airborne Radioactivity Removal Unit 1B	~~221.0~~ 236.0	0/~~5~~9	---	---
1-C-~~2~~3-EPA	Electrical Penetration Area 1A	261.0	0/12	---	12/0
1-C-~~2~~3-EPB	Electrical Penetration Area 1B	261.0	0/12	---	12/0
1-C-BAL	ELEVATOR MACHINE ROOM	302.0	---	---	2/0
1-C-1	CONTAINMENT FAN COOLERS	236.0	0/4	---	---
1-C-1	CONTAINMENT 263 + PRESS. CUBICLE	236/309	0/24	---	---
2.0 Reactor Auxiliary Building					
1-A-1-PA	RHR Pump Room 1A	190.0	0/11	---	---
1-A-1PB	RHR Pump Room 1B	190.0	0/11	---	---
1-A-2MP	Misc. Pumps & Equipment	216.0	0/28	---	32/0
1-A-3-PB	Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps, Component Cooling Water Pumps & Heat Exchangers	236.0	0/~~46~~56	---	~~50~~59/0
1-A-3-COME	Decontamination Area & Corridor Cable Trays	236.0	0/10	---	14/0
1-A-3-COME	Letdown Heat Exchanger & Corridor Cable Trays	236.0	0/6	---	18/0
1-A-3-COR	Corridor Cable Trays	236.0	0/4	---	22
1-A-3-~~COMI~~ COMI	Recycle Holdup Tank Area & Corridor Cable Trays	236.0	0/10	---	21/0

*(A/B) A = The number of early warning fire detectors.
B = The number of detectors used for actuation of fire suppression systems.

**The fire detection instruments located within the Containment Building are not required to be OPERABLE during the performance of Type A Containment Leakage Rate Tests.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 177 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.03.03.10

Page Number: 3/4 3-71

Section Number: APPLICABILITY

Comment:

CHANGE THE APPLICABILITY OF THIS SPEC TO "As shown in Table 3.3-12".

Basis

SOME ITEMS ON TABLE 3.3-12 OPERATE ONLY WHEN LIQUID WASTE TREATMENT EFFLUENT IS BEING DISCHARGED. WHEN THERE ARE NO LIQUID EFFLUENTS, THERE SHOULD BE NO REQUIREMENT TO MONITOR OPERATION. IF FACT, MONITOR VENDORS RECOMMEND SHUTDOWN (TURNING OFF HIGH VOLTAGE) WHEN THERE IS NO FLOW THROUGH THE MONITOR.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 151

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.03.03.10

Page Number: 3/4 3-72

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-12

Comment:

ITEM 1.a.3) - DELETE THE "S" FROM THE WORD "TANKS".

Basis

TYPO

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 178 * Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.03.03.10 Page Number: 3/4 3-72 & 73

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-12

Comment:

ADD A NEW COLUMN FOR "APPLICABILITY" AS FOLLOWS:

	APPLICABILITY
ITEM 1a1	**
ITEM 1a2	**
ITEM 1a3	**
ITEM 1b	**
ITEM 1c	**
ITEM 2a	*
ITEM 2b	*
ITEM 3a1	**
ITEM 3a2	**
ITEM 3a3	**
ITEM 3b	*

ADD THE FOLLOWING NOTES TO PAGE 3/4 3-74
* AT ALL TIMES
** WHENEVER LIQUID EFFLUENT IS BEING RELEASED VIA THIS PATHWAY.

Basis

SEE ITEM No. 177 FOR BASES.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 24 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.03.03.10

Page Number: 3/4 3-73 & 3-76

Section Number: T 3/3-12 &4.3-8

Comment:

DELETE 3a4 AND 3a5 FROM EACH TABLE.

Basis

THE NORMAL SERVICE WATER SYSTEM IS NOT A ROUTINE EFFLUENT PATHWAY. EVEN IF IT WERE, THESE MONITORS ARE NOT APPROPRIATE TO ESTIMATE RELEASE SINCE THEY MONITOR THE FLOW IN THE SERVICE LOOPS AND SEE THE SAME WATER OVER AND OVER AGAIN. IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT THAT THE NORMAL SERVICE WATER DOES BECOME CONTAMINATED, THE APPROPRIATE FLOW TO MONITOR RELEASES WOULD BE THE COOLING TOWER BLOWDOWN WHICH IS ALREADY COVERED BY THIS SPECIFICATION.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 23

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.03.03.10

Page Number: 3/4 3-73

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-12

Comment:

ITEM 3b - INSERT THE NUMBER "1" IN THE MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE AND INSERT THE NUMBER "38" IN THE ACTION COLUMN.

Basis

TYPO

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 48 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.03.03.10

Page Number: 3/4 3-76

Section Number: TABLE 4.3-8

Comment:

ITEMS 3a1, 3a2, 3a3 AND 3b - CHANGE THE DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST FREQUENCY FROM "Q" TO "NA" FOR EACH OF THESE ITEMS.

Basis

THE ALARM FUNCTION FOR ITEMS 3a1, 3a2 AND 3a3 IS COVERED AND TESTED BY 1a1, 1a2 AND 1a3 IN THE TABLE FOR NO SAMPLE FLOW. FLOW MEASUREMENT DEVICE READOUTS ARE USED IN CALCULATIONS BUT NOT AS ALARMS.
ITEM 3b IS NOT A ROUTINE EFFLUENT PATHWAY AND HAS NO ALARM FUNCTION.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 219

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.03.03.10

Page Number: 3/4 3-77

Section Number: TABLE 4.3-8

Comment:

IN THE TITLE BLOCK - CHANGE THE TABLE NUMBER TO "4.3-8".

Basis

TYPO

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 161 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.03.03.11

Page Number: 3/4 3-80

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-13

Comment:

CHANGE ITEM 4.a TO THE FOLLOWING:
a.1 Noble Gas Activity Monitor(PIG)
a.2 Noble Gas Activity Monitor(WRGM)
THE MINIMUN NUMBER OF CHANNELS OPERABLE FOR BOTH
a.1 & a.2 IS "1"
THE APPLICABILITY FOR a.1 IS "*"
THE APPLICABILITY FOR a.2 IS "MODES 1, 2, 3".
THE ACTION FOR 1.a IS "45, 51".
THE ACTION FOR 1.b IS "52".

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS PROVIDED TO MORE ACCURATELY COVER
THE GASEOUS EFFLUENT RADIATION MONITORING
EQUIPMENT IN THE PLANT.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 162 Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.03.03.11 Page Number: 3/4 3-81

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-13

Comment:

ACTION 45, LINE 2 - INSERT THE WORDS "waste gas decay" AFTER THE PHRASE "contents of the".

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS PROPOSED TO CLARIFY WHICH TANKS ARE COVERED BY THIS ACTION STATEMENT.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 203 * Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.03.03.11 Page Number: 3/4 3-81

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-13

Comment:

ADD THE FOLLOWING NOTES TO TABLE 3.3-13:

ACTION 51 With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement for both the PIG and WGRM, effluent releases via this pathway may continue provided grap samples are taken at least once per 12 hours and these samples are analyzed for radioactivity within 24 hours.

ACTION 52 Take the action as required by Specification 3.3.3.6 Action C.

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS PROPOSED TO MORE ADEQUATELY DESCRIBE THE GASEOUS RADIATION MONITORING EQUIPMENT AS INSTALLED IN THE PLANT.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 163 | Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.03.03.11 | Page Number: 3/4 3-82 & 83

Section Number: TABLE 4.3-9

Comment:

ITEMS 2b, 2c, 3b, 3c, 4b, 4c, 5b & 5c - IN THE CHANNEL CHECK COLUMN, CHANGE "W" TO "N.A."

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS MADE TO PROPERLY REFLECT THAT THE CHANNEL CHECK FOR THESE SAMPLERS IS COVERED BY THE FLOW RATE MONITOR OF ITEM e. OF EACH SPECIFICATION.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 204 | Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.03.03.11 | Page Number: 3/4 3-82 & 83

Section Number: TABLE 4.3-9

Comment:

ON BOTH PAGES OF THE TABLE, CHANGE THE HEADING "CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST" TO "DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST".
ITEMS 2d, 2e, 3d, 3e, 4d, 4e, 5d and 5e - IN THE CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST COLUMN, DELETE THE # FOOTNOTE REFERENCE.

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS MADE TO CORRECT AN ERROR AND ACCURATELY DESCRIBE THE APPROPRIATE TEST TYPE FOR THIS EQUIPMENT.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 215 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.03.04

Page Number: 3/4 3-85

Section Number: 3.3.4

Comment:

DELETE THE COMPLETE SPECIFIFCATION.

Basis

PER DISCUSSION WITH THE NRC MATERIALS ENGINEERING BRANCH, THE NRC HAS COMPLETED ITS REVIEW OF WESTINGHOUSE TOPICAL REPORTS WSTG-1-P, MAY 1981; WSTG-2-P, MAY 1981; AND WSTG-3-P, JULY 1984. THE SHNPP SPECIFIC ROTOR AND MISSILE PROBABILITY REPORTS WERE BASED ON THESE REPORTS AND CALCULATE REQUIRED INSPECTION INTERVALS FOR MAINTAINING P1 GREATER THAN NORMAL WESTINGHOUSE SCHEDULE BASED ON PURELY COMMERCIAL CONSIDERATIONS. BASED ON THE COMPLETED NRC REVIEW AND OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE STAFF, WE THEREFORE PROPOSE TO DELETE THE TURBINE SURVEILLANCE SPECIFICATION 3.3.4. WE PROPOSE TO REPLACE IT WITH THE INDICATED SECTION 6 COMMITMENT (See comment No. 216) TO ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN A MAINTENANCE AND TESTING PROGRAM CONSISTENT WITH APPLICABLE GUIDANCE PROVIDED IN THE VENDOR RECOMMENDATIONS.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 136 Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.04.01.02 Page Number: 3/4 4-2

Section Number: ACTION B

Comment:

CHANGE ACTION b. TO THE FOLLOWING:
With one or less reactor coolant loops in operation....

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS PROPOSED TO CLARIFY THE ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN SHOULD NO REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS BE OPERABLE.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 61

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.04.01.03

Page Number: 3/4 4-4

Section Number: 3.4.1.3.d

Comment:

3.4.1.3.d - AT THE END OF THE STATEMENT, CHANGE THE WORD "AND" TO THE WORD "OR".

Basis

THE WORD "AND" IS GRAMMATICALLY INCORRECT IN THIS CASE. ANY TWO LOOPS ARE ACCEPTABLE. THEREFORE, "AND" SHOULD BE REPLACED BY "OR".

CK

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 14 Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.04.01.04.01 Page Number: 3/4 4-6

Section Number: FOOTNOTE ***

Comment:

IN FOOTNOTE *** INSERT THE WORDS "or equal to" BEFORE 50 F.

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS MADE TO MAKE ALL THE TECH SPEC REFERENCES TO THIS TEMPERATURE CONSISTENT.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 299 Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: B 3/4.03.04.09 Page Number: B 3/4 4-14

Section Number: B 3/4.4.9

Comment:

IN THE FIRST LINE UNDER LTOP, CHANGE THE VALUE OF "2.45" TO "2.9".

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS PROPOSED TO PROVIDE THE LATEST INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US.

Record Number: 76 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.04.05

Page Number: 3/4 4-16

Section Number: 4.4.5.4

Comment:

DELETE THE FOOTNOTE AT THE BOTTOM OF THE PAGE AND ITS "*" IN SECTION 4.4.5.4.a.6.

Basis

THIS FOOTNOTE IS AN AID IN THE DETERMINATION OF THE PROPER TUBE PLUGGING LIMIT. IT SERVES NO PURPOSE AFTER THE VALUE HAS BEEN DETERMINED.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 25 Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.04.06.01 Page Number: 3/4 4-21

Section Number: ACTION A

Comment:

LINE 5 - INSERT THE WORD "AIRBORNE" AFTER THE WORDS "THE REQUIRED".

Basis

TYPO

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 147

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.04.06.01

Page Number: 3/4 4-21 & 22

Section Number: 3.4.6.1

Comment:

IN 3.4.6.1.b AND IN 4.4.6.1.b - CHANGE "CONTAINMENT SUMP" TO "REACTOR CAVITY SUMP".

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS PROPOSED IN ORDER TO BE CONSISTENT WITH PLANT NOMENCLATURE.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 119 * Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.04.06.02 Page Number: 3/4 4-23

Section Number: FOOTNOTE *

Comment:

CHANGE THE FOOTNOTE TO THE FOLLOWING:
"....leakage shall be adjusted by multiplying the observed leakage by the square root of the quotient of 2235 divided by the test pressure."

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS PROPOSED TO MAKE THE WORDING OF THE FOOTNOTE CONSISTENT WITH THE FSAR AND TO BETTER SPECIFY HOW THE ADJUSTMENT SHALL BE MADE.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 297 | Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.04.07 | Page Number: 3/4 4-27 & 28

Section Number: TABLE 3.4-2

Comment:

TABLE 3.4-2 AND TABLE 4.4-3 - IN THE FOOTNOTE ON THE BOTTOM, CHANGE THE VALUE OF "250" TO "180".

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS MADE FOR CONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE FSAR AND THE TECH SPECS.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 305 *

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.04.08

Page Number: 3/4 4-32

Section Number: FIRST NOTE

Comment:

CHANGE "10" TO "15"

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS MADE TO MAKE THE NOTE CONSISTENT WITH THE DEFINITION OF E-BAR.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 194

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.04.09.02

Page Number: 3/4 4-34

Section Number: ACTION

Comment:

LINE 1 - INSERT AFTER THE WORD "exceeded" THE WORDS "for the heatup and cooldown rates shown on Table 4.4-6,"

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS MADE TO MORE ACCURATELY REFLECT THE APPLICABLE LIMITS.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 26 | Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.04.09.02 | Page Number: 3/4 4-35

Section Number: FIGURE 3.4-2

Comment:

BOTTOM TITLE BLOCK - IN THE CURVE TITLE, CHANGE THE WORD "HEATUP" TO THE WORD "COOLDOWN". CHANGE "5 EFPY" TO "4 EFPY" IN TWO PLACES.

Basis

TYPO
THE CHANGE IN EFPY TO 4 IS BASED ON DATA SUPPLIED BY THE VENDOR.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 27 Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.04.09.02 Page Number: 3/4 4-36

Section Number: FIGURE 3.4-3

Comment:

BOTTOM TITLE BLOCK - IN THE CURVE TITLE, CHANGE THE WORD "COOLDOWN" TO THE WORD "HEATUP". CHANGE "5 EFPY" TO "4 EFPY" IN 3 PLACES.

Basis :

TYPO
THE CAHNGE IN EFPY IS BASED OF INFOMATION SUPPLIED BY THE VENDOR.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 298 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.04.09.04

Page Number: 3/4 4-40

Section Number: 3.4.9.4

Comment:

IN 3.4.9.4.b, ACTION a, AND ACTION b - CHANGE THE VALUE OF "2.45" TO "2.9".

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS PROPOSED TO PROVIDE THE LATEST INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US.

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 28

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.04.09.04

Page Number: 2/4 4-41

Section Number: FIGURE 3.4-4

Comment:

X AXIS LABEL - IN THE LABEL, CHANGE "RTD" TO "RCS".

Basis

TYPO

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 29 * Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.04.09.04 Page Number: 3/4 4-41

Section Number: FIGURE 3.4-4

Comment:

CHANGE FOOTNOTE * TO THE FOLLOWING: VALUES BASED ON 4 EFPY REACTOR VESSEL DATA AND CONTAIN MARGINS OF -10 F AND +60 psig FOR POSSIBLE INSTRUMENT ERROR.

Basis

TYPO. THIS INFORMATION WAS PROVIDED BY TELECON IN JANUARY, 1986 BUT WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE P&R TECH SPECS.
THE CHANGE TO 4 EFPY IS BASED ON NEWLY SUPPLIED VENDOR DATA.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 29 *　　Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.04.09.04　　Page Number: 3/4 4-41

Section Number: FIGURE 3.4-4

Comment:

CHANGE FOOTNOTE * TO THE FOLLOWING: VALUES BASED ON 4 EFPY REACTOR VESSEL DATA AND CONTAIN MARGINS OF -10 F AND +60 psig FOR POSSIBLE INSTRUMENT ERROR.

Basis

TYPO. THIS INFORMATION WAS PROVIDED BY TELECOM IN JANUARY, 1986 BUT WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE P&R TECH SPECS.
THE CHANGE TO 4 EFPY IS BASED ON NEWLY SUPPLIED VENDOR DATA.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 241

Comment Type: FSAR/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3/4.05.01

Page Number: 3/4 5-1

Section Number: 3.5.1.b

Comment:

THE TS STATE THAT THE MINIMUM ACCUMULATOR VOLUME IS BETWEEN 7440 AND 7710 GALLONS. FSAR TABLES 6.3.2-1 AND 8 STATES THAT MINIMUM ACCUMULATOR VOLUME IS 925 cu. ft (approx 7715 GALLONS). THE FSAR WILL BE REVISED NECESSARY.

Basis

Record Number: 71 Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.05.02 Page Number: 3/4 5-5

Section Number: 4.5.2.f.1

Comment:

CHANGE REFERENCED SPECIFICATION TO "4.1.2.4".

Basis

THE CHANGE IS NECESSARY TO COMPLY WITH THE NUMBERING OF THE REFERENCED SPEC.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 212

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.05.02

Page Number: 3/4 5-5

Section Number: 4.5.2.e.1

Comment:

LINE 3 - INSERT THE WORDS "on RWST LO-LO level" AFTER "containment sump".

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS PROPOSED TO CLARIFY THE SIGNAL USED IN THIS SURVEILLANCE.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 152 Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.05:02 Page Number: 3/4 5-6

Section Number: 4.5.2.g

Comment:

IN THE TABLE OF HPSI SYSTEM VALVE NUMBERS, IN THE HPSI SYSTEM EBASCO Valve No. COLUMN, THE THIRD VALVE - CHANGE "2SI-V433SA-1" TO "2SI-V438SA-1".

Basis

TYPO

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 93 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.5.4

Page Number: 3/4 5-9

Section Number: LCO

Comment:

ACTION A- INSERT "448,000" IN PLACE OF "433,000" AND "95" IN PLACE OF "84"
ACTION B- DELETE "MINIMUM" AND CHANGE "OF 2000 PPM" TO "OF BETWEEN 2000 PPM AND 2200 PPM"

Basis

THESE CHANGES ARE MADE TO PROVIDE THE MOST RECENT VALUES WE HAVE AND TO REFLECT THAT CERTAIN OF OUR ANALYSES ASSUMED AN UPPER LIMIT ON BORON CONCENTRATION.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 121 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.06.01.02

Page Number: 3/4 6-2

Section Number: 4.6.1.2

Comment:

CHANGE 4.6.1.2 AS FOLLOWS:
.... N45.4-1972, or a test of less than 24 hours duration is permitted if performed using the criteria contained in Bechtel Topical Report BN-TOP-1, Rev. 1, November 1, 1972, "Testing Criteria for Integrated Leakage Rate Testing of Primary Containment Structures for Nuclear Power Plants." In addition to the BN-TOP-1 criteria, the mass point technique will be used to calculate the leakage rate.

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS PROPOSED TO CLARIFY THE METHODOLOGY WHICH MAY BE USED FOR THE SHORT DURATION TEST.

CP&L Comments

'HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 199 * | Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.06.01.04 | Page Number: 3/4 6-6

Section Number: 3.6.1.4

Comment:

LINE 2 - CHANGE THE VALUE OF "-4.0" TO "-1.0".

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS MADE FOR CONSISTENCY BETWEEN THIS SPEC AND THE CONTAINMENT ~~VACUUM BREAKER SETTINGS~~. Analysis Assumptions.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 193 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.06.01.07

Page Number: 3/4 6-9 & 10

Section Number: 3.6.1.7

Comment:

DELETION OF THE LIMITATION ON CONTAINMENT PURGING AS SHOWN ON THE ATTACHED MARKED UP PAGES.

Basis

THESE CHANGES ARE PROPOSED CONSISTENT WITH CP&L's POSITION THAT SHNPP HAS BEEN DESIGNED, CONSTRUCTED AND REVIEWED AS A CONTINUOUS PURGE PLANT. WE FEEL THAT IMPOSITION OF THIS SPECIFICATION AS CURRENTLY WRITTEN REPRESENTS AN UNWARRENTED BACKFIT. THIS IS DISCUSSED IN OUR LETTER NLS 86-054 DATED FEBRUARY 6, 1986.

RECORD # 193

PROOF AND REVIEW COPY

(Record 193)

CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.7 Each containment purge makeup and exhaust isolation valve shall be OPERABLE and:

a. Each [42-inch] containment preentry purge makeup and exhaust isolation valve shall be closed and sealed closed, and

b. The [8-inch]~~*~~ containment purge makeup and exhaust isolation valve(s) ~~may be open for up to [1000]* hours during a calendar year provided no more than one pair (one makeup and one exhaust) are open at one time.~~ SHALL BE OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

a. With a [42-inch] containment preentry purge makeup and/or exhaust isolation valve open or not sealed closed, close and/or seal close that valve or isolate the penetration(s) within 4 hours, otherwise be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

b. With the [8-inch]* containment purge makeup and/or exhaust isolation valve(s) ~~open for more than [1000]* hours during a calendar year,~~ INOPERABLE close the open [8-inch]~~*~~ valve(s) or isolate the penetration(s) within 4 hours, otherwise be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours, and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

c. With a containment purge makeup and/or exhaust isolation valve(s) having a measured leakage rate in excess of the limits of Specifications 4.6.1.7.~~3~~2 and/or 4.6.1.7.~~4~~3, restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status within 24 hours, otherwise be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours, and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

~~*For a 3-inch valve or less, the valves may be open continuously. For an 8-inch valve or less, the valves may be open for up to 1000 hours during a calendar year. For an 18-inch valve or less, the valves may be open for up to 500 hours during a calendar year. For a valve greater than 18 inches, the valve may be open for up to 250 hours during a calendar year. All valves that may be open during plant operations (MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4) must be qualified to close under postulated accident conditions. After operational experience, the licensee may request additional time for the qualified valves to be open during plant operations and shall provide justification for the requested additional time as indicated in the Bases.~~

PROOF AND REVIEW COPY

Recd 1/93

CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.7.1 Each [42-inch] containment preentry purge makeup and exhaust isolation valve shall be verified to be sealed closed and closed at least once per 31 days.

~~4.6.1.7.2 The cumulative time that all (8-inch) purge makeup and exhaust isolation valves have been open during a calendar year shall be determined at least once per 7 days.~~

4.6.1.7.~~3~~ 2 At least once per 6 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS, the inboard and outboard 42-inch containment preentry makeup and exhaust isolation valves shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying that the combined measured leakage rate is less than 0.05 L_a when pressurized to P_a.

4.6.1.7.~~4~~ 3 At least once per ~~3 months~~ 92 DAYS each [8-inch] containment purge makeup and exhaust isolation valve with resilient material seals shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying that the combined measured leakage rate is less than [0.01] L_a when pressurized to P_a.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 211 Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.06.02.02 Page Number: 3/4 6-12

Section Number: LCO a

Comment:

CHANGE "6000" TO "2705"; CHANGE "6270" TO "2876"; CHANGE "16" TO "28"; CHANGE "20" TO "30". DELETE EXPRESSION IN PARENTHESIS.

Basis

THIS CHANGE PROVIDES OUR LATEST INFORMATION. PARENTHESIS DELETED BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE CHANGES TO MEASUREMENT READOUT NOW BEING CONSIDERED.

Record Number: 143

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.06.02.02

Page Number: 3/4 6-12

Section Number: 4.6.2.2.C

Comment:

LAST LINE - MOVE THE WORDS "TEST SIGNAL" TO AFTER THE WORDS "CONTAINMENT ISOLATION PHASE A".

Basis

TYPO

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 144

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.06.02.03

Page Number: 3/4 6-13

Section Number: 3.6.2.3

Comment:

LINE 2 - CHANGE THE WORD "HALF" TO "LOW"

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS PROPOSED TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THE PLANT MAIN CONTROL BOARD NOMENCLATURE.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 62 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.06.03

Page Number: 3/4 6-14

Section Number: NEW ACTION

Comment:

ADD A NEW ACTION STATEMENT e. AS FOLLOWS:

e. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

Basis

CP&L PROPOSES TO ADD THIS ITEM BECAUSE IF THE PENETRATION HAS BEEN ADEQUATELY SEALED, THEN OPERATION MAY CONTINUE INDEFINITELY. IF OPERATION MAY CONTINUE WITHOUT LIMIT, THEN CLEARLY PERMISSION FOR MODE CHANGES IS ALSO APPROPRIATE. IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT FOR MANY PENETRATIONS, PLANT CONDITIONS WOULD NOT PERMIT US TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS, BUT IT SHOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR USE WHEN APPROPRIATE.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 200

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.06.03

Page Number: 3/4 6-15

Section Number: 4.6.3.2.c

Comment:

LINE 1 - CHANGE "PURGE AND EXHAUST" TO "VENTILATION".

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS MADE TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THE PLANT NOMENCLATURE FOR THIS TEST SIGNAL.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 184

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.06.04.01

Page Number: 3/4 6-17

Section Number: LCO

Comment:

AFTER MONITORS, INSERT "EACH WITH AT LEAST ONE AVAILABLE SAMPLE POINT"

Basis

THIS CHANGE EXPANDS THE LCO STATEMENT TO BE MORE EXPLICIT ON THE REQUIRED EQUIPMENT CONFIGURATION.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 30

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.07.01.02

Page Number: 3/4 7-4

Section Number: 4.7.1.2.1a.1

Comment:

CHANGE "WHEN TESTED PURSUANT TO SPECIFICATION 4.0.5" TO "AT A RECIRCULATION FLOW OF GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 50 gpm".

Basis

THIS CHANGE RETURNS THE SURVIELLANCE TO THE WORDING GIVEN IN THE STANDARD REV. 5 TECH SPECS. CP&L PROPOSES TO RETURN TO THIS WORDING BASED ON CONFLICTING FREQUENCIES WHEN THIS TEST IS PERFORMED PER 4.0.5.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 201 * Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.07.01.02 Page Number: 3/4 7-4

Section Number: 4.7.1.2.1.a.2

Comment:

CHANGE THE SURVEILLANCE TO THE FOLLOWING:
Verifying that with the control station in automatic, the steam turbine-driven pump develops a discharge pressure of at least 30 psig higher than the secondary steam supply pressure used for the test on a recirculation flow of greater than or equal to 90 gpm when the secondary steam supply pressure......

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS PROPOSED TO PROVIDE AN ACCURATE TEST WHICH REFLECTS THE ACTUAL PUMP CONTROL FEATURES. THE AUTOMATIC CONTROLLER WILL MAINTAIN A MINIMUM DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE WITH RESPECT TO THE SECONDARY STEAM SUPPLY PRESSURE. THE PREVIOUS SURVEILLANCE WOULD HAVE REQUIRED TAKING THE PUMP INTO A MANUAL CONTROL MODE WHILE OUR PROPOSAL ALLOW IT TO BE TESTED IN ITS NORMAL LINEUP CONDITION.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 306 *

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.07.01.04

Page Number: 3/4 7-8

Section Number: FOOTNOTE

Comment:

CHANGE "10" TO "15"

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS MADE TO MAKE THE NOTE CONSISTENT WITH THE DEFINITION OF E-BAR.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 60 Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.7.3 Page Number: 3/4 7-11

Section Number: 4.7.3.b.2

Comment:

CHANGE SURVIELLANCE 4.7.3.b.2 TO THE FOLLOWING:

Each Component Cooling Water Pump, required to be OPERABLE, starts automatically on a safety injection test signal.

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS NEEDED BECAUSE, AS WRITTEN, THIS SURVIELLANCE IMPLIES THAT THE C PUMP WOULD HAVE TO BE RACKED IN AND TESTED EVERY 18 MONTHS EVEN IF IT WERE NOT NEEDED. AS REWRITTEN, THIS TESTING WOULD BE PERFORMED FOR THE C PUMP ONLY IF IT WERE TO BE PLACED IN SERVICE (TESTING TO BE COMPLETED PRIOR TO DECLARING C PUMP OPERABLE).

CP&L Comments.

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 164

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.07.06

Page Number: 3/4 7-14

Section Number: 4.7.6.b

Comment:

LINE 2 - INSERT THE WORD "SIGNIFICANT" AFTER THE WORD "FOLLOWING".

Basis

THESE CHANGES ARE MADE TO CLARIFY THAT MINOR PAINTING (SIGNS, TOUCHUP, ETC.) OR CHEMICAL RELEASES IN A LARGE AREA WILL NOT REQUIRE A FULL CHARCOAL TEST.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 31 .

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.07.06

Page Number: 3/4 7-15

Section Number: 4.7.6d.5

Comment:

LINE 1 - DELETE THE WORDS "/TOXIC GAS"

Basis

TYPO

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 167 * Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.07.06 Page Number: 3/4 7-15

Section Number: 4.7.6.b2 & C

Comment:

IN BOTH SURVEILLANCES, CHANGE THE VALUE OF "0.2%" TO "0.175%".

Basis

THESE CHANGES BRING THE SPECIFICATION INTO AGREEMENT WITH REG GUIDE 1.52.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 186 Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.07.06 Page Number: 3/4 7-15

Section Number: 4.7.6.b.1 & 3

Comment:

ADD TO THE END OF 4.7.6.b.1 - "during system operation, when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1975."

DELETE ITEM 4.7.6.b.3 COMPLETELY.

Basis

THESE CHANGES CONSOLIDATE THE SPECIFICATION AND MAKE THEM SIMPLIER SINCE THE REQUIRED CONDITIONS FOR b1 AND b3 ARE THE SAME.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 153

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.07.06

Page Number: 3/4 7-16

Section Number: 4.7.6.e

Comment:

LINE 4 - MOVE THE WORD "aerosol" TO BEFORE THE WORD "test".

Basis

TYPO

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 165

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.07.07

Page Number: 3/4 7-17

Section Number: 4.7.7.b

Comment:

LINE 2 - INSERT THE WORD "SIGNIFICANT" AFTER THE WORD "FOLLOWING".

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS MADE TO CLARIFY THAT MINOR PAINTING OR A CHEMICAL RELEASE IN A LARGE AREA WILL NOT REQUIRE A FULL CHARCOAL TEST.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 187 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.07.07

Page Number: 3/4 7-17

Section Number: 4.7.7.b.1 & 3

Comment:

AND TO THE END OF 4.7.7.b.1 - "during system operation, when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1975.".

DELETE 4.7.7.b.3 COMPLETELY.

Basis

SEE ITEM No. 186 FOR BASES.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 168 *

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.07.07

Page Number: 3/4 7-17 & 18

Section Number: 4.7.7.b2 & C

Comment:

IN BOTH SURVEILLANCES, CHANGE THE VALUE OF "0.2%" TO "0.175%".

Basis

THESE CHANGES ARE MADE TO BRING THE SPECIFICATION INTO CONFORMANCE WITH REG GUIDE 1.52.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 189 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.07.07

Page Number: 3/4 7-18

Section Number: 4.7.7.d.3 & 4

Comment:

ITEM 4.7.7.d.1 LINE 3 - CHANGE "the ECCS pump room" TO "each elevation of the emergency area exhausted".

ITEM 4.7.7.d.4 LINE 1 - CHANGE "opened" TO "in the balanced posistion".

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS MADE TO MORE ACCURATELY REFLECT THE DEMANDS ON THE EQUIPMENT AND THE POSITION OF THE VALVE.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 154   Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.07.07   Page Number: 3/4 7-18

Section Number: 4.7.7.e

Comment:

LINE 4 - MOVE THE WORD "aerosol" TO BEFORE THE WORD "test".

Basis

TYPO

Record Number: 189 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.07.07

Page Number: 3/4 7-18

Section Number: 4.7.7.d.3 & 4

Comment:

ITEM 4.7.7.d.1 LINE 3 - CHANGE "the ECCS pump room" TO "each elevation of the emergency area exhausted".

ITEM 4.7.7.d.4 LINE 1 - CHANGE "opened" TO "in the balanced posistion".

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS MADE TO MORE ACCURATELY REFLECT THE DEMANDS ON THE EQUIPMENT AND THE POSISTION OF THE VALVE.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 66 | Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.07.10.03 | Page Number: 3/4 7-33

Section Number: NEW SURV.

Comment:

ADD NEW SURVEILLANCE 4.7.10.3.c AS FOLLOWS:

4.7.10.3.c At least once per 3 years, by:
1) Partially opening each hose station valve to verify valve OPERABILITY and no flow blockage, and
2) Conducting a hose hydrostatic test at a pressure of 150 psig or at least 50 psig above the maximum fire main operating pressure, whichever is greater.

Basis

TYPO
THESE SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS WERE APPARENTLY MISSED IN TYPING BY THE NRC IN THE SEPTEMBER RETYPE AND WERE NOT CAUGHT AND CORRECTED BY CP&L. WE ARE RESUPPLYING THE REQUIREMENTS AS A PROOF AND REVIEW COMMENT.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 134 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.07.12

Page Number: 3/4 7-40

Section Number: 3.7.12

Comment:

IN THE LCO AND IN ACTION STATEMENT a - CHANGE "8 HOURS" TO "12 HOURS.

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS PROPOSED TO MAKE THE LCO AND ACTION TIMES CONSISTENT WITH THE SURVEILLANCE INTERVAL. NO ADVERSE IMPACT WOULD BE EXPECTED FROM THIS CHANGE.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 288 Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.08.01.01 Page Number: 3/4 8-1

Section Number: 3.8.1.1.b

Comment:

ITEM b1 - CHANGE "2670" TO "2540" AND "LATER" TO "88%"
ITEM b2 - CHANGE THE LCO TO: A seperate fuel oil storage tank containing a minimum of 100,000 gallons of fuel.

Basis

THESE CHANGES ARE MADE TO REFLECT THE LATEST INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US ON THE TANK LEVELS AND VOLUMES. THE PERCENT LEVEL HAS BEEN DELETED FROM ITEM b2 BECAUSE THE TANK INSTRUMENTATION READS IN GALLONS.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 77 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.08.01.01

Page Number: 3/4 8-1

Section Number: ACTION A

Comment:

IN ACTION a, CHANGE THE SECOND SENTENCE TO THE FOLLOWING:

Upon entering this action statement, if either emergency diesel generator has not been.....

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS PROPOSED TO CLARIFY THE REQUIREMENT AND PREVENT A MISINTERPRETATION WHICH COULD LEAD TO ADDITIONAL EDG STARTS.

Record Number: 78 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.08.01.01

Page Number: 3/4 8-2

Section Number: ACTION C

Comment:

CHANGE ACTION c. TO THE FOLLOWING:

c. With one offsite circuit of 3.8.1.1.a and one diesel generator inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining A.C. sources by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within 1 hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter; restore one of the inoperable sources to OPERABLE status within....

DELETE THE LAST SENTENCE OF ACTION C.

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS MADE SO THAT THE OPERABLE DIESEL GENERATOR IS NOT REQUIRED TO BE STARTED TO PROVE ITS OPERABILITY. THE DIESEL IS CONSIDERED OPERABLE BECAUSE IT HAS A VALID SURVEILLANCE TEST. ADDITIONALLY, TDI OWNER'S GROUP REQUIREMENTS REQUIRE THAT EACH TIME A DIESEL IS STARTED, A PRE-START AND TWO POST-START MAINTENANCE ITERATIONS BE PERFORMED. THESE MAINTENANCE ITEMS REQUIRE THAT THE OPERABLE DIESEL BE TAKEN INOPERABLE FOR APPROXIMATELY 30 MINUTES TOTAL JUST DUE TO THESE BLOWOVERS. WITH TWO SOURCES OF A.C. POWER ALREADY INOPERABLE IN THIS ACTION STATEMENT, IT IS NOT PRUDENT TO TAKE A THIRD SOURCE OUT OF SERVICE. THEREFORE THE REQUIREMENT TO START THE DIESEL HAS BEEN DELETED.

OTHER CHANGES HAVE BEEN MADE TO THIS ACTION, BUT ARE PURELY EDITORIAL.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 54

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.08.01.01

Page Number: 3/4 8-2

Section Number: ACTION E

Comment:

LINE 3 - CHANGE "SURVIELLANCE REQUIREMENT 4.8.1.1.a" TO "SURVIELLANCE REQUIREMENT 4.8.1.1.1.a"

Basis

TYPO

CP&L Comments

:HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 289 Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.08.01.01 Page Number: 3/4 8-1

Section Number: ACTION B

Comment:

LINE 7 - DELETE THE FOOTNOTE * FROM THE ACTION STATEMENT.
DELETE FOOTNOTE * COMPLETELY FROM THE BOTTOM OF PAGE 3/4 8-1 AND FROM THE BOTTOM OF PAGE 3/4 8-2.

Basis

THE DELETION OF THIS FOOTNOTE IS BASED ON THE STANDARD TECH SPEC INTERPRETATION THAT ACTION STATEMENTS ONLY APPLY WHEN IN AN ACTION STATEMENT. IF THE INOPERABLE SOURCE IS RETURNED TO SERVICE WITHIN 24 HOURS, THE PLANT IS NO LONGER IN AN ACTION STATEMENT AND THEREFORE SHOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO TEST AN OPERABLE DIESEL OTHER THAN AS REQUIRED BY THE SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY. ADDITIONALLY, THE REPEATED TESTING OF THE DIESELS IS CONTRARY TO THE INTENT OF GENERIC LETTER 84-15.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 78 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.08.01.01

Page Number: 3/4 8-2

Section Number: ACTION C

Comment:

CHANGE THE BEGINING OF ACTION c. TO THE FOLLOWING:

c. With one offsite circuit of 3.8.1.1.a and one diesel.....

Basis

THE COMMENT IS EDITORIAL AND IS MADE FOR CONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE ACTION STATEMENTS.

Record Number: 290

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.08.01.01

Page Number: 3/4 8-2

Section Number: ACTION D

Comment:

RENUMBER ACTION D TO E AND CHANGE TO THE FOLLOWING:
With two of the required offsite A.C. circuits inoperable, restore one of the inoperable offsite.....

ALSO DELETE THE LAST SENTENCE OF THE ACTION STATEMENT.

Basis

SEE COMMENT No. 78 FOR BASES.

CP&L Comments

NPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 56 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.08.01.01

Page Number: 3/4 8-2

Section Number: ACTIONS

Comment:

INSERT A NEW ACTION d. AND RENUMBER THE BALANCE OF THE ACTION STATEMENTS.

d. With one diesel generator inoperable in addition to ACTION b or c above, verify that:

1. All required systems, subsystems, trains, components, and devices that depend on the remaining OPERABLE diesel generators a source of emergency power are also OPERABLE, and

2. When in MODES 1, 2, or 3, the steam-driven auxiliary feedwater pump is OPERABLE.

If these conditions are not satisfied within 2 hours be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

Basis

THIS ACTION STATEMENT HAS APPEARED IN SEVERAL RECENTLY ISSUED TECH SPECS AND IS FELT TO BE A VALUABLE CLARIFYING STATEMENT.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 291 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.08.01.01

Page Number: 3/4 8-3

Section Number: 4.8.1.1.1.a

Comment:

LINE 2 - DELETE THE WORDS "INDICATING POWER AVAILABILITY".

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS MADE BECAUSE THE BREAKERS ARE VERIFIED IN THIS SURVEILLANCE. BREAKER ALIGNMENT DOES NOT ENSURE POWER AVAILABILITY.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 57

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.08.01.01

Page Number: 3/4 8-4

Section Number: NEW SURV.

Comment:

ADD A NEW SURVIELLANCE 4.8.1.1.2.a.6

4.8.1.1.2.a.6 Verifying the pressure in the air start receivers to be greater than or equal to [LATER] psig.

Basis

THIS SPECIFICATION IS NEEDED TO ENSURE THAT THE AIR START SYSTEM HAS SUFFICIENT AIR TO START THE DIESEL. TESTING WILL BE PERFORMED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT 190 psig WILL PROVIDE AT LEAST 5 STARTS ON A ONE TIME BASIS.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 292 Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.08.01.01 Page Number: 3/4 8-3, 5, 7

Section Number: FOOTNOTE ***

Comment:

DELETE THE WORDS "UNDER DIRECT MONITORING BY THE MANUFACTURER".

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS PROPOSED SO THAT CP&L MAY PERFORM TESTING AT LOADS HIGHER THAN THE TECH SPEC LIMITS, IF APPROPRIATE, WITHOUT HAVING TO WAIT FOR A TDI REPRESENTATIVE TO REVIEW THE TEST AND TO ARRIVE ON SITE. ALTHOUGH TESTING ABOVE THE TECH SPEC RANGE IS NOT EXPECTED FREQUENTLY BUT SHOULD NOT REQUIRE MANUFACTURER REPRESENTATIVES ON SITE.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 58 Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.08.01.01 Page Number: 3/4 8-5

Section Number: 4.8.1.1.2.d

Comment:

DELETE THE FOLLOWING,FROM THE SURVIELLANCE:

The diesel generator shall be started for this test by using one of the following signals on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS:
1. Simulated loss of offsite power by itself.
2. Simulated loss of offsite power in conjunction with a safety injection test signal.
3. A safety injection test signal by itself.

ALSO IN THE NEXT PARAGRAPH, LINE 2 - DELETE THE WORD "ALSO".

Basis

THIS DELETION HAS BEEN MADE IN THE INTEREST OF ENHANCING THE OVERALL LEVEL OF SAFETY IN THE TECH SPECS AS WELL AS SIMPLIFYING THEM. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO USE EACH OF THESE START SIGNALS ON A ROTATING BASIS WITHOUT TAKING VOLUNTARY LCO's ON EQUIPMENT AND USING JUMPERS TO BYPASS PARTS OF THE ESF SYSTEM. THIS IS HIGHLY UNDESIRABLE AND IS DISCOURAGED OR FORBIDDEN BY IEEE STANDARD 279 AND REG GUIDE 1.118. NRC GUIDANCE HAS, IN FACT, PERMITTED RECENT WESTINGHOUSE PLANTS TO AVOID THIS UNDESIRABLE ACTIVITY. WE HAVE DELETED THE REFERENCE TO THE START SIGNAL BECAUSE THE STANDARD REV. 5 TECH SPECS LIST ALL OF THE AVAILABLE START SIGNALS. SINCE ONE OF THEM MUST BE USED TO START THE DIESEL, LISTING EACH IS REDUNDANT.

DELETING THE WORD "ALSO" RIDS THE STATEMENT OF UNNECESSARY WORDING.

Record Number: 293 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.08.01.01

Page Number: 3/4 8-5

Section Number: 4.8.1.1.2.e.2

Comment:

LINE 2 - CHANGE "WITH" TO "WITHIN"
LINE 3 - CHANGE THE VALUE "1.2" TO "6.75".

Basis

THE FIRST CHANGE IS A TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR. THE SECOND CHANGE IS BASED ON THE WESTINGHOUSE STANDARD TECH SPEC WORDS DESCRIBING THIS VALUE---less than or equal to 75% of the difference between nominal speed and the Overspeed Trip Setpoint, or 15% above nominal. THIS DEFINITION PROVIDES THE VALUE OF 6.75 WHEN APPLIED TO SHNPP.

CP&L Comments

:HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 294 Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.08.01.01 Page Number: 3/4 8-6

Section Number: 4.8.1.1.2.e.4.b

Comment:

LINE 5 - DELETE THE WORDS "LOAD SEQUENCER"

Basis

TYPO

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 295 Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.08.01.01 Page Number: 3/5 8-7

Section Number: 4.8.1.1.2.f

Comment:

LINE 2 - CHANGE THE WORD "INTERDEPENDENCE" TO "INDEPENDENCE".

Basis

THE DIESELS ARE TOTALLY INDEPENDENT, THEREFORE THE PROPER TERM IS INDEPENDENT. THIS IS A TYPO IN THE WESTINGHOUSE STANDARD TECH SPECS.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 79 Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.08.01.01 Page Number: 3/4 8-8

Section Number: TABLE 4.8-1

Comment:

SECOND PARAGRAPH OF FOOTNOTE * - CHANGE
"SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 4.8.1.1.2.c" TO
"SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 4.8.1.1.2.d"

Basis

TYPO
SURV. 4.8.1.1.2.c IS THE DIESEL FUEL OIL SAMPLE
SPEC AND DOES NOT START THE DIESEL.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 296 Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.08.01.02 Page Number: 3/4 8-9

Section Number: 3.8.1.2.b.

Comment:

ITEM b1 - CHANGE "2670" TO "2540" AND "LATER" TO "88%"
ITEM b2 - CHANGE THE SURVEILLANCE TO THE FOLLOWING:
A seperate fuel oil storage tank containing a minimum volume of 100,000 gallons of fuel, and

Basis

THESE CHANGES ARE PROPOSED TO REFLECT THE LATEST INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 302

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.08.01.02

Page Number: 3/4 8-9

Section Number: ACTIONS

Comment:

CHANGE 2.45 TO 2.9

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS MADE TO INCORPORATE THE LATEST INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 38

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.08.02.01

Page Number: 3/4 8-10

Section Number: ACTION

Comment:

CHANGE THE ACTION STATEMENT TO:
WITH ONE OF THE REQUIRED D.C. ELECTRICAL SOURCES INOPERABLE, RESTORE THE INOPERABLE D.C. ELECTRICAL SOURCE TO OPERABLE STATUS WITHIN 2 HOURS OR BE IN AT LEAST HOT STANDBY WITHIN THE NEXT 6 HOURS AND IN COLD SHUTDOWN WITHIN THE FOLLOWING 30 HOURS.

Basis

THIS CHANGE TO BE MAKE THE SPEC EASIER TO UNDERSTAND.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 137 Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.08.02.01 Page Number: 3/4 8-10

Section Number: 4.8.2.1.b.3

Comment:

DELETE THE WORD "OF" AFTER THE VALUE OF "10".

Basis

TYPO

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 208 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.08.02.01

Page Number: 3/4 8-10

Section Number: 4.8.2.1.b.3

Comment:

CHANGE THE VALUE OF "60" TO "70".

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS MADE FOR CONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE TECH SPECS AND THE BATTERY SIZING CALC.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 138

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.08.02.01

Page Number: 3/4 8-12

Section Number: TABLE 4.8-2

Comment:

CENTER THE TITLE "CATEGORY B(2)" OVER THE LAST 2 COLUMNS OF THE TABLE.
ADD A SEPARATOR LINE BETWEEN THE CATAGORY A AND CATAGORY B REQUIREMENTS.

Basis

THESE CHANGES ARE PROPOSED TO MAKE THE TABLE EASIER TO READ.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 39 Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.08.02.02 Page Number: 3/4 8-13

Section Number: ACTION

Comment:

IN THE ACTION STATEMENT LINE 4 - CHANGE "EMERGENCY BATTERY OR FULL-CAPACITY CHARGER" TO "EMERGENCY BATTERY AND FULL-CAPACITY CHARGER".

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS TO MAKE THE SPECIFICATION EASIER TO UNDERSTAND.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 303

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.08.02.02

Page Number: 3/4 8-13

Section Number: ACTIONS

Comment:

CHANGE 2.45 TO 2.9

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS MADE TO INCORPORATE THE LATEST INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 74

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.08.03.01

Page Number: 3/4 8-14

Section Number: 3.8.3.1.f

Comment:

CHANGE BUS "1DP-1A-SIV" TO "1DP-1B-SIV"

Basis

TYPO

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 72 * Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.08.03.01 Page Number: 3/4 8-15

Section Number: ACTION B

Comment:

DIVIDE ACTION B INTO THE FOLLOWING:

b. With one 118-volt A.C. vital bus not energized from its associated inverter; reenergize the 118-volt A.C. vital bus within 2 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

c. With one of the 118-volt A.C. vital bus associated inverters not connected to its associated D.C. bus; reconnect the inverter to its associated D.C. bus within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

REDESIGNATE ACTION C TO D.

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS PROPOSED TO CLARIFY THE INTENT OF THE ACTION STATEMENT.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 304

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.08.03.02

Page Number: 3/4 8-16

Section Number: ACTIONS

Comment:

CHANGE 2.45 TO 2.9

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS MADE TO INCORPORATE THE LATEST INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 214 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.08.04.01

Page Number: 3/4 8-18

Section Number: 4.8.4.1.a.2

Comment:

CHANGE THE WORDING IN LINE 15 TO:
....except that only time delay trips will be involved. New molded case circuit breakers will be tested for both time delay and instantaneous elements prior to installation. Circuit breakers found inoperable......

Basis

IT IS THE OPINION OF CP&L THAT THE CONTINIOUS TESTING OF MOLDED CASE CIRCUIT BREAKERS AT THE CURRENT LEVELS REQUIRED FOR INSTANTANEOUS TRIPS IS DESTRUCTIVE TO THE BREAKER. WE ALSO THINK THAT THIS TEST IS NOT REQUIRED TO VERIFY OPERABILITY OF THE BREAKERS. WE OFFER AS SUBSTANTIATION THIS QUOTE FROM NEMA STANDARD PUBLICATION NO. AB 2. (PAGE 3, PARAGRAPH 8) "FREQUENT OPERATIONS DUE TO HEAVY SHORT-CIRCUIT CURRENTS MAY CAUSE EROSION OF CONTACTS AND/OR CRACKING OF INSULATION".

FROM OUR OWN EXPERIENCE WHILE CONDUCTING PRELIMINARY TESTING ON BREAKERS IN THE 15 TO 40 AMP RANGE, THE THERMAL ELEMENTS ARE SO SMALL THAT THE APPLICATION OF THE TEST CURRENT HEATS THEM UP SO THAT IT IS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE TO TELL IF IT WAS THE INSTANTANEOUS OR THERMALS THAT TRIPPED THE BREAKER. TESTING OF THESE BREAKERS IS AT MOST INCONCLUSIVE. WE ARE THEREFORE IN THE PROCESS OF CONTACTING THE BREAKER MANUFACTURER TO MAKE A DETERMINATION AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THEY RECOMMEND INSTANTANEOUS TESTING. THUS WHILE WE COULD PERFORM THE TESTING, IF REQUIRED, WE FEEL THAT IT IS DESTRUCTIVE AND THUS SOMEWHAT SELF-DEFEATING AND WE BELIEVE OUR PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE PROVIDES ADEQUATE ASSURANCE OF BREAKER RELIABILITY WITHOUT DESTROYING THE BREAKERS.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 73 * Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.09.01 Page Number: 3/4 9-2

Section Number: TABLE 4.9-1

Comment:

CHANGE THE DESCRIPTION FOR VALVE 1CS-510 TO:
Boric Acid Batch Tank outlet valve may be opened if the batching tank concentration is greater than or equal to 2000 ppm, and valve 1CS-503 (makeup...
CHANGE THE DESCRIPTION FOR VALVE 1CS-503 TO:
...open unless outlet valve 1CS-510 is closed.
CHANGE THE DESCRIPTION FOR VALVE 1CS-570 TO:
Place valve in "shut" at valve control switch and place BTRS function selector switch in "off". No lock required.
CHANGE THE DESCRIPTION FOR VALVE 1CS-98 TO:
BTRS bypass valve. Place valve control switch in "open" position.

Basis

THESE CHANGES ARE PROPOSED TO CLARIFY THE TABLE AND TO MAKE IT CONFORM TO ACTUAL PLANT NOMENCLATURE.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 75

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.09.06

Page Number: 3/4 9-7

Section Number: 3.9.6.b.2

Comment:

CHANGE "LATER" TO "600".

Basis

THIS VALUE HAS BEEN PROVIDED BY WESTINGHOUSE AS THE PROPER LOAD LIMIT FOR THE AUXILIARY HOIST.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 166 | Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.09.12 | Page Number: 3/3 9-14

Section Number: 4.9.12.b

Comment:

LINE 2 - INSERT THE WORD "SIGNIFICANT" AFTER THE WORD "FOLLOWING".

Basis

THE CHANGE IS MADE TO CLARIFY THAT MINOR PAINTING OR A CHEMICAL RELEASE IN A LARGE AREA WILL NOT REQUIRE A FULL CHARCOAL TEST.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 188 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.09.12

Page Number: 3/4 9-14 & 15

Section Number: 4.9.12.b.1 & 3

Comment:

ADD TO THE END OF 4.9.12.b.1 - "during system operation, when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1975.".

DELETE 4.9.12.b.3 COMPLETELY.

Basis

SEE ITEM No. 186 FOR BASES.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 155 Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.09.12 Page Number: 3/4 9-15

Section Number: 4.9.12.e

Comment:

LINE 4 - MOVE THE WORD "aerosol" TO BEFORE THE WORD "test".

Basis

TYPO

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 169 * | Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.09.12 | Page Number: 3/4 9-15

Section Number: 4.9.12.b2 & C

Comment:

IN BOTH PLACES, CHANGE THE VALUE OF "0.2%" TO "1.0%".

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS MADE TO BRING THE SPECIFICATION INTO COMFORMANCE WITH REG GUIDE 1.52 FOR THESE 2 INCH CHARCOAL FILTERS.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 190 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.09.12

Page Number: 3/4 9-15

Section Number: 4.9.12.d.4

Comment:

LINE 1 - CHANGE THE WORD "open" TO "in the balanced position".

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS MADE TO MORE ACCURATELY REFLECT PLANT NOMENCLATURE FOR THE VALVE POSITION.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 156 Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.11.01.04 Page Number: 3/4 11-7

Section Number: 3.11.1.4.a

Comment:

CHANGE THE WORD "lines" TO "liners".

Basis

TYPO

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 118

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.11.02.02

Page Number: 3/4 11-12

Section Number: 3.11.2.2

Comment:

LINE 2 - CHANGE "BE BE LIMITED" TO "BE LIMITED"

Basis

TYPO

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 132

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.11.02.05

Page Number: 3/4 11-15

Section Number: 3.11.2.5

Comment:

LINE 2 - THE WORD "recombiners" IS MISSPELLED.
CORRECT TO "recombiners".

Basis

TYPO

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 32

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.12.01

Page Number: 3/4 12-7

Section Number: TABLE 3.12-1

Comment:

TABLE NOTATIONS NOTE 1 LINE 14 OF THE NOTE - CHANGE "SPECIFICATION 6.9.1.6" TO "SPECIFICATION 6.9.1.3".

Basis

TYPO

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 33

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.12.01

Page Number: 3/4 12-7

Section Number: TABLE 3.12-1

Comment:

TABLE NOTATIONS NOTE 1 - DELETE THE ENTIRE LAST SENTENCE OF THE NOTE.

Basis

TYPO
THIS INFORMATION IS NOT IN THE STANDARD REV. 5 TECH SPECS NOR WAS IT ADDED IN THE REVIEW PROCESS BY CP&L. THIS INFORMATION IS NOT ACURATE DUE TO CHANGES IN THE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR LER'S.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 82 | Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 3.12.03 | Page Number: 3/4 12-13

Section Number: ACTION B

Comment:

LINE 10 - CHANGE "SPECIFICATION 6.14" TO "SPECIFICATION 6.9.1.4"

Basis

TYPO

Record Number: 183 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: B 3/4.01.01.03

Page Number: B 3/4 1-1

Section Number: B 3/4.1.1.1

Comment:

ADD A NEW PARAGRAPH TO THE END OF THIS BASES AS FOLLOWS:

Analysis of inadvertent boron dilution at cold shutdown is based on
1. all RCCA's in the core while the RCS is drained (i.e., not filled), and
2. all RCCA's except shutdown banks C and D fully inserted in the core while the RCS is filled.

In addition, by assuming the most reactive control rod is stuck out of the core, its worth is effectively added to the 2000 pcm shutdown margin in calculating the necessary soluble boron concentration.

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS ADDED IN ORDER TO PROVIDE A MORE COMPLETE BASIS STATEMENT.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 301 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.01.02

Page Number: B 3/4 1-2

Section Number: BASES-3RD PARA.

Comment:

CHANGE 200 DEGREES F TO 350 DEGREES F.

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS PROPOSED TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THE RESTRICTIONS PLACED UPON US BY THE COLD OVERPRESSURE ANALYSIS.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 97 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: B 3/4.02.04

Page Number: B 3/4 2-6

Section Number: B 3/4.2.4

Comment:

REPLACE THE LAST TWO SENTENCE OF THE QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO BASES WITH THE FOLLOWING:

The perferred sets of four symmetric thimbles is a unique set of eight detectors locations. These locations are C-8, E-5, E-11, H-3, H-13, L-5, L-11, N-8. If other locations must be used, then a special report to NRR should be submitted within 30 days.

Basis

THIS REVISION TO THE BASES CLARIFIES THAT THE EIGHT LISTED THIMBLES ARE STRONGLY PERFERRED BUT ARE NOT THE ONLY POSSIBLE APPROACH. THE ADDED SPECIAL REPORT WILL ENSURE THAT THE NRC IS AWARE OF THE SITUATION.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 173 * Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 3.2.5 Page Number: B 3/4 2-6

Section Number: BASES

Comment:

DELETE "OF 590.8 DEGREES F". CHANGE "OF 2213 psig CORRESPOND" TO "ARE COMPARED". CHANGE 592.8 TO 592.6

Basis

THIS CHANGE CORRECTS AN ADMINISTRATIVE ERROR IN THE ANALYTICAL VALUE AND SUPPORTS THE REVISED SPECIFICATION AS DISCUSSED IN THAT PROPOSED CHANGE.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 157 Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: B 3/4.03.01 Page Number: B 3/4 3-1

Section Number: B 3/4.3.1

Comment:

THE SECOND WORD OF TEXT SHOULD BE CHANGED TO "OPERABILITY".

Basis

TYPO

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 175 Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: B 3/4.03.01 Page Number: B 3/4 3-1

Section Number: B 3/4 3.1

Comment:

IN THE FOURTH PARAGRAPH - CHANGE EQUATION 3.3-1 TO THE FOLLOWING:
Z + R + S less than or equal to TA

Basis

TYPO

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 128 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: B 3/4.03.03.01

Page Number: B 3/4 3-3

Section Number: P-11 BASES

Comment:

UNDER THE P-11 DISCUSSION, IN THE THIRD LINE, INSERT THE FOLLOWING AFTER "steam-line pressure,":
...sends an open signal to the accumulator discharge valves,...

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS PROPOSED IN ORDER TO MAKE THE BASES DISCUSSION MORE COMPLETE.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 47 — Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: B 3/4.03.03.09 — Page Number: B 3/4 3-5

Section Number: B 3/4.3.3.9

Comment:

IN THE TITLE LINE AND IN THE FIRST LINE OF TEXT, CHANGE "LOOSE-PART DETECTION SYSTEM" TO "METAL IMPACT MONITORING SYSTEM".

Basis

THE PLANT SPECIFIC NAME FOR THIS SYSTEM IS METAL IMPACT MONITORING SYSTEM. THIS CHANGE IS NEEDED FOR CONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE BASES AND THE SPECIFICATION.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 158

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: B 3/4.03.03.07

Page Number: B 3/4 3-5

Section Number: 3/4.3.3.7

Comment:

LINE 5 - CAPITALIZE THE WORD "ROOM".

Basis

TYPO

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 59 *

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: B 3/4.04.08

Page Number: B 3/4 4-5

Section Number: B 3/4.4.8

Comment:

ADD TO THE END OF THE SECOND PARAGRAPH THE FOLLOWING SENTENCE:
See Generic Letter 85-19 for additional information.

Basis

TYPO
THIS INFORMATION WAS ORIGINALLY PROPOSED BY CP&L TO APPROPRIATELY REFERENCE THE LATEST GUIDANCE. IT WAS APPARENTLY LEFT OUT DUE TO TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 80 *

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: B 3/4.04.08

Page Number: B 3/4 4-5 & 6

Section Number: B 3/4.4.8

Comment:

PARAGRAPH 3 - CHANGE "10 MINUTES" TO "15 MINUTES" IN 3 PLACES (LINE 9, LINE 15 AND THE FIRST LINE OF PAGE B 3/4 4-6)

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS REQUIRED FOR CONSISTENCY BETWEEN SECTION 1.0 AND THE BASES SECTION OF THE TECH SPECS.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 109 * Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: B 3/4.04.09 Page Number: B 3/4 4-6

Section Number: B 3/4.4.9

Comment:

CHANGE THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF THIS BASIS TO THE FOLLOWING:

The temperature and pressure changes during heatup and cooldown are limited to be consistent with the requirements given in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Appendix G and 10 CFR 50 Appendix G. Also the new 10 CFR 50, Appendix G rule which addresses the metal temperature of the closure head flange and vessel flange regions is considered. This rule states the minimum metal temperature of the closure flange region should be at least 120 F higher than the limiting RT NDT for these regions when the pressure exceeds 20% of the preservice hydrostatic test pressure (621 psig for Westinghouse plants). For Shearon Harris Unit 1, the minimum temperature of the closure flange and vessel flange regions is 120 F since the limiting RT NDT is 0 F (see Table B 3/4 4-1). The Shearon Harris Unit 1 heatup and cooldown curves shown in Figures 3.4-2 and 3.4-3 are not impacted by the rule.

Basis

THIS WORDING CHANGE IS PROPOSED IN ORDER TO PROVIDE A MORE DETAILED AND CORRECT STATEMENT CONCERNING THE PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 110 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: B 3/4.04.09

Page Number: B 3/4 4-7

Section Number: B 3/4.4.9

Comment:

ADD TO THE FIRST UNNUMBERED PARAGRAPH THE FOLLOWING SENTENCE:
These Properties are then evaluated in accordance with the NRC Standard Review Plan.

Basis

THE SENTENCE WAS ADDED TO PROVIDE A MORE COMPLETE DISCUSSION OF FRACTURE TOUGHNESS TESTING.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 111 *

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: B 3/4.04.09

Page Number: B 3/4 4-7

Section Number: B 3/4.4.9

Comment:

CHANGE "5 EFPY" TO "4 EFPY" IN 3 PLACES IN THIS SECTION.

Basis

THE VALUE FOR EFPY WERE REVISED TO INCORPORATE DATA RECENTLY RECEIVED FROM OUR VENDOR.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 206

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: B 3/4.04.09

Page Number: B 3/4 4-7

Section Number: B 3/4.4.9

Comment:

IN THE FIRST FULL PARAGRAPH, LINE 2 - CHANGE "Winden" TO "Winter".

Basis

TYPO

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 113 Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: B 3/4.04.09 Page Number: B 3/4 4-8

Section Number: TABLE B 3/4 4-1

Comment:

IN THE TITLE BLOCK, MOVE "AVG. SHELF ENERGY" FROM ITS PRESENT LOCATION AND CENTER IT OVER THE LAST TWO COLUMNS AT THE RIGHT OF THE PAGE.

Basis

TYPO

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 112 *　　　　Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: B 3/4.04.01　　　　Page Number: B 3/4 4-9

Section Number: FIGURE B3/4 4-1

Comment:

REPLACE FIGURE B 3/4.4-1 WITH NEW FIGURE.

Basis

THE NEW FIGURE IS PROVIDED AS A RESULT OF NEW INFORMATION PROVIDED BY OUR VENDOR.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 195

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: B 3/4.04.09

Page Number: B 3/4 4-14

Section Number: B 3/4.4.9

Comment:

IN THE SECOND PARAGRAPH UNDER THE LTOP BASES, LINE 10 - INSERT "(below 335 F)" AFTER "MODES 4, 5, and 6".

Basis

THIS CHANGE CLARIFIES THE BASIS STATEMENT.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 191 Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: B 3/4.06.01.07 Page Number: B 3/4 6-2

Section Number: B 3/4.6.1.7

Comment:

FIRST PARAGRAPH, LINE 6 - INSERT THE WORD "PRE-ENTRY" BEFORE THE WORD "CONTAINMENT".

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS TO CORRECT A TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR AND CONFORM TO PLANT NOMENCLATURE.

Record Number: 192

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: B 3/4.06.01.07

Page Number: B 3/4 6-2

Section Number: B 3/4.6.1.7

Comment:

SECOND PARAGRAPH, LINE 1 - INSERT THE WORD "NORMAL" BEFORE THE WORD "CONTAINMENT".

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS MADE TO CORRECT A TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR AND CONFORM TO PLANT NOMENCLATURE.

Record Number: 69

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: B 3/4.06.04

Page Number: B 3/4 6-4

Section Number: B 3/4.6.4

Comment:

LAST LINE - CHANGE "MARCH 1971" TO "REV. 2, NOVEMBER 1978"

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS NESESSARY TO MAKE THE TECH SPECS AGREE WITH THE FSAR SECTION 1.8.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 176 Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: B 3/4.07.01.01 Page Number: B 3/4 7-1

Section Number: B 3/4.7.1.1

Comment:

SECOND PARAGRAPH, LAST WORDS - CHANGE "TABLE 3.7-2" TO "TABLE 3.7-1".

Basis

TYPO

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 197 Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: B 3/4.07.01.01 Page Number: B 3/4 7-1

Section Number: B 3/4.7.1.1

Comment:

LINE 2 - INSERT "psig" AFTER THE VALUE "1305".

Basis

TYPO

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 210 Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: B 3/4.07.01.02 Page Number: B 3/4 7-2

Section Number: B 3/4.7.1.2

Comment:

CHANGE THE VALUE OF "450" TO "475" AND CHANGE THE VALUE OF "1170" TO "1217".

Basis

THESE VALUES ARE THE LATEST INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US AT THIS TIME.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 70

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: B 3/4.07.05

Page Number: B 3/4 7-3

Section Number: B 3/4.7.5

Comment:

SECOND PARAGRAPH, LAST WORDS - CHANGE THE WORDS "MARCH 1974" TO "REV. 2, JANUARY 1976".

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS NECESSARY FOR THE TECH SPEC TO AGREE WITH THE FSAR SECTION 1.8.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 55 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: B 3/4.07.09

Page Number: B 3/4 7-5

Section Number: B 3/4.7.9

Comment:

CHANGE THE FIRST PARAGRAPH TO THE FOLLOWING:
The sources requiring leak tests are specified in 10 CFR 31.5(c)(2)(ii). The limitation on removable contamination is mandated by paragraph 31.5(c)(5).

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS PROPOSED TO CLARIFY THE PROPER LIMITATIONS ON REMOVABLE CONTAMINATION.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 135 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: B 3/4.07.12

Page Number: B 3/4 7-7

Section Number: B 3/4.7.12.

Comment:

DELETE THE LAST SENTENCE OF BASES SECTION 3/4.7.12.

Basis

: THIS CHANGE IS MADE TO CORRECT A STANDARD BASES STATEMENT TO BE CONSISTENT WITH SHNPP SPECIFIC CONDITIONS.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 34

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: B 3/4.08.01

Page Number: B 3/4 8-1

Section Number: B 3/4.8.1

Comment:

PARAGRAPH 2 LINES 4 AND 5 - INSERT THE WORD "AUXILIARY" BETWEEN THE WORDS "STARTUP" AND "TRANSFORMERS" IN BOTH LINES.

Basis

TYPO
THE PLANT SPECIFIC NAME FOR THESE PIECES OF EQUIPMENT IS STARTUP AUXILARY TRANSFORMERS.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 131 * Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 5.02.02 Page Number: 5-6

Section Number: 5.2.2

Comment:

CHANGE THE VALUE OF "379 F" TO "380 F".

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS PROPOSED TO CORRECT THIS VALUE TO THE DESIGN NUMBER WHICH IS INTENDED FOR THIS SPECIFICATION RATHER THAN THE ANALYTICAL VALUE CURRENTLY IN PLACE.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 300

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 6.02.01

Page Number: 6-2

Section Number: 6.2.1.f.5

Comment:

DELETE f.5

Basis

THIS PROVISION WAS FOR A SPECIAL STA SHIFT ROTATION SCHEDULE. NOW THAT ALL OPERATIONS ARE ON A 12-HOUR SHIFT BASIS, THE STA'S WILL WORK THE STANDARD SHIFTS AND THE SPECIAL ALLOWANCE IS NO LONGER NEEDED.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 171 Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 6.02.01 Page Number: 6-3 & 4

Section Number: FIG.6.2-1 & 2

Comment:

REPLACE THE PROOF AND REVIEW FIGURES WITH THE ATTACHED NEW FIGURES.

Basis

THE NEW ORGANIZATION CHARTS ARE REVISED TO SHOW THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND TITLES WHICH CP&L CURRENTLY EXPECTS TO HAVE IN PLACE AT LICENSE RECEIPT.

CORPORATE ORGANIZATION



FIGURE 6.2-1
CORPORATE ORGANIZATION

Record 171

PLANT ORGANIZATION



FIGURE 6.2-2

PLANT ORGANIZATION

A-4

Record 17

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 114 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 6.03.01

Page Number: 6-6 & 7

Section Number: 6.3.1

Comment:

CHANGE THE FIRST SENTENCE TO READ "...alternatives noted in the FSAR, Section 1.8, for comparable positions...."

Basis

THE REFERENCE TO SPECIFIC FSAR PAGES AND AMENDMENTS WERE ADDED BY THE NRC STAFF JUST BEFORE THE TYPING OF THE PROOF & REVIEW SPECIFICATIONS. THE REASON GIVEN FOR THEIR ADDITION WAS THAT THIS WAS THE ONLY WAY FSAR MATERIAL COULD BE REFERENCED IN THE TECH SPECS. WE ARE PROPOSING TO DELETE THESE SPECIFIC REFERENCES BECAUSE WE BELIEVE THAT THIS TECHNIQUE HAS THE POTENTIAL TO GENERATE MANY UNNECESSARY FUTURE TECH SPEC CHANGE REQUESTS SINCE TECH SPEC CHANGES WILL BE NECESSITATED BY ANY CHANGE, NO MATTER HOW MINOR, ON A LISTED FSAR PAGE. IN ADDITION, WE FIND SEVERAL EXAMPLES WITHIN THE STANDARD TECH SPECS (NUREG 0472 Rev. 5) WHICH REFERENCE THE FSAR WITHOUT REFERENCING SPECIFIC PAGE AND AMENDMENT NUMBERS. SOME OF THESE EXAMPLES ARE DEFINITION 1.20 - PHYSICS TESTS, PARAGRAPH 5.4.1 AND PARAGRAPH 5.6.1.1.

PREVENTION OF THESE UNNECESSARY TECH SPEC CHANGE REQUESTS WILL ELIMINATE A SUBSTANTIAL NONPRODUCTIVE ADMINISTRATIVE BLUNDER FOR BOTH CP&L AND THE NRC STAFF. A GENERAL FSAR REFERENCE DOES NOT LESSEN THE STRENGTH OF THE COMMITMENT ON THE PART OF CP & L OR COMPLICATE ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES BY THE NRC.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 124 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 6.04.01

Page Number: 6-7

Section Number: 6.4.1

Comment:

LINE 3 - DELETE "AND RECOMMENDATIONS".

Basis

THE TERM "AND RECOMMENDATIONS" HAS BEEN DELETED SINCE IT IS ONLY A RECOMMENDATION AND NOT A REQUIREMENT. CP&L'S POSITION ON THE STANDARD WAS DEVELOPED ON THE BASIS THAT WHILE RECOMMENDATIONS ARE EXCELLENT GOALS, AND WE WILL STRIVE TO MEET THEM, THEY ARE NOT COMMITMENTS. ESCALATION TO COMMITMENT STATUS IS WHAT THIS PROOF AND REVIEW WORDING WOULD HAVE DONE.

Record Number: 81 Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 6.05.01.03 Page Number: 6-7

Section Number: 6.5.1.3.1

Comment:

LAST LINE - CHANGE "SPECIFICATION 6.5.2" TO "SPECIFICATION 6.5.1.4"

Basis

TYPO
SECTION 6.5.1.4 DESCRIBES SAFETY REVIEWS, NOT 6.5.2.

Record Number: 115 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 6.04.01

Page Number: 6-7

Section Number: 6.4.1

Comment:

CHANGE THE FIRST SENTENCE AS FOLLOWS:
"...alternatives noted in the FSAR, Section 1.8, and Appendix A of 10 CFR Part 55....."

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS DISCUSSED IN OUR CHANGE NUMBER 114.. PLEASE SEE CHANGE NUMBER 114 FOR A DETAILED EXPLANATION OF THE BASES.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 35 | Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 6.05.01.04 | Page Number: 6-8

Section Number: 6.5.1.4.3

Comment:

LAST SENTENCE - BREAK THE SENTENCE INTO TWO SENTENCES AS FOLLOWS: ....prior to implementation. Implementaion may not proceed until after review by the Corporate Nuclear Safety Section in accordance with Specification 6.5.3.9.

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS MADE TO CLARIFY THE CORRECT PLACE OF THE CNS REVIEW IN THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS. ALSO A TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR WAS CORRECTED IN THE REFERENCED SPEC.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 142 Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 6.05.01.04 Page Number: 6-8

Section Number: 6.5.1.4.5

Comment:

ADD TO THE END OF THE PARAGRAPH THE FOLLOWING:
... , but implementation may proceed prior to the completion of that review.

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS MADE TO CLARIFY THE CORRECT PLACE OF THE CNS REVIEW IN THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 244 | Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 6.05.02.02 | Page Number: 6-9

Section Number: 6.5.2.2

Comment:

CHANGE TITLE "ASSISTANT TO THE PLANT GENERAL MANAGER" TO "DIRECTOR PLANT PROGRAMS AND PROCEDURES"

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS CONSISTENT WITH AN INTERNAL ORGANIZATION CHANGE.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 51

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 6.05.02.03

Page Number: 6-9

Section Number: 6.5.2.3

Comment:

LINE 3 - CHANGE "WRITING TO THE PNSC CHAIRMAN" TO "WRITING BY THE PNSC CHAIRMAN".

Basis

TYPO

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 52 | Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 6.05.02.05 | Page Number: 6-9

Section Number: 6.5.2.5

Comment:

LINE 3 - CHANGE "FIVE MEMBERS" TO "FOUR VOTING MEMBERS".

Basis

THE SHNPP PNSC CONSISTS OF 9 MEMBERS TOTAL (CHAIRMAN AND 8 OTHER MEMBERS). A SIMPLE MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERSHIP IS REQUIRED TO CONDUCT BUSINESS. THEREFORE, 5 TOTAL VOTES ARE NEEDED (THE CHAIRMAN AND 4 OTHER MEMBERS).

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 127 * Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 6.05.02.06 Page Number: 6-9 & 10

Section Number: 6.5.2.6.a & L

Comment:

CHANGE 6.5.2.6.a TO THE FOLLOWING:
DELETE ALL OF (1) AND "(2) AND OTHER"
CHANGE THE END OF 6.5.2.6.L FROM "all other programs required by Specification 6.8.4." TO "the Technical Specification Equipment List Program."

Basis

THE CHANGES IN 6.5.2.6.a & L ARE PROPOSED TO ENABLE THE PNSC TO MAINTAIN ITS PROPER FOCUS ON THOSE ASPECTS OF PLANT PERFORMANCE MOST CLOSELY RELATED TO PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY. THE CP&L PROCEDURE REVIEW SYSTEM, FOR MOST PROCEDURES, IS COVERED ELSEWHERE IN SECTION 6. CERTAIN PROGRAMS, THOSE LISTED IN 6.5.2.6.L AND COVERED BY SECTIONS 6.13 THROUGH 6.16, HAVE SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE EITHER BECAUSE OF THEIR SPECIAL POTENTIAL IMPACT OR BEACUSE THEY EMBODY THE REMOVAL OF CERTAIN CRITERIA FROM THE BODY OF THE SPECIFICATIONS. IT IS INDEED APPROPRIATE THAT THESE PROGRAMS RECEIVE SPECIAL ATTENTION OVER AND ABOVE OUR STANDARD REVIEW PROCESS. OTHER PROGRAMS, SUCH AS THOSE LISTED IN SECTION 6.8.4, ARE SPECIFIED SIMPLY BECAUSE THERE IS NO OTHER MECHANISM FOR CP&L TO DOCUMENT ITS COMMITMENT TO THESE PROGRAMS. HOWEVER, ONCE THE COMMITMENT HAS BEEN THUS ESTABLISHED, THESE PROGRAMS DO NOT HAVE A SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE TO WARRENT CONSTANT PNSC REVIEW. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE A WISE USE OF OUR RESOURCES. THE PROGRAMS IN 6.8.4 WOULD UNDERGO THE SAME REVIEW AND CHANGE PROCESS AS ALL OTHER PLANT PROCEDURES OR PROGRAMS.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 140

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 6.05.03.01

Page Number: 6-11

Section Number: 6.5.3.1

Comment:

LINE 2 - INSERT THE WORD "DEPARTMENT" AFTER THE WORDS "ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES".

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS PROPOSED TO PROVIDE THE COMPLETE OFFICAL DEPARTMENT NAME.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 116 *

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 6.05.03.09

Page Number: 6-12

Section Number: 6.5.3.9.a

Comment:

ADD TO THE END OF THE PARAGRAPH THE FOLLOWING:
Implementation may proceed prior to completion of the review.

Basis

CP & L PROPOSED THIS CHANGE IN DECEMBER. IT HAS APPARENTLY BEEN INADVERTENTLY LEFT OUT IN TYPING. THE CHANGE IS NEEDED TO CLARIFY THAT THE CNS REVIEW IS AN AFTER-THE-FACT REVIEW TO VERIFY THAT THE SAFETY ANALYSIS ARE BEING PROPERLY PERFORMED.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 139 Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 6.05.03.09 Page Number: 6-12

Section Number: 6.5.3.9.C

Comment:

ADD TO THE END OF THE STATEMENT - "PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION.".

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS PROPOSED TO CLARIFY THE EXACT REQUIREMENTS ON THIS REVIEW.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 307

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 6.05.03.11

Page Number: 6-13

Section Number: 6.5.3.11C

Comment:

CHANGE ADD C

A SUMMATION OF CORPORATE NUCLEAR SAFETY SECTION RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCERNS SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO THE CHAIRMAN/PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND OTHER APPROPRIATE SENIOR MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL AT LEAST EVERY OTHER MONTH.

Basis

THIS CHANGE REINTRODUCES REQUIREMENT DROPPED AS A TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 123

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 6.05.03.10

Page Number: 6-13

Section Number: 6.5.3.10

Comment:

CHANGE "SPECIFICATION 6.5.3.9.h" TO "SPECIFICATION 6.5.3.9.e; h, and j".

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS TO CLARIFY THE SCOPE OF THE REVIEW FOR THESE ITEMS.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 141 Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 6.05.03.11 Page Number: 6-13

Section Number: 6.5.3.11.b

Comment:

LINE 3 - CHANGE THE SECOND SENTENCE TO THE FOLLOWING:
A report summarizing the reviews encompassed by Specification 6.5.3.9 shall be provided to the Plant General Manager and the Vice President-Harris Nuclear Project every other month.

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS PROPOSED TO CLARIFY THE SCHEDULE OF THESE REPORTS.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 36 | Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 6.05.04 | Page Number: 6-14

Section Number: 6.5.4.1.L

Comment:

CHANGE THE STATEMENT TO READ:
ANY OTHER AREAS OF UNIT OPERATION CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE BY THE MANAGER-CORPORATE NUCLEAR SAFETY OR THE VICE PRESIDENT- HARRIS NUCLEAR PROJECT.

Basis

NEW INFORMATION
THIS CHANGE PROVIDES THE SPECIFIC CP&L TITLES FOR THE POSITIONS LISTED IN THE SPECIFICATION.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 37

Comment Type: ERROR

LCO Number: 6.08.01

Page Number: 6-17

Section Number: 6.8.1g

Comment:

- INSERT THE WORD "PROGRAM" AFTER THE WORDS "QUALITY ASSURANCE ".

Basis

TYPO

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 239 Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 6.08.04 Page Number: 6-18

Section Number: 6.8.4.C.3

Comment:

DELETE "THE DISCHARGE OF THE CONDENSATE PUMPS".

Basis

OTHER SAMPLE POINTS MAY BE USED TO MONITOR CONDENSATE FOR CONDENSER IN-LEAKAGE OTHER THAN JUST THE CONDENSATE PUMP DISCHARGE.

CP&L Comments

HNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 216 * Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 6.08.04 Page Number: 6-19

Section Number: 6.8.4.g

Comment:

ADD THE FOLLOWING NEW PROGRAM:

g. Turbine and Turbine Valve Maintenance

A turbine and turbine valve maintenance program shall be maintained consistent with the applicable guidance provided in the vendor recommendation.

Basis

SEE ITEM No. 215 FOR BASES.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 170 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 6.09.01.04

Page Number: 6-22

Section Number: 6.9.1.4

Comment:

AT THE END OF THE SECOND PARAGRAPH, REVISE THE WORDING TO THE FOLLOWING:
....type of container (e.g., Type A, Type B) and SOLIDIFICATION agent or absorbant (e.g. cement).

Basis

THIS PROPOSED CHANGE MAKES THE BASES MORE ACCURATE. "LSA" AND "LARGE QUANTITY" ARE NOT CONTAINER TYPES, AND UREA IS NO LONGER AN ACCEPTABLE ABSORBANT.

CP&L Comments

NPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 125

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: 6.10.03

Page Number: 6-25

Section Number: 6.10.3.i

Comment:

CHANGE "QUALITY ASSURANCE MANUAL" TO "QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM".

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS TO PROVIDE THE APPROPRIATE CP&L DESIGNATION.

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 172 *

Comment Type: IMPROVEMENT

LCO Number: GENERAL

Page Number: SEE ATTACHED

Section Number: SEE ATTACHED

Comment:

INCORPORATE THE "TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION EQUIPMENT LIST PROGRAM" INTO THE TECH SPECS PER THE ATTACHED PAGES.

