

NRC DISTRIBUTION FOR PART 50 DOCKET MATERIAL

814411

TO:

Mr. James G. Keppler

FROM:
Commonwealth Edison Company
Morris, Ill.
B. B. Stephenson

DATE OF DOCUMENT
4/29/77

DATE RECEIVED
5/23/77

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DESCRIPTION

**DO NOT REMOVE
ACKNOWLEDGED**

PLANT NAME: Dresden Unit No. 2

RJL

(1-P)

ENCLOSURE

Licensee Event Report (RO 50-237/1977-15) on 4/2/77 concerning control rod drive L-5 being found to uncouple and overtravel when withdrawn to position 48....

(2-P)

NOTE: IF PERSONNEL EXPOSURE IS INVOLVED SEND DIRECTLY TO KREGER/J. COLLINS

FOR ACTION/INFORMATION

BRANCH CHIEF:	ZIEMANN
W/3 CYS FOR ACTION	
LIC. ASST.:	DIGGS
W/1 CYS	
ACRS 16 CYS REPORT SENT	AS CAT B

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION


REG FILE			
NRC-PDR			
I & E (2)			
MIPC			
SCHROEDER/IPPOLITO			
HOUSTON			
NOVAK/CHECK			
GRIMES			
BUTLER			
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TEDESCO/MACCARY			
EISENHUT			
BAER			
SHAO			
VOLLMER/BUNGH			
KREGER/J. COLLINS			

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

LPDR: Morris Ill.	
TIC:	
NSIC:	

CONTROL NUMBER

771440148






Commonwealth Edison
 Dresden Nuclear Power Station
 R.R. #1
 Morris, Illinois 60450
 Telephone 815/942-2920

D. Lantorn

BBS Ltr. # 77-379

April 29, 1977

Regulatory Docket File



Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional Director
 Directorate of Regulatory Operations - Region III
 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
 799 Roosevelt Road
 Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Enclosed please find Reportable Occurrence report number 50-237/1977-15. This report is being submitted to your office in accordance with the Dresden Nuclear Power Station Technical Specifications, Section 6.6.B.

B. B. Stephenson

B. B. Stephenson
 Station Superintendent
 Dresden Nuclear Power Station

BBS/skm

Enclosure

cc: Director of Inspection & Enforcement
 Director of Management Information & Program Control
 File/NRC

771440118

MAY 4 1977



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... ..

... ..

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:
1 6

[PLEASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION]

LICENSEE NAME	LICENSE NUMBER	LICENSE TYPE	EVENT TYPE
01 I L D R S 2	0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0	4 1 1 1 1	0 3
7 8 9 14	15 25	26 30	31 32

CATEGORY	REPORT TYPE	REPORT SOURCE	DOCKET NUMBER	EVENT DATE	REPORT DATE
01 CONT	L	L	0 5 0 - 0 2 3 7	0 4 0 2 7 7	0 4 2 9 7 7
7 8 57 58	59	60	61 68	69 74	75 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION

02 | During routine start-up operations, control rod drive (CRD) L-5 was found to uncouple | 80
7 8 9

03 | and overtravel when withdrawn to position 48. L-5 was immediately inserted and | 80
7 8 9

04 | electrically disarmed. Reactor start-up operations were resumed after it had been | 80
7 8 9

05 | determined that the position and core location of the L-5 control rod did not | 80
7 8 9

06 | adversely affect core symmetry. At a reactor power level of approximately 30%, L-5 | 80
7 8 9

(continued)

SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	COMPONENT CODE	PRIME COMPONENT SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER	VIOLATION
R B	E	C R D R V E	N	G 0 8 0	N
7 8 9 10	11	12 17	43	44 47	48

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

08 | Symptom and performance evaluations indicate that a loosened CRD inner filter may | 80
7 8 9

09 | potentially cause the blade and drive to uncouple at the fully withdrawn position. | 80
7 8 9

10 | Loosening of the filter may have resulted from a combination of improper installation | 80
7 8 9

(continued)

FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION
C	0 0 0	NA	A	NA
7 8 9	10 12 13	14	44 45 46	47 80

FORM OF ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY	LOCATION OF RELEASE
Z	Z	NA	NA
7 8 9	10	11 44	45 80

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
0 0 0	Z	NA
7 8 9 11	12 13	14 80

PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION
0 0 0	NA
7 8 9 11	12 80

OFFSITE CONSEQUENCES

NA
7 8 9 80

LOSS OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY

TYPE	DESCRIPTION
Z	NA
7 8 9 10	11 80

PUBLICITY


NA
7 8 9 80

ADDITIONAL FACTORS

NA
7 8 9 80

7 8 9 80

NAME: Robert Herbert PHONE: Ext. 265



EVENT DESCRIPTION (continued)

was withdrawn to position 48 and checked for overtravel. The overtravel check proved satisfactory, verifying that CRD L-5 was recoupled and operable.
(50-237/1977-15)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION (continued)

and latching spring fatigue. It has been determined that a loosened filter cannot exert sufficient pressure to uncouple the blade except when the drive is fully withdrawn to position 48; upon insertion, the blade and drive automatically recouple. Because the potential for uncoupling the blade exists only when the drive is fully withdrawn, the safety implications of this event are minimal.

As a precautionary measure, an operating order has been issued to ensure that a coupling check is performed whenever drive L-5 is withdrawn to position 48. During the next Unit-2 refueling outage, CRD L-5 will be disassembled and inspected. If another primary cause of failure is determined at that time, a supplemental report will be submitted. Control rod drive/blade uncoupling incidents have occurred several times in the past.

RECEIVED DOCUMENT
PROCESSING UNIT

1971 MAY 20 PM 1 56

JOB 1010-