

E 03/10/78

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)  
DISTRIBUTION FOR INCOMING MATERIAL 50-220

REC: GRIER B H  
NRC

ORG: SCHNEIDER R R  
NIAGARA MOHAWK PWR

DOCDATE: 03/01/78  
DATE RCVD: 03/07/78

DOCTYPE: LETTER NOTARIZED: NO

COPIES RECEIVED

SUBJECT:

LTR 0 ENCL 1

LICENSEE EVENT REPT (RO 50-220/78-07) ON 02/06/78 CONCERNING DURING  
STEADY STATE OPERATAION, AN INSPEC OF THE LIQUID WASTE SURGE TANK  
FOUND SEVERAL PINHOLE LEAKS...W/ATT LERS 78-008, 78-009 AND 78-010.

PLANT NAME: NINE MILE PT - UNIT 1

REVIEWER INITIAL: XJM  
DISTRIBUTOR INITIAL: DL

\*\*\*\*\* DISTRIBUTION OF THIS MATERIAL IS AS FOLLOWS \*\*\*\*\*

INCIDENT REPORTS  
(DISTRIBUTION CODE A002)

FOR ACTION: BR CHIEF ~~LEAR~~\*\*W/4 ENCL

INTERNAL:

REG FILE\*\*W/ENCL  
I & E\*\*W/2 ENCL  
SCHROEDER/IPPOLITO\*\*W/ENCL  
NOVAK/CHECK\*\*W/ENCL  
KNIGHT\*\*W/ENCL  
HANAUER\*\*W/ENCL  
EISENHUT\*\*W/ENCL  
SHAO\*\*W/ENCL  
KREGER/J. COLLINS\*\*W/ENCL  
K SEYFRIT/IE\*\*W/ENCL

NRC PDR\*\*W/ENCL  
MIPC\*\*W/3 ENCL  
HOUSTON\*\*W/ENCL  
GRIMES\*\*W/ENCL  
BUTLER\*\*W/ENCL  
TEDESCO\*\*W/ENCL  
BAER\*\*W/ENCL  
VOLLMER/BUNCH\*\*W/ENCL  
ROSA\*\*W/ENCL

EXTERNAL:

LPDR'S  
OSWEGO, NY\*\*W/ENCL  
TIC\*\*W/ENCL  
NSIC\*\*W/ENCL  
ACRS CAT B\*\*W/16 ENCL

DISTRIBUTION: LTR 45 ENCL 45  
SIZE: 1P+1P+4P

CONTROL NBR: 780680045

\*\*\*\*\* THE END \*\*\*\*\*



11

The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that every entry should be supported by a valid receipt or invoice. This ensures transparency and allows for easy verification of the data.

In the second section, the author outlines the various methods used to collect and analyze the data. This includes both manual and automated processes. The goal is to ensure that the information is both reliable and up-to-date.

The third part of the document provides a detailed breakdown of the results. It shows that there has been a significant increase in sales over the period covered. This is attributed to several factors, including improved marketing strategies and better customer service.

The fourth section discusses the challenges faced during the data collection process. One major issue was the inconsistency in the quality of the data provided by different departments. This was addressed by implementing a standardized data entry protocol.

Another challenge was the volume of data generated. To manage this, the system was upgraded to handle larger datasets more efficiently. This has resulted in faster processing times and more accurate reports.

The fifth part of the document offers recommendations for future data management. It suggests regular audits to ensure data integrity and the use of advanced analytics tools to gain deeper insights into the data.

Finally, the document concludes by summarizing the key findings and the overall impact of the data analysis. It highlights the value of data-driven decision-making and the importance of continuous improvement in data management practices.

The author expresses confidence that the insights gained from this analysis will be instrumental in driving the company's growth and success in the coming year.

March 1, 1978

Mr. Boyce H. Grier  
 Director  
 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
 Region I  
 631 Park Avenue  
 King of Prussia, PA. 19406



RE: Docket No. 50-220

Dear Mr. Grier:

In accordance with Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit #1 Technical Specifications, we hereby submit the following Licensee Event Reports:

- LER 78-07, which is in violation of Section 6.9.2b(4) of the Technical Specifications
- LER 78-08, which is in violation of Section 3.6.2 of the Technical Specifications
- LER 78-09, in accordance with the Technical Specifications
- LER 78-10, which is in violation of Section 3.6.2 of the Technical Specifications

These reports were completed in the format designated in NUREG-0161, dated July 1977.

Very truly yours,

R.R. Schneider  
 Vice President -  
 Electric Production

mtm

Attachments (3 copies)

xc: Director, Office of I&E (30 copies)  
 Director, Office of MIPC (3 copies)

780680045

A002/s \*  
 o/i



20 20

17  
17-17-6

17-17-6

17-17-6  
17-17-6  
17-17-6  
17-17-6  
17-17-6  
17-17-6

17-17-6

17-17-6

17-17-6

17-17-6





100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100





12 28

12 28

12 28

12 28

12 28

12 28

12 28







11  
12  
13

14  
15  
16

17  
18  
19

20  
21  
22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

February 28, 1978

Mr. Boyce H. Grier  
Director  
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region I  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, PA. 19406

RE: Docket No. 50-220  
LER 78-09/01T-0  
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit #1

Dear Mr. Grier:

During routine station operation with the TIP detectors withdrawn, explosive charges in the TIP System shear valves were replaced with new charges. The explosive operated TIP shear isolation valves are a back-up system to be used for isolation of the TIP tubes in the event it is not possible to withdraw the detector so the normal automatic isolation system may function.

Following replacement, performance of Maintenance Procedure, N1-IMP-TIP-3 found that the ohmmeter continuity test for acceptable electric contact was unsatisfactory. The normal TIP tube isolation system was operable at this time.

It was found that the actual electrical connections to the explosive charges were not as described in the Maintenance Procedure. General Electric NED Product Service was informed of the problem and given the numbers of the drawings used to wire the system. A revision to the drawing, which had originally been issued in February 1968, was located. The configuration shown in this revision would cause the charges to fire.

The wiring for firing the charges in the TIP System was changed to match that shown in the revised drawing. All of the old charges were test fired using the wiring scheme shown in the revised drawing. They all fired successfully.

A review of the Pre-Operational Test of our Liquid Poison System showed that the explosive shear valves in that system had been operationally tested prior to startup.

In addition to the wiring problems uncovered, it was found that the 2 AMP fuses required in the squib circuits were instant blow devices instead of the slow blow type specified by the vendor. All of the fuses in the monitor/control units were replaced with new devices.

An evaluation of the safety implications is being conducted.



2  
10

10  
10

10  
10  
10



2000