ATTACHED PAGES
3/4 6-14 & 16
3/4 7-30 & 33
3/4 8-17, 20 & 21
6-10 & 29

DELETE THE FOLLOWING PAGES
3/4 6-16
3/4 7-31,32
3/4 7-34,35
3/4 8-19
3/4 8-21

Basis

THIS CHANGE IS PROPOSED AS A SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT IN THE SPECIFICATIONS TO OPTIMIZE THE USE OF BOTH LICENSEE AND NRC MANPOWER IN REDUCING THE NUMBER OF UNNECESSARY TECH SPEC CHANGES. THIS PROPOSAL IS DISCUSSED IN MORE DETAIL IN LETTER NLS-86-046.

PROOF AND REVIEW COPY

(Revised 172)

MAJOR CHANGES TO LIQUID, GASEOUS, AND SOLID RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEMS (Continued)

6. A comparison of the predicted releases of radioactive materials, in liquid and gaseous effluents and in solid waste, to the actual releases for the period prior to when the change is to be made;

7. An estimate of the exposure to plant operating personnel as a result of the change; and

8. Documentation of the fact that the change was reviewed and found acceptable in accordance with Specificaton 6.5.

b. Shall become effective upon review and acceptance in accordance with Specification 6.5.

6.16 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION EQUIPMENT LIST PROGRAM (TSEL)

6.16.1 THE TSEL SHALL BE APPROVED BY THE COMMISSION PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION.

6.16.2 LICENSEE INITIATED CHANGES TO THE TSEL:

a. SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO THE COMMISSION IN THE ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE YEAR IN WHICH THE CHANGE WAS MADE EFFECTIVE. THIS SUBMITTAL SHALL CONTAIN:

1) SUFFICIENTLY DETAILED INFORMATION TO SUPPORT THE RATIONALE FOR THE CHANGE WITHOUT BENEFIT OF ADDITIONAL OR SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION;

2) A DETERMINATION THAT THE CHANGE DID NOT REDUCE THE LEVEL OF CONTROL OR SURVEILLANCE INTENDED BY THE RELEVANT SPECIFICATION;

3) DOCUMENTATION OF THE FACT THAT THE CHANGE HAS BEEN FOUND ACCEPTABLE BY THE PLANT GENERAL MANAGER.

b. SHALL BECOME EFFECTIVE UPON REVIEW AND ACCEPTANCE BY THE PNSC.

#172

PROOF AND REVIEW COPY

Record 172

TABLE 3.8-2

MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION

VALVE NUMBER	BYPASS DEVICE (CONTINUOUS)(ACCIDENT CONDITIONS)(NO)	SYSTEM(S) AFFECTED

DELETE

#172

PROOF AND REVIEW COPY

Record 172

TABLE 3.8-1

CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR
OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

DEVICE NUMBER AND LOCATION	SYSTEM POWERED
1. 6900 VAC (Primary breaker) (Backup breaker)	Reactor Coolant pump 1 2 3 4
2. 480 VAC from MOAD Centers List all; primary breakers Backup breakers Backup breakers	
3. 480 VAC from MCC List all; primary breakers Backup breakers Backup breakers	
4. 125V DC Lighting List all; primary breakers Backup breakers Backup breakers	
5. 440 VAC CRDM Power Primary breakers Backup breakers Backup breakers	

DELETE

#172

PROOF AND REVIEW COPY

Record 172

TABLE 3.7-4 (Continued)

FIRE HOSE STATIONS

LOCATION[1]	ELEVATION	HOSE RACK NO.
RAB	261	261-Jz-43
RAB	261	261-Fw-43
RAB	305	305-C-39
RAB	305	305-I-41
RAB	305	305-Fw-43
FHB	236	236-L-41
FHB	236	236-L-45
FHB	261	261-L-41
FHB	261	261-L-45
FHB	286	286-L-27
FHB	286	286-N-36
FHB	286	286-L-43
FHB	286	286-N-51
FHB	286	286-L-65
FHB	286	286-N-71
FHB	286	286-L-75y
DGB	261	261-C-2
DGB	261	261-C-4
DGB	261	261-B-1
DGB	261	261-B-2

DELETE

[1]CB - Containment Building   FHB - Fuel Handling Building
RAB - Reactor Auxiliary Building   DGB - Diesel Generator Building

#172

PROOF AND REVIEW COPY

Record172

TABLE 3.7-4

FIRE HOSE STATIONS

DELETE

LOCATION[1]	ELEVATION	HOSE RACK NO.
CB	221	221-C-4
CB	221	221-C-12
CB	221	221-C-19
CB	236	236-C-4
CB	236	236-C-12
CB	236	236-C-19
CB	261	261-C-4
CB	261	261-C-12
CB	261	261-C-19
CB	286	286-C-4
CB	286	286-C-12
CB	286	286-C-19
RAB	190	190-G-16
RAB	190	190-G-38
RAB	216	216-G-16
RAB	216	216-Fz-27
RAB	216	216-G-38
RAB	216	216-Gy-13
RAB	236	236-Gy-13
RAB	236	236-G-16
RAB	236	236-Fz-27
RAB	236	236-D-27
RAB	236	236-G-38
RAB	236	236-Kz-31
RAB	236	236-C-39
RAB	236	236-Fw-43
RAB	236	236-Jz-43
RAB	236	236-E-15
RAB	261	261-Gy-13
RAB	261	261-E-15
RAB	261	261-G-16
RAB	261	261-D-27
RAB	261	261-Kz-31
RAB	261	261-G-38
RAB	261	261-C-39
RAB	261	261-Fw-42
RAB	286	286-C-15
RAB	286	286-E-15
RAB	286	286-G-16
RAB	286	286-E-38
RAB	286	286-C-39
RAB	286	286-Jv-41
RAB	286	286-Fw-42

[1]CB - Containment Building
RAB - Reactor Auxiliary Building
FHB - Fuel Handling Building
DGB - Diesel Generator Building

#172

PROOF AND REVIEW COPY

TABLE 3.7-3 (Continued)

PREACTION AND MULTICYCLE SPRINKLER SYSTEMS

Record 172

DELETE

	SPRINKLER SYSTEM	LOCATION/ELEVATION
o.	Charcoal Filter Room 1A Sprinkler (1-A-4-CHFA)	RAB /261
p.	Charcoal Filter Room 1B Sprinkler (1-A-4-CHFB)	RAB /261
q.	Electrical Penetration Area SA Sprinkler (1-A-EPA)	RAB /261
r.	Electrical Penetration Area SB Sprinkler (1-A-EPB)	RAB /261
s.	Cable Spreading Room A Sprinkler (1-A-CSRA)	RAB /286
t.	Cable Spreading Room B Sprinkler (1-A-CSRB)	RAB /286
u.	HVAC Equipment Room Sprinkler (12-A-6-HV7)	RAB /305
v.	Emergency Exhaust System E-12 (5-F-3-CHFA)	FHB /261
x.	Emergency Exhaust System E-13 (5-F-3-CHFB)	FHB /261
y.	Fuel Pool Cooling Heat Exchangers and Pumps (5-F-2-FPC)	FHB /236
z.	Diesel Generator 1A-Sprinkler (1-D-1-DGA-RM)	DGB /261
aa.	Diesel Generator 1B-Sprinkler (1-D-1-DGB-RM)	DGB /261
bb.	Diesel Fuel Oil Day Tank 1A-Sprinkler (1-D-1-DGA-TK)	DGB /280
cc.	Diesel Fuel Oil Day Tank 1B-Sprinkler (1-D-1-DGB-TK)	DGB /280
dd.	Diesel Oil Pump Room 1A-Sprinkler (1-O-PA)	Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank Area /242.25
ee.	Diesel Oil Pump Room 1B-Sprinkler (1-O-PB)	Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank Area /242.25

#172

PROOF AND REVIEW COPY

TABLE 3.7-3

PREACTION AND MULTICYCLE SPRINKLER SYSTEMS

(Record 172)

Delete

SPRINKLER SYSTEM		LOCATION/ELEVATION
a.	Airborne Radioactivity Removal Unit - 1A Sprinkler (1-C-1-CHFA)	C.B. /221
b.	Airborne Radioactivity Removal Unit-1B Sprinkler (1-C-1-CHFB)	C.B. /221
c.	Electrical Cable Penetration Area-1A Sprinkler (1-C-1-EPA)	C.B. /261
d.	Electrical Cable Penetration Area-1B Sprinkler (1-C-1-EPB)	C.B. /261
e.	Containment Spray and RHR Pump Room 1A Sprinkler (I-A-1-PA)	RAB /190
f.	Containment Spray and RHR Pump Room 1B Sprinkler (1-A-1-PB)	RAB /190
g.	AUX. Feed Water Pumps and Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger and Pumps Sprinkler (1-A-3-PB)	RAB /236
h.	Decontamination Area and Corridor Cable Tray Sprinkler (1-A-3-COMB)	RAB /236
i.	Letdown Heat Exchanger Area, Corridor Cable Tray Sprinkler (1-A-3-COME)	RAB /236
j.	Recycle Holdup Tank Area, Corridor Cable Tray Sprinkler (1-A-3-COMI)	RAB /236
k.	HVAC Chiller Equipment Area and Cable Tray Sprinkler (1-A-4-CHLR)	RAB /261
l.	Boric Acid Equipment Area, Corridor Cable Tray Sprinkler (1-A-4-COMB)	RAB /261
m.	Corridor Cable Tray Sprinkler (1-A-4-COME)	RAB /261 Column 43, E to H
n.	Corridor Cable Tray Sprinkler (1-A-4-COMI)	RAB /261 Column 43, I to L

TABLE 3.6-1

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

VALVE NUMBER	FUNCTION	MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME (Seconds)
1. Phase "A" Isolation		
a.		
b.		
2. Phase "B" Isolation		
a.		
b.		
3. Containment Purge and Exhaust		
a.		
b.		
4. Manual		
a.		
b.		
5. Other		
a.		
b.		

DELETE

#172

*May be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control.

**Not subject to Type C leakage tests.

***The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

PROOF AND REVIEW COPY

Recd 172

Attachment 2

Discrepancies Between FSAR and TS

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 221

Comment Type: FSAR/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: B 3/4.08.04

Page Number: B 3/4 8-3

Section Number: B 3/4.8.4

Comment:

THE TS REFERENCE R.G. 1.106, REV 1, MARCH 1977 AND FSAR SECTION 1.8 AND PAGE 8.3.1-30a REFERENCE REV.0. THE FSAR WILL BE REVISED AS NECESSARY.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 222

Comment Type: FSAR/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3/4.07.06

Page Number: 3/4 7-14

Section Number: 4.7.6.d.5

Comment:

THE 15 SECOND ISOLATION TIME IN TS 4.7.6.d.5 IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH R.G. 1.95. FSAR SECTION 1.8 DOES NOT IDENTIFY THIS AS AN EXCEPTION. THE FSAR WILL BE REVISED AS NECESSARY.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 233 | Comment Type: FSAR/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3/4.03.02 | Page Number: 3/4 3-36

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-5

Comment:

TS TABLE 3.3-5 LISTS THE RESPONSE TIME FOR MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION AS N.A. THE FSAR STATES THAT CREDIT FOR MAIN STEAM ISOLATION IS TAKEN IN THE MSLB ANALYSES. REFER TO FSAR SECTION 6.2.1.4.5 (PAGE 6.2.1-26a) AND ITEM J OF TABLE 10.4.9b-2 (PAGE 10.4.9. b-11). THE FSAR WILL BE REVISED AS NECESSARY.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 235 Comment Type: FSAR/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3/4.06.01 Page Number: 3/4 6-1

Section Number: 4.6.1.1.c

Comment:

THE TS LIST Pa as 41 psig. FSAR SECTIONS 6.2.6.1 (p 6.2.6-1), 6.2.6.6.3 (p 6.2.6-7) AND 6.2.6.1 (p 6.2.6-5) PROVIDE Pa AS 36.7. THE FSAR WILL BE REVISED.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 236 | Comment Type: FSAR/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3/4.03.02 | Page Number: 3/4 3-27 AND 29

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-4

Comment:

FSAR 7.3.1-12 STATES THAT THE SETPOINT FOR HI-1 AND HI-2 IS 4.5 psig WHILE TS TABLE 3.3-4, ITEMS 1c & 4c PROVIDE A VALUE OF 3.0 psig. THE FSAR WILL BE REVISED.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 237 Comment Type: FSAR/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3/4.03.02 Page Number: 3/4 3-27

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-4

Comment:

FSAR TABLE 7.3.1-12 AND SECTION 6.5.2.2 (p 6.5.2-2) STATES THAT THE SETPOINT FOR HI-3 IS 12.0 psig WHILE TS TABLE 3.3-4, ITEM 2c PROVIDES A VALUE OF 4.5 psig. THE FSAR WILL BE REVISED.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 238

Comment Type: FSAR/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3.06.02.02

Page Number: 3/4 6-12

Section Number: 3.6.2.2.a

Comment:

FSAR TABLE 6.5.2-1 (p 6.5.2-10) STATES THAT MINIMUM SPRAY ADDITIVE TANK VOLUME IS 7000 GALLONS. FSAR SECTION 6.5.2.3.3 (p 6.5.2-6) STATES THAT THERE WILL BE A MAXIMUM VOLUME OF 7000 GALLONS IN THE SPRAY ADDITIVE TANK. THESE VALUES ARE INCONSITENT WITH THE VALUES PROVIDED IN TS 3.6.2.2. THE FSAR WILL BE REVISED.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 240

Comment Type: FSAR/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3/4.05.01

Page Number: 3/4 5-1

Section Number: 3.5.1.d

Comment:

THE TS STATE THAT THE ACCCUMULATOR PRESSURE SHALL BE MAINTAINED BETWEEN 585 psig AND 665 psig. FSAR TABLES 6.3.2-1 AND 8 LIST THE MINIMUM OPERATING PRESSURE AS 600 psig. FSAR TABLES 6.3.2-1 AND 8 WILL BE REVISED TO AGREE WITH FSAR TABLES 15.6.2-1A AND 2.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 241

Comment Type: FSAR/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3/4.05.01

Page Number: 3/4 5-1

Section Number: 3.5.1.b

Comment:

THE TS STATE THAT THE MINIMUM ACCUMULATOR VOLUME IS BETWEEN 7440 AND 7710 GALLONS. FSAR TABLES 6.3.2-1 AND 8 STATES THAT MINIMUM ACCUMULATOR VOLUME IS 925 cu. ft (approx 7715 GALLONS). THE FSAR WILL BE REVISED NECESSARY.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 243 Comment Type: FSAR/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3/4.07.06 Page Number: 3/4 7-15

Section Number: 4.7.6.b.3

Comment:

TS 4.7.6.b.3 REQUIRES VERIFICATION OF CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION FLOW RATE OF 4000 cfm + or - 10%. FSAR FIGURE 9.4.1-1 I NDICATES A RECIRCULATION RATE OF 4000 cfm MAXIMUM AND 3200 cfm MINIMUM. THE FSAR WILL BE REVISED.

Basis

Record Number: 245

Comment Type: FSAR/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3/4.03.03

Page Number: 3/4 3-46

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-6

Comment:

RADIATION MONITORS FOR THE SPENT FUEL POOL AREA ARE NOT INCLUDED IN FSAR TABLE 12.3.4-2. HOWEVER, THESE MONITORS ARE DISCUSSED IN THE FSAR SECTION 12.3.4.1.8.3. FSAR TABLE 12.3.4-2 WILL BE REVISED.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 246

Comment Type: FSAR/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 2.02.01

Page Number: 2-7 THROUGH 10

Section Number: TABLE 2.2-1

Comment:

THE OVERTEMPERATURE AND OVERPOWER DELTA T EQUATIONS IN TS TABLE 2.2-1 ARE NOT IDENTICAL TO THOSE PROVIDED IN FSAR SECTION 7.2.1.1.2 (p 7.2.1-4 AND 5). THE FSAR WILL BE REVISED AS NECESSARY.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 247

Comment Type: FSAR/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3.03.03.03

Page Number: 3/4 3-51

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-7

Comment:

FSAR SECTION 3.7.4 INCORRECTLY LISTS THE LOCATIONS OF THE TRIAXIAL PEAK ACCELEROGRAPH RECORDERS. HOWEVER, THE LOCATIONS ARE CORRECTLY LISTED IN THE TS AND PROVIDED IN THE FSAR TABLE 3.7.4-1. FSAR SECTION 3.7.4 WILL BE REVISED.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 248

Comment Type: FSAR/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3.04.04

Page Number: 3/4 4-12

Section Number: 4.4.4.3

Comment:

THE TS STATE THAT THE NITROGEN ACCUMULATORS ARE THE PRIMARY AND THAT INSTRUMENT AIR IS THE BACKUP MOTIVE POWER FOR THE PORVs. FSAR SECTION 8.3.1.2.35 (p 8.3.1-42) STATES THE CONVERSE. THE FSAR WILL BE REVISED.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 251

Comment Type: FSAR/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3/4.04.05

Page Number: 3/4 4-13

Section Number: 3/4.4.5

Comment:

SER SECTION 5.4.2.2 STATES THE FSAR CONTAINS PROPOSED TS. FSAR SECTION 16.2 NO LONGER CONTAINS PROPOSED TS. THE FSAR WILL BE REVISED TO DELETE REFERENCES TO SECTION 16.2.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 255

Comment Type: FSAR/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: STS 3/4.5.4

Page Number:

Section Number: STS 3/4.5.4

Comment:

STS 3/4.5.4 REGARDING BORON INJECTION TANK (BIT) WAS DELETED BASED ON AN ANALYSIS PERFORMED BY CP&L. THE NRC STAFF HAS REVIEWED BIT DELECTION ANALYSIS AND HAS ISSUED A SER. HOWEVER, THE FSAR HAS NOT BEEN REVISED TO REFLECT THE BIT DELETION. THE FSAR WILL BE REVISED.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 256

Comment Type: FSAR/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3/4.07.05

Page Number: 3/4 7-13

Section Number: 3/4.7.5

Comment:

FSAR SECTION 2.4.14.c STATES THAT FLOW WILL BE INITIATED THROUGH THE ESW INTAKE CHANNEL WHEN THE WATER TEMPERATURE IS LESS THAN 35 F. THE TS DO NOT INCORPORATE THIS REQUIREMENT. THE FSAR WILL BE REVISED.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 259 Comment Type: FSAR/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3.06.01.04 Page Number: 3/4 6-6

Section Number: 3.6.1.4

Comment:

THE TS STATE THAT THE CONTAINMENT INTERNAL PRESSURE SHALL BE MAINTAINED BETWEEN -1 INCHES w.g. AND 1.9 psig. CP&L HAS SUBMITTED JUSTIFICATION FOR A VALUE LESS THAN 14.7 psia. FSAR SECTION 6.2.1.5 WILL BE REVISED TO REFLECT THIS JUSTIFICATION.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 260

Comment Type: FSAR/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 6.0

Page Number: 6-1 THRU 29

Section Number: 6.0

Comment:

THE ORGANIZATION DESCRIBED IN SECTION 6.0 OF THE TS IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH FSAR CHAPTER 13.1. THE FSAR WILL BE REVISED.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 261

Comment Type: FSAR/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3/4.07.010

Page Number: 3/4 7-27

Section Number: 3.7.10.1.a

Comment:

FSAR SECTION 9.5.1.2.3 (p 9.5.1-21) STATES THAT THE MINIMUM FIRE WATER SUPPLY REQUIREMENT IS 1900 gpm. THE TS STATES THE MINIMUM REQUIREMENT AS 2100 gpm. THE FSAR WILL BE REVISED.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 262

Comment Type: FSAR/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 5.03.02

Page Number: 5-6

Section Number: 5.3.2

Comment:

FSAR SECTION 4.2.2.3.1 ONLY DISCUSSES Ag, In, Cd CONTROL RODS AND THE TS DISCUSSES HAFNIUM. THE FSAR WILL BE REVISED TO REFLECT THE DESIGN AND ANALYSES FOR THE PLANT.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 263

Comment Type: FSAR/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3/4.08.02

Page Number: 3/4 8-12

Section Number: TABLE 4.8-2

Comment:

THE TS STATE THAT THE BATTERY FLOAT VOTAGES IS GRAETER THEAN OR EQUAL TO 2.13 VOLTS PER CELL. FSAR SECTION 8.3.2.1.2 STATES THAT THE BATTERY CHARGER MAINTAINS A REGULATED FLOAT VOLTAGE OF 2.20 TO 2.25 VOLTS PER CELL. THE FSAR WILL BE REVISED AS NECESSARY.

Basis

Record Number: 265

Comment Type: FSAR/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: B.3/4.07.01.01

Page Number: B 3/4 7-1

Section Number: B.3/4.7.1.1

Comment:

FSAR SECTION 5.2.2.1 STATES THAT 110% OF SECONDARY DESIGN PRESSURE IS 1335 psig. THE TS PROVIDE THE VALUE AS 1305 psig. THE FSAR IS INCORRECT AND WILL BE REVISED.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 267

Comment Type: FSAR/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3/4.03.02

Page Number: 3/4 3-21

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-3

Comment:

TS TABLE 3.3-3, ITEM 5b LISTS THE TRIP LOGIC AS 2/4 IN ANY GENERATOR. FSAR FIGURE 7.3.1-1 (SHEET 5 OF 7) SHOWS THE LOGIC AS 2/3 IN ANY GENERATOR. HOWEVER, FSAR TABLE 7.3.1-4 CORRECTLY INDICATES THE 2/4 LOGIC. FSAR FIGURE 7.3.1-1 WILL BE REVISED.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 268

Comment Type: FSAR/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3.01.02.06

Page Number: 3/4 1-12

Section Number: 3.1.2.6.b.3 & 4

Comment:

TS 3.1.2.6.b.3&4 AND 3.5.4.c&d PROVIDE THE MINIMUM AND MAXIMUM RWST SOLUTION TEMPERATURE AS 40 F AND 125 F, RESPECTIVELY. FSAR TABLE 6.2.2-9 PROVIDES THE OPERATING TEMPERATURE RANGE FOR THE TWST AS 40 F-100 F. THE FSAR WILL BE REVISED.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 269 Comment Type: FSAR/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3.01.02.06 Page Number: 3/4 1-12

Section Number: 3.1.2.6.b.1

Comment:

FSAR SECTION 6.2.2.3.2.3 (p 6.2.2-13) STATES THAT THE RWST IS DESIGNED FOR A 470,000 GALLON CAPACITY WITH A MINIMUM WATER INVENTORY OF 374,000 GALLONS MAINTAINED DURING ALL NORMAL MODES, AS INDICATED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. TS 3.1.2.6.b.1 AND 3.5.4.a STATE THAT THE RWST MINIMUM WATER VOLUME IS 448,000 GALLONS. FSAR SECTION 6.5.2.3.3 PROVIDES A VALUE OF 374,000 GALLONS. FSAR TABLE 6.2.2-9 ALSO PROVIDES THE MINIMUM VOLUME AS 374,000 GALLONS. THE FSAR WILL BE REVISED.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 271 Comment Type: FSAR/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3/4.03.02 Page Number: 3/4 3-32

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-4

Comment:

FSAR SECTION 8.3.1.1.2.11 (PAGE 8.3.1-16) PROVIDES THE 6.9 KV EMERGENCY BUS UNDERVOLTAGE - PRIMARY SETPOINT AS 72% (4968 VOLTS) TS TABLE 3.3-4, ITEM 9 LISTS THE SETPOINT AS 5040 VOLTS. THE FSAR PROVIDES A .5 SECOND DELAY TIME AND THE TS PROVIDES A 1 SECOND DELAY TIME. THE FSAR WILL BE REVISED.

Basis

Record Number: 274

Comment Type: FSAR/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3/4.03.02

Page Number: 3/4 3-32

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-34

Comment:

FSAR SECTION 8.3.1.1.2.11 (p 8.3.1-16) PROVIDES THE 6.9 KV EMERGENCY BUS UNDERVOLTAGE - SECONDARY SETPOINT AS 89% (6141 VOLTS). TS TABLE 3.3-4, ITEM 9 LISTS THE SETPOINT AS 6420 VOLTS. THE FSAR WILL BE REVISED AS NECESSARY.

Basis

Record Number: 275

Comment Type: FSAR/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3.08.01.01

Page Number: 3/4 8-4

Section Number: 4.8.1.1.2.b&c

Comment:

FSAR SECTIONS 9.5.4.5 AND 1.8 (p 9.5.4.-6f AND 1.8-175) STATES THAT DG FUEL OIL WILL BE SAMPLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ASTM D 270-75 AND THE TS REFERENCE ASTM-D4057-81. THE FSAR WILL BE REVISED.

Basis

Record Number: 276

Comment Type: FSAR/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3.08.01.01

Page Number: 3/4 8-4

Section Number: 4.8.1.1.2.b&c

Comment:

FSAR SECTIONS 9.5.4.5 AND 1.8 (p.9.5.4-6f AND 1.8-175) STATES THAT DG FUEL OIL SAMPLES WILL BE TESTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ASTM D 975-81. THIS IS NOT IN AGREEMENT WITH THE TS. THE FSAR WILL BE REVISED.

Basis

Record Number: 278

Comment Type: FSAR/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3.08.01.01

Page Number: 3/4 8-4

Section Number: 4.8.1.1.2.b&c

Comment:

THE TS AS WRITTEN TAKE EXCEPTION TO REG. GUIDE 1.137. FSAR SECTION 1.8 DOES NOT LIST ALL OF THESE EXCEPTIONS. THE FSAR WILL BE REVISED AS NECESSARY.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 279

Comment Type: FSAR/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3.08.01.01

Page Number: 3/4 8-1 AND 9

Section Number: 3.8.1.1.b.2

Comment:

FSAR SECTION 9.5.4.1 STATES THAT THE MAIN FUEL OIL STORAGE TANK WILL BE REFILLED BEFORE THE TANK INVENTORY DROPS TO APPROXIMATELY 150,000 GALLONS. TS 3.8.1.1.b.2 AND 3.8.1.2.b.2 ALLOW A MINIMUM VOLUME OF 100,000 GALLONS. THE FSAR WILL BE REVISED.

Basis

Record Number: 280

Comment Type: FSAR/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3.07.01.03

Page Number: 3/4 7-6

Section Number: 3.7.1.3

Comment:

FSAR SECTION 9.2.6.5 (p 9.2.6-3a) PROVIDES VALUES FOR SETPOINTS AND TOTAL WATER INVENTORIES FOR THE CST AND THEY ARE INCONSISTENT WITH TS. SPECIFIC SETPOINTS WILL BE DELETED FROM THE FSAR AND THE FSAR WILL REFERENCE THE TS.

Basis

Record Number: 282

Comment Type: FSAR/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3.07.06

Page Number: 3/4 7-15

Section Number: 4.7.6.d.3

Comment:

FSAR SECTION 6.4.3 STATES THAT THE OPERATOR CAN ALLOW UP TO 800 CFM PRESSURIZATION FLOW AND THE TS ONLY ALLOW UP TO 400 CFM. THE FSAR WILL BE REVISED AS NECESSARY.

Basis

Record Number: 284

Comment Type: FSAR/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: B 3/4.08.02

Page Number: B 3/4 8-2

Section Number: B 3/4.8.2

Comment:

THE TS REFERENCE REGULATORY GUIDE 1.129 AND IEEE 450-1975 FOR THE TESTING OF THE BATTERIES. FSAR SECTION 1.8 STATES THAT CP&L DOES NOT HAVE TO ADDRESS REGULATORY GUIDE 1.129. HOWEVER, REGULATORY GUIDE 1.129 ENDORSES IEEE 450-1975 AND CP&L DOES UTILIZE THIS INDUSTRY STANDARD AS DISCUSSED IN THE FSAR. THE FSAR WILL BE REVISED AS NECESSARY.

Basis

Attachment 3

Discrepancies Between TS and SER

(3447GAS/ljs)

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 223 | Comment Type: SER/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 6.02.02 | Page Number: 6-1

Section Number: TABLE 6.2-1

Comment:

THE MINIMUM SHIFT CREW COMPOSITION PROVIDED IN SER SECTION 13.1.2.2 DOES NOT AGREE WITH TS TABLE 6.2-1. THE SER SHOULD BE REVISED.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 224 Comment Type: SER/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3.07.01.02. Page Number: 3/4 7-5

Section Number: 4.7.1.2.2

Comment:

THE STAFF COMMITTED IN SER SECTION 10.4.9 TO REVIEW THE AFW TECH SPEC TO ENSURE THAT THERE IS A SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT TO PERFORM A FLOW TEST AFTER AN EXTENDED COLD SHUTDOWN. THE STAFF FURTHER COMMITTED TO ISSUE AN SER SUPPLEMENT AFTER THEY REVIEW THE TECH SPECS.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 225

Comment Type: SER/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3.07.01.02

Page Number: 3/4 7-4

Section Number: ACTIONS A&B

Comment:

THE SER STATES THAT CP&L HAS NOT PROPOSED A TS THAT DISCUSSES OUTAGE TIMES WITH TWO AND THREE AFW PUMPS INOPERABLE. TS 3.7.1.2 COVERS THIS REQUEST. THE STAFF COMMITTED IN SER SECTION 10.4.9 TO REVIEW THE TS AND ISSUE AN SER SUPPLEMENT. THE SER SUPPLEMENT SHOULD BE ISSUED.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 226

Comment Type: SER/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3.08.01.01

Page Number: 3/4 8-3 & 7

Section Number: 4.8.1.1

Comment:

SER SECTION 9.5.4.1 STATES THAT AFTER ALL MAINTENANCE CP&L WILL VERIFY ALIGNMENT AND PERFORM A POST-MAINTENANCE TEST. TS 4.8.1.1.2 f ADDRESSES TESTING AFTER MODIFICATIONS THAT COULD AFFECT DIESEL GENERATOR INTERDEPENDENCE AND NOT AFTER ALL MAINTENANCE. TS 4.8.1.1.1 ADDRESSES ALIGNMENT VERIFICATION. THE SER SHOULD BE REVISED.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 227

Comment Type: SER/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3/4.07.13

Page Number: 3/4 7-42

Section Number: 3/4.7.13

Comment:

SER SECTION 9.2.7 STATES THAT THE APPLICANT HAS NOT A PROPOSED TS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF NUREG-0452 FOR THE ESCWS.. NUREG-0452 DOES NOT PROVIDE A TS FOR THE ESCWS HOWEVER, CP&L HAS PROPOSED TS 3/4.7.13. THE SER SHOULD BE REVISED.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 228

Comment Type: SER/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3/4 .07.013

Page Number: 3/4 7-11

Section Number: 4.7.3.b

Comment:

SER SECTION 9.2.2 REQUESTS SPECIFIC TS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM. THE SER FURTHER STATES THE STAFF WILL REVIEW THE TS AND WRITE A SER SUPPLEMENT. THE SER SUPPLEMENT SHOULD BE ISSUED BASED ON THE PROOF AND REVIEW TS.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 229

Comment Type: SER/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3/4.07.04

Page Number: 3/4 7-12

Section Number: 4.7.4.b.

Comment:

SER SECTION 9.2.1 STATES THAT CP&L HAS PROPOSED TS THAT DO NOT INCLUDE PERIODIC TESTING OF THE SAFETY-RELATED PORTION OF THE SWS AS A UNIT WITH ALL VALVES OPERATING TO ISOLATE NON SAFETY-RELATED LOADS FROM SAFETY AND WITH TWO EMERGENCY SW PUMPS STARTING TO SERVE SAFETY RELATED LOADS. TS 4.7.4.b INCLUDES THESE ITEMS. THE SER SHOULD BE REVISED.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 230

Comment Type: SER/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3.08.04.02

Page Number: 3/4 8-20

Section Number: 3.8.4.2

Comment:

SER SECTION 8.4.6 REQUESTS THAT CP&L PROVIDE A LIST OF MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES IN THE TS. CP&L HAS PROPOSED THAT THESE LISTS BE MAINTAINED AS PART OF THE TS EQUIPMENT LIST PROGRAM. THE SER SHOULD BE REVISED.

Basis

Record Number: 231

Comment Type: SER/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3.07.03

Page Number: 3/4 7-11

Section Number: 4.7.3

Comment:

SER SECTION 7.3.3.9 STATES THAT THE STAFF REQUESTED CP&L TO REVISE THE PROPOSED TS TO INCLUDE THE TESTING OF THE SPARE CCW PUMP BREAKER. THE TS DO NOT INCLUDE A SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE SPARE CCW PUMP BREAKER. HOWEVER, BY THE DEFINITION OF OPERABLE, THE BREAKER WILL BE TESTED PRIOR TO PLACING THE PUMP INSERVICE AND DECLARING THE SYSTEM OPERABLE. THE SER SHOULD BE REVISED.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 232

Comment Type: SER/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3.02.02

Page Number: 3/4 2-5

Section Number: 3.2.2

Comment:

TS 3.2.2 STATES THAT Fq(Z) SHALL BE LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 2.32. SER SECTION 4.2.3.3 STATES THAT THE TS SHOULD REFLECT AN Fq OF 2.10. CP&L HAS SUBMITTED INFORMATION JUSTIFYING AN Fq OF 2.32 AND IT IS UNDERGOING STAFF REVIEW. THE SER SHOULD BE REVISED UPON COMPLETION OF STAFF REVIEW.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 234

Comment Type: SER/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3/4. 06.01

Page Number: 3/4 6-1

Section Number: 4.6.1.1.c

Comment:

THE TS LIST Pa AS 41 psig. SER SECTION 6.2.1.1 (PAGE 6-4) Pa AS 36.7. THE SER SHOULD BE REVISED.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 242

Comment Type: SER/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3/4.04.03

Page Number: 3/4 4-10

Section Number: 3.4.3

Comment:

SER SECTION 8.4.8 STATES THAT WESTINGHOUSE HAS DETERMINED THAT 400 KW OF PRESSURIZER HEATERS ARE NEEDED TO MAINTAIN NATURAL CIRCULATION IN HOT SHUTDOWN CONDITIONS. AS STATED IN FSAR SECTION 8.3.1.2.35 AND TS 3.4.3 TWO GROUPS OF PRESSURIZER HEATERS, EACH WITH A MINIMUM OF 125 KW, IS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN NATURAL CIRCULATION IN HOT SHUTDOWNCONDITIONS. THE SER SHOULD BE REVISED.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 249

Comment Type: SER/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3/4.04.05

Page Number: 3/4 4-13

Section Number: 3/4.4.5

Comment:

SER SECTION 5.4.2.2 STATES THAT CP&L WILL USE STS, REVISION 2 FOR STEAM GENERATOR TUBE INSERVICE INSPECTION. CP&L USED STS, DRAFT REVISION 5. THE SER SHOULD BE REVISED.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 250

Comment Type: SER/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3/4.04.05

Page Number: 3/4 4-13

Section Number: 3/4.4.5

Comment:

SER SECTION 5.4.2.2 STATES THAT THE FSAR CONTAINS PROPOSED TS. FSAR SECTION 16.2 NO LONGER CONTAINS PROPOSED TS. THE SER SHOULD BEREVISED.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 252

Comment Type: SER/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3.04.06.02

Page Number: 3/4 4-23

Section Number: 3.4.62.f

Comment:

SER SECTION 5.2.5 STATES THE APPLICANT HAS PROPOSED NO SPECIFICATION TO DEAL WITH LEAKAGE THROUGH RCS PRESSURE ISOLATION VALVES. TS 3.4.6.2.f ADDRESSES THIS SUBJECT. FURTHER, THE STAFF STATES THEY WILL ISSUE AN SER SUPPLEMENT AFTER REVIEWING THE TS. THE SER SUPPLEMENT SHOULD BE REISSUED.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 253

Comment Type: SER/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3.02.03

Page Number: 3/4 2-9

Section Number: 3.2.3

Comment:

SER SECTION 4.4.3.3 STATES THAT DNBR PENALTIES DUE TO FUEL ROD BOWING SHOULD BE INCLUDED INTO THE TS. THE TS DO NOT SPECIFICALLY INCLUDE THIS REQUEST DRAFT REV. 5 OF THE STS HAVE BEEN REVISED TO COVER THIS REQUEST. THE SER NEEDS TO BE REVISED.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 254

Comment Type: SER/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: STANDARD STS

Page Number:

Section Number: STS 3/4.7.6

Comment:

SER SECTIONS 2.4.2.2 AND 2.4.14 STATE THAT THE STAFF WILL REQUIRE A TS TO ENSURE THAT WATERTIGHT AND AIRTIGHT DOORS ARE NORMALLY IN A CLOSED POSITION. CP&L HAS SUBMITTED INFORMATION JUSTIFYING A CHANGE TO THE SER POSITION. THE SER SHOULD BE REVISED. REFERENCE STS 3/4.7.6.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 257

Comment Type: SER/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3/4.07.05

Page Number: 3/4 7-13

Section Number: 3/4.7.5

Comment:

SER SECTION 2.4.11.1 (p 2-25) STATES THAT THE TS WILL DEFINE AVERAGE WATER TEMPERATURE OF THE AUXILIARY RESERVOIR, ABOVE WHICH THE PLANT WILL BE SHUTDOWN. THE SER SHOULD BE REVISED TO REFLECT THE FACT TS DEFINE A WATER TEMPERATURE AT THE INTAKE STRUCTURE, ABOVE WHICH THE PLANT WILL BE SHUTDOWN.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 258

Comment Type: SER/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3.06.01.04

Page Number: 3/4 6-6

Section Number: 3.6.1.4

Comment:

THE TS STATE THAT THE CONTAINMENT INTERNAL PRESSUE SHALL BE MAINTAINED BETWEEN -1 INCHES w.g AND 1.9 psig. SER SECTION 6.2.1.5 (p 6-9) STATES THAT THE TS ARE TO RESTRICT THE NORMAL OPERATING CONTAINMENT PRESSURE TO GREATER THAN 14.7 psia (0 psig). HOWEVER, CP&L HAS SUBMITTED JUSTIFICATION FOR A VALUE LESS THAN 14.7 psia. THE SER SHOULD BE REVISED TO REFLECT THE STAFF'S REVIEW OF THE CP&L JUSTIFICATION.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 264

Comment Type: SER/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: B.3/4.08.01

Page Number: B.3/4 8-1

Section Number: B.3/4.8.1

Comment:

SER SECTION 8.2.1 (p 8-1) STATES THAT THE CP&L GRID CONSISTS SIX 230 KV TRANSMISSION LINES. THE TS STATE THAT FIVE 230 KV TRANSMISSION LINES WILL BE IN SERVICE AT FUEL LOAD. THE SER SHOULD BE REVISED.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 266

Comment Type: SER/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3/4.03-02

Page Number: 3/4 3-21

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-3

Comment:

TS TABLE 3.3-3, ITEM 5b LISTS THE TRIP LOGIC AS 2/4 IN ANY GENERATOR. SER PAGE 7-11 LISTS THE LOGIC AS 2/3 IN ANY GENERATOR. THE SER SHOULD BE REVISED.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 270

Comment Type: SER/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3.04.06.02

Page Number: 3/4 4-23

Section Number: 3.4.6.2.f

Comment:

SER SECTION 3.9.6 (p 3-47) STATES THAT THE LEAKAGE OF RCS PRESSURE ISOLATION VALVE SHALL BE LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 1 gpm. AS DISCUSSED AND AGREED TO WITH THE NRC STAFF, THE CURRENT STAFF POSITION IS TO ALLOW LEAKAGE TO BE LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO .5 gpm/inch OF NOMINAL VALUE SIZE, NOT TO EXCEED 5 gpm. THE SER SHOULD BE REVISED.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 272

Comment Type: SER/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3/4 .03.02

Page Number: 3/4 3-32

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-4

Comment:

SER PAGE 8-9 PROVIDES THE 6.9 KV EMERGENCY BUS UNDERVOLTAGE PRIMARY SETPOINT AS 72% (4968 VOLTS) TS TABLE 3.3-4 ITEM 9 LISTS THE SETPOINT AS 5040 VOLTS. THE SER PROVIDES A .5 SECOND DELAY WHILE THE TS PROVIDE A 1 SECOND DELAY TIME. THE SER SHOULD BE REVISED.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 273

Comment Type: SER/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3/4.03.02

Page Number: 3/4 3-32

Section Number: TABLE 3.3-4

Comment:

SER PAGE 8-9 STATES THAT THE 6.9 KV EMERGENCY BUS UNDERVOLTAGE - SECONDARY SETPOINT WILL BE SET AT 89% (6141 VOLTS). TS TABLE 3.3-4, ITEM 9 LISTS THE SETPOINT AS 6420 VOLTS. THE SER SHOULD BE REVISED

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 277

Comment Type: SER/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3.08.01.01

Page Number: 3/4 8-4

Section Number: 4.8.1.1.2.b&c

Comment:

THE SER ON PAGE 9-65 STATES THAT FUEL OIL QUALITY AND TESTS WILL CONFORM WITH REG. GUIDE 1.137. THE TS AS WRITTEN TAKE EXCEPTIONS TO REG. GUIDE 1.137. THE SER SHOULD BE REVISED.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 281

Comment Type: SER/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3.07.01.03

Page Number: 3/4 7-6

Section Number: 3.7.1.3

Comment:

SER SECTIONS 9.2.6 (p 9-19) AND 10.4.9 (p. 10-18 and 10-20) STATE THAT A MINIMUM WATER VOLUME OF 240,000 GALLONS IS MAINTAINED IN THE CST 240,000 GALLONS IS THE REQUIRED AMOUNT BUT 270,000 GALLONS MINIMUM MUST BE MAINTAINED IN THE CST TO HAVE 240,000 GALLONS AVAILABLE. THE SER SHOULD BE REVISED.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 283

Comment Type: SER/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3.07.06

Page Number: 3/4 7-15

Section Number: 4.7.6.d.3

Comment:

SER SECTION 6.4 STATES THAT THE TS WILL LIMIT PRESSURIZATION FLOW TO 142 CFM. THE SER SHOULD BE REVISED.

Basis

Record Number: 285

Comment Type: SER/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3.01.02.02

Page Number: 3/4 1-8

Section Number: 3.1.2.2

Comment:

SER SECTOPM 7.3.3.10 STATES THAT THE STAFF REQUESTED CP&L TO REVISE THE PROPOSED TS TO INCLUDE TESTING OF THE SPARE CHARGING PUMP BREAKER. THE TS DO NOT INCLUDE A SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT FOR A SPARE CHARGING PUMP BREAKER. HOWEVER, BY THE DEFINITION OF OPERABLE, THE BREAKER USED FOR THE SPARE PUMP WILL BE TESTED PRIOR TO PLACING THE PUMP INSERVICE AND DECLARING THE SYSTEM OPERABLE. THE SER SHOULD BE REVISED.

Basis

CP&L Comments

SHNPP Proof and Review Technical Specifications

Record Number: 286

Comment Type: SER/TS DISCREPANCY

LCO Number: 3.02.03

Page Number: 3/4 2-10

Section Number: 4.2.3.3

Comment:

SER SECTION 4.4.3.1(PAGE 4-31) STATES THAT THE TS SHOULD REQUIRE THAT THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM FLOW BE MEASURED EVERY 24 HOURS. THE TS REQUIRE THE FLOW TO BE MEASURED EVERY 12 HOURS. THE SER SHOULD BE REVISED.

Basis

Attachment 4

Marked-Up TS Pages

(3447GAS/ljs)

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1.0 DEFINITIONS

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2.0 SAFETY LIMITS AND LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS

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3.0/4.0 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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5.0 DESIGN FEATURES

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6.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

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SECTION 1.0

DEFINITIONS

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1.0 DEFINITIONS

The defined terms of this section appear in capitalized type and are applicable throughout these Technical Specifications.

ACTION

1.1 ACTION shall be that part of a Technical Specification which prescribes remedial measures required under designated conditions.

ACTUATION LOGIC TEST

1.2 An ACTUATION LOGIC TEST shall be the application of various simulated input combinations in conjunction with each possible interlock logic state and verification of the required logic output. The ACTUATION LOGIC TEST shall include a continuity check, as a minimum, of output devices.

ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST

1.3 An ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall be the injection of a simulated signal into the channel as close to the sensor as practicable to verify OPERABILITY of alarm, interlock and/or trip functions. The ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall include adjustments, as necessary, of the alarm, interlock and/or Trip Setpoints such that the Setpoints are within the required range and accuracy.

AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE

1.4 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE shall be the difference in normalized flux signals between the top and bottom halves of a two section excore neutron detector.

CHANNEL CALIBRATION

1.5 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be the adjustment, as necessary, of the channel such that it responds within the required range and accuracy to known values of input. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall encompass the entire channel including the sensors and alarm, interlock and/or trip functions and may be performed by any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel steps such that the entire channel is calibrated.

CHANNEL CHECK

1.6 A CHANNEL CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment of channel behavior during operation by observation. This determination shall include, where possible, comparison of the channel indication and/or status with other indications and/or status derived from independent instrument channels measuring the same parameter.

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

1.7 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall exist when:

a. All penetrations required to be closed during accident conditions are either:

1. Capable of being closed by an OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valve system, or

2. Closed by manual valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except as provided in Table [3.6-1] of Specification [3.6.3].

b. All equipment hatches are closed and sealed,

c. Each air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification [3.6.1.3],

d. The containment leakage rates are within the limits of Specification [3.6.1.2], and

e. The sealing mechanism associated with each penetration (e.g., welds, bellows, or O-rings) is OPERABLE.

CONTROLLED LEAKAGE

1.8 CONTROLLED LEAKAGE shall be that seal water flow supplied to the reactor coolant pump seals.

CORE ALTERATION

1.9 CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement or manipulation of any component within the reactor pressure vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel. Suspension of CORE ALTERATION shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe conservative position.

DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST

1.10 A DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall consist of exercising the digital computer hardware using data base manipulation to verify OPERABILITY of alarm and/or trip functions.

DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131

1.11 DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 shall be that concentration of I-131 (microCurie/gram) which alone would produce the same thyroid dose as the quantity and isotopic mixture of I-131, I-132, I-133, I-134, and I-135 actually present. The thyroid dose conversion factors used for this calculation shall be those listed in [Table III of TID-14844, "Calculation of Distance Factors for Power and Test Reactor Sites."

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Ē - AVERAGE DISINTEGRATION ENERGY

1.12 Ē shall be the average, weighted in proportion to the concentration of each radionuclide in the reactor coolant at the time of sampling, of the sum of the average beta and gamma energies per disintegration (MeV/d) for isotopes, with half-lives greater than 15 minutes, making up at least 95% of the total non-iodine activity in the coolant.

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME

1.13 The ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (ESF) RESPONSE TIME shall be that time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its ESF Actuation Setpoint at the channel sensor until the ESF equipment is capable of performing its safety function (i.e., the valves travel to their required positions, pump discharge pressures reach their required values, etc.). Times shall include diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays where applicable.

EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY

1.14 The EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY shall be that line beyond which the land is not controlled by the licensee to limit access.

FREQUENCY NOTATION

1.15 The FREQUENCY NOTATION specified for the performance of Surveillance Requirements shall correspond to the intervals defined in Table 1.1.

GASEOUS RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM

1.16 A GASEOUS RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM is any system designed and installed to reduce radioactive gaseous effluents by collecting primary coolant system off-gases from the primary system and providing for delay or holdup for the purpose of reducing the total radioactivity prior to release to the environment.

IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE

1.17 IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE shall be:

a. Leakage (except CONTROLLED LEAKAGE) into closed systems, such as pump seal or valve packing leaks that are captured and conducted to a sump or collecting tank, or

b. Leakage into the containment atmosphere from sources that are both specifically located and known either not to interfere with the operation of Leakage Detection Systems or not to be PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, or

c. Reactor Coolant System leakage through a steam generator to the Secondary Coolant System.

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MASTER RELAY TEST

1.18 A MASTER RELAY TEST shall be the energization of each master relay and verification of OPERABILITY of each relay. The MASTER RELAY TEST shall include a continuity check of each associated slave relay.

MEMBER(S) OF THE PUBLIC

1.19 MEMBER(S) OF THE PUBLIC shall include all persons who are not occupationally associated with the plant. This category does not include employees of the licensee, its contractors, or vendors. Also excluded from this category are persons who enter the site to service equipment or to make deliveries. This category does include persons who use portions of the site for recreational, occupational, or other purposes not associated with the plant.

OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL

1.20 The OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL (ODCM) shall contain the methodology and parameters used in the calculation of offsite doses due to radioactive gaseous and liquid effluents, in the calculation of gaseous and liquid effluent monitoring Alarm/Trip Setpoints, and in the conduct of the Environmental Radiological Monitoring Program.

OPERABLE - OPERABILITY

1.21 A system, subsystem, train, component or device shall be OPERABLE or have OPERABILITY when it is capable of performing its specified function(s), and when all necessary attendant instrumentation, controls, electrical power, cooling or seal water, lubrication or other auxiliary equipment that are required for the system, subsystem, train, component, or device to perform its function(s) are also capable of performing their related support function(s).

OPERATIONAL MODE - MODE

1.22 An OPERATIONAL MODE (i.e., MODE) shall correspond to any one inclusive combination of core reactivity condition, power level, and average reactor coolant temperature specified in Table 1.2.

PHYSICS TESTS

1.23 PHYSICS TESTS shall be those tests performed to measure the fundamental nuclear characteristics of the reactor core and related instrumentation: (1) described in Chapter [14.0] of the FSAR, (2) authorized under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59, or (3) otherwise approved by the Commission.

PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE

1.24 PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE shall be leakage (except steam generator tube leakage) through a nonisolable fault in a Reactor Coolant System component body, pipe wall, or vessel wall.

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PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM

1.25 The PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM (PCP) shall contain the current formulas, sampling, analyses, tests, and determinations to be made to ensure that processing and packaging of solid radioactive wastes based on demonstrated processing of actual or simulated wet solid wastes will be accomplished in such a way as to assure compliance with 10 CFR Parts 20, 61, and 71 and Federal and State regulations, burial ground requirements, and other requirements governing the disposal of radioactive waste.

PURGE - PURGING

1.26 PURGE or PURGING shall be any controlled process of discharging air or gas from a confinement to maintain temperature, pressure, humidity, concentration or other operating condition, in such a manner that replacement air or gas is required to purify the confinement.

QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO

1.27 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO shall be the ratio of the maximum upper excore detector calibrated output to the average of the upper excore detector calibrated outputs, or the ratio of the maximum lower excore detector calibrated output to the average of the lower excore detector calibrated outputs, whichever is greater. With one excore detector inoperable, the remaining three detectors shall be used for computing the average.

RATED THERMAL POWER

1.28 RATED THERMAL POWER shall be a total reactor core heat transfer rate to the reactor coolant of 2775 MWt.

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME

1.29 The REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME shall be the time interval from when the monitored parameter exceeds its Trip Setpoint at the channel sensor until loss of stationary gripper coil voltage.

REPORTABLE EVENT

1.30 A REPORTABLE EVENT shall be any of those conditions specified in Section 50.73 of 10 CFR Part 50.

SHUTDOWN MARGIN

1.31 SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be the instantaneous amount of reactivity by which the reactor is subcritical or would be subcritical from its present condition assuming all rod cluster assemblies (shutdown and control) are fully inserted except for the single rod cluster assembly of highest reactivity worth which is assumed to be fully withdrawn.

SITE BOUNDARY

1.32 For these Specifications, the SITE BOUNDARY shall be identical to the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY defined above.

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SLAVE RELAY TEST

1.33 A SLAVE RELAY TEST shall be the energization of each slave relay and verification of OPERABILITY of each relay. The SLAVE RELAY TEST shall include a continuity check, as a minimum, of associated testable actuation devices.

SOLIDIFICATION

1.34 SOLIDIFICATION shall be the conversion of wet wastes into a form that meets shipping and burial ground requirements.

SOURCE CHECK

1.35 A SOURCE CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment of channel response when the channel sensor is exposed to a source of increased radioactivity.

STAGGERED TEST BASIS

1.36 A STAGGERED TEST BASIS shall consist of:

a. A test schedule for n systems, subsystems, trains, or other designated components obtained by dividing the specified test interval into n equal subintervals, and

b. The testing of one system, subsystem, train, or other designated component at the beginning of each subinterval.

THERMAL POWER

1.37 THERMAL POWER shall be the total reactor core heat transfer rate to the reactor coolant.

TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST

1.38 A TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST shall consist of operating the Trip Actuating Device and verifying OPERABILITY of alarm, interlock and/or trip functions. The TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST shall include adjustment, as necessary, of the Trip Actuating Device such that it actuates at the required Setpoint within the required accuracy.

UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE

1.39 UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE shall be all leakage which is not IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE or CONTROLLED LEAKAGE.

UNRESTRICTED AREA

1.40 An UNRESTRICTED AREA shall be any area at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY access to which is not controlled by the licensee for purposes of protection of individuals from exposure to radiation and radioactive materials, or any area within the SITE BOUNDARY used for residential quarters or for industrial, commercial, institutional, and/or recreational purposes.

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VENTILATION EXHAUST TREATMENT SYSTEM

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1.41 A VENTILATION EXHAUST TREATMENT SYSTEM shall be any system designed and installed to reduce gaseous radioiodine or radioactive material in particulate form in effluents by passing ventilation or vent exhaust gases through charcoal adsorbers and/or HEPA filters for the purpose of removing iodines or particulates from the gaseous exhaust stream prior to the release to the environment. Such a system is not considered to have any effect on noble gas effluents. Engineered Safety Features Atmospheric Cleanup Systems are not considered to be VENTILATION EXHAUST TREATMENT SYSTEM components.

VENTING

1.42 VENTING shall be the controlled process of discharging air or gas from a confinement to maintain temperature, pressure, humidity, concentration, or other operating condition, in such a manner that replacement air or gas is not provided or required during VENTING. Vent, used in system names, does not imply a VENTING process.

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TABLE 1.1

FREQUENCY NOTATION

NOTATION	FREQUENCY
S	At least once per 12 hours.
D	At least once per 24 hours.
W	At least once per 7 days.
M	At least once per 31 days.
Q	At least once per 92 days.
SA	At least once per 184 days.
R	At least once per 18 months.
S/U	Prior to each reactor startup.
N.A.	Not applicable.
P	Completed prior to each release.

TABLE 1.2

OPERATIONAL MODES

MODE	REACTIVITY CONDITION, K_{eff}	% RATED THERMAL POWER*	AVERAGE COOLANT TEMPERATURE
1. POWER OPERATION	$\geq$ 0.99	> 5%	$\geq$ 350°F
2. STARTUP	$\geq$ 0.99	$\leq$ 5%	$\geq$ 350°F
3. HOT STANDBY	< 0.99	0	$\geq$ 350°F
4. HOT SHUTDOWN	< 0.99	0	350°F > T_{avg} > 200°F
5. COLD SHUTDOWN	< 0.99	0	$\leq$ 200°F
6. REFUELING**	$\leq$ 0.95	0	$\leq$ 140°F

*Excluding decay heat.

**Fuel in the reactor vessel with the vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned or with the head removed.

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SECTION 2.0

SAFETY LIMITS

AND

LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS

2.0 SAFETY LIMITS AND LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS

2.1 SAFETY LIMITS

REACTOR CORE

2.1.1 The combination of THERMAL POWER, pressurizer pressure, and the highest operating loop coolant temperature (T_{avg}) shall not exceed the limits shown in Figure 2.1-1 for 3-loop operation.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTION:

a. Whenever the point defined by the combination of the highest operating loop average temperature and THERMAL POWER has exceeded the appropriate pressurizer pressure line, be in HOT STANDBY within 1 hour, and comply with the requirements of Specification 6.7.1.

b. Operation with less than 3 loops is governed by Specification 3.4.1.1.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE

2.1.2 The Reactor Coolant System pressure shall not exceed 2735 psig except during hydrostatic testing.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.

ACTION:

MODES 1 and 2:

Whenever the Reactor Coolant System pressure has exceeded 2735 psig, be in HOT STANDBY with the Reactor Coolant System pressure within its limit within 1 hour, and comply with the requirements of Specification 6.7.1.

MODES 3, 4, and 5:

Whenever the Reactor Coolant System pressure has exceeded 2735 psig, reduce the Reactor Coolant System pressure to within its limit within 5 minutes, and comply with the requirements of Specification 6.7.1.

2.2 LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS

2.2.1 The Reactor Trip System Instrumentation and Interlock Setpoints shall be set consistent with the Trip Setpoint values shown in Table 2.2-1.

APPLICABILITY: As shown for each channel in Table 3.3-1.

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

Replace from 2-2a

FIGURE 2.1-1

REACTOR CORE SAFETY LIMITS - THREE LOOPS IN OPERATION



Figure 2.1-1 Reactor Core Safety Limits Three Loops in Operation

APPLICABILITY (Continued)

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ACTION:

a. With a Reactor Trip System Instrumentation or Interlock Setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Trip Setpoint column but more conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Value column of Table 2.2-1, adjust the Setpoint consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.

b. With the Reactor Trip System Instrumentation or Interlock Setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 2.2-1, either:

1. Adjust the Setpoint consistent with the Trip Setpoint value of Table 2.2-1 and determine within 12 hours that Equation 2.2-1 was satisfied for the affected channel, or

2. Declare the channel inoperable and apply the applicable ACTION statement requirement of Specification 3.3.1 until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with its Setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.

Equation 2.2-1 $Z + R + S \leq TA$

Where:

Z = The value from Column Z of Table 2.2-1 for the affected channel,

R = The "as measured" value (in percent span) of rack error for the affected channel,

S = Either the "as measured" value (in percent span) of the sensor error, or the value from Column S (Sensor Error) of Table 2.2-1 for the affected channel, and

TA = The value from Column TA (Total Allowance) of Table 2.2-1 for the affected channel.

c. With a Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Channel or Interlock inoperable, take the appropriate ACTION shown in Table 3.3-1.

TABLE 2.2-1

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL ALLOWANCE (TA)	Z	SENSOR ERROR (S)	TRIP SETPOINT	ALLOWABLE VALUE
1. Manual Reactor Trip	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
2. Power Range, Neutron Flux					
a. High Setpoint	[7.5]	[4.56]	0	≤[109]% of RTP**	≤[111.1]% of RTP**
b. Low Setpoint	[8.3]	[4.56]	0	≤[25]% of RTP**	≤[27.1]% of RTP**
3. Power Range, Neutron Flux, High Positive Rate	[1.6]	[0.5]	0	≤[5]% of RTP** with a time constant ≥[2] seconds	≤[6.3]% of RTP** with a time constant ≥[2] seconds
4. Power Range, Neutron Flux, High Negative Rate	[1.6]	[0.5]	0	≤[5]% of RTP** with a time constant ≥[2] seconds	≤[6.3]% of RTP** with a time constant ≥[2] seconds
5. Intermediate Range, Neutron Flux	[17.0]	[8.41]	0	≤[25]% of RTP**	≤[30.9]% of RTP**
6. Source Range, Neutron Flux	[17.0]	[10.01]	0	≤[10^5] cps	≤[1.4×10^5] cps
7. Overtemperature ΔT	[8.9]	[6.44]	NOTE 5 ~~[2.8]~~	See Note 1	See Note 2
8. Overpower ΔT	[4.9]	[1.43]	[0.2]	See Note 3	See Note 4
9. Pressurizer Pressure-Low	[5.0]	[2.21]	[1.5]	≥[1960] psig	≥[1946] psig
10. Pressurizer Pressure-High	[7.5]	[5.01]	[0.5]	≤[2385] psig	≤[2399] psig
11. Pressurizer Water Level-High	[8.0]	[2.18]	[1.5]	≤[92]% of instrument span	≤[93.8]% of instrument span

*Loop design flow = [97,600] gpm
**RTP = RATED THERMAL POWER

TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued)

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL ALLOWANCE (TA)	Z	SENSOR ERROR (S)	TRIP SETPOINT	ALLOWABLE VALUE
12. Reactor Coolant Flow-Low	[3.9]	[2.85]	[0.6]	>[91.7]% of loop design flow*	>[90.5]% of loop design flow*
13. Steam Generator Water Level Low-Low	[19.2]	[18.18]	[1.5]	>[38.5]% of narrow range instrument span	>[38.0]% of narrow range instrument span
14. Steam Generator Water Level-Low Coincident With	[19.2]	[6.68]	[1.5]	>[38.5]% of narrow range instrument span	>[36.8]% of narrow range instrument span
Steam/Feedwater Flow Mismatch	[20.0]	[3.41]	NOTE 6 ~~[3.15]~~	<[40]% of full steam flow at RTP**	<[43.1]% of full steam flow at RTP**
15. Undervoltage - Reactor Coolant Pumps	[14.0]	[1.3]	0.0	>[5148] volts	>[4920] volts
16. Underfrequency - Reactor Coolant Pumps	[5.0]	3.0	[0.0]	>[57.5] Hz	>[57.3] Hz
17. Turbine Trip					
a. Low Fluid Oil Pressure	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	>[1000] psig	>[950] psig
b. Turbine Throttle Valve Closure	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	>[1]% open	>[1]% open
18. Safety Injection Input from ESF	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.

**RTP = RATED THERMAL POWER

TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued)

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL ALLOWANCE (TA)	Z	SENSOR ERROR (S)	TRIP SETPOINT	ALLOWABLE VALUE
19. Reactor Trip System Interlocks					
a. Intermediate Range Neutron Flux, P-6	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	≥[1 x 10^{-10}] amp	≥[6 x 10^{-11}] amp
b. Low Power Reactor Trips Block, P-7					
1) P-10 input	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	≤[10]% of RTP**	≤[12.1]% of RTP**
2) P-13 input	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	<[10]% RTP** Turbine Impulse Pressure Equivalent	<[12.1]% RTP** Turbine Impulse Pressure Equivalent
c. Power Range Neutron Flux, P-8	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	≤[49]% of RTP**	≤[51.1]% of RTP**
d. Power Range Neutron Flux, P-10	N.A.	N.A.	N.A	≥[10]% of RTP**	≥[7.9]% of RTP**
e. Turbine Impulse Chamber Pressure, P-13	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	<[10]% RTP** Turbine Impulse Pressure Equivalent	<[12.1]% RTP** Turbine Impulse Pressure Equivalent
20. Reactor Trip Breakers	N.A.	N.A.	N.A	N.A.	N.A.
21. Automatic Trip and Interlock Logic	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
22. Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.

**RTP = RATED THERMAL POWER

TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

NOTE 1: OVERTEMPERATURE ΔT

$$\Delta T \frac{(1 + \tau_1 S)}{(1 + \tau_2 S)} \left(\frac{1}{1 + \tau_3 S}\right) \leq \Delta T_0 \left\{K_1 - K_2 \frac{(1 + \tau_4 S)}{(1 + \tau_5 S)} \left[T \left(\frac{1}{1 + \tau_6 S}\right) - T'\right] + K_3(P - P') - f_1(\Delta I)\right\}$$

Where:	ΔT	=	Measured ΔT by RTD Manifold Instrumentation;
	$\frac{1 + \tau_1 S}{1 + \tau_2 S}$	=	Lead-lag compensator on measured ΔT;
	τ_1, τ_2	=	Time constants utilized in lead-lag compensator for ΔT, τ_1 = [8] s, τ_2 = [3] s;
	$\frac{1}{1 + \tau_3 S}$	=	Lag compensator on measured ΔT;
	τ_3	=	Time constants utilized in the lag compensator for ΔT, τ_3 = [0] s;
	ΔT_0	=	Indicated ΔT at RATED THERMAL POWER;
	K_1	=	~~[1.10];~~ [LATER]
	K_2	=	[0.0182]/°F;
	$\frac{1 + \tau_4 S}{1 + \tau_5 S}$	=	The function generated by the lead-lag compensator for T_{avg} dynamic compensation;
	τ_4, τ_5	=	Time constants utilized in the lead-lag compensator for T_{avg}, τ_4 = [~~33~~ 28] s, τ_5 = [4] s;
	T	=	Average temperature, °F;
	$\frac{1}{1 + \tau_6 S}$	=	Lag compensator on measured T_{avg};
	τ_6	=	Time constant utilized in the measured T_{avg} lag compensator, τ_6 = [0] s;

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TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

NOTE 1: (Continued)

T'	$\leq$	[588.8]°F (Nominal T_{avg} at RATED THERMAL POWER);
K_3	=	0.000828/psig;
P	=	Pressurizer pressure, psig;
P'	=	2235 psig (Nominal RCS operating pressure);
S	=	Laplace transform operator, s^{-1};

and $f_1(\Delta I)$ is a function of the indicated difference between top and bottom detectors of the power-range neutron ion chambers; with gains to be selected based on measured instrument response during plant startup tests such that:

(1) For $q_t - q_b$ between -[34]% and + [9.0]%, $f_1(\Delta I) = 0$, where q_t and q_b are percent RATED THERMAL POWER in the top and bottom halves of the core respectively, and $q_t + q_b$ is total THERMAL POWER in percent of RATED THERMAL POWER;

(2) For each percent that the magnitude of $q_t - q_b$ exceeds -[34]%, the ΔT Trip Setpoint shall be automatically reduced by [2.02]% of its value at RATED THERMAL POWER; and

(3) For each percent that the magnitude of $q_t - q_b$ exceeds +[9]%, the ΔT Trip Setpoint shall be automatically reduced by [1.83]% of its value at RATED THERMAL POWER.

NOTE 2: The channel's maximum Trip Setpoint shall not exceed its computed Trip Setpoint by more than ~~[1.6]%~~. 1.9 % ΔT SPAN.

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TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

NOTE 3: OVERPOWER ΔT

$$\Delta T \frac{(1 + \tau_1 S)}{(1 + \tau_2 S)} \left(\frac{1}{1 + \tau_3 S}\right) \leq \Delta T_o \left\{K_4 - K_5 \left(\frac{\tau_7 S}{1 + \tau_7 S}\right) \left(\frac{1}{1 + \tau_6 S}\right) T - K_6 \left[T \left(\frac{1}{1 + \tau_6 S}\right) - T''\right] - f_2(\Delta I)\right\}$$

Where:

ΔT	=	As defined in Note 1,
$\frac{1 + \tau_1 S}{1 + \tau_2 S}$	=	As defined in Note 1,
τ_1, τ_2	=	As defined in Note 1,
$\frac{1}{1 + \tau_3 S}$	=	As defined in Note 1,
τ_3	=	As defined in Note 1,
ΔT_o	=	As defined in Note 1,
K_4	=	[1.086],
K_5	=	[0.02]/°F for increasing average temperature and 0 for decreasing average temperature,
$\frac{\tau_7 S}{1 + \tau_7 S}$	=	The function generated by the rate-lag compensator for T_{avg} dynamic compensation,
τ_7	=	Time constants utilized in the rate-lag compensator for T_{avg}, τ_7 = [10] s,
$\frac{1}{1 + \tau_6 S}$	=	As defined in Note 1,
τ_6	=	As defined in Note 1,

TABLE 2.2-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

NOTE 3: (Continued)

K_6 = [0.00159]/°F for T > T" and K_6 = 0 for T ≤ T",

T = As defined in Note 1,

T" = Indicated T_{avg} at RATED THERMAL POWER (Calibration temperature for ΔT instrumentation, ≤ [588.8]°F),

S = As defined in Note 1, and

$f_2(\Delta I)$ = 0 for all ΔI.

NOTE 4: The channel's maximum Trip Setpoint shall not exceed its computed Trip Setpoint by more than [3.4]% x ΔT SPAN.

NOTE 5: THE SENSOR ERROR FOR TEMPERATURE IS 2.1 AND 0.7 FOR PRESSURE.

NOTE 6: THE SENSOR ERROR FOR STEAM FLOW IS 0.9, FOR FEED FLOW IS 1.5, AND FOR STEAM PRESSURE IS 0.75.

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BASES

FOR

SECTION 2.0

SAFETY LIMITS

AND

LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS

NOTE

The BASES contained in succeeding pages summarize the reasons for the Specifications in Section 2.0, but in accordance with 10 CFR 50.36 are not part of these Technical Specifications.

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2.1.1 REACTOR CORE

The restrictions of this Safety Limit prevent overheating of the fuel and possible cladding perforation which would result in the release of fission products to the reactor coolant. Overheating of the fuel cladding is prevented by restricting fuel operation to within the nucleate boiling regime where the heat transfer coefficient is large and the cladding surface temperature is slightly above the coolant saturation temperature.

Operation above the upper boundary of the nucleate boiling regime could result in excessive cladding temperatures because of the onset of departure from nucleate boiling (DNB) and the resultant sharp reduction in heat transfer coefficient. DNB is not a directly measurable parameter during operation and therefore THERMAL POWER and reactor coolant temperature and pressure have been related to DNB through the W-3 correlation. The W-3 DNB correlation has been developed to predict the DNB flux and the location of DNB for axially uniform and nonuniform heat flux distributions. The local DNB heat flux ratio (DNBR) is defined as the ratio of the heat flux that would cause DNB at a particular core location to the local heat flux and is indicative of the margin to DNB.
ACTUAL CALCULATED

The minimum value of the DNBR during steady-state operation, normal operational transients, and anticipated transients is limited to 1.30. This value corresponds to a 95% probability at a 95% confidence level that DNB will not occur and is chosen as an appropriate margin to DNB for all operating conditions.

The curves of Figure [2.1-1] show the loci of points of THERMAL POWER, Reactor Coolant System pressure and average temperature for which the minimum DNBR is no less than 1.30, or the average enthalpy at the vessel exit is equal to the enthalpy of saturated liquid.

CALCULATED

These curves are based on an enthalpy hot channel factor, $F^N_{\Delta H}$, of 1.55 and a reference cosine with a peak of 1.55 for axial power shape. An allowance is included for an increase in calculated $F^N_{\Delta H}$ at reduced power based on the expression:

$$F^N_{\Delta H} = 1.55\ [1+ 0.2\ (1-P)]$$

Where P is the fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER.

These limiting heat flux conditions are higher than those calculated for the range of all control rods fully withdrawn to the maximum allowable control rod insertion assuming the axial power imbalance is within the limits of the f_1 (ΔI) function of the Overtemperature trip. When the axial power imbalance is not within the tolerance, the axial power imbalance effect on the Overtemperature ΔT trips will reduce the Setpoints to provide protection consistent with core Safety Limits.

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2.1.2 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE

The restriction of this Safety Limit protects the integrity of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) from overpressurization and thereby prevents the release of radionuclides contained in the reactor coolant from reaching the containment atmosphere.

The reactor pressure vessel, pressurizer, and the RCS piping, pumps, valves and fittings are designed to Section III, Division I of the ASME Code for Nuclear Power Plants, which permits a maximum transient pressure of 110% to 125% of design pressure (2485 psig) depending on component. The Safety Limit of 2735 psig (110% of design pressure) is therefore consistent with the design criteria and associated Code requirements.

The entire RCS is hydrotested at 125% (3107 psig) of design pressure, to demonstrate integrity prior to initial operation.

2.2 LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS

2.2.1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS

The Reactor Trip Setpoint Limits specified in Table 2.2-1 are the nominal values at which the Reactor trips are set for each functional unit. The Trip Setpoints have been selected to ensure that the core and Reactor Coolant System are prevented from exceeding their safety limits during normal operation and design basis anticipated operational occurrences and to assist the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System in mitigating the consequences of accidents. The Setpoint for a Reactor Trip System or interlock function is considered to be adjusted consistent with the nominal value when the "as measured" Setpoint is within the band allowed for calibration accuracy. For example, if a bistable has a trip setpoint of ≤ 100%, a span of 125%, and a calibration accuracy of 0.5% of span, then the bistable is considered to be adjusted to the trip setpoint as long as the "as measured" value for the bistable is ≤ 100.62%.

RACK PLUS RACK PLUS RACK PLUS

To accommodate the instrument drift assumed to occur between operational tests and the accuracy to which Setpoints can be measured and calibrated, Allowable Values for the Reactor Trip Setpoints have been specified in Table 2.2-1. Operation with Setpoints less conservative than the Trip Setpoint but within the Allowable Value is acceptable since an allowance has been made in the safety analysis to accommodate this error. An optional provision has been included for determining the OPERABILITY of a channel when its Trip Setpoint is found to exceed the Allowable Value. The methodology of this option utilizes the "as measured" deviation from the specified calibration point for rack and sensor components in conjunction with a statistical combination of the other uncertainties of the instrumentation to measure the process variable and the uncertainties in calibrating the instrumentation. In Equation 2.2-1, $Z + R + S \leq TA$, the interactive effects of the errors in the rack and the sensor, and the "as measured" values of the errors are considered. Z, as specified in Table 2.2-1, in percent span, is the statistical summation of

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS (Continued)

errors assumed in the analysis excluding those associated with the sensor and rack drift and the accuracy of their measurement. TA or Total Allowance is the difference, in percent span, between the Trip Setpoint and the value used in the analysis for Reactor trip. R or Rack Error is the "as measured" deviation, in percent span, for the affected channel from the specified Trip Setpoint. S or Sensor Error is either the "as measured" deviation of the sensor from its calibration point or the value specified in Table 2.2-1, in percent span, from the analysis assumptions. Use of Equation 2.2-1 allows for a sensor drift factor and an increased rack drift factor, and provides a threshold value for determination of OPERABILITY.

The methodology to derive the Trip Setpoints is based upon combining all of the uncertainties in the channels. Inherent to the determination of the Trip Setpoints are the magnitudes of these channel uncertainties. Sensors and other instrumentation utilized in these channels are expected to be capable of operating within the allowances of these uncertainty magnitudes. Rack drift in excess of the Allowable Value exhibits the behavior that the rack has not met its allowance. Being that there is a small statistical chance that this will happen, an infrequent excessive drift is expected. Rack or sensor drift, in excess of the allowance that is more than occasional, may be indicative of more serious problems and should warrant further investigation.

The various Reactor trip circuits automatically open the Reactor trip breakers whenever a condition monitored by the Reactor Trip System reaches a preset or calculated level. In addition to redundant channels and trains, the design approach provides a Reactor Trip System which monitors numerous system variables, therefore providing Trip System functional diversity. The functional capability at the specified trip setting is required for those anticipatory or diverse Reactor trips for which no direct credit was assumed in the safety analysis to enhance the overall reliability of the Reactor Trip System. The Reactor Trip System initiates a Turbine trip signal whenever Reactor trip is initiated. This prevents the reactivity insertion that would otherwise result from excessive Reactor Coolant System cooldown and thus avoids unnecessary actuation of the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System.

Manual Reactor Trip

The Reactor Trip System includes manual Reactor trip capability.

Power Range, Neutron Flux

In each of the Power Range Neutron Flux channels there are two independent bistables, each with its own trip setting used for a High and Low Range trip setting. The Low Setpoint trip provides protection during subcritical and low power operations to mitigate the consequences of a power excursion beginning from low power, and the High Setpoint trip provides protection during power operations to mitigate the consequences of a reactivity excursion from all power levels.

Power Range, Neutron Flux (Continued)

The Low Setpoint trip may be manually blocked above P-10 (a power level of approximately 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER) and is automatically reinstated below the P-10 Setpoint.

Power Range, Neutron Flux, High Rates

The Power Range Positive Rate trip provides protection against rapid flux increases which are characteristic of a rupture of a control rod drive housing. Specifically, this trip complements the Power Range Neutron Flux High and Low trips to ensure that the criteria are met for rod ejection from mid-power.

The Power Range Negative Rate trip provides protection for control rod drop accidents. At high power a single or multiple rod drop accident could cause local flux peaking which could cause an unconservative local DNBR to exist. The Power Range Negative Rate trip will prevent this from occurring by tripping the reactor. No credit is taken for operation of the Power Range Negative Rate trip for those control rod drop accidents for which DNBRs will be greater than 1.30.

Intermediate and Source Range, Neutron Flux

The Intermediate and Source Range, Neutron Flux trips provide core protection during reactor startup to mitigate the consequences of an uncontrolled rod cluster control assembly bank withdrawal from a subcritical condition. These trips provide redundant protection to the Low Setpoint trip of the Power Range, Neutron Flux channels. The Source Range channels will initiate a Reactor trip at about 10^5 counts per second unless manually blocked when P-6 becomes active. The Intermediate Range channels will initiate a Reactor trip at a current level equivalent to approximately 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER unless manually blocked when P-10 becomes active.

Overtemperature ΔT

The Overtemperature ΔT trip provides core protection to prevent DNB for all combinations of pressure, power, coolant temperature, and axial power distribution, provided that the transient is slow with respect to piping transit delays from the core to the temperature detectors (about 4 seconds), and pressure is within the range between the Pressurizer High and Low Pressure trips. The Setpoint is automatically varied with: (1) coolant temperature to correct for temperature induced changes in density and heat capacity of water and includes dynamic compensation for piping delays from the core to the loop temperature detectors, (2) pressurizer pressure, and (3) axial power distribution. With normal axial power distribution, this Reactor trip limit is always below the core Safety Limit as shown in Figure 2.1-1. If axial peaks are greater than design, as indicated by the difference between top and bottom power range nuclear detectors, the Reactor trip is automatically reduced according to the notations in Table 2.2-1.

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BASES

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Overpower ΔT

The Overpower ΔT trip provides assurance of fuel integrity (e.g., no fuel pellet melting and less than 1% cladding strain) under all possible overpower conditions, limits the required range for Overtemperature ΔT trip, and provides a backup to the High Neutron Flux trip. The Setpoint is automatically varied with: (1) coolant temperature to correct for temperature induced changes in density and heat capacity of water, and (2) rate of change of temperature for dynamic compensation for piping delays from the core to the loop temperature detectors, to ensure that the allowable heat generation rate (kW/ft) is not exceeded. The Overpower ΔT trip provides protection to mitigate the consequences of various size steam breaks as reported in WCAP-9226, "Reactor Core Response to Excessive Secondary Steam Releases."

Pressurizer Pressure

In each of the pressurizer pressure channels, there are two independent bistables, each with its own trip setting to provide for a High and Low Pressure trip thus limiting the pressure range in which reactor operation is permitted. The Low Setpoint trip protects against low pressure which could lead to DNB by tripping the reactor in the event of a loss of reactor coolant pressure.

On decreasing power the Low Setpoint trip is automatically blocked by P-7 (a power level of approximately 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER with turbine impulse chamber pressure at approximately 10% of full power equivalent); and on increasing power, automatically reinstated by P-7.

The High Setpoint trip functions in conjunction with the pressurizer relief and safety valves to protect the Reactor Coolant System against system overpressure.

Pressurizer Water Level

The Pressurizer High Water Level trip is provided to prevent water relief through the pressurizer safety valves. On decreasing power the Pressurizer High Water Level trip is automatically blocked by P-7 (a power level of approximately 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER with a turbine impulse chamber pressure at approximately 10% of full power equivalent); and on increasing power, automatically reinstated by P-7.

Reactor Coolant Flow

The Low Reactor Coolant Flow trips provide core protection to prevent DNB by mitigating the consequences of a loss of flow resulting from the loss of one or more reactor coolant pumps.

On increasing power above P-7 (a power level of approximately 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER or a turbine impulse chamber pressure at approximately 10% of full power equivalent), an automatic Reactor trip will occur if the flow in more than one loop drops below ~~90%~~ 91.7% of nominal full loop flow. Above P-8

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Reactor Coolant Flow (Continued)

(a power level of approximately 49% of RATED THERMAL POWER) an automatic Reactor trip will occur if the flow in any single loop drops below ~~90%~~ 91.7% of nominal full loop flow. Conversely, on decreasing power between P-8 and the P-7 an automatic Reactor trip will occur on low reactor coolant flow in more than one loop and below P-7 the trip function is automatically blocked.

Steam Generator Water Level

The Steam Generator Water Level Low-Low trip protects the reactor from loss of heat sink in the event of a sustained steam/feedwater flow mismatch resulting from loss of normal feedwater. The specified Setpoint provides allowances for starting delays of the Auxiliary Feedwater System.

Steam/Feedwater Flow Mismatch and Low Steam Generator Water Level

The Steam/Feedwater Flow Mismatch in coincidence with a Steam Generator Low Water Level trip is not used in the transient and accident analyses but is included in Table 2.2-1 to ensure the functional capability of the specified trip settings and thereby enhance the overall reliability of the Reactor Trip System. This trip is redundant to the Steam Generator Water Level Low-Low trip. The Steam/Feedwater Flow Mismatch portion of this trip is activated when the steam flow exceeds the feedwater flow by greater than or equal to [1.627×10^6] lbs/hour. The Steam Generator Low Water level portion of the trip is activated when the water level drops below [38.~~3~~5]%, as indicated by the narrow range instrument. These trip values include sufficient allowance in excess of normal operating values to preclude spurious trips but will initiate a Reactor trip before the steam generators are dry. Therefore, the required capacity and starting time requirements of the auxiliary feedwater pumps are reduced and the resulting thermal transient on the Reactor Coolant System and steam generators is minimized.

Undervoltage and Underfrequency - Reactor Coolant Pump Bus~~s~~es

The Undervoltage and Underfrequency Reactor Coolant Pump Bus trips provide core protection against DNB as a result of complete loss of forced coolant flow. The specified Setpoints assure a Reactor trip signal is generated before the Low Flow Trip Setpoint is reached. Time delays are incorporated in the Underfrequency and Undervoltage trips to prevent spurious Reactor trips from momentary electrical power transients. For undervoltage, the delay is set so that the time required for a signal to reach the Reactor trip breakers following the simultaneous trip of two or more reactor coolant pump bus circuit breakers shall not exceed [1.2] seconds. For underfrequency, the delay is set so that the time required for a signal to reach the Reactor trip breakers after the Underfrequency Trip Setpoint is reached shall not exceed [0.3] second.

On decreasing power the Undervoltage and Underfrequency Reactor Coolant Pump Bus trips are automatically blocked by P-7 (a power level of approximately 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER with a turbine impulse chamber pressure at approximately

Undervoltage and Underfrequency - Reactor Coolant Pump Busses (Continued)

10% of full power equivalent); and on increasing power, reinstated automatically by P-7.

