			CAT	EGORY 🔔				
•	REGUL	RY INFOR	RMATIO	N DISTRIBUTION SYS	TEM (RI	DS)		
ACCESSIC FACIL: AUTH.N VERRILI DONAHUE RECIP.	ON NBR:9610100116 50-400 Shearon Ha NAME AUTHO JI,M. Carolin J.J.W. Carolin NAME RECIP	DOC. rris Nuc R AFFILI na Power na Power IENT AFF	DATE: lear l ATION & Lic & Lic TLIATI	96/10/03 NOTARIZ Power Plant, Unit ght Co. ght Co. ION	ED: NO l, Caro	lina	DOCKET # 05000400	÷ 
SUBJECI	LER 96-018-00:0 by mechanical f Restored "A" pu walkdown to sup	on 96090 Eailure Imp to s Oport pl	3,manu of "B" ervice ant re	al reactor trip in NSW pump & "A" NS & performed secon -start.W/961003 lt	nitiated SW pump. ndary pl r.	l.Caus Lant	ed	C A
DISTRIB TITLE:	UTION CODE: IE221 50.73/50.9 Licens	COPIE see Even	S RECE t Repo	IVED:LTR / ENCL rt (LER), Incident	/ SIZE Rpt, e	: tc.	6	T E
NOTES:A	pplication for pe	ermit re	newal	filed.			05000400	G
	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPII LTTR	ES ENCL	RECIPIENT	COP LTTR	IES		0
	PD2-1 PD	1	1	LE,N	1	1	,	R
INTERNAL:	ACRS FILE CENTER	1	1 1	AEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB	2 1	2 1		Y
	NRR/DE/EELB NRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DRPM/PECB	1 1 1 1	1 1 1 1	NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRCH/HQMB NRR/DSSA/SPLB	1 1 1 1	1 1 1 1		1
	RGN2 FILE 01	1 1	1 1	RES/DSIR/EIB	1	1		D
EXTERNAL:	L ST LOBBY WARD	1	1	LITCO BRYCE, J H	1	l		0
	NOAC MURPHY,G.A NRC PDR	1 1	1 1	NOAC POORE,W. NUDOCS FULL TXT	1 1	1 1		C
								υ
								M
								E

へ、二

N

Т

NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS: PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE. TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD) ON EXTENSION 415-2083

v



Carolina Power & Light Company Harris Nuclear Plant PO Box 165 New Hill NC 27562

OCT 3 1996

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Serial: HNP-96-164 10CFR50.73

### SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1 DOCKET NO. 50-400 LICENSE NO. NPF-63 <u>LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 96-018-00</u>

Sir or Madam:

In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report describes a manual reactor trip due to the loss of Normal Service Water.

Sincerely,

J. W. Donahue Director of Site Operations Harris Plant

 $\mathbf{M}\mathbf{V}$ 

Enclosure

c: Mr. J. B. Brady (HNP Senior Resident - NRC)
Mr. S. D. Ebneter (NRC Regional Administrator - Region II)
Mr. N. B. Le (NRC Project Manager - NRR)

9610100116 961003 PDR ADDCK 05000400 S PDR

EN

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk / HNP-96-164 Page 2 of 2

cc:

Mr. R. T. Biggerstaff Ms. P. B. Brannan Mr. B. H. Clark Mr. J. M. Collins Mr. J. P. Cowan Mr. G. W. Davis Ms. S. F. Flynn Mr. H. W. Habermeyer Mr. G. D. Hicks (BNP) Mr. M. D. Hill Mr. W. J. Hindman Ms. C. W. Hobbs (HEEC) Mr. R. M. Krich (RNP) Ms. W. C. Langston Mr. C. W. Martin (BNP) Mr. R. D. Martin Mr. J. W. McKay Mr. P. M. Odom (RNP) Mr. W. R. Robinson Mr. G. A. Rolfson Mr. R. F. Saunders Mr. R. S. Stancil Mr. C. N. Sweely Mr. J. P. Thompson (BNP) Mr. T. D. Walt Mr. R. L. Warden (RNP) HNP Real Time Training INPO Harris Licensing File Nuclear Records

