

ENCLOSURE 1

NOTICE OF VIOLATION

Carolina Power and Light Company
Shearon Harris Unit 1

Docket No.: 50-400
License No.: NPF-63

During an NRC inspection conducted on May 15 - June 18, 1993, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, the violations are listed below:

- A. Technical Specification 3.8.4.1 requires that each containment penetration conductor overcurrent protective device specified in procedure PLP-106, Technical Specification Equipment List Program and Core Operating Limits Report, shall be operable.

Procedure PLP-106, Attachment 6, Containment Penetration Conductor Overcurrent Protective Devices, lists two 15 ampere circuit breakers for primary and secondary protection for the integrated reactor vessel head cable bridge hoist.

Contrary to the above, as of May 25, 1993, the containment electrical penetration for the integrated reactor vessel head cable bridge hoist was provided with only one 15 ampere circuit breaker for overcurrent protection.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).

- B. Technical Specification 6.8.1.a requires that written procedures be established and implemented covering procedures outlined in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978.

Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, paragraphs 3.s.2.(b) and 8 require operating procedures for the onsite AC electrical distribution system and for surveillance testing.

Operating Procedure OP-156.02, AC Electrical Distribution, Section 5.13.2, contains directions for placing 6.9 kilovolt electrical circuit breakers into service and contains a note to ensure that the mechanism operated cell aligns with the corresponding fork on the breaker mechanism as the breaker is racked into place.

Operations Surveillance Test Procedure OST-1119, Containment Spray Operability Train B, Section 7.3, step 48, directs operators to turn off and lock the breaker to valve ICT-95 during restoration of the system following testing.

Contrary to the above,

1. On May 23, 1993, procedure OP-156.02 was found to be improperly implemented in that the fork on breaker 122 was not aligned with the mechanism operated cell. This condition contributed to an

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inadvertent deenergization of the 1B-SB emergency bus and resultant emergency diesel generator actuation.

2. On June 2, 1993, while performing procedure OST-1119, plant personnel turned off but did not lock the breaker to valve ICT-95 as required. Furthermore, procedure steps had been initialed by both the operator and an independent verifier that the breaker was locked off.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).

- C. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III requires, in part, that measures be established to assure that regulatory requirements and design bases are correctly translated into design documents. Also, design control measures shall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design.

The licensee's Corporate Quality Assurance Manual, Section 3.0, sets forth minimum requirements for control of design activities affecting systems, components, and structures. It requires that sufficient design verification shall be performed to substantiate that the final design documents meet the appropriate design inputs. It further requires that a design verification of the completed design package shall be performed to verify that the design is technically adequate with respect to the design basis.

Contrary to the above, adequate measures were not established to assure that design bases were correctly translated into design documents, and an adequate verification was not performed to verify that designs were technically adequate with respect to the design bases for pipe stress analysis calculation 71-1, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Piping From Floor (Elevation 261') to Steam Generator Auxiliary Feed Pumps, Discharge Nozzles, and Anchor Point 4803 at Wall", originated in 1974. Specifically, the pipe stress analysis did not correctly model the centers of gravity for two motor-operated valves in the seismic class I auxiliary feedwater system. This rendered the associated recirculation piping for the "A" and "B" motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps, being outside of its design seismic basis since initial construction.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Carolina Power and Light Company is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D. C. 20555, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region II, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results

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achieved, (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved. If an adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order or demand for information may be issued as to why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the response time.

Dated at Atlanta, Georgia
this 2nd day of July 1993