UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199

Report No.: 50-400/95-18

Licensee: Carolina Power & Light Company
P. O. Box 1551
Raleigh, NC 27602

Docket No.: 50-400 License No.: NPF-63

Facility Name: Harris 1

Inspection Conducted: November 12 - December 9, 1995

Inspectors: J. B. Brady 1/5/96
D. Roberts, Acting Senior Resident Inspector Date Signed

Accompanying Personnel: J. Blake, Senior Project Manager, DRS

Approved by: M. Shymlock 1-5-96
M. Shymlock, Chief Date Signed
Reactor Projects Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

Scope:

This routine inspection was conducted in the areas of operations, maintenance, surveillance, engineering, plant support, review of licensee event reports, and licensee action on previous inspection items. Numerous facility tours were conducted and facility operations observed.

Results:

Plant Operations

Two violations were identified in the Operations area, one of which was non-cited. The non-cited violation, identified by the licensee, involved the failure to perform an offsite power availability verification per Technical Specification requirements, paragraph 3.b. The cited violation, identified by the inspector, involved the failure to report the missed Technical Specification requirement above. Inattention to detail was noted in approving scaffolds located over safety-related plant equipment, paragraph 3.a.(2). Otherwise, plant operations were conducted well.

Enclosure 2

Maintenance

Overall, maintenance and surveillance activities were performed well. The inspector identified no violations or deviations in this area, paragraph 4.

Engineering

Engineering activities were performed adequately. The plant's steam generators have performed traditionally well since original installation, paragraph 5.b. The inspectors identified no violations or deviations in the engineering area.

Plant Support

The inspectors found plant housekeeping and material condition of components to be good, especially in areas renovated by the plant upgrade project, paragraph 6.a. The licensee's adherence to radiological controls, security controls, fire protection requirements, emergency preparedness requirements and TS requirements in these areas was satisfactory. The inspectors identified no violations or deviations in the plant support area.

REPORT DETAILS

1. PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee Employees

*D. Batton, Superintendent, On-Line Scheduling
D. Braund, Superintendent, Security
*J. Collins, Manager, Training
J. Dobbs, Manager, Outage and Scheduling
*J. Donahue, General Manager, Harris Plant
*R. Duncan, Superintendent, Mechanical Systems
*W. Gautier, Manager, Maintenance
*M. Hamby, Supervisor, Regulatory Compliance
*M. Hill, Manager, Nuclear Assessment
D. McCarthy, Superintendent, Outage Management
*W. Robinson, Vice President, Harris Plant
G. Rolfson, Manager, Harris Engineering Support Services
S. Sewell, Superintendent, Design Control
*T. Walt, Manager, Regulatory Affairs
*B. White, Manager, Environmental and Radiation Control
*O. Wilkins, Supervisor, Licensing and Regulatory Programs
*A. Williams, Manager, Operations

Other licensee employees contacted included: office, operations, engineering, maintenance, chemistry/radiation control, and corporate personnel.

NRC Personnel

J. Blake, Senior Project Manager, Mechanical Branch, DRS
*D. Roberts, Acting Senior Resident Inspector, Harris Plant

*Attended exit interview

Acronyms and initialisms used throughout this report are listed in the last paragraph.

2. PLANT STATUS AND ACTIVITIES

a. Operating Status of the Plant Over the Inspection Period.

The plant continued in power operation (Mode 1) for the duration of this inspection period. The unit ended the period in day 33 of power operation since startup on November 7, 1995.

b. Other NRC Inspections or Meetings at the Site.

Mr. J. Blake, a Senior Project Manager from NRC Region II, was on site from November 27 - December 1 conducting a routine

maintenance inspection. The inspector's findings are documented in this report.

3. OPERATIONS

a. Plant Operations (71707)

(1) Shift Logs and Facility Records

The inspectors reviewed records and discussed various entries with operations personnel to verify compliance with the TS and the licensee's administrative procedures. In addition, the inspectors independently verified clearance order tagouts.

The inspectors found the logs to be legible and well organized, and to provide sufficient information on plant status and events. The inspectors found clearance tagouts to be properly implemented. The inspectors identified no violations or deviations in shift logs or facility records.

(2) Facility Tours and Observations

Throughout the inspection period, the inspectors toured the facility to observe activities in progress, and attended several licensee meetings to observe planning and management activities.