NRC FORM	M 366		U.S. NUCL	EAR REC	ULATOR	Y COMM	ISSION	1		AP	PROVED BY O	MB NO	. 3150	-0104		
(495)										EXPIRES 04/30/98						
										ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED AR						
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)										INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the information and						
	(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)									HEUUKDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6 F33), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150 0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.						
FACILITY NAP	FACILITY NAME (1)									NUMBER	2)			PAGE	(3)	
l ł	Harris Nuclear Plant Unit-1 50-400												1 OF	: 3		
TITLE (4)	тпсе (4)															
Manual reactor trip due to loss of Normal Service Water																
EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OT										THER FACILIT	ies inv	OLVED	(8)	0		
монтн	DAY YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	молтн	DAY	YEAR	FACI	urr	NAME			DUCKE	05000		
9	90 20	96	018		10	03	96	FACI	LITY	NAME			DOCKET NUMBER			
	00 00	00	010					<u>  </u>						0500	00	
OPERATI	NG 1	1HIS R	2201(b)	TTED PL	20.220	10 THE 3(a)(2)(v	REQUI	REME	<u>118</u>	50F 10	CFR 3: (Chec a)(2)(i)	k one o	r more	) (11) 0.73(a)	(2)(viii)	
POWER	3 1000	20.	2203(a)(1)		20.220	3(a)(3)(i)				50.73(	a)(2)(ii)		5	0.73(a)	(2)(x)	
LEVEL (1	0) 100%	20.	2203(a)(2)(i)		20.220	3(a)(3)(ii)	)		$\overline{}$	50.73(	a)(2)(iii)		7:	3.71		
		20.	2203(a)(2)(ii) 2203(a)(2)(iii)		20.220	)(1)		<u> </u>	싄	50.73(	a)(2)(v)		Specify	y in Abs	tract below	
		20.	2203(a)(2)(iv)		50.36(c	)(2)			$\neg$	50.73(	a)(2)(vii)		- or in NRC Form 366A			
		<u> </u>		LICEN	SEE CONT	FACT FO	R THIS	LER	(12)	)						
NAME								<b>–</b> [	TELE	PHONE NU	IMBER (Include Are	a Code)				
N	lichael Ve	rrilli Sr	. Analyst - Lic	ensing							(919)	362-2	303			
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	COMP	LETE ONE LINE P	OR EAC	н сомро	NENT F	AILURE	DES	CRIE	BED IN T	HIS REPORT (	13)				
CAUSE	E SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE CAU				CAU	SE	SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU			IFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS						
В	KG	Р	P115		Y		•									
		, SUPPLEME	NTAL REPORT E	XPECTE	D (14)					EXP	ECTED	MONTH		DAY	YEAR	
X YES	complete EX	PECTED S	UBMISSION DAT	'E).		NO		SUBMISSION 1				1		15	97	
ABSTRACT	Limit to 1	400 space	s, i.e., approxima	ately 15	single-spa	ced type	written	lines	) (1	6)		I				
On September 3, 1996 at approximately 2338 hours, with the plant operating in mode 1 at 100% power and the "B" Normal Service Water (NSW) pump in service, operators in the main control room received numerous NSW system alarms and observed indication of zero flow and pressure in the NSW header. The Reactor Operator manually started the standby "A" NSW pump to restore flow, but the pump tripped after running for less than two minutes. When re- start attempts on the "A" NSW pump failed, a manual reactor trip was initiated at approximately 2342 hours. Plant systems responded as expected, including an automatic start of the Auxiliary Feedwater System and the unit was stabilized in mode 3 (Hot Standby).																
The cause of this event was a mechanical failure of the "B" NSW pump and the failure of the "A" NSW to remain running once manually started. The "B" NSW pump shaft sheared. The cause of the "A" NSW pump trip will require additional investigation.																
Correctiv support p while rep continuing incorpora	Corrective actions included restoring the "A" NSW pump to service, performing a secondary plant walkdown to support plant re-start, and evaluating the acceptability of having only one NSW pump available during plant operation while repairs continue on the "B" NSW pump. Additional planned actions include repair of the "B" NSW pump, continuing evaluation and/or testing of the NSW system, failure analysis for the "B" NSW pump sheared shaft and incorporation of lessons learned from this event into operator training.															
This even approxim	t is report ately 0207	able per ' via the	10CFR50.72 emergency no	and 10 tificati	CFR50. on syste	73. A m.	4-hou	ır no	n-e	merge	ncy report v	vas ma	ide to	the N	IRC at	
IC FORM 366 (4-95)																

Ċ

NE 4

C FORM 356A 353 - LICENSI	EE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION		U.	S. NUCLEAR R	EGULATI	DRY COMM	USSION
FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET	1	LER NUMBER (6)	PAGE (3)			
	50.400	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant - Unit #1	50-400	96	018	00	2	UF	3

TEXT Of more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366AJ (17)