Turbine Trip

A Turbine trip initiates a Reactor trip. On decreasing power the Reactor trip from the Turbine trip is automatically blocked by P-7 (a power level of approximately 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER); and on increasing power, reinstated automatically by P-7.

Safety Injection Input from ESF

If a Reactor trip has not already been generated by the Reactor Trip System instrumentation, the ESF automatic actuation logic channels will initiate a Reactor trip upon any signal which initiates a Safety Injection. The ESF instrumentation channels which initiate a Safety Injection signal are shown in Table 3.3-3.

Reactor Trip System Interlocks

The Reactor Trip System interlocks perform the following functions:

P-6 On increasing power P-6 allows the manual block of the Source Range trip (i.e., prevents premature block of Source Range trip), and deenergizes the high voltage to the detectors. On decreasing power, Source Range Level trips are automatically reactivated and high voltage restored.

P-7 On increasing power P-7 automatically enables Reactor trips on low flow in more than one reactor coolant loop, reactor coolant pump MOTOR ~~bus~~ undervoltage and underfrequency, Turbine trip, pressurizer low pressure and pressurizer high level. On decreasing power, the above listed trips are automatically blocked.

P-8 On increasing power, P-8 automatically enables Reactor trips on low flow in one or more reactor coolant loops. On decreasing power, the P-8 automatically blocks the above listed trips.

P-10 On increasing power, P-10 allows the manual block of the Intermediate Range trip and the Low Setpoint Power Range trip; and automatically blocks the Source Range trip and deenergizes the Source Range high voltage power. On decreasing power, the Intermediate Range trip and the Low Setpoint Power Range trip are automatically reactivated. Provides input to P-7.

P-13 Provides input to P-7.

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SECTIONS 3.0 AND 4.0

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

AND

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

3/4.0 APPLICABILITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.0.1 Compliance with the Limiting Conditions for Operation contained in the succeeding specifications is required during the OPERATIONAL MODES or other conditions specified therein; except that upon failure to meet the Limiting Conditions for Operation, the associated ACTION requirements shall be met.

3.0.2 Noncompliance with a specification shall exist when the requirements of the Limiting Condition for Operation and associated ACTION requirements are not met within the specified time intervals. If the Limiting Condition for Operation is restored prior to expiration of the specified time intervals, completion of the ACTION requirements is not required, UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED IN THE ACTION STATEMENT.

3.0.3 When a Limiting Condition for Operation is not met, except as provided in the associated ACTION requirements, within 1 hour action shall be initiated to place the unit in a MODE in which the specification does not apply by placing it, as applicable, in:

a. At least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours,
b. At least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours, and
c. At least COLD SHUTDOWN within the subsequent 24 hours.

Where corrective measures are completed that permit operation under the ACTION requirements, the action may be taken in accordance with the specified time limits as measured from the time of failure to meet the Limiting Condition for Operation. Exceptions to these requirements are stated in the individual specifications.

This specification is not applicable in MODE 5 or 6.

3.0.4 Entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE or other specified condition shall not be made unless the conditions for the Limiting Condition for Operation are met without reliance on provisions contained in the ACTION requirements. This provision shall not prevent passage through or to OPERATIONAL MODES as required to comply with ACTION requirements. Exceptions to these requirements are stated in the individual specifications.

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APPLICABILITY

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.0.1 Surveillance Requirements shall be met during the OPERATIONAL MODES or other conditions specified for individual Limiting Conditions for Operation unless otherwise stated in an individual Surveillance Requirement.

4.0.2 Each Surveillance Requirement shall be performed within the specified time interval with:

a. A maximum allowable extension not to exceed 25% of the surveillance interval, but

b. The combined time interval for any three consecutive surveillance intervals shall not exceed 3.25 times the specified surveillance interval.

4.0.3 Failure to perform a Surveillance Requirement within the specified time interval shall constitute a failure to meet the OPERABILITY requirements for a Limiting Condition for Operation. Exceptions to these requirements are stated in the individual specifications. Surveillance Requirements do not have to be performed on inoperable equipment.

4.0.4 Entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE or other specified condition shall not be made unless the Surveillance Requirement(s) associated with the Limiting Condition for Operation has been performed within the stated surveillance interval or as otherwise specified.

4.0.5 Surveillance Requirements for inservice inspection and testing of ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components shall be applicable as follows:

a. Inservice inspection of ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components and inservice testing of ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 pumps and valves shall be performed in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Section 50.55a(g), except where specific written relief has been granted by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50, Section 50.55a(g)(6)(i);

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

b. Surveillance intervals specified in Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda for the inservice inspection and testing activities required by the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda shall be applicable as follows in these Technical Specifications:

ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda terminology for inservice inspection and testing activities	Required frequencies for performing inservice inspection and testing activities
Weekly	At least once per 7 days
Monthly	At least once per 31 days
Quarterly or every 3 months	At least once per 92 days
Semiannually or every 6 months	At least once per 184 days
Every 9 months	At least once per 276 days
Yearly or annually	At least once per 366 days

c. The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are applicable to the above required frequencies for performing inservice inspection and testing activities;

d. Performance of the above inservice inspection and testing activities shall be in addition to other specified Surveillance Requirements; and

e. Nothing in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code shall be construed to supersede the requirements of any Technical Specification.

3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL

SHUTDOWN MARGIN - T_{avg} GREATER THAN 200°F

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be greater than or equal to 1770 pcm for [3] loop operation.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2*, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than 1770 pcm, immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 30 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 7000 ppm boron or equivalent until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.1.1.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be greater than or equal to 1770 pcm

a. Within 1 hour after detection of an inoperable control rod(s) and at least once per 12 hours thereafter while the rod(s) is inoperable. If the inoperable control rod is immovable or untrippable, the above required SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be verified acceptable with an increased allowance for the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable control rod(s);

b. When in MODE 1 or MODE 2 ~~with K_{eff} greater than or equal to 1~~ at least once per 12 hours by verifying that control bank withdrawal is within the limits of Specification 3.1.3.6;

c. ~~When in MODE 2 with K_{eff} less than 1,~~ Within 4 hours prior to achieving reactor criticality by verifying that the predicted critical control rod position is within the limits of Specification 3.1.3.6;

d. Prior to initial operation above 5% RATED THERMAL POWER after each fuel loading, by consideration of the factors of Specification 4.1.1.1.1e. below, with the control banks at the maximum insertion limit of Specification 3.1.3.6; and

*See Special Test Exceptions Specification 3.10.1.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 28 FEB 1986

e. When in MODE 3 or 4, at least once per 24 hours by consideration of the following factors:

1. Reactor Coolant System boron concentration,
2. Control rod position,
3. Reactor Coolant System average temperature,
4. Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation,
5. Xenon concentration, and
6. Samarium concentration.

4.1.1.1.2 The overall core reactivity balance shall be compared to predicted values to demonstrate agreement within ±1000 pcm at least once per 31 Effective Full Power Days (EFPD). This comparison shall consider at least those factors stated in Specification 4.1.1.1.1e., above. The predicted reactivity values shall be adjusted (normalized) to correspond to the actual core conditions prior to exceeding a fuel burnup of 60 EFPD after each fuel loading.

SHUTDOWN MARGIN - T_{avg} LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 200°F

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.1.2 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be greater than or equal to 2000 pcm.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 5.

ACTION:

With the SHUTDOWN MARGIN less than 2000 pcm immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 30 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 7000 ppm boron or equivalent until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.1.2 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be greater than or equal to 2000 pcm:

a. Within 1 hour after detection of an inoperable control rod(s) and at least once per 12 hours thereafter while the rod(s) is inoperable. If the inoperable control rod is immovable or untrippable, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be verified acceptable with an increased allowance for the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable control rod(s); and

b. At least once per 24 hours by consideration of the following factors:

   1. Reactor Coolant System boron concentration,
   2. Control rod position,
   3. Reactor Coolant System average temperature,
   4. Fuel burnup based on gross thermal energy generation,
   5. Xenon concentration, and
   6. Samarium concentration.

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.1.3 The moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) shall be:

a. Less positive than [0] pcm/°F for the all rods withdrawn, beginning of cycle life (BOL), hot zero THERMAL POWER condition; and

b. Less negative than -42 pcm/°F for the all rods withdrawn, end of cycle life (EOL), RATED THERMAL POWER condition.

APPLICABILITY: Specification 3.1.1.3a. - MODES 1 and 2* only**.
Specification 3.1.1.3b. - MODES 1, 2, and 3 only**.

ACTION:

a. With the MTC more positive than the limit of Specification 3.1.1.3a. above, operation in MODES 1 and 2 may proceed provided:

1. Control rod withdrawal limits are established and maintained sufficient to restore the MTC to less positive than 0 pcm/°F within 24 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours. These withdrawal limits shall be in addition to the insertion limits of Specification 3.1.3.6;

2. The control rods are maintained within the withdrawal limits established above until a subsequent calculation verifies that the MTC has been restored to within its limit for the all rods withdrawn condition; and

3. A Special Report is prepared and submitted to the Commission, pursuant to Specification 6.9.2, within 10 days, describing the value of the measured MTC, the interim control rod withdrawal limits, and the predicted average core burnup necessary for restoring the positive MTC to within its limit for the all rods withdrawn condition.

b. With the MTC more negative than the limit of Specification 3.1.1.3b. above, be in HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours.

*With k_{eff} greater than or equal to 1.

**See Special Test Exceptions Specification 3.10.3.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.1.3 The MTC shall be determined to be within its limits during each fuel cycle as follows:

a. The MTC shall be measured and compared to the BOL limit of Specification 3.1.1.3a., above, prior to initial operation above 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, after each fuel loading; and

b. The MTC shall be measured at any THERMAL POWER and compared to -33 pcm/°F (all rods withdrawn, RATED THERMAL POWER condition) within 7 EFPD after reaching an equilibrium boron concentration of 300 ppm. In the event this comparison indicates the MTC is more negative than -33 pcm/°F, the MTC shall be remeasured, and compared to the EOL MTC limit of Specification 3.1.1.3b., at least once per 14 EFPD during the remainder of the fuel cycle.

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MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.1.4 The Reactor Coolant System lowest operating loop temperature (T_{avg}) shall be greater than or equal to [551]°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2* **.

ACTION:

With a Reactor Coolant System operating loop temperature (T_{avg}) less than [551]°F, restore T_{avg} to within its limit within 15 minutes or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 15 minutes.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.1.4 The Reactor Coolant System temperature (T_{avg}) shall be determined to be greater than or equal to [551]°F:

a. Within 15 minutes prior to achieving reactor criticality, and

b. At least once per 30 minutes when the reactor is critical and the Reactor Coolant System T_{avg} is less than [561]°F with the T_{avg}-T_{ref} Deviation Alarm not reset.

*With K_{eff} greater than or equal to 1.

**See Special Test Exceptions Specification 3.10.3.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS

FLOW PATH - SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.2.1 As a minimum, one of the following boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source:

a. A flow path from the boric acid tank via either a boric acid transfer pump or a gravity feed connection and a charging/safety injection pump to the Reactor Coolant System if the boric acid tank in Specification 3.1.2.5a. or 3.1.2.6a. is OPERABLE, or

b. The flow path from the refueling water storage tank via a charging/safety injection PUMP to the Reactor Coolant System if the refueling water storage tank in Specification 3.1.2.5b. or 3.1.2.6b. is OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4*, 5, and 6.

ACTION:

With none of the above flow paths OPERABLE or capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.2.1 At least one of the above required flow paths shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by verifying that the temperature of the flow path between the boric acid tank and the charging/safety injection pump suction header is greater than or equal to [65]°F when a flow path from the boric acid tank is used, and

b. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

*A maximum of one charging/safety injection pump shall be OPERABLE whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than or equal to 335°F.

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FLOW PATHS - OPERATING

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.2.2 At least two of the following three boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE:

a. The flow path from the boric acid tank via a boric acid transfer pump and a charging/safety injection pump to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS), and

b. Two flow paths from the refueling water storage tank via charging/safety injection pumps to the RCS.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

With only one of the above required boron injection flow paths to the RCS OPERABLE, restore at least two boron injection flow paths to the RCS to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 2000 pcm at 200°F within the next 6 hours; restore at least two flow paths to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.2.2 At least two of the above required flow paths shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by verifying that the temperature of the flow path between the boric acid tank and the charging/safety injection pump suction header tank is greater than or equal to [65]°F when a flow path from the boric acid tank is used;

b. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position; AND

~~c. At least once per 18 months during shutdown by verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a safety injection test signal; and~~

c ~~d.~~ At least once per 18 months by verifying that the flow path required by Specification 3.1.2.2a. delivers at least 30 gpm to the RCS.

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CHARGING PUMP - SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.2.3 One charging/safety injection pump in the boron injection flow path required by Specification 3.1.2.1 shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4*, 5*, and 6.*

ACTION:

With no charging/safety injection pump OPERABLE or capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.2.3.1 The above required charging/safety injection pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying, on recirculation flow or in service supplying flow to the reactor coolant system and reactor coolant pump seals, that a differential pressure across the pump of greater than or equal to 2446 psid is developed when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

4.1.2.3.2 All charging/safety injection pumps, excluding the above required OPERABLE pump, shall be demonstrated inoperable** at least once per 31 days, except when the reactor vessel head is removed, by verifying that the motor circuit breakers are secured in the open position.

*A maximum of one charging/safety injection pump shall be OPERABLE whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than or equal to 335°F.

**An inoperable pump may be energized for testing provided the discharge of the pump has been isolated from the RCS by a closed isolation valve with power removed from the valve operator or by a manual isolation valve secured in the closed position.

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CHARGING PUMPS - OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.2.4 At least two charging/safety injection pumps shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

With only one charging/safety injection pump OPERABLE, restore at least two charging/safety injection pumps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 2000 pcm at 200°F within the next 6 hours; restore at least two charging/safety injection pumps to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.2.4 At least two charging/safety injection pumps shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying, on recirculation flow or in service supplying flow to the reactor coolant system and reactor coolant pump seals, that a differential pressure across each pump of greater than or equal to 2446 psid is developed when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

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BORATED WATER SOURCE - SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.2.5 As a minimum, one of the following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. A boric acid tank with:

1. A minimum contained borated water volume of ~~5400~~ 4330 gallons, which is equivalent to ~~18~~ 10% indicated level.

2. A minimum boron concentration of [7000] ppm, and

3. A minimum solution temperature of [65]°F.

b. The refueling water storage tank (RWST) with:

1. A minimum contained borated water volume of [~~61900~~ 85000] gallons, which is equivalent to [~~12~~ 4]% indicated level.

2. A ~~minimum~~ boron concentration of between [2000] ppm and 2200 ppm, and

3. A minimum solution temperature of [40]°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With no borated water source OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.2.5 The above required borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by:

1. Verifying the boron concentration of the water,

2. Verifying the contained borated water volume, and

3. Verifying the boric acid tank solution temperature when it is the source of borated water.

b. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the RWST temperature when it is the source of borated water and the outside air temperature is less than [40]°F.

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.2.6 As a minimum, the following borated water source(s) shall be OPERABLE as required by Specification 3.1.2.2:

a. A boric acid tank with:

1. A minimum contained borated water volume of ~~16300~~ 16830 gallons, which is equivalent to ~~45%~~ 52 indicated level.

2. A minimum boron concentration of [7000] ppm, and

3. A minimum solution temperature of [65]°F.

b. The refueling water storage tank (RWST) with:

1. A minimum contained borated water volume of [~~433000~~ 448000] gallons, which is equivalent to [~~84~~ 95]% indicated level.

2. A ~~minimum~~ boron concentration of between [2000] ppm and 2200 ppm.

3. A minimum solution temperature of [40]°F, and

4. A maximum solution temperature of [125]°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

a. With the boric acid tank inoperable and being used as one of the above required borated water sources, restore the boric acid tank to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to at least 2000 pcm at 200°F; restore the boric acid tank to OPERABLE status within the next 7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours.

b. With the RWST inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.2.6 Each borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by:

1. Verifying the boron concentration in the water,

2. Verifying the contained borated water volume of the water source, and

3. Verifying the boric acid tank solution temperature when it is the source of borated water.

b. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the RWST temperature when the outside air temperature is either less than [40]°F or greater than [125]°F.

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES

GROUP HEIGHT

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.1 All shutdown and control rods shall be OPERABLE and positioned within ± 12 steps (indicated position) of their group step counter demand position.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1* and 2*.

ACTION:

a. With one or more rods inoperable due to being immovable as a result of excessive friction or mechanical interference or known to be untrippable, determine that the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is satisfied within 1 hour and be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

b. With more than one rod misaligned from the group step counter demand position by more than ± 12 steps (indicated position), be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

c. With more than one rod inoperable ~~for greater than 36 hours~~, due to a rod control urgent failure alarm or obvious electrical problem in the rod control system EXISTING FOR GREATER THAN 36 HOURS, be in HOT STANDBY within the following 6 hours.

d. With one rod trippable but inoperable due to causes other than addressed by ACTION a., above, or misaligned from its group step counter demand height by more than ± 12 steps (indicated position), POWER OPERATION may continue provided that within 1 hour:

   1. The rod is restored to OPERABLE status within the above alignment requirements, or

   2. The rod is declared inoperable and the remainder of the rods in the group with the inoperable rod are aligned to within ± 12 steps of the inoperable rod while maintaining the rod sequence and insertion limits of Figure 3.1-1. The THERMAL POWER level shall be restricted pursuant to Specification 3.1.3.6 during subsequent operation, or

   3. The rod is declared inoperable and the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is satisfied. POWER OPERATION may then continue provided that:

      a) A reevaluation of each accident analysis of Table 3.1-1 is performed within 5 days; this reevaluation shall confirm that the previously analyzed results of these accidents

*See Special Test Exceptions Specifications 3.10.2 and 3.10.3.

ACTION (Continued):

remain valid for the duration of operation under these conditions;

b) The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 is determined at least once per 12 hours;

c) A power distribution map is obtained from the movable incore detectors and $F_Q(Z)$ and $F^N_{\Delta H}$ are verified to be within their limits within 72 hours; and

d) The THERMAL POWER level is reduced to less than or equal to 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next hour and within the following 4 hours the High Neutron Flux Trip Setpoint is reduced to less than or equal to 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.3.1.1 The position of each rod shall be determined to be within the group demand limit by verifying the individual rod positions at least once per 12 hours except during time intervals when the rod position deviation monitor is inoperable, then verify the group positions at least once per 4 hours.

4.1.3.1.2 Each rod not fully inserted in the core shall be determined to be OPERABLE by movement of at least 10 steps in any one direction at least once per 31 days.

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TABLE 3.1-1

ACCIDENT ANALYSES REQUIRING REEVALUATION
IN THE EVENT OF AN INOPERABLE ROD

Rod Cluster Control Assembly Insertion Characteristics

Rod Cluster Control Assembly Misalignment

Loss of Reactor Coolant from Small Ruptured Pipes or from Cracks in Large Pipes Which Actuates the Emergency Core Cooling System

Single Rod Cluster Control Assembly Withdrawal at Full Power

Major Reactor Coolant System Pipe Ruptures (Loss-of-Coolant Accident)

Major Secondary Coolant System Pipe Rupture

Rupture of a Control Rod Drive Mechanism Housing (Rod Cluster Control Assembly Ejection)

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.2 The Digital Rod Position Indication System and the Demand Position Indication System shall be OPERABLE and capable of determining the shutdown and control rod positions within ± 12 steps.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTION:

a. With a maximum of one digital rod position indicator per bank inoperable either:

   1. Determine the position of the nonindicating rod(s) indirectly by the movable incore detectors at least once per 8 hours and immediately after any motion of the nonindicating rod which exceeds 24 steps in one direction since the last determination of the rod's position, or

   2. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 8 hours.

b. With a maximum of one demand position indicator per bank inoperable either:

   1. Verify that all digital rod position indicators for the affected bank are OPERABLE and that the most withdrawn rod and the least withdrawn rod of the bank are within a maximum of 12 steps of each other at least once per 8 hours, or

   2. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 8 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.3.2 Each digital rod position indicator shall be determined to be OPERABLE by verifying that the Demand Position Indication System and the Digital Rod Position Indication System agree within 12 steps at least once per 12 hours except during time intervals when the rod position deviation monitor is inoperable, then compare the Demand Position Indication System and the Digital Rod Position Indication System at least once per 4 hours.

POSITION INDICATION SYSTEM - SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.3 One digital rod position indicator (excluding demand position indication) shall be OPERABLE and capable of determining the rod position within ± 12 steps for each shutdown or control rod not fully inserted.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 3* **, 4* **, and 5* **.

ACTION:

ACTION:

a. With one of the above required position indicator(s) inoperable, either restore the indicator to OPERABLE within 8 hours or open the Reactor Trip System breakers.

b. With more than one of the above required position indicators inoperable, immediately open the Reactor Trip System breakers.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.3.3 Each of the above required digital rod position indicator(s) shall be determined to be OPERABLE by verifying that the digital rod position indicators agree with the demand position indicators within 12 steps when exercised over the full-range of rod travel at least once per 18 months.

*With the Reactor Trip System breakers in the closed position.

**See Special Test Exceptions Specification 3.10.5.

ROD DROP TIME

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.4 The individual shutdown and control rod drop time from the fully withdrawn position shall be less than or equal to [2.2] seconds from beginning of decay of stationary gripper coil voltage to dashpot entry with:

a. T_{avg} greater than or equal to [551]°F, and

b. All reactor coolant pumps operating.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTION:

a. With the drop time of any rod determined to exceed the above limit, restore the rod drop time to within the above limit prior to proceeding to MODE 1 or 2.

b. With the rod drop times within limits but determined with two reactor coolant pumps operating, operation may proceed provided THERMAL POWER is restricted to less than or equal to [66]% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.3.4 The rod drop time of shutdown and control rods shall be demonstrated through measurement prior to reactor criticality:

a. For all rods following each removal of the reactor vessel head,

b. For specifically affected individual rods following any maintenance on or modification to the Control Rod Drive System which could affect the drop time of those specific rods, and

c. At least once per 18 months.

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SHUTDOWN ROD INSERTION LIMIT

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.5 All shutdown rods shall be fully withdrawn.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1* and 2* **.

ACTION:

With a maximum of one shutdown rod not fully withdrawn, except for surveillance testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.3.1.2, within 1 hour either:

a. Fully withdraw the rod, or

b. Declare the rod to be inoperable and apply Specification 3.1.3.1.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.3.5 Each shutdown rod shall be determined to be fully withdrawn:

a. Within 15 minutes prior to withdrawal of any rods in Control Bank A, B, C, or D during an approach to reactor criticality, and

b. At least once per 12 hours thereafter.

---

*See Special Test Exceptions Specifications 3.10.2 and 3.10.3.

**With K_{eff} greater than or equal to 1.

CONTROL ROD INSERTION LIMITS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.6 The control banks shall be limited in physical insertion as shown in Figure 3.1-1.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1* and 2* **.

ACTION:

With the control banks inserted beyond the above insertion limits, except for surveillance testing pursuant to Specification 4.1.3.1.2:

a. Restore the control banks to within the limits within 2 hours, or

b. Reduce THERMAL POWER within 2 hours to less than or equal to that fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER which is allowed by the bank position using ~~the above~~ figure~~s~~ 3.1-1, or

c. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.3.6 The position of each control bank shall be determined to be within the insertion limits at least once per 12 hours except during time intervals when the rod insertion limit monitor is inoperable, then verify the individual rod positions at least once per 4 hours.

*See Special Test Exceptions Specifications 3.10.2 and 3.10.3.

**With K_{eff} greater than or equal to 1.

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

FIGURE 3.1-1

ROD GROUP INSERTION LIMITS VERSUS THERMAL POWER THREE-LOOP OPERATION

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3/4.2.1 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.2.1 The indicated AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (AFD) shall be maintained within the following target band (flux difference units) from the target AFD value:

a. ± 5% for core average accumulated burnup of less than or equal to 3000 MWD/MTU; and

b. + 3%, -12% for core average accumulated burnup of greater than 3000 MWD/MTU.

The indicated AFD may deviate outside the above required target band at greater than or equal to 50% but less than 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER provided the indicated AFD is within the Acceptable Operation Limits of Figure 3.2-1 and the cumulative penalty deviation time does not exceed 1 hour during the previous 24 hours.

The indicated AFD may deviate outside the above required target band at greater than 15% but less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER provided the cumulative penalty deviation time does not exceed 1 hour during the previous 24 hours.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER.* **

ACTION:

a. With the indicated AFD outside of the above required target band and with THERMAL POWER greater than or equal to 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER, within 15 minutes either:

   1. Restore the indicated AFD to within the target band limits, or

   2. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

b. With the indicated AFD outside of the above required target band for more than 1 hour of cumulative penalty deviation time during the previous 24 hours or outside the Acceptable Operation Limits of Figure 3.2-1 and with THERMAL POWER less than 90% but equal to or greater than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER, reduce:

   1. THERMAL POWER to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 30 minutes, and

   2. The Power Range Neutron Flux** - High Setpoints to less than or equal to 55% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours.

*See Special Test Exceptions Specification 3.10.2.

**Surveillance testing of the Power Range Neutron Flux Channel may be performed pursuant to Specification 4.3.1.1 provided the indicated AFD is maintained within the Acceptable Operation Limits of Figure 3.2-1. A total of 16 hours operation may be accumulated with the AFD outside of the above required target band during testing without penalty deviation.

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

ACTION (Continued)

c. With the indicated AFD outside of the above required target band for more than 1 hour of cumulative penalty deviation time during the previous 24 hours and with THERMAL POWER less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER, the THERMAL POWER shall not be increased equal to or greater than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER until the indicated AFD is within the above required target band and the indicated AFD is outside of the above required band for less than 1 hour of cumulative penalty deviation time during the previous 24 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.2.1.1 The indicated AFD shall be determined to be within its limits during POWER OPERATION above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER by:

a. Monitoring the indicated AFD for each OPERABLE excore channel:

   1. At least once per 7 days when the AFD Monitor Alarm is OPERABLE, and

   2. At least once per hour for the first 24 hours after restoring the AFD Monitor Alarm to OPERABLE status.

b. Monitoring and logging the indicated AFD for each OPERABLE excore channel at least once per hour for the first 24 hours and at least once per 30 minutes thereafter, when the AFD Monitor Alarm is inoperable. The logged values of the indicated AFD shall be assumed to exist during the interval preceding each logging.

4.2.1.2 The indicated AFD shall be considered outside of its target band when two or more OPERABLE excore channels are indicating the AFD to be outside the target band. Penalty deviation outside of the above required target band shall be accumulated on a time basis of:

a. One minute penalty deviation for each 1 minute of POWER OPERATION outside of the target band at THERMAL POWER levels equal to or above 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and

b. One-half minute penalty deviation for each 1 minute of POWER OPERATION outside of the target band at THERMAL POWER levels between 15% and 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

4.2.1.3 The target flux difference of each OPERABLE excore channel shall be determined by measurement at least once per 92 Effective Full Power Days. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.2.1.4 The target flux difference shall be updated at least once per 31 Effective Full Power Days by either determining the target flux difference pursuant to Specification 4.2.1.3 above or by linear interpolation between the most recently measured value and 0% at the end of the cycle life. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.



FIGURE 3.2-1

AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE LIMITS AS A FUNCTION OF RATED THERMAL POWER

3/4.2.2 HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR - $F_Q(Z)$

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.2.2 $F_Q(Z)$ shall be limited by the following relationships:

$$F_Q(Z) \le \left[\frac{2.32}{P}\right] [K(Z)] \text{ for } P > 0.5$$

$$F_Q(Z) \le [(4.64)]\ [K(Z)] \text{ for } P \le 0.5$$

Where:

$$P = \frac{\text{THERMAL POWER}}{\text{RATED THERMAL POWER}}, \text{ and}$$

K(Z) = the function obtained from Figure 3.2-2 for a given core height location.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

ACTION:

With $F_Q(Z)$ exceeding its limit:

a. Reduce THERMAL POWER at least 1% for each 1% $F_Q(Z)$ exceeds the limit within 15 minutes and similarly reduce the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Trip Setpoints within the next 4 hours; POWER OPERATION may proceed for up to a total of 72 hours; subsequent POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the Overpower ΔT Trip Setpoints have been reduced at least 1% for each 1% $F_Q(Z)$ exceeds the limit.

b. Identify and correct the cause of the out-of-limit condition prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the reduced limit required by ACTION a., above; THERMAL POWER may then be increased provided $F_Q(Z)$ is demonstrated through incore mapping to be within its limit.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 28 FEB 1986

4.2.2.1 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

4.2.2.2 F_{xy} shall be evaluated to determine if $F_Q(Z)$ is within its limit by:

a. Using the movable incore detectors to obtain a power distribution map at any THERMAL POWER greater than 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER,

b. Increasing the measured F_{xy} component of the power distribution map by 3% to account for manufacturing tolerances and further increasing the value by 5% to account for measurement uncertainties,

c. Comparing the F_{xy} computed (F_{xy}^C) obtained in Specification 4.2.2.2b., above to:

1. The F_{xy} limits for RATED THERMAL POWER (F_{xy}^{RTP}) for the appropriate measured core planes given in Specification 4.2.2.2e. and f., below, and

2. The relationship:

$$F_{xy}^{L} = F_{xy}^{RTP} [1+0.2(1-P)],$$

Where F_{xy}^L is the limit for fractional THERMAL POWER operation expressed as a function of F_{xy}^{RTP} and P is the fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER at which F_{xy} was measured.

d. Remeasuring F_{xy} according to the following schedule:

1. When F_{xy}^C is greater than the F_{xy}^{RTP} limit for the appropriate measured core plane but less than the F_{xy}^L relationship, additional power distribution maps shall be taken and F_{xy}^C compared to F_{xy}^{RTP} and F_{xy}^L either:

a) Within 24 hours after exceeding by 20% of RATED THERMAL POWER or greater, the THERMAL POWER at which F_{xy}^C was last determined, or

b) At least once per 31 Effective Full Power Days (EFPD), whichever occurs first.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

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2. When the F_{xy}^C is less than or equal to the F_{xy}^{RTP} limit for the appropriate measured core plane, additional power distribution maps shall be taken and F_{xy}^C compared to F_{xy}^{RTP} and F_{xy}^L at least once per 31 EFPD.

e. The F_{xy} limits for RATED THERMAL POWER (F_{xy}^{RTP}) shall be provided for all core planes containing Bank "D" control rods and all unrodded core planes in a Radial Peaking Factor Limit Report per Specification 6.9.1.6;

f. The F_{xy} limits of Specification 4.2.2.2e., above, are not applicable in the following core planes regions as measured in percent of core height from the bottom of the fuel:

1. Lower core region from 0 to 15%, inclusive,

2. Upper core region from 85 to 100%, inclusive,

3. Grid plane regions at 17.8 ± 2%, 32.1 ± 2%, 46.4 ± 2%, 60.6 ± 2%, and 74.9 ± 2%, inclusive, and

4. Core plane regions within ± 2% of core height [± 2.88 inches] about the bank demand position of the Bank "D" control rods.

g. With F_{xy}^C exceeding F_{xy}^L, the effects of F_{xy} on $F_Q(Z)$ shall be evaluated to determine if $F_Q(Z)$ is within its limits.

4.2.2.3 When $F_Q(Z)$ is measured for other than F_{xy} determinations, an overall measured $F_Q(Z)$ shall be obtained from a power distribution map and increased by 3% to account for manufacturing tolerances and further increased by 5% to account for measurement uncertainty.



FIGURE 3.2-2
LOCA AXIAL PENALTY FUNCTION FOR Fq(z)
K(Z) - ~~NORMALIZED $F_Q(Z)$ AS A FUNCTION OF CORE HEIGHT~~

Replace from 3/4 2-8a

SHEARON HARRIS UNIT 1

3/4 2-8a



Figure 3.2-2 K (z) Local Axial Penalty Function for $F_Q(z)$

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3/4.2.3 RCS FLOW RATE AND NUCLEAR ENTHALPY RISE HOT CHANNEL FACTOR

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.2.3 The Indicated Reactor Coolant System (RCS) total flow rate and $F^N_{\Delta H}$ shall be maintained as follows:

(1.0 + C1)

a. Measured RCS flow rate $\geq$ [292,800 gpm] x $\cancel{C_1}$, and

b. Measured $F^N_{\Delta H} \leq 1.49\ [1.0 + 0.2(1.0-P)]$

Where:

$$P = \frac{\text{THERMAL POWER}}{\text{RATED THERMAL POWER}}$$

$F^N_{\Delta H}$ = Measured values of $F^N_{\Delta H}$ obtained by using the movable incore detectors to obtain a power distribution map, and the measured values of $F^N_{\Delta H}$ shall be used for comparison above since the 1.49 value above accounts for a 4% allowance on incore measurement of $F^N_{\Delta H}$.

C_1 = Measurement uncertainty for core flow as described in the Bases.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

ACTION:

With RCS total flow rate or $F^N_{\Delta H}$ outside the above limits:

a. Within 2 hours either:

1. Restore RCS total flow rate and $F^N_{\Delta H}$ to within the above limits, or

2. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER and reduce the Power Range Neutron Flux - High Trip Setpoint to less than or equal to 55% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours.

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

ACTION (Continued):

b. Within 24 hours of initially being outside the above limits, verify through incore flux mapping and RCS total flow rate comparison that $F^N_{\Delta H}$ and RCS total flow rate are restored to within the above limits, or reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 2 hours.

c. Identify and correct the cause of the out-of-limit condition prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the reduced THERMAL POWER limit required by ACTION a.2. and/or b., above; subsequent POWER OPERATION may proceed provided that $F^N_{\Delta H}$ and indicated RCS total flow rate are demonstrated, through incore flux mapping and RCS total flow rate comparison, to be within acceptable limits PRIOR to exceeding the following THERMAL POWER levels:

1. A nominal 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER,
2. A nominal 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and
3. Within 24 hours of attaining greater than or equal to 95% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.2.3.1 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

4.2.3.2 The indicated RCS total flow rate determined by process computer readings or digital voltmeter measurement and $F^N_{\Delta H}$ shall be determined to be within acceptable limits:

a. Prior to operation above 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER after each fuel loading, and

b. At least once per 31 Effective Full Power Days.

4.2.3.3 The indicated RCS total flow rate shall be verified to be within the acceptable limit at least once per 12 hours when the most recently obtained value of $F^N_{\Delta H}$, obtained per Specification 4.2.3.2, is assumed to exist.

4.2.3.4 The RCS total flow rate indicators shall be subjected to a CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months. The measurement instrumentation shall be calibrated within 7 days prior to the performance of the calorimetric flow measurement.

MOVE TO

4.2.3.5 The RCS total flow rate shall be determined by precision heat balance measurement at least once per 18 months.

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3/4.2.4 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.2.4 The QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO shall not exceed 1.02.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, above 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER*.

ACTION:

a. With the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO determined to exceed 1.02 but less than or equal to 1.09:

   1. Calculate the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO at least once per hour until either:

      a) The QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is reduced to within its limit, or

      b) THERMAL POWER is reduced to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

   2. Within 2 hours either:

      a) Reduce the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO to within its limit, or

      b) Reduce THERMAL POWER at least 3% from RATED THERMAL POWER for each 1% of indicated QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO in excess of 1 and similarly reduce the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Trip Setpoints within the next 4 hours.

   3. Verify that the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is within its limit within 24 hours after exceeding the limit or reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 2 hours and reduce the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Trip Setpoints to less than or equal to 55% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours; and

   4. Identify and correct the cause of the out-of-limit condition prior to increasing THERMAL POWER; subsequent POWER OPERATION above 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER may proceed provided that the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is verified within its limit at least once per hour for 12 hours or until verified acceptable at 95% or greater RATED THERMAL POWER.

*See Special Test Exceptions Specification 3.10.2.

ACTION (Continued):

b. With the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO determined to exceed 1.09 due to misalignment of either a shutdown or control rod:

   1. Calculate the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO at least once per hour until either:

      a) The QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is reduced to within its limit, or

      b) THERMAL POWER is reduced to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

   2. Reduce THERMAL POWER at least 3% from RATED THERMAL POWER for each 1% of indicated QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO in excess of 1.0 ~~1~~, within 30 minutes;

   3. Verify that the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is within its limit within 2 hours after exceeding the limit or reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 2 hours and reduce the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Trip Setpoints to less than or equal to 55% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours; and

   4. Identify and correct the cause of the out-of-limit condition prior to increasing THERMAL POWER; subsequent POWER OPERATION above 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER may proceed provided that the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is verified within its limit at least once per hour for 12 hours or until verified acceptable at 95% or greater RATED THERMAL POWER.

c. With the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO determined to exceed 1.09 due to causes other than the misalignment of either a shutdown or control rod:

   1. Calculate the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO at least once per hour until either:

      a) The QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is reduced to within its limit, or

      b) THERMAL POWER is reduced to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

ACTION (Continued):

2. Reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 2 hours and reduce the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Trip Setpoints to less than or equal to 55% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours; and

3. Identify and correct the cause of the out-of-limit condition prior to increasing THERMAL POWER; subsequent POWER OPERATION above 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER may proceed provided that the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is verified within its limit at least once per hour for 12 hours or until verified at 95% or greater RATED THERMAL POWER.

d. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.2.4.1 The QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO shall be determined to be within the limit above 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER by:

a. Calculating the ratio at least once per 7 days when the alarm is OPERABLE, and

b. Calculating the ratio at least once per 12 hours during steady-state operation when the alarm is inoperable.

4.2.4.2 The QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO shall be determined to be within the limit when above 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER with one Power Range channel inoperable by using the movable incore detectors to confirm that the normalized symmetric power distribution, obtained from two sets of four symmetric thimble locations or full-core flux map, is consistent with the indicated QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO at least once per 12 hours.

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3/4.2.5 DNB PARAMETERS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.2.5 The following DNB-related parameters shall be maintained within the following limits:

a. Indicated Reactor Coolant System T_{avg} ≤ [~~590.8~~] 592.6 °F and after additions for instrument uncertainty

b. Indicated Pressurizer Pressure ≥ [~~2213~~] 2205 psig* after subtractions for instrument uncertainty

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

ACTION:

With any of the above parameters exceeding its indicated limit, restore the parameter to within its limit within 2 hours or reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.2.5 Each of the parameters shown in Specification 3.2.5 shall be verified to be within its limit at least once per 12 hours.

*This limit is not applicable during either a Thermal Power Ramp in excess of ±5% Rated Thermal Power per minute or a Thermal Power step ~~increase~~ change in excess of ±10% Rated Thermal Power.

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3/4.3.1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.1 As a minimum, the Reactor Trip System instrumentation channels and interlocks of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE with RESPONSE TIMES as shown in Table 3.3-2.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-1.

ACTION: As shown in Table 3.3-1.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.1.1 Each Reactor Trip System instrumentation channel and interlock and the automatic trip logic shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements specified in Table 4.3-1.

4.3.1.2 The REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each Reactor trip function shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per 18 months. Each test shall include at least one train such that both trains are tested at least once per 36 months and one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific Reactor trip function as shown in the "Total No. of Channels" column of Table 3.3-1.

TABLE 3.3-1

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS	CHANNELS TO TRIP	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE	APPLICABLE MODES	ACTION
1. Manual Reactor Trip	2	1	2	1, 2	1
	2	1	2	3*, 4*, 5*	9
2. Power Range, Neutron Flux					
a. High Setpoint	4	2	3	1, 2	2#
b. Low Setpoint	4	2	3	1###, 2	2#
3. Power Range, Neutron Flux High Positive Rate	4	2	3	1, 2	2#
4. Power Range, Neutron Flux, High Negative Rate	4	2	3	1, 2	2#
5. Intermediate Range, Neutron Flux	2	1	2	1###, 2	3
6. Source Range, Neutron Flux					
a. Startup	2	1	2	2##	4
b. Shutdown	2	1	2	3*, 4*, 5*	5
7. Overtemperature ΔT	3	2	2	1, 2	6#
8. Overpower ΔT	3	2	2	1, 2	6#
9. Pressurizer Pressure--Low	3	2	2	1	6#
10. Pressurizer Pressure--High	3	2	2	1, 2	6#
11. Pressurizer Water Level--High	3	2	2	1	6#

TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS	CHANNELS TO TRIP	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE	APPLICABLE MODES	ACTION
12. Reactor Coolant Flow--Low a. Single Loop (Above P-8)	3/loop	2/loop in any operating loop	2/loop in each operating loop	1	6#
b. Two Loops (Above P-7 and below P-8)	3/loop	2/loop in two operating loops	2/loop each operating loop	1	6#
13. Steam Generator Water Level--Low-Low	3/stm. gen.	2/stm. gen. in any operating stm. gen.	3/stm. gen. each operating stm. gen.	1, 2	6#(1)
14. Steam Generator Water Level--Low Coincident With Steam/Feedwater Flow Mismatch	2 stm. gen. level and 2 stm./feedwater flow mismatch in each stm. gen.	1 stm. gen. level coincident with 1 stm./feedwater flow mismatch in same stm. gen.	1 stm. gen. level and 2 stm./feedwater flow mismatch in same stm. gen. or 2 stm. gen. level and 1 stm./feedwater flow mismatch in same stm. gen.	1, 2	6#
15. Undervoltage--Reactor Coolant Pumps (ABOVE P-7)	~~6-1/bus/train~~ 2/PUMP/TRAIN	~~2~~ ~~1/Pump out~~ ~~2/3 Pumps~~ 2/TRAIN	2/~~Pump~~ TRAIN	1	6#(1)

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TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS	CHANNELS TO TRIP	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE	APPLICABLE MODES	ACTION
16. Underfrequency--Reactor Coolant Pumps (ABOVE P-7)	~~6-1/bus/train~~ 2/PUMP/TRAIN	~~2~~ 2/TRAIN ~~1/pump on 2/3 Pumps~~	2/~~Pump~~ TRAIN	1	6#
17. Turbine Trip					
a. Low Fluid Oil Pressure	3	2	2	1	6#
b. Turbine Throttle Valve Closure	4	4	1	1	10#
18. Safety Injection Input from ESF	2	1	2	1, 2	8
19. Reactor Trip System Interlocks					
a. Intermediate Range Neutron Flux, P-6	2	1	2	2##	7
b. Low Power Reactor Trips Block, P-7					
1) P-10 Input	4	2	3	1	7
or					
2) P-13 Input	2	1	2	1	7
c. Power Range Neutron Flux, P-8	4	2	3	1	7
d. Power Range Neutron Flux, P-10	4	2	3	1, 2	7
e. Turbine Impulse Chamber Pressure, P-13	2	1	2	1	7

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TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS	CHANNELS TO TRIP	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE	APPLICABLE MODES	ACTION
20. Reactor Trip Breakers	2	1	2	1, 2	8, 11
	2	1	2	3*, 4*, 5*	9
21. Automatic Trip and Interlock Logic	2	1	2	1, 2	8
	2	1	2	3*, 4*, 5*	9
22. Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers	2	1	1	**	12

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TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

*When the Reactor Trip System breakers are closed and the Control Rod Drive System is capable of rod withdrawal.

~~**The channel(s) associated with the trip functions derived from the out-of-service reactor coolant loop shall be placed in the tripped condition.~~

** ~~***~~Whenever Reactor Trip Breakers are to be tested.

#The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

##Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.

###Below the P-10 (Low Setpoint Power Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.

(1)The applicable MODES and ACTION statement for these channels noted in Table 3.3-3 are more restrictive and, therefore, applicable.

ACTION STATEMENTS

ACTION 1 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours.

ACTION 2 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours,

b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1, and

c. Either, THERMAL POWER is restricted to less than or equal to 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER and the Power Range Neutron Flux Trip Setpoint is reduced to less than or equal to [85]% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 4 hours; or, the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO is monitored at least once per 12 hours per Specification 4.2.4.2.

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TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued)

ACTION 3 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement and with the THERMAL POWER level:

a. Below the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the P-6 Setpoint, and

b. Above the P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint but below 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above 10% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

ACTION 4 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes.

ACTION 5 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or open the Reactor Trip System breakers, and verify compliance with the shutdown margin requirements of Specification 3.1.1.1 or 3.1.1.2, as applicable, within 1 hour and at least once per 12 hours thereafter.

ACTION 6 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours, and

b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, the inoperable channel may be bypassed for up to 4 hours for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.1.1.

ACTION 7 - With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, within 1 hour determine by observation of the associated permissive annunciator window(s) that the interlock is in its required state for the existing plant condition, or apply Specification 3.0.3.

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TABLE 3.3-1 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued)

ACTION 8 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1, provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 9 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or open the Reactor Trip System breakers within the next hour.

ACTION 10 - With the number of OPERABLE channels less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may continue provided the inoperable channels are placed in the tripped condition within 6 hours.

ACTION 11 - With one of the diverse trip features (undervoltage or shunt trip attachment) inoperable, restore it to OPERABLE status within 48 ~~hous~~ hours or declare the breaker inoperable and apply ACTION ~~10~~ 8. The breaker shall not be bypassed while one of the diverse trip features is inoperable except for the time required for performing maintenance to restore the breaker to OPERABLE status.

ACTION 12 - No additional corrective actions are required.

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TABLE 3.3-2

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION RESPONSE TIMES

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	RESPONSE TIME
1. Manual Reactor Trip	N.A.
2. Power Range, Neutron Flux	≤ [0.5] second*
3. Power Range, Neutron Flux, High Positive Rate	N.A.
4. Power Range, Neutron Flux, High Negative Rate	≤ [0.5] second*
5. Intermediate Range, Neutron Flux	N.A.
6. Source Range, Neutron Flux	N.A.
7. Overtemperature ΔT	≤ [4] seconds*
8. Overpower ΔT	≤ [4] seconds*
9. Pressurizer Pressure--Low	≤ [2] seconds
10. Pressurizer Pressure--High	≤ [2] seconds
11. Pressurizer Water Level--High	N.A.

*Neutron detectors are exempt from response time testing. Response time of the neutron flux signal portion of the channel shall be measured from detector output or input of first electronic component in channel.

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TABLE 3.3-2 (Continued)

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION RESPONSE TIMES

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	RESPONSE TIME
12. Reactor Coolant Flow--Low	
a. Single Loop (Above P-8)	$\leq$ [1] second
b. Two Loops (Above P-7 and below P-8)	$\leq$ [1] second
13. Steam Generator Water Level--Low-Low	$\leq$ [2] seconds
14. Steam Generator Water Level-Low Coincident with Steam/Feedwater Flow Mismatch	N.A.
15. Undervoltage - Reactor Coolant Pumps (ABOVE P-7)	$\leq$ [1.5] seconds
16. Underfrequency - Reactor Coolant Pumps (ABOVE P-7)	$\leq$ [0.6] second
17. Turbine Trip	
a. Low Fluid Oil Pressure	N.A.
b. Turbine Throttle Valve Closure	N.A.
18. Safety Injection Input from ESF	N.A.
19. Reactor Trip System Interlocks	N.A.
20. Reactor Trip Breakers	N.A.
21. Automatic Trip and Interlock Logic	N.A.
22. Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers	N.A.

TABLE 4.3-1

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST	TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST	ACTUATION LOGIC TEST	MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED
1. Manual Reactor Trip	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	R~~(12)~~	N.A.	1, 2, 3*, 4*, 5*
2. Power Range, Neutron Flux						
a. High Setpoint	S	D(2, 4), M(3, 4), Q(4, 6), R(4, 5)	Q(15)	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2
b. Low Setpoint	S	R(4)	S/U(1)	N.A.	N.A.	1***, 2
3. Power Range, Neutron Flux, High Positive Rate	N.A.	R(4)	Q(15)	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2
4. Power Range, Neutron Flux, High Negative Rate	N.A.	R(4)	Q(15)	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2
5. Intermediate Range, Neutron Flux	S	R(4, 5)	S/U(1)	N.A.	N.A.	1***, 2
6. Source Range, Neutron Flux	S	R(4, 5)	S/U(1), Q(8, 15)	N.A.	N.A.	2**, 3, 4, 5
7. Overtemperature ΔT	S	R(11)	Q(15)	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2
8. Overpower ΔT	S	R	Q(15)	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2
9. Pressurizer Pressure--Low	S	R	Q(15)	N.A.	N.A.	1 (16)
10. Pressurizer Pressure--High	S	R	Q(15)	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2

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TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued)

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST	TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST	ACTUATION LOGIC TEST	MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED
11. Pressurizer Water Level--High	S	R	Q(15)	N.A.	N.A.	1
12. Reactor Coolant Flow--Low	S	R	Q(15)	N.A.	N.A.	1
13. Steam Generator Water Level--Low-Low	S	R	Q(15, 16)	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2(16)
14. Steam Generator Water Level--Low Coincident with Steam/Feedwater Flow Mismatch	S	R	Q(15)	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2
15. Undervoltage--Reactor Coolant Pumps	N.A.	R	N.A.	Q(9, 15) ~~16)~~	N.A.	1
16. Underfrequency--Reactor Coolant Pumps	N.A.	R	N.A.	Q(9, 15)	N.A.	1
17. Turbine Trip						
a. Low Fluid Oil Pressure	N.A.	R	N.A.	S/U(1, 9)	N.A.	1
b. Turbine Throttle Valve Closure	N.A.	R	N.A.	S/U(1, 9)	N.A.	1
18. Safety Injection Input from ESF	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.	1, 2
19. Reactor Trip System Interlocks						
a. Intermediate Range Neutron Flux, P-6	N.A.	R(4)	R	N.A.	N.A.	2**

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TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued)

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST	TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST	ACTUATION LOGIC TEST	MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED
19. Reactor Trip System Interlocks (Continued)						
b. Low Power Reactor Trips Block, P-7	N.A.	R(4)	R	N.A.	N.A.	1
c. Power Range Neutron Flux, P-8	N.A.	R(4)	R	N.A.	N.A.	1
d. Power Range Neutron Flux, P-10	N.A.	R(4)	R	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2
e. Turbine Impulse Chamber Pressure, P-13	N.A.	R	R	N.A.	N.A.	1
20. Reactor Trip Breaker	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(7, 9, 10)	N.A.	1, 2, 3*, 4*, 5*
21. Automatic Trip and Interlock Logic	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(7)	1, 2, 3*, 4*, 5*
22. Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	~~M(13, 14)~~ R(14) M(7,13)	N.A.	1, 2, 3*, 4*, 5*

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TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

*When the Reactor Trip System breakers are closed and the Control Rod Drive System is capable of rod withdrawal.

**Below P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.

***Below P-10 (Low Setpoint Power Range Neutron Flux Interlock) Setpoint.

(1) If not performed in previous 31 days.

(2) Comparison of calorimetric to excore power indication above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER. Adjust excore channel gains consistent with calorimetric power if absolute difference is greater than 2%. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable to entry into MODE 2 or 1.

(3) Single point comparison of incore to excore AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER. Recalibrate if the absolute difference is greater than or equal to 3%. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 2 or 1.

(4) Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

(5) Detector plateau curves shall be obtained, and evaluated and compared to manufacturer's data. For the Intermediate Range and Power Range Neutron Flux channels the provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 2 or 1.

(6) Incore - Excore Calibration, above 75% of RATED THERMAL POWER. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 2 or 1.

(7) Each train shall be tested at least every 62 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.

(8) Quarterly surveillance in MODES 3*, 4*, and 5* shall also include verification that permissives P-6 and P-10 are in their required state for existing plant conditions by observation of the permissive annunciator window.

(9) Setpoint verification is not applicable.

(10) The TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST shall independently verify the OPERABILITY of the undervoltage and shunt trip attachments of the reactor trip breakers.

(11) CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall include the RTD bypass loops flow rate.

~~(12) The TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST shall independently verify the OPERABILITY of the undervoltage and shunt trip circuits for the Manual Reactor Trip Function. The test shall also verify the OPERABILITY of the Bypass Breaker trip circuit(s).~~

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TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS (Continued)

(13) Remote manual ~~undervoltage trip when breaker placed in service.~~ SHUNT TRIP PRIOR TO PLACING BREAKER IN SERVICE.

(14) Automatic undervoltage trip.

(15) Each channel shall be tested at least every 92 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.

(16) The surveillance frequency and/or MODES specified for these channels in Table 4.3-2 are more restrictive and, therefore, applicable.

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3/4.3.2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.2 The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) instrumentation channels and interlocks shown in Table 3.3-3 shall be OPERABLE with their Trip Setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3-4 and with RESPONSE TIMES as shown in Table 3.3-5.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-3.

ACTION:

a. With an ESFAS Instrumentation or Interlock Trip Setpoint trip less conservative than the value shown in the Trip Setpoint column but more conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Value column of Table 3.3-4, adjust the Setpoint consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.

b. With an ESFAS Instrumentation or Interlock Trip Setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Value column of Table 3.3-4, either:

   1. Adjust the Setpoint consistent with the Trip Setpoint value of Table 3.3-4, and determine within 12 hours that Equation 3.3-1 was satisfied for the affected channel, or

   2. Declare the channel inoperable and apply the applicable ACTION statement requirements of Table 3.3-3 until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with its Setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.

   Equation 3.3-1 $Z + R + S \leq TA$

   Where:

   Z = The value from Column Z of Table 3.3-4 for the affected channel,

   R = The "as measured" value (in percent span) of rack error for the affected channel,

   S = Either the "as measured" value (in percent span) of the sensor error, or the value from Column S (Sensor Error) of Table 3.3-4 for the affected channel, and

   TA = The value from Column TA (Total Allowance) of Table 3.3-4 for the affected channel.

c. With an ESFAS instrumentation channel or interlock inoperable, take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-3.

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.2.1 Each ESFAS instrumentation channel and interlock and the automatic actuation logic and relays shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the ESFAS Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements specified in Table 4.3-2.

4.3.2.2 The ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME of each ESFAS function shall be demonstrated to be within the limit at least once per 18 months. Each test shall include at least one train such that both trains are tested at least once per 36 months and one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once per N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific ESFAS function as shown in the "Total No. of Channels" column of Table 3.3-3.

TABLE 3.3-3

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS	CHANNELS TO TRIP	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE	APPLICABLE MODES	ACTION
1. Safety Injection (Reactor Trip, Feedwater Isolation, Control Room Isolation, Start Diesel Generators, Containment Ventilation Isolation, Phase A Containment Isolation, Start Auxiliary Feedwater System Motor-Driven Pump, Start Containment Fan Coolers, Start Emergency Service Water Pumps, Start Emergency Service Water Booster Pumps)					
a. Manual Initiation	2	1	2	1, 2, 3, 4	18
b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	2	1	2	1, 2, 3	14
c. Containment Pressure--High-1	3	2	2	1, 2, 3	15*
d. Pressurizer Pressure--Low	3	2	2	1, 2, 3#	15*
e. Steam Line Pressure--Low	3/steam line	2/steam line in any steam line	2/steam line	1, 2, 3#	15*

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TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS	CHANNELS TO TRIP	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE	APPLICABLE MODES	ACTION
2. Containment Spray					
a. Manual Initiation	2	1 with 2 coincident switches	2	1, 2, 3, 4	18
b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	2	1	2	1, 2, 3, 4	14
c. Containment Pressure--High-3	4	2	3	1, 2, 3	16
3. Containment Isolation					
a. Phase "A" Isolation					
1) Manual Initiation	2	1	2	1, 2, 3, 4	18
2) Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	2	1	2	1, 2, 3, 4	14
3) Safety Injection	See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection initiating functions and requirements.				
b. Phase "B" Isolation					
1) Manual Containment Spray Initiation	See Item 2.a. above for Manual Containment Spray initiating functions and requirements.				

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS	CHANNELS TO TRIP	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE	APPLICABLE MODES	ACTION
3. Containment Isolation (Continued)					
2) Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	2	1	2	1, 2, 3, 4	14
3) Containment Pressure--High-3	See Item 2.c. above for Containment Pressure High-3 initiating functions and requirements.				
c. Containment Ventilation Isolation					
1) Manual Containment Spray Initiation	See Item 2.a. above for Manual Containment Spray initiating functions and requirements.				
2) Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	2	1	2	1, 2, 3, 4, 6**	17, 25
3) Safety Injection	See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection initiating functions and requirements.				
4) Containment Radioactivity--High	4 See Table 3.3-6, Item 1a for Containment Radioactivity--High initiating functions and requirements				
5) Manual Phase "A" Isolation	See Item 3.a.1) above for Manual Phase "A" Isolation initiating functions and requirements.				

PLACE UNDER "TOTAL NO OF CHANNELS

INDENT THIS NOTE SO IT BEGINS UNDER THE "CHANNELS TO TRIP" COLUMN

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TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS	CHANNELS TO TRIP	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE	APPLICABLE MODES	ACTION
4. Main Steam Line Isolation					
a. Manual Initiation					
1) Individual MSIV Closure	1/steam line	1/steam line	1/operating steam line	1, 2, 3	23
2) System	2	1	2	1, 2, 3	22
b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	2	1	2	1, 2, 3	21
c. Containment Pressure--High-2	3	2	2	1, 2, 3	15*
d. Steam Line Pressure--Low	See Item 1.e. above for Steam Line Pressure--Low initiating functions and requirements.				
e. Negative Steam Line Pressure Rate--High	3/steam line	2 in any steam line	2/steam line	3***	15*
5. Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation					
a. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	2	1	2	1, 2	24
b. Steam Generator Water Level--High-High (P-14)	4/stm. gen.	2/stm. gen. in any stm. gen.	3/stm. gen. in each stm. gen.	1, 2	19*

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TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS	CHANNELS TO TRIP	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE	APPLICABLE MODES	ACTION
5. Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation (Continued)					
c. Safety Injection	See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection initiating functions and requirements.				
6. Auxiliary Feedwater					
a. Manual Initiation	1/pump	1/pump	1/pump	1, 2, 3	22
b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	2	1	2	1, 2, 3	21
c. Stm. Gen. Water Level--Low-Low					
1) Start Motor-Driven Pumps	3/stm. gen.	2/stm. gen. in any stm. gen.	2/stm. gen. in each stm. gen.	1, 2, 3	15*
2) Start Turbine-Driven Pump	3/stm. gen.	2/stm. gen. in any 2 stm. gen.	2/stm. gen. in each stm. gen.	1, 2, 3	15*
d. Safety Injection Start Motor-Driven Pumps	See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection initiating functions and requirements.				

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TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS	CHANNELS TO TRIP	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE	APPLICABLE MODES	ACTION
6. Auxiliary Feedwater (Continued)					
e. Loss-of-Offsite Power Start Motor-Driven Pumps and Turbine-Driven Pump	See Item 9. below for Loss of Offsite Power initiating functions and requirements.				
f. Trip of All Main Feedwater Pumps Start Motor-Driven Pumps	1/pump	1/pump	1/pump	1, 2	18
g. Steam Line Differential Pressure--High	3/steam line	2/steam line twice with any steamline low	2/steam line	1, 2, 3	15*
Coincident With: Main Steam Line Isolation (CAUSES AFW ISOLATION)	See Item 4. above for all Steam Line Isolation initiating functions and requirements				
7. Safety Injection Switchover to Containment Sump					
a. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	2	1	2	1, 2, 3, 4	14
b. RWST Level--Low-Low	4	2	3	1, 2, 3, 4	16
Coincident With: Safety Injection	See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection initiating functions and requirements.				

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TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS	CHANNELS TO TRIP	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE	APPLICABLE MODES	ACTION
8. Containment Spray Switch-over to Containment Sump					
a. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	2	1	2	1, 2, 3, 4	14
b. RWST--Low Low	See Item 7.b. above for all RWST--Low Low initiating functions and requirements.				
Coincident With: Containment Spray	See Item 2 above for all Containment Spray initiating functions and requirements.				
9. Loss-of-Offsite Power					
a. 6.9 kV Emergency Bus--Undervoltage Primary	3/bus	2/bus	2/bus	1, 2, 3, 4	15*
b. 6.9 kV Emergency Bus--Undervoltage Secondary	3/bus	2/bus	2/bus	1, 2, 3, 4	15*
10. Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Interlocks					
a. Pressurizer Pressure, P-11	3	2	2	1, 2, 3	20
b. Low-Low T_{avg}, P-12	~~4~~ 3	2	~~3~~ 2	1, 2, 3	20
c. Reactor Trip, P-4	2	2	2	1, 2, 3	22
d. Steam Generator Water Level, P-14	See Item 5.b. above for all P-14 initiating functions and requirements.				

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TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

*The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

#Trip function may be blocked in this MODE below the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure Interlock) Setpoint.

**During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in containment, refer to Specification 3.9.9.

***Trip function automatically blocked above P-11 and may be blocked below P-11 when Safety Injection on low steam line pressure is not blocked.

ACTION STATEMENTS

ACTION 14 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1, provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 15 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed until performance of the next required CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour.

ACTION 16 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed provided the inoperable channel is placed in the bypassed condition and the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met. One additional channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1.

ACTION 17 - With less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, operation may continue provided the Containment Purge Makeup and Exhaust Isolation valves are maintained closed while in MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 (refer to Specification 3.6.1.7). For MODE 6, refer to Specification 3.9.4.

ACTION 18 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

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TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued)

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ACTION 19 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour, and

b. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, one additional channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing of other channels per Specification 4.3.2.1.

ACTION 20 - With less than the Minimum Number of Channels OPERABLE, within 1 hour determine by observation of the associated permissive annunciator window(s) that the interlock is in its required state for the existing plant condition, or apply Specification 3.0.3.

ACTION 21 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1 provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 22 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

ACTION 23 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or declare the associated valve inoperable and take the ACTION required by Specification [3.7.1.5].

ACTION 24 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1 provided the other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 25 - During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel within containment, comply with the ACTION statement of Specification 3.9.9.

TABLE 3.3-4

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL ALLOWANCE (TA)	Z	SENSOR ERROR (S)	TRIP SETPOINT	ALLOWABLE VALUE
1. Safety Injection (Reactor Trip, Feedwater Isolation, Control Room Isolation, Start Diesel Generators, Containment Ventilation Isolation, Phase A Containment Isolation, Start Auxiliary Feedwater System Motor Driven Pump, Start Containment Fan Coolers, Start Emergency Service Water Pumps, Start Emergency Service Water Booster Pumps)					
a. Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
c. Containment Pressure--High-1	[2.7]	[0.71]	[1.5]	≤ [3.0] psig	≤ [3.6] psig
d. Pressurizer Pressure--Low	[18.8]	[14.41]	[1.5]	≥ [1850] psig	≥ [1836] psig
e. Steam Line Pressure--Low	[17.7]	[14.81]	[1.5]	≥ [601] psig	≥ [578.3] psig*
2. Containment Spray					
a. Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
c. Containment Pressure--High-3	[3.6]	[0.71]	[1.5]	≤ [10.0] psig	≤ [11.0] psig

TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL ALLOWANCE (TA)	Z	SENSOR ERROR (S)	TRIP SETPOINT	ALLOWABLE VALUE
3. Containment Isolation					
a. Phase "A" Isolation					
1) Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
2) Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
3) Safety Injection	See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.				
b. Phase "B" Isolation					
1) Manual Containment Spray Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
2) Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
3) Containment Pressure--High-3	See Item 2.c. above for Containment Pressure High-3 Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.				
c. Containment Ventilation Isolation					
1) Manual Containment Spray Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
2) Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.

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TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL ALLOWANCE (TA)	Z	SENSOR ERROR (S)	TRIP SETPOINT	ALLOWABLE VALUE
3. Containment Isolation (Continued)					
3) Safety Injection	See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.				
4) Containment Radio-activity--High	See Table 3.3-6, Item 1., for Containment ~~Radioactivity--High~~ Ventilation Isolation Signal Area Monitor. for Trip Setpoint ~~and Allowable Values.~~				
5) Manual Phase "A" Isolation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
4. Main Steam Line Isolation					
a. Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
c. Containment Pressure--High-2	[2.7]	[0.71]	[1.5]	[$\leq$3.0] psig	[$\leq$3.6] psig
d. Steam Line Pressure--Low	See Item 1.e. above for Steam Line Pressure--Low Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.				
e. Negative Steam Line Pressure Rate--High	[2.3]	[0.5]	[0]	$\leq$ [100] psi/s	$\leq$ [122.8] psi/s**
5. Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation					
a. Automatic Actuation Logic Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.

TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL ALLOWANCE (TA)	Z	SENSOR ERROR (S)	TRIP SETPOINT	ALLOWABLE VALUE
5. Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation (Continued)					
b. Steam Generator Water Level--High-High (P-14)	[7.1]	[4.28]	[1.5]	≤[82.4]% of narrow range instrument span.	≤[84.2]% of narrow range instrument span.
c. Safety Injection	See Item 1. above for Safety Injection Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.				
6. Auxiliary Feedwater					
a. Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
c. Steam Generator Water Level--Low-Low	[19.2]	~~[18.2]~~ 18.18	[1.5]	≥ [38.5]% of narrow range instrument span.	≥ [38.0]% of narrow range instrument span.
d. Safety Injection Start Motor-Driven Pumps	See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values				
e. Loss-of-Offsite Power Start Motor-Driven Pumps and Turbine-Driven Pumps	See Item 9. below for all Loss-of-Offsite Trip Setpoint and Allowable ~~Valves~~ VALUES				
f. Trip of All Main Feedwater Pumps Start Motor-Driven Pumps	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.

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TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT			TOTAL ALLOWANCE (TA)	Z	SENSOR ERROR (S)	TRIP SETPOINT	ALLOWABLE VALUE
6.	Auxiliary Feedwater (Continued)						
	g.	Steam Line Differential Pressure--High	5.0	1.47	3.0	≤ 100psi	≤ 127.4 psi
		Coincident With: Main Steam Line Isolation	See Item 4. above for Main Steam Line Isolation Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.				
7.	Safety Injection Switchover to Containment Sump						
	a.	Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
	b.	RWST Level--Low-Low	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	≥ [38.5]%	≥ [37.4]%
		Coincident With Safety Injection	See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.				
8.	Containment Spray Switchover to Containment Sump						
	a.	Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
	b.	RWST--Low-Low	See Item 7.b. above for all RWST--Low-Low Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.				
		Coincident With: Containment Spray	See Item 2. above for all Containment Spray Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.				

TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL ALLOWANCE (TA)	Z	SENSOR ERROR (S)	TRIP SETPOINT	ALLOWABLE VALUE
9. Loss-of-Offsite Power					
a. 6.9 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage--Primary	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	≥ [5040] volts with a ≤ [1.0] second time delay.	≥ [4990] volts with a ≤ [~~101~~] 1.01 second time delay.
b. 6.9 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage--Secondary	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	≥ [6420] volts with a ≤ [15] second time delay (without Safety Injection).	≥ [6292] volts with a ≤ [16.5] second time delay (without Safety Injection).
				≥ [6420] volts with a ≤ [54.0] second time delay (with Safety Injection).	≥ [6292] volts with a ≤ [59.4] second time delay (with Safety Injection).
10. Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Interlocks					
a. Pressurizer Pressure, P-11	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	≥ [2000] psig	≥ [1986] psig
b. Low-Low T_{avg}, P-12	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	≥ [553]°F	≥ [550.6]°F
c. Reactor Trip, P-4	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
d. Steam Generator Water Level, P-14	See Item 5.b above for all Steam Generator Water Level Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.				

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TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

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*Time constants utilized in the lead-lag controller for Steam Line Pressure-Low are $\tau_1 \geq$ [50] seconds and $\tau_2 \geq$ [5] seconds. CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall ensure that these time constants are adjusted to these values.

**The time constant utilized in the rate-lag controller for Steam Line Pressure-Negative Rate--High is less than or equal to [50] seconds. CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall ensure that this time constant is adjusted to this value.

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TABLE 3.3-5

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES

INITIATION SIGNAL AND FUNCTION	RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS
1. Manual Initiation	
a. Safety Injection (ECCS)	N.A.
b. Containment Spray	N.A.
c. Phase "A" Isolation	N.A.
d. Containment Ventilation Isolation	N.A.
e. Steam Line Isolation	N.A.
f. Reactor Trip	N.A.
g. Start Diesel Generator	N.A.
2. Containment Pressure--High-1	
a. Safety Injection (ECCS)	≤ [27](1)/[12](5)
1) Reactor Trip	≤ [2]
2) Feedwater Isolation	≤ [7](3)
3) Containment Phase "A" Isolation	≤ [~~17~~ 12](2)/[~~27~~ 22.5](1)
4) Containment Ventilation Isolation	≤ ~~[5]~~(6) 4.75
5) Auxiliary Feedwater Motor-Driven Pumps	≤ [60]
6) Emergency Service Water Pumps	≤ [32](1)/[22](~~2~~ 8)
7) Containment Fan Coolers	≤ [27](1)/[17](~~2~~ 8)
8) Control Room Isolation	N.A.
3. Pressurizer Pressure--Low	
a. Safety Injection (ECCS)	≤ [27](1)/[12](5)
1) Reactor Trip	≤ [2]
2) Feedwater Isolation	≤ [7](3)
3) Containment Phase "A" Isolation	≤ [~~27~~ 12](2)/[~~27~~ 22.5](1)
4) Containment Ventilation Isolation	≤ ~~[25](1)/[10](2)~~ ~~[5]~~(6) 4.75

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TABLE 3.3-5 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES

INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION	RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS
3. Pressurizer Pressure--Low (Continued)	
a. Safety Injection (ECCS) (Continued)	
5) Auxiliary Feedwater Motor-Driven Pumps	≤ [60]
6) Emergency Service Water Pumps	≤ [32](1)/[22](~~2~~ 8)
7) Containment Fan Coolers	≤ [27](1)/[17](~~2~~ 8)
8) Control Room Isolation	N.A.
4. Main Steam Line Pressure--Low	
a. Safety Injection (ECCS)	≤ [12](5)/[22](4)
1) Reactor Trip	≤ [2]
2) Feedwater Isolation	≤ [7](3)
3) Containment Phase "A" Isolation	≤ [~~17~~ 12](2)/[~~27~~ 22.5](1)
4) Containment Ventilation Isolation	≤ [~~5~~ 4.75](6)
5) Auxiliary Feedwater Motor-Driven Pumps	≤ [60]
6) Emergency Service Water Pumps	≤ [32](~~2~~ 1)/[22](~~1~~ 8)
7) Containment Fan Coolers	≤ [27](1)/[17](~~2~~ 8)
8) Control Room Isolation	N.A.
b. Steam Line Isolation	≤ [7]~~(3)~~
5. Containment Pressure--High-3	
a. Containment Spray	≤ [~~Later~~ 18.5](~~2~~ 8)/[32.2](1)
b. Phase "B" Isolation	≤ [22.5](1)/[12](2)
6. Containment Pressure--High-2 Steam Line Isolation	≤ [7]~~(3)~~
7. Steam Line Pressure - Negative Rate--High Steam Line Isolation	≤ [7]~~(3)~~

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TABLE 3.3-5 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIMES

INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION	RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS
8. Steam Generator Water Level--High-High	
a. Turbine Trip	≤ [2.5]
b. Feedwater Isolation	≤ [7](3)
9. Steam Generator Water Level--Low-Low	
a. Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps	≤ [60]
b. Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump	≤ [60]
10. Loss-of-Offsite Power	
Motor and Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump	≤ [60]
11. Trip of All Main Feedwater Pumps	
All Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps	N.A.
12. Steam Line Differential Pressure--High Coincident with Main Steam Line Isolation Signal	
Isolate Auxiliary Feedwater to the Affected Steam Generator	[N.A.]
13. RWST Level--Low-Low	
a. Safety Injection Switchover to Containment Sump Coincident with Safety Injection	≤ [32]
b. Safety Injection Switchover to Containment Sump Coincident With Containment Spray	≤ [103]
14. Containment Radioactivity--High ~~Containment Isolation~~	≤ [3.5](6,7)
a. Containment Purge Isolation	

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TABLE 3.3-5 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

(1) Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays included.

(2) Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delay not included. Offsite power available.

(3) Applicable to Main Feedwater Isolation Valves and Main Feedwater Bypass Isolation Valves.

(4) Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delay included. RHR pumps not included.

(5) Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays not included. RHR pumps not included.

(6) Isolation of Normal Containment Purge. This value is not applicable to Pre-entry Containment Purge which is permitted to be operating only in MODES 5 or 6 as per Specification 3.6.1.7.

(7) Response time testing of radiation monitors is not required.

(8.) DIESEL GENERATOR STARTING DELAY NOT INCLUDED BUT SEQUENCER LOADING DELAYS ARE INCLUDED.

TABLE 4.3-2

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL UNIT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST	TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST	ACTUATION LOGIC TEST	MASTER RELAY TEST	SLAVE RELAY TEST	MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED
1. Safety Injection (Reactor Trip, Feedwater Isolation, Control Room Isolation, Start Diesel Generators, Containment Ventilation Isolation, Phase A Containment Isolation, Start Auxiliary Feedwater System Motor-Driven Pumps, Start Containment Fan Coolers, Start Emergency Service Water Pumps, Start Emergency Service Water Booster Pumps)								
a. Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3, 4
b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(1)	M(1)	Q(3)	1, 2, 3
c. Containment Pressure--High-1	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
d. Pressurizer Pressure--Low	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
e. Steam Line Pressure--Low	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3

TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL UNIT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST	TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST	ACTUATION LOGIC TEST	MASTER RELAY TEST	SLAVE RELAY TEST	MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED
2. Containment Spray								
a. Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3, 4
b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(1)	M(1)	Q	1, 2, 3, 4
c. Containment Pressure--High-3	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
3. Containment Isolation								
a. Phase "A" Isolation								
1) Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.	N.A.	N.A	1, 2, 3, 4
2) Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(1)	M(1)	Q(3)	1, 2, 3, 4
3) Safety Injection	See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection Surveillance Requirements.							
b. Phase "B" Isolation								
1) Manual Containment Spray Initiation	See Item 2.a. above for Manual Containment Spray Surveillance Requirements.							
2) Automatic Actuation Logic Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(1)	M(1)	Q	1, 2, 3, 4

TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL UNIT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST	TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST	ACTUATION LOGIC TEST	MASTER RELAY TEST	SLAVE RELAY TEST	MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED
3. Containment Isolation (Continued)								
3) Containment Pressure--High-3	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
c. Containment Ventilation Isolation								
1) Manual Containment Spray Initiation	See Item 2.a. above for Manual Containment Spray Surveillance Requirements.							
2) Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(1, 2)	M(1, 2)	Q(2)	1, 2, 3, 4, 6#
3) Safety Injection	See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection Surveillance Requirements.							
4) Containment Radioactivity--High	See Table 4.3-3, Item 1., for Containment Radioactivity--High Surveillance Requirements.							
5) Manual Phase A Isolation	See Item 3.a.1) above for Manual Phase A Isolation Surveillance Requirements.							
4. Main Steam Line Isolation								
a. Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A	N.A	N.A.	M(1)	M(1)	Q	1, 2, 3
c. Containment Pressure--High-2	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3

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TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL UNIT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST	TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST	ACTUATION LOGIC TEST	MASTER RELAY TEST	SLAVE RELAY TEST	MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED
4. Main Steam Line Isolation (Continued)								
d. Steam Line Pressure--Low	See Item 1.e. above for Steam Line Pressure--Low Surveillance Requirements.							
e. Negative Steam Line Pressure Rate--High	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	3
5. Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation								
a. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(1)	M(1)	Q	1, 2
b. Steam Generator Water Level--High-High (P-14)	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2
c. Safety Injection	See Item 1. above for Safety Injection Surveillance Requirements.							
6. Auxiliary Feedwater								
a. Manual Initiation	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
b. Automatic Actuation and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A	N.A.	N.A.	M(1)	M(1)	Q	1, 2, 3
c. Steam Generator Water Level--Low-Low	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A	N.A	1, 2, 3
d. Safety Injection Start Motor-Driven Pump	See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection Surveillance Requirements.							
e. Loss-of-Offsite Power Start Motor-Driven Pump and Turbine-Driven Pump	See Item 9. below for all Loss-of-Offsite Power Surveillance Requirements.							

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TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL UNIT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST	TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST	ACTUATION LOGIC TEST	MASTER RELAY TEST	SLAVE RELAY TEST	MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED
6. Auxiliary Feedwater (Continued)								
f. Trip of All Main Feedwater Pumps Start Motor-Driven Pumps	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.	N.A.	N.A	1, 2
g. Steam Line Differential Pressure--High	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
Coincident With Main Steam Line Isolation	See Item 4. above for all Main Steam Line Isolation Surveillance Requirements.							
7. Safety Injection Switchover to Containment Sump								
a. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(1)	M(1)	Q(3)	1, 2, 3, 4
b. RWST Level--Low-Low	S	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	~~N.A.~~ Q(3)	1, 2, 3, 4
Coincident With Safety Injection	See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection Surveillance Requirements.							
8. Containment Spray Switchover to Containment Sump								
a. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	M(1)	M(1)	Q(3)	1, 2, 3, 4

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TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL UNIT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST	TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST	ACTUATION LOGIC TEST	MASTER RELAY TEST	SLAVE RELAY TEST	MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED
8. Containment Spray Switchover to Containment Sump (Continued)								
b. RWST Level--Low-Low	See Item 7.b. above for RWST Level--Low-Low Surveillance Requirements.							
Coincident with: Containment Spray	See Item 2. above for Containment Spray Surveillance Requirements.							
9. Loss-of-Offsite Power								
a. 6.9 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage--Primary	N.A.	R	N.A.	M*	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3, 4
b. 6.9 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage--Secondary	N.A.	R.	N.A.	M*	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3, 4
10. Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Interlocks								
a. Pressurizer Pressure, P-11	N.A.	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
b. Low-Low T_{avg}, P-12	N.A.	R	M	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
c. Reactor Trip, P-4	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	R	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1, 2, 3
d. Steam Generator Water Level, P-14	See Item 5.b. above for P-14 Surveillance Requirements.							

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FEB TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)

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TABLE NOTATION

(1) Each train shall be tested at least every 62 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS.

(2) The Surveillance Requirements of Specification 4.9.9 apply during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in containment.

* Setpoint verification not required.

\# During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in containment.

(3) EXCEPT FOR RELAYS K602, K636, K739, K740 AND K741 WHICH SHALL BE TESTED AT LEAST ONCE PER 18 MONTHS AND DURING EACH COLD SHUTDOWN EXCEEDING 72 HOURS UNLESS TESTED WITHIN THE PREVIOUS 90 DAYS.

3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

RADIATION MONITORING FOR PLANT OPERATIONS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.3.1 The radiation monitoring instrumentation channels for plant operations shown in Table 3.3-6 shall be OPERABLE with their Alarm/Trip Setpoints within the specified limits.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-6.

ACTION:

a. With a radiation monitoring channel Alarm/Trip Setpoint for plant operations exceeding the value shown in Table 3.3-6, adjust the Setpoint to within the limit within 4 hours or declare the channel inoperable.

b. With one or more radiation monitoring channels for plant operations inoperable, take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-6.

c. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.3.1 Each radiation monitoring instrumentation channel for plant operations shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST for the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-3.

TABLE 3.3-6

RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION FOR PLANT OPERATIONS

INSTRUMENT	CHANNELS TO TRIP	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE	APPLICABLE MODES	ALARM/TRIP	ACTION
1. Containment Radioactivity--					
a. Containment Ventilation Isolation Signal Area Monitors	2	3	1, 2, 3, 4, 6	≤ 2000 mR/hr	27
b. Gaseous Radioactivity-- RCS Leakage Detection	1	1	1, 2, 3, 4	~~≤ 8.0x10⁻³ µCi/ml~~ N.A.	26, 27
c. Particulate Radioactivity-- RCS Leakage Detection	1	1	1, 2, 3, 4	~~≤ 2.7x10⁻⁸ µCi/ml~~ N.A.	26, 27
2. Spent Fuel Pool Area-- Fuel Handling Building Emergency Exhaust Actuation					
a. Fuel Handling Building Operating Floor--South Network	1***	2	**	≤ 100 mR/hr	28
b. Fuel Handling Building Operating Floor--North Network	1***	2	*	≤ 100 mR/hr	28
3. Control Room Outside Air Intakes--					
a. Normal Outside Air Intake Isolation	1	2	All	≤ 1.0×10^{-5} µCi/ml	29
b. Emergency Outside Air Intake Isolation--South Intake	1	2	All	≤ 1.0×10^{-5} µCi/ml	29
c. Emergency Outside Air Intake Isolation--North Intake	1	2	All	≤ 1.0×10^{-5} µCi/ml	29

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TABLE 3.3-6 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

* With irradiated fuel in the Northend Spent Fuel Pool or transfer of irradiated fuel from or to a spent fuel shipping cask.

** With irradiated fuel in the Southend Spent Fuel Pool or New Fuel Pool.

*** Each channel consists of 3 detectors with 1 of 3 logic. A channel is OPERABLE when 1 or more of the detectors are OPERABLE.

ACTION STATEMENTS

ACTION 26 - Must satisfy the ACTION requirement for Specification 3.4.6.1.

ACTION 27 - With less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, operation may continue provided the containment purge makeup and exhaust isolation valves are maintained closed.

ACTION 28 - With less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, suspend all operations involving movement of fuel within the storage pool or crane operations over the storage pool.

ACTION 29 - With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, within 1 hour initiate isolation of the respective air intake. With no outside air intakes available, maintain operation of the Control Room Emergency Filtration System in the Recirculation Mode of Operation.