During these tours, the inspectors observed monitoring instrumentation and equipment operation. The inspectors also verified that operating shift staffing met TS requirements and that the licensee was conducting control room operations in an orderly and professional manner. The inspectors additionally observed several shift turnovers to verify continuity of plant status, operational problems, and other pertinent plant information. Licensee performance in these areas was satisfactory.

While touring the RAB on November 15, the inspector noted that scaffolding was located over the two trains of safety-related boric acid transfer pumps. It had been erected approximately a week earlier and was intended to support an ongoing plant upgrade project. The inspector reviewed the associated scaffold approval form (serial number RAB 236-014) posted nearby. The form contained a description of the affected area and an approval questionnaire for the Shift Supervisor or his Designee (another licensed SRO) to complete and sign authorizing erection. The inspector noted that a question on the form asking whether the scaffolding was located near safety-related components was checked "no",

and the following block asking whether an engineering assessment was required was also checked "no". The inspector mentioned this discrepancy to the work control center SCO who had the scaffolding removed the next day. The SCO was coincidentally the same SCO that had approved the scaffolding for erection. He indicated that he had approved the scaffolding over a month earlier while the plant was in Mode 5, and that checking "no" for the safety-related question was a clerical error.

A step in PLP-401 prohibited erecting scaffolds over redundant train components of a safety system without a prior engineering assessment. After the inspector's discovery, engineering personnel evaluated the effect of having scaffolding located over both the "A" and "B" BATPs. The engineers determined that either of the two pumps could only meet one of the boron injection flow paths addressed by TS 3.1.2.2. The minimum two flow path requirement was usually satisfied by individual charging pumps, with the BATPs kept in standby - as they were on November 15. Thus the engineer determined that, in the absence of any clearances or deficiencies for the charging pumps while the scaffolding was erected, boration flow path TS compliance was never compromised.

The inspector concluded that although a violation did not occur, the clerical error of checking "no" for the safety-related question indicated lack of attention to detail. The approving SCO initiated a condition report for this incident which prompted several corrective actions. The SCO was counseled, and the scaffolding procedure will be revised requiring operations staff to be more directly involved in scaffold inspections, and requiring that scaffold be erected within 24 hours of being approved or approval must be renewed.

b. Effectiveness of Licensee Control in Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Problems (40500)

Condition Reports (CRs) were reviewed to verify that TS were complied with, corrective actions and generic items were identified, and items were reported as required by 10 CFR 50.73.

On October 9, a control room SCO failed to perform an offsite power availability verification following a valve clearance which made the "A" emergency diesel generator inoperable. TS 3/4.8.1 Action Statement b.1 required that each of the two required physically independent circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite class 1E distribution system be determined operable within one hour of a diesel becoming inoperable.

However, the operator assumed that since the valve under clearance was in the emergency service water system - which is used to cool the diesel jacket water heat exchanger and has its own TS LCO requirements - there was no need to take action under the diesel generator TS. His error in judgement was identified by another SCO in the work control center about an hour and 40 minutes after the diesel was declared inoperable. Operators in the control room immediately performed the offsite power determination in accordance with procedure OST-1023, Offsite Power Availability Verification, Weekly Interval.

The failure to perform the offsite power verification within one hour was a violation of TS 3/4.8.1. This licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, and is identified as NCV 400/95-18-01: Failure to Verify Offsite Power Availability In Accordance With TS 3/4.8.1.

Operators documented this error in CR 95-2593 and sent the CR to Regulatory Affairs staff for a reportability evaluation. The licensee's initial analysis concluded that, although the OST procedure was not performed within the required one hour, a BOP operator's daily surveillance rounds log indicated that the two SATs and 5 unit auxiliary busses were energized. This log was coincidentally completed three minutes after the SCO declared the diesel inoperable. Regulatory Affairs and Operations personnel concluded that since the unit was shutdown and the 5 auxiliary busses were energized, they were indeed being fed from offsite power via the two station auxiliary transformers. Plant personnel then concluded that these verifications, although coincidental, satisfied the offsite power determination, and a reportable TS violation did not exist.

