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Carolina Power & Light Co.

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Die Grand B

SUBJECT: Initial Part 21 rept re defect in Anchor Darling supplied main feedwater preheater bypass isolation valves.On 920112, all non-Q components replaced w/suitable components & tested

satisfactorily.Next rept will be submitted by 920214.

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NOTES: Application for permit renewal filed.

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
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SUBJECT: 10CFR21 INITIAL NOTIFICATION

SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

ITEM: DEFICIENCY IN THE ACTUATOR TO THE MAIN FEEDWATER

PREHEATER BYPASS ISOLATION VALVES.

Plant Identification numbers:

2AF-V156 SAB-1 2AF-V157 SAB-1 2AF-V158 SAB-1

The Harris Plant (3 loop Westinghouse NSSS) has model D-4 steam generators (SGs). These SGs have a split feed arrangement where at 100% full power, approximately 82% of the needed SG feed flow is directed to the SG preheater section located immediately above the SG tube sheet, and the remaining 18% is directed to the SG upper U-tube region via the same line used for auxiliary feedwater (AFW) flow. The containment isolation valve for the 18% feed flow path is the Main Feedwater Preheater Bypass Isolation Valve.

SUPPLIED BY: ANCHOR DARLING SUPPLIED VALVE AND ACTUATOR PACKAGE
HILLER ACTUATOR MODEL # 12 SA-A029

## NATURE OF DEFICIENCY: (See attached drawing)

The valve and actuator for the 3 Main Feedwater Preheater Bypass Isolation Valves were specified, purchased, and installed for a Q Class application. During review of a proposed plant modification, it was determined that several actuator components were in fact non-Q.

A potential failure mechanism existed where the failure of a non-Q component could result in the inability of a Q-class component to perform as designed. Specifically, a postulated failure of the air pump (#6 in drawing), could cause a situation where normal leakage of the accumulator (item 1) from its normal 150 psig pressure would go undetected by redundant pressure switches (PS A and B). These switches provide the valves an auto close signal when pressure drops to 66 psig in the input air header.

The valves are containment isolation valves and are required to close within 10 seconds of a feedwater isolation signal. If accumulator pressure drops from its normal 150 psig to below 122 psig, it may not close within the required time. If accumulator pressure drops to approximately 20 psig, there may not be sufficient force to reposition the valve and maintain it closed against maximum differential pressure.

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
REPORTING BASIS: This design deficiency could have compromised the containment boundarys' capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents resulting in offsite exposures.


IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION: Upon discovery of this condition on January 7, 1992 a two hour surveillance interval was commenced to verify the actuators' components were functioning properly and the accumulators were fully pressurized. On January 12, 1992, all non-Q components were replaced with suitable components and tested satisfactorily. Following this the two hour surveillance interval was suspended. An engineering review was in progress during this time to determine the 10CFR21 reportability. On January 15, 1992 the Harris Plant Nuclear Safety Committee determined a 10CFR21 report was appropriate.

FOLLOWUP ACTION: A written report will be submitted by February 14, 1992.

REFERENCE: IE Information Notice No. 82-25: Failures of Hiller Actuators Upon Gradual Loss of Air Pressure.

<u>POINT OF CONTACT:</u> Chuck Olexik, Manager - Regulatory Compliance, Harris Plant 919-362-2718.





- D. H. 14-23:40 MM D.C. 18-24-80

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