TABLE 4.3-3

RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION FOR PLANT OPERATIONS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

INSTRUMENT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST	MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED
1. Containment Radioactivity--				
a. Containment Ventilation Isolation Signal AREA MONITORS	S	R	M	1, 2, 3, 4, 6
b. Gaseous Radioactivity--RCS Leakage Detection	S	R	M	1, 2, 3, 4
c. Particulate Radioactivity--RCS Leakage Detection	S	R	M	1, 2, 3, 4
2. Spent Fuel Pool Area--Fuel Handling Building Emergency Exhaust Actuation				
a. Fuel Handling Building Operating Floor--South Network	S	R	M	**
b. Fuel Handling Building Operating Floor--North Network	S	R	M	*
3. Control Room Outside Air Intakes				
a. Normal Outside Air Intake Isolation	S	R	M	All
b. Emergency Outside Air Intake Isolation--South Intake	S	R	M	All
c. Emergency Outside Air Intake Isolation--North Intake	S	R	M	All

TABLE NOTATIONS

* With irradiated fuel in the Northend Spent Fuel Pool or transfer of irradiated fuel from or to a spent fuel shipping cask.

** With irradiated fuel in the Southend Spent Fuel Pool or New Fuel Pool.

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.3.2 The Movable Incore Detection System shall be OPERABLE with:

a. At least 38~~% of the~~ detector thimbles,

b. A minimum of two detector thimbles per core quadrant, and

c. Sufficient movable detectors, drive, and readout equipment to map these thimbles.

APPLICABILITY: When the Movable Incore Detection System is used for:

a. Recalibration of the Excore Neutron Flux Detection System, or

b. Monitoring the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO, or

c. Measurement of $F^N_{\Delta H}$, $F_Q(Z)$ and F_{xy}.

q

ACTION:

With the Movable Incore Detection System inoperable, do not use the system for the above applicable monitoring or calibration functions. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.3.2 The Movable Incore Detection System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE ~~at least once per~~ 24 hours ~~by normalizing each detector output~~ when required for:

WITHIN

a. Recalibration of the Excore Neutron Flux Detection System, or

b. Monitoring the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO, or

c. Measurement of $F^N_{\Delta H}$, $F_Q(Z)$ and F_{xy}.

q

PRIOR TO USE BY IRRADIATING EACH DETECTOR USED AND DETERMINING THE ACCEPTABILITY OF ITS VOLTAGE CURVE

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.3.3 The seismic monitoring instrumentation shown in Table 3.3-7 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

a. With one or more of the above required seismic monitoring instruments inoperable for more than 30 days, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next 10 days outlining the cause of the malfunction and the plans for restoring the instrument(s) to OPERABLE status.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.3.3.1 Each of the above required seismic monitoring instruments shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION, and an ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-4.

4.3.3.3.2 Each of the above required seismic monitoring instruments actuated during a seismic event greater than or equal to [0.01] g shall be restored to OPERABLE status within 24 hours and a CHANNEL CALIBRATION performed within 10 days following the seismic event. Data shall be retrieved from actuated instruments and analyzed to determine the magnitude of the vibratory ground motion. A Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 14 days describing the magnitude, frequency spectrum, and resultant effect upon facility features important to safety.

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TABLE 3.3-7

SEISMIC MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

INSTRUMENTS AND SENSOR LOCATIONS	MEASUREMENT RANGE	MINIMUM INSTRUMENTS OPERABLE
1. Triaxial Time-History Accelerographs		
a. Containment Mat (El 221 ft)	0.01-1.0 g	1***
b. Containment (El 286 ft)	0.01-1.0 g	1***
c. Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank Building (El 242 ft)	0.01-1.0 g	1***
2. Triaxial Peak Accelerograph Recorders		
a. Reactor Coolant Pipe (Loop 1)	± 10 g	1
b. Steam Generator 1A Pedestal (El 238 ft)	± 2 g	1
c. Reactor Auxiliary Building (El 236 ft)	± 10 g	1
3. Triaxial Seismic Switches		
a. Starter Unit for Time History Accelerograph System--Containment Mat (El 221 ft)	0.005 to 0.05 ~~0.01~~ g ~~** (H or V)~~	1*
b. Triaxial Seismic Switch--Containment Mat (El 221 ft)	0.025-0.25 ~~0.113~~ g ~~** V,~~ ~~0.119 g** (E-W)~~ ~~0.092 g** (N-S)~~	1*
4. Triaxial Response-Spectrum Recorders		
a. Steam Generator 1B Pedestal (El 238 ft)	± 2 g	1
b. Reactor Auxiliary Building (El 216 ft)	± 2 g	1
c. Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank Building	± 2 g	1
d. Containment Building (El 221 ft)	± 2 g	1*

*With main control room indication.

~~**Setpoints for seismic switches with direction designators H-horizontal, V-vertical, E-East, W-West, N-North, S-South.~~

***With main control room recording.

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TABLE 4.3-4

SEISMIC MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 28 FEB 1986

INSTRUMENTS AND SENSOR LOCATIONS	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST
1. Triaxial Time-History Accelerographs			
a. Containment Mat (El 221 ft)	M*	R	SA***
b. Containment (El 286 ft)	M*	R	SA***
c. Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank Building (El 242 ft)	M*	R	SA***
2. Triaxial Peak Accelerograph~~s~~ RECORDERS			
a. Reactor Coolant Pipe (Loop 1)	N.A.	R	N.A.
b. Steam Generator 1A Pedestal (El 238 ft)	N.A.	R	N.A.
c. Reactor Auxiliary Building (El 236 ft)	N.A.	R	N.A.
3. Triaxial Seismic Switches			
a. Starter Unit for Time History Accelerograph System--Containment Mat (El 221 ft)**	M	R	SA***
b. Triaxial Seismic Switch--Containment Mat (El 221 ft)**	M	R	SA***
4. Triaxial Response-Spectrum Recorders			
a. Containment Building (Active) (El 221 ft)**	M	R	SA***
b. Steam Generator (Passive) 1B Pedestal	N.A.	R	N.A.
c. Reactor Auxiliary Building (Passive) (El 216 ft)	N.A.	R	N.A.
d. Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank Building (Passive) (El 242 ft)	N.A.	R	N.A.

*Except seismic starter unit.

**With main control room alarms.

***The bistable trip setpoint need not be determined during the performance of a channel operational test.

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.3.4 The meteorological monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3-8 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

a. With one or more required meteorological monitoring channels inoperable for more than 7 days, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next 10 days outlining the cause of the malfunction and the plans for restoring the channel(s) to OPERABLE status.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.3.4 Each of the above meteorological monitoring instrumentation channels shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK and CHANNEL CALIBRATION at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-5.

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TABLE 3.3-8

METEOROLOGICAL MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

INSTRUMENT	LOCATION	MINIMUM OPERABLE
1. Wind Speed		
	Nominal Elev. 12.5 meters	1
	Nominal Elev. 61.4 meters	1
2. Wind Direction		
	Nominal Elev. 12.5 meters	1
	Nominal Elev. 61.4 meters	1
3. Air Temperature-- Differential Temperature		
	11.0 meters to 59.9 meters	1

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TABLE 4.3-5

METEOROLOGICAL MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

INSTRUMENT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION
1. Wind Speed		
a. Nominal Elev. 12.5 meters	D	SA
b. Nominal Elev. 61.4 meters	D	SA
2. Wind Direction		
a. Nominal Elev. 12.5 meters	D	SA
b. Nominal Elev. 61.4 meters	D	SA
3. Differential Air Temperature Between 11.0 meters and 59.9 meters	D	SA

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.3.5.a The Remote Shutdown System monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3-9 shall be OPERABLE.

3.3.3.5.b All transfer switches, Auxiliary Control Panel Controls and Auxiliary Transfer Panel Controls for the OPERABILITY of those components required by the SHNPP Safe Shutdown Analysis to (1) remove decay heat via auxiliary feedwater flow and steam generator power-operated relief valve flow from steam generators A and B, (2) control RCS inventory through the normal charging flow path, (3) control RCS pressure, (4) control reactivity, and (5) remove decay heat via the RHR system shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

a. With the number of OPERABLE remote shutdown monitoring channels less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE as required by Table 3.3-9, restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.

b. With one or more inoperable Remote Shutdown System transfer switches, power, or control circuits required by 3.3.3.5.b, restore the inoperable switch(s)/circuit(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 12 hours.

c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.3.5.1 Each remote shutdown monitoring instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the CHANNEL CHECK and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-6.

4.3.3.5.2 Each Remote Shutdown System transfer switch, power and control circuit and control switches required by 3.3.3.5.b, shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months.

TABLE 3.3-9

REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM

INSTRUMENT	READOUT LOCATION	TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE
1. Reactor Coolant System Hot-Leg Temperature	ACP*	2	1
2. Reactor Coolant System Cold-Leg Temperature	ACP*	2	1
3. Pressurizer Pressure	ACP*	2 ~~1-SSA Channel**~~	1-SSA Channel**
4. Pressurizer Level	ACP*	2	1
5. Steam Generator Pressure (Note 1)	ACP*	1/Steam Generator	1/Steam Generator
6. Steam Generator Level--Wide Range (Note 1)	ACP*	1/Steam Generator	1/Steam Generator
7. Residual Heat Removal Flow (Note 2)	ACP*	2	1
8. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow (Note 1)	ACP*	1/Steam Generator	N.A (NOTE 3) ~~1/Steam Generator~~
9. Condensate Storage Tank Level	ACP*	2 ~~1-SSA Channel**~~	1-SSA Channel**
10. Reactor Coolant System Pressure-Wide Range	ACP*	2 ~~1-SSA Channel**~~	1-SSA Channel**
11. Wide-Range Flux Monitor	ACP*	1	1-SSA CHANNEL**
12. Charging Header Flow	ACP*	1	1-SSA CHANNEL**
13. a. Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Steam Inlet--Pump Discharge ΔP or	ACP*	1	1-SSA CHANNEL**
b. Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Speed	ACP*	1	1
14. Boric Acid Tank Level	ACP*	1	1-SSA CHANNEL**

*ACP = Auxiliary Control Panel
**SSA = Safe Shutdown Analysis

Note 1 - Steam Generators A&B Only
Note 2 - RHR Train B Only
NOTE 3 - STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL IS USED

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TABLE 4.3-6

REMOTE SHUTDOWN MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

INSTRUMENT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION
1. Reactor Coolant System Hot-Leg Temperature	M	R
2. Reactor Coolant System Cold-Leg Temperature	M	R
3. Pressurizer Pressure	M	R
4. Pressurizer Level	M	R
5. Steam Generator Pressure	M	R
6. Steam Generator Water Level--Wide Range	M	R
7. Residual Heat Removal Flow	M	R
8. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow	M	R
9. Condensate Storage Tank Level	M	R
10. Reactor Coolant System Pressure--Wide Range	M	R
11. Wide-Range Flux Monitor	M	Q
12. Charging Header Flow	M	R
13. a. Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Steam Inlet--Pump Discharge ΔP	M	R
b. Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Speed	M	R
14. Boric Acid Tank Level	M	R

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ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.3.6 The accident monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3-10 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

a. With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels less than the Total Number of Channels shown in Table 3.3-10, restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

, the pressurizer safety valve position indicator, or the subcooling margin monitors

b. With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels, except the radiation monitors, less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements of Table 3.3-10, restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

, the pressurizer safety valve position indicator, or the subcooling margin monitor

c. With the number of OPERABLE channels for the radiation monitors less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements, initiate the preplanned alternate method of monitoring the appropriate parameter(s), within 72 hours, and either restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission, pursuant to Specification 6.9.2, within 14 days that provides actions taken, cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the channels to OPERABLE status.

d. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.3.6 Each accident monitoring instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the CHANNEL CHECK and CHANNEL CALIBRATION at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-7.

TABLE 3.3-10

ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

INSTRUMENT	TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE
1. Containment Pressure		
a. Narrow Range	2	1
b. Wide Range	2	1
2. Reactor Coolant Hot-Leg Temperature--Wide Range	2	1
3. Reactor Coolant Cold-Leg Temperature--Wide Range	2	1
4. Reactor Coolant Pressure--Wide Range	2	1
5. Pressurizer Water Level	2	1
6. Steam Line Pressure	2/steam generator	1/steam generator
7. Steam Generator Water Level--Narrow Range	4 ~~1~~/steam generator	1/steam generator
8. Steam Generator Water Level--Wide Range	1/steam generator	1/steam generator
9. Refueling Water Storage Tank Water Level	2	1
10. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate	1 ~~2~~/steam generator	1/steam generator
11. Reactor Coolant System Subcooling Margin Monitor	2	1
12. PORV Position Indicator*	2 ~~1~~/valve	1/valve
13. PORV Block Valve Position Indicator**	2 ~~1~~/valve	1/valve
14. Safety Valve Position Indicator	2/valve	1/valve
15. Containment Water Level (ECCS Sump)--Narrow Range	2	1
16. Containment Water Level--Wide Range	2	1

TABLE 3.3-10 (Continued)

ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

INSTRUMENT	TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE
17. In Core Thermocouples	4/core quadrant	2/core quadrant
18. Plant Vent--High Range Noble Gas Monitor	N.A.	1
19. Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors	N.A.	1/steam line
20. Containment--High Range Radiation Monitor	N.A.	1
21. Reactor Vessel Level	2	1
22. Containment Spray NaOH Tank Level	2	1
23. Turbine Building Vent Stack Radiation Monitor	N.A.	1
24. Waste Processing Building Exhaust System Radiation Monitors		
a. Vent 5	N.A.	1
b. Vent 5A	N.A.	1
25. Condensate Storage Tank Level	2	1

*Not applicable if the associated block valve is in the closed position.

**Not applicable if the block valve is verified in the closed position and power is removed.

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TABLE 4.3-7

ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

INSTRUMENT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION
1. Containment Pressure		
a. Narrow Range	M	R
b. Wide Range	M	R
2. Reactor Coolant Hot Leg Temperature--Wide Range	M	R
3. Reactor Coolant Cold Leg Temperature--Wide Range	M	R
4. Reactor Coolant Pressure--Wide Range	M	R
5. Pressurizer Water Level	M	R
6. Steam Line Pressure	M	R
7. Steam Generator Water Level--Narrow Range	M	R
8. Steam Generator Water Level--Wide Range	M	R
9. Refueling Water Storage Tank Water Level	M	R
10. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate	M	R
11. Reactor Coolant System Subcooling Margin Monitor	M	R
12. PORV Position Indicator	M	R
13. PORV Block Valve Position Indicator	M	R
14. Safety Valve Position Indicator	M	R
15. Containment Water Level (ECCS Sump)--Narrow Range	M	R
16. Containment Water Level--Wide Range	M	R

TABLE 4.3-7 (Continued)

ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

INSTRUMENT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION
17. In Core Thermocouples	M	R
18. Plant Vent--High Range Noble Gas Monitor	M	R
19. Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor	M	R
20. Containment--High Range Radiation Monitor	M	R*
21. Reactor Vessel Level	M	R
22. Containment Spray NaOH Tank Level	M	R
23. Turbine Building Vent Stack Radiation Monitor	M	R
24. Waste Processing Building Exhaust System Radiation Monitors	~~M~~	~~R~~
a. Vent 5	M	R
b. Vent 5A	M	R
25. Condensate Storage Tank Level	M	R

*CHANNEL CALIBRATION may consist of an electronic calibration of the channel, not including the detector, for range decades above 10 R/h and a one point calibration check of the detector below 10 R/h with an installed or portable gamma source.

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.3.7 Two independent Chlorine Detector Trains, with their Trip Setpoints adjusted to actuate at a chlorine concentration of less than or equal to 5 ~~[later]~~ ppm, shall be OPERABLE. Each train shall consist of a detector at each Control Room Area Ventilation System intake (both normal and emergency) and a detector at the chlorine storage area.

APPLICABILITY: All MODES.

ACTION:

a. With one Chlorine Detector Train inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or within the next 6 hours initiate and maintain operation of the Control Room Area Ventilation System in the recirculation mode of operation.

b. With both Chlorine Detector Trains inoperable, within 1 hour initiate and maintain operation of the Control Room Area Ventilation System in the recirculation mode of operation.

c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.3.7 Each Chlorine Detector Train shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of a CHANNEL CHECK at least once per 12 hours, an ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days and a CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months.

FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.3.8 As a minimum, the fire detection instrumentation for each fire detection zone shown in Table 3.3-11 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever equipment protected by the fire detection instrument is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTION:

a. With any, but not more than one-half the total in any fire zone, Function A fire detection instruments shown in Table 3.3-11 inoperable, restore the inoperable instrument(s) to OPERABLE status within 14 days or within the next 1 hour establish a fire watch patrol to inspect the zone(s) with the inoperable instrument(s) at least once per hour, unless the instrument(s) is located inside the containment, then inspect that containment zone at least once per 8 hours (or monitor the containment air temperature at least once per hour at the locations listed in Specification 4.6.1.5).

b. With more than one-half of the Function A fire detection instruments in any fire zone shown in Table 3.3-11 inoperable, or with any Function B fire detection instruments shown in Table 3.3-11 inoperable, or with any two or more adjacent fire detection instruments shown in Table 3.3-11 inoperable, within 1 hour establish a fire watch patrol to inspect the zone(s) with the inoperable instrument(s) at least once per hour, unless the instrument(s) is located inside the containment, then inspect that containment zone at least once per 8 hours (or monitor the containment air temperature at least once per hour at the locations listed in Specification 4.6.1.5).

c. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.3.8.1 Each of the above required fire detection instruments which are accessible during plant operation shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 6 months by performance of a TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST. Fire detectors which are not accessible during plant operation shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of a TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST during each COLD SHUTDOWN exceeding 24 hours unless performed in the previous 6 months.

4.3.3.8.2 The NFPA Standard 72D supervised circuits supervision associated with the detector alarms of each of the above required fire detection instruments shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 6 months.

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TABLE 3.~~6~~3-11

FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION

ZONE	INSTRUMENT LOCATION	ELEVATION (FT)	TOTAL NUMBER OF INSTRUMENTS HEAT (A/B)*	FLAME (A/B)*	SMOKE (A/B)*
1.0 Containment Building**					
1-C-1-RCP-1A	Reactor Coolant Pump 1A	256.33	12/0	---	---
1-C-1-RCP-1B	Reactor Coolant Pump 1B	256.33	12/0	---	---
1-C-1-RCP-1C	Reactor Coolant Pump 1C	256.33	12/0	---	---
1-C-1-CHFA	Airborne Radioactivity Removal Unit 1A	221.0	0/5	---	---
1-C-1-CHFB	Airborne Radioactivity Removal Unit 1B	221.0	0/~~5~~9	---	---
1-C-~~2~~3-EPA	Electrical Penetration Area 1A	261.0	0/12	---	12/0
1-C-~~2~~3-EPB	Electrical Penetration Area 1B	261.0	0/12	---	12/0
1-C-BAL	ELEVATOR MACHINE ROOM	302.0	---	---	2/0
2.0 Reactor Auxiliary Building					
1-A-1-PA	RHR Pump Room 1A	190.0	0/11	---	---
1-A-1PB	RHR Pump Room 1B	190.0	0/11	---	---
1-A-2MP	Misc. Pumps & Equipment	216.0	0/28	---	32/0
1-A-3-PB	Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps, Component Cooling Water Pumps & Heat Exchangers	236.0	0/~~46~~56	---	~~50~~59/0
1-A-3-COME	Decontamination Area & Corridor Cable Trays	236.0	0/10	---	14/0
1-A-3-COME	Letdown Heat Exchanger & Corridor Cable Trays	236.0	0/6	---	18/0
1-A-3-COR	CORRIDOR CABLE TRAYS	236.0	0/4	---	22
1-A-3-COMI	Recycle Holdup Tank Area & Corridor Cable Trays	236.0	0/10	---	~~21~~22/0

*(A/B) A = The number of early warning fire detectors.
B = The number of detectors used for actuation of fire suppression systems.

**The fire detection instruments located within the Containment Building are not required to be OPERABLE during the performance of Type A Containment Leakage Rate Tests.

1-C-1 CONTAINMENT FAN COOLERS --- 236.0 0/4 --- ---

1-C- CONTAINMENT EX-PRESS. CUBICLE No. 309 236/309 0/24 ---

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TABLE 3.3-11 (Continued)

FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION

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ZONE	INSTRUMENT LOCATION	ELEVATION (FT)	TOTAL NUMBER OF INSTRUMENTS HEAT (A/B)*	FLAME (A/B)*	SMOKE (A/B)*
2.0	Reactor Auxiliary Building (Continued)				
1-A-4-CHLR	HVAC Chiller Equipment Area & Cable Trays	261.0	0/~~42~~ 44	---	~~42~~ 44/0
1-A-4-~~COMB~~ COM-B	Boric Acid Equipment Area & Corridor Cable Trays	261.0	0/12	---	13/0
1-A-4-~~COME~~ COM-E	Corridor Cable Trays	261.0	0/~~8~~ 7	---	12/0
1-A-4-~~COMI~~ COM-I	Corridor Cable Trays	261.0	0/~~4~~ 3	---	7/0
1-A-4-CHFA	Charcoal Filter Room 1A	261.0	0/5	---	10/0
1-A-4-CHFB	Charcoal Filter Room 1B	261.0	0/4	---	8/0
1-A-EPA	Electrical Penetration Area SA	261.0	0/15	---	15/0
1-A-EPB	Electrical Penetration Area SB	261.0	0/15	---	15/0
1-A-5-HVA	HVAC Room 1A	286.0	---	---	14/0
1-A-5-HVB	HVAC Room 1B	286.0	---	---	15/0
1-A-SWGRA	Switchgear Room A	286.0	---	---	18/0
1-A-SWGRB	Switchgear Room B	286.0	---	---	17/0
1-A-BATA	Battery Room 1A	286.0	---	---	2/0
1-A-BATB	Battery Room 1B	286.0	---	---	2/0
1-A-CSRA	Cable Spreading Room A	286.0	0/~~21~~ 27	---	~~21~~ 27/0
1-~~B~~ A-CSRB	Cable Spreading Room B	286.0	0/15	---	15/0
1-A-ACP	Auxiliary Control Panel	286.0	---	---	2/0
1-A-CSRA	PIC Room A	286.0	---	---	2/0
12-A-6-RT1	Terminal Cabinet Room	305.0	---	---	14/0
12-A-6-RCC1	Rod Control Cabinets Room	305.0	---	---	~~7~~ 9/0
12-A-6-CR1	MAIN Control Room AREA	305.0	---	---	~~18~~ 20/0
12-A-6-APR1	Auxiliary Relay Panels	305.0	---	---	6/0
12-A-6-CR1	CONTROL ROOM PANELS	305.0	---	---	9/0

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Table 3.3-11 (Continued)

ZONE	INSTRUMENT LOCATION	ELEVATION (FT)	TOTAL NUMBER OF INSTRUMENTS HEAT (A/B)*	FLAME (A/B)*	SMOKE (A/B)*
2.0 Reactor Auxiliary Building (Continued)					
12-A-6-PICR1	Process Instruments & Control Racks	305.0	---	---	8/0
12-A-6-HV7	HVAC Equipment Room	305.0	0/~~4~~ 8	---	24 ~~12~~/0
3.0 Fuel Handling Building					
5-F-2-FPC	Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps & Heat Exchangers	236.0	0/16	---	2/0 ~~---~~
5-F-3-CHFA	Emergency Exhaust Charcoal Filter A	261.0	0/8	---	8/0
5-F-3-CHFB	Emergency Exhaust Charcoal Filter B	261.0	0/8	---	8/0
5-F-3-CHF-BAL	Emergency Exhaust Balance	261.0	---	---	4/0
5-F-3-DMNZ	1/2 GENERAL COL. 36 TO 50	261.0	---	---	12/0
4.0 Diesel Generator Building					
1-D-1-DGA-RM	Diesel Generator 1A	261.0	0/10	4 ~~8~~/0	---
1-D-1-DGB-RM	Diesel Generator 1B	261.0	0/10	4 ~~8~~/0	---
1-D-1-DGA-ASU	Diesel Generator Air Starting Unit 1A	261.0	2/0	---	---
1-D-1-DGB-ASU	Diesel Generator Air Starting Unit 1B	261.0	2/0	---	---
1-D-1-DGA-TK	Diesel Fuel Oil Day Tank 1A	280.0	0/2 ~~2/0~~	---	---
1-D-1-DGB-TK	Diesel Fuel Oil Day Tank 1B	280.0	0/2 ~~2/0~~	---	---
1-D-1-DGA-ER	Diesel Generator MCC & Control Panel 1A	261.0	---	---	2/0
1-D-1-DGB-ER	Diesel Generator MCC & Control Panel 1B	261.0	---	---	2/0
1-D-3-DGA-ES	Diesel Exhaust Silencer 1A	292.0	---	2/0	---
1-D-3-DGB-ES	Diesel Exhaust Silencer 1B	292.0	---	2/0	---

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TABLE 3.3-11 (Continued)

ZONE	INSTRUMENT LOCATION	ELEVATION (FT)	TOTAL NUMBER OF INSTRUMENTS HEAT (A/B)*	FLAME (A/B)*	SMOKE (A/B)*
5.0 Diesel Oil Storage Tank Area					
1-0-PA	Diesel Fuel Oil Pump Room 1A	242.25	0/2	2/0	---
1-0-PB	Diesel Fuel Oil Pump Room 1B	242.25	0/2	2/0	---
5-0-BAL	Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank Area--Balance	242.25	---	7/0	---
6.0 Emergency Service Water Intake Structure					
12-1-ESWPA	Electrical Equipment Room SA	251.7/ 262.0	---	---	~~10~~ 8/0
	Pump Room SA	262.0	---	2/0	---
12-1-ESWPB	Electrical Equipment Room SB	251.7/ 262.0	---	---	~~10~~ 8/0
	Pump Room SB	262.0	---	2/0	---

ADD THE FOLLOWING 2 PAGES TO THIS TABLE (PAGES 3/4 3-69a & 3-69B)

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Add this to table 3.3-11

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TABLE 3.3-11a

HVAC DUCT FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS

Supply Fan Zone	HVAC System	Smoke Detector Tag No.
1.0 Reactor Auxiliary Building		
1-A-5-HVA EL. 286	Switchgear Room A AH-12 (1A-SA) (1B-SA)	FAD-1FP-8655-A01 FAD-1FP-8655-A02 FAD-1FP-8655-A03
1-A-5-HVB EL. 286	Switchgear Room B AH-13 (1A-SB) (1B-SB)	FAD-1FP-8655-B01 FAD-1FP-8655-B02 FAD-1FP-8655-B03 FAD-1FP-8655-B04
12-A-6-HV7 EL. 305	Electrical Equipment Protection Rooms HVAC AH-16 (1A-SA) (1B-SB)	FAD-1FP-8655-C01 FAD-1FP-8655-C02
12-A-7-HV EL. 324	NNS Ventilation AH-14 (NNS)	FAD-1FP-8655-D01 FAD-1FP-8655-D02 FAD-1FP-8655-D03 FAD-1FP-8655-D04 ~~FAD-1FP-8655-D05~~
1-A-5-HV3 EL. 286	Normal Supply S-3A (NNS) S-3B (NNS)	FAD-1FP-8655-E01 FAD-1FP-8655-E02 FAD-1FP-8655-E03 FAD-1FP-8655-E04 FAD-1FP-8655-E05
12-A-6-HV7 EL. 305	Control Room HVAC AH-15 (1A-SA), (1B-SB)	FAD-1FP-8655-F01 FAD-1FP-8655-F02 FAD-1FP-8655-F03 FAD-1FP-8655-F04
(Later) EL. 324	Computer & Communication RM HVAC AH-97A(NNS) AH-97B(NNS)	FAD-1FP-8655-G01 FAD-1FP-8655-G02
(Later) EL. 324	Computer Battery & Aux Electric Protection Rms HVAC AH-98A (NNS), AH-98B (NNS)	FAD-1FP-8655-H01 FAD-1FP-8655-H02
2.0 Fuel Handling Building		
1-A-4-CHFA EL. 261	Normal Supply (South) AH-21A (NNS), AH-21B (NNS)	FAD-1FP-8657-A01 FAD-1FP-8657-A02

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ADD THIS TO TABLE 3.3-11

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TABLE 3.3-11a

HVAC DUCT FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTS

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Supply Fan Zone	HVAC System	Smoke Detector Tag No.
2.0 Fuel Handling Building (Cont'd)		
5-F-3-HV EL. 261	Normal Supply (North) AH-22A (NNS), AH-22B (NNS)	FAD-1FP-8657-B01 FAD-1FP-8657-B02 FAD-1FP-8657-B03
12-A-7-HV EL. 324	Normal Supply (Oper Fl) AH-56 (NNS), AH-57 (NNS)	FAD-1FP-8657-C01 FAD-1FP-8657-C02
12-A-7-HV EL. 324	Normal Supply (Oper Fl) AH-58 (NNS), AH-59 (NNS)	FAD-1FP-8657-D01 FAD-1FP-8657-D02
3.0 Diesel Generator Building		
1-D-3-DGA-HVR EL. 292	Electric Equip. Rm. A HVAC AH-85, (1A-SA), AH-85 (1B-SA)	FAD-1FP-8658-A01 FAD-1FP-8658-A02
1-D-3-DGB-HVR EL. 292	Electric Equip Rm B HVAC AH-85 (1A-SB), AH-85 (1B-SB)	FAD-1FP-8658-B01 FAD-1FP-8658-B02

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.3.9 The Metal Impact Monitoring System shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTION:

a. With one or more Metal Impact Monitoring System channels inoperable for more than 30 days, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next 10 days outlining the cause of the malfunction and the plans for restoring the channel(s) to OPERABLE status.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.3.9 Each channel of the Metal Impact Monitoring System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of:

a. A CHANNEL CHECK at least once per 24 hours,

b. An ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST, except for verification of setpoint, at least once per 31 days, and

c. A CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months.

RADIOACTIVE LIQUID EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.3.10 The radioactive liquid effluent monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3-12 shall be OPERABLE with their Alarm/Trip Setpoints set to ensure that the limits of Specification 3.11.1.1 are not exceeded. The Alarm/Trip Setpoints of these channels shall be determined and adjusted in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL (ODCM).

APPLICABILITY: ~~At all times.~~ AS SHOWN IN TABLE 3.3-12

ACTION:

a. With a radioactive liquid effluent monitoring instrumentation channel Alarm/Trip Setpoint less conservative than required by the above specification, immediately (1) suspend the release of radioactive liquid effluents monitored by the affected channel or (2) declare the channel inoperable and take ACTION as directed by b. below.

b. With less than the minimum number of radioactive liquid effluent monitoring instrumentation channels OPERABLE, take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-12. Exert best effort to return the instrument to OPERABLE status within 30 days and, if unsuccessful, explain in the next Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report pursuant to Specification 6.9.1.4 why this inoperability was not corrected in a timely manner.

c. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4, are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.3.10 Each radioactive liquid effluent monitoring instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, SOURCE CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION, and DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-8.

TABLE 3.3-12

RADIOACTIVE LIQUID EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

INSTRUMENT	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE	APPLICABILITY	ACTION
1. Radioactivity Monitors Providing Alarm and Automatic Termination of Release			
a. Liquid Radwaste Effluent Lines			
1) Treated Laundry and Hot Shower Tanks Discharge Monitor	1	**	35
2) Waste Monitor Tanks and Waste Evaporator Condensate Tanks Discharge Monitor	1	**	35
3) Secondary Waste Sample Tank~~s~~ Discharge Monitor	1	**	35
b. Turbine Building Floor Drains Effluent Line	1	**	36
c. Outdoor Tank Area Drain Transfer Pump Monitor	1	**	37
2. Radioactivity Monitors Providing Alarm But Not Providing Automatic Termination of Release			
a. Normal Service Water System Return From Waste Processing Building to the Circulating Water System	1	*	39
b. Normal Service Water System Return From the Reactor Auxiliary Building to the Circulating Water System	1	*	39
3. Flow Rate Measurement Devices			
a. Liquid Radwaste Effluent Lines			
1) Treated Laundry and Hot Shower Tanks Discharge	1	**	38
2) Waste Monitor Tanks and Waste Evaporator Condensate Tanks Discharge	1	**	38

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TABLE 3.3-12 (Continued)

RADIOACTIVE LIQUID EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

INSTRUMENT	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE	Applicability	ACTION
3. Flow Rate Measurement Devices (Continued)			
3) Secondary Waste Sample Tank	1	**	38
~~4) Normal Service Water System Supply to the Waste Processing Building~~	~~1~~		~~38~~
~~5) Normal Service Water System Return From the Reactor Auxiliary Building to the Circulating Water System~~	~~1~~		~~38~~
b. Cooling Tower Blowdown	1	*	38

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TABLE 3.3-12 (Continued)

* - AT ALL TIMES

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ACTION STATEMENTS

** WHENEVER LIQUID EFFLUENT IS BEING RELEASED VIA THIS PATHWAY

ACTION 35 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases via this pathway may continue provided that prior to initiating a release:

a. At least two independent samples are analyzed in accordance with Specification 4.11.1.1.1, and

b. At least two technically qualified members of the facility staff independently verify the release rate calculations and discharge line valving.

Otherwise, suspend release of radioactive effluents via this pathway.

ACTION 36 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases via this pathway may continue provided grab samples are analyzed for radioactivity at a lower limit of detection of no more than 10^{-7} microCurie/ml:

a. At least once per 12 hours when the specific activity of the secondary coolant is greater than 0.01 microCurie/gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131, or

b. At least once per 24 hours when the specific activity of the secondary coolant is less than or equal to 0.01 microCurie/gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131.

ACTION 37 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases via this pathway may continue provided that, at least once per 12 hours, grab samples are collected and analyzed for radioactivity at a lower limit of detection of no more than 10^{-7} microCurie/ml.

ACTION 38 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases via this pathway may continue provided the flow rate is estimated at least once per 4 hours during actual releases. Pump performance curves generated in place may be used to estimate flow.

ACTION 39 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, effluents releases via this pathway may continue provided the weekly Cooling Tower Blowdown weir surveillance is performed as required by Specification 4.11.1.1.1. Otherwise follow the ACTION specified in ACTION 37 above.

TABLE 4.3-8

RADIOACTIVE LIQUID EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

INSTRUMENT	CHANNEL CHECK	SOURCE CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST
1. Radioactiity Monitors Providing Alarm and Automatic Termination of Release				
a. Liquid Radwaste Effluent Lines				
1) Treated Laundry and Hot Shower Tanks Discharge Monitor	D	P	R(3)	Q(1)
2) Waste Monitor Tanks and Waste Evaporator Condensate Tanks Discharge Monitor	D	P	R(3)	Q(1)
3) Secondary Waste Sample Tank Discharge Monitor	D	P	R(3)	Q(1)
b. Turbine Building Floor Drains Effluent Line	D	M	R(3)	Q(1)
c. Outdoor Tank Area Drain Transfer Pump Monitor	D	M	R(3)	Q(1)
2. Radioactivity Monitors Providing Alarm But Not Providing Automatic Termination of Release				
a. Normal Service Water System Return From the Waste Processing Building to the Circulating Water System	D	M	R(3)	Q(2)

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TABLE 4.3-8 (Continued)

RADIOACTIVE LIQUID EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

INSTRUMENT	CHANNEL CHECK	SOURCE CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST
2. Radioactivity Monitors Providing Alarm But Not Providing Automatic Termination of Release (Continued)				
b. Normal Service Water System Return From the Reactor Auxiliary Building to the Circulating Water System	D	M	R(3)	Q(2)
3. Flow Rate Measurement Devices				
a. Liquid Radwaste Effluent Lines				
1) Treated Laundry and Hot Shower Tanks Discharge	D(4)	N.A.	R	~~Q~~ N.A.
2) Waste Monitor Tanks and Waste Evaporator Condensate Tanks Discharge	D(4)	N.A.	R	~~Q~~ N.A.
3) Secondary Waste Sample Tank	D(4)	N.A.	R	~~Q~~ N.A.
~~4) Normal Service Water System Supply Waste Processing Building~~	~~D(4)~~	~~N.A.~~	~~R~~	~~N.A.~~
~~5) Normal Service Water System Return From Reactor Auxiliary Building to the Circulating Water System~~	~~D(4)~~	~~N.A.~~	~~R~~	~~N.A.~~
b. Cooling Tower Blowdown	D(4)	N.A.	R	~~Q~~ N.A.

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TABLE ~~3.3-8~~ (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

(1) The DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall also demonstrate that automatic isolation of this pathway and control room alarm annunciation occur if any of the following conditions exists:

a. Instrument indicates measured levels above the Alarm/Trip Setpoint, or

b. Circuit failure (monitor loss of communications (alarm only), detector loss of counts (Alarm only) or monitor loss of power), or

c. Detector check source test failure (alarm only), or

d. Detector channel out of service (alarm only), or

e. Monitor loss of sample flow (alarm only).

(2) The DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall also demonstrate that control room alarm annunciation occurs if any of the following conditions exists:

a. Instrument indicates measured levels above the Alarm Setpoint, or

b. Circuit failure (monitor loss of communications (alarm only), detector loss of counts, or monitor loss of power), or

c. Detector check source test failure, or

d. Detector channel out of service, or

e. Monitor loss of sample flow.

(3) The initial CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be performed using one or more of the reference standards certified by the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) or using standards that have been obtained from suppliers that participate in measurement assurance activities with NBS. These standards shall permit calibrating the system over its intended range of energy and measurement range. For subsequent CHANNEL CALIBRATION, sources that have been related to the initial calibration shall be used.

(4) CHANNEL CHECK shall consist of verifying indication of flow during periods of release. CHANNEL CHECK shall be made at least once per 24 hours on days on which continuous, periodic, or batch releases are made.

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RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.3.11 The radioactive gaseous effluent monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3-13 shall be OPERABLE with their Alarm/Trip Setpoints set to ensure that the limits of Specifications 3.11.2.1 and 3.11.2.5 are not exceeded. The Alarm/Trip Setpoints of these channels meeting Specification 3.11.2.1 shall be determined and adjusted in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3-13

ACTION:

a. With a radioactive gaseous effluent monitoring instrumentation channel Alarm/Trip Setpoint less conservative than required by the above specification, immediately (1) suspend the release of radioactive gaseous effluents monitored by the affected channel or (2) declare the channel inoperable and take ACTION as directed by b. below.

b. With the number of OPERABLE radioactive gaseous effluent monitoring instrumentation channels less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE, take the ACTION shown in Table 3.3-13. Restore the inoperable instrumentation to OPERABLE status within the time specified in the ACTION, or explain in the next Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report pursuant to Specification 6.9.1.4 why this inoperability was not corrected within the time specified.

c. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.3.11 Each radioactive gaseous effluent monitoring instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, SOURCE CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and a DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST or an ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-9.

TABLE 3.3-13

RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

	INSTRUMENT	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE	APPLICABILITY	ACTION
1.	GASEOUS WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM--HYDROGEN AND OXYGEN ANALYZERS			
a.	Recombiner Outlet Hydrogen Monitor	1/recombiner	**	50
b.	Recombiner Outlet Oxygen Monitor	1/recombiner	**	48
c.	Compressor Discharge Oxygen Monitor	1	**	48
2.	TURBINE BUILDING VENT STACK			
a.	Noble Gas Activity Monitor	1	*	47
b.	Iodine Sampler	1	*	49
c.	Particulate Sampler	1	*	49
d.	Flow Rate Monitor	1	*	46
e.	Sampler Flow Rate Monitor	1	*	46
3.	PLANT VENT STACK			
a.	Noble Gas Activity Monitor	1	*	47
b.	Iodine Sampler	1	*	49
c.	Particulate Sampler	1	*	49
d.	Flow Rate Monitor	1	*	46
e.	Sampler Flow Rate Monitor	1	*	46

TABLE 3.3-13 (Continued)

RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

	INSTRUMENT	MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE	APPLICABILITY	ACTION
4.	WASTE PROCESSING BUILDING VENT STACK 5			
a.1	Noble Gas Activity Monitor (PIG)	1	*	45, ~~47~~ 51/
.2	Noble Gas Activity Monitor (WGRM)	1	MODES 1,2,3	52
b.	Iodine Sampler	1	*	49
c.	Particulate Sampler	1	*	49
d.	Flow Rate Monitor	1	*	46
e.	Sampler Flow Rate Monitor	1	*	46
5.	WASTE PROCESSING BUILDING STACK 5A			
a.	Noble Gas Activity Monitor	1	*	47
b.	Iodine Sampler	1	*	49
c.	Particulate Sampler	1	*	49
d.	Flow Rate Monitor	1	*	46
e.	Sampler Flow Rate Monitor	1	*	46

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TABLE 3.3-13 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

* At all times.

** During GASEOUS RADWASTE TREATMENT operation

ACTION STATEMENTS

ACTION 45 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, the contents of the WASTE GAS DECAY tank(s) may be released to the environment provided that prior to initiating the release:

a. At least two independent samples of the tank's contents are analyzed, and

b. At least two technically qualified members of the facility staff independently verify the release rate calculations and discharge valve lineup.

Otherwise, suspend release of radioactive effluents via this pathway.

ACTION 46 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases via this pathway may continue provided the flow rate is estimated at least once per 4 hours.

ACTION 47 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases via this pathway may continue provided grab samples are taken at least once per 12 hours and these samples are analyzed for radioactivity within 24 hours.

ACTION 48 - With the number of channnels OPERABLE less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, operation may continue provided grab samples are taken and analyzed at least once per 4 hours during degassing operations and at least once per 24 hours during other operations.

ACTION 49 - With the number of channels OPERABLE less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, effluent releases via the affected pathway may continue provided samples are continuously collected with auxiliary sampling equipment as required in Table 4.11-2.

ACTION 50 - With the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, suspend oxygen supply to the recombiner.

ACTION 51 - WITH THE NUMBER OF CHANNELS OPERABLE LESS THAN REQUIRED BY THE MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE REQUIREMENTS FOR BOTH THE PIG AND WGRM, EFFLUENT RELEASES VIA THIS PATHWAY MAY CONTINUE PROVIDED GRAB SAMPLES ARE TAKEN AT LEAST ONCE PER 12 HOURS AND THESE SAMPLES ARE ANALYZED FOR RADIOACTIVITY WITHIN 24 HOURS.

ACTION 52 - TAKE THE ACTION AS REQUIRED BY SPECIFICATION 3.3.3.6, ACTION C.

TABLE 4.3-9

RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

INSTRUMENT	CHANNEL CHECK	SOURCE CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST	MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED
1. GASEOUS WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM--HYDROGEN AND OXYGEN ANALYZERS					
a. Recombiner Outlet Hydrogen Monitor	D	N.A.	Q(4)	M#	**
b. Recombiner Outlet Oxygen Monitor	D	N.A.	Q(5)	M#	**
c. Compressor Discharge Oxygen Monitor	D	N.A.	Q(5)	M#	**
2. TURBINE BUILDING VENT STACK					
a. Noble Gas Activity	D	M	R(3)	Q(2)	*
b. Iodine Sampler	~~W~~ N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	*
c. Particulate Sampler	~~W~~ N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	*
d. Flow Rate Monitor	D	N.A.	R	Q~~*~~	*
e. Sampler Flow Rate Monitor	D	N.A.	R	Q~~*~~	*
3. PLANT VENT STACK					
a. Noble Gas Activity Monitor	D	M	R(3)	Q(2)	*
b. Iodine Sampler	~~W~~ N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	*
c. Particulate Sampler	~~W~~ N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	*
d. Flow Rate Monitor	D	N.A.	R	Q~~*~~	*
e. Sampler Flow Rate Monitor	D	N.A.	R	Q~~*~~	*

TABLE 4.3-9 (Continued)

RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

INSTRUMENT	CHANNEL CHECK	SOURCE CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST	MODES FOR WHICH SURVEILLANCE IS REQUIRED
4. WASTE PROCESSING BUILDING VENT STACK 5					
a. Noble Gas Activity Monitor	D	M	R(3)	Q(1)	*
b. Iodine Sampler	~~*~~ N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	*
c. Particulate Sampler	~~*~~ N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	*
d. Flow Rate Monitor	D	N.A.	R	Q~~*~~	*
e. Sampler Flow Rate Monitor	D	N.A.	R	Q~~*~~	*
5. WASTE PROCESSING BUILDING VENT STACK 5A					
a. Noble Gas Activity Monitor	D	M	R(3)	Q(2)	*
b. Iodine Sampler	~~*~~ N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	*
c. Particulate Sampler	~~*~~ N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	*
d. Flow Rate Monitor	D	N.A.	R	Q~~*~~	*
e. Sampler Flow Rate Monitor	D	N.A.	R	Q~~*~~	*

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TABLE 4.3-9 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

*At all times.

**During GASEOUS RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM operation.

#ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST

(1) The DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall also demonstrate that automatic isolation of this pathway and control room alarm annunciation occur if any of the following conditions exists:

a. Instrument indicates measured levels above the Alarm/Trip Setpoint, or

b. Circuit failure (monitor loss of communications - (alarm only), detector loss of counts (alarm only) or monitor loss of power), or

c. Detector check source test failure (alarm only), or

d. Detector channel out of service (alarm only), or

e. Monitor loss of sample flow (alarm only)

(2) The DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST shall also demonstrate that control room alarm annunciation occurs if any of the following conditions exists:

a. Instrument indicates measured levels above the Alarm Setpoint, or

b. Circuit failure (monitor loss of communications (alarm only), detector loss of counts, or monitor loss of power), or

c. Detector check source test failure, or

d. Detector channel out of service, or

e. Monitor loss of sample flow.

(3) The initial CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be performed using one or more of the reference standards certified by the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) or using standards that have been obtained from suppliers that participate in measurement assurance activities with NBS. These standards shall permit calibrating the system over its intended range of energy and measurement range. For subsequent CHANNEL CALIBRATION, sources that have been related to the initial calibration shall be used.

(4) The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall include the use of standard gas samples containing hydrogen and nitrogen.

(5) The CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall include the use of standard gas samples containing oxygen and nitrogen.

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3/4.3.4 TURBINE OVERSPEED PROTECTION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.4 At least one Turbine Overspeed Protection System shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2*, and 3*.

ACTION:

a. With one throttle valve or one governor valve per high pressure turbine steam line inoperable and/or with one reheat stop valve or one reheat intercept valve per low pressure turbine steam line inoperable, restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status within 72 hours, or close at least one valve in the affected steam line(s) or isolate the turbine from the steam supply within the next 6 hours.

b. With the above required Turbine Overspeed Protection System otherwise inoperable, within 6 hours isolate the turbine from the steam supply.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.4.1 The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable.

4.3.4.2 The above required Turbine Overspeed Protection System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by direct observation of the movement of each of the following valves through at least one complete cycle from the running position:

1. Four high pressure turbine throttle valves,
2. Four high pressure turbine governor valves,
3. Four low pressure turbine reheat stop valves, ~~and~~
4. Four low pressure turbine reheat intercept valves.

DELETE

b. At least once per 18 months by performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on the Turbine Overspeed Protection Systems, and

c. At least once per 40 months by disassembling at least one of each of the above valves and performing a visual and surface inspection of valve seats, disks, and stems and verifying no unacceptable flaws or excessive corrosion. If unacceptable flaws or excessive corrosion are found, all other valves of that type shall be inspected.

*Not applicable in MODE 2 or 3 with all main steam isolation valves and bypass valves in the closed position and all other steam flow paths to the turbine isolated.

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3/4.4.1 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION

STARTUP AND POWER OPERATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.1.1 All reactor coolant loops shall be in operation.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.*

ACTION:

With less than the above required reactor coolant loops in operation, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.1.1 The above required reactor coolant loops shall be verified in operation and circulating reactor coolant at least once per 12 hours.

*See Special Test Exceptions Specification 3.10.4.

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HOT STANDBY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.1.2 At least two of the reactor coolant loops listed below shall be OPERABLE with two reactor coolant pumps in operation when the Reactor Trip System breakers are closed and one reactor coolant pump in operation when the Reactor Trip System breakers are open:*

a. Reactor Coolant Loop A and its associated steam generator and reactor coolant pump,

b. Reactor Coolant Loop B and its associated steam generator and reactor coolant pump,

c. Reactor Coolant Loop C and its associated steam generator and reactor coolant pump,

APPLICABILITY: MODE 3.**

ACTION:

a. With less than the above required reactor coolant loops OPERABLE, restore the required loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.

b. With ~~only one~~ one or less reactor coolant loop in operation and the Reactor Trip System breakers in the closed position, within 1 hour open the Reactor Trip System breakers.

c. With no reactor coolant loop in operation, suspend all operations involving a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and immediately initiate corrective action to return the required reactor coolant loop to operation.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.1.2.1 At least the above required reactor coolant pumps, if not in operation, shall be determined OPERABLE once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignments and indicated power availability.

4.4.1.2.2 The required steam generators shall be determined OPERABLE by verifying narrow range secondary side water level to be greater than or equal to [10%] at least once per 12 hours.

*All reactor coolant pumps may be deenergized for up to 1 hour provided: (1) no operations are permitted that would cause dilution of the Reactor Coolant System boron concentration, and (2) core outlet temperature is maintained at least 10°F below saturation temperature.

**See Special Test Exception 3.10.4.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

4.4.1.2.3 The required reactor coolant loops shall be verified in operation and circulating reactor coolant at least once per 12 hours.

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.1.3 At least two of the loops listed below shall be OPERABLE and at least one of these loops shall be in operation:*

a. Reactor Coolant Loop A and its associated steam generator and reactor coolant pump,**

b. Reactor Coolant Loop B and its associated steam generator and reactor coolant pump,**

c. Reactor Coolant Loop C and its associated steam generator and reactor coolant pump,**

d. RHR Loop [A], ~~and~~ OR

e. RHR Loop [B].

APPLICABILITY: MODE 4.

ACTION:

a. With less than the above required loops OPERABLE, immediately initiate corrective action to return the required loops to OPERABLE status as soon as possible; if the remaining OPERABLE loop is an RHR loop, be in COLD SHUTDOWN within 24 hours.

b. With no loop in operation, suspend all operations involving a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and immediately initiate corrective action to return the required loop to operation.

*All reactor coolant pumps and RHR pumps may be deenergized for up to 1 hour provided: (1) no operations are permitted that would cause dilution of the Reactor Coolant System boron concentration, and (2) core outlet temperature is maintained at least 10°F below saturation temperature.

**A reactor coolant pump shall not be started with one or more of the Reactor Coolant System cold leg temperatures less than or equal to [335]°F unless the secondary water temperature of each steam generator is less than 50°F above each of the Reactor Coolant System cold leg temperatures.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.1.3.1 The required reactor coolant pump(s), if not in operation, shall be determined OPERABLE once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignments and indicated power availability.

4.4.1.3.2 The required steam generator(s) shall be determined OPERABLE by verifying narrow range secondary side water level to be greater than or equal to [10]% at least once per 12 hours.

4.4.1.3.3 At least one reactor coolant or RHR loop shall be verified in operation and circulating reactor coolant at least once per 12 hours.

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.1.4.1 At least one residual heat removal (RHR) loop shall be OPERABLE and in operation*, and either:

a. One additional RHR loop shall be OPERABLE**, or

b. The narrow range secondary side water level of at least two steam generators shall be greater than [10]%.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 5 with reactor coolant loops filled***.

ACTION:

a. With one of the RHR loops inoperable and with less than the required steam generator water level, immediately initiate corrective action to return the inoperable RHR loop to OPERABLE status or restore the required steam generator water level as soon as possible.

b. With no RHR loop in operation, suspend all operations involving a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and immediately initiate corrective action to return the required RHR loop to operation.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.1.4.1.1 The narrow range secondary side water level of at least two steam generators when required shall be determined to be within limits at least once per 12 hours.

4.4.1.4.1.2 At least one RHR loop shall be determined to be in operation and circulating reactor coolant at least once per 12 hours.

---

*The RHR pump may be deenergized for up to 1 hour provided: (1) no operations are permitted that would cause dilution of the Reactor Coolant System boron concentration, and (2) core outlet temperature is maintained at least 10°F below saturation temperature.

**One RHR loop may be inoperable for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing provided the other RHR loop is OPERABLE and in operation.

***A reactor coolant pump shall not be started with one or more of the Reactor Coolant System cold leg temperatures less than or equal to [335]°F unless the secondary water temperature of each steam generator is less than OR EQUAL TO 50°F above each of the Reactor Coolant System cold leg temperatures.

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COLD SHUTDOWN - LOOPS NOT FILLED

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.1.4.2 Two residual heat removal (RHR) loops shall be OPERABLE* and at least one RHR loop shall be in operation.**

APPLICABILITY: MODE 5 with reactor coolant loops not filled.

ACTION:

a. With less than the above required RHR loops OPERABLE, immediately initiate corrective action to return the required RHR loops to OPERABLE status as soon as possible.

b. With no RHR loop in operation, suspend all operations involving a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and immediately initiate corrective action to return the required RHR loop to operation.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.1.4.2 At least one RHR loop shall be determined to be in operation and circulating reactor coolant at least once per 12 hours.

*One RHR loop may be inoperable for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing provided the other RHR loop is OPERABLE and in operation.

**The RHR pump may be deenergized for up to 1 hour provided: (1) no operations are permitted that would cause dilution of the Reactor Coolant System boron concentration, and (2) core outlet temperature is maintained at least 10°F below saturation temperature.

3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES

SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.2.1 A minimum of one pressurizer Code safety valve shall be OPERABLE with a lift setting of 2485 psig ± 1%.*

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4 and 5.

ACTION:

With no pressurizer Code safety valve OPERABLE, immediately suspend all operations involving positive reactivity changes and place an OPERABLE RHR loop into operation in the shutdown cooling mode.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.2.1 No additional requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5.

*The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure.

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.2.2 All pressurizer Code safety valves shall be OPERABLE with a lift setting of 2485 psig ± 1%.*

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

With one pressurizer Code safety valve inoperable, either restore the inoperable valve to OPERABLE status within 15 minutes or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.2.2 No additional requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5.

*The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating temperature and pressure.

3/4.4.3 PRESSURIZER

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.3 The pressurizer shall be OPERABLE with a water volume of less than or equal to [1227] cubic feet, equivalent to 92% of indicated span, and at least two groups of pressurizer heaters each having a capacity of at least [125] kW.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

a. With only one group of pressurizer heaters OPERABLE, restore at least two groups to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

b. With the pressurizer otherwise inoperable, be in at least HOT STANDBY with the Reactor Trip System breakers open within 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.3.1 The pressurizer water volume shall be determined to be within its limit at least once per 12 hours.

4.4.3.2 The capacity of each of the above required groups of pressurizer heaters shall be verified by energizing the heaters and measuring circuit power (kW) at least once per 92 days.

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3/4.4.4 RELIEF VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.4 All power-operated relief valves (PORVs) and their associated block valves shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

a. With one or more PORV(s) inoperable, because of excessive seat leakage, within 1 hour either restore the PORV(s) to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve(s); otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

b. With one PORV inoperable as a result of causes other than excessive seat leakage, within 1 hour either restore the PORV to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve and remove power from the block valve.

c. With two PORVs inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat leakage, within 1 hour either restore the PORV(s) to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve(s) and remove power from the block valve(s); restore the PORV to OPERABLE status within the following 72 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

d. With all three PORVs inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat leakage, within 1 hour either restore the PORV(s) to OPERABLE status or close their associated block valve(s) and remove power from the block valve(s) and be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

e. With one or more block valve(s) inoperable, within 1 hour: (1) restore the block valve(s) to OPERABLE status, or close the block valve(s) and remove power from the block valve(s), or close the PORV and remove power from its associated solenoid valve; and (2) apply the ACTION b., c. or d. above, as appropriate, for the isolated PORV(s).

f. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.4.1 In addition to the requirements of Specification 4.0.5, each PORV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by:

a. Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION, and
b. Operating the valve through one complete cycle of full travel.

4.4.4.2 Each block valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 92 days by operating the valve through one complete cycle of full travel unless the block valve is closed with power removed in order to meet the requirements of ACTION b., c. or d. in Specification 3.4.4.

4.4.4.3 The backup air supply for the PORVs shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by isolating the normal accumulators and operating the valves through a complete cycle of full travel.

3/4.4.5 STEAM GENERATORS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.5 Each steam generator shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With one or more steam generators inoperable, restore the inoperable generator(s) to OPERABLE status prior to increasing T_{avg} above 200°F.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.5.0 Each steam generator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the following augmented inservice inspection program and the requirements of Specification 4.0.5.

4.4.5.1 Steam Generator Sample Selection and Inspection - Each steam generator shall be determined OPERABLE during shutdown by selecting and inspecting at least the minimum number of steam generators specified in Table 4.4-1.

4.4.5.2 Steam Generator Tube Sample Selection and Inspection - The steam generator tube minimum sample size, inspection result classification, and the corresponding action required shall be as specified in Tables 4.4-2 A and B. The inservice inspection of steam generator tubes shall be performed at the frequencies specified in Specification 4.4.5.3 and the inspected tubes shall be verified acceptable per the acceptance criteria of Specification 4.4.5.4. The tubes selected for each inservice inspection shall include at least 3% of the total number of tubes in all steam generators; the tubes selected for these inspections shall be selected on a random basis except:

a. Where experience in similar plants with similar water chemistry indicates critical areas to be inspected, then at least 50% of the tubes inspected shall be from these critical areas;

b. The first sample of tubes selected for each inservice inspection (subsequent to the preservice inspection) of each steam generator shall include:

   1. All nonplugged tubes that previously had detectable wall penetrations (greater than 20%),

   2. Tubes in those areas where experience has indicated potential problems, and

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

4.4.5.2 (Continued)

3. A tube inspection (pursuant to Specification 4.4.5.4a.8) shall be performed on each selected tube. If any selected tube does not permit the passage of the eddy current probe for a tube inspection, this shall be recorded and an adjacent tube shall be selected and subjected to a tube inspection.

c. The tubes selected as the second and third samples (if required by Tables 4.4-2 A and B) during each inservice inspection may be subjected to a partial tube inspection provided:

1. The tubes selected for these samples include the tubes from those areas of the tube sheet array where tubes with imperfections were previously found, and

2. The inspections include those portions of the tubes where imperfections were previously found.

d. Each inspection shall include a sample of those tubes expanded in the preheater section of the steam generator. The first sample size, second sample size and subsequent inspection shall follow Table 4.4-2B.

The results of each sample inspection shall be classified into one of the following three categories:

Category	Inspection Results
C-1	Less than 5% of the total tubes inspected are degraded tubes and none of the inspected tubes are defective.
C-2	One or more tubes, but not more than 1% of the total tubes inspected are defective, or between 5% and 10% of the total tubes inspected are degraded tubes.
C-3	More than 10% of the total tubes inspected are degraded tubes or more than 1% of the inspected tubes are defective.

Note: In all inspections, previously degraded tubes must exhibit significant (greater than 10%) further wall penetrations to be included in the above percentage calculations.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

4.4.5.3 Inspection Frequencies - The above required inservice inspections of steam generator tubes shall be performed at the following frequencies:

a. The first inservice inspection shall be performed after 6 Effective Full Power Months but within 24 calendar months of initial criticality. Subsequent inservice inspections shall be performed at intervals of not less than 12 nor more than 24 calendar months after the previous inspection. If two consecutive inspections, not including the preservice inspection, result in all inspection results falling into the C-1 category or if two consecutive inspections demonstrate that previously observed degradation has not continued and no additional degradation has occurred, the inspection interval may be extended to a maximum of once per 40 months;

b. If the results of the inservice inspection of a steam generator conducted in accordance with Tables 4.4-2 A and B at 40-month intervals fall in Category C-3, the inspection frequency shall be increased to at least once per 20 months. The increase in inspection frequency shall apply until the subsequent inspections satisfy the criteria of Specification 4.4.5.3a.; the interval may then be extended to a maximum of once per 40 months; and

c. Additional, unscheduled inservice inspections shall be performed on each steam generator in accordance with the first sample inspection specified in Tables 4.4-2 A and B during the shutdown subsequent to any of the following conditions:

   1. Reactor-to-secondary tubes leak (not including leaks originating from tube-to-tube sheet welds) in excess of the limits of Specification 3.4.6.2, or

   2. A seismic occurrence greater than the Operating Basis Earthquake, or

   3. A loss-of-coolant accident requiring actuation of the Engineered Safety Features, or

   4. A main steam line or feedwater line break.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

4.4.5.4 Acceptance Criteria

a. As used in this specification:

1. Imperfection means an exception to the dimensions, finish, or contour of a tube from that required by fabrication drawings or specifications. Eddy-current testing indications below 20% of the nominal tube wall thickness, if detectable, may be considered as imperfections;

2. Degradation means a service-induced cracking, wastage, wear, or general corrosion occurring on either inside or outside of a tube;

3. Degraded Tube means a tube containing imperfections greater than or equal to 20% of the nominal wall thickness caused by degradation;

4. % Degradation means the percentage of the tube wall thickness affected or removed by degradation;

5. Defect means an imperfection of such severity that it exceeds the plugging limit. A tube containing a defect is defective;

6. Plugging Limit means the imperfection depth at or beyond which the tube shall be removed from service and is equal to [40]%~~*~~ of the nominal tube wall thickness;

7. Unserviceable describes the condition of a tube if it leaks or contains a defect large enough to affect its structural integrity in the event of an Operating Basis Earthquake, a loss-of-coolant accident, or a steam line or feedwater line break as specified in Specification 4.4.5.3c., above;

8. Tube Inspection means an inspection of the steam generator tube from the point of entry (hot leg side) completely around the U-bend to the top support of the cold leg; and

9. Preservice Inspection means an inspection of the full length of each tube in each steam generator performed by eddy current techniques prior to service to establish a baseline condition of the tubing. This inspection shall be performed prior to initial POWER OPERATION using the equipment and techniques expected to be used during subsequent inservice inspections.

~~*Value to be determined in accordance with recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.121, August 1976.~~

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

4.4.5.4 Acceptance Criteria (Continued)

b. The steam generator shall be determined OPERABLE after completing the corresponding actions (plug all tubes exceeding the plugging limit and all tubes containing through-wall cracks) required by Tables 4.4-2A and B.

4.4.5.5 Reports

a. Within 15 days following the completion of each inservice inspection of steam generator tubes, the number of tubes plugged in each steam generator shall be reported to the Commission in a Special Report pursuant to Specification 6.9.2;

b. The complete results of the steam generator tube inservice inspection shall be submitted to the Commission in a Special Report pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 12 months following the completion of the inspection. This Special Report shall include:

1. Number and extent of tubes inspected,

2. Location and percent of wall-thickness penetration for each indication of an imperfection, and

3. Identification of tubes plugged.

c. Results of steam generator tube inspections which fall into Category C-3 shall be reported in a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days and prior to resumption of plant operation. This report shall provide a description of investigations conducted to determine cause of the tube degradation and corrective measures taken to prevent recurrence.

TABLE 4.4-1

MINIMUM NUMBER OF STEAM GENERATORS TO BE INSPECTED DURING INSERVICE INSPECTION

No. of Steam Generators per Unit	3
First Inservice Inspection	2
Second & Subsequent Inservice Inspections	1(1)(2)

TABLE NOTATIONS

(1) The inservice inspection may be limited to one steam generator on a rotating schedule encompassing 9% of the tubes if the results of the first or previous inspections indicate that all steam generators are performing in a like manner. Note that, under some circumstances, the operating conditions in one or more steam generators may be found to be more severe than those in other steam generators. Under such circumstances the sample sequence shall be modified to inspect the most severe conditions.

(2) The other steam generator not inspected during the first inservice inspection shall be inspected. The third and subsequent inspections should follow the instructions described in 1. above.

TABLE 4.4-2A

STEAM GENERATOR TUBE INSPECTION

1ST SAMPLE INSPECTION			2ND SAMPLE INSPECTION		3RD SAMPLE INSPECTION	
Sample Size	Result	Action Required	Result	Action Required	Result	Action Required
A minimum of S Tubes per S.G.	C-1	None	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	C-2	Plug defective tubes and inspect additional 2S tubes in this S.G.	C-1	None	N/A	N/A
			C-2	Plug defective tubes and inspect additional 4S tubes in this S.G.	C-1	None
					C-2	Plug defective tubes
					C-3	Perform action for C-3 result of first sample
			C-3	Perform action for C-3 result of first sample	N/A	N/A
	C-3	Inspect all tubes in this S.G., plug defective tubes and inspect 2S tubes in each other S.G. Notification to NRC pursuant to Specification 6.9.1	All other S.G.s are C-1	None	N/A	N/A
			Some S.G.s C-2 but no additional S.G.s are C-3	Perform action for C-2 result of second sample	N/A	N/A
			Additional S.G. is C-3	Inspect all tubes in each S.G. and plug defective tubes. Notification to NRC pursuant to Specification 6.9.1	N/A	N/A

$S = \frac{9}{n}\%$ where n is the number of steam generators inspected during an inspection.

TABLE 4.4-2B

STEAM GENERATOR TUBE INSPECTION - TUBE EXPANDED IN PREHEATER REGION

1ST SAMPLE INSPECTION			2ND SAMPLE INSPECTION	
Sample Size	Result	Action Required	Result	Action Required
A minimum of S of the tubes expanded in the preheater section	C-1	None	N/A	N/A
	C-2	Plug defective tubes and inspect all other expanded tubes in this Steam Generator	C-1	N/A
			C-2	Plug defective tubes
			C-3	Perform action for C-3 result of first sample
	C-3	Inspect all expanded tubes in this Steam Generator, plug defective tubes and inspect all expanded tubes in each other Steam Generator. Notification to NRC pursuant to Specification 6.9.1	All other S.G.s are C-1	None
			One or more S.G.s C-2 but no additional S.G.s are C-3	Plug defective tubes
			Additional S.G. is C-3	Plug defective tubes. Notification to NRC pursuant to Specification 6.9.1

$S = \frac{9}{n}\%$ where n is the number of steam generators inspected during an inspection.

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3/4.4.6 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE

LEAKAGE DETECTION SYSTEMS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.6.1 The following Reactor Coolant System Leakage Detection Systems shall be OPERABLE:

a. The Containment Airborne Gaseous Radioactivity Monitoring System,
b. The ~~Containment~~ REACTOR CAVITY Sump Level and Flow Monitoring System, and
c. The Containment Airborne Particulate Radioactivity Monitoring System.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

a. With a. or c. of the above required Leakage Detection Systems INOPERABLE, operation may continue for up to 30 days provided grab samples of the containment atmosphere are obtained and analyzed for airborne gaseous and particulate radioactivity at least once per 24 hours when the required AIRBORNE Gaseous or Particulate Radioactivity Monitoring System is inoperable; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

b. With b. of the above required Leakage Detection Systems inoperable be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

c. With a. and c. of the above required Leakage Detection Systems inoperable:

1. Restore either Monitoring System (a. or c.) to OPERABLE status within 72 hours and

2. Obtain and analyze a grab sample of the containment atmosphere for gaseous and particulate radioactivity at least once per 24 hours, and

3. Perform a Reactor Coolant System water inventory balance at least one per 8 hours.

Otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.6.1 The Leakage Detection Systems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a. Containment Airborne Gaseous and Particulate Monitoring Systems-performance of CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION, and DIGITAL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST at the frequencies specified in Table 4.3-3,

b. ~~Containment~~ REACTOR CAVITY Sump Level and Flow Monitoring System-performance of CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months.

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.6.2 Reactor Coolant System leakage shall be limited to:

a. No PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE,

b. 1 gpm UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE,

c. 1 gpm total reactor-to-secondary leakage through all steam generators and [500] gallons per day through any one steam generator,

d. 10 gpm IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE from the Reactor Coolant System,

e. 31 gpm CONTROLLED LEAKAGE at a Reactor Coolant System pressure of 2235 ± 20 psig, and

f. The maximum allowable leakage of any Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valve shall be as specified in Table 3.4-1 at a pressure of 2235 ± 20 psig.*

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

a. With any PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

b. With any Reactor Coolant System leakage greater than any one of the above limits, excluding PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE and leakage from Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valves, reduce the leakage rate to within limits within 4 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

c. With any Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valve leakage greater than the limit specified in Table 3.4-1, isolate the high pressure portion of the affected system from the low pressure portion within 4 hours by use of at least two closed manual or deactivated automatic valves, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

*Test pressures less than 2235 psig but greater than 150 psig are allowed. Observed leakage shall be adjusted ~~for the actual test pressure up to 2235 psig assuming the leakage to be directly proportional to pressure differential to the one-half power.~~ BY MULTIPLYING THE OBSERVED LEAKAGE BY THE SQUARE ROOT OF THE QUOTIENT OF 2235 DIVIDED BY THE TEST PRESSURE.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.6.2.1 Reactor Coolant System leakages shall be demonstrated to be within each of the above limits by:

a. Monitoring the containment Airborne Gaseous or Particulate Radioactivity Monitor at least once per 12 hours;

b. Monitoring the containment sump inventory and discharge at least once per 12 hours;

c. Measurement of the CONTROLLED LEAKAGE to the reactor coolant pump seals when the Reactor Coolant System pressure is 2235 ± 20 psig at least once per 31 days with the modulating valve fully open. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3 or 4;

d. Performance of a Reactor Coolant System water inventory balance at least once per 72 hours; and

e. Monitoring the Reactor Head Flange Leakoff System at least once per 24 hours.

4.4.6.2.2 Each Reactor Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valve specified in Table 3.4-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying leakage to be within its limit:

a. At least once per 18 months,

b. Prior to entering MODE 2 whenever the plant has been in COLD SHUTDOWN for 72 hours or more and if leakage testing has not been performed in the previous 9 months,

c. Prior to returning the valve to service following maintenance, repair or replacement work on the valve, and

d. Within 24 hours following valve actuation due to automatic or manual action or flow through the valve.

The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3 or 4.

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TABLE 3.4-1

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE ISOLATION VALVES

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EBASCO VALVE NUMBER	CP&L VALVE NUMBER	TYPE	FUNCTION	MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE LEAKAGE
1-RH-V502-SB-1	1RH1	12" Gate	RHR Pump Suction*	5 gpm
1-RH-V503-SA-1	1RH2	12" Gate	RHR Pump Suction*	5 gpm
1-RH-V500-SB-1	1RH39	12" Gate	RHR Pump Suction*	5 gpm
1-RH-V501-SA-1	1RH40	12" Gate	RHR Pump Suction*	5 gpm
1-SI-V510-SA-1	1SI134	6" Check	Low Head Injection (Hot Leg)	3 gpm
1-SI-V511-SB-1	1SI135	6" Check	Low Head Injection (Hot Leg)	3 gpm
1-SI-V544-SA-1	1SI249	12" Check	Accumulator Injection	5 gpm
1-SI-V547-SA-1	1SI250	12" Check	Accumulator Injection	5 gpm
1-SI-V545-SB-1	1SI251	12" Check	Accumulator Injection	5 gpm
1-SI-V548-SB-1	1SI252	12" Check	Accumulator Injection	5 gpm
1-SI-V546-SA-1	1SI253	12" Check	Accumulator Injection	5 gpm
1-SI-V549-SA-1	1SI254	12" Check	Accumulator Injection	5 gpm
2-SI-V581-SA-1	1SI346	10" Check	Low Head Injection	5 gpm
2-SI-V580-SB-1	1SI347	10" Check	Low Head Injection	5 gpm
1-SI-V584-SA-1	1SI356	6" Check	Low Head Injection	3 gpm
1-SI-V585-SB-1	1SI357	6" Check	Low Head Injection	3 gpm
1-SI-V586-SA-1	1SI358	6" Check	Low Head Injection	3 gpm
1-SI-V587-SA-1	1SI359	10" Gate	Hot Leg Recirculation	5 gpm

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*Specifications 4.4.6.2.2.b. and d. do not apply to these valves.

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3/4.4.7 CHEMISTRY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.7 The Reactor Coolant System chemistry shall be maintained within the limits specified in Table 3.4-2.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4:

a. With any one or more chemistry parameter in excess of its Steady-State Limit but within its Transient Limit, restore the parameter to within its Steady-State Limit within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours; and

b. With any one or more chemistry parameter in excess of its Transient Limit, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

At All Other Times:

With the concentration of either chloride or fluoride in the Reactor Coolant System in excess of its Steady-State Limit for more than 24 hours or in excess of its Transient Limit, reduce the pressurizer pressure to less than or equal to 500 psig, if applicable, and perform an engineering evaluation to determine the effects of the out-of-limit condition on the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System; determine that the Reactor Coolant System remains acceptable for continued operation prior to increasing the pressurizer pressure above 500 psig or prior to proceeding to MODE 4.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.7 The Reactor Coolant System chemistry shall be determined to be within the limits by analysis of those parameters at the frequencies specified in Table 4.4-3.

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TABLE 3.4-2

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

CHEMISTRY LIMITS

PARAMETER	STEADY-STATE LIMIT	TRANSIENT LIMIT
Dissolved Oxygen*	≤ 0.10 ppm	≤ 1.00 ppm
Chloride	≤ 0.15 ppm	≤ 1.50 ppm
Fluoride	≤ 0.15 ppm	≤ 1.50 ppm

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*Limit not applicable with T_{avg} less than or equal to ~~250~~ 180°F.

TABLE 4.4-3

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

CHEMISTRY LIMITS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

PARAMETER	SAMPLE AND ANALYSIS FREQUENCY
Dissolved Oxygen*	At least once per 72 hours
Chloride	At least once per 72 hours
Fluoride	At least once per 72 hours

*Not required with T_{avg} less than or equal to ~~250~~ 180°F

3/4.4.8 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.8 The specific activity of the reactor coolant shall be limited to:

a. Less than or equal to 1 microCurie per gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131, and

b. Less than or equal to 100/$\bar{E}$ microCuries per gram of gross radioactivity.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.

ACTION:

MODES 1, 2 and 3*:

a. With the specific activity of the reactor coolant greater than 1 microCurie per gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 for more than 48 hours during one continuous time interval or exceeding the limit line shown on Figure 3.4-1, be in at least HOT STANDBY with T_{avg} less than 500°F within 6 hours. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

b. With the specific activity of the reactor coolant greater than 100/$\bar{E}$ microCuries per gram, be in at least HOT STANDBY with T_{avg} less than 500°F within 6 hours.

MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5:

With the specific activity of the reactor coolant greater than 1 microcurie per gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 or greater than 100/$\bar{E}$ microCuries per gram, perform the sampling and analysis requirements of Item 4.a) of Table 4.4-4 until the specific activity of the reactor coolant is restored to within its limits.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.8 The specific activity of the reactor coolant shall be determined to be within the limits by performance of the sampling and analysis program of Table 4.4-4.

*With T_{avg} greater than or equal to 500°F.

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

FIGURE 3.4-1

DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 REACTOR COOLANT SPECIFIC ACTIVITY LIMIT VERSUS PERCENT OF RATED THERMAL POWER WITH THE REACTOR COOLANT SPECIFIC ACTIVITY >1 μCi/gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131

TABLE 4.4-4

REACTOR COOLANT SPECIFIC ACTIVITY SAMPLE AND ANALYSIS PROGRAM

TYPE OF MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS	SAMPLE AND ANALYSIS FREQUENCY	MODES IN WHICH SAMPLE AND ANALYSIS REQUIRED
1. Gross Radioactivity Determination*	At least once per 72 hours.	1, 2, 3, 4
2. Isotopic Analysis for DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 Concentration	1 per 14 days.	1
3. Radiochemical for $\bar{E}$ Determination	1 per 6 months**	1
4. Isotopic Analysis for Iodine Including I-131, I-133, and I-135	a. Once per 4 hours, whenever the specific activity exceeds 1 µCi/gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 or 100/$\bar{E}$ µCi/gram of gross radioactivity, and	1#, 2#, 3#, 4#, 5#
	b. One sample between 2 and 6 hours following a THERMAL POWER change exceeding 15% of the RATED THERMAL POWER within a 1-hour period.	1, 2, 3

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TABLE 4.4-4 (Continued)

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TABLE NOTATIONS

*A gross radioactivity analysis shall consist of the quantitative measurement of the total specific activity of the reactor coolant except for radionuclides with half-lives less than ~~10~~ 15. minutes and all radioiodines. The total specific activity shall be the sum of the degassed beta-gamma activity and the total of all identified gaseous activities in the sample within 2 hours after the sample is taken and extrapolated back to when the sample was taken. Determination of the contributors to the gross specific activity shall be based upon those energy peaks identifiable with a 95% confidence level. The latest available data may be used for pure beta-emitting radionuclides.

**Sample to be taken after a minimum of 2 EFPD and 20 days of POWER OPERATION have elapsed since reactor was last subcritical for 48 hours or longer.

#Until the specific activity of the Reactor Coolant System is restored within its limits.

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3/4.4.9 PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.9.1 The Reactor Coolant System (except the pressurizer) temperature and pressure shall be limited in accordance with the limit lines shown on Figures 3.4-2 and 3.4-3 during heatup, cooldown, criticality, and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing with:

a. A maximum heatup of [100]°F in any 1-hour period,

b. A maximum cooldown of [100]°F in any 1-hour period, and

c. A maximum temperature change of less than or equal to [10]°F in any 1-hour period during inservice hydrostatic and leak testing operations above the heatup and cooldown limit curves.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

With any of the above limits exceeded, restore the temperature and/or pressure to within the limit within 30 minutes; perform an engineering evaluation to determine the effects of the out-of-limit condition on the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System; determine that the Reactor Coolant System remains acceptable for continued operation or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and reduce the RCS T_{avg} and pressure to less than 200°F and 500 psig, respectively, within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.9.1 The Reactor Coolant System temperature and pressure shall be determined to be within the limits at least once per 30 minutes during system heatup, cooldown, and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing operations.

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REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.9.2 The Reactor Coolant System (except the pressurizer) temperature and pressure shall be limited in accordance with the limit lines shown on Figures 3.4-2 and 3.4-3 during heatup, cooldown, criticality, and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing with:

a. A maximum heatup rate as shown on Table 4.4-6.

b. A maximum cooldown rate as shown on Table 4.4-6.

c. A maximum temperature change of less than or equal to [10]°F in any 1-hour period during inservice hydrostatic and leak testing operations above the heatup and cooldown limit curves.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 4, 5, and 6 with reactor vessel head on.

ACTION:

With any of the pressure limits on Figures 3.4-2 and 3.4-3 exceeded FOR THE HEATUP AND COOLDOWN RATES SHOWN ON TABLE 4.4-6 restore the temperature and/or pressure to within the limit within 30 minutes; perform an engineering evaluation to determine the effects of the out-of-limit condition on the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System; determine that the Reactor Coolant System remains acceptable for continued operation or maintain the RCS T_{avg} and pressure at less than 200°F and 500 psig, respectively.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.9.2.1 The Reactor Coolant System temperature and pressure shall be determined to be within the limits at least once per 30 minutes during system heatup, cooldown, and inservice leak and hydrostatic testing operations.

4.4.9.2.2 The reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance specimens shall be removed and examined, to determine changes in material properties, as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H, in accordance with the schedule in Table 4.4-5. The results of these examinations shall be used to update Figure 3.4-2 and 3.4-3.

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MATERIAL PROPERTY BASIS

CONTROLLING MATERIAL	:	PLATE METAL
COPPER CONTENT	:	0.10 WT%
PHOSPHORUS CONTENT	:	0.006 WT%
RT_{NDT} INITIAL	:	90°F
RT_{NDT} AFTER 5 EFPY	:	1/4T, 155°F 3/4T, 135°F

CURVE APPLICABLE FOR COOLDOWN RATES UP TO 100°F/HR FOR THE SERVICE PERIOD UP TO ~~5~~ 4 EFPY AND CONTAINS MARGINS OF 10°F AND 60 PSIG FOR POSSIBLE INSTRUMENT ERRORS.



FIGURE 3.4-2

COOLDOWN ~~HEATUP~~ REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LIMITATIONS - APPLICABLE UP TO ~~5~~ 4 EFPY

Replace from 3/4 4-35a

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MATERIAL PROPERTY BASIS

CONTROLLING MATERIAL	:	PLATE METAL
COPPER CONTENT	:	0.10 WT%
PHOSPHORUS CONTENT	:	0.006 WT%
RT_{NDT} INITIAL	:	90°F
RT_{NDT} AFTER 4 EFPY	:	1/4T, 155°F 3/4T, 135°F

CURVE APPLICABLE FOR COOLDOWN RATES UP TO 100°F/HR FOR THE SERVICE PERIOD UP TO 4 EFPY AND CONTAINS MARGINS OF 10°F AND 60 PSIG FOR POSSIBLE INSTRUMENT ERRORS.



Figure 3.4-2 Shearon Harris Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System Cooldown Limitiations Applicable for 4 EFPY

3/4 4-35a

SHEARON HARRIS UNIT 1

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MATERIAL PROPERTY BASIS

CONTROLLING MATERIAL	:	PLATE METAL
COPPER CONTENT	:	0.10 WT%
PHOSPHORUS CONTENT	:	0.006 WT%
RT_{NDT} INITIAL	:	90°F
RT_{NDT} AFTER 5 EFPY	:	1/4T, 155°F 3/4T, 135°F

CURVE APPLICABLE FOR HEATUP RATES UP TO 60°F/HR FOR THE SERVICE PERIOD UP TO ~~5~~ 4 EFPY AND CONTAINS MARGINS OF 10°F AND 60 PSIG FOR POSSIBLE INSTRUMENT ERRORS.