After discussions with control room operators during this inspection, the inspector reviewed procedure OST-1023, Offsite Power Availability Verification, Weekly Interval, to determine the adequacy of licensee actions following the October incident. During the discussions with operators, the inspector learned that the missed OST procedure included electrical breaker alignment verifications which were the only means of ensuring that the intent of the TS was met. The procedure contained a schematic diagram demonstrating how each SAT could be powered via separate electrical busses in the switchyard. Although certain switchyard breaker alignments exist where it would be possible to have both SATs energized via only one offsite transmission line, procedural acceptance criteria and notes prohibited such alignments. This was to maintain compliance with the Bases for TS 3/4.8.1, AC Sources, which stated, in part, that as long as two (of seven physically independent) transmission lines are in service and two circuits exist through the SATs to the Class 1E buses, the TS LCO

is met. The inspector concluded that the failure to perform procedure OST-1023 to ensure two offsite connections were available did not meet the LCO requirement.

The inspector informed Regulatory Affairs personnel of this discovery who reevaluated the situation and concluded that a reportable TS violation occurred on October 9, 1995. 10 CFR 50.73 required an LER to be submitted within 30 days for any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's TS. Failure to report this incident by November 8, 1995 was contrary to the above requirement. This is identified as Violation 400/95-18-02, Failure to Report TS Violation Involving Improper Verification of Offsite Power Availability. Of particular concern to the inspector was the fact that this inspector identified violation could have been prevented by a more thorough review of the TS requirements. The licensee planned to issue an LER within 30 days of the inspectors discovery.

c. Review of LERs (92700)

(1) (Open) LER 95-011-00, Reactor Trip/Safety Injection During Solid State Protection System Testing Due to the Failure of a Relay Contact, and Unplanned ESF Actuation During Troubleshooting Following the Reactor Trip/SI.

This LER reported two separate events, both fully discussed in NRC IR 400/95-17. While corrective actions were completed for the reactor trip/safety injection event, this LER will remain open pending completion and inspection of corrective actions associated with the unplanned ESFAS actuation on November 6, 1995.

The inspector noted that although the text of the LER was correct in describing the conditions surrounding the ESFAS testing on November 6, the LER title includes the word "troubleshooting" in describing licensee activities leading to the event. The inspector noted that all troubleshooting of the reactor trip/safety injection had been completed before the second event and the cause identified as a failed relay contact. The testing on November 6 was not for "troubleshooting" but to further test other "block function" relays in the SSPS system.

(2) (Open) LER 95-012-00, Containment Pre-Entry Purge Valve 1CP-1 Drifted Open During Mode 1 Power Operation.

Control room operators observed containment pre-entry purge valve 1CP-1 with dual (mid-position) indication, while it was required to be sealed closed in accordance with TS 3.6.1.7. The air-operated valve is sealed by locking its

air supply valve closed. This method was inadequate in that the supply valve leaked by its seat, allowing sufficient air pressure to open valve 1CP-1. The licensee identified and corrected this condition by maintaining a vent path to prevent air pressure buildup to the actuator. Further corrective actions will include procedure revisions to provide a more positive means of assuring that valves are closed properly. The LER will remain open pending completion of the licensee's corrective actions.

d. Follow-up - Operations (92901)

(Closed) Violation 400/95-08-01, Failure to Notify Shift Supervisor of a Breached Reactor Auxiliary Building Emergency Exhaust System Boundary.

By letter dated July 5, 1995, the licensee admitted the violation as stated, attributed the incident to personnel error on behalf of a single individual, and mentioned several corrective actions designed to prevent recurrence. The corrective actions included counseling the involved individual; and raising plant awareness of the requirements for RABEES boundary doors via operations night orders, a management memorandum, and periodic newsletter publications. The licensee also enhanced the general employee training program to include discussion related to the function and importance of the doors. The inspector verified that all of these corrective actions were completed.

This violation is closed.

Two violations were identified in the Operations area, one of which was non-cited. The non-cited violation, identified by the licensee, involved the failure to perform an offsite power availability verification per TS requirements. The cited violation, identified by the inspector, involved the failure to report the missed TS requirement above in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73. Inattention to detail was noted in approving scaffolds located over safety-related plant equipment. Otherwise, plant operations were conducted well.

4. MAINTENANCE

a. Maintenance Observation (62703)

The inspector observed the maintenance and reviewed the work packages for the following maintenance activities to verify that correct equipment clearances were in effect; work requests were issued, and TS requirements were being followed. The first two paragraphs below discuss jobs that were conducted as part of a containment spray system outage on December 6, 1995. The

inspector noted that the system work was scheduled in accordance with plant procedures governing on-line maintenance.

