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ACCESSION NBR: 9408260172 DOC. DATE: 94/08/17 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
 FACIL: 50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Carolina 05000400
 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 VERRILLI, M. Carolina Power & Light Co.
 DONAHUE, J.W. Carolina Power & Light Co.
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 94-033-00: on 940718, failure was identified in one train ESW that could possibly prevent high head charging/safety injection pumps from performing. Caused by oversight. Report will be provided upon completion of analysis. W/940817 ltr.

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NOTES: Application for permit renewal filed. 05000400

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Carolina Power & Light Company
Harris Nuclear Plant
PO Box 165
New Hill NC 27562

AUG 17 1994

Letter Number: HO-940354

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: NRC Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1
DOCKET NO. 50-400
LICENSE NO. NPF-63
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 94-003-00

Gentlemen:

In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within thirty (30) days of a reportable occurrence and is in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-1022, September 1983.

Sincerely,

J. W. Donahue
General Manager
Harris Plant

MV

Enclosure

cc: Mr. S. D. Ebnetter (NRC - RII)
Mr. N. B. Le (NRC - PM/NRR)
Mr. J. E. Tedrow (NRC - SHNPP)
Mr. W. R. Robinson

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PDR ADDCK 05000400
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State Road 1134 New Hill NC

JE22

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant-Unit #1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000/400	PAGE (3) 1 OF 1
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TITLE (4) Unanalyzed single Failure in the Emergency Service Water System that results in the Charging/Safety Injection Pumps not being able to perform their design function.

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
7	18	94	94	-- 003 --	00	8	16	94	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER 05000
									FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER 05000

OPERATING MODE (9)	1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)								
POWER LEVEL (10)	100%	20.402(b)			20.405(c)			50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)			50.36(c)(1)			50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)			50.36(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(vi)		OTHER
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)		(Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)			X 50.73(a)(2)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)		
20.405(a)(1)(v)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(x)				

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)	
NAME Michael Verrilli Sr. Specialist - Licensing	TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) (919) 362-2303

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)										
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)				EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).	<input type="checkbox"/>	NO	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
				9	16	94

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On July 18, 1994, a single failure was identified in one train of the Emergency Service Water System (ESW) that could possibly prevent the high head Charging/Safety Injection Pumps (CSIP) from performing their design function due to inadequate oil cooling. Specifically, if the "A" train return valve to the Auxiliary Reservoir (1SW-270) failed to open, a recirculation flow path would develop between the "A" ESW discharge header and the "B" ESW supply through a train cross connect at the inlet to the CSIP oil coolers. Adequate ESW flow would still be delivered to the "B" CSIP but at elevated temperature. The "A" CSIP would receive no cooling flow due to the isolated return path.

The cause of this condition was an oversight that occurred during ESW system design. Immediate corrective actions were to close the train cross connect valves at the CSIP lube oil coolers. This eliminated the possibility of the described scenario.

Additional analysis is currently being performed by Carolina Power & Light and vendor engineering personnel to evaluate the effects of the elevated cooling water temperatures to the CSIP lube oil coolers. A supplement to this report will be provided upon completion of the on-going engineering analysis. This supplement will include additional information related to the safety consequences of the possible CSIP failure as well as additional corrective actions that may be needed.