FIGURE 3.4-3

Replace from 3/4 4-36a

HEATUP ~~COOLDOWN~~ REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LIMITATIONS - APPLICABLE UP TO ~~5~~ 4 EFPY

MATERIAL PROPERTY BASIS

CONTROLLING MATERIAL : PLATE METAL
COPPER CONTENT : 0.10 WT%
PHOSPHORUS CONTENT : 0.006 WT%
RT_{NDT} INITIAL : 90°F
RT_{NDT} AFTER 4 EFPY : 1/4T, 155°F
3/4T, 135°F

CURVE APPLICABLE FOR HEATUP RATES UP TO 100°F/HR FOR THE SERVICE PERIOD UP TO 4 EFPY AND CONTAINS MARGINS OF 10°F AND 60 PSIG FOR POSSIBLE INSTRUMENT ERRORS.



Figure 3.4-3 Shearon Harris Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System Heatup Limitations Applicable for 4 EFPY

TABLE 4.4-5

REACTOR VESSEL MATERIAL SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM - WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULE

CAPSULE NUMBER	VESSEL LOCATION	LEAD* FACTOR	WITHDRAWAL TIME (EFPY)**
U	343°	3.12	1st Refueling
V	107°	3.12	3 EFPY
X	287°	3.12	6 EFPY
W	110°	2.7	12 EFPY
Y	290°	2.7	20 EFPY
Z	340°	2.7	Standby

*The factor by which the capsule fluence leads the vessel maximum inner wall fluence.

**Withdrawal time may be modified to coincide with those refueling outages or plant shutdowns most closely approaching the withdrawal schedules.

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TABLE 4.4-6

MAXIMUM HEATUP AND COOLDOWN RATES
FOR MODES 4, 5, AND 6 (WITH REACTOR VESSEL HEAD ON)

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COOLDOWN RATES

TEMPERATURE*	COOLDOWN IN ANY 1 HOUR PERIOD
350-200°F	50°F
200-125°F	20°F
< 125°F	5°F

HEATUP RATES

TEMPERATURE*	HEATUP IN ANY 1 HOUR PERIOD
< 125°F	10°F
125-150°F	30°F
150-350°F	50°F

*Temperature range used should be based on the lowest RCS cold leg value.

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.9.3 The pressurizer temperature shall be limited to:

a. A maximum heatup of [100]°F in any 1-hour period,
b. A maximum cooldown of [200]°F in any 1-hour period, and
c. A maximum spray water temperature differential of [625]°F.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

With the pressurizer temperature limits in excess of any of the above limits, restore the temperature to within the limits within 30 minutes; perform an engineering evaluation to determine the effects of the out-of-limit condition on the structural integrity of the pressurizer; determine that the pressurizer remains acceptable for continued operation or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and reduce the pressurizer pressure to less than 500 psig within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.9.3 The pressurizer temperatures shall be determined to be within the limits at least once per 30 minutes during system heatup or cooldown. The spray water temperature differential shall be determined to be within the limit at least once per 12 hours during auxiliary spray operation.

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.9.4 At least one of the following Overpressure Protection Systems shall be OPERABLE:

a. Two power-operated relief valves (PORVs) with setpoints which do not exceed the limits established in Figure 3.4-4, or

b. The Reactor Coolant System (RCS) depressurized with an RCS vent of greater than or equal to 2.~~45~~9 square inches.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 4 when the temperature of any RCS cold leg is less than or equal to [335]°F, MODE 5 and MODE 6 with the reactor vessel head on.

ACTION:

a. With one PORV inoperable, restore the inoperable PORV to OPERABLE status within 7 days or depressurize and vent the RCS through at least a 2.~~45~~9 square inch vent within the next 8 hours.

b. With both PORVs inoperable, depressurize and vent the RCS through at least a 2.~~45~~9 square inch vent within 8 hours.

c. In the event either the PORVs or the RCS vent(s) are used to mitigate an RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days. The report shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the PORVs or RCS vent(s) on the transient, and any corrective action necessary to prevent recurrence.

d. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.9.4.1 Each PORV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a. Performance of an ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST on the PORV actuation channel, but excluding valve operation, within 31 days prior to entering a condition in which the PORV is required OPERABLE and at least once per 31 days thereafter when the PORV is required OPERABLE;

b. Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on the PORV actuation channel at least once per 18 months; and

c. Verifying the PORV isolation valve is open at least once per 72 hours when the PORV is being used for overpressure protection.

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

RCS TEMP OF	LOW PORV * PSIG ○	HIGH PORV * PSIG △
< 100	390	400
125	400	410
250	400	410
300	425	435
335	440	450

* VALUES BASED ON ~~5~~ 6 EFPY REACTOR VESSEL DATA AND CONTAINS MARGINS OF −10°F AND + 60psig FOR POSSIBLE INSTRUMENT ERROR.

FIGURE 3.4-4

MAXIMUM ALLOWED PORV SETPOINT FOR THE LOW TEMPERATURE OVERPRESSURE SYSTEM

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

4.4.9.4.2 The RCS vent(s) shall be verified to be open at least once per 12 hours* when the vent(s) is being used for overpressure protection.

*Except when the vent pathway is provided with a valve which is locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the open position, then verify these valves open at least once per 31 days.

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3/4.4.10 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.10 The structural integrity of ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components shall be maintained in accordance with Specification 4.4.10.

APPLICABILITY: All MODES.

ACTION:

a. With the structural integrity of any ASME Code Class 1 component(s) not conforming to the above requirements, restore the structural integrity of the affected component(s) to within its limit or isolate the affected component(s) prior to increasing the Reactor Coolant System temperature more than 50°F above the minimum temperature required by NDT considerations.

b. With the structural integrity of any ASME Code Class 2 component(s) not conforming to the above requirements, restore the structural integrity of the affected component(s) to within its limit or isolate the affected component(s) prior to increasing the Reactor Coolant System temperature above 200°F.

c. With the structural integrity of any ASME Code Class 3 component(s) not conforming to the above requirements, restore the structural integrity of the affected component(s) to within its limit or isolate the affected component(s) from service.

d. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.10 In addition to the requirements of Specification 4.0.5, each reactor coolant pump flywheel shall be inspected per the recommendations of Regulatory Position C.4.b of Regulatory Guide 1.14, Revision 1, August 1975.

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3/4.4.11 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENTS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.4.11 At least one Reactor Coolant System vent path consisting of at least [one] vent valve and one block valve, powered from emergency buses, shall be OPERABLE and closed at each of the following locations:

a. Reactor vessel head,
b. Pressurizer steam space

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

a. With one of the above Reactor Coolant System vent paths inoperable, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable vent path is maintained closed with power removed from the valve actuators of all the vent valves in the inoperable vent path and both block valves; restore the inoperable vent path to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

b. With both Reactor Coolant System vent paths inoperable, due to causes other than the removal of power to both block valves pursuant to Action a, maintain the inoperable vent path closed with power removed from the valve actuators of all the vent valves and block valves in the inoperable vent paths, and restore at least [one] of the vent paths to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.4.11.1 Each Reactor Coolant System vent path block valve not required to be closed by ACTION a. or b., above, shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 92 days by operating the valve through one complete cycle of full travel from the control room.

4.4.11.2 Each Reactor Coolant System vent path shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by:

a. Verifying all manual isolation valves in each vent path are locked in the open position,

b. Cycling each vent valve through at least one complete cycle of full travel from the control room, and

c. Verifying flow through the Reactor Coolant System vent paths during venting.

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3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS

3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS

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COLD LEG INJECTION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.5.1 Each Reactor Coolant System (RCS) accumulator shall be OPERABLE with:

a. The isolation valve open,

b. A contained borated water volume of between [7440] and [7710] gallons, which is equivalent to an indicated level between 66 and 97% level.

c. A boron concentration of between [1900] and [2100] ppm, and

d. A nitrogen cover-pressure of between [585] and [665] psig.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3*.

ACTION:

a. With one accumulator inoperable, except as a result of a closed isolation valve, restore the inoperable accumulator to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and reduce pressurizer pressure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours.

b. With one accumulator inoperable due to the isolation valve being closed, either immediately open the isolation valve or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and reduce pressurizer pressure to less than 1000 psig within the following 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.5.1.1 Each accumulator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 12 hours by:

1. Verifying, by the absence of alarms, the contained borated water volume and nitrogen cover-pressure in the tanks, and

2. Verifying that each accumulator isolation valve is open.

*Pressurizer pressure above 1000 psig.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

b. At least once per 31 days and within 6 hours after each solution volume increase of greater than or equal to [76] gallons, which is equivalent to an indicated level change of [9]% by verifying the boron concentration of the accumulator solution; and

c. At least once per 31 days when the RCS pressure is above [1000 psig] by verifying that the circuit breaker supplying power to the respective isolation valve operator is open.

4.5.1.2 Each accumulator water level and pressure channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

3/4.5.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T_{avg} GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 350°F

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.5.2 Two independent Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of:

a. One OPERABLE charging/safety injection pump,

b. One OPERABLE RHR heat exchanger,

c. One OPERABLE RHR pump, and

d. An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank on a Safety Injection signal and, upon being manually aligned, transferring suction to the containment sump during the recirculation phase of operation.

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APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

a. With one ECCS subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

b. In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date. The current value of the usage factor for each affected Safety Injection nozzle shall be provided in this Special Report whenever its value exceeds 0.70.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.5.2 Each ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 12 hours by verifying that the following valves are in the indicated positions with power to the valve operators removed:

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

CP&L Valve No.	EBASCO Valve No.	Valve Function	Valve Position*
ISI-107	2SI-V500SA-1	High Head Safety Injection to Reactor Coolant System Hot Legs	Closed-1
ISI-86	2SI-V501SB-1	High Head Safety Injection to Reactor Coolant System Hot Legs	Closed-1
ISI-52	2SI-V502SA-1	High Head Safety Injection to Reactor Coolant System Cold Legs	Closed-1
ISI-340	2SI-V579SA-1	Low Head Safety Injection to Reactor Coolant System Cold Legs	Open-1
ISI-341	2SI-V578SB-1	Low Head Safety Injection to Reactor Coolant System Cold Legs	Open-1
ISI-359	2SI-V587SA-1	Low Head Safety Injection to Reactor Coolant System Hot Legs	Closed-1

b. At least once per 31 days by:

1. Verifying that the ECCS piping is full of water by venting accessible discharge piping high points, and

2. Verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

c. By a visual inspection which verifies that no loose debris (rags, trash, clothing, etc.) is present in the containment which could be transported to the containment sump and cause restriction of the pump suctions during LOCA conditions. This visual inspection shall be performed:

1. For all accessible areas of the containment prior to establishing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, and

2. Of the areas affected within containment at the completion of each containment entry when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is established.

*Closed-1 and Open-1--The Control Power Disconnect Switch shall be maintained in the "OFF" position and the valve control switch shall be maintained in the valve position noted above.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

d. At least once per 18 months by:

1. Verifying automatic isolation and interlock action of the RHR system from the Reactor Coolant System by ensuring that:

   a) With a simulated or actual Reactor Coolant System pressure signal greater than or equal to 425 psig the interlocks prevent the valves from being opened, and

   b) With a simulated or actual Reactor Coolant System pressure signal less than or equal to [750] psig the interlocks will cause the valves to automatically close.

2. A visual inspection of the containment sump and verifying that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or abnormal corrosion.

e. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:

1. Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on safety injection actuation and safety injection switchover to containment sump on RWST Lo-Lo Level test signals, and

2. Verifying that each of the following pumps start automatically upon receipt of a safety injection actuation test signal:

   a) charging/safety injection pump,
   b) RHR pump.

f. By verifying that each of the following pumps develops the required differential pressure when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5:

1. charging/safety injection pump (Refer to Specification 4.1.2.4.~~1~~)
2. RHR pump > 134 psi.

g. By verifying that the locking mechanism is in place and locked for the following ECCS throttle valves:

1. Within 4 hours following completion of each valve stroking operation or maintenance on the valve when the ECCS subsystems are required to be OPERABLE, and

2. At least once per 18 months.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

HPSI SYSTEM EBASCO Valve No.(FSAR)	HPSI SYSTEM EBASCO Valve No.	HPSI SYSTEM CP&L Valve No.
2SI-V16SA-1	2SI-V440SA-1	ISI-5
2SI-V22SB-1	2SI-V439SB-1	ISI-6
2SI-V28SA-1	2SI-~~V433SA-1~~ V438SA-1	ISI-7
2SI-V62SA-1	2SI-V437SA-1	ISI-69
2SI-V68SB-1	2SI-V436SB-1	ISI-70
2SI-V74SA-1	2SI-V435SA-1	ISI-71
2SI-V38SA-1	2SI-V434SA-1	ISI-101
2SI-V44SB-1	2SI-V433SB-1	ISI-102
2SI-V50SA-1	2SI-V432SA-1	ISI-103
2SI-V83SA-1	2SI-V431SA-1	ISI-124
2SI-V89SB-1	2SI-V430SB-1	ISI-125
2SI-V95SA-1	2SI-V429SA-1	ISI-126

h. By performing a flow balance test, during shutdown, following completion of modifications to the ECCS subsystems that alter the subsystem flow characteristics and verifying that:

1. For charging/safety injection pump lines, with a single pump running:

   a) The sum of the injection line flow rates, excluding the highest flow rate, is greater than or equal to 379 gpm, and

   b) The total pump flow rate is less than or equal to 650 gpm.

2. For RHR pump lines, with a single pump running, the sum of the injection line flow rates is greater than or equal to 3663 gpm.

3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T_{avg} LESS THAN 350°F

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.5.3 As a minimum, one ECCS subsystem comprised of the following shall be OPERABLE:

a. One OPERABLE charging/safety injection pump,*

b. One OPERABLE RHR heat exchanger,

c. One OPERABLE RHR pump, and

d. An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water storage tank upon being manually realigned and transferring suction to the containment sump during the recirculation phase of operation.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 4.

ACTION:

a. With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE because of the inoperability of either the charging/safety injection pump or the flow path from the refueling water storage tank, restore at least one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours.

b. With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE because of the inoperability of either the residual heat removal heat exchanger or RHR pump, restore at least one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status or maintain the Reactor Coolant System T_{avg} less than 350°F by use of alternate heat removal methods.

c. In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date. The current value of the usage factor for each affected Safety Injection nozzle shall be provided in this Special Report whenever its value exceeds 0.70.

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*A maximum of one charging/safety injection pump shall be OPERABLE whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than or equal to [335]°F.

4.5.3.1 The ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per the applicable requirements of Specification 4.5.2.

4.5.3.2 All charging/safety injection pumps, except the above allowed OPERABLE pump, shall be demonstrated inoperable* by verifying that the motor circuit breakers are secured in the open position prior to the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs decreasing below 335°F and at least once per 31 days thereafter.

*An inoperable pump may be energized for testing provided the discharge of the pump has been isolated from the RCS by a closed isolation valve with the power removed from the valve operator or by a manual valve secured in the closed position.

3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.5.4 The refueling water storage tank (RWST) shall be OPERABLE with:

a. A minimum contained borated water volume of [~~433000~~ 448000] gallons, which is equivalent to ~~84%~~ 95 indicated level.

b. A ~~minimum~~ boron concentration of between [2000] ppm and 2200 ppm of boron,

c. A minimum solution temperature of [40]°F, and

d. A maximum solution temperature of [125]°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With the RWST inoperable, restore the tank to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.5.4 The RWST shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by:

1. Verifying the contained borated water volume in the tank, and
2. Verifying the boron concentration of the water.

b. At least once per 24 hours by verifying the RWST temperature when the outside air temperature is less than 40°F or greater than [125]°F.

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3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

Without primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, restore CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be demonstrated:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that all penetrations* not capable of being closed by OPERABLE containment automatic isolation valves and required to be closed during accident conditions are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their closed positions, except as provided in Table 3.6-1 of Specification 3.6.3;

b. By verifying that each containment air lock is in compliance with the requirements of Specification 3.6.1.3; and

c. After each closing of each penetration subject to Type B testing, except the containment air locks, if opened following a Type A or B test, by leak rate testing the seal with gas at a pressure not less than P_a, [41 psig], and verifying that when the measured leakage rate for these seals is added to the leakage rates determined pursuant to Specification 4.6.1.2d. for all other Type B and C penetrations, the combined leakage rate is less than 0.60 L_a.

*Except valves, blind flanges, and deactivated automatic valves which are located inside the containment and are locked, sealed or otherwise secured in the closed position. These penetrations shall be verified closed during each COLD SHUTDOWN except that such verification need not be performed more often than once per 92 days.

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.2 Containment leakage rates shall be limited to:

a. An overall integrated leakage rate of:

1. Less than or equal to L_a, [0.10]% by weight of the containment air per 24 hours at P_a, [41 psig], or

2. Less than or equal to L_t, [0.07]% by weight of the containment air per 24 hours at a reduced pressure of P_t, [20.5 psig].

b. A combined leakage rate of less than or equal to 0.60 L_a for all penetrations and valves subject to Type B and C tests, when pressurized to P_a.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With either the measured overall integrated containment leakage rate exceeding 0.75 L_a or 0.75 L_t, as applicable, or the measured combined leakage rate for all penetrations and valves subject to Types B and C tests exceeding 0.60 L_a, restore the overall integrated leakage rate to less than 0.75 L_a or less than 0.75 L_t, as applicable, and the combined leakage rate for all penetrations subject to Type B and C tests to less than 0.60 L_a prior to increasing the Reactor Coolant System temperature above 200°F.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

DURATION

OF LESS THAN 24 HOURS IS PERMITTED IF

4.6.1.2 The containment leakage rates shall be demonstrated at the following test schedule and shall be determined in conformance with the criteria specified in Appendix J of 10 CFR Part 50 using the methods and provisions of ANSI N45.4-[1972], or a ~~short-duration~~ test ~~may be~~ performed ~~for Type A tests~~ using the ~~test duration~~ criteria contained in ~~Paragraph 2.0 of~~ Bechtel Topical Report BN-TOP-1, Rev. 1, November 1, 1972, "Testing Criteria for Integrated Leakage Rate Testing of Primary Containment Structures for Nuclear Power Plants." (IN ADDITION TO THE BN-TOP-1 CRITERIA) & The Mass Point technique~~, as described in ANSI/ANS 56.8-1981, Paragraph 5.7.2, may be used in lieu of the Total Time or Point-to-Point methods~~. WILL BE USED TO CALCULATE THE LEAKAGE RATE.

a. Three Type A tests (Overall Integrated Containment Leakage Rate) shall be conducted at 40 ± 10 month intervals during shutdown at a pressure not less than either P_a, or at P_t, during each 10-year

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

service period. The third test of each set shall be conducted during the shutdown for the 10-year plant inservice inspection;

b. If any periodic Type A test fails to meet either 0.75 L_a or 0.75 L_t, the test schedule for subsequent Type A tests shall be reviewed and approved by the Commission. If two consecutive Type A tests fail to meet either 0.75 L_a or 0.75 L_t, a Type A test shall be performed at least every 18 months until two consecutive Type A tests meet either 0.75 L_a or 0.75 L_t at which time the above test schedule may be resumed;

c. The accuracy of each Type A test shall be verified by a supplemental test which:

   1. Confirms the accuracy of the test by verifying that the supplemental test result, L_c, minus the sum of the Type A and the superimposed leak, L_o, is equal to or less than 0.25 L_a or 0.25 L_t;

   2. Has a duration sufficient to establish accurately the change in leakage rate between the Type A test and the supplemental test; and

   3. Requires that the rate at which gas is injected into the containment or bled from the containment during the supplemental test is between 0.75 L_a and 1.25 L_a; or 0.75 L_t and 1.25 L_t.

d. Type B and C tests shall be conducted with gas at a pressure not less than P_a, at intervals no greater than 24 months except for tests involving:

   1. Air locks,

   2. Containment purge makeup and exhaust isolation valves with resilient material seals,

e. Air locks shall be tested and demonstrated OPERABLE by the requirements of Specification 4.6.1.3;

f. Purge makeup and exhaust isolation valves with resilient material seals shall be tested and demonstrated OPERABLE by the requirements of Specification 4.6.1.7.3 or 4.6.1.7.4, as applicable;

g. The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable.

CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.3 Each containment air lock shall be OPERABLE with:

a. Both doors closed except when the air lock is being used for normal transit entry and exit through the containment, then at least one air lock door shall be closed, and

b. An overall air lock leakage rate of less than or equal to 0.05 L_a at P_a.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

a. With one containment air lock door inoperable:

1. Maintain at least the OPERABLE air lock door closed and either restore the inoperable air lock door to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or lock the OPERABLE air lock door closed;

2. Operation may then continue until performance of the next required overall air lock leakage test provided that the OPERABLE air lock door is verified to be locked closed at least once per 31 days;

3. Otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours; and

4. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

b. With the containment air lock inoperable, except as the result of an inoperable air lock door, maintain at least one air lock door closed; restore the inoperable air lock to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.3 Each containment air lock shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. Within 72 hours following each closing, except when the air lock is being used for multiple entries, then at least once per 72 hours, by verifying seal leakage is less than 0.01 L_a as determined by precision flow measurements when measured for at least 3.0 seconds with the volume between the seals at a constant pressure of [41 psig];

b. By conducting overall air lock leakage tests at not less than P_a, and verifying the overall air lock leakage rate is within its limit:

   1. At least once per 6 months,* and

   2. Prior to establishing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY when maintenance has been performed on the air lock that could affect the air lock sealing capability.**

c. At least once per 6 months by verifying that only one door in each air lock can be opened at a time.

*The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable.

**This represents an exemption to Appendix J, paragraph III.D.2 of 10 CFR Part 50.

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INTERNAL PRESSURE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.4 Primary containment internal pressure shall be maintained between ~~[-4.0]~~ -1.0 inches water gauge and [1.9] psig.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With the containment internal pressure outside of the limits above, restore the internal pressure to within the limits within 1 hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.4 The primary containment internal pressure shall be determined to be within the limits at least once per 12 hours.

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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

AIR TEMPERATURE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.5 Primary containment average air temperature shall not exceed 120°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With the containment average air temperature greater than 120°F, reduce the average air temperature to within the limit within 8 hours, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.5 The primary containment average air temperature shall be the arithmetical average of the temperatures at the following locations and shall be determined at least once per 24 hours, to be within the limit:

Location

a. Elevation 290 ft - 3 locations

CONTAINMENT VESSEL STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.6 The structural integrity of the containment vessel shall be maintained at a level consistent with the acceptance criteria in Specification 4.6.1.6.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With the structural integrity of the containment vessel not conforming to the above requirements, restore the structural integrity to within the limits within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.6.1. Containment Vessel Surfaces. The structural integrity of the exposed accessible interior and exterior surfaces of the containment vessel, including the liner plate, shall be determined, during the shutdown for each Type A containment leakage rate test (reference Specification 4.6.1.2), by a visual inspection of these surfaces. This inspection shall be performed prior to the Type A containment leakage rate test to verify no apparent changes in appearance or other abnormal degradation.

4.6.1.6.2 Reports. Any abnormal degradation of the containment vessel structure detected during the above required inspections shall be reported to the Commission in a Special Report pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 15 days. This report shall include a description of the condition of the concrete, the inspection procedure, the tolerances on cracking, and the corrective actions taken.

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CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.1.7 Each containment purge makeup and exhaust isolation valve shall be OPERABLE and:

a. Each [42-inch] containment preentry purge makeup and exhaust isolation valve shall be closed and sealed closed, and

b. The [8-inch]~~*~~ containment purge makeup and exhaust isolation valve(s) ~~may be open for up to [1000]* hours during a calendar year provided no more than one pair (one makeup and one exhaust) are open at one time.~~ SHALL BE OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

a. With a [42-inch] containment preentry purge makeup and/or exhaust isolation valve open or not sealed closed, close and/or seal close that valve or isolate the penetration(s) within 4 hours, otherwise be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

b. With the [8-inch]* containment purge makeup and/or exhaust isolation valve(s) ~~open for more than [1000]* hours during a calendar year,~~ INOPERABLE close the open [8-inch]~~*~~ valve(s) or isolate the penetration(s) within 4 hours, otherwise be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours, and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

c. With a containment purge makeup and/or exhaust isolation valve(s) having a measured leakage rate in excess of the limits of Specifications 4.6.1.7.~~3~~2 and/or 4.6.1.7.~~4~~3, restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status within 24 hours, otherwise be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours, and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

~~*For a 3-inch valve or less, the valves may be open continuously. For an 8-inch valve or less, the valves may be open for up to 1000 hours during a calendar year. For an 18-inch valve or less, the valves may be open for up to 500 hours during a calendar year. For a valve greater than 18 inches, the valve may be open for up to 250 hours during a calendar year. All valves that may be open during plant operations (MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4) must be qualified to close under postulated accident conditions. After operational experience, the licensee may request additional time for the qualified valves to be open during plant operations and shall provide justification for the requested additional time as indicated in the Bases.~~

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CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.1.7.1 Each [42-inch] containment preentry purge makeup and exhaust isolation valve shall be verified to be sealed closed and closed at least once per 31 days.

~~4.6.1.7.2 The cumulative time that all (8-inch) purge makeup and exhaust isolation valves have been open during a calendar year shall be determined at least once per 7 days.~~

4.6.1.7.~~3~~2 At least once per 6 months on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS, the inboard and outboard 42-inch containment preentry makeup and exhaust isolation valves shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying that the combined measured leakage rate is less than 0.05 L_a when pressurized to P_a.

4.6.1.7.~~4~~3 At least once per ~~3 months~~ 92 DAYS each [8-inch] containment purge makeup and exhaust isolation valve with resilient material seals shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying that the combined measured leakage rate is less than [0.01] L_a when pressurized to P_a.

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3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS

CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.2.1 Two independent Containment Spray Systems shall be OPERABLE with each Spray System capable of taking suction from the RWST and transferring suction to the containment sump.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With one Containment Spray System inoperable, restore the inoperable Spray System to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours; restore the inoperable Spray System to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. Refer also to Specification 3.6.2.3 Action.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.2.1 Each Containment Spray System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position;

b. By verifying, that on recirculation flow, each pump develops a discharge pressure of greater than or equal to 231 psig when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5;

c. At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by:

   1. Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on containment spray actuation and containment spray switchover to containment sump test signals, and

   2. Verifying that each spray pump starts automatically on a containment spray actuation test signal.

d. At least once per 5 years by performing an air or smoke flow test through each spray header and verifying each spray nozzle is unobstructed.

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SPRAY ADDITIVE SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.2.2 The Spray Additive System shall be OPERABLE with:

a. A spray additive tank containing a volume of between [~~6000~~] 2705 and 2976 [~~6270~~] gallons ~~(which is equivalent to between [85] and [88%] indicated level)~~ of between [~~10~~] 28% and [~~20%~~] 30% by weight NaOH solution, and

b. Two spray additive eductors each capable of adding NaOH solution from the chemical additive tank to a Containment Spray System pump flow.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With the Spray Additive System inoperable, restore the system to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours; restore the Spray Additive System to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.2.2 The Spray Additive System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position;

b. At least once per 6 months by:

1. Verifying the contained solution volume in the tank, and
2. Verifying the concentration of the NaOH solution by chemical analysis.

c. At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a containment spray or containment isolation phase A test signal as applicable; and ~~test signal, and~~

d. At least once per 5 years by verifying each eductor flow rate is greater than or equal to [later] gpm, using the RWST as the test source and throttled to [later] psig at the eductor inlet.

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CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.2.3 Four containment fan coolers (AH-1, AH-2, AH-3 and AH-4) shall be OPERABLE with one of two fans in each cooler capable of operation at half speed. Train SA consists of AH-2 and AH-3. Train SB consists of AH-1 and AH-4.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

a. With one train of the above required containment fan coolers inoperable and both Containment Spray Systems OPERABLE, restore the inoperable train of fan coolers to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

b. With both trains of the above required containment fan coolers inoperable and both Containment Spray Systems OPERABLE, restore at least one train of fan coolers to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. Restore both above required trains of fan coolers to OPERABLE status within 7 days of initial loss or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

c. With one train of the above required containment fan coolers inoperable and one Containment Spray System inoperable, restore the inoperable Spray System to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. Restore the inoperable train of containment fan coolers to OPERABLE status within 7 days of initial loss or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.2.3 Each train of containment fan coolers shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by:

1. Starting each fan train from the control room, and verifying that each fan train operates for at least 15 minutes, and

2. Verifying a cooling water flow rate of greater than or equal to 1500 gpm to each cooler.

b. At least once per 18 months by verifying that each fan train starts automatically on a safety injection test signal.

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3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.3 The containment isolation valves specified in ~~Table 3.6-1~~ the Technical Specification Equipment List Program shall be OPERABLE with isolation times as shown in ~~Table 3.6-1.~~

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With one or more of the containment isolation valve(s) specified in ~~Table 3.6-1~~ inoperable, maintain at least one isolation valve OPERABLE in each affected penetration that is open and:

a. Restore the inoperable valve(s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours, or

b. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or

c. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange, or

d. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

e The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.3.1 The isolation valves specified in ~~Table 3.6-1~~ The Technical Specification Equipment List Program shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by performance of a cycling test, and verification of isolation time.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

4.6.3.2 Each isolation valve specified in ~~Table 3.6-1~~ THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION EQUIPMENT LIST PROGRAM shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING MODE at least once per 18 months by:

a. Verifying that on a Phase "A" Isolation test signal, each Phase "A" isolation valve actuates to its isolation position;

b. Verifying that on a Phase "B" Isolation test signal, each Phase "B" isolation valve actuates to its isolation position; and

c. Verifying that on a Containment ~~Purge and Exhaust~~ VENTILATION Isolation test signal, each normal and preentry purge makeup and exhaust valve actuates to its isolation position.

4.6.3.3 The isolation time of each power-operated or automatic valve of ~~Table 3.6-1~~ THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION EQUIPMENT LIST PROGRAM shall be determined to be within its limit when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

TABLE 3.6-1

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

VALVE NUMBER	FUNCTION	MAXIMUM ISOLATION TIME (Seconds)
1. Phase "A" Isolation		
a.		
b.		
2. Phase "B" Isolation		
a.		
b.		
3. Containment Purge and Exhaust		
a.		
b.		
4. Manual		
a.		
b.		
5. Other		
a.		
b.		

*May be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control.

**Not subject to Type C leakage tests.

***The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

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3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL

HYDROGEN MONITORS

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

each with at least one available sample point

3.6.4.1 Two independent containment hydrogen monitors shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTION:

a. With one hydrogen monitor inoperable, restore the inoperable monitor to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours.

b. With both hydrogen monitors inoperable, restore at least one monitor to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.4.1 Each hydrogen monitor shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of a CHANNEL CHECK at least once per 12 hours, an ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days, and at least once per 92 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by performing a CHANNEL CALIBRATION using sample gas containing:

a. [Two] volume percent hydrogen, balance nitrogen, and
b. [Six] volume percent hydrogen, balance nitrogen.

ELECTRIC HYDROGEN RECOMBINERS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.4.2 Two independent Hydrogen Recombiner Systems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2.

ACTION:

With one Hydrogen Recombiner System inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.4.2 Each Hydrogen Recombiner System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 6 months by verifying, during a Hydrogen Recombiner System functional test, that the minimum heater sheath temperature increases to greater than or equal to [700]°F within [90] minutes. Upon reaching [700]°F, increase the power setting to maximum power for 2 minutes and verify that the power meter reads greater than or equal to [60] kW, and

b. At least once per 18 months by:

   1. Performing a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of all recombiner instrumentation and control circuits,

   2. Verifying through a visual examination that there is no evidence of abnormal conditions within the recombiner enclosure (i.e., loose wiring or structural connections, deposits of foreign materials, etc.), and

   3. Verifying the integrity of all heater electrical circuits by performing a resistance to ground test following the above required functional test. The resistance to ground for any heater phase shall be greater than or equal to 10,000 ohms.

3/4 6.5 VACUUM RELIEF SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.6.5 The containment vacuum relief system shall be OPERABLE with an Actuation Setpoint of equal to or less negative than -2.5 inches water gauge differential pressure (containment pressure less atmospheric pressure)

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With one containment vacuum relief system inoperable, restore the system to OPERABLE status within 4 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.6.5 No additional requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5.

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3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS

3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE

SAFETY VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.1.1 All main steam line Code safety valves associated with each steam generator shall be OPERABLE with lift settings as specified in Table 3.7-2.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

a. With one or more main steam line Code safety valves inoperable, operation may proceed provided, that within 4 hours, either the inoperable valve is restored to OPERABLE status or the Power Range Neutron Flux High Trip Setpoint is reduced per Table 3.7-1; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.1.1 No additional requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5.

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TABLE 3.7-1

MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE POWER RANGE NEUTRON FLUX HIGH SETPOINT WITH INOPERABLE STEAM LINE SAFETY VALVES DURING 3 LOOP OPERATION

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MAXIMUM NUMBER OF INOPERABLE SAFETY VALVES ON ANY OPERATING STEAM GENERATOR	MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE POWER RANGE NEUTRON FLUX HIGH SETPOINT (PERCENT OF RATED THERMAL POWER)
1	[87]
2	[64]
3	[42]

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TABLE 3.7-2

STEAM LINE SAFETY VALVES PER LOOP

VALVE NUMBER			LIFT SETTING (± 1%)*	ORIFICE SIZE (IN.²)
STEAM GENERATOR				
A	B	C		
1MS-43	1MS-44	1MS-45	1170 psig	16.0
1MS-46	1MS-47	1MS-48	1185 psig	16.0
1MS-49	1MS-50	1MS-51	1200 psig	16.0
1MS-52	1MS-53	1MS-54	1215 psig	16.0
1MS-55	1MS-56	1MS-57	1230 psig	16.0

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*The lift setting pressure shall correspond to ambient conditions of the valve at nominal operating termperature and pressure.

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AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.1.2 At least three independent steam generator auxiliary feedwater pumps and associated flow paths shall be OPERABLE with:

a. Two motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps, each capable of being powered from separate emergency busses, and

b. One steam turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump capable of being powered from an OPERABLE steam supply system.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

a. With one auxiliary feedwater pump inoperable, restore the required auxiliary feedwater pumps to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

b. With two auxiliary feedwater pumps inoperable, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

c. With three auxiliary feedwater pumps inoperable, immediately initiate corrective action to restore at least one auxiliary feedwater pump to OPERABLE status as soon as possible.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.1.2.1 Each auxiliary feedwater pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by:

1. Verifying that each motor-driven pump develops a discharge pressure of greater than or equal to [1510] psig ~~when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.~~ AT A RECIRCULATION FLOW OF GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 50gpm.

2. Verifying that (WITH THE CONTROL STATION IN AUTOMATIC) the steam turbine-driven pump develops a discharge pressure of ~~greater than or equal to [1150] psig~~ OF AT LEAST 30psig HIGHER THAN THE SECONDARY STEAM SUPPLY PRESSURE USED FOR THE TEST on a recirculation flow of greater than or equal to ~~[100]~~ 90 gpm when the secondary steam supply pressure is greater than [210] psig. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3;

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

3. Verifying by flow or position check that each valve (manual, power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in its correct position; and

4. Verifying that the isolation valves in the suction line from the CST are locked open.

b. At least once per 18 months during shutdown by verifying that each auxiliary feedwater pump starts as designed automatically upon receipt of an Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation test signal and that the respective pressure control valve responds as required.

4.7.1.2.2 An auxiliary feedwater flow path to each steam generator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE, following each COLD SHUTDOWN of greater than 30 days, prior to entering MODE 2 by verifying normal flow to each steam generator from at least one auxiliary feedwater pump.

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PLANT SYSTEMS

CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.1.3 The condensate storage tank (CST) shall be OPERABLE with a contained water volume of at least [~~252,000~~] gallons of water, which is equivalent to [~~later~~] indicated level. 270,000
62%

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

With the CST inoperable, within 4 hours either:

a. Restore the CST to OPERABLE status or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours, or

b. Demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the Emergency Service Water System as a backup supply to the auxiliary feedwater pumps and restore the CST to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.1.3.1 The CST shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 12 hours by verifying the contained water volume is within its limits when the tank is the supply source for the auxiliary feedwater pumps.

4.7.1.3.2 The Emergency Service Water System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 12 hours by verifying that each valve, required to permit the Emergency Service Water System to supply water to the auxiliary feedwater pumps, is open whenever the Emergency Service Water System is the supply source for the auxiliary feedwater pumps.

SPECIFIC ACTIVITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.1.4 The specific activity of the Secondary Coolant System shall be less than or equal to 0.1 microCurie/gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With the specific activity of the Secondary Coolant System greater than 0.1 microCurie/gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.1.4 The specific activity of the Secondary Coolant System shall be determined to be within the limit by performance of the sampling and analysis program of Table 4.7-1.

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TABLE 4.7-1

SECONDARY COOLANT SYSTEM SPECIFIC ACTIVITY SAMPLE AND ANALYSIS PROGRAM

TYPE OF MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS	SAMPLE AND ANALYSIS FREQUENCY
1. Gross Radioactivity Determination* or Isotopic Analysis for DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 Concentration	At least once per 72 hours.
2. Isotopic Analysis for DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 Concentration	a. Once per 31 days, whenever the gross radioactivity determination indicates concentrations greater than 10% of the allowable limit for radioiodines. b. Once per 6 months, whenever the gross radioactivity determination indicates concentrations less than or equal to 10% of the allowable limit for radioiodines.

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*A gross radioactivity analysis shall consist of the quantitative measurement of the total specific activity of the secondary coolant except for radionuclides with half-lives less than ~~10~~ 15 minutes. Determination of the contributors to the gross specific activity shall be based upon those energy peaks identifiable with a 95% confidence level.

MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.1.5 Each main steam line isolation valve (MSIV) shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

MODE 1:

With one MSIV inoperable but open, POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable valve is restored to OPERABLE status within 4 hours; otherwise be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.

MODES 2 and 3:

With one MSIV inoperable, subsequent operation in MODE 2 or 3 may proceed provided the isolation valve is maintained closed. Otherwise, be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.1.5 Each MSIV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying full closure within 5 seconds when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into MODE 3.

3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.2 The temperatures of both the reactor and secondary coolants in the steam generators shall be greater than [70]°F when the pressure of either coolant in the steam generator is greater than [200] psig.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied:

a. Reduce the steam generator pressure of the applicable side to less than or equal to [200] psig within 30 minutes, and

b. Perform an engineering evaluation to determine the effect of the overpressurization on the structural integrity of the steam generator. Determine that the steam generator remains acceptable for continued operation prior to increasing its temperatures above 200°F.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.2 The pressure in each side of the steam generator shall be determined to be less than [200] psig at least once per hour when the temperature of either the reactor or secondary coolant is less than [70]°F.

3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.3 At least two component cooling water (CCW) pumps*, heat exchangers and essential flow paths shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With only one component cooling water loop OPERABLE, restore at least two loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.3 At least two component cooling water loops shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) servicing safety-related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in its correct position; and

b. At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by verifying that:

   1. Each automatic valve servicing safety-related equipment or isolating non-safety-related components actuates to its correct position on a safety injection test signal, and

   2. Each Component Cooling Water ~~System~~ pump, REQUIRED TO BE OPERABLE, starts automatically on a safety injection test signal.

   3. Each automatic valve serving the gross failed fuel detector actuates to its correct position on a low surge tank level test signal.

*The Breaker for CCW pump 1C-SAB shall not be racked into either power source (SA or SB) unless the breaker from the applicable CCW pump (1A-SA or 1B-SB) is racked out.

3/4.7.4 EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.4 At least two independent emergency service water loops shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With only one emergency service water loop OPERABLE, restore at least two loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.4 At least two emergency service water loops shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) servicing safety-related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position is in its correct position; and

b. At least once per 18 months during shutdown, by verifying that:

   1. Each automatic valve servicing safety-related equipment or isolating non-safety portions of the system actuates to its correct position on a safety injection test signal, and

   2. Each emergency service water pump starts automatically on a safety injection test signal.

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3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.5 The ultimate heat sink shall be OPERABLE with:

a. A minimum auxiliary reservoir water level at or above elevation [250] feet Mean Sea Level, USGS datum, or a minimum main reservoir water level at or above [205.7] feet mean sea level, USGS datum, and

b. A water temperature as measured at the respective intake structure of less than or equal to 95°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.5 The ultimate heat sink shall be determined OPERABLE at least once per 24 hours by verifying the water temperature and water level to be within their limits.

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3/4.7.6 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.6 Two independent Control Room Emergency Filtration Systems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: All MODES.

ACTION:

MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4:

With one Control Room Emergency Filtration System inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

MODES 5 and 6:

a. With one Control Room Emergency Filtration System inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or initiate and maintain operation of the remaining OPERABLE Control Room Emergency Filtration System in the recirculation mode.

b. With both Control Room Emergency Filtration Systems inoperable, or with the OPERABLE Control Room Emergency Filtration System, required to be in the recirculation mode by ACTION a., not capable of being powered by an OPERABLE emergency power source, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.6 Each Control Room Emergency Filtration System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by initiating, from the control room, flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that the system operates for at least 10 continuous hours with the heaters operating;

b. At least once per 18 months or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following significant painting, fire, or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system by:

   1. Verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than [0.05%] and uses the test procedure guidance in Regulatory Position C.5.a, C.5.c, and C.5.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52,

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

Revisions 2, March 1978, and the system flow rate is [4000] cfm ± 10% DURING SYSTEM OPERATION, WHEN TESTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ANSI N510-1975.

2. Verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, for a methyl iodide penetration of less than [~~0.2%~~]; and
0.175%

~~3. Verifying a system flow rate of [4000] cfm ± 10% during system operation when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1975.~~

c. After every 720 hours of charcoal adsorber operation, by verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, for a methyl iodide penetration of less than [[illegible]];
0.175%

d. At least once per 18 months by:

1. Verifying that the total pressure drop across the control room emergency filtration unit is less than [8.49] inches Water Gauge while operating the system at a flow rate of [4000] cfm ± 10%;

2. Verifying that, on a safety injection and high radiation test signal, the system automatically switches into an isolation with recirculation mode of operation with flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks;

3. Verifying that the system maintains the control room at a positive pressure of greater than or equal to [1/8] inch Water Gauge at less than or equal to a pressurization flow of 400 cfm relative to adjacent areas during system operation;

4. Verifying that the heaters dissipate [14 ± 1.4] kW when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1975; and

5. Verifying that on a High Chlorine~~/Toxic Gas~~ test signal, the system automatically switches into ~~a recirculation~~ AN ISOLATION mode of operation ~~with flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks~~ within [15] seconds.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

e. After each complete or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank, by verifying that the unit satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than [0.05%] in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 for a DOP test aerosol while operating the system at a flow rate of [4000] cfm ± 10%; and

f. After each complete or partial replacement of a charcoal adsorber bank, by verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than [0.05%] in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 for a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas while operating the system at a flow rate of [4000] cfm ± 10%.

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3/4.7.7 REACTOR AUXILIARY BUILDING (RAB) EMERGENCY EXHAUST SYSTEM

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.7 Two independent RAB Emergency Exhaust Systems shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With one RAB Emergency Exhaust System inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.7 Each RAB Emergency Exhaust System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by initiating, from the control room, flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that the system operates for at least 10 continuous hours with the heaters operating;

b. At least once per 18 months or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following SIGNIFICANT painting, fire, or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system by:

1. Verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than [0.05%] and uses the test procedure guidance in Regulatory Positions C.5.a, C.5.c, and C.5.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, and the unit flow rate is [6800] cfm ± 10% DURING SYSTEM OPERATION, WHEN TESTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ANSI N510-1975.
2. Verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, for a methyl iodide penetration of less than [~~0.2%~~]; and 0.175%
3. ~~Verifying a unit flow rate of [6800] cfm ± 10% during system operation when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1975.~~

c. After every 720 hours of charcoal adsorber operation, by verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978,

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, for a methyl iodide penetration of less than ~~[0.2]~~%; 0.175%

d. At least once per 18 months by:

1. Verifying that the total pressure drop across the RAB emergency exhaust unit is less than [9.22] inches water gauge while operating the unit at a flow rate of 6800 cfm ± 10%,

2. Verifying that the system starts on a safety injection test signal,

3. Verifying that the system maintains ~~the ECCS pump room~~ EACH ELEVATION OF THE EMERGENCY AREA at a negative pressure of greater than or equal to [1/8] inch water gauge relative to the outside atmosphere,

4. Verifying that the filter cooling bypass valve is locked ~~opened~~ IN THE BALANCED POSITION, and

5. Verifying that the heaters dissipate [40 ± 4] kW when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1975.

e. After each complete or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank, by verifying that the unit satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than [0.05%] in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 for a DOP test aerosol while operating the unit at a flow rate of [6800] cfm ± 10%; and

f. After each complete or partial replacement of a charcoal adsorber bank, by verifying that the unit satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than [0.05%] in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 for a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas while operating the unit at a flow rate of [6800] cfm ± 10%.

3/4.7.8 SNUBBERS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.8 All snubbers shall be OPERABLE. The only snubbers excluded from the requirements are those installed on nonsafety-related systems and then only if their failure or failure of the system on which they are installed would have no adverse effect on any safety-related system.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. MODES 5 and 6 for snubbers located on systems required OPERABLE in those MODES.

ACTION:

With one or more snubbers inoperable on any system, within 72 hours replace or restore the inoperable snubber(s) to OPERABLE status and perform an engineering evaluation per Specification 4.7.8g. on the attached component or declare the attached system inoperable and follow the appropriate ACTION statement for that system.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.8 Each snubber shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the following augmented inservice inspection program in lieu of the requirements of Specification 4.0.5.

a. Inspection Types

As used in this specification, type of snubber shall mean snubbers of the same design and manufacturer, irrespective of capacity.

b. Visual Inspections

Snubbers are categorized as inaccessible or accessible during reactor operation. Each of these groups (inaccessible and accessible) may be inspected independently according to the schedule below. The first inservice visual inspection of each type of snubber shall be performed after 4 months but within 10 months of commencing POWER OPERATION and shall include all snubbers. If all snubbers of each type [on any system] are found OPERABLE during the first inservice visual inspection, the second inservice visual inspection [of that system] shall be performed at the first refueling outage. Otherwise, subsequent visual inspections [of a given system] shall be performed in accordance with the following schedule:

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

No. of Inoperable Snubbers of Each Type [on Any System] per Inspection Period	Subsequent Visual Inspection Period*,**
0	18 months ± 25%
1	12 months ± 25%
2	6 months ± 25%
3,4	124 days ± 25%
5,6,7	62 days ± 25%
8 or more	31 days ± 25%.

c. Visual Inspection Acceptance Criteria

Visual inspections shall verify that: (1) there are no visible indications of damage or impaired OPERABILITY, (2) attachments to the foundation or supporting structure are functional, and (3) fasteners for attachment of the snubber to the component and to the snubber anchorage are functional. Snubbers which appear inoperable as a result of visual inspections may be determined OPERABLE for the purpose of establishing the next visual inspection interval, provided that; (1) the cause of the rejection is clearly established and remedied for that particular snubber and for other snubbers irrespective of type [on that system] that may be generically susceptible; and (2) the affected snubber is functionally tested in the as-found condition and determined OPERABLE per Specification 4.7.8f. All snubbers connected to an inoperable common hydraulic fluid reservoir shall be counted as inoperable snubbers. [For those snubbers common to more than one system, the OPERABILITY of such snubbers shall be considered in assessing the surveillance schedule for each of the related systems.]

d. Transient Event Inspection

An inspection shall be performed of all snubbers attached to sections of systems that have experienced unexpected, potentially damaging transients as determined from a review of operational data and a visual inspection of the systems within 6 months following such an event. In addition to satisfying the visual inspection acceptance criteria, freedom-of-motion of mechanical snubbers shall be verified using at least one of the following: (1) manually induced snubber movement; or (2) evaluation of in-place snubber piston setting; or (3) stroking the mechanical snubber through its full range of travel.

*The inspection interval for each type of snubber on a given system shall not be lengthened more than one step at a time unless a generic problem has been identified and corrected; in that event the inspection interval may be lengthened one step the first time and two steps thereafter if no inoperable snubbers of that type are found on that system.

**The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

e. Functional Tests

During the first refueling shutdown and at least once per 18 months thereafter during shutdown, a representative sample of snubbers of each type shall be tested using one of the following sample plans. The sample plan for each type shall be selected prior to the test period and cannot be changed during the test period. The NRC Regional Administrator shall be notified in writing of the sample plan selected for each snubber type prior to the test period or the sample plan used in the prior test period shall be implemented:

1. At least 10% of the total of each type of snubber shall be functionally tested either in-place or in a bench test. For each snubber of a type that does not meet the functional test acceptance criteria of Specification 4.7.8f., an additional 10% of that type of snubber shall be functionally tested until no more failures are found or until all snubbers of that type have been functionally tested; or

2. A representative sample of each type of snubber shall be functionally tested in accordance with Figure 4.7-1. "C" is the total number of snubbers of a type found not meeting the acceptance requirements of Specification 4.7.8f. The cumulative number of snubbers of a type tested is denoted by "N". At the end of each day's testing, the new values of "N" and "C" (previous day's total plus current day's increments) shall be plotted on Figure 4.7-1. If at any time the point plotted falls in the "Reject" region, all snubbers of that type shall be functionally tested. If at any time the point plotted falls in the "Accept" region, testing of snubbers of that type may be terminated. When the point plotted lies in the "Continue Testing" region, additional snubbers of that type shall be tested until the point falls in the "Accept" region or the "Reject" region, or all the snubbers of that type have been tested; or

3. An initial representative sample of 55 snubbers shall be functionally tested. For each snubber type which does not meet the functional test acceptance criteria, another sample of at least one-half the size of the initial sample shall be tested until the total number tested is equal to the initial sample size multiplied by the factor, 1 + C/2, where "C" is the number of snubbers found which do not meet the functional test acceptance criteria. The results from this sample plan shall be plotted using an "Accept" line which follows the equation N = 55(1 + C/2). Each snubber point should be plotted as soon as the snubber is tested. If the point plotted falls on or below the "Accept" line, testing of that type of snubber may be terminated.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

e. Functional Tests (Continued)

If the point plotted falls above the "Accept" line, testing must continue until the point falls in the "Accept" region or all the snubbers of that type have been tested.

Testing equipment failure during functional testing may invalidate that day's testing and allow that day's testing to resume anew at a later time provided all snubbers tested with the failed equipment during the day of equipment failure are retested. The representative sample selected for the functional test sample plans shall be randomly selected from the snubbers of each type and reviewed before beginning the testing. The review shall ensure, as far as practicable, that they are representative of the various configurations, operating environments, range of size, and capacity of snubbers of each type. Snubbers placed in the same location as snubbers which failed the previous functional test shall be retested at the time of the next functional test but shall not be included in the sample plan. If during the functional testing, additional sampling is required due to failure of only one type of snubber, the functional test results shall be reviewed at that time to determine if additional samples should be limited to the type of snubber which has failed the functional testing.

f. Functional Test Acceptance Criteria

The snubber functional test shall verify that:

1. Activation (restraining action) is achieved within the specified range in both tension and compression;

2. Snubber bleed, or release rate where required, is present in both tension and compression, within the specified range;

3. For mechanical snubbers, the force required to initiate or maintain motion of the snubber is within the specified range in both directions of travel; and

4. For snubbers specifically required not to displace under continuous load, the ability of the snubber to withstand load without displacement.

Testing methods may be used to measure parameters indirectly or parameters other than those specified if those results can be correlated to the specified parameters through established methods.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

g. Functional Test Failure Analysis

An engineering evaluation shall be made of each failure to meet the functional test acceptance criteria to determine the cause of the failure. The results of this evaluation shall be used, if applicable, in selecting snubbers to be tested in an effort to determine the OPERABILITY of other snubbers irrespective of type which may be subject to the same failure mode.

For the snubbers found inoperable, an engineering evaluation shall be performed on the components to which the inoperable snubbers are attached. The purpose of this engineering evaluation shall be to determine if the components to which the inoperable snubbers are attached were adversely affected by the inoperability of the snubbers in order to ensure that the component remains capable of meeting the designed service.

If any snubber selected for functional testing either fails to lock up or fails to move, i.e., frozen-in-place, the cause will be evaluated and, if caused by manufacturer or design deficiency, all snubbers of the same type subject to the same defect shall be functionally tested. This testing requirement shall be independent of the requirements stated in Specification 4.7.8e. for snubbers not meeting the functional test acceptance criteria.

h. Functional Testing of Repaired and Replaced Snubbers

Snubbers which fail the visual inspection or the functional test acceptance criteria shall be repaired or replaced. Replacement snubbers and snubbers which have repairs which might affect the functional test results shall be tested to meet the functional test criteria before installation in the unit. Mechanical snubbers shall have met the acceptance criteria subsequent to their most recent service, and the freedom-of-motion test must have been performed within 12 months before being installed in the unit.

i. Snubber Service Life Program

The service life of hydraulic and mechanical snubbers shall be monitored to ensure that the service life is not exceeded between surveillance inspections. The maximum expected service life for various seals, springs, and other critical parts shall be determined and established based on engineering information and shall be extended or shortened based on monitored test results and failure history. Critical parts shall be replaced so that the maximum service life will not be exceeded during a period when the snubber is required to be OPERABLE. The parts replacements shall be documented and the documentation shall be retained in accordance with Specification 6.10.3.

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

FIGURE 4.7-1
SAMPLE PLAN 2) FOR SNUBBER FUNCTIONAL TEST

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3/4.7.9 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.9 Each sealed source (excluding startup sources and fission detectors previously subjected to core flux) containing radioactive material either in excess of 100 microCuries of beta and/or gamma emitting material or 10 microCuries of alpha emitting material shall be free of greater than or equal to 0.005 microCurie of removable contamination.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

a. With a sealed source having removable contamination in excess of the above limits, immediately withdraw the sealed source from use and either:

   1. Decontaminate and repair the sealed source, or

   2. Dispose of the sealed source in accordance with Commission Regulations.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.9.1 Test Requirements - Each sealed source shall be tested for leakage and/or contamination by:

a. The licensee, or

b. Other persons specifically authorized by the Commission or an Agreement State.

The test method shall have a detection sensitivity of at least 0.005 microCurie per test sample.

4.7.9.2 Test Frequencies - Each category of sealed sources (excluding startup sources and fission detectors previously subjected to core flux) shall be tested at the frequency described below.

a. Sources in use - At least once per 6 months for all sealed sources containing radioactive materials:

   1. With a half-life greater than 30 days (excluding Hydrogen 3), and

   2. In any form other than gas.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

b. Stored sources not in use - Each sealed source and fission detector shall be tested prior to use or transfer to another licensee unless tested within the previous 6 months. Sealed sources and fission detectors transferred without a certificate indicating the last test date shall be tested prior to being placed into use; and

c. Startup sources and fission detectors - Each sealed startup source and fission detector shall be tested within 31 days prior to being subjected to core flux or installed in the core and following repair or maintenance to the source.

4.7.9.3 Reports - A report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission on an annual basis if sealed source or fission detector leakage tests reveal the presence of greater than or equal to 0.005 microCurie of removable contamination.

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3/4.7.10 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS

FIRE PROTECTION WATER SUPPLY AND DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.10.1 The Fire Protection Water Supply and Distribution System shall be OPERABLE with:

a. At least [two] fire pumps, each with a capacity of [2100] gpm, with their discharges aligned to the fire suppression header,

b. The auxiliary reservoir water level shall be maintained in accordance with Specification 3.7.5, and

c. An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the auxiliary reservoir and transferring the water through distribution piping with OPERABLE sectionalizing control or isolation valves to the yard hydrant curb valves, the last valve ahead of the water flow alarm device on each sprinkler or hose standpipe, and the last valve on each spray system required to be OPERABLE per Specifications 3.7.10.2, 3.7.10.3, and 3.7.10.4.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

a. With one pump and/or one water supply inoperable, restore the inoperable equipment to OPERABLE status within 7 days or provide an alternate backup pump or supply. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

b. With the Fire Protection Water Supply and Distribution System otherwise inoperable, establish a backup system within 24 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.10.1.1 The Fire Protection Water Supply and Distribution System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by starting the electric motor-driven pump and operating it for at least 15 minutes on relief valve flow,

b. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path is in its correct position,

c. At least once per 12 months by cycling each testable valve in the flow path through at least one complete cycle of full travel,

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

d. At least once per 18 months by performing a system functional test which includes simulated automatic actuation of the system throughout its operating sequence, and:

1. Verifying that each pump develops at least [2100] gpm at a discharge pressure of [131] psig.

2. Cycling each valve in the flow path that is not testable during plant operation through at least one complete cycle of full travel, and

3. Verifying that each fire suppression pump starts sequentially to maintain the Fire Suppression Water System pressure greater than or equal to [80] psig.

e. At least once per 3 years by performing a flow test of the system in accordance with Chapter 5, Section 11 of the Fire Protection Handbook, 14th Edition, published by the National Fire Protection Association.

4.7.10.1.2 The fire pump diesel engine shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying:

1. The fuel storage tank contains at least [130] gallons of fuel, and

2. The diesel starts from ambient conditions and operates for at least 30 minutes on relief valve flow.

b. At least once per 92 days by verifying that a sample of diesel fuel from the fuel storage tank, obtained in accordance with ASTM-D4057-81 is within the acceptable limits specified in Table 1 of ASTM D975-1981 when checked for viscosity and water and sediment; and

c. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by subjecting the diesel to an inspection in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommendations for the class of service.

4.7.10.1.3 The fire pump diesel starting 24-volt battery bank and charger shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by verifying that:

1. The electrolyte level of each battery is above the plates, and

2. The overall battery voltage is greater than or equal to 24 volts.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

b. At least once per 92 days by verifying that the specific gravity is appropriate for continued service of the battery, and

c. At least once per 18 months by verifying that:

   1. The batteries, cell plates, and battery racks show no visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration, and

   2. The battery-to-battery and terminal connections are clean, tight, free of corrosion, and coated with anticorrosion material.

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PLANT SYSTEMS

PREACTION AND MULTICYCLE SPRINKLER SYSTEMS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.10.2 The Preaction and Multicycle Sprinkler Systems listed ~~on Table 3.7-3~~ IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION EQUIPMENT LIST PROGRAM shall be OPERABLE:

APPLICABILITY: Whenever equipment protected by the Preaction and Multicycle Sprinkler System is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTION:

a. With one or more of the above required Preaction and Multicycle Sprinkler Systems inoperable, within 1 hour establish a continuous fire watch with backup fire suppression equipment for those areas in which redundant systems or components could be damaged; for other areas, establish an hourly fire watch patrol.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.10.2 Each of the above required Preaction and Multicycle Sprinkler Systems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated, or automatic) in the flow path is in its correct position,

b. At least once per 12 months by cycling each testable valve in the flow path through at least one complete cycle of full travel,

c. At least once per 18 months:

1. By performing a system functional test which includes simulated automatic actuation of the system, and:

    a) Verifying that the automatic valves in the flow path actuate to their correct positions on a thermal test signal, and

    b) Cycling each valve in the flow path that is not testable during plant operation through at least one complete cycle of full travel.

2. By a visual inspection of the dry pipe spray and sprinkler headers to verify their integrity; and

3. By a visual inspection of each nozzle's spray area to verify the spray pattern is not obstructed.

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TABLE 3.7-3

PREACTION AND MULTICYCLE SPRINKLER SYSTEMS

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Delete

SPRINKLER SYSTEM		LOCATION/ELEVATION
a.	Airborne Radioactivity Removal Unit - 1A Sprinkler (1-C-1-CHFA)	C.B. /221
b.	Airborne Radioactivity Removal Unit-1B Sprinkler (1-C-1-CHFB)	C.B. /221
c.	Electrical Cable Penetration Area-1A Sprinkler (1-C-1-EPA)	C.B. /261
d.	Electrical Cable Penetration Area-1B Sprinkler (1-C-1-EPB)	C.B. /261
e.	Containment Spray and RHR Pump Room 1A Sprinkler (I-A-1-PA)	RAB /190
f.	Containment Spray and RHR Pump Room 1B Sprinkler (1-A-1-PB)	RAB /190
g.	AUX. Feed Water Pumps and Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger and Pumps Sprinkler (1-A-3-PB)	RAB /236
h.	Decontamination Area and Corridor Cable Tray Sprinkler (1-A-3-COMB)	RAB /236
i.	Letdown Heat Exchanger Area, Corridor Cable Tray Sprinkler (1-A-3-COME)	RAB /236
j.	Recycle Holdup Tank Area, Corridor Cable Tray Sprinkler (1-A-3-COMI)	RAB /236
k.	HVAC Chiller Equipment Area and Cable Tray Sprinkler (1-A-4-CHLR)	RAB /261
l.	Boric Acid Equipment Area, Corridor Cable Tray Sprinkler (1-A-4-COMB)	RAB /261
m.	Corridor Cable Tray Sprinkler (1-A-4-COME)	RAB /261 Column 43, E to H
n.	Corridor Cable Tray Sprinkler (1-A-4-COMI)	RAB /261 Column 43, I to L

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TABLE 3.7-3 (Continued)

PREACTION AND MULTICYCLE SPRINKLER SYSTEMS

SPRINKLER SYSTEM		LOCATION/ELEVATION
o.	Charcoal Filter Room 1A Sprinkler (1-A-4-CHFA)	RAB /261
p.	Charcoal Filter Room 1B Sprinkler (1-A-4-CHFB)	RAB /261
q.	Electrical Penetration Area SA Sprinkler (1-A-EPA)	RAB /261
r.	Electrical Penetration Area SB Sprinkler (1-A-EPB)	RAB /261
s.	Cable Spreading Room A Sprinkler (1-A-CSRA)	RAB /286
t.	Cable Spreading Room B Sprinkler (1-A-CSRB)	RAB /286
u.	HVAC Equipment Room Sprinkler (12-A-6-HV7)	RAB /305
v.	Emergency Exhaust System E-12 (5-F-3-CHFA)	FHB /261
x.	Emergency Exhaust System E-13 (5-F-3-CHFB)	FHB /261
y.	Fuel Pool Cooling Heat Exchangers and Pumps (5-F-2-FPC)	FHB /236
z.	Diesel Generator 1A-Sprinkler (1-D-1-DGA-RM)	DGB /261
aa.	Diesel Generator 1B-Sprinkler (1-D-1-DGB-RM)	DGB /261
bb.	Diesel Fuel Oil Day Tank 1A-Sprinkler (1-D-1-DGA-TK)	DGB /280
cc.	Diesel Fuel Oil Day Tank 1B-Sprinkler (1-D-1-DGB-TK)	DGB /280
dd.	Diesel Oil Pump Room 1A-Sprinkler (1-O-PA)	Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank Area /242.25
ee.	Diesel Oil Pump Room 1B-Sprinkler (1-O-PB)	Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank Area /242.25

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.10.3 The fire hose stations given in THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION EQUIPMENT LIST PROGRAM ~~Table 3.7-4~~ shall be OPERABLE.*

APPLICABILITY: Whenever equipment in the areas protected by the fire hose stations is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTION:

a. With one or more of the fire hose stations given in THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION EQUIPMENT LIST PROGRAM ~~Table 3.7-4~~ inoperable, provide gated wye(s) on the nearest OPERABLE hose station(s). One outlet of the wye shall be connected to the standard length of hose provided for the hose station. The second outlet of the wye shall be connected to a length of hose sufficient to provide coverage for the area left unprotected by the inoperable hose station. Where it can be demonstrated that the physical routing of the fire hose would result in a recognizable hazard to operating technicians, plant equipment, or the hose itself, the fire hose shall be stored in a roll at the outlet of the OPERABLE hose station. Signs shall be mounted above the gated wye(s) to identify the proper hose to use. The above ACTION requirement shall be accomplished within 1 hour if the inoperable fire hose is the primary means of fire suppression; otherwise route the additional hose within 24 hours.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.10.3 Each of the fire hose stations given in THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION EQUIPMENT LIST PROGRAM ~~Table 3.7-4~~ shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days, by a visual inspection of the fire hose stations accessible during plant operations to assure all required equipment is at the station.

b. At least once per 18 months, by:

1. Visual inspection of the stations not accessible during plant operations to assure all required equipment is at the station,

2. Removing the hose for inspection and re-racking, and

3. Inspecting all gaskets and replacing any degraded gaskets in the couplings.

INSERT ** ADD NEW SURVEILLANCE - (NEXT PAGE 3/4 7-33a)

*Fire hose stations within the containment are required to be operable only during refueling and maintenance outages.

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INSERT FOR PAGE 3/4 7-33

c. AT LEAST ONCE PER 3 YEARS, by:

1. PARTIALLY OPENING EACH HOSE STATION VALVE TO VERIFY VALVE OPERABILITY AND NO FLOW BLOCKAGE, AND
2. CONDUCTING A HOSE HYDROSTATIC TEST AT A PRESSURE OF 150 psig OR AT LEAST 50 psig ABOVE THE MAXIMUM FIRE MAIN OPERATING PRESSURE, WHICHEVER IS GREATER.

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TABLE 3.7-4

FIRE HOSE STATIONS

DELETE

LOCATION[1]	ELEVATION	HOSE RACK NO.
CB	221	221-C-4
CB	221	221-C-12
CB	221	221-C-19
CB	236	236-C-4
CB	236	236-C-12
CB	236	236-C-19
CB	261	261-C-4
CB	261	261-C-12
CB	261	261-C-19
CB	286	286-C-4
CB	286	286-C-12
CB	286	286-C-19
RAB	190	190-G-16
RAB	190	190-G-38
RAB	216	216-G-16
RAB	216	216-Fz-27
RAB	216	216-G-38
RAB	216	216-Gy-13
RAB	236	236-Gy-13
RAB	236	236-G-16
RAB	236	236-Fz-27
RAB	236	236-D-27
RAB	236	236-G-38
RAB	236	236-Kz-31
RAB	236	236-C-39
RAB	236	236-Fw-43
RAB	236	236-Jz-43
RAB	236	236-E-15
RAB	261	261-Gy-13
RAB	261	261-E-15
RAB	261	261-G-16
RAB	261	261-D-27
RAB	261	261-Kz-31
RAB	261	261-G-38
RAB	261	261-C-39
RAB	261	261-Fw-42
RAB	286	286-C-15
RAB	286	286-E-15
RAB	286	286-G-16
RAB	286	286-E-38
RAB	286	286-C-39
RAB	286	286-Jv-41
RAB	286	286-Fw-42

[1]CB - Containment Building FHB - Fuel Handling Building
RAB - Reactor Auxiliary Building DGB - Diesel Generator Building

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TABLE 3.7-4 (Continued)

FIRE HOSE STATIONS

LOCATION[1]	ELEVATION	HOSE RACK NO.
RAB	261	261-Jz-43
RAB	261	261-Fw-43
RAB	305	305-C-39
RAB	305	305-I-41
RAB	305	305-Fw-43
FHB	236	236-L-41
FHB	236	236-L-45
FHB	261	261-L-41
FHB	261	261-L-45
FHB	286	286-L-27
FHB	286	286-N-36
FHB	286	286-L-43
FHB	286	286-N-51
FHB	286	286-L-65
FHB	286	286-N-71
FHB	286	286-L-75y
DGB	261	261-C-2
DGB	261	261-C-4
DGB	261	261-B-1
DGB	261	261-B-2

DELETE

[1]CB - Containment Building FHB - Fuel Handling Building
RAB - Reactor Auxiliary Building DGB - Diesel Generator Building

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YARD FIRE HYDRANTS AND HYDRANT HOSE HOUSES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.10.4 The yard fire hydrants and associated hydrant hose houses given in Table 3.7-5 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever equipment in the areas protected by the yard fire hydrants is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTION:

a. With one or more of the yard fire hydrants or associated hydrant hose houses given in Table 3.7-5 inoperable, within 1 hour have sufficient additional lengths of 2 1/2 inch diameter hose located in an adjacent OPERABLE hydrant hose house to provide service to the unprotected area(s) if the inoperable fire hydrant or associated hydrant hose house is the primary means of fire suppression; otherwise, provide the additional hose within 24 hours.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.10.4 Each of the yard fire hydrants and associated hydrant hose houses given in Table 3.7-5 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days, by visual inspection of the hydrant hose house to assure all required equipment is at the hose house,

b. At least once per 12 months by:

    1. Conducting a hose hydrostatic test at a pressure of 150 psig or at least 50 psig above maximum fire main operating pressure, whichever is greater,

    2. Inspecting all the gaskets and replacing any degraded gaskets in the couplings, and

    3. Performing a flow check of each hydrant to verify its OPERABILITY.

    4. Visually inspecting each yard hydrant and verifying that the hydrant is dry and is not damaged (to be performed during September, October, or November)

    5. Visually inspecting each hydrant and verifying that it is not damaged (to be performed during March, April or May)

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TABLE 3.7-5

YARD FIRE HYDRANTS AND ASSOCIATED HYDRANT HOSE HOUSES

LOCATION		HYDRANT NUMBER
Emergency Service Water Intake Structure		1-4AJ-NNS
Emergency Service Water Screening Structure		1-4AI-NNS
Diesel Generator Building	North Side	1-4B-NNS
	South Side	1-4A-NNS
Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank Building	East Side	1-4V-NNS
	West Side	1-4H-NNS

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3/4.7.11 FIRE RATED ASSEMBLIES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.11 All fire rated assemblies (walls, floor/ceilings, cable tray enclosures, and other fire barriers) separating safety-related fire areas or separating portions of redundant systems important to safe shutdown within a fire area and all sealing devices in fire rated assembly penetrations (fire doors, fire windows, fire dampers, cable, piping, and ventilation duct penetration seals shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever the equipment in the area is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTION:

a. With one or more of the above required fire rated assemblies and/or sealing devices inoperable, within 1 hour either establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected assembly, or verify the OPERABILITY of fire detectors on at least one side of the inoperable assembly and establish an hourly fire watch patrol.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.11.1 At least once per 18 months the above required fire rated assemblies and penetration sealing devices shall be verified OPERABLE by performing a visual inspection of:

a. The exposed surfaces of each fire rated assembly,

b. Each fire window/fire damper and associated hardware, and

c. At least 10% of each type of sealed penetration. If apparent changes in appearance or abnormal degradations are found, a visual inspection of an additional 10% of each type of sealed penetration shall be made. This inspection process shall continue until a 10% sample with no apparent changes in appearance or abnormal degradation is found. Samples shall be selected such that each penetration will be inspected every 15 years.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

4.7.11.2 Each of the above required fire doors shall be verified OPERABLE by inspecting the automatic hold-open, release and closing mechanism and latches at least once per 6 months, and by verifying:

a. The OPERABILITY of the fire door supervision system for each electrically supervised fire door by performing a TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days,

b. That each locked closed fire door is closed at least once per 7 days,

c. That doors with automatic hold-open and release mechanisms are free of obstructions at least once per 24 hours, and a functional test is performed at least once per 18 months, and

d. That each unlocked fire door without electrical supervision is closed at least once per 24 hours.

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3/4.7.12 AREA TEMPERATURE MONITORING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.12 The temperature of each area shown in Table 3.7-6 shall not be exceeded for more than ~~8~~ 12 hours or by more than 30°F.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever the equipment in an affected area is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTION:

a. With one or more areas exceeding the temperature limit(s) shown in Table 3.7-6 for more than ~~8~~ 12 hours, prepare and submit to the Commission within 30 days, pursuant to Specification 6.9.2, a Special Report that provides a record of the cumulative time and the amount by which the temperature in the affected area(s) exceeded the limit(s) and an analysis to demonstrate the continued OPERABILITY of the affected equipment. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

b. With one or more areas exceeding the temperature limit(s) shown in Table 3.7-6 by more than 30°F, prepare and submit a Special Report as required by ACTION a. above and within 4 hours either restore the area(s) to within the temperature limit(s) or declare the equipment in the affected area(s) inoperable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.12 The temperature in each of the areas shown in Table 3.7-6 shall be determined to be within its limit at least once per 12 hours.

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TABLE 3.7-6

AREA TEMPERATURE MONITORING

AREA	MAXIMUM TEMPERATURE LIMIT (°F)
REACTOR AUXILIARY BUILDING	
1. Control Room Envelope, (El 305')	85
2. Process I&C, Room (El 305')	85
3. Rod Control Cabinets Area (El 305')	104
4. A&B Battery Rooms (El 286')	85
5. A&B Switchgear Rooms (El 286')	90
6. Main Steam, Feedwater Pipe Tunnel (El 286' & 261')	116
7. SA&SB Electrical Penetration Areas (El 236')	104
8. Area with MCC 1A35MSA and 1B35SB	104
9. HVAC Chillers, Auxiliary FW Piping & Valve Area (El 236')	104
10. CCW Pumps, CCW Hx, Auxiliary FW Pumps Area (El 236')	104
11. 1A-SA, 1B-SB, 1C-SAB and Spare Charging Pump Rooms (El 236')	104
12. Service Water Booster Pump 1B-SB	104
13. Mechanical and Electrical Penetration Areas (El 236')	104
14. Containment Spray Additive Tank, and H&V Equipment Area (El 216')	104
15. Trains A&B Containment Spray Pump, RHR Pump, H&V Equipment Areas	104.
FUEL HANDLING BUILDING	
16. Trains A&B Emergency Exhaust System Areas (El 261')	104
17. Fuel Pool Cooling Pump and Heat Exchanger Area (El 236')	104
WASTE PROCESSING BUILDING	
18. H&V Equipment Rooms (El 236')	104
MISCELLANEOUS	
19. Condensate Storage Tank Area (El 261')	122
20. Diesel fuel Oil Storage Building (El 242')	122
21. Emergency Service Water Electrical Equipment Room	104
22. Emergency Service Water Pump Room	122
23. 1A-SA & 1B-SB Exhaust Silencer Rooms (El 292')	122
24. 1A-SA & 1B-SB H&V Equipment Rooms (El 292')	122
25. 1A-SA & 1B-SB H&V Equipment Rooms (El 280')	110
26. 1A-SA & 1B-SB Electrical Rooms (El 261')	104
27. 1A-SA & 1B-SB Diesel Generator Rooms (El 261')	120

3/4.7.13 ESSENTIAL SERVICES CHILLED WATER SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.7.13 At least two independent Essential Services Chilled Water System loops shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With only one Essential Services Chilled Water System loop OPERABLE, restore at least two loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.7.13 The Essential Services Chilled Water System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a. Performance of surveillances as required by Specification 4.0.5, and

b. At least once per 18 months by demonstrating that nonessential portions of the system are automatically isolated upon receipt of a safety injection actuation signal.

3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

3/4.8.1 A.C. SOURCES

OPERATING

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.1.1 As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. Two physically independent circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E distribution system, and

b. Two separate and independent diesel generators, each with:

1. A separate day tank containing a minimum of ~~2670~~ ~~WATER~~ 2540 gallons of fuel, which is equivalent to [~~later~~ 88]% indicated level,

2. A SEPARATE main fuel oil storage tank containing a minimum of ~~99,300~~ 100000 gallons of fuel, ~~which is equivalent to [later]% indicated level,~~ and

3. A separate fuel oil transfer pump.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

a. With one offsite circuit of 3.8.1.1.a inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining A.C. sources by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within 1 hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter. UPON ENTERING THIS ACTION, ~~I~~f either emergency diesel generator (EDG) has not been successfully tested within the past 24 hours, demonstrate its OPERABILITY by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 separately for each such EDG within 24 hours. Restore the offsite circuit to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

b. With one diesel generator of 3.8.1.1.b inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the A.C. offsite sources by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.a within 1 hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter; and if the EDG became inoperable due to any cause other than preplanned preventative maintenance or testing, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining OPERABLE EDG performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 within 24 hours~~*~~; restore the diesel generator to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

~~*This test is required to be completed regardless of when the inoperable EDG is restored to OPERABILITY.~~

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

ACTION (Continued):

of 3.8.1.1.a 4.8.1.1.1.a

c. With one offsite circuit and one diesel generator inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining A.C. sources by performing Surveillance Requirement ~~4.8.1.1.a~~ within 1 hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter; ~~and if the EDG became inoperable due to any cause other than preplanned preventive maintenance or testing, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining OPERABLE EDG by performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 within 8 hours*~~; restore one of the inoperable sources to OPERABLE status within 12 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. Restore the other A.C. power source (offsite circuit or diesel generator) to OPERABLE status in accordance with the provisions of Section 3.8.1.1 Action Statement a or b, as appropriate with the time requirement of that Action Statement based on the time of initial loss of the remaining inoperable A.C. power source. ~~A successful test of diesel OPERABILITY per Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 performed under this Action Statement for an OPERABLE diesel or a restored to OPERABLE diesel satisfies the EDG test requirement of Action Statement a or b.~~

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e. ~~d.~~ With two of the required offsite A.C. circuits inoperable, ~~demonstrate the OPERABILITY of two diesel generators by sequentially performing Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 on both diesels within 8 hours, unless the diesel generators are already operating;~~ restore one of the inoperable offsite sources to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours. Following restoration of one offsite source, follow Action Statement a with the time requirement of that Action Statement based on the time of initial loss of the remaining inoperable offsite A.C. circuit. ~~A successful test(s) of diesel OPERABILITY per Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 performed under this Action Statement for the OPERABLE diesels satisfies the EDG test requirement of Action Statement a.~~

f. ~~e.~~ With two of the above required diesel generators inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of two offsite A.C. circuits by performing Surveillance Requirement ~~4.8.1.1.a~~ 4.8.1.1.1.a within 1 hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter; restore one of the inoperable diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 2 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. Following restoration of one diesel generator unit, follow Action Statement b with the time requirement of that Action

~~*This test is required to be completed regardless of when the inoperable EDG is restored to OPERABILITY.~~

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d. WITH ONE DIESEL GENERATOR INOPERABLE IN ADDITION TO ACTION b OR c ABOVE, VERIFY THAT:

1. ALL REQUIRED SYSTEMS, SUBSYSTEMS, TRAINS, COMPONENTS, AND DEVICES THAT DEPEND ON THE REMAINING OPERABLE DIESEL GENERATOR AS A SOURCE OF EMERGENCY POWER ARE ALSO OPERABLE, AND

2. WHEN IN MODES 1, 2 OR 3, THE STEAM-DRIVEN AUXILARY FEEDWATER PUMP IS OPERABLE.

IF THESE CONDITIONS ARE NOT SATISFIED WITHIN 2 HOURS BE IN AT LEAST HOT STANDBY WITHIN THE NEXT 6 HOURS AND IN COLD SHUTDOWN WITHIN THE FOLLOWING 30 HOURS.

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

ACTION (Continued):

Statement based on the time of initial loss of the remaining inoperable diesel generator. A successful test of diesel OPERABILITY per Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 performed under this Action Statement for a restored to OPERABLE diesel satisfies the EDG test requirement of Action Statement b.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.1.1.1 Each of the above required physically independent circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E distribution system shall be:

a. Determined OPERABLE at least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignment ~~indicating power availability~~, and

b. Demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during shutdown by manually transferring the onsite Class 1E power supply from the unit auxiliary transformer to the startup auxiliary transformer.

4.8.1.1.2 Each diesel generator shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. In accordance with the frequency specified in Table 4.8.1 on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by:

1. Verifying the fuel level in the day tank.
2. Verifying the fuel level in the main fuel oil storage tank.
3. Verifying the fuel oil transfer pump can be started and transfers fuel from the storage system to the day tank.
4. Verifying the diesel generator can start** and accelerate to synchronous speed (450 rpm) with generator voltage and frequency 6900 ± 690 volts and 60 ± 1.2 Hz. Subsequently, verifying the generator is synchronized, gradually loaded** to an indicated 6200-6400 kW*** and operates for at least 60 minutes.
5. VERIFYING THE PRESSURE IN AT LEAST ONE AIR START RECEIVER TO BE GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO [LATER] PSIG.

**This test shall be conducted in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations regarding engine prelube and warmup procedures, and as applicable regarding loading recommendations.

***This band is meant as guidance to avoid routine overloading of the engine. Loads in excess of this band for special testing ~~under direct monitoring of the manufacturer~~ or momentary variations due to changing bus loads shall not invalidate the test.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

4.8.1.1.2 (Continued)

6. Verifying the diesel generator is aligned to provide standby power to the associated emergency buses.

b. By sampling new fuel oil in accordance with ASTM-D4057-81, prior to addition to the main fuel oil storage tanks, and:

1. By verifying, prior to addition to the main fuel oil storage tanks, that the sample has:

a) An API gravity, when tested in accordance with ASTM-D287-67 or ASTM-D1290-80, within 0.3 degrees at 60°F, or a specific gravity, when tested in accordance with ASTM-D4052-81, within 0.0016 degree at 60/60°F when compared to the supplier's certificate, or an absolute specific gravity at 60/60°F of greater than or equal to 0.83 but less than or equal to 0.89, or an API gravity of greater than or equal to 26 degrees but less than or equal to 38 degrees.

b) A kinematic viscosity at 40°C of greater than or equal to 1.9 centistokes but less than or equal to 4.1 centistokes when determined in accordance with ASTM-D445-79. This surveillance is not required if the specific gravity of Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.b.1(a) is compared to the supplier's certificate.

c) A flash point of greater than or equal to 125°F as determined in accordance with ASTM-D93-80 or ASTM-D56-82.

d) A clear and bright appearance with proper color when tested in accordance with ASTM-D4176-82.