(1) WR/JO 94-AJMC1, Replace PSU-111 Style Terminals in Breaker Cubicle for Valve 1CT-11 with NU-2 Type

WR/JO 94-AJMB1, Replace PSU-111 Type Terminals in Breaker Cubicle for Valve 1CT-88 with NU-2 Type

The above work tickets were part of a continuing effort to replace PSU-111 type breaker cubicle terminal strips with the NU-2 type. The PSU-111 terminal strips incorporated a design in which two sections were frictionally fit to connect field connections to breaker connections. This friction fit design lended itself to loose connections and were blamed for several inoperable components over the past few years and were the source of NRC Violation 400/93-25-02. The NU-2 type did not incorporate the same frictional fit design, thus preventing recurrence of the earlier problems. The inspector reviewed the work associated with the above containment spray system valve breaker cubicles and observed good workmanship. All lifted leads were properly taped, documented, and independently verified as they were relanded to the terminal strips. A QC inspector was available to observe any modifications to terminal block mounting rails, as allowed in the design package. Overall, these jobs were performed well.

(2) WR/JO AIVN 001, Perform Limitorque Actuator Inspection and Lubrication.

This work was observed for the Limitorque actuator on containment spray system valve 1CT-11. As this was an SMB-00 type actuator, the work was done in accordance with applicable steps of procedure PM-M00014, Revision 5, Limitorque Inspection and Lubrication. The inspector observed mechanics lubricate the side mounted handwheel gearing, as instructed by Section 7.2, Step 3 of the procedure. The mechanics used vendor recommended grease for this task. The mechanics later identified two lifting eyebolt fasteners installed on the housing cover. The vendor had previously cautioned its customers against the use of lifting eyebolts in permanent plant applications, as they may not provide assurance that thrust housing preload requirements were being met. The mechanics appropriately initiated a work ticket to get the eyebolt fasteners removed. The inspector concluded that this work was done well.

(3) WR/JO 95-ALBY1, Repair Pin Hole Leak in Service Water Piping.

Licensee personnel replaced a leaking 2-inch diameter pipe nipple located on a 10-inch diameter service water pipe in the RAB. The affected section of service water piping penetrated containment and served one of the containment fan coolers. The nipple had been installed during plant construction and was intended for installing a radiological effluent monitor to identify potential service water leaks inside containment. During original plant construction, the licensee abandoned the effluent monitor and welded a cap on the pipe nipple. When the pin hole leak was discovered in November 1995, the licensee submitted ASME Code Case N-416-1 for NRC approval, which was granted by NRC letter dated November 29, 1995. The code case exempted the licensee from having to perform a hydrostatic pressure test following the repair, and instead required a system leakage test (at normal operating temperature and pressure) and surface examination of new welds in accordance with current ASME Code requirements. Various QC hold points were observed during the welding process. Following the weld repair, some of which the inspector observed, liquid penetrant examinations were performed by QC inspectors. All work and weld inspection results were properly documented in the work package. The inspector identified no concerns with this job.

In general, the performance of work was satisfactory with proper documentation of removed components and independent verification of the reinstallation. The inspectors identified no violations or deviations in this area.

b. Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspector observed several surveillance tests to verify that approved procedures were being used, qualified personnel were conducting the tests, tests were adequate to verify equipment operability, calibrated equipment was used, and TS requirements were followed. Test observation and data review included:

(1) MST-I0018, Revision 2, Main Steam/Feedwater Flow Loop 2 (F-0484/F-0487) Channel Calibration.

Satisfactory performance of this procedure partially satisfied surveillance requirements in TS 4.3.1.1 for reactor trip system instrumentation. This calibration is required every 18 months. The loop calibration consisted of a calibration check for ERFIS computer points, control room annunciators, control board indication, and various

electronic components in the loop including signal comparators. The inspector focused on the signal comparator which provided the reactor trip associated with steam/feedwater flow mismatch (a trip coincident with low steam generator level). The inspector verified that acceptance criteria in the procedure data sheets were consistent with the reactor trip setpoint and allowable value listed in TS Table 2.2-1. The as-found and as-left values for this signal were all within specifications. Calibrated instruments were used for this job, and all work was correctly documented in the procedure data sheets. This job was performed well.

(2) MST-I0080, Revision 3, Reactor Coolant System Wide Range Pressure (P-0402) Calibration.