# **EVENT DESCRIPTION:**

On September 3, 1996 at approximately 2338 hours, with the plant operating in mode 1 at 100% power and the "B" Normal Service Water pump (NSW, EIIS Code: KG-P) in service, operators in the main control room received numerous NSW system alarms and observed indication of zero flow and pressure in the NSW header. The Reactor Operator manually started the standby "A" NSW pump to restore service water flow. After observing closed indication for the "A" NSW pump breaker and indication that the "A" NSW pump discharge valve was opening, the "B" NSW pump was secured to allow the "B" discharge valve to shut. At this time, the Reactor Operator noticed that the "A" NSW pump had tripped. Following two unsuccessful re-start attempts on the "A" NSW pump, the Unit-Senior Control Operator directed a manual reactor and turbine trip at approximately 2342 hours. Prior to the reactor trip, the "A" Emergency Service Water (ESW) pump automatically started due to low header pressure. Plant systems responded to the reactor trip signal as expected, including an automatic start of the Auxiliary Feedwater System (EIIS Code: BA) on steam generator low-low level due to Reactor Coolant System (RCS, EIIS Code: AB) shrink following the reactor trip. The unit was stabilized in mode 3 with RCS temperature at 557 degrees and pressure at 2235 psig.

Following investigation and repairs, the plant was restarted on September 9, 1996 and returned to the grid at approximately 0342 on September 10, 1996. Delays were encountered in plant re-start due to the passage of Hurricane Fran (reference LER 96-019). Since the forced outage exceeded 72 hours, hot rod drop testing was performed prior to reactor startup in accordance with Harris Plant's response to NRC Bulletin 96-01. Reference Attachment 1 for hot rod drop testing results.

This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72 and 10CFR50.73 as a Reactor Protection System actuation. A 4-hour non-emergency report was made to the NRC at approximately 0207 via the emergency notification system.

# CAUSE:

The cause of this event was a mechanical failure in the "B" NSW pump and a malfunction resulting in the "A" NSW pump tripping after being manually started. The "B" NSW pump experienced a sheared pump shaft. A metallurgical analysis is currently in progress to determine the failure mode. The cause of the "A" NSW pump trip is still under investigation.

# SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

There were no safety consequences as a result of this event. The manual reactor/turbine trip was initiated per plant operating procedures to protect secondary plant components following the loss of Normal Service Water. Plant systems responded as expected following the initiation of the manual reactor/turbine trip.

#### **PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS:**

Previous similar problems with the NSW pumps and discharge valves were experienced during the reactor/turbine trip that occurred on April 25, 1996, which was reported in LER 96-008. Corrective actions for that event included adjusting the mechanical latch mechanism on the "A" NSW pump discharge valve control relay (CR1/2189) to ensure that it "latched in" properly and replacing two of the "B" NSW pump discharge valve control relays (CR4/2190 & CR1/2190) that experienced intermittent failures. Based on indications observed during the September 3, 1996 loss of NSW event, these corrective actions were effective since their associated functions performed as required. LER 96-008 also contained a corrective action to perform additional NSW testing during the next refueling outage (RFO-7). This testing will still be performed and will incorporate the results of the investigation referenced in planned corrective action #2 of this LER.