2. By verifying, within 30 days after addition to the main fuel oil storage tank, that the sample of new fuel oil meets the qualifications of Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.c.2) below.

c. At least once every 184 days by obtaining a sample of fuel oil in accordance with ASTM-D4057-81 and verifying that:

1. The oil meets the criteria of ASTM-D975-81 with the exception that sulfur analysis may be performed in accordance with ASTM-D1552-79 or ASTM-D2622-82, and that the carbon value may be determined in accordance with ASTM-D524-81 to be less than or equal to 0.2%.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

4.8.1.1.2 (Continued)

2. The oil has a total particulate content less than or equal to 10 mg/l when determined in accordance with ASTM-D2276-78, method A.

d. At least once per 184 days the diesel generator shall be started** and accelerated to at least 450 rpm in less than or equal to 10 seconds. The generator voltage and frequency shall be 6900 ± 690 volts and 60 ± 1.2 Hz in less than or equal to 10 seconds after the start signal.

The generator shall be manually synchronized to its appropriate emergency bus, loaded to an indicated 6200-6400*** kW in less than or equal to 60 seconds, and operate for at least 60 minutes. ~~The diesel generator shall be started for this test by using one of the following signals on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS~~:

~~1. Simulated loss of offsite power by itself.~~

~~2. Simulated loss of offsite power in conjunction with a safety injection test signal.~~

~~3. A safety injection test signal by itself.~~

This test, if it is performed so that it coincides with the testing required by Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.4, may ~~also~~ serve to concurrently meet those requirements as well.

e. At least once per 18 months during shutdown by:

1. Subjecting the diesel to an inspection in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with the TDI Owners Group recommendations for this class of standby service.

2. Verifying that, on rejection of a load of greater than or equal to 1078 kW, the voltage and frequency are maintained with 6900 ± 690 volts and 60 ± ~~1.2~~ 6.75 Hz.

**This test shall be conducted in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations regarding engine prelube and warmup procedures, and as applicable regarding loading recommendations.

***This band is meant as guidance to avoid routine overloading of the engine. Loads in excess of this band for special testing under direct monitoring of the manufacturer or momentary variations due to changing bus loads shall not invalidate the test.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

4.8.1.1.2 (Continued)

3. Verifying that the load sequencing timer is OPERABLE with the interval between each load block within 10% of its design interval.

4. Simulating a loss of offsite power by itself, and:

   a) Verifying de-energization of the emergency buses and load shedding from the emergency buses.

   b) Verifying the diesel starts** on the auto-start signal, energizing the emergency buses with permanently connected loads in less than or equal to 10 seconds, energizing the auto-connected shutdown loads through the sequencing timers ~~load sequencer~~, and operating for greater than or equal to 5 minutes while its generator is loaded with the emergency loads. After energization of these loads, the steady-state voltage and frequency shall be maintained at 6900 ± 690 volts and 60 ± 1.2 Hz.

5. Verifying that on a safety injection test signal (without loss of power) the diesel generator starts** on the auto-start signal and operates on standby for greater than or equal to 5 minutes.

6. Simulating a loss of offsite power in conjunction with a safety injection test signal, and·

   a) Verifying de-energization of the emergency buses and load shedding from the emergency buses.

   b) Verifying the diesel starts** on the auto-start signal, energizing the emergency buses with permanently connected loads in less than or equal to 10 seconds, energizing the auto-connected emergency (accident) loads through the sequencing timers, and operating for greater than or equal to 5 minutes and maintaining the steady-state voltage and frequency at 6900 ± 690 volts and 60 ± 1.2 Hz.

**This test shall be conducted in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations regarding engine prelube and warmup procedures, and as applicable regarding loading recommendations.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

4.8.1.1.2 (Continued)

c) Verifying that all diesel generator trips, except engine overspeed, generator differential, and emergency bus differential are automatically bypassed upon loss of offsite power signal or a safety injection signal.

7. Verifying the diesel generator operates** for at least 24 hours. During the first 2 hours of this test, the diesel generator shall be loaded to 6800-7000 kW*** and, during the remaining 22 hours of this test, the diesel generator shall be loaded to an indicated 6200-6400 kW***. Within 5 minutes after completing this 24-hour test, perform Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2e.4.

8. Verifying that the auto-connected loads to each diesel generator do not exceed the continuous rating of 6500 kW;

9. Verifying the diesel generator's capability to:

a) Synchronize with the offsite power source while the generator is loaded with its emergency loads upon a simulated restoration of offsite power,

b) Transfer its loads to the offsite power source, and

c) Proceed through its shutdown sequence.

10. Verifying that the following diesel generator lockout features prevent diesel generator operation:

a) Engine overspeed
b) Generator differential
c) Emergency bus differential
d) Emergency Stop
e) Operational and maintenance switch in the maintenance mode.

f. At least once per 10 years or after any modifications which could affect diesel generator independence by starting** both diesel generators simultaneously, during shutdown, and verifying that both diesel generators accelerate to at least 450 rpm in less than or equal to 10 seconds.

**This test shall be conducted in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations regarding engine prelube and warmup procedures, and as applicable regarding loading recommendations.

***This band is meant as guidance to avoid routine overloading of the engine. Loads in excess of this band for special testing under direct monitoring of the manufacturer or momentary variations due to changing bus loads shall not invalidate the test.

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TABLE 4.8-1

DIESEL GENERATOR TEST SCHEDULE

NUMBER OF FAILURES IN LAST 20 VALID TESTS*	NUMBER OF FAILURES IN LAST 100 VALID TESTS*	TEST FREQUENCY
≤ 1	≤ 4	Once per 31 days
≥ 2**	≥ 5	Once per 7 days

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*Criteria for determining number of failures and number of valid tests shall be in accordance with Regulatory Position C.2.e of Regulatory Guide 1.108, but determined on a per diesel generator basis.

For the purposes of determining the required test frequency, the previous test failure count may be reduced to zero if a complete diesel overhaul to like-new conditions is completed, provided that the overhaul including appropriate post-maintenance operation and testing, is specifically approved by the manufacturer <u>and</u> if acceptable reliability has been demonstrated. The reliability criterion shall be the successful completion of 14 consecutive tests in a single series. Ten of these tests shall be in accordance with Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.2.a.4; four tests, in accordance with 4.8.1.1.2.d Surveillance Requirement ~~4.8.1.1.2.c~~. If this criterion is not satisfied during the first series of tests, any alternate criterion to be used to transvalue the failure count to zero requires NRC approval.

**The associated test frequency shall be maintained until seven consecutive failure free demands have been performed <u>and</u> the number of failures in the last 20 valid demands has been reduced to one.

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ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

A.C. SOURCES

SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.1.2 As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. One circuit between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E distribution system, and

b. One diesel generator with:

   1. Day tank containing a minimum volume of ~~[2670]~~ 2540 gallons of fuel, which is equivalent to ~~[later]~~ 88% indicated level,

   2. A main fuel oil storage tank containing a minimum volume of 100000 ~~[99,800]~~ gallons of fuel, ~~which is equivalent to ___% indicated level,~~ and

   3. A fuel oil transfer pump.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With less than the above minimum required A.C. electrical power sources OPERABLE, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes, movement of irradiated fuel, or crane operation with loads over irradiated fuel and within 8 hours, depressurize and vent the Reactor Coolant System through a vent of greater than or equal to ~~2.45~~ 2.9 square inches. In addition, when in MODE 5 with the reactor coolant loops not filled, or in MODE 6 with the water level less than 23 feet above the reactor vessel flange, immediately initiate corrective action to restore the required sources to OPERABLE status as soon as possible.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.1.2 The above required A.C. electrical power sources shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of each of the requirements of Specifications 4.8.1.1.1 and 4.8.1.1.2.

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ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

3/4.8.2 D.C. SOURCES

OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.2.1 As a minimum, the following D.C. electrical sources shall be OPERABLE:

a. 125-volt Emergency Battery Bank 1A-SA and either full capacity charger, 1A-SA or 1B-SA, and,

b. 125-volt Emergency Battery Bank 1B-SB and either full capacity charger, 1A-SB or 1B-SB.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With one of the required D.C ELECTRICAL SOURCES ~~Emergency Batteries or both associated full-capacity chargers~~ inoperable, restore the inoperable ~~Emergency Battery or at least one associated full-capacity charger~~ D.C. ELECTRICAL SOURCE to OPERABLE status within 2 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.2.1 Each 125-volt Emergency Battery and charger shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by verifying that:

1. The parameters in Table 4.8-2 meet the Category A limits, and

2. The total battery terminal voltage is greater than or equal to 129 volts on float charge.

b. At least once per 92 days and within 7 days after a battery discharge with battery terminal voltage below 110 volts, or battery overcharge with battery terminal voltage above 150 volts, by verifying that:

1. The parameters in Table 4.8-2 meet the Category B limits,

2. There is no visible corrosion at either terminals or connectors, or the connection resistance of these items is less than [150 x 10^{-6}] ohm, and

3. The average electrolyte temperature of [10] ~~of~~ connected cells is above [~~60~~]° F.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

c. At least once per 18 months by verifying that:

1. The cells, cell plates, and battery racks show no visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration,

2. The cell-to-cell and terminal connections are clean, tight, and coated with anticorrosion material,

3. The resistance of each cell-to-cell and terminal connection is less than or equal to [150 x 10^{-6}] ohm, and

4. The battery charger will supply at least [150] amperes at greater than or equal to 125 volts for at least [4] hours.

d. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by verifying that the battery capacity is adequate to supply and maintain in OPERABLE status all of the actual or simulated emergency loads for the design duty cycle when the battery is subjected to a battery service test;

e. At least once per 60 months, during shutdown, by verifying that the battery capacity is at least 80% of the manufacturer's rating when subjected to a performance discharge test. Once per 60-month interval this performance discharge test may be performed in lieu of the battery service test required by Specification 4.8.2.1d.; and

f. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by giving performance discharge tests of battery capacity to any battery that shows signs of degradation or has reached 85% of the service life expected for the application. Degradation is indicated when the battery capacity drops more than 10% of rated capacity from its average on previous performance tests, or is below 90% of the manufacturer's rating.

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TABLE 4.8-2

BATTERY SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

CENTER TITLE

	CATEGORY A(1)	CATEGORY B(2)	
PARAMETER	LIMITS FOR EACH DESIGNATED PILOT CELL	LIMITS FOR EACH CONNECTED CELL	ALLOWABLE(3) VALUE FOR EACH CONNECTED CELL
Electrolyte Level	>Minimum level indication mark, and < ¼" above maximum level indication mark	>Minimum level indication mark, and < ¼" above maximum level indication mark	Above top of plates, and not overflowing.
Float Voltage	≥ 2.13 volts	≥ 2.13 volts (6)	> 2.07 volts
Specific Gravity(4)	≥ 1.200(5)	≥ 1.195	Not more than 0.020 below the average of all connected cells
		Average of all connected cells > 1.205	Average of all connected cells ≥ 1.195(5)

TABLE NOTATIONS

(1) For any Category A parameter(s) outside the limit(s) shown, the battery may be considered OPERABLE provided that within 24 hours all the Category B measurements are taken and found to be within their allowable values, and provided all Category A and B parameter(s) are restored to within limits within the next 6 days.

(2) For any Category B parameter(s) outside the limit(s) shown, the battery may be considered OPERABLE provided that the Category B parameters are within their allowable values and provided the Category B parameter(s) are restored to within limits within 7 days.

(3) Any Category B parameter not within its allowable value indicates an inoperable battery.

(4) Corrected for electrolyte temperature and level.

(5) Or battery charging current is less than [2] amps when on charge.

(6) Corrected for average electrolyte temperature.

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ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

D.C. SOURCES

SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.2.2 As a minimum, one 125-volt Emergency Battery (either 1A-SA or 1B-SB) and at least one associated full-capacity charger shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With the required Emergency Battery or full-capacity charger inoperable, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes, or movement of irradiated fuel; initiate corrective action to restore the required Emergency Battery ~~or~~ AND full-capacity charger to OPERABLE status as soon as possible, and within 8 hours, depressurize and vent the Reactor Coolant System through a vent of ≥ ~~2.45~~ 2.9 square inches.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.2.2 The above required 125-volt Emergency Battery and full-capacity charger shall be demonstrated OPERABLE in accordance with Specification 4.8.2.1.

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3/4.8.3 ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION

OPERATING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.3.1 The following electrical buses shall be energized in the specified manner with tie breakers open between redundant buses within the unit:

a. Division A ESF A.C. Buses consisting of:

1. [6900]-volt Bus 1A-SA.
2. [480]-volt Bus 1A2-SA.
3. [480]-volt Bus 1A3-SA.

b. Division B ESF A.C. Buses consisting of:

1. [6900]-volt Bus 1B-SB.
2. [480]-volt Bus 1B2-SB.
3. [480]-volt Bus 1B3-SB.

c. [118]-volt A.C. Vital Bus 1DP-1A-SI energized from its associated inverter connected to 125-volt D.C. Bus DP-1A-SA*,

d. [118]-volt A.C. Vital Bus 1DP-1A-SIII energized from its associated inverter connected to 125-volt D.C. Bus DP-1A-SA*,

e. [118]-volt A.C. Vital Bus 1DP-1B-SII energized from its associated inverter connected to 125-volt D.C. Bus DP-1B-SB*,

f. [118]-volt A.C. Vital Bus 1DP-1~~A~~B-SIV energized from its associated inverter connected to 125-volt D.C. Bus DP-1B-SB*,

g. [125]-volt D.C. Bus DP-1A-SA energized from Emergency Battery 1A-SA, and

h. [125]-volt D.C. Bus DP-1B-SB energized from Emergency Battery 1B-SB.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

*Two inverters may be disconnected from their 125-volt D.C. bus for up to 24 hours as necessary, for the purpose of performing an equalizing charge on their associated Emergency Battery provided: (1) their vital buses are energized and (2) the vital buses associated with the other Emergency Battery are energized from their associated inverters and connected to their associated 125-volt D.C. bus.

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

ACTION:

a. With one of the required divisions of A.C. ESF buses not fully energized, reenergize the division within 8 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

b. With one 118-volt A.C. vital bus ~~either~~ not energized from its associated inverter; ~~or with the inverter not connected to its associated D.C. bus: (1)~~ reenergize the 118-volt A.C. vital bus within 2 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours, ~~and (2) reenergize the 118-volt A.C. vital bus from its associated inverter connected to its associated 125-volt D.C. bus within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.~~

INSERT

d ~~c~~. With either 125-volt D.C. bus 1A-SA or 1B-SB not energized from its associated Emergency Battery, reenergize the D.C. bus from its associated Emergency Battery within 2 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.3.1 The specified buses shall be determined energized in the required manner at least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignment and indicated voltage on the buses.

c. WITH ONE OF THE 118-VOLT A.C. VITAL BUS ASSOCIATED INVERTERS NOT CONNECTED TO ITS ASSOCIATED D.C. BUS; RECONNECT THE INVERTER TO ITS ASSOCIATED D.C. BUS WITHIN 24 HOURS OR BE IN A LEAST HOT STANDBY WITHIN THE NEXT 6 HOURS AND COLD SHUTDOWN WITHIN THE FOLLOWING 30 HOURS.

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ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS

ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION

SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.3.2 As a minimum, one of the following divisions of electrical buses shall be energized in the specified manner:

a. Division A, consisting of:

1. 6900-volt Bus 1A-SA and

2. 480 volt Buses 1A2-SA and 1A3-SA, and

3. 118-volt A.C. Vital Buses 1BP-1A-SI and 1DP-1A-SIII energized from their associated inverter connected to 125-volt D.C. Bus DP-1A-SA, and

4. 125-volt D.C. Bus DP-1A-SA energized from Emergency Battery 1A-SA and chargers 1A-SA or 1B-SA, or

b. Division B, consisting of:

1. 6900-volt Bus 1B-SB and

2. 480-volt Buses 1B2-SB and 1B3-SB, and

3. 118-volt AC Vital Buses 1DP-1B-SII and 1DP-1B-SIV energized from their associated inverter connected to 125-volt D.C. Bus DP-1B-SB, and

4. 125-volt D.C. Bus DP-1B-SB energized from Emergency Battery 1B-SB and chargers 1B-SB or 1A-SB.

APPLICABILITY MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With any of the above required electrical buses not energized in the required manner, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS, positive reactivity changes, or movement of irradiated fuel; initiate corrective action to energize the required electrical buses in the specified manner as soon as possible; and within 8 hours, depressurize and vent the RCS through a vent of ≥ 2[redacted] square inches.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.3.2 The specified buses shall be determined energized in the required manner at least once per 7 days by verifying correct breaker alignment and indicated voltage on the buses.

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3/4.8.4 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.4.1 All containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices given in ~~Table 3.8-1~~ THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION EQUIPMENT LIST PROGRAM shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With one or more of the containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective device(s) given in ~~Table 3.8-1~~ THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION EQUIPMENT LIST PROGRAM inoperable:

a. Restore the protective device(s) to OPERABLE status or deenergize the circuit(s) by tripping the associated backup circuit breaker or racking out or removing the inoperable circuit breaker within 72 hours, declare the affected system or component inoperable, and verify the backup circuit breaker to be tripped or the inoperable circuit breaker racked out or removed at least once per 7 days thereafter; the provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable to overcurrent devices in circuits which have their backup circuit breakers tripped, their inoperable circuit breakers racked out or removed, or

b. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.4.1 All containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective devices given in ~~Table 3.8-1~~ THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION EQUIPMENT LIST PROGRAM shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 18 months:

1. By verifying that the [6900-volt] circuit breakers are OPERABLE by selecting, on a rotating basis, at least 10% of the circuit breakers, and performing the following:

    a) A CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the associated protective relays,

    b) An integrated system functional test which includes simulated automatic actuation of the system and verifying that each relay and associated circuit breakers and control circuits function as designed, and

    c) For each circuit breaker found inoperable during these functional tests, an additional representative sample of

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TABLE 3.8-1 FEB 1986

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CONTAINMENT PENETRATION CONDUCTOR
OVERCURRENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

DEVICE NUMBER AND LOCATION	SYSTEM POWERED
1. 6900 VAC (Primary breaker) (Backup breaker)	Reactor Coolant pump 1 2 3 4
2. 480 VAC from MOAD Centers List all; primary breakers Backup breakers Backup breakers	
3. 480 VAC from MCC List all; primary breakers Backup breakers Backup breakers	
4. 125V DC Lighting List all; primary breakers Backup breakers Backup breakers	
5. 440 VAC CRDM Power Primary breakers Backup breakers Backup breakers	

DELETE

ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.8.4.2 The thermal overload protection of each valve given in THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION EQUIPMENT LIST PROGRAM ~~Table 3.8-2~~ shall be bypassed only under accident conditions by an OPERABLE bypass device integral with the motor starter.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever the motor-operated valve is required to be OPERABLE.

ACTION:

With the thermal overload protection for one or more of the above required valves not capable of being bypassed under conditions for which it is designed to be bypassed, restore the inoperable device or provide a means to bypass the thermal overload within 8 hours, or declare the affected valve(s) inoperable and apply the appropriate ACTION Statement(s) of the affected system(s).

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.8.4.2 The thermal overload protection for the above required valves shall be verified to be bypassed only under accident conditions by an OPERABLE integral bypass device by the performance of a TRIP ACTUATION DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST of the bypass circuitry:

a. At least once per 92 days for those thermal overloads which are normally in force during plant operation and are bypassed only under accident conditions; and

b. Following maintenance on the motor starter.

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TABLE 3.8-2

MOTOR-OPERATED VALVES THERMAL OVERLOAD PROTECTION

VALVE NUMBER	BYPASS DEVICE (CONTINUOUS)(ACCIDENT CONDITIONS)(NO)	SYSTEM(S) AFFECTED

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3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.1 The boron concentration of all filled portions of the Reactor Coolant System and the refueling canal shall be maintained uniform and sufficient to ensure that the more restrictive of the following reactivity conditions is met; either:

a. A K_{eff} of 0.95 or less, or

b. A boron concentration of greater than or equal to [2000] ppm.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 6.

ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes and initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 30 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 7000 ppm boron or its equivalent until K_{eff} is reduced to less than or equal to 0.95 or the boron concentration is restored to greater than or equal to [2000] ppm, whichever is the more restrictive.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.1.1 The more restrictive of the above two reactivity conditions shall be determined prior to:

a. Removing or unbolting the reactor vessel head, and

b. Withdrawal of any control rod in excess of 3 feet from its fully inserted position within the reactor vessel.

4.9.1.2 The boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and the refueling canal shall be determined by chemical analysis at least once per 72 hours.

4.9.1.3 At least once per 31 days, verify that the valves listed in Table 4.9-1 are secured in their positions required by Table 4.9-1.

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TABLE 4.9-1

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS
TO PREVENT DILUTION DURING REFUELING

VALVE LOCATION/ID	VALVE POSITION DURING REFUELING	LOCK	DESCRIPTION
1CS-149	Closed	Yes	RMW to the CVCS makeup control system
1CS-510	Closed	Yes	Boric Acid Batch Tank ~~suction~~ OUTLET. Valve may be opened if the batching tank concentration is GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 2000 ppm boron, and valve ~~1-8302~~ 1CS-503 (makeup water supply to batch tank) is closed.
1CS-503	Closed	Yes	Reactor Makeup Water to Batching Tank. Do not open unless ~~suction~~ OUTLET valve ~~1-8308~~ 1CS-510 is closed.
1CS-570	Closed	No	Place valve in "~~maintain close~~ SHUT" at valve control switch and place BTRS ~~master~~ FUNCTION SELECTOR switch in "off." No lock required.
1CS-670	Closed	Yes	RMW to BTRS loop.
1CS-649	Closed	Yes	Resin sluice to BTRS demineralizers.
1CS-93	Closed	Yes	Resin sluice to CVCS demineralizers
1CS-320	Closed	Yes	Recycle Evaporation Feed Pump to charging/safety injection Pump Suction.
1CS-98	Open	No	BTRS ~~isolation~~ BYPASS valve. Place valve control switch in "~~maintain~~ open" position.

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3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.2 As a minimum, two Source Range Neutron Flux Monitors shall be OPERABLE, each with continuous visual indication in the control room and one with audible indication in the containment and control room.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 6.

ACTION:

a. With one of the above required monitors inoperable or not operating, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.

b. With both of the above required monitors inoperable or not operating, determine the boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System at least once per 12 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.2 Each Source Range Neutron Flux Monitor shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of:

a. A CHANNEL CHECK at least once per 12 hours,

b. An ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST within 8 hours prior to the initial start of CORE ALTERATIONS, and

c. An ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST at least once per 7 days.

3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.3 The reactor shall be subcritical for at least 100 hours.

APPLICABILITY: During movement of irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel.

ACTION:

With the reactor subcritical for less than 100 hours, suspend all operations involving movement of irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.3 The reactor shall be determined to have been subcritical for at least 100 hours by verification of the date and time of subcriticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel in the reactor vessel.

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3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.4 The containment building penetrations shall be in the following status:

a. The equipment door closed and held in place by a minimum of four bolts,

b. A minimum of one door in each airlock is closed, and

c. Each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere shall be either:

1. Closed by an isolation valve, blind flange, or manual valve, or

2. Be capable of being closed by OPERABLE automatic normal containment purge and containment pre-entry purge makeup and exhaust isolation valves.

APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel within the containment.

ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment building.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.4 Each of the above required containment building penetrations shall be determined to be either in its closed/isolated condition or capable of being closed by OPERABLE automatic normal containment purge and containment pre-entry purge makeup and exhaust isolation valves within 100 hours prior to the start of and at least once per 7 days during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment building by:

a. Verifying the penetrations are in their closed/isolated condition, or

b. Testing the normal containment purge and containment pre-entry purge makeup and exhaust isolation valves per the applicable portions of Specification 4.6.3.2.

3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.5 Direct communications shall be maintained between the control room and personnel at the refueling station in containment.

APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATIONS.

ACTION:

When direct communications between the control room and personnel at the refueling station cannot be maintained, suspend all CORE ALTERATIONS.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.5 Direct communications between the control room and personnel at the refueling station in containment shall be demonstrated within 1 hour prior to the start of and at least once per 12 hours during CORE ALTERATIONS.

3/4.9.6 REFUELING MACHINE OPERABILITY

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.6 The refueling machine and auxiliary hoist shall be used for movement of drive rods or fuel assemblies and shall be OPERABLE with:

a. The refueling machine, used for movement of fuel assemblies, having:

1. A minimum capacity of 4000 pounds, and

2. An automatic overload cutoff limit less than or equal to [2700] pounds.

b. The auxiliary hoist, used for latching and unlatching drive rods, having:

1. A minimum capacity of 3000 pounds, and

2. A 1000-pound load indicator that shall be used to monitor loads to prevent lifting more than ~~[later]~~ 600 pounds.

APPLICABILITY: During movement of drive rods or fuel assemblies within the reactor vessel.

ACTION:

With the requirements for the refueling machine and/or auxiliary hoist OPERABILITY not satisfied, suspend use of any inoperable refueling machine and/or auxiliary hoist from operations involving the movement of drive rods and fuel assemblies within the reactor vessel.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.6.1 The refueling machine used for movement of fuel assemblies within the reactor vessel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE, within 100 hours prior to the start of such operations, by performing a load test of at least [4000] pounds and demonstrating an automatic load cutoff when the refueling machine load exceeds [2700] pounds.

4.9.6.2 The auxiliary hoist and associated load indicator used for movement of drive rods within the reactor vessel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE within 100 hours prior to the start of such operations by performing a load test of at least [900] pounds.

3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - FUEL HANDLING BUILDING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.7 Loads in excess of 2300 pounds shall be prohibited from travel over fuel assemblies in the storage pool.

APPLICABILITY: With irradiated fuel assemblies in the storage pool.

ACTION:

a. With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, place the crane load in a safe condition.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.7 Crane interlocks and physical stops which prevent crane travel with loads in excess of 2300 pounds over fuel assemblies shall be demonstrated OPERABLE within 7 days prior to crane use and at least once per 7 days thereafter during crane operation.

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3/4.9.8 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION

HIGH WATER LEVEL

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.8.1 At least one residual heat removal (RHR) loop shall be OPERABLE and in operation.*

APPLICABILITY: MODE 6, with irradiated fuel in the vessel when the water level above the top of the reactor vessel flange is greater than or equal to 23 feet.

ACTION:

With no RHR loop OPERABLE and in operation, suspend all operations involving an increase in the reactor decay heat load or a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and immediately initiate corrective action to return the required RHR loop to OPERABLE and operating status as soon as possible. Close all containment penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere within 4 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.8.1 At least one RHR loop shall be verified in operation and circulating reactor coolant at a flow rate of greater than or equal to 2500 gpm at least once per 12 hours.

*The RHR loop may be removed from operation for up to 1 hour per 2-hour period during the performance of CORE ALTERATIONS and core loading verification in the vicinity of the reactor vessel hot legs.

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.8.2 Two independent residual heat removal (RHR) loops shall be OPERABLE, and at least one RHR loop shall be in operation.*

APPLICABILITY: MODE 6, with irradiated fuel in the vessel when the water level above the top of the reactor vessel flange is less than 23 feet.

ACTION:

a. With less than the required RHR loops OPERABLE, immediately initiate corrective action to return the required RHR loops to OPERABLE status or to establish greater than or equal to 23 feet of water above the reactor vessel flange as soon as possible.

b. With no RHR loop in operation, suspend all operations involving a reduction in boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System and immediately initiate corrective action to return the required RHR loop to operation. Close all containment penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere within 4 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.8.2 At least one RHR loop shall be verified in operation and circulating reactor coolant at a flow rate of greater than or equal to 2500 gpm at least once per 12 hours.

*The operating RHR loop may be removed from operation for up to 1 hour per 2-hour period during the performance of CORE ALTERATIONS and core loading verification in the vicinity of the reactor vessel hot legs.

3/4.9.9 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION SYSTEM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.9 The Containment Ventilation Isolation System shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel within the containment.

ACTION:

a. With the Containment Ventilation Isolation System inoperable, close each of the containment purge makeup and exhaust penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.9 The Containment Ventilation Isolation System shall be demonstrated OPERABLE within 100 hours prior to the start of and at least once per 7 days during CORE ALTERATIONS by verifying that containment ventilation isolation occurs on a two-out-of-four High Radiation test signal from the containment area radiation monitors (Table 3.3-6, item 1.a) and by verifying that isolation occurs for each valve using its control switch in the main control room.

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3/4.9.10 WATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.10 At least 23 feet of water shall be maintained over the top of the reactor vessel flange.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 6, during movement of fuel assemblies or control rods within the containment when either the fuel assemblies being moved or the fuel assemblies seated within the reactor vessel are irradiated.

ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, suspend all operations involving movement of fuel assemblies or control rods within the reactor vessel or containment (after placing assemblies in transit in a safe condition).

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.10 The water level shall be determined to be at least its minimum required depth within 2 hours prior to the start of and at least once per 24 hours thereafter during movement of fuel assemblies or control rods.

3/4.9.11 WATER LEVEL - NEW AND SPENT FUEL POOLS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.11 At least 23 feet of water shall be maintained over the top of irradiated fuel assemblies seated in the storage racks.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever irradiated fuel assemblies are in a pool.

ACTION:

a. With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, suspend all movement of fuel assemblies and crane operations with loads in the affected pool area and restore the water level to within its limit within 4 hours.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.11 At least once per 7 days, when irradiated fuel assemblies are in a pool, the water level in that pool shall be determined to be at least its minimum required depth.

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3/4.9.12 FUEL HANDLING BUILDING EMERGENCY EXHAUST

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.12 Two independent Fuel Handling Building Emergency Exhaust System Trains shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever irradiated fuel is in a storage pool.

ACTION:

a. With one Fuel Handling Building Emergency Exhaust System Train inoperable, fuel movement within the storage pool or crane operation with loads over the storage pool may proceed provided the OPERABLE Fuel Handling Building Emergency Exhaust System Train is capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency power source and is in operation and discharging through at least one train of HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers.

b. With no Fuel Handling Building Emergency Exhaust System Trains OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving movement of fuel within the storage pool or crane operation with loads over the storage pool until at least one Fuel Handling Building Emergency Exhaust System Train is restored to OPERABLE status.

c. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.12 The above required Fuel Handling Building Emergency Exhaust System trains shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by initiating, from the control room, flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that the system operates for at least 10 continuous hours with the heaters operating;

b. At least once per 18 months or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following SIGNIFICANT painting, fire, or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system by:

1. Verifying that the cleanup system satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than [0.05%] and uses the test procedure guidance in Regulatory Positions C.5.a, C.5.c, and C.5.d of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, and the unit flow rate is [6600] cfm ± 10% DURING SYSTEM OPERATION, WHEN TESTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ANSI N510-1975

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

4.9.12 (Continued)

2. Verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, for a methyl iodide penetration of less than ~~[0.2%]~~ 1.0%; and

~~3. Verifying a unit flow rate of [6600] cfm ± 10% during system operation when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1975.~~

c. After every 720 hours of charcoal adsorber operation by verifying, within 31 days after removal, that a laboratory analysis of a representative carbon sample obtained in accordance with Regulatory Position C.6.b of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, meets the laboratory testing criteria of Regulatory Position C.6.a of Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 2, March 1978, for a methyl iodide penetration of less than ~~[0.2%]~~ 1.0%.

d. At least once per 18 months by:

1. Verifying that the total pressure drop across a fuel handling building emergency exhaust unit is not greater than [9.27] inches water gauge while operating the unit at a flow rate of [6600] cfm ± 10%,

2. Verifying that on a High Radiation test signal, the system automatically starts (unless already operating) and directs its exhaust flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber banks,

3. Verifying that the system maintains the spent fuel storage pool area at a negative pressure of greater than or equal to [1/8] inch water gauge relative to the outside atmosphere during system operation,

4. Verifying that the filter cooling bypass valve is locked ~~open~~ IN THE BALANCED POSITION, and

5. Verifying that the heaters dissipate [40] ± [4] kW when tested in accordance with ANSI N510-1975.

e. After each complete or partial replacement of a HEPA filter bank, by verifying that the unit satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than [0.05%] in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 for a DOP test aerosol while operating the unit at a flow rate of [6600] cfm ± 10%.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

4.9.12 (Continued)

f. After each complete or partial replacement of a charcoal adsorber bank, by verifying that the unit satisfies the in-place penetration and bypass leakage testing acceptance criteria of less than [0.05%] in accordance with ANSI N510-1975 for a halogenated hydrocarbon refrigerant test gas while operating the unit at a flow rate of [6600] cfm ± 10%.

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3/4.10 SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS

3/4.10.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.10.1 The SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement of Specification 3.1.1.1 may be suspended for measurement of shutdown and control rod worth and SHUTDOWN MARGIN provided reactivity equivalent to at least the highest estimated single rod worth is available for trip insertion from OPERABLE control rod(s).

APPLICABILITY: MODE 2.

ACTION:

a. With any shutdown and control rod not fully inserted and with less than the above reactivity equivalent available for trip insertion, immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 30 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 7000 ppm boron or its equivalent until the SHUTDOWN MARGIN required by Specification 3.1.1.1 is restored.

b. With all shutdown and control rods fully inserted and the reactor subcritical by less than the above reactivity equivalent, immediately initiate and continue boration at greater than or equal to 30 gpm of a solution containing greater than or equal to 7000 ppm boron or its equivalent until the SHUTDOWN MARGIN required by Specification 3.1.1.1 is restored.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.10.1.1 The position of each shutdown and control rod either partially or fully withdrawn shall be determined at least once per 2 hours.

4.10.1.2 Each shutdown and control rod not fully inserted shall be demonstrated capable of full insertion when tripped from at least the 50% withdrawn position within 24 hours prior to reducing the SHUTDOWN MARGIN to less than the limits of Specification 3.1.1.1.

3/4.10.2 GROUP HEIGHT, INSERTION, AND POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.10.2 The group height, insertion, and power distribution limits of Specifications 3.1.3.1, 3.1.3.5, 3.1.3.6, 3.2.1, and 3.2.4 may be suspended during the performance of PHYSICS TESTS provided:

a. The THERMAL POWER is maintained less than or equal to 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and

b. The limits of Specifications 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 are maintained and determined at the frequencies specified in Specification 4.10.2.2 below.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1.

ACTION:

With any of the limits of Specification 3.2.2 or 3.2.3 being exceeded while the requirements of Specifications 3.1.3.1, 3.1.3.5, 3.1.3.6, 3.2.1, and 3.2.4 are suspended, either:

a. Reduce THERMAL POWER sufficient to satisfy the ACTION requirements of Specifications 3.2.2 and 3.2.3, or

b. Be in HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.10.2.1 The THERMAL POWER shall be determined to be less than or equal to 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER at least once per hour during PHYSICS TESTS.

4.10.2.2 The requirements of the below listed specifications shall be performed at least once per 12 hours during PHYSICS TESTS:

a. Specifications 4.2.2.2 and 4.2.2.3, and

b. Specification 4.2.3.2.

3/4.10.3 PHYSICS TESTS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.10.3 The limitations of Specifications 3.1.1.3, 3.1.1.4, 3.1.3.1, 3.1.3.5, and 3.1.3.6 may be suspended during the performance of PHYSICS TESTS provided:

a. The THERMAL POWER does not exceed 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER,

b. The Reactor Trip Setpoints on the OPERABLE Intermediate and Power Range channels are set at less than or equal to 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER, and

c. The Reactor Coolant System lowest operating loop temperature (T_{avg}) is greater than or equal to [541]°F.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 2.

ACTION:

a. With the THERMAL POWER greater than 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER, immediately open the Reactor trip breakers.

b. With a Reactor Coolant System operating loop temperature (T_{avg}) less than [541]°F, restore T_{avg} to within its limit within 15 minutes or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 15 minutes.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.10.3.1. The THERMAL POWER shall be determined to be less than or equal to 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER at least once per hour during PHYSICS TESTS.

4.10.3.2 Each Intermediate and Power Range channel shall be subjected to an ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST within 12 hours prior to initiating PHYSICS TESTS.

4.10.3.3 The Reactor Coolant System temperature (T_{avg}) shall be determined to be greater than or equal to [541]°F at least once per 30 minutes during PHYSICS TESTS.

3/4.10.4 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.10.4 The limitations of the following requirements may be suspended:

a. Specification 3.4.1.1 - During the performance of startup and PHYSICS TESTS in MODE 1 or 2 provided:

1. The THERMAL POWER does not exceed the P-7 Interlock Setpoint, and

2. The Reactor Trip Setpoints on the OPERABLE Intermediate and Power Range channels are set less than or equal to 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER.

b. Specification 3.4.1.2 - During the performance of hot rod drop time measurements in MODE 3 provided at least two reactor coolant loops as listed in Specification 3.4.1.2 are OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: During operation below the P-7 Interlock Setpoint or performance of hot rod drop time measurements.

ACTION:

a. With the THERMAL POWER greater than the P-7 Interlock Setpoint during the performance of startup and PHYSICS TESTS, immediately open the reactor trip breakers.

b. With less than the above required reactor coolant loops OPERABLE during performance of hot rod drop time measurements, immediately open the reactor trip breakers and comply with the provisions of the ACTION statements of Specification 3.4.1.2.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.10.4.1 The THERMAL POWER shall be determined to be less than P-7 Interlock Setpoint at least once per hour during startup and PHYSICS TESTS.

4.10.4.2 Each Intermediate and Power Range channel, and P-7 Interlock shall be subjected to an ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST within 12 hours prior to initiating startup and PHYSICS TESTS.

4.10.4.3 At least the above required reactor coolant loops shall be determined OPERABLE within 4 hours prior to initiation of the hot rod drop time measurements and at least once per 4 hours during the hot rod drop time measurements by verifying correct breaker alignments and indicated power availability and by verifying secondary side narrow range water level to be greater than or equal to [41%].

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SPECIAL TEST EXCEPTIONS

3/4.10.5 POSITION INDICATION SYSTEM - SHUTDOWN

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.10.5 The limitations of Specification 3.1.3.3 may be suspended during the performance of individual shutdown and control rod drop time measurements provided;

a. Only one shutdown or control bank is withdrawn from the fully inserted position at a time, and

b. The rod position indicator is OPERABLE during the withdrawal of the rods.*

APPLICABILITY: MODES 3, 4, and 5 during performance of rod drop time measurements.

ACTION:

With the Position Indication Systems inoperable or with more than one bank of rods withdrawn, immediately open the Reactor trip breakers.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.10.5 The above required Position Indication Systems shall be determined to be OPERABLE within 24 hours prior to the start of and at least once per 24 hours thereafter during rod drop time measurements by verifying the Demand Position Indication System and the Digital Rod Position Indication System agree:

a. Within 12 steps when the rods are stationary, and

b. Within 24 steps during rod motion.

*This requirement is not applicable during the initial calibration of the Digital Rod Position Indication System provided: (1) k_{eff} is maintained less than or equal to 0.95, and (2) only one shutdown or control rod bank is withdrawn from the fully inserted position at one time.

3/4.11 RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS

3/4.11.1 LIQUID EFFLUENTS

CONCENTRATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.11.1.1 The concentration of radioactive material released in liquid effluents to UNRESTRICTED AREAS (see Figure 5.1-3) shall be limited to the concentrations specified in 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, Table II, Column 2 for radionuclides other than dissolved or entrained noble gases. For dissolved or entrained noble gases, the concentration shall be limited to 2×10^{-4} microCurie/ml total activity.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

With the concentration of radioactive material released in liquid effluents to UNRESTRICTED AREAS exceeding the above limits, immediately restore the concentration to within the above limits.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.11.1.1.1 Radioactive liquid wastes shall be sampled and analyzed according to the sampling and analysis program of Table 4.11-1.

4.11.1.1.2 The results of the radioactivity analyses shall be used in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM to assure that the concentrations at the point of release are maintained within the limits of Specification 3.11.1.1.

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TABLE 4.11-1

RADIOACTIVE LIQUID WASTE SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS PROGRAM

LIQUID RELEASE TYPE	SAMPLING FREQUENCY	MINIMUM ANALYSIS FREQUENCY	TYPE OF ACTIVITY ANALYSIS	LOWER LIMIT OF DETECTION (LLD)(1) (μCi/ml)
1. Batch Waste Release Tanks(2)	P Each Batch	P Each Batch	Principal Gamma Emitters(3)	5×10^{-7}
			I-131	1×10^{-6}
a. Waste Monitor Tanks	P One Batch/M	M	Dissolved and Entrained Gases (Gamma Emitters)	1×10^{-5}
b. Waste Evaporator Condensate Tank	P Each Batch	M Composite(4)	H-3	1×10^{-5}
			Gross Alpha	1×10^{-7}
c. Secondary Waste Sample Tank	P Each Batch	Q Composite(4)	Sr-89, Sr-90	5×10^{-8}
			Fe-55	1×10^{-6}
d. Treated Laundry and Hot Shower Tanks				
2. Continuous Releases(5)(7)	Continuous(6)	W Composite(6)(7)	Principal Gamma Emitters(3)	5×10^{-7}
a. Cooling Tower Weir	M(7) Grab Sample	M(7)	Dissolved and Entrained Gases (Gamma Emitters)	1×10^{-5}
			I-131	1×10^{-6}
	Continuous(6)	M Composite(6)(7)	H-3	1×10^{-5}
			Gross Alpha	1×10^{-7}
	Continuous(6)	Q Composite(6)(7)	Sr-89, Sr-90	5×10^{-8}
			Fe-55	1×10^{-6}

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TABLE 4.11-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

(1)The LLD is defined, for purposes of these specifications, as the smallest concentration of radioactive material in a sample that will yield a net count, above system background, that will be detected with 95% probability with only 5% probability of falsely concluding that a blank observation represents a "real" signal.

For a particular measurement system, which may include radiochemical separation:

$$LLD = \frac{4.66\ s_b}{E \cdot V \cdot 2.22 \times 10^6 \cdot Y \cdot \exp(-\lambda \Delta t)}$$

Where:

LLD = the "a priori" lower limit of detection (microCurie per unit mass or volume),

s_b = the standard deviation of the background counting rate or of the counting rate of a blank sample as appropriate (counts per minute),

E = the counting efficiency (counts per disintegration),

V = the sample size (units of mass or volume),

2.22×10^6 = the number of disintegrations per minute per microCurie,

Y = the fractional radiochemical yield, when applicable,

λ = the radioactive decay constant for the particular radionuclide (sec^{-1}), and

Δt = the elapsed time between the midpoint of sample collection and the time of counting (sec).

Typical values of E, V, Y, and Δt should be used in the calculation.

It should be recognized that the LLD is defined as an <u>a priori</u> (before the fact) limit representing the capability of a measurement system and not as an <u>a posteriori</u> (after the fact) limit for a particular measurement.

(2)A batch release is the discharge of liquid wastes of a discrete volume. Prior to sampling for analyses, each batch shall be isolated, and then thoroughly mixed by a method described in the ODCM to assure representative sampling.

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TABLE 4.11-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS (Continued)

(3)The principal gamma emmiters for which the LLD specification applies include the following radionuclides: Mn-54, Fe-59, Co-58, Co-60, Zn-65, Mo-99, Cs-134, Cs-137, and Ce-141. CE-144 shall also be measured but with a LLD of 5×10^{-6}. This list does not mean that only these nuclides are to be considered. Other gamma peaks that are identifiable, together with those of the above nuclides, shall also be analyzed and reported in the Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report pursuant to Specification 6.9.1.4 in the format outlined in Regulatory Guide 1.21, Appendix B, Revision 1, June 1974.

(4)A composite sample is one in which the quantity of liquid sampled is proportional to the quantity of liquid waste discharged and in which the method of sampling employed results in a specimen that is representative of the liquids released.

(5)A continuous release is the discharge of liquid wastes of a nondiscrete volume, e.g., from a volume of a system that has an input flow during the continuous release.

(6)To be representative of the quantities and concentrations of radioactive materials in liquid effluents, samples shall be collected continuously in proportion to the rate of flow of the effluent stream. Prior to analyses, all samples taken for the composite shall be thoroughly mixed in order for the composite sample to be representative of the effluent release.

(7)The point monitors a potential release pathway only and not an actual release pathway. The potential contamination points are in the Normal Service Water (NSW) System. Action under this specification is as follows:

a) If the NSW monitors in Table 3.3-12 are OPERABLE and not in alarm, then no analysis under this specification is required but weekly composites will be collected.

b) If an NSW monitor is out of service, then the weekly analysis for principal gamma emitters will be performed.

c) If an NSW monitor is in alarm or if the principal gamma emitter analysis indicates the presence of radioactivity as defined in the ODCM, then all other analyses of this specification shall be performed at the indicated frequency as long as the initiating conditions exist.

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.11.1.2 The dose or dose commitment to a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC from radioactive materials in liquid effluents released to UNRESTRICTED AREAS (see Figure 5.1-3) shall be limited:

a. During any calendar quarter to less than or equal to 1.5 mrems to the whole body and to less than or equal to 5 mrems to any organ, and

b. During any calendar year to less than or equal to 3 mrems to the whole body and to less than or equal to 10 mrems to any organ.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

a. With the calculated dose from the release of radioactive materials in liquid effluents exceeding any of the above limits, prepare and submit to the Commission within 30 days, pursuant to Specification 6.9.2, a Special Report that identifies the cause(s) for exceeding the limit(s) and defines the corrective actions that have been taken to reduce the releases and the proposed corrective actions to be taken to assure that subsequent releases will be in compliance with the above limits.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.11.1.2 Cumulative dose contributions from liquid effluents for the current calendar quarter and the current calendar year shall be determined in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM at least once per 31 days.

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.11.1.3 The Liquid Radwaste Treatment System shall be OPERABLE and appropriate portions of the system shall be used to reduce releases of radioactivity when the projected doses due to the liquid effluent, to UNRESTRICTED AREAS (see Figure 5.1-3) would exceed 0.06 mrem to the whole body or 0.2 mrem to any organ in a 31-day period.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

a. With radioactive liquid waste being discharged without treatment and in excess of the above limits and any portion of the Liquid Radwaste Treatment System not in operation, prepare and submit to the Commission within 30 days, pursuant to Specification 6.9.2, a Special Report that includes the following information:

   1. Explanation of why liquid radwaste was being discharged without treatment, identification of any inoperable equipment or subsystems, and the reason for the inoperability,

   2. Action(s) taken to restore the inoperable equipment to OPERABLE status, and

   3. Summary description of action(s) taken to prevent a recurrence.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.11.1.3.1 Doses due to liquid releases to UNRESTRICTED AREAS shall be projected at least once per 31 days in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM when Liquid Radwaste Treatment Systems are not being fully utilized.

4.11.1.3.2 The installed Liquid Radwaste Treatment System shall be considered OPERABLE by meeting Specifications 3.11.1.1 and 3.11.1.2.

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LIQUID HOLDUP TANKS*

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.11.1.4 The quantity of radioactive material contained in each of the following unprotected outdoor tanks shall be limited to less than or equal to 10 Curies, excluding tritium and dissolved or entrained noble gases:

a. Outside temporary tank, excluding demineralizer vessels and ~~lines~~ LINERS used to solidify or to dewater radioactive wastes.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

a. With the quantity of radioactive material in any of the above listed tanks exceeding the above limit, immediately suspend all additions of radioactive material to the tank, within 48 hours reduce the tank contents to within the limit, and describe the events leading to this condition in the next Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report, pursuant to Specification 6.9.1.4.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.11.1.4 The quantity of radioactive material contained in each of the above listed tanks shall be determined to be within the above limit by analyzing a representative sample of the tank's contents at least once per 7 days when radioactive materials are being added to the tank.

*Tanks included in this specification are those outdoor tanks that are not surrounded by liners, dikes, or walls capable of holding the tank contents and that do not have tank overflows and surrounding area drains connected to the Liquid Radwaste Treatment System.

DOSE RATE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.11.2.1 The dose rate due to radioactive materials released in gaseous effluents from the site to areas at and beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (see Figure 5.1-1) shall be limited to the following:

a. For noble gases: Less than or equal to 500 mrems/yr to the whole body and less than or equal to 3000 mrems/yr to the skin, and

b. For Iodine-131, for Iodine-133, for tritium, and for all radionuclides in particulate form with half-lives greater than 8 days: Less than or equal to 1500 mrems/yr to any organ.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

With the dose rate(s) exceeding the above limits, immediately restore the release rate to within the above limit(s).

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.11.2.1.1 The dose rate due to noble gases in gaseous effluents shall be determined to be within the above limits in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM.

4.11.2.1.2 The dose rate due to Iodine-131, Iodine-133, tritium, and all radionuclides in particulate form with half-lives greater than 8 days in gaseous effluents shall be determined to be within the above limits in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM by obtaining representative samples and performing analyses in accordance with the sampling and analysis program specified in Table 4.11-2.

TABLE 4.11-2

RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS WASTE SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS PROGRAM

GASEOUS RELEASE TYPE	SAMPLING FREQUENCY	MINIMUM ANALYSIS FREQUENCY	TYPE OF ACTIVITY ANALYSIS	LOWER LIMIT OF DETECTION (LLD)[1] (μCi/ml)
1. Waste Gas Storage Tank	P Each Tank Grab Sample	P Each Tank	Principal Gamma Emitters[2]	1×10^{-4}
2. Containment Purge or Vent	P Each PURGE[3] Grab Sample	P Each PURGE[3]	Principal Gamma Emitters[2]	1×10^{-4}
		M	H-3 (oxide)	1×10^{-6}
3. a. Plant Vent Stack	M[3],[4],[5] Grab Sample		Principal Gamma Emitters[2]	1×10^{-4}
		M	H-3 (oxide)	1×10^{-6}
b. Turbine Bldg Vent Stack, Waste Processing Bldg Vent Stacks 5&5A	M Grab Sample	M	Principal Gamma Emitters[2]	1×10^{-4}
4. All Release Types as listed in 1., 2., and 3. above	Continuous[6]	W[7] Charcoal Sample	I-131	1×10^{-12}
			I-133	1×10^{-10}
	Continuous[6]	W[7] Particulate Sample	Principal Gamma Emitters[2]	1×10^{-11}
	Continuous[6]	M Composite Particulate Sample	Gross Alpha	1×10^{-11}
	Continuous[6]	Q Composite Particulate Sample	Sr-89, Sr-90	1×10^{-11}

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TABLE 4.11-2 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

(1) The LLD is defined, for purposes of these specifications, as the smallest concentration of radioactive material in a sample that will yield a net count, above system background, that will be detected with 95% probability with only 5% probability of falsely concluding that a blank observation represents a "real" signal.

For a particular measurement system, which may include radiochemical separation:

$$LLD = \frac{4.66\ s_b}{E \cdot V \cdot 2.22 \times 10^6 \cdot Y \cdot \exp(-\lambda\Delta t)}$$

Where:

LLD = the "a priori" lower limit of detection (microCurie per unit mass or volume),

s_b = the standard deviation of the background counting rate or of the counting rate of a blank sample as appropriate. (counts per minute),

E = the counting efficiency (counts per disintegration),

V = the sample size (units of mass or volume),

2.22×10^6 = the number of disintegrations per minute per microCurie,

Y = the fractional radiochemical yield, when applicable,

λ = the radioactive decay constant for the particular radionuclide (sec^{-1}), and

Δt = the elapsed time between the midpoint of sample collection and the time of counting (sec).

Typical values of E, V, Y, and Δt should be used in the calculation.

It should be recognized that the LLD is defined as an a priori (before the fact) limit representing the capability of a measurement system and not as an a posteriori (after the fact) limit for a particular measurement.

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TABLE 4.11-2 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS (Continued)

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(2) The principal gamma emitters for which the LLD specification applies include the following radionuclides: Kr-87, Kr-88, Xe-133, Xe-133m, Xe-135, and Xe-138 in noble gas releases and Mn-54, Fe-59, Co-58, Co-60, Zn-65, Mo-99, I-131, Cs-134, Cs-137, Ce-141 and Ce-144 in Iodine and particulate releases. This list does not mean that only these nuclides are to be considered. Other gamma peaks that are identifiable, together with those of the above nuclides, shall also be analyzed and reported in the Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report pursuant to Specification 6.9.1.4 in the format outlined in Regulatory Guide 1.21, Appendix B, Revision 1, June 1974.

(3) Sampling and analysis shall also be performed following shutdown, startup, or a THERMAL POWER change exceeding 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER within a 1-hour period.

(4) Tritium grab samples shall be taken at least once per 24 hours when the refueling canal is flooded.

(5) Tritium grab samples shall be taken at least once per 7 days from the ventilation exhaust from the spent fuel pool area, whenever spent fuel is in the spent fuel pool.

(6) The ratio of the sample flow rate to the sampled stream flow rate shall be known for the time period covered by each dose or dose rate calculation made in accordance with Specifications 3.11.2.1, 3.11.2.2, and 3.11.2.3.

(7) Samples shall be changed at least once per 7 days and analyses shall be completed within 48 hours after changing, or after removal from sampler. Sampling shall also be performed at least once per 24 hours for at least 7 days following each shutdown, startup, or THERMAL POWER change exceeding 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER within a 1-hour period and analyses shall be completed within 48 hours of changing. When samples collected for 24 hours are analyzed, the corresponding LLDs may be increased by a factor of 10. This requirement does not apply if: (1) analysis shows that the DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131 concentration in the reactor coolant has not increased more than a factor of 3; and (2) the noble gas monitor shows that effluent activity has not increased more than a factor of 3.

DOSE - NOBLE GASES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.11.2.2 The air dose due to noble gases released in gaseous effluents, to areas at and beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (see Figure 5.1-3) shall be ~~be~~ limited to the following:

a. During any calendar quarter: Less than or equal to 5 mrads for gamma radiation and less than or equal to 10 mrads for beta radiation, and

b. During any calendar year: Less than or equal to 10 mrads for gamma radiation and less than or equal to 20 mrads for beta radiation.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION

a. With the calculated air dose from radioactive noble gases in gaseous effluents exceeding any of the above limits, prepare and submit to the Commission within 30 days, pursuant to Specification 6.9.2, a Special Report that identifies the cause(s) for exceeding the limit(s) and defines the corrective actions that have been taken to reduce the releases and the proposed corrective actions to be taken to assure that subsequent releases will be in compliance with the above limits.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.11.2.2 Cumulative dose contributions for the current calendar quarter and current calendar year for noble gases shall be determined in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM at least once per 31 days.

DOSE - IODINE-131, IODINE-133, TRITIUM, AND RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IN PARTICULATE FORM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.11.2.3 The dose to a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC from Iodine-131, Iodine-133, tritium, and all radionuclides in particulate form with half-lives greater than 8 days in gaseous effluents released to areas at and beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (see Figure 5.1-3) shall be limited to the following:

a. During any calendar quarter: Less than or equal to 7.5 mrems to any organ and,

b. During any calendar year: Less than or equal to 15 mrems to any organ.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

a. With the calculated dose from the release of Iodine-131, Iodine-133, tritium, and radionuclides in particulate form with half-lives greater than 8 days, in gaseous effluents exceeding any of the above limits, prepare and submit the the Commission within 30 days, pursuant to Specification 6.9.2, a Special Report that identifies the cause(s) for exceeding the limit(s) and defines the corrective actions that have been taken to reduce the releases and the proposed corrective actions to be taken to assure that subsequent releases will be in compliance with the above limits.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.11.2.3 Cumulative dose contributions for the current calendar quarter and current calendar year for Iodine-131, Iodine-133, tritium and radionuclides in particulate form with half-lives greater than 8 days shall be determined in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM at least once per 31 days.

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.11.2.4 The VENTILATION EXHAUST TREATMENT SYSTEM and the GASEOUS RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM shall be OPERABLE and appropriate portions of these systems shall be used to reduce releases of radioactivity when the projected doses in 31 days due to gaseous effluent releases to areas at and beyond the SITE BOUNDARY (see Figure 5.1-3) would exceed:

a. 0.2 mrad to air from gamma radiation, or

b. 0.4 mrad to air from beta radiation, or

c. 0.3 mrem to any organ of a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

a. With radioactive gaseous waste being discharged without treatment and in excess of the above limits, prepare and submit to the Commission within 30 days, pursuant to Specification 6.9.2, a Special Report that includes the following information:

   1. Identification of any inoperable equipment or subsystems, and the reason for the inoperability,

   2. Action(s) taken to restore the inoperable equipment to OPERABLE status, and

   3. Summary description of action(s) taken to prevent a recurrence.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.11.2.4.1 Doses due to gaseous releases to areas at and beyond the SITE BOUNDARY shall be projected at least once per 31 days in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM when the GASEOUS RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM is not being fully utilized.

4.11.2.4.2 The installed VENTILATION EXHAUST TREATMENT SYSTEM and GASEOUS RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM shall be considered OPERABLE by meeting Specifications 3.11.2.1 and 3.11.2.2 or 3.11.2.3.

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.11.2.5 The concentration of oxygen in the GASEOUS RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM downstream of the hydrogen ~~recombines~~ RECOMBINERS shall be limited to less than or equal to 2% by volume whenever the hydrogen concentration exceeds 4% by volume.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

a. With the concentration of oxygen in the GASEOUS RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM downstream of the hydrogen recombiners greater than 2% by volume but less than or equal to 4% by volume, reduce the oxygen concentration to the above limits within 48 hours.

b. With the concentration of oxygen in the GASEOUS RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM downstream of the hydrogen recombiners greater than 4% by volume and the hydrogen concentration greater than 4% by volume, immediately suspend all additions of waste gases to the system and reduce the concentration of oxygen to less than or equal to 4% by volume, then take ACTION a., above.

c. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.11.2.5 The concentrations of hydrogen and oxygen in the GASEOUS RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM shall be determined to be within the above limits by monitoring, at least once per 12 hours, the waste gases in the GASEOUS RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM with the hydrogen and oxygen monitors required OPERABLE by Table 3.3-13 of Specification 3.3.3.11.

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.11.2.6 The quantity of radioactivity contained in each gas storage tank shall be limited to less than or equal to 1.05×10^5 Curies of noble gases (considered as Xe-133 equivalent).

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

a. With the quantity of radioactive material in any gas storage tank exceeding the above limit, immediately suspend all additions of radioactive material to the tank, within 48 hours reduce the tank contents to within the limit, and describe the events leading to this condition in the next Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report, pursuant to Specification 6.9.1.4.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.11.2.6 The quantity of radioactive material contained in each gas storage tank shall be determined to be within the above limit at least once per 24 hours when radioactive materials are being added to the tank.

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3/4.11.3 SOLID RADIOACTIVE WASTES

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.11.3 Radioactive wastes shall be solidified or dewatered in accordance with the PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM to meet shipping and transportation requirements during transit, and disposal site requirements when received at the disposal site.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

a. With SOLIDIFICATION or dewatering not meeting disposal site and shipping and transportation requirements, suspend shipment of the inadequately processed wastes and correct the PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM, the procedures, and/or the Solid Waste System as necessary to prevent recurrence.

b. With SOLIDIFICATION or dewatering not performed in accordance with the PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM, test the improperly processed waste in each container to ensure that it meets burial ground and shipping requirements and take appropriate administrative action to prevent recurrence.

c. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.11.3 SOLIDIFICATION of at least one representative test specimen from at least every tenth batch of each type of wet radioactive wastes (e.g., filter sludges, spent resins, evaporator bottoms, boric acid solutions, and sodium sulfate solutions) shall be verified in accordance with the PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM:

a. If any test specimen fails to verify SOLIDIFICATION, the SOLIDIFICATION of the batch under test shall be suspended until such time as additional test specimens can be obtained, alternative SOLIDIFICATION parameters can be determined in accordance with the PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM, and a subsequent test verifies SOLIDIFICATION. SOLIDIFICATION of the batch may then be resumed using the alternative SOLIDIFICATION parameters determined by the PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM;

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

4.11.3 (Continued)

b. If the initial test specimen from a batch of waste fails to verify SOLIDIFICATION, the PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM shall provide for the collection and testing of representative test specimens from each consecutive batch of the same type of wet waste until at least three consecutive initial test specimens demonstrate SOLIDIFICATION. The PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM shall be modified as required, as provided in Specification 6.13, to assure SOLIDIFICATION of subsequent batches of waste; and

c. With the installed equipment incapable of meeting Specification 3.11.3 or declared inoperable, restore the equipment to OPERABLE status or provide for contract capability to process wastes as necessary to satisfy all applicable transportation and disposal requirements.

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3/4.11.4 TOTAL DOSE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.11.4 The annual (calendar year) dose or dose commitment to any MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC due to releases of radioactivity and to radiation from uranium fuel cycle sources shall be limited to less than or equal to 25 mrems to the whole body or any organ, except the thyroid, which shall be limited to less than or equal to 75 mrems.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

a. With the calculated doses from the release of radioactive materials in liquid or gaseous effluents exceeding twice the limits of Specification 3.11.1.2a., 3.11.1.2b., 3.11.2.2a., 3.11.2.2b., 3.11.2.3a., or 3.11.2.3b., calculations shall be made including direct radiation contributions from the units and from outside storage tanks to determine whether the above limits of Specification 3.11.4 have been exceeded. If such is the case, prepare and submit to the Commission within 30 days, pursuant to Specification 6.9.2, a Special Report that defines the corrective action to be taken to reduce subsequent releases to prevent recurrence of exceeding the above limits and includes the schedule for achieving conformance with the above limits. This Special Report, as defined in 10 CFR 20.405(c), shall include an analysis that estimates the radiation exposure (dose) to a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC from uranium fuel cycle sources, including all effluent pathways and direct radiation, for the calendar year that includes the release(s) covered by this report. It shall also describe levels of radiation and concentrations of radioactive material involved, and the cause of the exposure levels or concentrations. If the estimated dose(s) exceeds the above limits, and if the release condition resulting in violation of 40 CFR Part 190 has not already been corrected, the Special Report shall include a request for a variance in accordance with the provisions of 40 CFR Part 190. Submittal of the report is considered a timely request, and a variance is granted until staff action on the request is complete.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.11.4.1 Cumulative dose contributions from liquid and gaseous effluents shall be determined in accordance with Specifications 4.11.1.2, 4.11.2.2, and 4.11.2.3, and in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM.

4.11.4.2 Cumulative dose contributions from direct radiation from the units and from radwaste storage tanks shall be determined in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM. This requirement is applicable only under conditions set forth in ACTION a. of Specification 3.11.4.

3/4.12 RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING

3/4.12.1 MONITORING PROGRAM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.12.1 The Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program shall be conducted as specified in Table 3.12-1.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

a. With the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program not being conducted as specified in Table 3.12-1, prepare and submit to the Commission, in the Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report required by Specification 6.9.1.3, a description of the reasons for not conducting the program as required and the plans for preventing a recurrence.

b. With the level of radioactivity as the result of plant effluents in an environmental sampling medium at a specified location exceeding the reporting levels of Table 3.12-2 when averaged over any calendar quarter, prepare and submit to the Commission within 30 days, pursuant to Specification 6.9.2, a Special Report that identifies the cause(s) for exceeding the limit(s) and defines the corrective actions to be taken to reduce radioactive effluents so that the potential annual dose* to a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC is less than the calendar year limits of Specifications 3.11.1.2, 3.11.2.2, or 3.11.2.3. When more than one of the radionuclides in Table 3.12-2 are detected in the sampling medium, this report shall be submitted if:

$$\frac{\text{concentration (1)}}{\text{reporting level (1)}} + \frac{\text{concentration (2)}}{\text{reporting level (2)}} + \ldots \geq 1.0$$

When radionuclides other than those in Table 3.12-2 are detected and are the result of plant effluents, this report shall be submitted if the potential annual dose* to a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC from all radionuclides is equal to or greater than the calendar year limits of Specification 3.11.1.2, 3.11.2.2, or 3.11.2.3. This report is not required if the measured level of radioactivity was not the result of plant effluents; however, in such an event, the condition shall be reported and described in the Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report required by Specification 6.9.1.3.

*The methodology and parameters used to estimate the potential annual dose to a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC shall be indicated in this report.

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

ACTION (Continued):

c. With milk or fresh leafy vegetation samples unavailable from one or more of the sample locations required by Table 3.12-1, identify specific locations for obtaining replacement samples and add them within 30 days to the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program given in the ODCM. The specific locations from which samples were unavailable may then be deleted from the monitoring program. Pursuant to Specification 6.14, submit in the next Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report documentation for a change in the ODCM including a revised figure(s) and table for the ODCM reflecting the new location(s) with supporting information identifying the cause of the unavailability of samples and justifying the selection of the new location(s) for obtaining samples.

d. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.12.1 The radiological environmental monitoring samples shall be collected pursuant to Table 3.12-1 from the specific locations given in the table and figure(s) in the ODCM, and shall be analyzed pursuant to the requirements of Table 3.12-1 and the detection capabilities required by Table 4.12-1.

TABLE 3.12-1

RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING PROGRAM*

EXPOSURE PATHWAY AND/OR SAMPLE	NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLES AND SAMPLE LOCATIONS(1)	SAMPLING AND COLLECTION FREQUENCY	TYPE AND FREQUENCY OF ANALYSIS
1. Direct Radiation(2)	Forty routine monitoring stations either with two or more dosimeters or with one instrument for measuring and recording dose rate continuously, placed as follows: An inner ring of stations, one in each meteorological sector in the general area of the SITE BOUNDARY; An outer ring of stations, one in each meteorological sector in the 6- to 8-km range from the site; and The balance of the stations to be placed in special interest areas such as population centers, nearby residences, schools, and in one or two areas to serve as control stations.	Quarterly.	Gamma dose quarterly.

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TABLE 3.12-1 (Continued)

RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING PROGRAM

EXPOSURE PATHWAY AND/OR SAMPLE	NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLES AND SAMPLE LOCATIONS(1)	SAMPLING AND COLLECTION FREQUENCY	TYPE AND FREQUENCY OF ANALYSIS
2. Airborne Radioiodine and Particulates	Samples from five locations: Three samples from close to the three SITE BOUNDARY locations, in different sectors, of the highest calculated annual average ground-level D/Q; One sample from the vicinity of a community having the highest calculated annual average ground-level D/Q; and One sample from a control location, as for example 15 to 30 km distant and in the least prevalent wind direction.	Continuous sampler operation with sample collection weekly, or more frequently if required by dust loading.	Radioiodine Cannister: I-131 analysis weekly. Particulate Sampler: Gross beta radioactivity analysis following filter change;(3) and gamma isotopic analysis(4) of composite (by location) quarterly.
3. Waterborne			
a. Surface(5)	One sample upstream. One sample downstream.	Composite sample over 1-month period.(6)	Gamma isotopic analysis(4) monthly. Composite for tritium analysis quarterly.
b. Ground	Samples from one or two sources only if likely to be affected(7).	Quarterly.	Gamma isotopic(4) and tritium analysis quarterly.

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TABLE 3.12-1 (Continued)

RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING PROGRAM

EXPOSURE PATHWAY AND/OR SAMPLE	NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLES AND SAMPLE LOCATIONS[1]	SAMPLING AND COLLECTION FREQUENCY	TYPE AND FREQUENCY OF ANALYSIS
3. Waterborne (Continued)			
c. Drinking	One sample in the vicinity of the nearest downstream municipal water supply intake from the Cape Fear River. One sample from a control location.	Composite sample over 2-week period[6] when I-131 analysis is performed; monthly composite otherwise.	I-131 analysis on each composite when the dose calculated for the consumption of the water is greater than 1 mrem per year[8]. Composite for gross beta and gamma isotopic analyses[4] monthly. Composite for tritium analysis quarterly.
d. Sediment from Shoreline	One sample in the vicinity of the cooling tower blowdown discharge in an area with existing or potential recreational value.	Semiannually.	Gamma isotopic analysis[4] semiannually.
4. Ingestion			
a. Milk	Samples from milking animals in three locations within 5 km distance having the highest dose potential. If there are none, then one sample from milking animals in each of three areas between 5 to 8 km distant where doses are calculated to be greater than 1 mrem per yr.[8] One sample from milking animals at a control location 15 to 30 km distant and in the least prevalent wind direction.	Semimonthly when animals are on pasture; monthly at other times.	Gamma isotopic[4] and I-131 analysis semimonthly when animals are on pasture; monthly at other times.

TABLE 3.12-1 (Continued)

RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING PROGRAM

EXPOSURE PATHWAY AND/OR SAMPLE	NUMBER OF REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLES AND SAMPLE LOCATIONS[1]	SAMPLING AND COLLECTION FREQUENCY	TYPE AND FREQUENCY OF ANALYSIS
4. Ingestion (Continued)			
b. Fish and Invertebrates	One sample of Bluegills, Catfish, and Large-Mouth Bass species in vicinity of plant discharge area.	Sample in season, or semiannually if they are not seasonal.	Gamma isotopic analysis[4] on edible portions.
	One sample of same species in areas not influenced by plant discharge.		
c. Food Products	Samples of three different kinds of broad leaf vegetation grown nearest each of two different offsite locations of highest predicted annual average ground level D/Q if milk sampling is not performed.	Monthly during growing season.	Gamma isotopic[4] and I-131 analysis.
	One sample of each of the similar broad leaf vegetation grown 15 to 30 km distant in the least prevalent wind direction if milk sampling is not performed.	Monthly during growing season.	Gamma isotopic[4] and I-131 analysis.

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TABLE 3.12-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

(1) Specific parameters of distance and direction sector from the centerline of one reactor, and additional description where pertinent, shall be provided for each and every sample location in Table 3.12-1 in a table and figure(s) in the ODCM. Refer to NUREG-0133, "Preparation of Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications for Nuclear Power Plants," October 1978, and to Radiological Assessment Branch Technical Position, Revision 1, November 1979. Deviations are permitted from the required sampling schedule if specimens are unobtainable due to circumstances such as hazardous conditions, seasonal unavailability, and malfunction of automatic sampling equipment. If specimens are unobtainable due to sampling equipment malfunction, effort shall be made to complete corrective action prior to the end of the next sampling period. All deviations from the sampling schedule shall be documented in the Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report pursuant to Specification 6.9.1.~~7~~3 It is recognized that, at times, it may not be possible or practicable to continue to obtain samples of the media of choice at the most desired location or time. In these instances suitable alternative media and locations may be chosen for the particular pathway in question and appropriate substitutions made within 30 days in the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program. ~~In lieu of any Licensee Event Report required by Specification 6.9.1 and pursuant to Specification 6.9.1.7, identify the cause of the unavailability of samples for that pathway and identify the new location(s) for obtaining replacement samples in the next Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report and also include in the report a revised figure(s) and table for the ODCM reflecting the new location(s).~~

(2) One or more instruments, such as a pressurized ion chamber, for measuring and recording dose rate continuously may be used in place of, or in addition to, integrating dosimeters. For the purposes of this table, a thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD) is considered to be one phosphor; two or more phosphors in a packet are considered as two or more dosimeters. Film badges shall not be used as dosimeters for measuring direct radiation. (The 40 stations is not an absolute number. The number of direct radiation monitoring stations may be reduced according to geographical limitations; e.g., at an ocean site, some sectors will be over water so that the number of dosimeters may be reduced accordingly. The frequency of analysis or readout for TLD systems will depend upon the characteristics of the specific system used and should be selected to obtain optimum dose information within minimal fading.)

(3) Airborne particulate sample filters shall be analyzed for gross beta radioactivity 24 hours or more after sampling to allow for radon and thoron daughter decay. If gross beta activity in air particulate samples is greater than 10 times the yearly mean of control samples, gamma isotopic analysis shall be performed on the individual samples.

TABLE 3.12-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS (Continued)

(4) Gamma isotopic analysis means the identification and quantification of gamma-emitting radionuclides that may be attributable to the effluents from the facility.

(5) The "upstream sample" shall be taken at a distance beyond significant influence of the discharge. The "downstream" sample shall be taken in an area beyond but near the mixing zone. "Upstream" samples in an estuary must be taken far enough upstream to be beyond the plant influence. Salt water shall be sampled only when the receiving water is utilized for recreational activities.

(6) A composite sample is one in which the quantity (aliquot) of liquid sampled is proportional to the quantity of flowing liquid and in which the method of sampling employed results in a specimen that is representative of the liquid flow. In this program composite sample aliquots shall be collected at time intervals that are very short (e.g., hourly) relative to the compositing period (e.g., monthly) in order to assure obtaining a representative sample.

(7) Groundwater samples shall be taken when this source is tapped for drinking or irrigation purposes in areas where the hydraulic gradient or recharge properties are suitable for contamination.

(8) The dose shall be calculated for the maximum organ and age group, using the methodology and parameters in the ODCM.

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TABLE 3.12-2

REPORTING LEVELS FOR RADIOACTIVITY CONCENTRATIONS IN ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLES

ANALYSIS	WATER (pCi/l)	AIRBORNE PARTICULATE OR GASES (pCi/m^3)	FISH (pCi/kg, wet)	MILK (pCi/l)	FOOD PRODUCTS (pCi/kg, wet)
H-3	20,000*				
Mn-54	1,000		30,000		
Fe-59	400		10,000		
Co-58	1,000		30,000		
Co-60	300		10,000		
Zn-65	300		20,000		
Zr-Nb-95	400				
I-131	2**	0.9		3	100
Cs-134	30	10	1,000	60	1,000
Cs-137	50	20	2,000	70	2,000
Ba-La-140	200			300	

*For drinking water samples. This is 40 CFR Part 141 value. If no drinking water pathway exists, a value of 30,000 pCi/l may be used.

**If no drinking water pathway exists, a value of 20 pCi/l may be used.

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TABLE 4.12-1

DETECTION CAPABILITIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLE ANALYSIS(1) (2)

LOWER LIMIT OF DETECTION (LLD)(3)

ANALYSIS	WATER (pCi/l)	AIRBORNE PARTICULATE OR GASES (pCi/m^3)	FISH (pCi/kg, wet)	MILK (pCi/l)	FOOD PRODUCTS (pCi/kg, wet)	SEDIMENT (pCi/kg, dry)
Gross Beta	4	0.01				
H-3	2000*					
Mn-54	15		130			
Fe-59	30		260			
Co-58,60	15		130			
Zn-65	30		260			
Zr-Nb-95	15					
I-131	1**	0.07		1	60	
Cs-134	15	0.05	130	15	60	150
Cs-137	18	0.06	150	18	80	180
Ba-La-140	15			15		

*If no drinking water pathway exists, a value of 3000 pCi/l may be used.

**If no drinking water pathway exists, a value of 15 pCi/l may be used.

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TABLE 4.12-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS

(1)This list does not mean that only these nuclides are to be considered. Other peaks that are identifiable, together with those of the above nuclides, shall also be analyzed and reported in the Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report pursuant to Specification 6.9.1.3.

(2)Required detection capabilities for thermoluminescent dosimeters used for environmental measurements shall be in accordance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 4.13.

(3)The LLD is defined, for purposes of these specifications, as the smallest concentration of radioactive material in a sample that will yield a net count, above system background, that will be detected with 95% probability with only 5% probability of falsely concluding that a blank observation represents a "real" signal.

For a particular measurement system, which may include radiochemical separation:

$$LLD = \frac{4.66\ s_b}{E \cdot V \cdot 2.22 \cdot Y \cdot \exp(-\lambda \Delta t)}$$

Where:

LLD = the "a priori" lower limit of detection (picoCuries per unit mass or volume),

s_b = the standard deviation of the background counting rate or of the counting rate of a blank sample as appropriate (counts per minute),

E = the counting efficiency (counts per disintegration),

V = the sample size (units of mass or volume),

2.22 = the number of disintegrations per minute per picoCurie,

Y = the fractional radiochemical yield, when applicable,

λ = the radioactive decay constant for the particular radionuclide (sec^{-1}), and

Δt = the elapsed time between environmental collection, or end of the sample collection period, and time of counting (sec).

Typical values of E, V, Y, and Δt should be used in the calculation.

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TABLE 4.12-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS (Continued)

It should be recognized that the LLD is defined as an a priori (before the fact) limit representing the capability of a measurement system and not as an a posteriori (after the fact) limit for a particular measurement. Analyses shall be performed in such a manner that the stated LLDs will be achieved under routine conditions. Occasionally background fluctuations, unavoidable small sample sizes, the presence of interfering nuclides, or other uncontrollable circumstances may render these LLDs unachievable. In such cases, the contributing factors shall be identified and described in the Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report pursuant to Specification 6.9.1.3.

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RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING

3/4.12.2 LAND USE CENSUS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.12.2 A Land Use Census shall be conducted and shall identify within a distance of 8 km (5 miles) the location in each of the 16 meteorological sectors of the nearest milk animal, the nearest residence, and the nearest garden* of greater than 50 m^2 (500 ft^2) producing broad leaf vegetation.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

a. With a Land Use Census identifying a location(s) that yields a calculated dose or dose commitment greater than the values currently being calculated in Specification 4.11.2.3, pursuant to Specification 6.9.1.4, identify the new location(s) in the next Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report.

b. With a Land Use Census identifying a location(s) that yields a calculated dose or dose commitment (via the same exposure pathway) 20% greater than at a location from which samples are currently being obtained in accordance with Specification 3.12.1, add the new location(s) within 30 days to the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program given in the ODCM. The sampling location(s), excluding the control station location, having the lowest calculated dose or dose commitment(s), via the same exposure pathway, may be deleted from this monitoring program after [October 31] of the year in which this Land Use Census was conducted. Pursuant to Specification ~~6.14,~~ 6.9.1.4 submit in the next Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report documentation for a change in the ODCM including a revised figure(s) and table(s) for the ODCM reflecting the new location(s) with information supporting the change in sampling locations.

c. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.12.2 The Land Use Census shall be conducted during the growing season at least once per 12 months using that information that will provide the best results, such as by a door-to-door survey, aerial survey, or by consulting local agriculture authorities. The results of the Land Use Census shall be included in the Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report pursuant to Specification 6.9.1.3.

*Broad leaf vegetation sampling of at least three different kinds of vegetation may be performed at the SITE BOUNDARY in each of two different direction sectors with the highest predicted D/Qs in lieu of the garden census. Specifications for broad leaf vegetation sampling in Table 3.12-1, Part 4.c., shall be followed, including analysis of control samples.

RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING

3/4.12.3 INTERLABORATORY COMPARISON PROGRAM

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.12.3 Analyses shall be performed on all radioactive materials, supplied as part of an Interlaboratory Comparison Program that has been approved by the Commission, that correspond to samples required by Table 3.12-1.

APPLICABILITY: At all times.

ACTION:

a. With analyses not being performed as required above, report the corrective actions taken to prevent a recurrence to the Commission in the Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report pursuant to Specification 6.9.1.3.

b. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.12.3 The Interlaboratory Comparison Program shall be described in the ODCM. A summary of the results obtained as part of the above required Interlaboratory Comparison Program shall be included in the Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report pursuant to Specification 6.9.1.3.

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BASES FOR

SECTIONS 3.0 AND 4.0

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION

AND

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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NOTE

The BASES contained in succeeding pages summarize the reasons for the Specifications in Sections 3.0 and 4.0, but in accordance with 10 CFR 50.36 are not part of these Technical Specifications.

The specifications of this section provide the general requirements applicable to each of the Limiting Conditions for Operation and Surveillance Requirements within Section 3/4. In the event of a disagreement between the requirements stated in these Technical Specifications and those stated in an applicable Federal Regulation or Act, the requirements stated in the applicable Federal Regulation or Act shall take precedence and shall be met.

3.0.1 This specification defines the applicability of each specification in terms of defined OPERATIONAL MODES or other specified conditions and is provided to delineate specifically when each specification is applicable.

3.0.2 This specification defines those conditions necessary to constitute compliance with the terms of an individual Limiting Condition for Operation and associated ACTION requirement.

3.0.3 The specification delineates the measures to be taken for those circumstances not directly provided for in the ACTION statements and whose occurrence would violate the intent of a specification. For example, Specification 3.5.2 requires two independent ECCS subsystems to be OPERABLE and provides explicit ACTION requirements if one ECCS subsystem is inoperable. Under the requirements of Specification 3.0.3, if both the required ECCS subsystems are inoperable, within 1 hour measures must be initiated to place the unit in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours, and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. As a further example, Specification 3.6.2.1 requires two Containment Spray Systems to be OPERABLE and provides explicit ACTION requirements if one Spray System is inoperable. Under the requirements of Specification 3.0.3, if both the required Containment Spray Systems are inoperable, within 1 hour measures must be initiated to place the unit in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours, in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours, and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the subsequent 24 hours. It is acceptable to initiate and complete a reduction in OPERATIONAL MODES in a shorter time interval than required in the ACTION statement and to add the unused portion of this allowable out-of-service time to that provided for operation in subsequent lower OPERATION MODE(S). Stated allowable out-of-service times are applicable regardless of the OPERATIONAL MODE(S) in which the inoperability is discovered but the times provided for achieving a mode reduction are not applicable if the inoperability is discovered in a mode lower than the applicable mode. For example if the Containment Spray System was discovered to be inoperable while in STARTUP, the ACTION Statement would allow up to 156 hours to achieve COLD SHUTDOWN. If HOT STANDBY is attained in 16 hours rather than the allowed 78 hours, 140 hours would still be available before the plant would be required to be in COLD SHUTDOWN However, if this system was discovered to be inoperable while in HOT STANDBY, the 6 hours provided to achieve HOT STANDBY would not be additive to the time available to achieve COLD SHUTDOWN so that the total allowable time is reduced from 156 hours to 150 hours.

3.0.4 This specification provides that entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE or other specified applicability condition must be made with: (1) the full complement of required systems, equipment, or components OPERABLE and (2) all other parameters as specified in the Limiting Conditions for Operation being met without regard for allowable deviations and out-of-service provisions contained in the ACTION statements.

3.0.4 (Continued)

The intent of this provision is to ensure that facility operation is not initiated with either required equipment or systems inoperable or other specified limits being exceeded.

Exceptions to this provision have been provided for a limited number of specifications when startup with inoperable equipment would not affect plant safety. These exceptions are stated in the ACTION statements of the appropriate specifications.