The inspector observed the calibration and return to service of pressure transmitter PT-01RC-0402I, located on instrument rack A1-R45A in the RAB. The inspector reviewed the test preparations for conformance with requirements in procedure section 7.1.1, Remove Pressure Transmitter from Service; and observed the activities of sections 7.1.2 Transmitter Calibration and 7.1.3, Return Pressure Transmitter to Service.

The personnel involved with this surveillance were very familiar with the operations involved with the calibration. This job was performed well.

The inspectors found satisfactory surveillance procedure performance with proper use of calibrated test equipment, necessary communications established, notification/authorization of control room personnel, and knowledgeable personnel having performed the tasks. The inspectors observed no violations or deviations in this area.

c. Follow-up - Maintenance (92902)

(Closed) IFI 94-23-03, Follow the Licensee's Activities to Enhance the On-line Maintenance Scheduling Process.

The inspector reviewed work management/control procedures and interviewed work control personnel to determine if the licensee had established and maintained effective controls for pre-planning, preparing, and scheduling on-line maintenance activities. The procedures reviewed included the following:

Number, Revision	Procedure Type/ Title
PLP-710, Revision 3	Plant Programs (PLP)/ Work Management Process
WCM-001, Revision 0/1	Work Control Manual Procedure/ System Outages
PLP-402, Revision 2	Plant Programs/ NRC Maintenance Rule Implementation Program
MMM-036, Revision 2	Maintenance Management Manual/ Multi-Discipline Work Team Process
ADM-NGGC-0101 Revision 0	CP&L Standard Procedure/ Maintenance Rule Program

The inspector also reviewed an operations training handout dated November 13, 1995, "Shift Briefing for RTT File No. RTT-95-031 - Subject: PSA Summary and Maintenance Rule Overview." With this training each person was given a wallet-sized card which included a bar graph of the "Important Systems - Risk Reduction" and a listing of four "Important Operator Actions" on one side and a "PSA Summary - Harris" with pie-charts "By Sequence Type" and "By Initiating Event" on the other.

The inspector concluded that the conduct and control of on-line maintenance was well proceduralized and that the governing procedure incorporated a risk-based assessment process for conducting system outages. Personnel controlling work were aware of and adequately trained on the use of these procedures.

This item is closed.

Overall, maintenance and surveillance activities were performed well. The inspector identified no violations or deviations in this area.

5. ENGINEERING

a. Design and Installation of Plant Modifications (37551)

The inspector revisited the engineering evaluation documented in ESR 9500098, Revision 0, Closed Cell Tubing/Sheet Type Insulation Evaluation.

This ESR, previously discussed in October NRC Inspection Report 400/95-15, was reviewed when the inspector discovered during this inspection that closed cell tubing insulation was still installed in the plant on HVAC system piping without being tracked in the licensee's combustible loading program (either temporarily or

through a permanent update of the Fire Hazards Analysis). While the licensee's evaluation, developed to accept the use of this material, considered the rubber-based insulation to be non-combustible, the evaluation stated three acceptance criteria in its discussion: 1) flame spread rating less than 25; 2) smoke density rating less than 50; and 3) thickness less than 1/8 inch. The material met the first two criteria. However, the inspectors previously took exception to classifying this material as non-combustible as it measured between 3/4 and 1 inch thick in most plant applications, thereby not meeting the third specified criterion. The licensee informed the inspectors then that they would update the FSAR Fire Hazards Analysis to include the material.

Upon the inspector's discovery, licensee personnel immediately placed the material in its transient combustible program and began a review to determine why the material was not being tracked after judgement in September that it was combustible. The licensee later determined that the 1/8 inch stipulation, which originated from a combustible definition contained in NRC Branch Technical Position BTEP CMEB 9.5-1, did not apply to pipe insulation and that including this attribute in the ESR was in error. The licensee further demonstrated that its FSAR and design basis discussions on combustible material did not include the 1/8 inch criterion. After discussions with NRC headquarters and regional personnel, the inspector concluded that the 1/8 inch criteria did not apply, and thus the material was properly classified as non-combustible.

While this issue is resolved, the licensee informed the inspector that the ESR discussion would be cleaned up to remove the 1/8 inch criteria from its definition of combustible material.

