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ACCESSION NBR:9505080020 DOC.DATE: 95/04/20 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
FACIL:50-409 La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor, Dairyland Power Coop 05000409
AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
GREEN,W.R. Dairyland Power Cooperative
BERG,W.L. Dairyland Power Cooperative
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 95-001-00:on 950412,noted that HPSW to containment building isolated.Caused by momentary LOP due to operational test of 1A EDG.Procedures for test being modified to include instructions to verify value being open.W/950420 ltr.

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TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

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PRIORITY 1 DOCUMENT

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WILLIAM L. BERG
General Manager

April 20, 1995

In reply, please
refer to LAC-13480

DOCKET NO. 50-409

Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

Gentlemen:

SUBJECT: Dairyland Power Cooperative
La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (LACBWR)
Possession-Only License No. DPR-45
Licensee Event Report No. 95-001

REFERENCES: (1) 10 CFR 50.73

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, attached is Licensee Event Report No. 95-001.

If there are any questions, please contact us.

Sincerely,

DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE

William L Berg

William L. Berg, General Manager

WLB:WRG:dh

cc: John Martin, Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III

Morton Fairtile, Project Manager
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/88

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
LA CROSSE BOILING WATER REACTOR (LACBWR)	0 5 0 0 0 4 0 9	1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)
LOSS OF CONTAINMENT BUILDING BASEMENT FIRE HOSE STATION OPERABILITY

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)					REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR		SEQUENTIAL NUMBER		REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
												0 5 0 0 0
0 4	1 2	9 5	9 5	—	0 0 1	—	0 0	0 4	1 7	9 5		0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 0 0	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
WILLIAM R. GREEN, TECHNICAL SUPPORT ENGINEER	AREA CODE 6 0 8 6 8 9 - 4 2 1 0

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	
A				N							

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

The La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (LACBWR) Technical Specifications (T.S.) 4.4.5 states, "The fire hose stations in the following locations shall be operable." This statement is followed by a list of five stations that includes the "Containment Building Basement." This requirement is applicable at all times. The action step of this T.S. states, "With a hose station inoperable, establish a 1-hour fire watch, or route an additional hose of equivalent capacity to the unprotected area within one hour." On April 12, 1995, it was noted by a LACBWR staff member that the High Pressure Service Water to the Containment Building, which supplies water pressure to the Containment Building Basement hose station, was isolated.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
LA CROSSE BOILING WATER REACTOR	0 5 0 0 0 4 0 9	9 5	— 0 0 1	— 0 0	0 2 OF 0 2

TEXT *(If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's)* (17)

The La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (LACBWR) Technical Specifications (T.S.) require that several fire hose stations be operable at all times. Included in the list of hose stations is the Containment Building Basement hose station.

On the morning of Wednesday, April 12, 1995, a LACBWR operator discovered the High Pressure Service Water (HPSW) Containment Building automatic isolation valve shut, which rendered the Containment Building hose station inoperable. At the time of this discovery, the operators on duty were unsure of when the isolation had occurred, or what caused the isolation. The shift supervisor was informed and the valve was opened.

Further investigation of the incident revealed that the valve had probably closed on the morning of April 10, 1995. On this date we had performed an operational test of the 1A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) which caused momentary loss of power to the 120 VAC regulated bus during the Power Supply transfer. This caused a momentary loss of control power to the HPSW auto isolation valve and caused the valve to fail closed. This condition went unnoticed until April 12, 1995. Portions of the operational test of the 1A EDG were repeated on April 18, 1995, to confirm our analysis of this incident.

The effect of this situation in Plant Safety was minimal. Numerous fire extinguishers are located throughout the Containment Building to be used in the event of a fire. The HPSW auto isolation valve had the capability of being unisolated in the event of a fire and routine tours (every 4 hours) are conducted in the Containment Building to identify possible hazardous conditions such as fire hazards.

To ensure this situation doesn't occur again, the procedure for the operational test of the 1A EDG that was performed on April 10, 1995, is being modified to include a statement that instructs operators to verify open, and reopen as necessary, the HPSW auto isolation valve during this procedure.