	, . <b>V</b>		<u> </u>									
NRC FO	RM 366A			2.0	. NUCLEAR P	EGULAT	RY COMM	IISSICI				
14-321	LICENSEE EVENT	REPORT (LER	})									
TEXT CONTINUATION												
	FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET	11	R NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)					
	Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant - Unit #1	50-400 ·	YEAR SE 96	OUENTIAL NUMBER 018	revision number 00	3	OF	3				
TEXT Ø	I more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366AJ (17)		<u></u>	<del></del>		I						
~~~			+									
COF	RECTIVE ACTIONS COMPLETED:											
1.	Trouble shooting was performed which determined the the NSW pumps.	nat a common-	mode failure	e mechan	ism did	not e	xist w	ith				
2.	The "A" NSW pump was returned to service on September 7, 1996.											
3.	A safety analysis was performed on September 5, 1996, which determined the acceptability of returning the plant to service with only one NSW pump available while repairs continued on the "B" NSW pump. This analysis, combined with the results of an engineering evaluation, concluded that repairs to the "B" NSW pump could be made on-line with the "A" NSW pump in service.											
4.	A secondary plant walkdown to assess potential damage related to the loss of NSW transient was completed on September 4, 1996. Discrepancies identified during the walkdown that would prevent plant re-start were repaired on September 4, 1996.											
COP	PECTIVE ACTIONS PLANNED.											
<u>con</u> 1.	Repairs will be completed on the "B" NSW pump by	November 25,	1996.									
2.	Additional testing and/or evaluation will be performed to determine the cause of the "A" NSW pump trip after being manually started on September 3, 1996. This will be completed during the next refueling outage (RFO-7) scheduled to start in March 1997.											
3.	Additional analysis will be performed to determine the failure mechanism involved in the "B" NSW pump sheared shaft. This will be completed by November 30, 1996.											
4.	Upon completion of the on-going investigations, training on the lessons learned from the loss of NSW event will be incorporated into the operator training program. This will be completed by November 30, 1996.											
	,											
	•											

Č

ત્

# Attachment 1

# Serial: HNP-96-164

# Comparison of BOC 7 and 3/29/96 and 9/9/96 Rod Drop Times

-				Collent	Current	Projected									
				Burn Up	Burn Up	Burn Up	Fuel Assembly	Rod Drop	Recoils	Rod Drop	Recoils	Red Dress	Dessile		
Rod	Core	Assembly	Assembly	3/11/96	9/4/96	EOC7	Spacer/Grid	Times		Times			Recoils	BOC	BOC
Bank	Loc	Serial#	Region	GWD/MTU	GWD/MTU	GWD/MTU	Type	SpaceriGrid	PAC	2/44/00	044400	limes		Delta	Delta
CA	F02	G33	7	42.46	46.08	50.67	Vantage 5	4 000		3/11/90	3/11/96	9/9/96	<u>9/9/96</u>	3/11/96	9/9/96
CA	K14	G34	7	42.53	46.15	50.67	Vantage 5	1.900		1.996	3	1.95	3	0.008	-0.038
CA	K02	G38	7	45.46	46.87	53.16	Vantage 5	2.130	2	2.170	3	2.14	3	0.032	0.002
CA	806	G41		45.47	48.88	53.16	Vantage 5	2.003	2	2,038	2	1.97	4	0.035	-0.033
CA	B10	G47	7	42.54	46.16	50.67	Vaniage 5	2.200	3-	2,314	3	2.23	3	0.026	-0.058
CA	E14	G48	7	45.46	48.87	53.16	Vantage 5	2.100	<u>2</u>	2.123	3	2.05	3	-0.037	-0.110
CA	P06	G49	7	42.52	46.13	50.67	Vantage 5	2.040	<u></u>	1.990	1	1.96	3	-0.050	+0.080
CA	P10	G52		45.45	48.85	53.16	Vantage 5	1.988	3	1.994	3	1,94	3	0.006	-0.048
СВ	D06	H37	8	30.31	37.93	47.01	*HTD/IEM/01.M	1.935		1.959	3	1.93	2	0.024	-0.005
