

CATEGORY 1

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9601180365 DOC.DATE: 95/01/04 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
 FACIL:50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Carolina 05000400
 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 HAMBY,M.R. Carolina Power & Light Co.
 DONAHUE,J.W. Carolina Power & Light Co.
 RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 95-013-00:on 951009,Tech Spec violation due to not performing off-site verification.Caused by cognitive personnel error.Individuals counseled.W/950104 ltr. C
A
T
E
G
O
R
Y

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 5
 TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:Application for permit renewal filed. 05000400

	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR ENCL	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR ENCL	
	PD2-1 PD	1 1	LE,N	1 1	
INTERNAL:	ACRS	1 1	AEOD/SPD/RAB	2 2	Y
	AEOD/SPD/RRAB	1 1	<u>FILE CENTER</u>	1 1	
	NRR/DE/ECGB	1 1	NRR/DE/EELB	1 1	1
	NRR/DE/EMEB	1 1	NRR/DRCH/HHFB	1 1	
	NRR/DRCH/HICB	1 1	NRR/DRCH/HOLB	1 1	
	NRR/DRCH/HQMB	1 1	NRR/DRPM/PECB	1 1	
	NRR/DSSA/SPLB	1 1	NRR/DSSA/SRXB	1 1	
	RES/DSIR/EIB	1 1	RGN2 FILE 01	1 1	D
EXTERNAL:	L ST LOBBY WARD	1 1	LITCO BRYCE,J H	2 2	O
	NOAC MURPHY,G.A	1 1	NOAC POORE,W.	1 1	C
	NRC PDR	1 1	NUDOCS FULL TXT	1 1	U M E N T

NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
 PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK,
 ROOM OWFN 5D-5(EXT. 415-2083) TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM
 DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!

FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED
 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 26 ENCL 26



Carolina Power & Light Company
Harris Nuclear Plant
PO Box 165
New Hill NC 27562

JAN - 4 1995

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Serial: HNP-96-003
10CFR50.73

SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1
DOCKET NO. 50-400
LICENSE NO. NPF-63
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 95-013-00

Gentlemen:

In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report concerns a failure to complete required action to verify off-site power within one hour when an Emergency Diesel Generator was declared inoperable.

Sincerely,

J. W. Donahue
General Manager
Harris Plant

MRH

Enclosure

c: Mr. S. D. Ebnetter (NRC - RII)
Mr. N. B. Le (NRC - PM/NRR)
Mr. D. J. Roberts (NRC - HNP)

9601180365 950104
PDR ADOCK 05000400
S PDR

180011

LEDR
11

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Page 2

cc: Ms. D. B. Alexander
Mr. W. R. Campbell (BNP)
Mr. J. M. Collins
Mr. J. P. Cowan
Mr. G. Davis
Ms. S. D. Floyd
Mr. H. W. Habermeyer, Jr.
Ms. T. A. Head (GLS File)
Mr. G. D. Hicks (BNP)
Mr. M. D. Hill
Mr. R. M. Krich (RNP)
Mr. C. W. Martin (BNP)
Mr. R. D. Martin
Mr. J. P. McKone
Mr. J. W. Moyer (RNP)
Mr. P. M. Odom (RNP)
Mr. W. R. Robinson
Mr. G. A. Rolfson
Mr. C. T. Sawyer
Mr. R. S. Stancil
Mr. J. P. Thompson (BNP)
Mr. T. D. Walt
HNP Real Time Training
INPO
Nuclear Records (Letter Number HO-960051)
NLS File: HI/A-2D (L. M. Randall)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST- 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T-6 F33), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)

Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant - Unit # 1

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

050000400

PAGE (3)

1 OF 3

TITLE (4)

Technical Specification Violation due to not performing Off-Site Power Verification as required by action statement.

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
10	09	95	95	-- 013	-- 00	01	04	96		
OPERATING MODE (9)		3	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more) (11)							
POWER LEVEL (10)		0%	20.2201(b)			20.2203(a)(2)(v)	x		50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)
			20.2203(a)(1)			20.2203(a)(3)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)
			20.2203(a)(2)(i)			20.2203(a)(3)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)	73.71
			20.2203(a)(2)(ii)			20.2203(a)(4)			50.73(a)(2)(iv)	OTHER
			20.2203(a)(2)(iii)			50.36(c)(1)			50.73(a)(2)(v)	Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A
			20.2203(a)(2)(iv)			50.36(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME

Mickey R. Hamby, Manager - CAP/OEF

TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code)

(919) 362-2204

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES
(If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).

X NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH DAY YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

Train "A" of the Emergency Service Water (ESW) System was declared inoperable and placed under clearance to allow maintenance on the "A" ESW Screen Wash Pump discharge check valve. The Senior Control Operator (SCO) was notified that the ESW train was inoperable. The SCO incorrectly decided that declaring the "A" Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) inoperable was not required and therefore did not perform a verification of off-site power within one hour as required when an EDG is inoperable. Following identification of the missed action statement requirement by other Operations personnel, the surveillance was completed. The SCO's determination that off-site power did not require verification was based on informal discussions among Operations personnel. This was a cognitive, personnel error. The corrective action was to counsel the involved individual on the importance of completing required Technical Specification actions.

Operations personnel subsequently gathered data which they believed verified that off-site power was available as required within the one hour period. This information consisted of log readings taken after the ESW train was declared inoperable. The data confirmed that both Station Auxiliary Transformers were energized by off-site power and that the breaker alignment from the switchyard to the Emergency Buses must have been as required. Based on this information, this event was initially determined to be not reportable. Following additional reviews, it was determined that the available information did not verify that power was available from two off-site transmission lines as described in the Technical Specification Bases. An inadequate review of the Technical Specification requirements caused this inappropriate act, which was a cognitive, personnel error. The corrective action was to counsel the involved individual on the importance of complete verification of Technical Specification requirements.

This event is being reported per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i) as a Technical Specification violation.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION**

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant - Unit #1	05000400	95	013	00	2 OF 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On October 9, 1995, the plant was in Mode 3. At 1257, the Work Control Center personnel declared train "A" of the Emergency Service Water (ESW) System (EIIS:BI) inoperable and placed the system under clearance to allow maintenance on the "A" ESW Screen Wash Pump discharge check valve. Work Control Center personnel notified the Senior Control Operator (SCO) in the Main Control Room that the clearance was hung and that train "A" of the ESW System was inoperable. The SCO incorrectly determined that declaring the associated Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) (EIIS:EK) inoperable was not required based on previous discussion among Operations personnel. The off-site power verification, which is required by Technical Specification 3.8.1.1.b.1 to be done within one hour if an EDG becomes inoperable, was not performed. The SCO made this decision without notifying the Shift Supervisor - Nuclear or other Operations management. At 1411, personnel in the Work Control Center inquired about the completion status of the off-site power verification. Following discussions with the Shift Supervisor - Nuclear and the Manager - Operations, the determination was made that off-site power verification was required and the surveillance was completed at 1443.

Subsequently, on October 17, 1995, Operations personnel gathered data which they believed verified that off-site power was available on October 9, 1995 as required within the one hour period after the diesel was made inoperable. This information consisted of log readings taken within one hour after the diesel was made inoperable. The data confirmed that both Station Auxiliary Transformers were energized by off-site power and that the breaker alignment to the emergency buses from the switchyard must have been correct to result in the log readings. The off-site supply lines to the switchyard were not considered at that time. Based on this information, this event was initially determined to be not reportable. At 1530 on December 7, 1995, it was determined that the information available within the one hour period following the EDG's inoperability did not verify that power was available from two off-site transmission lines, as the observed voltage and current readings could occur with a single incoming transmission line. Specifically, breaker position was not verified as required by action statement 4.8.1.1.a. At that time, the October 9, 1995 event was determined to be reportable, as the required surveillance was not completed within one hour. Subsequently, transmission personnel verified there were no clearances on any of Harris Nuclear Plant's seven incoming transmission lines and the seven transmission lines were in-service to the switchyard.

CAUSE:

The SCO's determination on October 9, 1995, that off-site power did not require verification, based on informal discussions among Operations personnel, resulted in the initial inappropriate act. This was a cognitive, personnel error. An inadequate review of the Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements, including the bases section, caused the subsequent inappropriate act on October 17, 1995. This inappropriate act was also a cognitive, personnel error.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE:

The safety significance for this event was minimal. Off-site power verification is required within one hour if an EDG is inoperable. In this instance, off-site power was being provided to the plant Class 1E buses as was verified by operator log readings. Actual switchyard breaker positions were not verified within one hour as required, however, transmission personnel subsequently verified that the seven transmission lines to the Harris Nuclear Plant's switchyard were in-service. The complete surveillance procedure was completed within one hour and forty-six minutes.

**LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION**

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant - Unit #1	05000400	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	3 OF 3
		95	.. 013	.. 00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

PREVIOUS SIMILAR LERs:

A review of the LER database was conducted for similar events. No similar events were found.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS COMPLETED:

1. On October 9, 1995, the involved Operations individual was counseled on the importance of completing required Technical Specification actions.
2. On December 7, 1995, the involved Regulatory Affairs individual was counseled on the importance of complete verification of Technical Specification requirements.

EIIS CODES:

- BI - Essential Service Water System
- EK - Emergency Onsite Power Supply System