The inspectors identified no violations or deviations in this area.

b. Onsite System Engineering (37551)

Steam Generator Performance. The inspector reviewed the licensee's preventive maintenance program for the steam generators. The Harris plant has model D4 steam generators which were placed into commercial operation on May 2, 1987. While the licensee removed the majority of the copper from the feedwater system prior to startup, it still has 90-10 CuNi tubing in the main condenser. The licensee originally planned to re-tube the main condenser during RFO-7 (Spring 1997) but those plans have been delayed because of the continued good performance of the steam generators. The current plans are to re-tube the main condenser at the same time the steam generators are replaced.

Through the most recent refueling outage in September, the licensee has only plugged a total of 46 steam generator tubes - 11 of these during pre-service - in the 6.8 EFPYs that the plant has operated.

The inspector concluded that the licensee has implemented a very aggressive secondary water (condensate and feedwater) chemistry control program since the unit was placed on line. This chemistry control program includes the full-time use of full flow deep bed condensate polishers and careful control of important chemical parameters (e.g., sulfates, chlorine, sodium).

The inspectors identified no violations or deviations in the systems engineering area.

c. Follow-up - Engineering (92903)

(Closed) Violation 400/94-22-03, Failure to Identify/Correct Several Design Deviations for Small Bore Pipe Supports.

This violation concerned the licensee's failure to identify or correct several deficiencies in small bore pipe supports, both safety and nonsafety-related. By letter dated December 30, 1994, the licensee admitted the violation as cited, attributed the deficiencies to lack of procedural controls for work on or around the supports, and listed several corrective actions. The corrective actions included procedural revisions prohibiting the use of pipe hangers as supports for lead shielding, or as temporary attachment points. Guidance was also provided for scheduling work related to snubbers and hangers, and criteria for inspecting hangers was enhanced. A QC surveillance program was created to periodically perform plant walkdowns and identify potential deficiencies. Work tickets were generated and resolved for the deficiencies noted in NRC IR 50-400/94-22. The inspector reviewed the procedure changes and closed work tickets and concluded that the licensee had taken appropriate actions to correct the violation.

This violation is closed.

The inspectors concluded that the engineering activities were performed adequately. The inspectors identified no violations or deviations in the engineering area.

6. PLANT SUPPORT

a. Plant Housekeeping Conditions (71707) - The inspectors reviewed storage of material and components, and observed cleanliness conditions of various areas throughout the facility to determine whether safety hazards existed. The inspector noted that plant

housekeeping has significantly improved in areas that have been renovated by the licensee's ongoing plant upgrade project. These areas now include the mechanical and electrical penetration rooms in the RAB, as well as major portions of the 236 and 261 foot elevations of that building.

b. Radiological Protection Program (71750) - The inspectors reviewed radiation protection control activities to verify that these activities were in conformance with facility policies and procedures, and in compliance with regulatory requirements. The inspectors also verified that selected doors which controlled access to very high radiation areas were appropriately locked. Radiological postings were likewise spot checked for adequacy. The inspector identified no violations in the licensee's implementation of its radiological protection program.

c. Security Control (71750) - During this period, the inspectors toured the protected area and noted that the perimeter fence was intact and not compromised by erosion or disrepair. The fence fabric was secured and barbed wire was properly installed. Isolation zones were maintained on both sides of the barrier and were free of objects which could shield or conceal an individual. The inspectors observed various security force shifts perform daily activities, including searching personnel and packages entering the protected area by special purpose detectors or by a physical patdown for firearms, explosives and contraband. Other activities included vehicles being searched, escorted and secured; escorting of visitors; patrols; and compensatory posts. In conclusion, the inspectors found that selected functions and equipment of the security program complied with requirements.

d. Fire Protection (71750) - The inspectors observed fire protection activities, staffing and equipment to verify that fire alarms, extinguishing equipment, actuating controls, fire fighting equipment, emergency equipment, and fire barriers were operable. During plant tours, the inspector looked for fire hazards. The inspectors concluded that the fire equipment and barriers inspected were in proper physical condition.

e. Emergency Preparedness (71750) - The inspectors toured emergency response facilities to verify availability for emergency operation. Duty rosters were reviewed to verify appropriate staffing levels were maintained. As applicable, the inspectors observed emergency preparedness exercises and drills to verify response personnel were adequately trained. While no drills were conducted this report period, the licensee conducted several walk-throughs of the newly renovated emergency response facilities to familiarize emergency response organization personnel with new features. The inspector considered the walk-throughs a benefit to the licensee's program.

f. Licensee Self Assessment (40500) - The inspector reviewed a NAS/QC Surveillance report documenting surveillance inspections by QC personnel in the NAS organization. Report number SR 95-034, dated December 5, 1995, documented QC observations during service water system work done the previous week. The inspector noted that this and previous QC surveillances for jobs done earlier this year demonstrated a good questioning attitude from the licensee's QC staff. Detailed findings, which may or may not have resulted in issues, were well documented and worth investigating nonetheless.