4.0.1 This specification provides that surveillance activities necessary to ensure the Limiting Conditions for Operation are met and will be performed during the OPERATIONAL MODES or other conditions for which the Limiting Conditions for Operation are applicable. Provisions for additional surveillance activities to be performed without regard to the applicable OPERATIONAL MODES or other conditions are provided in the individual Surveillance Requirements. Surveillance Requirements for Special Test Exceptions need only be performed when the Special Test Exception is being utilized as an exception to an individual specification.

4.0.2 The provisions of this specification provide allowable tolerances for performing surveillance activities beyond those specified in the nominal surveillance interval. These tolerances are necessary to provide operational flexibility because of scheduling and performance considerations. The phrase "at least" associated with a surveillance frequency does not negate this allowable tolerance value and permits the performance of more frequent surveillance activities.

The tolerance values, taken either individually or consecutively over three test intervals, are sufficiently restrictive to ensure that the reliability associated with the surveillance activity is not significantly degraded beyond that obtained from the nominal specified interval.

4.0.3 The provisions of this specification set forth the criteria for determination of compliance with the OPERABILITY requirements of the Limiting Conditions for Operation. Under these criteria, equipment, systems or components are assumed to be OPERABLE if the associated surveillance activities have been satisfactorily performed within the specified time interval. Nothing in this provision is to be construed as defining equipment, systems or components OPERABLE when such items are found or known to be inoperable although still meeting the Surveillance Requirements. Items may be determined inoperable during use, during surveillance tests, or in accordance with this specification. Therefore, ACTION statements are entered when the Surveillance Requirements should have been performed rather than at the time it is discovered that the tests were not performed.

4.0.4 This specification ensures that the surveillance activities associated with a Limiting Condition for Operation have been performed within the specified time interval prior to entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE or other applicable condition. The intent of this provision is to ensure that surveillance activities have been satisfactorily demonstrated on a current basis as required to meet the OPERABILITY requirements of the Limiting Condition for Operation.

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4.0.4 (Continued)

Under the terms of this specification, for example, during initial plant STARTUP or following extended plant outages, the applicable surveillance activities must be performed within the stated surveillance interval prior to placing or returning the system or equipment into OPERABLE status.

4.0.5 This specification ensures that inservice inspection of ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 components and inservice testing of ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 pumps and valves will be performed in accordance with a periodically updated version of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and Addenda as required by 10 CFR 50.55a. Relief from any of the above requirements has been provided in writing by the Commission and is not a part of these Technical Specifications.

This specification includes a clarification of the frequencies for performing the inservice inspection and testing activities required by Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda. This clarification is provided to ensure consistency in surveillance intervals throughout these Technical Specifications and to remove any ambiguities relative to the frequencies for performing the required inservice inspection and testing activities.

Under the terms of this specification, the more restrictive requirements of the Technical Specifications take precedence over the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda. For example, the requirements of Specification 4.0.4 to perform surveillance activities prior to entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE or other specified applicability condition takes precedence over the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code provision which allows pumps to be tested up to 1 week after return to normal operation. And for example, the Technical Specification definition of OPERABLE does not grant a grace period before a device that is not capable of performing its specified function is declared inoperable and takes precedence over the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code provision which allows a valve to be incapable of performing its specified function for up to 24 hours before being declared inoperable.

3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL

3/4.1.1.1 and 3/4.1.1.2 SHUTDOWN MARGIN

A sufficient SHUTDOWN MARGIN ensures that: (1) the reactor can be made subcritical from all operating conditions, (2) the reactivity transients associated with postulated accident conditions are controllable within acceptable limits, and (3) the reactor will be maintained sufficiently subcritical to preclude inadvertent criticality in the shutdown condition.

SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements vary throughout core life as a function of fuel depletion, RCS boron concentration, and RCS T_{avg}. The most restrictive condition occurs at EOL, with T_{avg} at no load operating temperature, and is associated with a postulated steam line break accident and resulting uncontrolled RCS cooldown. In the analysis of this accident, a minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN of 1770 pcm is required to control the reactivity transient. Accordingly, the SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirement is based upon this limiting condition and is consistent with FSAR safety analysis assumptions. With T_{avg} less than 200°F, the reactivity transients resulting from a postulated steam line break cooldown are minimal, but a 2000 pcm SHUTDOWN MARGIN is required to provide adequate protection for postulated inadvertent dilution events.

* INSERT NEXT PAGE (B 3/4 1-1a)

3/4.1.1.3 MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT

The limitations on moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) are provided to ensure that the value of this coefficient remains within the limiting condition assumed in the FSAR accident and transient analyses.

The MTC values of this specification are applicable to a specific set of plant conditions; accordingly, verification of MTC values at conditions other than those explicitly stated will require extrapolation to those conditions in order to permit an accurate comparison.

The most negative MTC, value equivalent to the most positive moderator density coefficient (MDC), was obtained by incrementally correcting the MDC used in the FSAR analyses to nominal operating conditions. These corrections involved subtracting the incremental change in the MDC associated with a core condition of all rods inserted (most positive MDC) to an all rods withdrawn condition and, a conversion for the rate of change of moderator density with temperature at RATED THERMAL POWER conditions. This value of the MDC was then transformed into the limiting MTC value -42 pcm/°F. The MTC value of -33 pcm/°F represents a conservative value (with corrections for burnup and soluble boron) at a core condition of 300 ppm equilibrium boron concentration and is obtained by making these corrections to the limiting MTC value of -42 pcm/°F.

The Surveillance Requirements for measurement of the MTC at the beginning and near the end of the fuel cycle are adequate to confirm that the MTC remains

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ANALYSIS OF INADVERTENT BORON DILUTION AT COLD SHUTDOWN IS BASED ON:

1. ALL RCCA'S IN THE CORE WHILE THE RCS IS DRAINED (i.e., NOT FILLED), AND
2. ALL RCCA'S EXCEPT SHUTDOWN BANKS C AND D FULLY INSERTED IN THE CORE WHILE THE RCS IS FILLED.

IN ADDITION, BY ASSUMING THE MOST REACTIVE CONTROL ROD IS STUCK OUT OF THE CORE, ITS WORTH IS EFFECTIVELY ADDED TO THE 2000 pcm SHUTDOWN MARGIN IN CALCULATING THE NECESSARY SOLUABLE BORON CONCENTRATION

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BASES

MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT (Continued)

within its limits since this coefficient changes slowly due principally to the reduction in RCS boron concentration associated with fuel burnup.

3/4.1.1.4 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY

This specification ensures that the reactor will not be made critical with the Reactor Coolant System average temperature less than [551]°F. This limitation is required to ensure: (1) the moderator temperature coefficient is within it analyzed temperature range, (2) the trip instrumentation is within its normal operating range, (3) the pressurizer is capable of being in an OPERABLE status with a steam bubble, and (4) the reactor vessel is above its minimum RT_{NDT} temperature.

3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS

The Boron Injection System ensures that negative reactivity control is available during each mode of facility operation. The components required to perform this function include: (1) borated water sources, (2) charging/safety injection pumps, (3) separate flow paths, (4) boric acid transfer pumps, and (5) an emergency power supply from OPERABLE diesel generators.

With the RCS average temperature above 200°F, a minimum of two boron injection flow paths are required to ensure single functional capability in the event an assumed failure renders one of the flow paths inoperable. The boration capability of either flow path is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN from expected operating conditions of 1770 pcm after xenon decay and cooldown to 200°F. The maximum expected boration capability requirement occurs at EOL from full power equilibrium xenon conditions and requires ~~16300~~ 16830 gallons of [7000] ppm borated water be maintained in the boric acid storage tanks or [~~432,727~~] 448,000 gallons of 2000 ppm borated water be maintained in the refueling water storage tank (RWST).

With the RCS temperature below ~~200°F~~ 350°F, one boron injection flow path is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single boron injection flow path becomes inoperable.

The limitation for a maximum of one charging/safety injection pump (CSIP) to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all CSIPs except the required OPERABLE pump to be inoperable below [335°F] provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV.

The boron capability required below 200°F is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN of 1000 pcm after xenon decay and cooldown from 200°F to 140°F. This condition requires either ~~5400~~ 4330 gallons of [7000] ppm borated water be maintained in the boric acid storage tanks or [~~58,412~~] 85,000 gallons of 2000 ppm borated water be maintained in the RWST.

BORATION SYSTEMS (Continued)

, allowances for other identified needs,

an allowance for

The gallons given above are the amounts that need to be maintained in the tank in the various circumstances. To get the specified value, each value had added to it ~~(1)~~ the unusable volume of water in the tank ~~(2200 gallons for the BAT, 35,640 gallons for RWST)~~ and ~~a 3%~~ an allowance for possible instrument error ~~(1018 gallons for the BAT and 13,900 gallons for the RWST)~~. In addition, for human factors purposes, the percent indicated levels were then raised to either the next whole percent and the gallon figures rounded off. This makes the LCO values conservative to the analyzed values. The specified percent level and gallons differ by less than 0.1%.

or the next even per cent

The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST also ensure a pH value of between [8.5] and [11.0] for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.

The OPERABILITY of one Boron Injection System during REFUELING ensures that this system is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6.

3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES

The specifications of this section ensure that: (1) acceptable power distribution limits are maintained, (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, and (3) the potential effects of rod misalignment on associated accident analyses are limited. OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators is required to determine control rod positions and thereby ensure compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion limits.

The intent of Technical Specification 3.1.3.1 ACTION statement "a" is to ensure, before leaving ACTION statement "a" and utilizing ACTION statement "c," that the rod urgent Failure alarm is illuminated or that an obvious electrical problem in the rod control system is detected by minimal electrical troubleshooting techniques. Expeditious action will be taken to determine if rod immovability is caused by an electrical problem in the rod control system.

The ACTION statements which permit limited variations from the basic requirements are accompanied by additional restrictions which ensure that the original design criteria are met. Misalignment of a rod requires measurement of peaking factors and a restriction in THERMAL POWER. These restrictions provide assurance of fuel rod integrity during continued operation. In addition, those safety analyses affected by a misaligned rod are reevaluated to confirm that the results remain valid during future operation.

The maximum rod drop time restriction is consistent with the assumed rod drop time used in the safety analyses. Measurement with T_{avg} greater than or equal to [551]°F and with all reactor coolant pumps operating ensures that the measured drop times will be representative of insertion times experienced during a Reactor trip at operating conditions.

MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES (Continued)

Control rod positions and OPERABILITY of the rod position indicators are required to be verified on a nominal basis of once per 12 hours with more frequent verifications required if an automatic monitoring channel is inoperable. These verification frequencies are adequate for assuring that the applicable LCOs are satisfied.

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BASES

The specifications of this section provide assurance of fuel integrity during Condition I (Normal Operation) and II (Incidents of Moderate Frequency) events by: (1) maintaining the minimum DNBR in the core greater than or equal to 1.30 during normal operation and in short-term transients, and (2) limiting the fission gas release, fuel pellet temperature, and cladding mechanical properties to within assumed design criteria. In addition, limiting the peak linear power density during Condition I events provides assurance that the initial conditions assumed for the LOCA analyses are met and the ECCS acceptance criteria limit of 2200°F is not exceeded.

The definitions of certain hot channel and peaking factors as used in these specifications are as follows:

$F_Q(Z)$ Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor, is defined as the maximum local heat flux on the surface of a fuel rod at core elevation Z divided by the average fuel rod heat flux, allowing for manufacturing tolerances on fuel pellets and rods;

$F^N_{\Delta H}$ Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor, is defined as the ratio of the integral of linear power along the rod with the highest integrated power to the average rod power; and

$F_{xy}(Z)$ Radial Peaking Factor, is defined as the ratio of peak power density to average power density in the horizontal plane at core elevation Z.

3/4.2.1 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE

The limits on AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (AFD) assure that the $F_Q(Z)$ upper bound envelope of 2.32 times the normalized axial peaking factor is not exceeded during either normal operation or in the event of xenon redistribution following power changes.

Target flux difference (TARGET AFD) is determined at equilibrium xenon conditions. The rods may be positioned within the core in accordance with their respective insertion limits and should be inserted near their normal position for steady-state operation at high power levels. The value of the target flux difference obtained under these conditions divided by the fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER is the target flux difference at RATED THERMAL POWER for the associated core burnup conditions. Target flux differences for other THERMAL POWER levels are obtained by multiplying the RATED THERMAL POWER value by the appropriate fractional THERMAL POWER level. The periodic updating of the target flux difference value is necessary to reflect core burnup considerations.

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AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (Continued)

Although it is intended that the plant will be operated with the AFD within the target band required by Specification 3.2.1 about the target flux difference, during rapid plant THERMAL POWER reductions, control rod motion will cause the AFD to deviate outside of the target band at reduced THERMAL POWER levels. This deviation will not affect the xenon redistribution sufficiently to change the envelope of peaking factors which may be reached on a subsequent return to RATED THERMAL POWER (with the AFD within the target band) provided the time duration of the deviation is limited. Accordingly, a 1-hour penalty deviation limit cumulative during the previous 24 hours is provided for operation outside of the target band but within the limits of Figure 3.2-1 while at THERMAL POWER levels between 50% and 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER. For THERMAL POWER levels between 15% and 50% of RATED THERMAL POWER, deviations of the AFD outside of the target band are less significant. The penalty of 2 hours actual time reflects this reduced significance.

Provisions for monitoring the AFD on an automatic basis are derived from the plant process computer through the AFD Monitor Alarm. The computer determines the 1-minute average of each of the OPERABLE excore detector outputs and provides an alarm message immediately if the AFD for two or more OPERABLE excore channels are outside the target band and the THERMAL POWER is greater than 90% of RATED THERMAL POWER. During operation at THERMAL POWER levels between 50% and 90% and between 15% and 50% RATED THERMAL POWER, the computer outputs an alarm message when the penalty deviation accumulates beyond the limits of 1 hour and 2 hours, respectively.

Figure B 3/4 2-1 shows a typical monthly target band.

3/4.2.2 AND 3/4.2.3 HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR, AND RCS FLOW RATE AND NUCLEAR ENTHALPY RISE HOT CHANNEL FACTOR

The limits on heat flux hot channel factor, RCS flow rate, and nuclear enthalpy rise hot channel factor ensure that: (1) the design limits on peak local power density and minimum DNBR are not exceeded and (2) in the event of a LOCA the peak fuel clad temperature will not exceed the 2200°F ECCS acceptance criteria limit.

Each of these is measurable but will normally only be determined periodically as specified in Specifications 4.2.2 and 4.2.3. This periodic surveillance is sufficient to ensure that the limits are maintained provided:

a. Control rods in a single group move together with no individual rod insertion differing by more than ± 12 steps, indicated, from the group demand position;

b. Control rod groups are sequenced with overlapping groups as described in Specification 3.1.3.6;



FIGURE B 3/4 2-1

TYPICAL INDICATED AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE VERSUS THERMAL POWER FOR BURNUP GREATER THAN 3000 MWD/MTU

HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR, AND RCS FLOW RATE AND NUCLEAR ENTHALPY RISE HOT CHANNEL FACTOR (Continued)

c. The control rod insertion limits of Specifications 3.1.3.5 and 3.1.3.6 are maintained; and

d. The axial power distribution, expressed in terms of AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE, is maintained within the limits.

$F^N_{\Delta H}$ will be maintained within its limits provided Conditions a. through d. above are maintained. The combination of the RCS flow requirement and the measurement of $F^N_{\Delta H}$ ensure that the calculated DNBR will not be below the design DNBR value. The relaxation of $F^N_{\Delta H}$ as a function of THERMAL POWER allows changes in the radial power shape for all permissible rod insertion limits.

$F^N_{\Delta H}$ is evaluated as being less than or equal to 1.49. This value is used in the various accident analyses where $F^N_{\Delta H}$ influences parameters other than DNBR, e.g., peak clad temperature, and thus is the maximum "as measured" value allowed.

Fuel rod bowing reduces the value of DNB ratio. Credit is available to offset this reduction in the generic margin. The generic margins, totaling 9.1% DNBR completely offset any rod bow penalties. This margin includes the following:

a. Design limit DNBR of [1.30 vs 1.28],
b. Grid Spacing (K_s) of [0.046 vs 0.059],
c. Thermal Diffusion Coefficient of [0.038 vs 0.059],
d. DNBR Multiplier of [0.86 vs 0.88], and
e. Pitch reduction.

The applicable values of rod bow penalties are referenced in the FSAR.

When an F_Q measurement is taken, an allowance for both experimental error and manufacturing tolerance must be made. An allowance of 5% is appropriate for a full-core map taken with the Incore Detector Flux Mapping System, and a 3% allowance is appropriate for manufacturing tolerance.

The Radial Peaking Factor, $F_{xy}(Z)$, is measured periodically to provide assurance that the Hot Channel Factor, $F_Q(Z)$, remains within its limit. The F_{xy} limit for RATED THERMAL POWER (F_{xy}^{RTP}) as provided in the Radial Peaking Factor Limit Report per Specification 6.9.1.6 was determined from expected power control manuevers over the full range of burnup conditions in the core.

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HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR, AND RCS FLOW RATE AND NUCLEAR ENTHALPY RISE HOT CHANNEL FACTOR (Continued)

When RCS flow rate and $F^N_{\Delta H}$ are measured, no additional allowances are necessary prior to comparison with the limits of Specification 3.2.3.

A measurement error of 4% for $F^N_{\Delta H}$ has been allowed for in determination of the design DNBR value, and a normal RCS flowrate error of 2.4% will be included in C_1, which will be modified as discussed below.

The measurement error for RCS total flow rate is based upon performing a precision heat balance and using the result to calibrate the RCS flow rate indicators. Potential fouling of the feedwater venturi which might not be detected could bias the result from the precision heat balance in a non-conservative manner. Therefore, a penalty of [0.1]% for undetected fouling of the feedwater venturi, raises the nominal flow measurement allowance, C_1, to 2.5% for no venturi fouling. Any fouling which might bias the RCS flow rate measurement greater than [0.1]% can be detected by monitoring and trending various plant performance parameters. If detected, action shall be taken before performing subsequent precision heat balance measurements, i.e., either the effect of the fouling shall be quantified and compensated for in the RCS flow rate measurement or the venturi shall be cleaned to eliminate the fouling.

The 12-hour periodic surveillance of indicated RCS flow is sufficient to detect only flow degradation that could lead to operation outside the acceptable region of operation.

3/4.2.4 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO

The QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO limit assures that the radial power distribution satisfies the design values used in the power capability analysis. Radial power distribution measurements are made during STARTUP testing and periodically during power operation.

The limit of 1.02, at which corrective action is required, provides DNB and linear heat generation rate protection with x-y plane power tilts. A limiting tilt of 1.025 can be tolerated before the margin for uncertainty in F_Q is depleted. A limit of 1.02 was selected to provide an allowance for the uncertainty associated with the indicated power tilt.

The 2-hour time allowance for operation with a tilt condition greater than 1.02 but less than 1.09 is provided to allow identification and correction of a dropped or misaligned control rod. In the event such action ~~action~~ does not correct the tilt, the margin for uncertainty on F_Q is reinstated by reducing the maximum allowed power by 3% for each percent of tilt in excess of 1.

QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO (Continued)

For purposes of monitoring QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO when one excore detector is inoperable, the moveable incore detectors are used to confirm that the normalized symmetric power distribution is consistent with the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO. The incore detector monitoring is done with a full incore flux map or two sets of four symmetric thimbles. The ~~two~~ sets of four symmetric thimbles is a unique set of eight detector locations. These locations are C-8, E-5, E-11, H-3, H-13, L-5, L-11, N-8. IF OTHER LOCATIONS MUST BE USED, THEN A SPECIAL REPORT TO NRR SHOULD BE SUBMITTED WITHIN 30 DAYS.

PREFERRED

3/4.2.5 DNB PARAMETERS

The limits on the DNB-related parameters assure that each of the parameters are maintained within the normal steady-state envelope of operation assumed in the transient and accident analyses. The limits are consistent with the initial FSAR assumptions and have been analytically demonstrated adequate to maintain a minimum DNBR of 1.30 throughout each analyzed transient. The indicated T_{avg} value ~~of [590.8]°F~~ and the indicated pressurizer pressure value ~~of [2213] psig correspond~~ ARE COMPARED to analytical limits of 592.8°F and 2205 psig, respectively, with allowance for measurement uncertainty.

The 12-hour periodic surveillance of these parameters through instrument readout is sufficient to ensure that the parameters are restored within their limits following load changes and other expected transient operation.

3/4.3.1 AND 3/4.3.2 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the Reactor Trip System and the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System instrumentation and interlocks ensures that: (1) the associated ACTION and/or Reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its Setpoint (2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, (3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out-of-service for testing or maintenance, and (4) sufficient system functional capability is available from diverse parameters.

The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy, and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions. The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses. The Surveillance Requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards. The periodic surveillance tests performed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation Trip Setpoints specified in Table 3.3-4 are the nominal values at which the bistables are set for each functional unit. A Setpoint is considered to be adjusted consistent with the nominal value when the "as measured" Setpoint is within the band allowed for calibration accuracy. For example, if a bistable has a trip setpoint of $\leq$100%, a span of 125%, and a calibration accuracy of ±0.50%, then the bistable is considered to be adjusted to the trip setpoint as long as the "as measured" value for the bistable is $\leq$100.62%.

To accommodate the instrument drift assumed to occur between operational tests and the accuracy to which Setpoints can be measured and calibrated, Allowable Values for the Setpoints have been specified in Table 3.3-4. Operation with Setpoints less conservative than the Trip Setpoint but within the Allowable Value is acceptable since an allowance has been made in the safety analysis to accommodate this error. An optional provision has been included for determining the OPERABILITY of a channel when its Trip Setpoint is found to exceed the Allowable Value. The methodology of this option utilizes the "as measured" deviation from the specified calibration point for rack and sensor components in conjunction with a statistical combination of the other uncertainties of the instrumentation to measure the process variable and the uncertainties in calibrating the instrumentation. In Equation 3.3-1, $Z + R + S \leq TA$, the interactive effects of the errors in the rack and the sensor, and the "as measured" values of the errors are considered. Z, as specified in Table 3.3-4, in percent span, is the statistical summation of errors assumed in the analysis excluding those associated with the sensor and rack drift and the accuracy of their measurement. TA or Total Allowance is the difference, in percent span, between the trip setpoint and the value used in the analysis for the actuation. R or Rack Error is the "as measured" deviation, in the percent span, for the affected channel from the specified Trip Setpoint. S or Sensor Error is either the "as measured"

REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

deviation of the sensor from its calibration point or the value specified in Table 3.3-4, in percent span, from the analysis assumptions. Use of Equation 3.3-1 allows for a sensor draft factor, an increased rack drift factor, and provides a threshold value for determination of OPERABILITY.

The methodology to derive the Trip Setpoints is based upon combining all of the uncertainties in the channels. Inherent to the determination of the Trip Setpoints are the magnitudes of these channel uncertainties. Sensor and rack instrumentation utilized in these channels are expected to be capable of operating within the allowances of these uncertainty magnitudes. Rack drift in excess of the Allowable Value exhibits the behavior that the rack has not met its allowance. Being that there is a small statistical chance that this will happen, an infrequent excessive drift is expected. Rack or sensor drift, in excess of the allowance that is more than occasional, may be indicative of more serious problems and should warrant further investigation.

The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the reactor trip and the Engineered Safety Features actuation associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the safety analyses. No credit was taken in the analyses for those channels with response times indicated as not applicable. Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel test measurements provided that such tests demonstrate the total channel response time as defined. Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either: (1) in place, onsite, or offsite test measurements, or (2) utilizing replacement sensors with certified response time.

The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System senses selected plant parameters and determines whether or not predetermined limits are being exceeded. If they are, the signals are combined into logic matrices sensitive to combinations indicative of various accidents events, and transients. Once the required logic combination is completed, the system sends actuation signals to those Engineered Safety Features components whose aggregate function best serves the requirements of the condition. As an example, the following actions may be initiated by the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System to mitigate the consequences of a steam line break or loss-of-coolant accident: (1) charging/safety injection pumps start and automatic valves position, (2) reactor trip, (3) feedwater isolation, (4) startup of the emergency diesel generators, (5) containment spray pumps start and automatic valves position (6) containment isolation, (7) steam line isolation, (8) turbine trip, (9) auxiliary feedwater pumps start and automatic valves position, (10) containment fan coolers start and automatic valves position, (11) emergency service water pumps start and automatic valves position, and (12) control room isolation and emergency filtration start.

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REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System interlocks perform the following functions:

P-4 Reactor tripped - Actuates Turbine trip, closes main feedwater valves on T_{avg} below Setpoint, prevents the opening of the main feedwater valves which were closed by a Safety Injection or High Steam Generator Water Level signal, allows Safety Injection block so that components can be reset or tripped.

Reactor not tripped - prevents manual block of Safety Injection.

SENDS AN OPEN SIGNAL TO THE ACCUMULATOR DISCHARGE VALVES

P-11 On increasing pressurizer pressure, P-11 automatically reinstates Safety Injection actuation on low pressurizer pressure and low steam-line pressure, and automatically blocks steam-line isolation on a high rate of decrease in steam-line pressure. On decreasing pressurizer pressure, P-11 allows the manual block of Safety Injection on low pressurizer pressure and low steam-line pressure and allows steam-line isolation, on a high rate of decrease in steam-line pressure, to become active upon manual block of Safety Injection from low steam-line pressure.

P-12 P-12 has no ESF or reactor trip functions. On decreasing reactor coolant loop temperature, P-12 automatically removes the arming signal from the Steam Dump System.

P-14 On increasing steam generator water level, P-14 automatically trips all feedwater isolation valves and inhibits feedwater control valve modulation.

3/4.3.3 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

3/4.3.3.1 RADIATION MONITORING FOR PLANT OPERATIONS

The OPERABILITY of the radiation monitoring instrumentation for plant operations ensures that: (1) the associated action will be initiated when the radiation level monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its setpoint, (2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, and (3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out-of-service for testing or maintenance. The radiation monitors for plant operations senses radiation levels in selected plant systems and locations and determines whether or not predetermined limits are being exceeded. If they are, the signals are combined into logic matrices sensitive to combinations indicative of various accidents and abnormal conditions. Once the required logic combination is completed, the system sends actuation signals to initiate alarms or automatic isolation action and actuation of emergency systems.

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3/4.3.3.2 MOVABLE INCORE DETECTORS

The OPERABILITY of the movable incore detectors with the specified minimum complement of equipment ensures that the measurements obtained from use of this system accurately represent the spatial neutron flux distribution of the core. The OPERABILITY of this system is demonstrated by irradiating each detector used and determining the acceptability of its voltage curve.

For the purpose of measuring $F_Q(Z)$ or $F^N_{\Delta H}$, a full incore flux map is used. Quarter-core flux maps, as defined in WCAP-8648, June 1976, may be used in recalibration of the Excore Neutron Flux Detection System, and full incore flux maps or symmetric incore thimbles may be used for monitoring the QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO when one Power Range channel is inoperable.

3/4.3.3.3 SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the seismic instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to promptly determine the magnitude of a seismic event and evaluate the response of those features important to safety. This capability is required to permit comparison of the measured response to that used in the design basis for the facility to determine if plant shutdown is required pursuant to Appendix A of 10 CFR Part 100. The instrumentation is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.12, "Instrumentation for Earthquakes," April 1974.

3/4.3.3.4 METEOROLOGICAL INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the meteorological instrumentation ensures that sufficient meteorological data are available for estimating potential radiation doses to the public as a result of routine or accidental release of radioactive materials to the atmosphere. This capability is required to evaluate the need for initiating protective measures to protect the health and safety of the public and is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.23, "Onsite Meteorological Programs," February 1972.

3/4.3.3.5 REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Remote Shutdown System ensures that sufficient capability is available to permit safe shutdown of the facility from locations outside of the control room. This capability is required in the event control room habitability is lost and is consistent with General Design Criterion 19 of 10 CFR Part 50.

The OPERABILITY of the Remote Shutdown System ensures that a fire will not preclude achieving safe shutdown. The Remote Shutdown System instrumentation, control, and power circuits and transfer switches necessary to eliminate effects of the fire and allow operation of instrumentation, control and power circuits required to achieve and maintain a safe shutdown condition are independent of areas where a fire could damage systems normally used to shut down the reactor.

REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM (Continued)

This capability is consistent with General Design Criterion 3 and Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50.

3/4.3.3.6 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables following an accident. This capability is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 3, "Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plant Conditions During and Following an Accident," May 1983 and NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements," November 1980.

3/4.3.3.7 CHLORINE DETECTION SYSTEMS

The OPERABILITY of the Chlorine Detection Systems ensures that sufficient capability is available to promptly detect and initiate protective action in the event of an accidental chlorine release. This capability is required to protect control room personnel and is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.95, Revision 1, "Protection of Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Operators Against an Accidental Chlorine Release," January 1977.

3/4.3.3.8 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the fire detection instrumentation ensures that both adequate warning capability is available for prompt detection of fires and that Fire Suppression Systems, that are actuated by fire detectors, will discharge extinguishing agents in a timely manner. Prompt detection and suppression of fires will reduce the potential for damage to safety-related equipment and is an integral element in the overall facility Fire Protection Program.

Fire detectors that are used to actuate Fire Suppression Systems represent a more critically important component of a plant s Fire Protection Program than detectors that are installed solely for early fire warning and notification. Consequently, the minimum number of OPERABLE fire detectors must be greater.

The loss of detection capability for Fire Suppression Systems, actuated by fire detectors, represents a significant degradation of fire protection for any area. As a result, the establishment of a fire watch patrol must be initiated at an earlier stage than would be warranted for the loss of detectors that provide only early fire warning. The establishment of frequent fire patrols in the affected areas is required to provide detection capability until the inoperable instrumentation is restored to OPERABILITY.

3/4.3.3.9 METAL IMPACT MONITORING ~~LOOSE PART DETECTION~~ SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the METAL IMPACT MONITORING ~~Loose-Part Detection~~ System ensures that sufficient capability is available to detect loose metallic parts in the Reactor System and

LOOSE PART DETECTION SYSTEM (Continued)

avoid or mitigate damage to Reactor System components. The allowable out-of-service times and surveillance requirements are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.133, "Loose-Part Detection Program for the Primary System of Light-Water-Cooled Reactors," May 1981.

3/4.3.3.10 RADIOACTIVE LIQUID EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The radioactive liquid effluent instrumentation is provided to monitor and control, as applicable, the releases of radioactive materials in liquid effluents during actual or potential releases of liquid effluents. The Alarm/Trip Setpoints for these instruments shall be calculated and adjusted in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM to ensure that the alarm/trip will occur prior to exceeding the limits of 10 CFR Part 20. The OPERABILITY and use of this instrumentation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 60, 63, and 64 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

3/4.3.3.11 RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS EFFLUENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The radioactive gaseous effluent instrumentation is provided to monitor and control, as applicable, the releases of radioactive materials in gaseous effluents during actual or potential releases of gaseous effluents. The Alarm/Trip Setpoints for these instruments shall be calculated and adjusted in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the ODCM to ensure that the alarm/trip will occur prior to exceeding the limits of 10 CFR Part 20. This instrumentation also includes provisions for monitoring (and controlling) the concentrations of potentially explosive gas mixtures in the GASEOUS RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM. The OPERABILITY and use of this instrumentation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 60, 63, and 64 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. The sensitivity of any noble gas activity monitors used to show compliance with the gaseous effluent release requirements of Specification 3.11.2.2 shall be such that concentrations as low as 1×10^{-6} μCi/ml are measurable.

3/4.3.4 TURBINE OVERSPEED PROTECTION

This specification is provided to ensure that the turbine overspeed protection instrumentation and the turbine speed control valves are OPERABLE and will protect the turbine from excessive overspeed. Protection from turbine excessive overspeed is required since excessive overspeed of the turbine could generate potentially damaging missiles which could impact and damage safety-related components, equipment or structures.

3/4.4.1 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS AND COOLANT CIRCULATION

The plant is designed to operate with all reactor coolant loops in operation and maintain DNBR above 1.30 during all normal operations and anticipated transients. In MODES 1 and 2 with one reactor coolant loop not in operation this specification requires that the plant be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours.

In MODE 3, two reactor coolant loops provide sufficient heat removal capability for removing core decay heat even in the event of a bank withdrawal accident; however, a single reactor coolant loop provides sufficient heat removal capacity if a bank withdrawal accident can be prevented, i.e., by opening the Reactor Trip System breakers. Single failure considerations require that two loops be OPERABLE at all times.

In MODE 4, and in MODE 5 with reactor coolant loops filled, a single reactor coolant loop or RHR loop provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat; but single failure considerations require that at least two loops (either RHR or RCS) be OPERABLE.

In MODE 5 with reactor coolant loops not filled, a single RHR loop provides sufficient heat removal capability for removing decay heat; but single failure considerations, and the unavailability of the steam generators as a heat removing component, require that at least two RHR loops be OPERABLE.

The operation of one reactor coolant pump (RCP) or one RHR pump provides adequate flow to ensure mixing, prevent stratification and produce gradual reactivity changes during boron concentration reductions in the Reactor Coolant System. The reactivity change rate associated with boron reduction will, therefore, be within the capability of operator recognition and control.

The restrictions on starting an RCP with one or more RCS cold legs less than or equal to [335]°F are provided to prevent RCS pressure transients, caused by energy additions from the Secondary Coolant System, which could exceed the limits of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50. The RCS will be protected against overpressure transients and will not exceed the limits of Appendix G by restricting starting of the RCPs to when the secondary water temperature of each steam generator is less than 50°F above each of the RCS cold leg temperatures.

3/4.4.2 SAFETY VALVES

The pressurizer Code safety valves operate to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its Safety Limit of 2735 psig. Each safety valve is designed to relieve 380,000 lbs per hour of saturated steam at the valve Setpoint. The relief capacity of a single safety valve is adequate to relieve any overpressure condition which could occur during shutdown. In the event that no safety valves are OPERABLE, an operating RHR loop, connected to the RCS, provides overpressure relief capability and will prevent RCS overpressurization. In addition, the Overpressure Protection System provides a diverse means of protection against RCS overpressurization at low temperatures.

SAFETY VALVES (Continued)

During operation, all pressurizer Code safety valves must be OPERABLE to prevent the RCS from being pressurized above its Safety Limit of 2735 psig. The combined relief capacity of all of these valves is greater than the maximum surge rate resulting from a complete loss-of-load assuming no reactor trip until the second Reactor Trip System trip setpoint is reached (i.e., no credit is taken for a direct Reactor trip on the loss-of-load) and also assuming no operation of the power-operated relief valves or steam dump valves.

Demonstration of the safety valves' lift settings will occur only during shutdown and will be performed in accordance with the provisions of Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Code.

3/4.4.3 PRESSURIZER

The limit on the maximum water volume in the pressurizer assures that the parameter is maintained within the normal steady-state envelope of operation assumed in the SAR. The limit is consistent with the initial SAR assumptions. The 12-hour periodic surveillance is sufficient to ensure that the parameter is restored to within its limit following expected transient operation. The maximum water volume also ensures that a steam bubble is formed and thus the RCS is not a hydraulically solid system. The requirement that a minimum number of pressurizer heaters be OPERABLE enhances the capability of the plant to control Reactor Coolant System pressure and establish natural circulation.

3/4.4.4 RELIEF VALVES

The power-operated relief valves (PORVs) and steam bubble function to relieve RCS pressure during all design transients up to and including the design step load decrease with steam dump. Operation of the PORVs minimizes the undesirable opening of the spring-loaded pressurizer Code safety valves. Each PORV has a remotely operated block valve to provide a positive shutoff capability should a relief valve become inoperable.

3/4.4.5 STEAM GENERATORS

The Surveillance Requirements for inspection of the steam generator tubes ensure that the structural integrity of this portion of the RCS will be maintained. The program for inservice inspection of steam generator tubes is based on a modification of Regulatory Guide 1.83, Revision 1. Inservice inspection of steam generator tubing is essential in order to maintain surveillance of the conditions of the tubes in the event that there is evidence of mechanical damage or progressive degradation due to design, manufacturing errors, or inservice conditions that lead to corrosion. Inservice inspection of steam generator tubing also provides a means of characterizing the nature and cause of any tube degradation so that corrective measures can be taken.

STEAM GENERATORS (Continued)

The plant is expected to be operated in a manner such that the secondary coolant will be maintained within those chemistry limits found to result in negligible corrosion of the steam generator tubes. If the secondary coolant chemistry is not maintained within these limits, localized corrosion may likely result in stress corrosion cracking. The extent of cracking during plant operation would be limited by the limitation of steam generator tube leakage between the Reactor Coolant System and the Secondary Coolant System (reactor-to-secondary leakage = 500 gallons per day per steam generator). Cracks having a reactor-to-secondary leakage less than this limit during operation will have an adequate margin of safety to withstand the loads imposed during normal operation and by postulated accidents. Operating plants have demonstrated that reactor-to-secondary leakage of 500 gallons per day per steam generator can readily be detected by radiation monitors of steam generator blowdown. Leakage in excess of this limit will require plant shutdown and an unscheduled inspection, during which the leaking tubes will be located and plugged.

Wastage-type defects are unlikely with proper chemistry treatment of the secondary coolant. However, even if a defect should develop in service, it will be found during scheduled inservice steam generator tube examinations. Plugging will be required for all tubes with imperfections exceeding the plugging limit of [40]% of the tube nominal wall thickness. Steam generator tube inspections of operating plants have demonstrated the capability to reliably detect degradation that has penetrated 20% of the original tube wall thickness.

Whenever the results of any steam generator tubing inservice inspection fall into Category C-3, these results will be reported to the Commission in a Special Report pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days and prior to resumption of plant operation. Such cases will be considered by the Commission on a case-by-case basis and may result in a requirement for analysis, laboratory examinations, tests, additional eddy-current inspection, and revision of the Technical Specifications, if necessary.

3/4.4.6 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE

3/4.4.6.1 LEAKAGE DETECTION SYSTEMS

The RCS Leakage Detection Systems required by this specification are provided to monitor and detect leakage from the reactor coolant pressure boundary. These Detection Systems are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.45, "Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection Systems," May 1973.

3/4.4.6.2 OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE

PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE of any magnitude is unacceptable since it may be indicative of an impending gross failure of the pressure boundary. Therefore, the presence of any PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE requires the unit to be promptly placed in COLD SHUTDOWN.

OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE (Continued)

Industry experience has shown that while a limited amount of leakage is expected from the RCS, the unidentified portion of this leakage can be reduced to a threshold value of less than 1 gpm. This threshold value is sufficiently low to ensure early detection of additional leakage.

The total steam generator tube leakage limit of 1 gpm for all steam generators ensures that the dosage contribution from the tube leakage will be limited to a small fraction of 10 CFR Part 100 dose guideline values in the event of either a steam generator tube rupture or steam line break. The 1 gpm limit is consistent with the assumptions used in the analysis of these accidents. The 500 gpd leakage limit per steam generator ensures that steam generator tube integrity is maintained in the event of a main steam line rupture or under LOCA conditions.

The 10 gpm IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE limitation provides allowance for a limited amount of leakage from known sources whose presence will not interfere with the detection of UNIDENTIFIED LEAKAGE by the Leakage Detection Systems.

The CONTROLLED LEAKAGE limitation restricts operation when the total flow supplied to the reactor coolant pump seals exceeds 31 gpm with the modulating valve in the supply line fully open at a nominal RCS pressure of 2235 psig. This limitation ensures that in the event of a LOCA, the safety injection flow will not be less than assumed in the safety analyses.

The maximum allowable leakage from any RCS pressure isolation valve is sufficiently low to ensure early detection of possible in-series check valve failure. It is apparent that when pressure isolation is provided by two in-series check valves and when failure of one valve in the pair can go undetected for a substantial length of time, verification of valve integrity is required. Since these valves are important in preventing overpressurization and rupture of the ECCS low pressure piping which could result in a LOCA that bypasses containment, these valves should be tested periodically to ensure low probability of gross failure.

The Surveillance Requirements for RCS pressure isolation valves provide added assurance of valve integrity thereby reducing the probability of gross valve failure and consequent intersystem LOCA. Leakage from the RCS pressure isolation valve is IDENTIFIED LEAKAGE and will be considered as a portion of the allowed limit.

3/4.4.7 CHEMISTRY

The limitations on Reactor Coolant System chemistry ensure that corrosion of the Reactor Coolant System is minimized and reduces the potential for Reactor Coolant System leakage or failure due to stress corrosion. Maintaining the chemistry within the Steady-State Limits provides adequate corrosion protection to ensure the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System over the life of the plant. The associated effects of exceeding the oxygen, chloride, and fluoride limits are time and temperature dependent. Corrosion studies show

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CHEMISTRY (Continued)

that operation may be continued with contaminant concentration levels in excess of the Steady-State Limits, up to the Transient Limits, for the specified limited time intervals without having a significant effect on the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System. The time interval permitting continued operation within the restrictions of the Transient Limits provides time for taking corrective actions to restore the contaminant concentrations to within the Steady-State Limits.

The Surveillance Requirements provide adequate assurance that concentrations in excess of the limits will be detected in sufficient time to take corrective action.

3/4.4.8 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY

The limitations on the specific activity of the reactor coolant ensure that the resulting 2-hour doses at the SITE BOUNDARY will not exceed an appropriately small fraction of 10 CFR Part 100 dose guideline values following a steam generator tube rupture accident in conjunction with an assumed steady-state reactor-to-secondary steam generator leakage rate of 1 gpm. The values for the limits on specific activity represent limits based upon a parametric evaluation by the NRC of typical site locations. These values are conservative in that specific site parameters of the SHEARON HARRIS site, such as SITE BOUNDARY location and meteorological conditions, were not considered in this evaluation.

The ACTION statement permitting POWER OPERATION to continue for limited time periods with the reactor coolant's specific activity greater than 1 microCurie/gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131, but within the allowable limit shown on Figure 3.4-1, accommodates possible iodine spiking phenomenon which may occur following changes in THERMAL POWER. SEE GENERIC LETTER 85-19 FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.

The sample analysis for determining the gross specific activity and $\bar{E}$ can exclude the radioiodines because of the low reactor coolant limit of 1 microCurie/gram DOSE EQUIVALENT I-131, and because, if the limit is exceeded, the radioiodine level is to be determined every 4 hours. If the gross specific activity level and radioiodine level in the reactor coolant were at their limits, the radioiodine contribution would be approximately 1%. In a release of reactor coolant with a typical mixture of radioactivity, the actual radioiodine contribution would probably be about 20%. The exclusion of radionuclides with half-lives less than 1~~0~~5 minutes from these determinations has been made for several reasons. The first consideration is the difficulty to identify short-lived radionuclides in a sample that requires a significant time to collect, transport, and analyze. The second consideration is the predictable delay time between the postulated release of radioactivity from the reactor coolant to its release to the environment and transport to the SITE BOUNDARY, which is relatable to at least 30 minutes decay time. The choice of 1~~0~~5 minutes for the half-life cutoff was made because of the nuclear characteristics of the typical reactor coolant radioactivity. The radionuclides in the typical reactor coolant have half-lives of less than 4 minutes or half-lives of greater than 14 minutes, which allows a

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SPECIFIC ACTIVITY (Continued)

distinction between the radionuclides above and below a half-life of ~~10~~ 15 minutes. For these reasons the radionuclides that are excluded from consideration are expected to decay to very low levels before they could be transported from the reactor coolant to the SITE BOUNDARY under any accident condition.

Based upon the above considerations for excluding certain radionuclides from the sample analysis, the allowable time of 2 hours between sample taking and completing the initial analysis is based upon a typical time necessary to perform the sampling, transport the sample, and perform the analysis of about 90 minutes. After 90 minutes, the gross count should be made in a reproducible geometry of sample and counter having reproducible beta or gamma self-shielding properties. The counter should be reset to a reproducible efficiency versus energy. It is not necessary to identify specific nuclides. The radiochemical determination of nuclides should be based on multiple counting of the sample within typical counting basis following sampling of less than 1 hour, about 2 hours, about 1 day, about 1 week, and about 1 month.

Reducing T_{avg} to less than 500°F prevents the release of activity should a steam generator tube rupture occur, since the saturation pressure of the reactor coolant is below the lift pressure of the atmospheric steam relief valves. The Surveillance Requirements provide adequate assurance that excessive specific activity levels in the reactor coolant will be detected in sufficient time to take corrective action. A reduction in frequency of isotopic analyses following power changes may be permissible if justified by the data obtained.

3/4.4.9 PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS

The temperature and pressure changes during heatup and cooldown are limited to be consistent with the requirements given in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Appendix G~~X~~ ← ADD INSERT (NEXT PAGE B 3/4 4-6a)

1. The reactor coolant temperature and pressure and system heatup and cooldown rates (with the exception of the pressurizer) shall be limited in accordance with Figures 3.4-2 and 3.4-3 for the service period specified thereon:

   a. Allowable combinations of pressure and temperature for specific temperature change rates are below and to the right of the limit lines shown. Limit lines for cooldown rates between those presented may be obtained by interpolation; and

   b. Figures 3.4-2 and 3.4-3 define limits to assure prevention of non-ductile failure only. For normal operation, other inherent plant characteristics, e.g., pump heat addition and pressurizer heater capacity, may limit the heatup and cooldown rates that can be achieved over certain pressure-temperature ranges.

INSERT FOR PAGE B3/4 4-6

AND 10CFR 50 APPENDIX G. ALSO THE NEW 10 CFR 50, APPENDIX G RULE WHICH ADDRESSES THE METAL TEMPERATURE OF THE CLOSURE HEAD FLANGE AND VESSEL FLANGE REGIONS IS CONSIDERED. THIS RULE STATES THE MINIMUM METAL TEMPERATURE OF THE CLOSURE FLANGE REGION SHOULD BE AT LEAST 120°F HIGHER THAN THE LIMITING RT NDT FOR THESE REGIONS WHEN THE PRESSURE EXCEEDS 20% OF THE PRESERVICE HYDROSTATIC TEST PRESSURE (621 psig FOR WESTINGHOUSE PLANTS). FOR SHEARON HARRIS UNIT 1, THE MINIMUM TEMPERATURE OF THE CLOSURE FLANGE AND VESSEL FLANGE REGIONS IS 120°F SINCE THE LIMITING RT NDT IS 0°F (SEE TABLE B 3/4 4-1). THE SHEARON HARRIS UNIT 1 HEATUP AND COOLDOWN CURVES SHOWN IN FIGURES 3.4-2 AND 3.4-3 ARE NOT IMPACTED BY THE RULE.

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PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS (Continued)

2. These limit lines shall be calculated periodically using methods provided below,

3. The secondary side of the steam generator must not be pressurized above 200 psig if the temperature of the steam generator is below 70°F,

4. The pressurizer heatup and cooldown rates shall not exceed 100°F/h and 200°F/h, respectively. The spray shall not be used if the temperature difference between the pressurizer and the spray fluid is greater than [625]°F, and

5. System preservice hydrotests and inservice leak and hydrotests shall be performed at pressures in accordance with the requirements of ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI.

The fracture toughness testing of the ferritic WINTER materials in the reactor vessel were performed in accordance with the 1971 ~~Winter~~ Addenda to Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. THESE PROPERTIES ARE THEN EVALUATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NRC STANDARD REVIEW PLAN. Heatup and cooldown limit curves are calculated using the most limiting value of the nil-ductility reference temperature, RT_{NDT}, at the end of [~~5~~] 4 effective full power years (EFPY) of service life. The [~~5~~] 4 EFPY service life period is chosen such that the limiting RT_{NDT} at the 1/4T location in the core region is greater than the RT_{NDT} of the limiting unirradiated material. The selection of such a limiting RT_{NDT} assures that all components in the Reactor Coolant System will be operated conservatively in accordance with applicable Code requirements.

The reactor vessel materials have been tested to determine their initial RT_{NDT}; the results of these tests are shown in Table B 3/4.4-1. Reactor operation and resultant fast neutron (E greater than 1 MeV) irradiation can cause an increase in the RT_{NDT}. Therefore, an adjusted reference temperature, based upon the fluence, copper content, and phosphorus content of the material in question, can be predicted using Figure B 3/4.4-1 and the largest value of ΔRT_{NDT} computed by either Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 1, "Effects of Residual Elements on Predicted Radiation Damage to Reactor Vessel Materials," or the Westinghouse Copper Trend Curves shown in Figure B 3/4.4-2. The heatup and cooldown limit curves of Figures 3.4-2 and 3.4-3 include predicted adjustments for this shift in RT_{NDT} at the end of [~~5~~] 4 EFPY as well as adjustments for possible errors in the pressure and temperature sensing instruments.

TABLE B 3/4.4-1

REACTOR VESSEL TOUGHNESS

AVG. SHELF ENERGY — MOVE TO

COMPONENT	GRADE	HEAT NO	CU %	P (%)	T_{NDT} (°F)	RT_{NDT} (°F)	MWD FT-LB	NMWD FT-LB
Closure Hd. Dome	A533,B,CL1	A9213-1	-	-	-10	8	-	114
Head Flange	A508, CL2	5302-V2	-	-	0	0	-	135
Vessel Flange	"	5302-V1	-	-	-10	-8	-	110
Inlet Nozzle	"	438B-4	-	-	-20	-20	-	169
" "	"	438B-5	-	-	0	0	-	128
" "	"	438B-6	-	-	-20	-20	-	149
Outlet Nozzle	"	439B-4	-	-	-10	-10	-	151
" "	"	439B-5	-	-	-10	-10	-	152
" "	"	439B-6	-	-	-10	-10	-	150
Nozzle Shell	A533B,CL1	C0224-1	.12	.008	-20	-1	-	90
" "	"	C0123-1	.12	.006	0	42	-	84
Inter. Shell	"	A9153-1	.09	.007	-10	60	106	83
" "	"	B4197-2	.10	.006	-10	90	112	78
Lower Shell	"	C9924-1	.08	.005	-10	54	147	98
" "	"	C9924-2	.08	.005	-20	57	148	88
Bottom Hd. Torus	"	A9249-2	-	-	-40	14	-	94
" " Dome		A9213-2	-	-	-40	-8	-	125
Weld (Inter & Lower Shell Vertical Weld Seams)			.06	.013	-20	-20	-	>94
Weld (Inter. to Lower Shell Girth Seam)			.04	.013	-20	-20	-	88

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

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FIGURE B 3/4.4-1

FAST NEUTRON FLUENCE (E>1MeV) AS A FUNCTION OF FULL POWER SERVICE LIFE

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

Figure B 3/4.4-1

Fast Neutron Fluence (E>1MeV) as a Function of Full Power Service Life



FIGURE B 3/4.4-2

EFFECT OF FLUENCE AND COPPER ON SHIFT OF RT_{NDT} FOR REACTOR VESSEL STEELS EXPOSED TO IRRADIATION AT 550°F

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PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS (Continued)

Values of ΔRT_{NDT} determined in this manner may be used until the results from the material surveillance program, evaluated according to ASTM E185, are available. Capsules will be removed and evaluated in accordance with the requirements of ASTM E185-73 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H. The surveillance specimen withdrawal schedule is shown in Table 4.4-5. The lead factor represents the relationship between the fast neutron flux density at the location of the capsule and the inner wall of the reactor vessel. Therefore, the results obtained from the surveillance specimens can be used to predict future radiation damage to the reactor vessel material by using the lead factor and the withdrawal time of the capsule. The heatup and cooldown curves must be recalculated when the ΔRT_{NDT} determined from the surveillance capsule exceeds the calculated ΔRT_{NDT} for the equivalent capsule radiation exposure.

Allowable pressure-temperature relationships for various heatup and cooldown rates are calculated using methods derived from Appendix G in Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code as required by Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50, and these methods are discussed in detail in WCAP-7924-A.

The general method for calculating heatup and cooldown limit curves is based upon the principles of the linear elastic fracture mechanics (LEFM) technology. In the calculation procedures a semielliptical surface defect with a depth of one-quarter of the wall thickness, T, and a length of 3/2T is assumed to exist at the inside of the vessel wall as well as at the outside of the vessel wall. The dimensions of this postulated crack, referred to in Appendix G of ASME Section III as the reference flaw, amply exceed the current capabilities of inservice inspection techniques. Therefore, the reactor operation limit curves developed for this reference crack are conservative and provide sufficient safety margins for protection against nonductile failure. To assure that the radiation embrittlement effects are accounted for in the calculation of the limit curves, the most limiting value of the nil-ductility reference temperature, RT_{NDT}, is used and this includes the radiation-induced shift, ΔRT_{NDT}, corresponding to the end of the period for which heatup and cooldown curves are generated.

The ASME approach for calculating the allowable limit curves for various heatup and cooldown rates specifies that the total stress intensity factor, K_I, for the combined thermal and pressure stresses at any time during heatup or cooldown cannot be greater than the reference stress intensity factor, K_{IR}, for the metal temperature at that time. K_{IR} is obtained from the reference fracture toughness curve, defined in Appendix G to the ASME Code. The K_{IR} curve is given by the equation:

PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS (Continued)

$$K_{IR} = 26.78 + 1.223 \exp [0.0145(T-RT_{NDT} + 160)] \quad (1)$$

Where: K_{IR} is the reference stress intensity factor as a function of the metal temperature T and the metal nil-ductility reference temperature RT_{NDT}. Thus, the governing equation for the heatup-cooldown analysis is defined in Appendix G of the ASME Code as follows:

$$C\, K_{IM} + K_{It} \leq K_{IR} \quad (2)$$

Where: K_{IM} = the stress intensity factor caused by membrane (pressure) stress,

K_{It} = the stress intensity factor caused by the thermal gradients,

K_{IR} = constant provided by the Code as a function of temperature relative to the RT_{NDT} of the material,

C = 2.0 for level A and B service limits, and

C = 1.5 for inservice hydrostatic and leak test operations.

At any time during the heatup or cooldown transient, K_{IR} is determined by the metal temperature at the tip of the postulated flaw, the appropriate value for RT_{NDT}, and the reference fracture toughness curve. The thermal stresses resulting from temperature gradients through the vessel wall are calculated and then the corresponding thermal stress intensity factor, K_{IT}, for the reference flaw is computed. From Equation (2) the pressure stress intensity factors are obtained and, from these, the allowable pressures are calculated.

COOLDOWN

For the calculation of the allowable pressure versus coolant temperature during cooldown, the Code reference flaw is assumed to exist at the inside of the vessel wall. During cooldown, the controlling location of the flaw is always at the inside of the wall because the thermal gradients produce tensile stresses at the inside, which increase with increasing cooldown rates. Allowable pressure-temperature relations are generated for both steady-state and finite cooldown rate situations. From these relations, composite limit curves are constructed for each cooldown rate of interest.

The use of the composite curve in the cooldown analysis is necessary because control of the cooldown procedure is based on measurement of reactor coolant temperature, whereas the limiting pressure is actually dependent on the material temperature at the tip of the assumed flaw. During cooldown, the 1/4T vessel location is at a higher temperature than the fluid adjacent to the vessel ID. This condition, of course, is not true for the steady-state situation. It

PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS (Continued)

follows that at any given reactor coolant temperature, the ΔT developed during cooldown results in a higher value of K_{IR} at the 1/4T location for finite cooldown rates than for steady-state operation. Furthermore, if conditions exist such that the increase in K_{IR} exceeds K_{It}, the calculated allowable pressure during cooldown will be greater than the steady-state value.

The above procedures are needed because there is no direct control on temperature at the 1/4T location; therefore, allowable pressures may unknowingly be violated if the rate of cooling is decreased at various intervals along a cooldown ramp. The use of the composite curve eliminates this problem and assures conservative operation of the system for the entire cooldown period.

HEATUP

Three separate calculations are required to determine the limit curves for finite heatup rates. As is done in the cooldown analysis, allowable pressure-temperature relationships are developed for steady-state conditions as well as finite heatup rate conditions assuming the presence of a 1/4T defect at the inside of the vessel wall. The thermal gradients during heatup produce compressive stresses at the inside of the wall that alleviate the tensile stresses produced by internal pressure. The metal temperature at the crack tip lags the coolant temperature; therefore, the K_{IR} for the 1/4T crack during heatup is lower than the K_{IR} for the 1/4T crack during steady-state conditions at the same coolant temperature. During heatup, especially at the end of the transient, conditions may exist such that the effects of compressive thermal stresses and different K_{IR}'s for steady-state and finite heatup rates do not offset each other and the pressure-temperature curve based on steady-state conditions no longer represents a lower bound of all similar curves for finite heatup rates when the 1/4T flaw is considered. Therefore, both cases have to be analyzed in order to assure that at any coolant temperature the lower value of the allowable pressure calculated for steady-state and finite heatup rates is obtained.

The second portion of the heatup analysis concerns the calculation of pressure-temperature limitations for the case in which a 1/4T deep outside surface flaw is assumed. Unlike the situation at the vessel inside surface, the thermal gradients established at the outside surface during heatup produce stresses which are tensile in nature and thus tend to reinforce any pressure stresses present. These thermal stresses, of course, are dependent on both the rate of heatup and the time (or coolant temperature) along the heatup ramp. Furthermore, since the thermal stresses at the outside are tensile and increase with increasing heatup rate, a lower bound curve cannot be defined. Rather, each heatup rate of interest must be analyzed on an individual basis.

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PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITS (Continued)

Following the generation of pressure-temperature curves for both the steady-state and finite heatup rate situations, the final limit curves are produced as follows. A composite curve is constructed based on a point-by-point comparison of the steady-state and finite heatup rate data. At any given temperature, the allowable pressure is taken to be the lesser of the three values taken from the curves under consideration.

The use of the composite curve is necessary to set conservative heatup limitations because it is possible for conditions to exist such that over the course of the heatup ramp the controlling condition switches from the inside to the outside and the pressure limit must at all times be based on analysis of the most critical criterion.

Finally, the composite curves for the heatup rate data and the cooldown rate data are adjusted for possible errors in the pressure and temperature sensing instruments by the values indicated on the respective curves.

Although the pressurizer operates in temperature ranges above those for which there is reason for concern of nonductile failure, operating limits are provided to assure compatibility of operation with the fatigue analysis performed in accordance with the ASME Code requirements.

LOW TEMPERATURE OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION

The OPERABILITY of two PORVs or an RCS vent opening of at least 2.~~45~~9 square inches ensures that the RCS will be protected from pressure transients which could exceed the limits of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 when one or more of the RCS cold legs are less than or equal to [335]°F. Either PORV has adequate relieving capability to protect the RCS from overpressurization when the transient is limited to either: (1) the start of an idle RCP with the secondary water temperature of the steam generator less than or equal to 50°F above the RCS cold leg temperatures, or (2) the start of a charging/safety injection pump and its injection into a water-solid RCS.

The maximum allowed PORV setpoint for the Low Temperature Overpressure Protection System (LTOPS) is derived by analysis which models the performance of the LTOPS assuming various mass input and heat input transients. Operation with a PORV setpoint less than or equal to the maximum setpoint ensures that Appendix G criteria will not be violated with consideration for a maximum pressure overshoot beyond the PORV setpoint which can occur as a result of time delays in signal processing and valve opening, instrument uncertainties, and single failure. To ensure that mass and heat input transients more severe than those assumed cannot occur, Technical Specifications require lockout of all but one charging/safety injection pump while in MODES 4, 5, and 6 (BELOW 335°F) with the reactor vessel head installed and disallow start of an RCP if secondary temperature is more than 50°F above primary temperature.

LOW TEMPERATURE OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION (Continued)

The maximum allowed PORV setpoint for the LTOPS will be updated based on the results of examinations of reactor vessel material irradiation surveillance specimens performed as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix H, and in accordance with the schedule in Table 4.4-5.

3/4.4.10 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

The inservice inspection and testing programs for ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components ensure that the structural integrity and operational readiness of these components will be maintained at an acceptable level throughout the life of the plant. These programs are in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and applicable Addenda as required by 10 CFR 50.55a(g) except where specific written relief has been granted by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(i).

Components of the Reactor Coolant System were designed to provide access to permit inservice inspections. The inspections will be performed in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 1977 Edition and Addenda through Summer 1978.

3/4.4.11 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM VENTS

Reactor Coolant System vents are provided to exhaust noncondensible gases and/or steam from the Reactor Coolant System that could inhibit natural circulation core cooling. The OPERABILITY of least one Reactor Coolant System vent path from the reactor vessel head and the pressurizer steam space ensures that the capability exists to perform this function.

The valve redundancy of the Reactor Coolant System vent paths serves to minimize the probability of inadvertent or irreversible actuation while ensuring that a single failure of a vent valve, power supply, or control system does not prevent isolation of the vent path.

The function, capabilities, and testing requirements of the Reactor Coolant System vents are consistent with the requirements of Item II.B.1 of NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plant Requirements," November 1980.

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3/4.5.1 ACCUMULATORS

The OPERABILITY of each Reactor Coolant System (RCS) accumulator ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the reactor core through each of the cold legs in the event the RCS pressure falls below the pressure of the accumulators. This initial surge of water into the core provides the initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.

The limits on accumulator volume, boron concentration and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for accumulator injection in the safety analysis are met.

The accumulator power operated isolation valves are considered to be "operating bypasses" in the context of IEEE Std. 279-1971, which requires that bypasses of a protective function be removed automatically whenever permissive conditions are not met. In addition, as these accumulator isolation valves fail to meet single failure criteria, removal of power to the valves is required.

The limits for operation with an accumulator inoperable for any reason except an isolation valve closed minimizes the time exposure of the plant to a LOCA event occurring concurrent with failure of an additional accumulator which may result in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures. If a closed isolation valve cannot be immediately opened, the full capability of one accumulator is not available and prompt action is required to place the reactor in a mode where this capability is not required.

3/4.5.2 AND 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS

The OPERABILITY of two independent ECCS subsystems ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem through any single failure consideration. Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the accumulators is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling to limit the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward. In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long-term core cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period.

With the RCS temperature below 350°F, one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.

The limitation for a maximum of one charging/safety injection pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify one charging/safety injection pump OPERABLE below [335°F] provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV.

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensures that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained. Surveillance Requirements for throttle valve position and flow balance testing provide assurance that proper

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ECCS SUBSYSTEMS (Continued)

ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA. Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to: (1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses.

3/4.5.4 REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK

The OPERABILITY of the refueling water storage tank (RWST) as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection into the core by the ECCS. This borated water is used as cooling water for the core in the event of a LOCA and provides sufficient negative reactivity to adequately counteract any positive increase in reactivity caused by RCS cooldown. RCS cooldown can be caused by inadvertant depressurization, a LOCA, or a steam line rupture.

The limits on RWST minimum volume and boron concentration assure that: (1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core and (2) the reactor will remain subcritical in the cold condition following mixing of the RWST and the RCS water volumes with all shutdown and control rods inserted except for the most reactive control assembly. These limits are consistent with the assumption of the LOCA and steam line break analyses.

The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.

The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST also ensure a pH value of between [8.5] and [11.0] for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.

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BASES

3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

3/4.6.1.1 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY

Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY ensures that the release of radioactive materials from the containment atmosphere will be restricted to those leakage paths and associated leak rates assumed in the safety analyses. This restriction, in conjunction with the leakage rate limitation, will limit the SITE BOUNDARY radiation doses to within the dose guideline values of 10 CFR Part 100 during accident conditions.

3/4.6.1.2 CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE

The limitations on containment leakage rates ensure that the total containment leakage volume will not exceed the value assumed in the safety analyses at the peak accident pressure, P_a. As an added conservatism, the measured overall integrated leakage rate is further limited to less than or equal to 0.75 L_a or 0.75 L_t, as applicable, during performance of the periodic test to account for possible degradation of the containment leakage barriers between leakage tests.

The surveillance testing for measuring leakage rates is consistent with the requirements of Appendix J of 10 CFR Part 50.

3/4.6.1.3 CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS

The limitations on closure and leak rate for the containment air locks are required to meet the restrictions on CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY and containment leak rate. Surveillance testing of the air lock seals provides assurance that the overall air lock leakage will not become excessive due to seal damage during the intervals between air lock leakage tests.

3/4.6.1.4 INTERNAL PRESSURE

The limitations on containment internal pressure ensure that: (1) the containment structure is prevented from exceeding its design negative pressure differential with respect to the outside atmosphere of -2 psig, and (2) the containment peak pressure does not exceed the design pressure of 45 psig.

The maximum peak pressure expected to be obtained from a postulated main steam line break event is 39.1 psig. The limit of 1.9 psig for initial positive containment pressure will limit the total pressure to 41 psig, which is less than design pressure and is consistent with the safety analyses.

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3/4.6.1.5 AIR TEMPERATURE

The limitations on containment average air temperature ensure that the overall containment average air temperature does not exceed the initial temperature condition assumed in the safety analysis for a [LOCA or steam line break accident]. Measurements shall be made at all listed locations, whether by fixed or portable instruments, prior to determining the average air temperature.

3/4.6.1.6 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY

This limitation ensures that the structural integrity of the containment will be maintained comparable to the original design standards for the life of the facility. Structural integrity is required to ensure that the containment will withstand the maximum pressure of 41 psig in the event of a postulated main steam line break accident. A visual inspection in conjunction with the Type A leakage tests is sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM

PRE-ENTRY

The ~~[42-inch]~~ containment ~~preentry~~ purge makeup and exhaust isolation valves are required to be sealed closed during plant operations since these valves have not been demonstrated capable of closing during a [LOCA or steam line break accident]. Maintaining these valves sealed closed during plant operation ensures that excessive quantities of radioactive materials will not be released via the Containment Purge System. To provide assurance that these containment valves cannot be inadvertently opened, the valves are sealed closed in accordance with Standard Review Plan 6.2.4 which includes mechanical devices to seal or lock the valve closed, or prevents power from being supplied to the valve operator.

NORMAL

The use of the containment purge lines is restricted to the [8-inch] purge makeup and exhaust isolation valves since, unlike the [42-inch] valves, the [8-inch] valves are capable of closing during a [LOCA or steam line break accident]. Therefore, the SITE BOUNDARY dose guideline of 10 CFR Part 100 would not be exceeded in the event of an accident during containment PURGING operation. Operation with one pair of these valves open will be limited to [1000] hours during a calendar year. The total time the containment purge system isolation valves may be open during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 in a calendar year is a function of anticipated need and operating experience. Only safety-related reasons; e.g., containment pressure control or the reduction of airborne radioactivity to facilitate personnel access for surveillance and maintenance activities, may be used to support the additional time requests. Only safety-related reasons should be used to justify the opening of these isolation valves during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 in any calendar year regardless of the allowable hours.

Leakage integrity tests with a maximum allowable leakage rate for containment purge makeup and exhaust supply valves will provide early indication of resilient material seal degradation and will allow opportunity for repair before

CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM (Continued)

gross leakage failures could develop. The 0.60 L_a leakage limit of Specification 3.6.1.2b. shall not be exceeded when the leakage rates determined by the leakage integrity tests of these valves are added to the previously determined total for all valves and penetrations subject to Type B and C tests.

3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS

3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Containment Spray System ensures that containment depressurization and cooling capability will be available in the event of a [LOCA or steam line break]. The pressure reduction and resultant lower containment leakage rate are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

The Containment Spray System and the Containment Fan Coolers are redundant to each other in providing post-accident cooling of the containment atmosphere. However, the Containment Spray System also provides a mechanism for removing iodine from the containment atmosphere and therefore the time requirements for restoring an inoperable spray system to OPERABLE status have been maintained consistent with that assigned other inoperable ESF equipment.

3/4.6.2.2 SPRAY ADDITIVE SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Spray Additive System ensures that sufficient NaOH is added to the containment spray in the event of a LOCA. The limits on NaOH volume and concentration ensure a pH value of between [8.5] and [11.0] for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components. The contained solution volume limit includes an allowance for solution not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics. These assumptions are consistent with the iodine removal efficiency assumed in the safety analyses.

3/4.6.2.3 CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Containment Fan Coolers ensures that: (1) the containment air temperature will be maintained within limits during normal operation, and (2) adequate heat removal capacity is available when operated in conjunction with the Containment Spray Systems during post-LOCA conditions.

The Containment Fan Coolers and the Containment Spray System are redundant to each other in providing post-accident cooling of the containment atmosphere. As a result of this redundancy in cooling capability, the allowable out-of-service time requirements for the Containment Fan Coolers have been appropriately adjusted. However, the allowable out-of-service time requirements for the Containment Spray System have been maintained consistent with that assigned other inoperable ESF equipment since the Containment Spray System also provides a mechanism for removing iodine from the containment atmosphere.

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3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment and is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criteria 54 through 57 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. Containment isolation within the time limits specified for those isolation valves designed to close automatically ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA.

3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL

The OPERABILITY of the equipment and systems required for the detection and control of hydrogen gas ensures that this equipment will be available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flammable limit during post-LOCA conditions. Either recombiner unit is capable of controlling the expected hydrogen generation associated with: (1) zirconium-water reactions, (2) radiolytic decomposition of water, and (3) corrosion of metals within containment. This hydrogen control system is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.7, "Control of Combustible Gas Concentrations in Containment Following a LOCA," ~~March 1971~~ REV. 2, NOVEMBER 1978.

3/4.6.5 VACUUM RELIEF VALVES

The OPERABILITY of the primary containment to atmosphere vacuum relief valves ensures that the containment internal pressure does not become more negative than [-1.93] psig. This condition is necessary to prevent exceeding the containment design limit for internal vacuum of [-2] psig.

3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE

3/4.7.1.1 SAFETY VALVES

The OPERABILITY of the main steam line Code safety valves ensures that the Secondary System pressure will be limited to within 110% [1305] psig of its design pressure of [1185] psig during the most severe anticipated system operational transient. The maximum relieving capacity is associated with a Turbine trip from 100% RATED THERMAL POWER coincident with an assumed loss of condenser heat sink (i.e., no steam bypass to the condenser).

The specified valve lift settings and relieving capacities are in accordance with the requirements of Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Code, 1971 Edition. The total relieving capacity for all valves on all of the steam lines is 1.36×10^7 lbs/h which is 111% of the total secondary steam flow of 12.2×10^6 lbs/h at 100% RATED THERMAL POWER. A minimum of two OPERABLE safety valves per steam generator ensures that sufficient relieving capacity is available for the allowable THERMAL POWER restriction in Table 3.7-~~2~~1

STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION is allowable with safety valves inoperable within the limitations of the ACTION requirements on the basis of the reduction in Secondary Coolant System steam flow and THERMAL POWER required by the reduced Reactor trip settings of the Power Range Neutron Flux channels. The Reactor Trip Setpoint reductions are derived on the following bases:

For 3 loop operation

$$SP = \frac{(X) - (Y)(V)}{X} \times (109)$$

Where:

SP = Reduced Reactor Trip Setpoint in percent of RATED THERMAL POWER,

V = Maximum number of inoperable safety valves per steam line,

[109] = Power Range Neutron Flux-High Trip Setpoint for [3] loop operation,

X = Total relieving capacity of all safety valves per steam line in lbs/hour, and

Y = Maximum relieving capacity of any one safety valve in lbs/hour

3/4.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Auxiliary Feedwater System ensures that the Reactor Coolant System can be cooled down to less than [350]°F from normal operating conditions in the event of a total loss of offsite power.

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM

Each electric motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump is capable of delivering a total feedwater flow of [~~450~~] 475 gpm at a pressure of [~~1170~~] 1217 psig to the entrance of the steam generators. The steam-driven auxiliary feedwater pump is capable of delivering a total feedwater flow of [900] gpm at a pressure of [1110] psig to the entrance of the steam generators. This capacity is sufficient to ensure that adequate feedwater flow is available to remove decay heat and reduce the Reactor Coolant System temperature to less than [350]°F when the Residual Heat Removal System may be placed into operation.

3/4.7.1.3 CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK

The OPERABILITY of the condensate storage tank with the minimum water volume ensures that sufficient water is available to maintain the RCS at HOT STANDBY conditions for 12 hours with steam discharge to the atmosphere concurrent with total loss-of-offsite power. The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.

3/4.7.1.4 SPECIFIC ACTIVITY

The limitations on Secondary Coolant System specific activity ensure that the resultant offsite radiation dose will be limited to a small fraction of 10 CFR Part 100 dose guideline values in the event of a steam line rupture. This dose also includes the effects of a coincident 1 gpm reactor-to-secondary tube leak in the steam generator of the affected steam line. These values are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

3/4.7.1.5 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES

The OPERABILITY of the main steam line isolation valves ensures that no more than one steam generator will blow down in the event of a steam line rupture. This restriction is required to: (1) minimize the positive reactivity effects of the Reactor Coolant System cooldown associated with the blowdown, and (2) limit the pressure rise within containment in the event the steam line rupture occurs within containment. The OPERABILITY of the main steam isolation valves within the closure times of the Surveillance Requirements are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITATION

The limitation on steam generator pressure and temperature ensures that the pressure-induced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits. The limitations of [70]°F and [200] psig are based on a steam generator RT_{NDT} of [60]°F and are sufficient to prevent brittle fracture.

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BASES

3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Component Cooling Water System ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

3/4.7.4 EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Emergency Service Water System ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK

The limitations on the ultimate heat sink level and temperature ensure that sufficient cooling capacity is available either: (1) provide normal cooldown of the facility or (2) mitigate the effects of accident conditions within acceptable limits.

The limitations on minimum water level and maximum temperature are based on providing a 30-day cooling water supply to safety-related equipment without exceeding its design basis temperature and is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.27, "Ultimate Heat Sink for Nuclear Plants," REV.2, JANUARY 1976 ~~March 1974~~.

3/4.7.6 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Control Room Emergency Filtration System ensures that the control room will remain habitable for operations personnel during and following all credible accident conditions. Operation of the system with the heaters operating for at least 10 continuous hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The OPERABILITY of this system in conjunction with control room design provisions is based on limiting the radiation exposure to personnel occupying the control room to 5 rems or less whole body, or its equivalent. This limitation is consistent with the requirements of General Design Criterion 19 of Appendix A, 10 CFR Part 50. ANSI N510-1975 will be used as a procedural guide for surveillance testing.

3/4.7.7 REACTOR AUXILIARY BUILDING EMERGENCY EXHAUST SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Reactor Auxiliary Building Emergency Exhaust System ensures that radioactive materials leaking from the ECCS equipment within the pump room following a LOCA are filtered prior to reaching the environment. Operation of the system with the heaters operating for at least 10 continuous

REACTOR AUXILIARY BUILDING EMERGENCY EXHAUST SYSTEM (Continued)

hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The operation of this system and the resultant effect on offsite dosage calculations was assumed in the safety analyses. ANSI N510-1975 will be used as a procedural guide for surveillance testing.

3/4.7.8 SNUBBERS

All snubbers are required OPERABLE to ensure that the structural integrity of the Reactor Coolant System and all other safety-related systems is maintained during and following a seismic or other event initiating dynamic loads.

Snubbers are classified and grouped by design and manufacturer but not by size. For example, mechanical snubbers utilizing the same design features of the 2-kip, 10-kip and 100-kip capacity manufactured by Company "A" are of the same type. The same design mechanical snubbers manufactured by Company "B" for the purposes of this Technical Specification would be of a different type, as would hydraulic snubbers from either manufacturer.

A list of individual snubbers with detailed information of snubber location and size and of system affected shall be available at the plant in accordance with Section 50.71(c) of 10 CFR Part 50. The accessibility of each snubber shall be determined and approved by the Manager-Technical Support. The determination shall be based upon the existing radiation levels and the expected time to perform a visual inspection in each snubber location as well as other factors associated with accessibility during plant operations (e.g., temperature, atmosphere, location, etc.), and the recommendations of Regulatory Guides 8.8 and 8.10. The addition or deletion of any hydraulic or mechanical snubber shall be made in accordance with Section 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50.

The visual inspection frequency is based upon maintaining a constant level of snubber protection to each safety-related system during an earthquake or severe transient. Therefore, the required inspection interval varies inversely with the observed snubber failures on a given system and is determined by the number of inoperable snubbers found during an inspection of each system. In order to establish the inspection frequency for each type of snubber on a safety-related system, it was assumed that the frequency of snubber failures and initiating events is constant with time and that the failure of any snubber on that system could cause the system to be unprotected and to result in failure during an assumed initiating event. Inspections performed before that interval has elapsed may be used as a new reference point to determine the next inspection. However, the results of such early inspections performed before the original required time interval has elapsed (nominal time less 25%) may not be used to lengthen the required inspection interval. Any inspection whose results require a shorter inspection interval will override the previous schedule.

The acceptance criteria are to be used in the visual inspection to determine OPERABILITY of the snubbers. For example, if a fluid port of a hydraulic

SNUBBERS (Continued)

snubber is found to be uncovered, the snubber shall be declared inoperable and shall not be determined OPERABLE via functional testing.

To provide assurance of snubber functional reliability, one of three functional testing methods is used with the stated acceptance criteria:

1. Functionally test 10% of a type of snubber with an additional 10% tested for each functional testing failure, or

2. Functionally test a sample size and determine sample acceptance or rejection using Figure 4.7-1, or

3. Functionally test a representative sample size and determine sample acceptance or rejection using the stated equation.

Figure 4.7-1 was developed using "Wald's Sequential Probability Ratio Plan" as described in "Quality Control and Industrial Statistics" by Acheson J. Duncan.

Permanent or other exemptions from the surveillance program for individual snubbers may be granted by the Commission if a justifiable basis for exemption is presented and, if applicable, snubber life destructive testing was performed to qualify the snubbers for the applicable design conditions at either the completion of their fabrication or at a subsequent date. Snubbers so exempted shall be listed in the list of individual snubbers indicating the extent of the exemptions.

The service life of a snubber is established via manufacturer input and information through consideration of the snubber service conditions and associated installation and maintenance records (newly installed snubbers, seal replaced, spring replaced, in high radiation area, in high temperature area, etc.). The requirement to monitor the snubber service life is included to ensure that the snubbers periodically undergo a performance evaluation in view of their age and operating conditions. These records will provide statistical bases for future consideration of snubber service life.

3/4.7.9 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION

* INSERT - SEE NEXT PAGE FOR NEW PARAGRAPH (PAGE B 3/4 7-5a

~~The limitations on removable contamination for sources requiring leak testing, including alpha emitters, is based on 10 CFR 31.5.c.2.(ii) for Byproducts. This limitation will ensure that leakage from Byproduct, Source, and Special Nuclear Material sources will not exceed allowable intake values.~~

Sealed sources are classified into three groups according to their use, with Surveillance Requirements commensurate with the probability of damage to a source in that group. Those sources that are frequently handled are required to be tested more often than those that are not. Sealed sources that are continuously enclosed within a shielded mechanism (i.e., sealed sources within

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THE SOURCES REQUIRING LEAK TESTS ARE SPECIFIED IN 10 CFR 31.5 (c)(2)(ii). THE LIMITATION ON REMOVABLE CONTAMINATION IS MANDATED BY PARAGRAPH 31.5 (c)(5).

SNUBBERS (Continued)

radiation monitoring or boron measuring devices) are considered to be stored and need not be tested unless they are removed from the shielded mechanism.

3/4.7.10 FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS

The OPERABILITY of the Fire Suppression Systems ensures that adequate fire suppression capability is available to confine and extinguish fires occurring in any portion of the facility where safety-related equipment is located. The Fire Suppression System consists of the fire protection water supply and distribution system, preaction and multicycle sprinkler systems, fire hose stations, and yard fire hydrants. The collective capability of the Fire Suppression Systems is adequate to minimize potential damage to safety-related equipment and is a major element in the facility Fire Protection Program.

In the event that portions of the Fire Suppression Systems are inoperable, alternate backup fire-fighting equipment is required to be made available in the affected areas until the inoperable equipment is restored to service. When the inoperable fire-fighting equipment is intended for use as a backup means of fire suppression, a longer period of time is allowed to provide an alternate means of fire fighting than if the inoperable equipment is the primary means of fire suppression.

The Surveillance Requirements provide assurance that the minimum OPERABILITY requirements of the Fire Suppression Systems are met.

In the event the Fire Suppression Water System becomes inoperable, immediate corrective measures must be taken since this system provides the major fire suppression capability of the plant.

3/4.7.11 FIRE RATED ASSEMBLIES

The functional integrity of the fire rated assemblies and barrier penetrations ensures that fires will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility. These design features minimize the possibility of a single fire rapidly involving several areas of the facility prior to detection and extinguishing of the fire. The fire barrier penetrations are a passive element in the facility Fire Protection Program and are subject to periodic inspections.

Fire barrier penetrations, including cable penetration barriers, fire doors and dampers are considered functional when the visually observed condition is the same as the as-designed condition. For those fire barrier penetrations that are not in the as-designed condition, an evaluation shall be performed to show that the modification has not degraded the fire rating of the fire barrier penetration.

FIRE RATED ASSEMBLIES (Continued)

During periods of time when a barrier is not functional, either: (1) a continuous fire watch is required to be maintained in the vicinity of the affected barrier, or (2) the fire detectors on at least one side of the affected barrier must be verified OPERABLE and an hourly fire watch patrol established until the barrier is restored to functional status.