СВ	F04	H38	8	30.35	37.99	47.08	*WTD/ICM/DAM	1.913		1.911	3	1.89	3	-0.002	-0.023
CB	K04	H39		30.30	37.91	47.00	*HTD//CM/DPM	1.003		1.899	2	1.86	2	0.016	-0.023
C.B	M06	H40	8	30.32	37.95	47.08	*WTD/IEM/DIM	1.901		1.915	3	1.91	3	0.014	0.009
СВ	M10	H41	8	30.29	37.90	47.00	*HTD/ICM/DPM	1.031		1.889	3	1.87	4	0.038	0.019
CB	K12	H42	8	30.33	37.97	47.08	*WTD/IEM/DIM	1.001		1.889	3	1.89	2	0.008	0.009
CB	E12	H43		30.30	37.93	47.00	*HTD/IEM/DEM	1.0/3		1.903	3	1.87	4	0.030	+0.003
СВ	010	H44	8	30.34	37.99	47.08	*HTD/JEM/DEM	1.901		1.894	3	1.88	3	+0.007	+0.021
CC	H10	H33	8	29.77	37.01	45.41	*HTD/ICM/DI-M	1.903		1.899	2	1.89	3	-0.004	-0.013
CC	F08	H34		29.78	37.02	45.41	*HTD/IEM/BIM	1.091		1.916	2	1.87	3	0.025	-0.021
CC	H06	H35		29.74	36.98	45.41	*HTD/IEM/BLM	1.073		1.888	3	1.87	3	0.015	-0.003
CC	K08	H36	8	29.76	36.99	45.41	*HTP/IEM/BI-M	1.912		1.939	2	1.91	3	0.027	-0.002
CC	D04	J10	9	5.92	13.63	22.90	*HTP/IEM/RIM	1.902		1.913		1.89	3	0.011	+0.012
CC	M04	J13	9	5.89	13.58	22.90	*HTP/IEM/Bi.M	1.000		1.897	3	1.88	4	0.009	-0.008
CC	M12	J16	9	5.89	13.59	22.90	*HTD/IEM/BAM	1.072		1.922	3	1.87	4	0.050	-0.002
CC	D12	J19		5.92	13.63	22.90	*HTP/IEM/BIM	1.002		1.8/4	3	1.85	4	-0.008	-0.032
CD	B08	J21	9	5.45	12.74	21.34	"HTP/IEM/BIM	2.069	<u> </u>	1.875	3	1.83	3	0.023	-0.022
CD	H02	J22	9	5.44	12.72	21.34	*HTP/ISM/BLM	1.000		2.047	2	2.02	2	-0.021	-0.048
CD	P08	J23	9	5.41	12.67	21.34	*HTP/IEM/Bil	1.940		1.924	3	1.89	3	-0.016	-0.050
CD	H14	J24	9	5.44	12.73	21.34	*HTP/IEM/BI-M	1 0 4 9	<u> </u>	1.904	2	1.86	3	0.026	-0.018
CD	F06	J57	9	6.13	14.43	24.82	*HTP/IEM/BAM	1.940		1.886	3	1.9	2	-0.062	-0.048
CD	K06	J58	9	6.11	14.39	24.82	*HTP/IEM/8.M	1.876	<u> </u>	1.897	3	1.9	3	0.027	0.030
CD	K10	J59	9	6.11	14.40	24.82	*HTP/IEM/BLM	1.050	<u> </u>	1.092	3	1.87	3	0.056	0.034
CD	F10	J60	9	6.13	14.42	24.82	*HTP/IEM/Bi-M	1 879		1.0/4	3	1.87	3	0.006	0.002
SA	G13	H01	8	25.58	32.99	41.77	*HTP/IEM/Bi-M	1.070		1.003	3	1.85	3	0.005	-0.028
SA	N07	H02	8	25.44	32.84	41.65	HTP//FM/Bi.M	1.879		1.009	4	1.87	3	0.000	-0.019
SA	C07	H03	8	25.59	32.99	41.77	*HTP/IEM/8I-M	1 868		1.091		1.89	4	0.012	0.011
SA	J13	H04	8	25.45	32.88	41.65	*HTP//FM/8I-M	1 870		1.097	3	1.86	3	0.029	-0.008
SA	J03	H05	8	25.58	32.97	41.77	HTP/JEM/RLM	1 889		1,03/	3	1.87	3	0.018	•0.009
SA	C09	H06	8	25.42	32.86	41.65	HTP/IEM/BIM	1 959		1.090		1.92	3	0.001	0.031
SA	N09	H07	8	25.51	32.89	41.77	*HTP/IEM/BI-M	1 888	<u> </u>	1 802		1.89	3	-0.033	-0.069
SA	G03	H08	8	25.47	32.90	41.65	HTP/IFM/BI-M	1.959		1.887		1.87	3	0.004	-0.018
SB	J07	A20	1	20.83	26.18	32.63	LOPAR	1 904	3	1.00/		1.88	3	-0.072	-0.079
<b>S</b> 8	G09	A26	1	20.83	26.19	32.63	LOPAR	1,982		1 984		1.93	3	0.010	0.026
SB	60L	A28	1	20.83	26.17	32.63	LOPAR	1,922		1 0 2 7	<u>`</u>	1.93	3	-0.018	-0.052
SB	G07	A50	1	20.84	26.20	32.63	LOPAR	1,996		1 952		1.88	3	0.015	-0.042
SB	E05	H21	8	30.49	38.07	47.07	*HTP/IFM/8+M	1.956		1 928		1.97	3	-0.044	-0.026
SB	L05	H22	8	30,47	38.02	47.07	*HTP/JEM/8I.M	1,917		1 0 2 2		1.93	3	-0.028	+0.026
SB	L11	H23	8	30.43	37.99	47.07	*HTP/IEM/RI.M	1.877		1.920		1.87	3	0.009	-0.047
SB	E11	H24	8	30.44	38.03	47.07	*HTP/IEM/BI-M	1 927		1.301	3	1.85	4	0.024	-0.027
SC	E03	J02	9	5.60	12.91	21.63	*HTP/IFM/BLM	1.893		1.910		1.89	4	-0.011	-0.037
SC	.N05	J04	9	5.57	12.85	21.63	*HTP/IEM/BI-M	1 892		1.090		1.87	4	0.005	-0.023
SC	L13	J06	9	5.59	14.17	21.63	*HTP/IEM/BI-M	1.963		1 957		1.87	4	0.003	-0.022
SC	C11	J08	9	5.60	12.91	21.63	*HTP/IEM/BI-M	1.882		1 808		1.92	3	-0.006	-0.043
									<u> </u>	1.030	3	1.88	4	0.016	+0.002

.

• • • • 

*•* . -

. .