The inspectors found plant housekeeping and material condition of components to be good. The licensee's adherence to radiological controls, security controls, fire protection requirements, emergency preparedness requirements and TS requirements in these areas was satisfactory. The inspectors identified no violations or deviations in the plant support area.

7. EXIT INTERVIEW

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on December 13, 1995. During this meeting, the inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as they are detailed in this report, with particular emphasis on the Violation, Non-Cited Violation, and LERs addressed below. The licensee representatives acknowledged the inspector's comments and did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this inspection. No dissenting comments from the licensee were received.

Item Number	Status	Description and Reference
95-018-01	Open/Closed	NCV Failure to Verify Offsite Power Availability In Accordance With TS 3/4.8.1, paragraph 3.b.
95-018-02	Open	VIO Failure to Report TS Violation Involving Improper Verification of Offsite Power Availability, paragraph 3.b.
94-022-03	Closed	VIO Failure to Identify/Correct Several Design Deviations for Small Bore Pipe Supports, paragraph 5.c.
94-023-03	Closed	IFI Follow the Licensee's Activities to Enhance the On-Line Maintenance Scheduling Process, paragraph 4.c.

Item Number (cont'd)	Status	Description and Reference
95-008-01	Closed	VIO Failure to Notify Shift Supervisor of a Breached RABEES Ventilation Boundary, paragraph 3.d.
95-011-00	Open	LER Reactor Trip/Safety Injection During Solid State Protection System Testing Due to the Failure of a Relay Contact, and Unplanned ESF Actuation During Troubleshooting Following the Reactor Trip/SI, paragraph 3.c.(1).
95-012-00	Open	LER Containment Pre-Entry Purge Valve 1CP-1 Drifted Open During Mode 1 Power Operation, paragraph 3.c.(2).

8. ACRONYMS AND INITIALISMS

ASME - American Society of Mechanical Engineers
BATP - Boric Acid Transfer Pump
BTEP - [NRC] Branch Technical Position
CFR - Code of Federal Regulations
CP&L - Carolina Power & Light
CR - Condition Report
EFPY - Effective Full Power Years
encl - Enclosure
ERFIS - Emergency Response Facility Information System
ESF - Engineered Safety Feature
ESFAS - Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System
ESR - Engineering Service Request
ESW - Emergency Service Water
FR - Federal Register
FSAR - Final Safety Analysis Report
HVAC - Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning
IFI - Inspector Follow-up Item
IR - [NRC] Inspection Report
LCO - Limiting Condition for Operation
LER - Licensee Event Report
MST - Maintenance Surveillance Test [procedure]
NAS - Nuclear Assessment Section
NCUC - North Carolina Utilities Commission
NCV - Non-Cited Violation
NED - Nuclear Engineering Department
NPF - Nuclear Production Facility [a type of license]

NRC	-	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRR	-	Nuclear Reactor Regulation
OST	-	Operations Surveillance Test [procedure]
PDR	-	Public Document Room
PLP	-	Plant Program Procedure
PSA	-	PWR Safety Analysis [NED Subunit]
PWR	-	Pressurized Water Reactor
QC	-	Quality Control
RAB	-	Reactor Auxiliary Building
RABEES	-	RAB Emergency Exhaust System
RCS	-	Reactor Coolant System
RFO	-	Refueling Outage
RII	-	Region Two [NRC Office]
RTT	-	Real-Time Training
SAT	-	Station Auxiliary Transformer
SCO	-	Senior Control Operator
SG	-	Steam Generator
SI	-	Safety Injection
SRO	-	Senior Reactor Operator
SSPS	-	Solid State Protection System
TS	-	Technical Specification [part of the facility license]
VIO	-	Violation [of NRC requirements]
WCC	-	Work Control Center
WR/JO	-	Work Request/Job Order