3/4.7.12 AREA TEMPERATURE MONITORING

The area temperature limitations ensure that safety-related equipment will not be subjected to temperatures in excess of their environmental qualification temperatures. Exposure to excessive temperatures may degrade equipment and can cause a loss of its OPERABILITY. ~~The temperature limits include an allowance for instrument error of ± [2]°F.~~

3.4.7.13 ESSENTIAL SERVICES CHILLED WATER SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Emergency Service Chilled Water System ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

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BASES

3/4.8.1, 3/4.8.2, AND 3/4.8.3 A.C. SOURCES, D.C. SOURCES, AND ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION

The OPERABILITY of the A.C. and D.C power sources and associated distribution systems during operation ensures that sufficient power will be available to supply the safety-related equipment required for: (1) the safe shutdown of the facility, and (2) the mitigation and control of accident conditions within the facility. The minimum specified independent and redundant A.C. and D.C. power sources and distribution systems satisfy the requirements of General Design Criterion 17 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

AUXILARY

The switchyard is designed using a breaker-and-a-half scheme. The switchyard currently has five connections with the CP&L transmission network; each of these transmission lines is physically independent. The switchyard has one connection with each of the two Startup Transformers and each SAT can be fed directly AUXILARY from an associated offsite transmission line. The Startup Transformers are the preferred power source for the Class 1E ESF buses. The minimum alignment of offsite power sources will be maintained such that at least two physically independent offsite circuits are available. The two physically independent circuits may consist of any two of the incoming transmission lines to the SATs (either through the switchyard or directly) and into the Class 1E system. As long as there are at least two transmission lines in service and two circuits through the SATs to the Class 1E buses, the LCO is met.

During MODES 5 and 6, the Class 1E buses can be energized from the offsite transmission net work via a combination of the main transformers, and unit auxiliary transformers. This arrangement may be used to satisfy the requirement of one physically independent circuit.

The ACTION requirements specified for the levels of degradation of the power sources provide restriction upon continued facility operation commensurate with the level of degradation. The OPERABILITY of the power sources are consistent with the initial condition assumptions of the safety analyses and are based upon maintaining at least one redundant set of onsite A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems OPERABLE during accident conditions coincident with an assumed loss-of-offsite power and single failure of the other onsite A.C. source. The A.C. and D.C. source allowable out-of-service times are based on Regulatory Guide 1.93, "Availability of Electrical Power Sources," December 1974. When one diesel generator is inoperable, there is an additional ACTION requirement to verify that all required systems, subsystems, trains, components and devices, that depend on the remaining OPERABLE diesel generator as a source of emergency power, are also OPERABLE, and that the steam-driven auxiliary feedwater pump is OPERABLE. This requirement is intended to provide assurance that a loss-of-offsite power event will not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical systems during the period one of the diesel generators is inoperable. The term, verify, as used in this context means to administratively check by examining logs or other information to determine if certain components are out-of-service for maintenance or other reasons. It does not mean to perform the Surveillance Requirements needed to demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the component.

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A.C. SOURCES, D.C. SOURCES, AMD ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION (Continued)

The OPERABILITY of the minimum specified A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems during shutdown and refueling ensures that: (1) the facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended time periods, and (2) sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the unit status.

The Surveillance Requirements for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the diesel generators are in accordance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guides 1.9, "Selection of Diesel Generator Set Capacity for Standby Power Supplies," March 10, 1971; 1.108, "Periodic Testing of Diesel Generator Units Used as Onsite Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 1, August 1977 as modified in accordance with the guidance of IE Notice 85-32, April 22, 1985; and 1.137, "Fuel-Oil Systems for Standby Diesel Generators," Revision 1, October 1979.

The Surveillance Requirement for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the station batteries are based on the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.129, "Maintenance Testing and Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Nuclear Power Plants," February 1978, and IEEE Std 450-1980, "IEEE Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations."

Verifying average electrolyte temperature above the minimum for which the battery was sized, total battery terminal voltage on float charge, connection resistance values, and the performance of battery service and discharge tests ensures the effectiveness of the charging system, the ability to handle high discharge rates, and compares the battery capacity at that time with the rated capacity.

Table 4.8-2 specifies the normal limits for each designated pilot cell and each connected cell for electrolyte level, float voltage, and specific gravity. The limits for the designated pilot cells float voltage and specific gravity, greater than 2.13 volts and 0.015 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity or a battery charger current that had stabilized at a low value, is characteristic of a charged cell with adequate capacity. The normal limits for each connected cell for float voltage and specific gravity, greater than 2.13 volts and not more than 0.020 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity with an average specific gravity of all the connected cells not more than 0.010 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity, ensures the OPERABILITY and capability of the battery.

Operation with a battery cell's parameter outside the normal limit but within the allowable value specified in Table 4.8-2 is permitted for up to 7 days. During this 7-day period: (1) the allowable values for electrolyte level ensures no physical damage to the plates with an adequate electron transfer capability; (2) the allowable value for the average specific gravity of all the cells, not more than 0.020 below the manufacturer's recommended full charge specific gravity, ensures that the decrease in rating will be less than the safety

A.C. SOURCES, D.C. SOURCES, AND ONSITE POWER DISTRIBUTION (Continued)

margin provided in sizing; (3) the allowable value for an individual cell's specific gravity, ensures that an individual cell's specific gravity will not be more than 0.040 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity and that the overall capability of the battery will be maintained within an acceptable limit; and (4) the allowable value for an individual cell's float voltage, greater than 2.07 volts, ensures the battery's capability to perform its design function.

3/4.8.4 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT PROTECTIVE DEVICES

Containment electrical penetrations and penetration conductors are protected by either deenergizing circuits not required during reactor operation or by demonstrating the OPERABILITY of primary and backup overcurrent protection circuit breakers during periodic surveillance.

The Surveillance Requirements applicable to lower voltage circuit breakers and fuses provide assurance of breaker and fuse reliability by testing at least one representative sample of each manufacturer's brand of circuit breaker and/or fuse. Each manufacturer's molded case and metal case circuit breakers and/or fuses are grouped into representative samples which are then tested on a rotating basis to ensure that all breakers and/or fuses are tested. If a wide variety exists within any manufacturer's brand of circuit breakers and/or fuses, it is necessary to divide that manufacturer's breakers and/or fuses into groups and treat each group as a separate type of breaker or fuses for surveillance purposes.

The bypassing of the motor-operated valves thermal overload protection during accident conditions by integral bypass devices ensures that safety-related valves will not be prevented from performing their function. The Surveillance Requirements for demonstrating the bypassing of the thermal overload protection during accident conditions are in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.106, "Thermal Overload Protection for Electric Motors on Motor Operated Valves," Revision 1, March 1977.

3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION

The limitations on reactivity conditions during REFUELING ensure that: (1) the reactor will remain subcritical during CORE ALTERATIONS, and (2) a uniform boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volume having direct access to the reactor vessel. These limitations are consistent with the initial conditions assumed for the boron dilution incident in the safety analyses. The value of 0.95 or less for K_{eff} includes a 1000 pcm conservative allowance for uncertainties. Similarly, the boron concentration value of [2000] ppm or greater includes a conservative uncertainty allowance of 50 ppm boron. The administrative controls over the required valves during refueling operations precludes the possibility of uncontrolled boron dilution of the filled portion of the RCS. This action prevents flow to the RCS of unborated water by closing flow paths from sources of unborated water.

3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the Source Range Neutron Flux Monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core.

3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME

The minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor vessel ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short-lived fission products. This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT BUILDING PENETRATIONS

The requirements on containment building penetration closure and OPERABILITY ensure that a release of radioactive material within containment will be restricted from leakage to the environment. The OPERABILITY and closure restrictions are sufficient to restrict radioactive material release from a fuel element rupture based upon the lack of containment pressurization potential while in the REFUELING MODE.

3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS

The requirement for communications capability ensures that refueling station personnel can be promptly informed of significant changes in the facility status or core reactivity conditions during CORE ALTERATIONS.

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3/4.9.6 REFUELING MACHINE

The OPERABILITY requirements for the refueling machine ensure that: (1) refueling machine will be used for movement of drive rods and fuel assemblies, (2) each crane has sufficient load capacity to lift a drive rod or fuel assembly, and (3) the core internals and reactor vessel are protected from excessive lifting force in the event they are inadvertently engaged during lifting operations.

3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - FUEL HANDLING BUILDING

The restriction on movement of loads in excess of the nominal weight of a fuel and control rod assembly and associated handling tool over other fuel assemblies in the storage pool ensures that in the event this load is dropped: (1) the activity release will be limited to that contained in a single fuel assembly, and (2) any possible distortion of fuel in the storage racks will not result in a critical array. This assumption is consistent with the activity release assumed in the safety analyses.

3/4.9.8 RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION

The requirement that at least one residual heat removal (RHR) loop be in operation ensures that: (1) sufficient cooling capacity is available to remove decay heat and maintain the water in the reactor vessel below 140°F as required during the REFUELING MODE, and (2) sufficient coolant circulation is maintained through the core to minimize the effect of a boron dilution incident and prevent boron stratification.

The requirement to have two RHR loops OPERABLE when there is less than 23 feet of water above the reactor vessel flange ensures that a single failure of the operating RHR loop will not result in a complete loss of residual heat removal capability. With the reactor vessel head removed and at least 23 feet of water above the reactor pressure vessel flange, a large heat sink is available for core cooling. Thus, in the event of a failure of the operating RHR loop, adequate time is provided to initiate emergency procedures to cool the core.

3/4.9.9 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of this system ensures that the containment purge makeup and exhaust penetrations will be automatically isolated upon detection of high radiation levels within the containment. The OPERABILITY of this system is required to restrict the release of radioactive material from the containment atmosphere to the environment.

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3/4.9.10 AND 3/4.9.11 WATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL AND NEW AND SPENT FUEL POOLS

The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water depth is available to remove 99% of the assumed 10% iodine gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly. The minimum water depth is consistent with the assumptions of the safety analysis.

3/4.9.12 FUEL HANDLING BUILDING EMERGENCY EXHAUST SYSTEM

The limitations on the Fuel Handling Building Emergency Exhaust System ensure that all radioactive material released from an irradiated fuel assembly will be filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber prior to discharge to the atmosphere. Operation of the system with the heaters operating for at least 10 continuous hours in a 31-day period is sufficient to reduce the buildup of moisture on the adsorbers and HEPA filters. The OPERABILITY of this system and the resulting iodine removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions of the safety analyses. ANSI N510-1975 will be used as a procedural guide for surveillance testing.

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3/4.10.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN

This special test exception provides that a minimum amount of shutdown and control rod worth is immediately available for reactivity control when tests are performed for control rod worth measurement. This special test exception is required to permit the periodic verification of the actual versus predicted core reactivity condition occurring as a result of fuel burnup or fuel cycling operations.

3/4.10.2 GROUP HEIGHT, INSERTION, AND POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

This special test exception permits individual shutdown and control rods to be positioned outside of their normal group heights and insertion limits during the performance of such PHYSICS TESTS as those required to: (1) measure shutdown and control rod worth, and (2) determine the reactor stability index and damping factor under xenon oscillation conditions.

3/4.10.3 PHYSICS TESTS

This special test exception permits PHYSICS TESTS to be performed at less than or equal to 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER with the RCS T_{avg} slightly lower than normally allowed so that the fundamental nuclear characteristics of the core and related instrumentation can be verified. In order for various characteristics to be accurately measured, it is at times necessary to operate outside the normal restrictions of these Technical Specifications. For instance, to measure the moderator temperature coefficient at BOL, it is necessary to position the various control rods at heights which may not normally be allowed by Specification 3.1.3.6 which in turn may cause the RCS T_{avg} to fall slightly below the minimum temperature of Specification 3.1.1.4.

3/4.10.4 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS

This special test exception permits reactor criticality under no flow conditions and is required to perform certain STARTUP and PHYSICS TESTS while at low THERMAL POWER levels.

3/4.10.5 POSITION INDICATION SYSTEM - SHUTDOWN

This special test exception permits the Position Indication Systems to be inoperable during rod drop time measurements. The exception is required since the data necessary to determine the rod drop time are derived from the induced voltage in the position indicator coils as the rod is dropped. This induced voltage is small compared to the normal voltage and, therefore, cannot be observed if the Position Indication Systems remain OPERABLE.

3/4.11.1 LIQUID EFFLUENTS

3/4.11.1.1 CONCENTRATION

This specification is provided to ensure that the concentration of radioactive materials released in liquid waste effluents to UNRESTRICTED AREAS will be less than the concentration levels specified in 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, Table II, Column 2. This limitation provides additional assurance that the levels of radioactive materials in bodies of water in UNRESTRICTED AREAS will result in exposures within: (1) the Section II.A design objectives of Appendix I, 10 CFR Part 50, to a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC, and (2) the limits of 10 CFR Part 20.106(e) to the population. The concentration limit for dissolved or entrained noble gases is based upon the assumption that Xe-135 is the controlling radioisotope and its MPC in air (submersion) was converted to an equivalent concentration in water using the methods described in International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) Publication 2.

The required detection capabilities for radioactive materials in liquid waste samples are tabulated in terms of the lower limits of detection (LLDs). Detailed discussion of the LLD, and other detection limits can be found in HASL Procedures Manual, HASL-300 (revised annually), Currie, L. A., "Limits for Qualitative Detection and Quantitative Determination - Application to Radiochemistry," Anal. Chem. 40, 586-93 (1968), and Hartwell, J. K., "Detection Limits for Radioanalytical Counting Techniques," Atlantic Richfield Hanford Company Report ARH-SA-215 (June 1975).

3/4.11.1.2 DOSE

This specification is provided to implement the requirements of Sections II.A, III.A, and IV.A of Appendix I, 10 CFR Part 50. The Limiting Condition for Operation implements the guides set forth in Section II.A of Appendix I. The ACTION statements provide the required operating flexibility and at the same time implement the guides set forth in Section IV.A of Appendix I to assure that the releases of radioactive material in liquid effluents to UNRESTRICTED AREAS will be kept "as low as is reasonably achievable." The dose calculation methodology and parameters in the ODCM implement the requirements in Section III.A of Appendix I that conformance with the guides of Appendix I be shown by calculational procedures based on models and data, such that the actual exposure of a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC through appropriate pathways is unlikely to be substantially underestimated. The equations specified in the ODCM for calculating the doses due to the actual release rates of radioactive materials in liquid effluents are consistent with the methodology provided in Regulatory Guide 1.109, "Calculation of Annual Doses to Man from Routine Releases of Reactor Effluents for the Purpose of Evaluating Compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I," Revision 1, October 1977 and Regulatory Guide 1.113, "Estimating Aquatic Dispersion of Effluents from Accidental and Routine Reactor Releases for the Purpose of Implementing Appendix I," April 1977.

3/4.11.1.3 LIQUID RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the Liquid Radwaste Treatment System ensures that this system will be available for use whenever liquid effluents require treatment prior to release to the environment. The requirement that the appropriate portions of this system be used when specified provides assurance that the releases of radioactive materials in liquid effluents will be kept "as low as is reasonably achievable." This specification implements the requirements of 10 CFR 50.36a, General Design Criterion 60 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 and the design objective given in Section II.D of Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50. The specified limits governing the use of appropriate portions of the Liquid Radwaste Treatment System were specified as a suitable fraction of the dose design objectives set forth in Section II.A of Appendix I, 10 CFR Part 50 for liquid effluents.

3/4.11.1.4 LIQUID HOLDUP TANKS

The tanks listed in this specification include all those outdoor radwaste tanks that are not surrounded by liners, dikes, or walls capable of holding the tank contents and that do not have tank overflows and surrounding area drains connected to the Liquid Radwaste Treatment System.

Restricting the quantity of radioactive material contained in the specified tanks provides assurance that in the event of an uncontrolled release of the tank's contents, the resulting concentrations would be less than the limits of 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, Table II, Column 2, at the nearest potable water supply and the nearest surface water supply in an UNRESTRICTED AREA.

3/4.11.2 GASEOUS EFFLUENTS

3/4.11.2.1 DOSE RATE

This specification is provided to ensure that the dose at any time at and beyond the SITE BOUNDARY from gaseous effluents from all units on the site will be within the annual dose limits of 10 CFR Part 20 to UNRESTRICTED AREAS. The annual dose limits are the doses associated with the concentrations of 10 CFR Part 20, Appendix B, Table II, Column I. These limits provide reasonable assurance that radioactive material discharged in gaseous effluents will not result in the exposure of a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC in an UNRESTRICTED AREA, either within or outside the SITE BOUNDARY, to annual average concentrations exceeding the limits specified in Appendix B, Table II of 10 CFR Part 20 (10 CFR Part 20.106(b)). For MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC who may at times be within the SITE BOUNDARY, the occupancy of that MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC will usually be sufficiently low to compensate for any increase in the atmospheric diffusion factor above that for the SITE BOUNDARY. Examples of calculations for such MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC, with the appropriate occupancy factors, shall be given in the ODCM. The specified release rate limits restrict, at all times, the corresponding gamma and beta dose rates above background to a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC at or beyond the SITE BOUNDARY to less than or equal to 500 mrems/year to the whole body or to less than or equal to 3000 mrems/year to the skin. These release rate limits also restrict, at all times, the corresponding thyroid dose rate

DOSE RATE (Continued)

above background to a child via the inhalation pathway to less than or equal to 1500 mrems/year.

The required detection capabilities for radioactive material in gaseous waste samples are tabulated in terms of the lower limits of detection (LLDs). Detailed discussion of the LLD, and other detection limits can be found in HASL Procedures Manual, HASL-300 (revised annually), Currie, L.A., "Limits for Qualitative Detection and Quantitative Determination - Application to Radiochemistry," Anal. Chem. 40, 586-93 (1968), and Hartwell, J.K., "Detection Limits for Radioanalytical Counting Techniques," Atlantic Richfield Hanford Company Report ARH-SA-215 (June 1975).

3/4.11.2.2 DOSE - NOBLE GASES

This specification is provided to implement the requirements of Sections II.B, III.A and IV.A of Appendix I, 10 CFR Part 50. The Limiting Condition for Operation implements the guides set forth in Section I.B of Appendix I. The ACTION statements provide the required operating flexibility and at the same time implement the guides set forth in Section IV.A of Appendix I to assure that the releases of radioactive material in gaseous effluents to UNRESTRICTED AREAS will be kept "as low as is reasonably achievable." The Surveillance Requirements implement the requirements in Section III.A of Appendix I that conformance with the guides of Appendix I be shown by calculational procedures based on models and data such that the actual exposure of a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC through appropriate pathways is unlikely to be substantially underestimated. The dose calculation methodology and parameters established in the ODCM for calculating the doses due to the actual release rates of radioactive noble gases in gaseous effluents are consistent with the methodology provided in Regulatory Guide 1.109, "Calculation of Annual Doses to Man from Routine Releases of Reactor Effluents for the Purpose of Evaluating Compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I," Revision I, October 1977 and Regulatory Guide 1.111, "Methods for Estimating Atmospheric Transport and Dispersion of Gaseous Effluents in Routine Releases from Light-Water Cooled Reactors," Revision 1, July 1977. The ODCM equations provided for determining the air doses at and beyond the SITE BOUNDARY are based upon the historical average atmospheric conditions.

3/4.11.2.3 DOSE - IODINE-131, IODINE-133, TRITIUM, AND RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IN PARTICULATE FORM

This specification is provided to implement the requirements of Sections II.C, III.A and IV.A of Appendix I, 10 CFR Part 50. The Limiting Conditions for Operation are the guides set forth in Section II.C of Appendix I. The ACTION statements provide the required operating flexibility and at the same time implement the guides set forth in Section IV.A of Appendix I to assure that the releases of radioactive materials in gaseous effluents to UNRESTRICTED AREAS will be kept "as low as is reasonably achievable." The ODCM calculational methods specified in the Surveillance Requirements implement the requirements

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DOSE - IODINE-131, IODINE-133, TRITIUM, AND RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IN PARTICULATE FORM (Continued)

in Section III.A of Appendix I that conformance with the guides of Appendix I be shown by calculational procedures based on models and data such that the actual exposure of a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC through appropriate pathways is unlikely to be substantially underestimated. The ODCM calculational methodology and parameters for calculating the doses due to the actual release rates of the subject materials are consistent with the methodology provided in Regulatory Guide 1.109, "Calculation of Annual Doses to Man from Routine Releases of Reactor Effluents for the Purpose of Evaluating Compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I," Revision 1, October 1977 and Regulatory Guide 1.111, "Methods for Estimating Atmospheric Transport and Dispersion of Gaseous Effluents in Routine Releases from Light-Water-Cooled Reactors," Revision 1, July 1977. These equations also provide for determining the actual doses based upon the historical average atmospheric conditions. The release rate specifications for Iodine-131 Iodine-133, tritium, and radionuclides in particulate form with half-lives greater than 8 days are dependent upon the existing radionuclide pathways to man in the areas at and beyond the SITE BOUNDARY. The pathways that were examined in the development of the calculations were: (1) individual inhalation of airborne radionuclides, (2) deposition of radionuclides onto green leafy vegetation with subsequent consumption by man, (3) deposition onto grassy areas where milk animals and meat producing animals graze with consumption of the milk and meat by man, and (4) deposition on the ground with subsequent exposure of man.

3/4.11.2.4 GASEOUS RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM

The OPERABILITY of the WASTE GAS HOLDUP SYSTEM and the VENTILATION EXHAUST TREATMENT SYSTEM ensures that the systems will be available for use whenever gaseous effluents require treatment prior to release to the environment. The requirement that the appropriate portions of these systems be used, when specified, provides reasonable assurance that the releases of radioactive materials in gaseous effluents will be kept "as low as is reasonably achievable." This specification implements the requirements of 10 CFR 50.36a, General Design Criterion 60 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 and the design objectives given in Section II.D of Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50. The specified limits governing the use of appropriate portions of the systems were specified as a suitable fraction of the dose design objectives set forth in Sections II.B and II.C of Appendix I, 10 CFR Part 50, for gaseous effluents.

3/4.11.2.5 EXPLOSIVE GAS MIXTURE

This specification is provided to ensure that the concentration of potentially explosive gas mixtures contained in the GASEOUS RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM downstream of the hydrogen recombiners is maintained below the flammability limits of hydrogen and oxygen. [Automatic control features are included in the system to prevent the hydrogen and oxygen concentrations from reaching these flammability limits. These automatic control features include isolation of the source of oxygen to reduce the concentration below the flammability limits.] Maintaining the concentration of hydrogen and oxygen below their flammability limits

EXPLOSIVE GAS MIXTURE (Continued)

provides assurance that the releases of radioactive materials will be controlled in conformance with the requirements of General Design Criterion 60 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.

3/4.11.2.6 GAS STORAGE TANKS

The tanks included in this specification are those tanks for which the quantity of radioactivity contained is not limited directly or indirectly by another Technical Specification. Restricting the quantity of radioactivity contained in each gas storage tank provides assurance that in the event of an uncontrolled release of the tank's contents, the resulting whole body exposure to a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC at the nearest SITE BOUNDARY will not exceed 0.5 rem. This is consistent with Standard Review Plan 11.3, Branch Technical Position ETSB 11-5, "Postulated Radioactive Releases Due to a Waste Gas System Leak or Failure," in NUREG-0800, July 1981.

3/4.11.3 SOLID RADIOACTIVE WASTES

This specification implements the requirements of 10 CFR 50.36a and General Design Criterion 60 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. The process parameters included in establishing the PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM may include, but are not limited to, waste type, waste pH, waste/liquid/SOLIDIFICATION agent/catalyst ratios, waste oil content, waste principal chemical constituents, and mixing and curing times.

3/4.11.4 TOTAL DOSE

This specification is provided to meet the dose limitations of 10 CFR Part 190 that have been incorporated into 10 CFR Part 20 by 46 FR 18525. The specification requires the preparation and submittal of a Special Report whenever the calculated doses due to releases of radioactivity and to radiation from uranium fuel cycle sources exceed 25 mrems to the whole body or any organ, except the thyroid, which shall be limited to less than or equal to 75 mrems. For sites containing up to four reactors, it is highly unlikely that the resultant dose to a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC will exceed the dose limits of 40 CFR Part 190 if the individual reactors remain within twice the dose design objectives of Appendix I, and if direct radiation doses from the units and from outside storage tanks are kept small. The Special Report will describe a course of action that should result in the limitation of the annual dose to a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC to within the 40 CFR Part 190 limits. For the purposes of the Special Report, it may be assumed that the dose commitment to the MEMBER of the PUBLIC from other uranium fuel cycle sources is negligible, with the exception that dose contributions from other nuclear fuel cycle facilities at the same site or within a radius of 8 km must be considered. If the dose to any MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC is estimated to exceed the requirements of 40 CFR Part 190, the Special Report with a request for a variance (provided the release conditions resulting in violation of 40 CFR Part 190 have not already been corrected), in accordance with the provisions of 40 CFR 190.11 and 10 CFR 20.405c, is considered to be a timely request and fulfills the requirements of 40 CFR Part 190 until NRC staff action is completed.

TOTAL DOSE (Continued)

The variance only relates to the limits of 40 CFR Part 190, and does not apply in any way to the other requirements for dose limitation of 10 CFR Part 20, as addressed in Specifications 3.11.1.1 and 3.11.2.1. An individual is not considered a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC during any period in which he/she is engaged in carrying out any operation that is part of the nuclear fuel cycle.

BASES

3/4.12.1 MONITORING PROGRAM

The Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program required by this specification provides representative measurements of radiation and of radioactive materials in those exposure pathways and for those radionuclides that lead to the highest potential radiation exposure of MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC resulting from the plant operation. This monitoring program implements Section IV.B.2 of Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50 and thereby supplements the Radiological Effluent Monitoring Program by verifying that the measurable concentrations of radioactive materials and levels of radiation are not higher than expected on the basis of the effluent measurements and the modeling of the environmental exposure pathways. Guidance for this monitoring program is provided by the Radiological Assessment Branch Technical Position on Environmental Monitoring, Revision 1, November 1979. The initially specified monitoring program will be effective for at least the first 3 years of commercial operation. Following this period, program changes may be initiated based on operational experience.

The required detection capabilities for environmental sample analyses are tabulated in terms of the lower limits of detection (LLDs). The LLDs required by Table 4.12-1 are considered optimum for routine environmental measurements in industrial laboratories. It should be recognized that the LLD is defined as an a priori (before the fact) limit representing the capability of a measurement system and not as an a posteriori (after the fact) limit for a particular measurement.

Detailed discussion of the LLD, and other detection limits, can be found in HASL Procedures Manual, HASL-300 (revised annually), Currie, L.A., "Limits for Qualitative Detection and Quantitative Determination - Application to Radiochemistry," Anal. Chem. 40, 586-93 (1968), and Hartwell, J. K., "Detection Limits for Radioanalytical Counting Techniques" Atlantic Richfield Hanford Company Report ARH-SA-215 (June 1975).

3/4.12.2 LAND USE CENSUS

This specification is provided to ensure that changes in the use of areas at and beyond the SITE BOUNDARY are identified and that modifications to the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program are made if required by the results of this census. The best information from the door-to-door survey, from aerial survey or from consulting with local agricultural authorities shall be used. This census satisfies the requirements of Section IV.B.3 of Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50. Restricting the census to gardens of greater than 50 m^2 provides assurance that significant exposure pathways via leafy vegetables will be identified and monitored since a garden of this size is the minimum required to produce the quantity (26 kg/year) of leafy vegetables assumed in Regulatory Guide 1.109 for consumption by a child. To determine this minimum garden size, the following assumptions were made: (1) 20% of the garden was used for growing broad leaf vegetation (i.e., similar to lettuce and cabbage), and (2) a vegetation yield of 2 kg/m^2.

3/4.12.3 INTERLABORATORY COMPARISON PROGRAM

The requirement for participation in an approved Interlaboratory Comparison Program is provided to ensure that independent checks on the precision and accuracy of the measurements of radioactive materials in environmental sample matrices are performed as part of the quality assurance program for environmental monitoring in order to demonstrate that the results are valid for the purposes of Section IV.B.2 of Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50.

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SECTION 5.0

DESIGN FEATURES

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5.0 DESIGN FEATURES

5.1 SITE

EXCLUSION AREA

5.1.1 The Exclusion Area Boundary shall be as shown in Figure 5.1-1.

LOW POPULATION ZONE

5.1.2 The Low Population Zone shall be as shown in Figure 5.1-2.

MAP DEFINING UNRESTRICTED AREAS AND SITE BOUNDARY FOR RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS AND LIQUID EFFLUENTS

5.1.3 Information regarding radioactive gaseous and liquid effluents, which will allow identification of structures and release points as well as definition of UNRESTRICTED AREAS within the SITE BOUNDARY that are accessible to MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC, shall be as shown in Figures 5.1-3 and 5.1-4.

5.2 CONTAINMENT

CONFIGURATION

5.2.1 The containment building is a steel-lined, reinforced concrete building of cylindrical shape, with a dome roof and having the following design features:

a. Nominal inside diameter = 130 feet.

b. Nominal inside height = 160 feet from the liner on the foundation mat to the spring line, 225 feet from the liner on the foundation mat to the dome peak.

c. Minimum thickness of concrete walls = 4.5 feet.

d. Minimum thickness of concrete dome = 2.5 feet.

e. Minimum thickness of concrete floor pad over the containment liner = 5.0 feet.

f. Nominal thickness of steel liner = 0.375 inches in the cylindrical portion, 0.25 inches on the bottom, and 0.5 inches in the dome.

g. Net free volume = 2.266×10^6 cubic feet.

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

FIGURE 5.1-1

EXCLUSION AREA

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

FIGURE 5.1-2

LOW POPULATION ZONE

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

FIGURE 5.1-3

SITE BOUNDARY FOR RADIOACTIVE GASEOUS AND LIQUID EFFLUENTS

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

FIGURE 5.1-4

ROUTINE GASEOUS RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE POINTS

DESIGN PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE

5.2.2 The containment building is designed and shall be maintained for a maximum internal pressure of 45.0 psig and a peak air temperature of ~~[379]~~°F. 380

5.3 REACTOR CORE

FUEL ASSEMBLIES

5.3.1 The core shall contain 157 fuel assemblies with each fuel assembly containing 264 fuel rods clad with [Zircaloy-4]. Each fuel rod shall have a nominal active fuel length of 144 inches and contain a maximum total weight of 1766 grams uranium. The initial core loading shall have a maximum enrichment of 3.5 weight percent U-235. Reload fuel shall be similar in physical design to the initial core loading and shall have a maximum enrichment of 3.9 weight percent U-235.

CONTROL ROD ASSEMBLIES

5.3.2 The core shall contain 52 shutdown and control rod assemblies. The shutdown and rod assemblies shall contain a nominal 142 inches of absorber material. The nominal values of absorber material shall be 80% silver, 15% indium, and 5% cadmium, or 95% hafnium with the remainder zirconium. All control rods shall be clad with stainless steel tubing.

5.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM

DESIGN PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE

5.4.1 The Reactor Coolant System is designed and shall be maintained:

a. In accordance with the Code requirements specified in Section [5.2] of the FSAR, with allowance for normal degradation pursuant to the applicable Surveillance Requirements,

b. For a pressure of 2485 psig, and

c. For a temperature of 650°F, except for the pressurizer which is 680°F.

VOLUME

5.4.2 The total water and steam volume of the Reactor Coolant System is 9410 ± 100 cubic feet at a nominal T_{avg} of [588.8]°F.

5.5 METEOROLOGICAL TOWER LOCATION

5.5.1 The meteorological station shall be located as shown on Figure 5.1-1.

5.6 FUEL STORAGE

CRITICALITY

5.6.1. The spent fuel storage racks are designed and shall be maintained with:

a. A k_{eff} equivalent to less than or equal to 0.95 when flooded with unborated water, which includes an allowance for uncertainties as described in Section [4.3.2.6] of the FSAR, and

b. A nominal 10.5 inch center-to-center distance between fuel assemblies placed in the PWR storage racks and 6.25 inch center to center distance in the BWR storage racks.

5.6.1. The k_{eff} for new fuel for the first core loading stored dry in the spent fuel storage racks shall not exceed [0.98] when aqueous foam moderation is assumed.

DRAINAGE

5.6.2 The new and spent fuel storage pools are designed and shall be maintained to prevent inadvertent draining of the pools below elevation 277.

CAPACITY

5.6.3 The new and spent fuel storage pools are designed for a storage capacity of 1832 PWR fuel assembles in fixed racks and a variable number of PWR and BWR storage spaces in 48 interchangeable 7x7 PWR and 11x11 BWR racks. These interchangeable racks will be installed as needed. Any combination of BWR and PWR racks may be used.

5.7 COMPONENT CYCLIC OR TRANSIENT LIMIT

5.7.1 The components identified in Table 5.7-1 are designed and shall be maintained within the cyclic or transient limits of Table 5.7-1.

TABLE 5.7-1

COMPONENT CYCLIC OR TRANSIENT LIMITS

COMPONENT	CYCLIC OR TRANSIENT LIMIT	DESIGN CYCLE OR TRANSIENT
Reactor Coolant System	[200] heatup cycles at $\leq$ 100°F/h and [200] cooldown cycles at $\leq$ 100°F/h.	Heatup cycle - T_{avg} from $\leq$ 200°F to $\geq$ 550°F. Cooldown cycle - T_{avg} from $\geq$ 550°F to $\leq$ 200°F.
	[200] pressurizer cooldown cycles at $\leq$ 200°F/h.	Pressurizer cooldown cycle temperatures from $\geq$ 650°F to $\leq$ 200°F.
	[200] loss of load cycles, without immediate Turbine or Reactor trip.	$\geq$ 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER to 0% of RATED THERMAL POWER.
	[40] cycles of loss-of-offsite A.C. electrical power.	Loss-of-offsite A.C. electrical ESF Electrical System.
	[80] cycles of loss of flow in one reactor coolant loop.	Loss of only one reactor coolant pump.
	[400] Reactor trip cycles.	100% to 0% of RATED THERMAL POWER.
	[10] auxiliary spray actuation cycles.	Spray water temperature differential > 320°F.
	[200] leak tests.	Pressurized to $\geq$ [2485] psig.
	[10] hydrostatic pressure tests.	Pressurized to $\geq$ [3107] psig.
Secondary Coolant System	[1] steam line break.	Break in a > 6-inch steam line.
	[10] hydrostatic pressure tests.	Pressurized to $\geq$ [1481] psig.

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SECTION 6.0

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS

6.1 RESPONSIBILITY

6.1.1 The Plant General Manager shall be responsible for overall unit operation and shall delegate in writing the succession to this responsibility during his absence.

6.1.2 The Shift Foreman (or, during his absence from the control room, a designated individual) shall be responsible for the control room command function. A management directive to this effect, signed by the Vice President-Harris Nuclear Project shall be reissued to all station personnel on an annual basis.

6.2 ORGANIZATION

OFFSITE

6.2.1 The offsite organization for unit management and technical support shall be as shown in Figure 6.2-1.

UNIT STAFF

6.2.2 The unit organization shall be as shown in Figure 6.2-2 and:

a. Each on-duty shift shall be composed of at least the minimum shift crew composition shown in Table 6.2-1;

b. At least one licensed Operator shall be in the control room when fuel is in the reactor. In addition, while the unit is in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, at least one licensed Senior Operator shall be in the control room;

c. An individual qualified as a Radiation Control Technician* shall be on site when fuel is in the reactor;

d. All CORE ALTERATIONS shall be observed and directly supervised by either a licensed Senior Operator or licensed Senior Operator Limited to Fuel Handling who has no other concurrent responsibilities during this operation;

e. A site Fire Brigade of at least five members* shall be maintained on site at all times. The Fire Brigade shall not include the Shift Supervisor and the two other members of the minimum shift crew necessary for safe shutdown of the unit and any personnel required for other essential functions during a fire emergency; and

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*The Radiation Control Technician and Fire Brigade composition may be less than the minimum requirements for a period of time not to exceed 2 hours, in order to accommodate unexpected absence, provided immediate action is taken to fill the required positions.

UNIT STAFF (Continued)

f. Administrative procedures shall be developed and implemented to limit the working hours of unit staff who perform safety-related functions (e.g., licensed Senior Operators, licensed Operators, health physicists, auxiliary operators, and key maintenance personnel).

Adequate shift coverage shall be maintained without routine heavy use of overtime. However, in the event that unforeseen problems require substantial amounts of overtime to be used, or during extended periods of shutdown for refueling, major maintenance, or major plant modification, on a temporary basis the following guidelines shall be followed:

1. An individual should not be permitted to work more than 16 hours straight, excluding shift turnover time.

2. An individual should not be permitted to work more than 16 hours in any 24-hour period, nor more than 24 hours in any 48-hour period, nor more than 72 hours in any 7-day period, all excluding shift turnover time.

3. A break of at least 8 hours should be allowed between work periods, including shift turnover time.

4. Except during extended shutdown periods; the use of overtime should be considered on an individual basis and not for the entire staff on a shift.

~~5. STAs are allowed to work a maximum of 84 hours in any 7-day period, excluding shift turnover time, while on their special rotation schedule.~~

Any deviation from the above guidelines shall be authorized by the Plant General Manager or his designee, or higher levels of management, in accordance with established procedures and with documentation of the basis for granting the deviation. Controls shall be included in the procedures such that individual overtime shall be reviewed monthly by the Plant General Manager or his designee to assure that excessive hours have not been assigned. Routine deviation from the above guidelines is not authorized.

CORPORATE ORGANIZATION



FIGURE 6.2-1
CORPORATE ORGANIZATION

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PLANT ORGANIZATION



FIGURE 6.2-2
PLANT ORGANIZATION

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TABLE 6.2-1 FEB 1986

MINIMUM SHIFT CREW COMPOSITION

POSITION	NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS REQUIRED TO FILL POSITION: MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4	MODE 5 or 6
SF	1	1
SRO	1	None
RO	2	1
AO	2	1
STA	1*	None

SF - Shift Foreman with a Senior Operator license on Unit 1
SRO - Individual with a Senior Operator license on Unit 1
RO - Individual with an Operator license on Unit 1
AO - Auxiliary Operator - license not required
STA - Shift Technical Advisor

The shift crew composition may be one less than the minimum requirements of Table 6.2-1 for a period of time not to exceed 2 hours, in order to accommodate unexpected absence of on-duty shift crew members, provided immediate action is taken to restore the shift crew composition to within the minimum requirements of Table 6.2-1. This provision does not permit any shift crew position to be unmanned upon shift change due to an oncoming shift crewman being late or absent.

During any absence of the Shift Foreman from the control room while the unit is in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, an individual (other than the Shift Technical Advisor) with a valid Senior Operator license shall be designated to assume the control room command function. During any absence of the Shift Foreman from the control room while the unit is in MODE 5 or 6, an individual with a valid Senior Operator license or Operator license shall be designated to assume the control room command function.

*The STA position shall be manned in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 unless the Shift Foreman or the individual with a Senior Operator license meets the qualifications for the STA as required by the NRC.

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6.2.3 ONSITE NUCLEAR SAFETY (ONS) UNIT

FUNCTION

6.2.3.1 The ONS Unit shall function to examine unit operating characteristics, NRC issuances, industry advisories, and other sources of unit design and operating experience information, including units of similar design, which may indicate areas for improving unit safety. The ONS Unit shall make detailed recommendations for revised procedures, equipment modifications, maintenance activities, operations activities, or other means of improving unit safety, to appropriate levels of management, up to and including the Senior Vice President-Operations Support, if necessary.

COMPOSITION

6.2.3.2 The ONS Unit shall be composed of at least five, dedicated, full-time engineers located on site. Each shall have a baccalaureate degree in engineering or related science and at least 2 years professional level experience in his field, at least 1 year of which experience shall be in the nuclear field.

RESPONSIBILITIES

6.2.3.3 The ONS Unit shall be responsible for maintaining surveillance of unit activities to provide independent verification* that these activities are performed correctly and that human errors are reduced as much as practical.

RECORDS

6.2.3.4 Records of activities performed by the ONS Unit shall be prepared, maintained, and forwarded each calendar month to the Manager-Nuclear Safety and Environmental Services.

6.2.4 SHIFT TECHNICAL ADVISOR

6.2.4.1 The Shift Technical Advisor shall provide advisory technical support to the Shift Foreman in the areas of thermal hydraulics, reactor engineering, and plant analysis with regard to the safe operation of the unit. The Shift Technical Advisor shall have a baccalaureate degree or equivalent in a scientific or engineering discipline and shall have received specific training in the response and analysis of the unit for transients and accidents, and in unit design and layout, including the capabilities of instrumentation and controls in the control room.

6.3 UNIT STAFF QUALIFICATIONS

6.3.1 Each member of the unit staff shall meet or exceed the minimum qualifications of the September 1979 draft of ANS 3.1, with the exceptions and alternatives noted ~~on~~ IN THE FSAR~~, pages~~ SECTION 1.8~~-8 (Am. 20), 1.8-9 (Am. 17), 1.8-10 (Am. 22),~~

*Not responsible for sign-off function.

UNIT STAFF QUALIFICATIONS (Continued)

~~1.8-11 (Am.20), 1.8-12 (Am.17), and 1.8-13 (Am.17)~~, for comparable positions, except for the Manager-Environmental and Radiation Control who shall meet or exceed the qualifications of Regulatory Guide 1.8, September 1975. The licensed Operators and Senior Operators shall also meet or exceed the minimum qualifications of the supplemental requirements specified in Sections A and C of Enclosure 1 of the March 28, 1980, NRC letter to all licensees.

6.4 TRAINING

6.4.1 A retraining and replacement training program for the unit staff shall be maintained under the direction of the Director-Harris Training Unit and shall meet or exceed the requirements ~~and recommendations~~ of the September 1979 draft of ANS 3.1, with the exceptions and alternatives noted IN THE ~~on~~ FSAR, ~~pages 1.8-8~~ SECTION 1.8, ~~(Am.20), 1.8-9 (Am.17), 1.8-10 (Am.22), 1.8-11 (Am.20), 1.8-12 (Am.17), and 1.8-13 (Am.17)~~, and Appendix A of 10 CFR Part 55 and the supplemental requirements specified in Sections A and C of Enclosure 1 of the March 28, 1980 NRC letter to all licensees, and shall include familiarization with relevant industry operational experience.

6.5 REVIEW AND AUDIT

6.5.1 SAFETY AND TECHNICAL REVIEWS

6.5.1.1 General Program Control

6.5.1.1.1 A safety and a technical evaluation shall be prepared for each of the following:

a. All procedures required by Specification 6.8, other procedures that affect nuclear safety, and changes thereto;

b. All proposed tests and experiments that are not described in the Final Safety Analysis Report; and

c. All proposed changes or modifications to plant systems or equipment that affect nuclear safety.

6.5.1.2 Technical Evaluations

6.5.1.2.1 Technical evaluations will be performed by personnel qualified in the subject matter and will determine the technical adequacy and accuracy of the proposed activity. If interdisciplinary evaluations are required to cover the technical scope of an activity, they will be performed.

6.5.1.2.2 Technical review personnel will be identified by the responsible Manager or his designee for a specific activity when the review process begins.

6.5.1.3 Qualified Safety Reviewers

6.5.1.3.1 The Plant General Manager shall designate those individuals who will be responsible for performing safety reviews described in Specification ~~6.5.2.~~ 6.5.1.4.

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Qualified Safety Reviewers (Continued)

These individuals shall have a baccalaureate degree in an engineering or related field or equivalent, and 2 years of related experience. Such designation shall include the disciplines or procedure categories for which each individual is qualified. Qualified individuals or groups not on the plant staff (as shown on Figure 6.2-2) may be relied upon to perform safety reviews if so designated by the Plant General Manager.

6.5.1.4 Safety Evaluations and Approvals

6.5.1.4.1 The safety evaluation prepared in accordance with Specification 6.5.1.1.1 shall include a written determination, with basis, of whether or not the procedures or changes thereto, proposed tests and experiments and changes thereto, and modifications constitute an unreviewed safety question as defined in Paragraph 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50, or whether they involve a change to the Final Safety Analysis Report, the Technical Specifications, or the Operating License.

6.5.1.4.2 The safety evaluation shall be prepared by a qualified individual. The safety evaluation shall be reviewed by a second qualified individual.

IMPLEMENTATION MAY NOT PROCEED

6.5.1.4.3 A safety evaluation and subsequent review that conclude that the subject action may involve an unreviewed safety question, a change to the Technical Specifications, or a change to the Operating License, will be referred to the Plant Nuclear Safety Committee (PNSC) for their review in accordance with Specification 6.5.2.6. If the PNSC recommendation is that an item is an unreviewed safety question, a change to the Technical Specifications, or a change to the Operating License, the action will be referred to the Commission for approval prior to implementation, ~~but not~~ until after review by the Corporate Nuclear Safety Section in accordance with Specification ~~6.5.4.9.~~ 6.5.3.9

6.5.1.4.4 If a safety evaluation and subsequent review conclude that the subject action does not involve an unreviewed safety question, a change to the Technical Specification, or a change to the Operating License, the action may be approved by the Plant General Manager or his designee or, as applicable, by the Manager of the primary functional area affected by the action. The individual approving the action shall assure that the reviewers collectively possess the background and qualification in all of the disciplines necessary and important to the specific review for both safety and technical aspects.

6.5.1.4.5 A safety evaluation and subsequent review that conclude that the subject action involves a change in the Final Safety Analysis Report shall be referred to the Corporate Nuclear Safety Section for review in accordance with Specification 6.5.3.9, BUT IMPLEMENTATION MAY PROCEED PRIOR TO THE COMPLETION OF THAT REVIEW.

6.5.1.4.6 The individual approving the procedure, test, or experiment or change thereto shall be other than those who prepared the safety evaluation or performed the safety review.

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6.5.2 PLANT NUCLEAR SAFETY COMMITTEE (PNSC)

FUNCTION

6.5.2.1 The PNSC shall function to advise the Plant General Manager on all matters related to nuclear safety.

COMPOSITION

6.5.2.2 The PNSC shall be composed of the:

Chairman:	Plant General Manager
Member:	Assistant Plant General Manager
Member:	Manager-Operations
Member:	Manager-Technical Support
Member:	Manager-Maintenance
Member:	Manager-Environmental and Radiation Control
Member:	~~Assistant to the Plant General~~ Manager Director Plant Programs And Procedures
Member:	Director-Regulatory Compliance
Member:	Director-QA/QC-Harris Plant

6.5.2.3 The Chairman may designate in writing other regular members who may serve as Acting Chairman of PNSC meetings. All alternate members shall be appointed in writing ~~to~~ by the PNSC Chairman. Alternates shall be designated for specific regular PNSC members and shall have expertise in the same general area as the regular member they represent. No more than two alternates shall participate as voting members in PNSC activities at any one time.

MEETING FREQUENCY

6.5.2.4 The PNSC shall meet at least once per calendar month and as convened by the PNSC Chairman or his designated alternate. The PNSC must meet in session to perform its function under these Technical Specifications.

QUORUM

6.5.2.5 The quorum of the PNSC necessary for the performance of the PNSC responsibility and authority provisions of these Technical Specifications shall consist of the Chairman or his designated alternate and ~~five~~ four voting members including alternates.

RESPONSIBILITIES

6.5.2.6 The PNSC shall be responsible for:

a. Review of ~~(1) all proposed programs required by Specification 6.8.4 and changes thereto and (2) any other~~ proposed procedures or changes thereto that have been initially determined to constitute an unreviewed safety question or involve an unreviewed change to the Technical Specifications;

RESPONSIBILITIES (Continued)

b. Review of all proposed tests and experiments that affect nuclear safety and that have been initially determined to appear to constitute an unreviewed safety question or involve an unreviewed change to the Technical Specifications;

c. Review of all proposed changes to Appendix "A" Technical Specifications;

d. Review of all proposed changes or modifications to unit systems or equipment that affect nuclear safety and that have been initially determined to appear to constitute an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59 or involve a change to the Technical Specifications;

e. Investigation of all violations of the Technical Specifications, including the preparation and forwarding of reports covering evaluation and recommendations to prevent recurrence, to the Vice President-Harris Nuclear Project and to the Manager-Corporate Nuclear Safety Section;

f. Review of all REPORTABLE EVENTS;

g. Review of unit operations to detect potential hazards to nuclear safety;

h. Performance of special reviews, investigations, or analyses and reports thereon as requested by the Plant General Manager or the Manager-Corporate Nuclear Safety Section;

i. Review of the Security Plan;

j. Review of the Emergency Plan;

k. Review of any accidental, unplanned, or uncontrolled radioactive release including the preparation of reports covering evaluation, recommendations, and disposition of the corrective action to prevent recurrence and the forwarding of these reports to the Vice President-Harris Nuclear Project and the Manager-Nuclear Safety and Environmental Services;

l. Review, prior to implementation, of changes to the PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM, the OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL, the Radwaste Treatment Systems, and ~~all other programs required by Specification 6.8.4.~~ THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION EQUIPMENT LIST PROGRAM.

6.5.2.7 The PNSC shall:

a. Render determinations in writing with regard to whether or not each item considered under Specification 6.5.2.6a. through e. constitutes an unreviewed safety question; and

RESPONSIBILITIES (Continued)

b. Provide written notification within 24 hours to the Vice President-Harris Nuclear Project and the Manager-Nuclear Safety and Environmental Services of disagreement between the PNSC and the Plant General Manager. However, the Plant General Manager shall have responsibility for resolution of such disagreements pursuant to Specification 6.1.1.

RECORDS

6.5.2.8 The PNSC shall maintain written minutes of each PNSC meeting that, at a minimum, document the results of all PNSC activities performed under the responsibility provisions of these Technical Specifications. Copies shall be provided to the Vice President-Harris Nuclear Project and the Manager-Nuclear Safety and Environmental Services.

6.5.3 CORPORATE NUCLEAR SAFETY SECTION

FUNCTION

DEPARTMENT

6.5.3.1 The Corporate Nuclear Safety Section (CNSS) of the Nuclear Safety and Environmental Services shall function to provide independent review of plant changes, tests, and procedures; verify that REPORTABLE EVENTS are investigated in a timely manner and corrected in a manner that reduces the probability of recurrence of such events; and detect trends that may not be apparent to a day-to-day observer. They shall also evaluate all CP&L LERs and other industry reports including the information forwarded by INPO from their evaluation of all industry LERs.

ORGANIZATION

6.5.3.2 The individuals assigned responsibility for independent reviews shall be technically qualified in a specified technical discipline or disciplines. These individuals shall collectively have the experience and competence required to review activities in the following areas:

a. Nuclear power plant operations,
b. Nuclear engineering,
c. Chemistry and radiochemistry,
d. Metallurgy,
e. Instrumentation and control,
f. Radiological safety,
g. Mechanical and electrical engineering,
h. Administrative controls,
i. Quality assurance practices,
j. Nondestructive testing, and
k. Other appropriate fields associated with the unique characteristics.

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ORGANIZATION (Continued)

6.5.3.3 The Manager-Corporate Nuclear Safety Section shall have a baccalaureate degree in an engineering or related field and, in addition, shall have a minimum of 10 years' related experience, of which a minimum of 5 years shall be in the operation and/or design of nuclear power plants.

6.5.3.4 The independent safety review program reviewers shall each have a baccalaureate degree in an engineering or related field or equivalent and, in addition, shall have a minimum of 5 years' related experience.

6.5.3.5 An individual may possess competence in more than one specialty area. If sufficient expertise is not available within the Corporate Nuclear Safety Section, competent individuals from other Carolina Power & Light Company organizations or outside consultants shall be utilized in performing independent reviews and investigations.

6.5.3.6 At least three individuals, qualified as discussed in Specification 6.5.3.2 above shall review each item submitted under the requirements of Specification 6.5.3.9.

6.5.3.7 Independent safety reviews shall be performed by individuals not directly involved with the activity under review or responsible for the activity under review.

6.5.3.8 The Corporate Nuclear Safety Section independent safety review program shall be conducted in accordance with written, approved procedures.

REVIEW

6.5.3.9 The Corporate Nuclear Safety Section shall perform reviews of the following:

a. Written safety evaluations for all procedures required by Specification 6.8 and other procedures that affect nuclear safety and changes thereto, and proposed tests or experiments and proposed modifications, any of which constitute a change to the Final Safety Analysis Report~~;~~. IMPLEMENTATION MAY PROCEED PRIOR TO COMPLETION OF THE REVIEW;

b. All procedures required by Specification 6.8 and other procedures that affect nuclear safety and changes thereto that constitute an unreviewed safety question as defined in Paragraph 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50 or involve a change to the Technical Specifications;

c. All proposed tests or experiments that constitute an unreviewed safety question as defined in Paragraph 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50 or involve a change to the Technical Specifications~~;~~ PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION;

d. All proposed changes to the Technical Specifications and Operating License;

REVIEW (Continued)

e. Violations of applicable codes, regulations, orders, Technical Specifications, license requirements, and internal procedures or instructions having nuclear safety significance, significant operating abnormalities or deviations from normal and expected performance of plant structures, systems, or components that affect nuclear safety;

f. All REPORTABLE EVENTS;

g. All proposed modifications that constitute an unreviewed safety question as defined in Paragraph 50.59 of 10 CFR Part 50 or involve a change to the Technical Specifications;

h. Any other matter involving safe operation of the nuclear power plant that the Manager-Corporate Nuclear Safety Section deems appropriate for consideration or which is referred to the Manager-Corporate Nuclear Safety Section by the onsite operating organization or other functional organizational units within Carolina Power & Light Company;

i. All recognized indications of an unanticipated deficiency in some aspect of design or operation of structures, systems, or components that could affect nuclear safety; and

j. Reports and minutes of the PNSC.

6.5.3.10 Review of items considered under Specification 6.5.3.9.~~f~~ e, h, and j above shall include the results of any investigations made and the recommendations resulting from these investigations to prevent or reduce the probability of recurrence of the event.

RECORDS

6.5.3.11 Records of Corporate Nuclear Safety Section reviews, including recommendations and concerns, shall be prepared and distributed as indicated below:

a. Copies of documented reviews shall be retained in the CNSS files.

b. Recommendations and concerns shall be submitted to the Plant General Manager and Vice President-Harris Nuclear Project within 14 days of completion of the review. A ~~Bimonthly~~ reports summarizing the reviews encompassed by Specification 6.5.3.9 shall be provided to the Plant General Manager and the Vice President-Harris Nuclear Project every other month

C. A summation of Corporate Nuclear Safety Section recommendations and concerns shall be submitted to the Chairman/President and Chief Executive Officer and other appropriate Senior management personnel at least every other month.

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6.5.4 CORPORATE QUALITY ASSURANCE AUDIT PROGRAM

AUDITS

6.5.4.1 Audits of unit activities shall be performed by the Quality Assurance Services Section of the Corporate Quality Assurance Department. These audits shall encompass:

a. The conformance of unit operation to provisions contained within the Technical Specifications and applicable license conditions, at least once per 12 months;

b. The training, qualifications, and performance as a group, of the entire unit staff, at least once per 12 months;

c. The results of actions taken to correct deficiencies occurring in unit equipment, structures, systems, or method of operation that affect nuclear safety, at least once per 6 months;

d. The performance of activities required by the Operational Quality Assurance Program to meet the criteria of Appendix B, 10 CFR Part 50, at least once per 24 months;

e. The fire protection programmatic controls including the implementing procedures, at least once per 24 months, by qualified licensee QA personnel;

f. The Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program and the results thereof, at least once per 12 months;

g. The OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL and implementing procedures, at least once per 24 months;

h. The PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM and implementing procedures for processing and packaging of radioactive wastes, at least once per 24 months;

i. The performance of activities required by the Quality Assurance Program for effluent and environmental monitoring, at least once per 12 months;

j. The Emergency Plan and implementing procedures, at least once per 12 months;

k. The Security Plan and implementing procedures, at least once per 12 months; and

l. Any other area of unit operation considered appropriate by the ~~[CNRAG]~~ or the [Vice President-~~Nuclear Operations~~].
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6.5.4.2 Personnel performing the quality assurance audits shall have access to the plant operating records.

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RECORDS

6.5.4.3 Records of audits shall be prepared and retained.

6.5.4.4 Audit reports encompassed by Specification 6.5.4.1 shall be prepared, approved by the Manager-Quality Assurance Services, and forwarded, within 30 days after completion of the audit, to the Executive Vice President-Power Supply and Engineering and Construction, Senior Vice President-Nuclear Generation, Vice President-Harris Nuclear Project, Manager-Nuclear Safety and Environmental Services, Plant General Manager, and the management positions responsible for the areas audited.

AUTHORITY

6.5.4.5 The Manager-Quality Assurance Service Section, under the Manager-Corporate Quality Assurance Department, shall be responsible for the following:

a. Administering the Corporate Quality Assurance Audit Program.

b. Approval of the individuals selected to conduct quality assurance audits.

6.5.4.6 Audit personnel shall be independent of the area audited.

6.5.4.7 Selection of personnel for auditing assignments shall be based on experience or training that establishes that their qualifications are commensurate with the complexity or special nature of the activities to be audited. In selecting audit personnel, consideration shall be given to special abilities, specialized technical training, prior pertinent experience, personal characteristics, and education.

6.5.4.8 Qualified outside consultants, or other individuals independent from those personnel directly involved in plant operation, shall be used to augment the audit teams when necessary.

6.5.5 OUTSIDE AGENCY INSPECTION AND AUDIT PROGRAM

6.5.5.1 An independent fire protection and loss prevention inspection and audit shall be performed at least once per 12 months using either qualified offsite licensee personnel or an outside fire protection firm.

6.5.5.2 An inspection and audit of the fire protection and loss prevention program shall be performed by an outside qualified fire consultant at intervals no greater than 36 months.

6.5.5.3 Copies of the audit reports and responses to them shall be forwarded to the Vice President-Harris Nuclear Project and the Manager-Corporate Quality Assurance.

6.6 REPORTABLE EVENT ACTION

6.6.1 The following actions shall be taken for REPORTABLE EVENTS:

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REPORTABLE EVENT ACTION (Continued)

a. The Commission shall be notified and a report submitted pursuant to the requirements of Section 50.73 to 10 CFR Part 50, and

b. Each REPORTABLE EVENT shall be reviewed by the PNSC, and the results of this review shall be submitted to the Manager-Corporate Nuclear Safety Section and the Vice President-Harris Nuclear Project.

6.7 SAFETY LIMIT VIOLATION

6.7.1 The following actions shall be taken in the event a Safety Limit is violated:

a. The NRC Operations Center shall be notified by telephone as soon as possible and in all cases within 1 hour. The Vice President-Harris Nuclear Project and the Manager-Corporate Nuclear Safety Section shall be notified within 24 hours;

b. A Safety Limit Violation Report shall be prepared. The report shall be reviewed by the PNSC. This report shall describe: (1) applicable circumstances preceding the violation, (2) effects of the violation upon facility components, systems, or structures, and (3) corrective action taken to prevent recurrence;

c. The Safety Limit Violation Report shall be submitted, within 14 days of the violation, to the Commission, the Manager-Corporate Nuclear Safety Section, and the Vice President-Harris Nuclear Project; and

d. Operation of the unit shall not be resumed until authorized by the Commission.

6.8 PROCEDURES AND PROGRAMS

6.8.1 Written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the activities referenced below:

a. The applicable procedures recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978;

b. The emergency operating procedures required to implement the requirements of NUREG-0737 and Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 as stated in Generic Letter No. 82-33;

c. Security Plan implementation;

d. Emergency Plan implementation;

e. PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM implementation;

f. OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL implementation;

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PROCEDURES AND PROGRAMS (Continued)

g. Quality Assurance PROGRAM for effluent and environmental monitoring; and

h. Fire protection program implementation.

6.8.2 Each procedure of Specification 6.8.1, and changes thereto, shall be reviewed and approved in accordance with Specification 6.5.1 prior to implementation and reviewed periodically as set forth in administrative procedures.

6.8.3 Temporary changes to procedures of Specification 6.8.1 may be made provided:

a. The intent of the original procedure is not altered;

b. The change is approved by two members of the plant management staff, at least one of whom holds a Senior Operator license on the unit affected; and

c. The change is documented, reviewed in accordance with Specification 6.5.1, and approved within 14 days of implementation by the Plant General Manager or by the Manager of the functional area affected by the procedure.

6.8.4 The following programs shall be established, implemented, and maintained:

a. Primary Coolant Sources Outside Containment

A program to reduce leakage, to as low as practical levels, from those portions of systems outside containment that could contain highly radioactive fluids during a serious transient or accident. The systems include:

1. Residual Heat Removal System

2. Safety Injection System, except boron injection recirculation subsystem and accumulator

3. Portions of the Chemical and Volume Control System:

    a. letdown subsystem, including demineralizers
    b. boron re-cycle holdup tanks
    c. charging pumps

4. Containment Spray System, except spray additive subsystem and RWST

5. Post-Accident Sample System

PROCEDURES AND PROGRAMS (Continued)

a. Primary Coolant Sources Outside Containment (Continued)

6. Post-Accident Reactor Auxiliary Building Ventilation System

7. Valve Leakoff Equipment Drain System

8. Gaseous Waste Processing System

9. Seal Water Return System

In addition, the program shall include:

10. Preventive maintenance and periodic visual inspection requirements, and

11. Integrated leak test requirements for each system at refueling cycle intervals or less.

b. In-Plant Radiation Monitoring

A program that will ensure the capability to determine accurately the airborne iodine concentration in vital areas under accident conditions. This program shall include the following:

1. Training of personnel,
2. Procedures for monitoring, and
3. Provisions for maintenance of sampling and analysis equipment.

c. Secondary Water Chemistry

A program for monitoring of secondary water chemistry to inhibit steam generator tube degradation. This program shall include:

1. Identification of a sampling schedule for the critical variables and the control points for these variables,

2. Identification of the procedures used to measure the values of the critical variables,

3. Identification of process sampling points, which shall include monitoring ~~the discharge of the condensate pumps~~ for evidence of condenser in-leakage,

4. Procedures for the recording and management of data,

5. Procedures defining corrective actions for all off-control point chemistry conditions, and

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PROCEDURES AND PROGRAMS (Continued)

c. Secondary Water Chemistry (Continued)

6. A procedure identifying (a) the authority responsible for the interpretation of the data and (b) the sequence and timing of administrative events required to initiate corrective action.

d. Backup Method for Determining Subcooling Margin

A program that will ensure the capability to monitor accurately the Reactor Coolant System subcooling margin. This program shall include the following:

1. Training of personnel, and
2. Procedures for monitoring.

e. Post-Accident Sampling

A program that will ensure the capability to obtain and analyze, under accident conditions, reactor coolant, radioactive iodines and particulates in plant gaseous effluents, and containment atmosphere samples. The program shall include the following:

1. Training of personnel,
2. Procedures for sampling and analysis, and
3. Provisions for maintenance of sampling and analysis equipment.

f. Inspections of Water Control Structures

A program to implement an ongoing inspection program in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.127 (Revision 1, March 1978) for the main and auxiliary dams, the auxiliary separating dike, the emergency service water and discharge channels, and the auxiliary reservoir channel. The program shall include the following:

1. The provisions of Regulatory Guide 1.127, Revision 1, to be implemented as a part of plant startup operations.

2. Subsequent inspections at yearly intervals for at least the next 3 years. If adverse conditions are not revealed by these inspections, inspection at 5-year intervals will be performed.

3. The program shall specify a maximum sediment depth that will be permitted to accumulate in the channels before removal is required.

g. Turbine and Turbine Valve Maintenance

A turbine and turbine valve maintenance program shall be maintained consistent with the applicable guidance provided in the vendor Recommendations.

6.9 REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

ROUTINE REPORTS

6.9.1 In addition to the applicable reporting requirements of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, the following reports shall be submitted to the Regional Administrator of the Regional Office of the NRC unless otherwise noted.

STARTUP REPORT

6.9.1.1 A summary report of plant startup and power escalation testing shall be submitted following: (1) receipt of an Operating License, (2) amendment to the license involving a planned increase in power level, (3) installation of fuel that has a different design or has been manufactured by a different fuel supplier, and (4) modifications that may have significantly altered the nuclear, thermal, or hydraulic performance of the unit.

The Startup Report shall address each of the tests identified in the Final Safety Analysis Report and shall include a description of the measured values of the operating conditions or characteristics obtained during the test program and a comparison of these values with design predictions and specifications. Any corrective actions that were required to obtain satisfactory operation shall also be described. Any additional specific details required in license conditions based on other commitments shall be included in this report.

Startup Reports shall be submitted within: (1) 90 days following completion of the Startup Test Program, (2) 90 days following resumption or commencement of commercial power operation, or (3) 9 months following initial criticality, whichever is earliest. If the Startup Report does not cover all three events (i.e., initial criticality, completion of Startup Test Program, and resumption or commencement of commercial operation), supplementary reports shall be submitted at least every 3 months until all three events have been completed.

ANNUAL REPORTS

6.9.1.2 Annual Reports covering the activities of the unit as described below for the previous calendar year shall be submitted prior to March 1 of each year. The initial report shall be submitted prior to March 1 of the year following initial criticality.

Reports required on an annual basis shall include:

a. A tabulation on an annual basis of the number of station, utility, and other personnel (including contractors) receiving exposures greater than 100 mrem/yr and their associated man-rem exposure according to work and job functions* (e.g., reactor operations and surveillance, inservice inspection, routine maintenance, special maintenance [describe maintenance], waste processing, and refueling). The dose assignments to various duty functions may be estimated based on pocket dosimeter, thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD), or

*This tabulation supplements the requirements of §20.407 of 10 CFR Part 20.

ANNUAL REPORTS (Continued)

film badge measurements. Small exposures totaling less than 20% of the individual total dose need not be accounted for. In the aggregate, at least 80% of the total whole-body dose received from external sources should be assigned to specific major work functions;

b. The results of specific activity analyses in which the primary coolant exceeded the limits of Specification 3.4.8. The following information shall be included: (1) reactor power history starting 48 hours prior to the first sample in which the limit was exceeded (in graphic and tabular format); (2) results of the last isotopic analysis for radioiodine performed prior to exceeding the limit, results of analysis while limit was exceeded and results of one analysis after the radioiodine activity was reduced to less than limit. Each result should include date and time of sampling and the radioiodine concentrations; (3) cleanup flow history starting 48 hours prior to the first sample in which the limit was exceeded; (4) graph of the I-131 concentration (μCi/gm) and one other radioidine isotope concentration (μCi/gm) as a function of time for the duration of the specific activity above the steady-state level; and (5) the time duration when the specific activity of the primary coolant exceeded the radioiodine limit.

c. Documentation of all challenges to the pressurizer power-operated relief valves (PORVs) and safety valves.

ANNUAL RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL OPERATING REPORT

6.9.1.3 Routine Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Reports, covering the operation of the unit during the previous calendar year, shall be submitted prior to May 1 of each year. The initial report shall be submitted prior to May 1 of the year following initial criticality.

The Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Reports shall include summaries, interpretations, and an analysis of trends of the results of the radiological environmental surveillance activities for the report period, including a comparison with preoperational studies, with operational controls, as appropriate, and with previous environmental surveillance reports, and an assessment of the observed impacts of the plant operation on the environment. The reports shall also include the results of the Land Use Census required by Specification 3.12.2.

The Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Reports shall include the results of analysis of all radiological environmental samples and of all environmental radiation measurements taken during the period pursuant to the locations specified in the table and figures in the OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL, as well as summarized and tabulated results of these analyses and measurements in the format of the table in the Radiological Assessment Branch Technical Position, Revision 1, November 1979. In the event that some individual results are not available for inclusion with the report, the report shall be submitted noting and explaining the reasons for the missing results. The missing data shall be submitted as soon as possible in a supplementary report.

ANNUAL RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL OPERATING REPORT (Continued)

The reports shall also include the following: a summary description of the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program; at least two legible maps* covering all sampling locations keyed to a table giving distances and directions from the centerline of the reactor; the results of licensee participation in the Interlaboratory Comparison Program and the corrective action taken if the specified program is not being performed as required by Specification 3.12.3; reasons for not conducting the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program as required by Specification 3.12.1, and discussion of all deviations from the sampling schedule of Table 3.12-1; discussion of environmental sample measurements that exceed the reporting levels of Table 3.12-2 but are not the result of plant effluents, pursuant to ACTION b. of Specification 3.12.1; and discussion of all analyses in which the LLD required by Table 4.12-1 was not achievable.

SEMIANNUAL RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE REPORT

6.9.1.4 Routine Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports covering the operation of the unit during the previous 6 months of operation shall be submitted within 60 days after January 1 and July 1 of each year. The period of the first report shall begin with the date of initial criticality.

The Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports shall include a summary of the quantities of radioactive liquid and gaseous effluents and solid waste released from the unit as outlined in Regulatory Guide 1.21, "Measuring, Evaluating, and Reporting Radioactivity in Solid Wastes and Releases of Radioactive Materials in Liquid and Gaseous Effluents from Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 1, June 1974, with data summarized on a quarterly basis following the format of Appendix B thereof. For solid wastes, the format for Table 3 in Appendix B shall be supplemented with three additional categories: class of solid wastes (as defined by 10 CFR Part 61), type of container (e.g., ~~LSA,~~ Type A, Type B/ ~~Large Quantity~~) and SOLIDIFICATION agent or absorbent (e.g., cement/ ~~urea formaldehyde~~).

The Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report to be submitted within 60 days after January 1 of each year shall include an annual summary of hourly meteorological data collected over the previous year. This annual summary may be either in the form of an hour-by-hour listing on magnetic tape of wind speed, wind direction, atmospheric stability, and precipitation (if measured), or in the form of joint frequency distributions of wind speed, wind direction, and atmospheric stability.** This same report shall include an assessment of the radiation doses due to the radioactive liquid and gaseous effluents released

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*One map shall cover stations near the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY; a second shall include the more distant stations.

**In lieu of submission with the Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report, the licensee has the option of retaining this summary of required meteorological data on site in a file that shall be provided to the NRC upon request.

SEMIANNUAL RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENT RELEASE REPORT (Continued)

from the unit or station during the previous calendar year. This same report shall also include an assessment of the radiation doses from radioactive liquid and gaseous effluents to MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC due to their activities inside the SITE BOUNDARY (Figure 5.1-3) during the report period. All assumptions used in making these assessments, i.e., specific activity, exposure time, and location, shall be included in these reports. The meteorological conditions concurrent with the time of release of radioactive materials in gaseous effluents, as determined by sampling frequency and measurement, shall be used for determining the gaseous pathway doses. The assessment of radiation doses shall be performed in accordance with the methodology and parameters in the OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL (ODCM).

The Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report to be submitted within 60 days after January 1 of each year shall also include an assessment of radiation doses to the likely most exposed MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC from reactor releases and other nearby uranium fuel cycle sources, including doses from primary effluent pathways and direct radiation, for the previous calendar year to show conformance with 40 CFR Part 190, "Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Nuclear Power Operation." Acceptable methods for calculating the dose contribution from liquid and gaseous effluents are given in Regulatory Guide 1.109, Revision 1, October 1977.

The Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports shall include a list and description of unplanned releases, from the site to UNRESTRICTED AREAS, of radioactive materials in gaseous and liquid effluents made during the reporting period.

The Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports shall include any changes made during the reporting period to the PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM and the ODCM, pursuant to Specifications 6.13 and 6.14, respectively, as well as any major change to Liquid, Gaseous, or Solid Radwaste Treatment Systems pursuant to Specification 6.15. It shall also include a listing of new locations for dose calculations and/or environmental monitoring identified by the Land Use Census pursuant to Specification 3.12.2.

The Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports shall also include the following: an explanation as to why the inoperability of liquid or gaseous effluent monitoring instrumentation was not corrected within the time specified in Specification 3.3.3.10 or 3.3.3.11, respectively; and a description of the events leading to liquid holdup tanks or gas storage tanks exceeding the limits of Specification 3.11.1.4 or 3.11.2.6, respectively.

MONTHLY OPERATING REPORTS

6.9.1.5 Routine reports of operating statistics and shutdown experience shall be submitted on a monthly basis to the Director, Office of Resource Management, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, with a copy to the Regional Administrator of the Regional Office of the NRC, no later than the 15th of each month following the calendar month covered by the report.

RADIAL PEAKING FACTOR LIMIT REPORT

6.9.1.6 The F_{xy} limits for RATED THERMAL POWER (F_{xy}^{RTP}) shall be provided to the NRC Regional Administrator with a copy to the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Attention: Chief, Reactor Systems Branch, Division of PWR Licensing-A, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, for all core planes containing Bank "D" control rods and all unrodded core planes and the plot of predicted ($F_q^T \cdot P_{Rel}$) vs Axial Core Height with the limit envelope at least 60 days prior to each cycle initial criticality unless otherwise approved by the Commission by letter. In addition, in the event that the limit should change requiring a new substantial or an amended submittal to the Radial Peaking Factor Limit Report, it will be submitted 60 days prior to the date the limit would become effective unless otherwise approved by the Commission by letter. Any information needed to support F_{xy}^{RTP} will be by request from the NRC and need not be included in this report.

SPECIAL REPORTS

6.9.2 Special reports shall be submitted to the Regional Administrator of the Regional Office of the NRC within the time period specified for each report.

6.10 RECORD RETENTION

6.10.1 In addition to the applicable record retention requirements of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, the following records shall be retained for at least the minimum period indicated.

6.10.2 The following records shall be retained for at least 5 years:

a. Records and logs of unit operation covering time interval at each power level;

b. Records and logs of principal maintenance activities, inspections, repair, and replacement of principal items of equipment related to nuclear safety;

c. All REPORTABLE EVENTS;

d. Records of surveillance activities, inspections, and calibrations required by these Technical Specifications;

e. Records of changes made to the procedures required by Specification 6.8.1;

f. Records of radioactive shipments;

g. Records of sealed source and fission detector leak tests and results; and

RECORD RETENTION (Continued)

h. Records of annual physical inventory of all sealed source material of record.

6.10.3 The following records shall be retained for the duration of the unit Operating License:

a. Records and drawing changes reflecting unit design modifications made to systems and equipment described in the Final Safety Analysis Report;

b. Records of new and irradiated fuel inventory, fuel transfers, and assembly burnup histories;

c. Records of radiation exposure for all individuals entering radiation control areas;

d. Records of gaseous and liquid radioactive material released to the environs;

e. Records of transient or operational cycles for those unit components identified in Table 5.7-1;

f. Records of reactor tests and experiments;

g. Records of training and qualification for current members of the unit staff;

h. Records of inservice inspections performed pursuant to these Technical Specifications;

i. Records of quality assurance activities required by the Operational Quality Assurance ~~Manual~~ PROGRAM;

j. Records of reviews performed for changes made to procedures or equipment or reviews of tests and experiments pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59;

k. Records of meetings of the PNSC and of the independent reviews performed by the Corporate Nuclear Safety Section;

l. Records of the service lives of all hydraulic and mechanical snubbers required by Specification 3.7.8 including the date at which the service life commences and associated installation and maintenance records;

m. Records of secondary water sampling and water quality;

n. Records of analyses required by the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program that would permit evaluation of the accuracy of the analysis at a later date. This should include procedures

RECORD RETENTION (Continued)

effective at specified times and QA records showing that these procedures were followed; and

o. Records of facility radiation and contamination surveys.

6.11 RADIATION PROTECTION PROGRAM

6.11.1 Procedures for personnel radiation protection shall be prepared consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20 and shall be approved, maintained, and adhered to for all operations involving personnel radiation exposure.

6.12 HIGH RADIATION AREA

6.12.1 Pursuant to Paragraph 20.203(c)(5) of 10 CFR Part 20, in lieu of the "control device" or "alarm signal" required by Paragraph 20.203(c), each high radiation area, as defined in 10 CFR Part 20, in which the intensity of radiation is equal to or less than 1000 mR/h at 45 cm (18 in.) from the radiation source or from any surface which the radiation penetrates shall be barricaded and conspicuously posted as a high radiation area and entrance thereto shall be controlled by requiring issuance of a Radiation Work Permit (RWP). Individuals qualified in radiation protection procedures (e.g., Health Physics Technicians) or personnel continuously escorted by such individuals may be exempt from the RWP issuance requirement during the performance of their assigned duties in high radiation areas with exposure rates equal to or less than 1000 mR/h, provided they are otherwise following plant radiation protection procedures for entry into such high radiation areas. Any individual or group of individuals permitted to enter such areas shall be provided with or accompanied by one or more of the following:

a. A radiation monitoring device that continuously indicates the radiation dose rate in the area; or

b. A radiation monitoring device that continuously integrates the radiation dose rate in the area and alarms when a preset integrated dose is received. Entry into such areas with this monitoring device may be made after the dose rate levels in the area have been established and personnel have been made knowledgeable of them; or

c. An individual qualified in radiation protection procedures, with a radiation dose rate monitoring device, who is responsible for providing positive control over the activities within the area and who shall perform periodic radiation surveillance at the frequency specified by the Radiation Control Supervisor in the RWP.

6.12.2 In addition to the requirements of Specification 6.12.1, accessible areas with radiation levels greater than 1000 mR/h at 45 cm (18 in.) from the radiation source or from any surface which the radiation penetrates, shall be provided with locked doors to prevent unauthorized entry, and the keys shall be maintained under the administrative control of the shift Foreman on duty

HIGH RADIATION AREA (Continued)

and/or health physics supervision. Doors shall remain locked except during periods of access by personnel under an approved RWP which shall specify the dose rate levels in the immediate work areas and the maximum allowable stay time for individuals in that area. In lieu of the stay time specification of the RWP, direct or remote (such as closed circuit TV cameras) continuous surveillance may be made by personnel qualified in radiation protection procedures to provide positive exposure control over the activities being performed within the area. During emergency situations that involve personal injury or actions taken to prevent major equipment damage, continuous surveillance and radiation monitoring of the work area by a qualified individual may be substituted for the routine RWP procedure.

For accessible individual high radiation areas, with radiation levels of greater than 1000 mR/h, that are located within large areas, such as PWR containment, where no enclosure exists for purposes of locking and where no enclosure can be reasonably constructed around the individual area, that individual area shall be barricaded and conspicuously posted, and a flashing light shall be activated as a warning device.

6.13 PROCESS CONTROL PROGRAM (PCP)

6.13.1 The PCP shall be approved by the Commission prior to implementation.

6.13.2 Licensee-initiated changes to the PCP:

a. Shall be submitted to the Commission in the Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for the period in which the change(s) was made. This submittal shall contain:

1. Sufficiently detailed information to totally support the rationale for the change without benefit of additional or supplemental information;

2. A determination that the change did not reduce the overall conformance of the solidified waste product to existing criteria for solid wastes; and

3. Documentation of the fact that the change has been reviewed and found acceptable by the PNSC.

b. Shall become effective upon review and acceptance by the PNSC.

6.14 OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL (ODCM)

6.14.1 The ODCM shall be approved by the Commission prior to implementation.

6.14.2 Licensee-initiated changes to the ODCM:

a. Shall be submitted to the Commission in the Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for the period in which the change(s) was made effective. This submittal shall contain:

OFFSITE DOSE CALCULATION MANUAL (ODCM) (Continued)

1. Sufficiently detailed information to totally support the rationale for the change without benefit of additional or supplemental information. Information submitted should consist of a package of those pages of the ODCM to be changed with each page numbered, dated and containing the revision number, together with appropriate analyses or evaluations justifying the change(s);

2. A determination that the change will not reduce the accuracy or reliability of dose calculations or setpoint determinations; and

3. Documentation of the fact that the change has been reviewed and found acceptable by the PNSC.

b. Shall become effective upon review and acceptance by the PNSC.

6.15 MAJOR CHANGES TO LIQUID, GASEOUS, AND SOLID RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEMS*

6.15.1 Licensee-initiated major changes to the Radwaste Treatment Systems (liquid, gaseous, and solid):

a. Shall be reported to the Commission in the Semiannual Radioactive Effluent Release Report for the period in which the evaluation was reviewed in accordance with Specification 6.5. The discussion of each change shall contain:

1. A summary of the evaluation that led to the determination that the change could be made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59;

2. Sufficient detailed information to totally support the reason for the change without benefit of additional or supplemental information;

3. A detailed description of the equipment, components, and processes involved and the interfaces with other plant systems;

4. An evaluation of the change, which shows the predicted releases of radioactive materials in liquid and gaseous effluents and/or quantity of solid waste that differ from those previously predicted in the License application and amendments thereto;

5. An evaluation of the change, which shows the expected maximum exposures, to a MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC in the UNRESTRICTED AREA and to the general population, that differ from those previously estimated in the License application and amendments thereto;

*Licensees may choose to submit the information called for in this Specification as part of the annual FSAR update.

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MAJOR CHANGES TO LIQUID, GASEOUS, AND SOLID RADWASTE TREATMENT SYSTEMS (Continued)

6. A comparison of the predicted releases of radioactive materials, in liquid and gaseous effluents and in solid waste, to the actual releases for the period prior to when the change is to be made;

7. An estimate of the exposure to plant operating personnel as a result of the change; and

8. Documentation of the fact that the change was reviewed and found acceptable in accordance with Specificaton 6.5.

b. Shall become effective upon review and acceptance in accordance with Specification 6.5.

6.16 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION EQUIPMENT LIST PROGRAM (TSEL)

6.16.1 THE TSEL SHALL BE APPROVED BY THE COMMISSION PRIOR TO IMPLEMENTATION.

6.16.2 LICENSEE INITIATED CHANGES TO THE TSEL:

a. SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO THE COMMISSION IN THE ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE YEAR IN WHICH THE CHANGE WAS MADE EFFECTIVE. THIS SUBMITTAL SHALL CONTAIN:

1) SUFFICIENTLY DETAILED INFORMATION TO SUPPORT THE RATIONALE FOR THE CHANGE WITHOUT BENEFIT OF ADDITIONAL OR SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION;

2) A DETERMINATION THAT THE CHANGE DID NOT REDUCE THE LEVEL OF CONTROL OR SURVEILLANCE INTENDED BY THE RELEVANT SPECIFICATION;

3) DOCUMENTATION OF THE FACT THAT THE CHANGE HAS BEEN FOUND ACCEPTABLE BY THE PLANT GENERAL MANAGER.

b. SHALL BECOME EFFECTIVE UPON REVIEW AND ACCEPTANCE BY THE PNSC.