

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR: 8709280186 DOC. DATE: 87/09/21 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET #
 .FACIL: 50-400 Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Carolina 05000400
 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
 SCHWABENBAUER Carolina Power & Light Co.
 WATSON, R. A. Carolina Power & Light Co.
 RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 87-043-00: on 870820, discovered that six manual isolation valves not included in Operations Surveillance Test OST-1029. Caused by personnel error. Test revised to include valves in monthly verification of position. W/870921 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR 1 ENCL 1 SIZE: 5
 TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES: Application for permit renewal filed. 05000400

	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR ENCL	RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME	COPIES LTTR ENCL
	PD2-1 LA BUCKLEY, B	1 1	PD2-1 PD	1 1
INTERNAL:	ACRS MICHELSON	1 1	ACRS MOELLER	2 2
	AEOD/DOA	1 1	AEOD/DSP/NAS	1 1
	AEOD/DSP/ROAB	2 2	AEOD/DSP/TPAB	1 1
	DEDRO	1 1	NRR/DEST/ADS	1 0
	NRR/DEST/CEB	1 1	NRR/DEST/ELB	1 1
	NRR/DEST/ICSB	1 1	NRR/DEST/MEB	1 1
	NRR/DEST/MTB	1 1	NRR/DEST/PSB	1 1
	NRR/DEST/RSB	1 1	NRR/DEST/SGB	1 1
	NRR/DLPQ/HFB	1 1	NRR/DLPQ/QAB	1 1
	NRR/DOEA/EAB	1 1	NRR/DREP/RAB	1 1
	NRR/DREP/RPB	2 2	NRR/DRIS/SIB	1 1
	NRR/PMAS/ILRB	1 1	<u>REG FILE</u> 02	1 1
	RES DEPY GI	1 1	RES TELFORD, J	1 1
	RES/DE/EIB	1 1	RGN2 FILE 01	1 1
EXTERNAL:	EG&G GROH, M	5 5	H ST LOBBY WARD	1 1
	LPDR	1 1	NRC PDR	1 1
	NSIC HARRIS, J	1 1	NSIC MAYS, G	1 1

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 4 0 0	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 4
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TITLE (4) **SIX OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES WERE OMITTED FROM MONTHLY POSITION CHECK DUE TO PERSONNEL ERROR IN PROCEDURE DEVELOPMENT.**

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 8 2 0	8 7	8 7	8 7	0 4 3	0 0	9 2 1	8 7				0 5 0 0 0
											0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9) 1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)										
POWER LEVEL (10) 1 1 0 1 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(e)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)							
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.38(e)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c)							
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.38(e)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)							
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iii)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)								
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)								
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.405(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)								

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)	
NAME RICHARD SCHWABENBAUER	TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE: 9 1 9 3 1 6 1 2 - 1 2 6 1 6 1 9

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)									
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)				EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO						

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

ABSTRACT

The plant was operating at 100 percent reactor power in Mode 1, Power Operation, on August 20, 1987. During a review of containment isolation valves, it was discovered at 1400 hours that six manual isolation valves were not included in Operations Surveillance Test (OST)-1029, Containment Penetration Outside Isolation Valve Verification, as required. OST-1029 satisfies Technical Specifications item 4.6.1.1.a for a 31-day verification that the valves are closed and locked.

Upon discovery, a check of the six isolation valves was made and it was found that all six valves were closed and locked as required. There is no indication that any of the valves have been opened since they were placed in their proper closed position prior to initial criticality of the plant.

The cause of the event was personnel error in omitting the six isolation valves from OST-1029 for verification of their locked closed position as required.

The immediate corrective action upon discovery was to verify that the six valves were in the closed and locked position as required, which they were.

Action to prevent recurrence is that OST-1029 has been revised to include these six valves in the monthly verification of position.

This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a violation of Technical Specifications Action item 4.6.1.1.a.

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PDR ADOCK 05000400
PDR

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Description:

The plant was operating in Mode 1, Power Operation, at 100 percent reactor power on August 20, 1987. Plant personnel were implementing a program to identify and tag containment isolation valves [see LER-87-014-00 corrective action no. (1)]. This program involved a review of procedures, drawings, and a plant walkdown. During the review, it was discovered that the following six manual isolation valves were not included in Operations Surveillance Test (OST)-1029, Containment Penetration Outside Isolation Valve Verification, as required.

1FP-355: Fire Protection water supply to containment. (EIIS:KP)

1DW-63: Demineralized water supply to containment. (EIIS:KC)

1SI-302 and 1SI-304: Drain valves off of the safety injection recirculation sump valve chambers. (EIIS:BP)

1CT-103 and 1CT-106: Drain valves off of the containment spray recirculation sump valve chambers. (EIIS:BE)

OST-1029 satisfies Technical Specifications item 4.6.1.1.a for a 31-day verification that the valves are closed and locked.

Upon discovery that the six valves were missing from OST-1029's monthly position check, operations personnel immediately verified that the valves were in the closed and locked position as required. There is no indication that any of the valves have been opened since they were placed in their proper closed position prior to initial criticality of the plant.

Plant conditions during and following this event was 100 percent reactor power in Mode 1, Power Operation.

OST-1029 has been revised to include the six valves which were omitted from the procedure.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Cause:

The reason for the errors in the procedure was investigated. The results of that investigation are as follows:

- 1) 1FP-355 - In the original design, this valve had an air operator and was closed by a phase A isolation signal. The actuator was deleted by a subsequent change that was not reflected in the flow drawings until the spring of 1987. Thus, the valve was not included in the early drafts of the procedure.
- 2) 1DW-63 - In the initial draft of the procedure, this valve was included but with the incorrect "noun name". It was listed as "Primary Water Supply" vice the real title of "Demineralized Water Makeup". Since Primary Water Supply is not a containment isolation valve, 1DW-63 was deleted from the procedure.
- 3) 1SI-302, 1SI-304, 1CT-103, 1CT-106 - The initial draft of the procedure did not include these valve chamber drain valves. The investigation concluded that these valves were omitted because they do not connect directly to containment.

In each case listed, the system valve lineup checklist which is separate from OST-1029 put the valves in the required locked closed position.

The root cause of the event is personnel error in omitting the valves in the monthly surveillance test to check their position.

Analysis:

Operation of plant components and systems and the health of the general public were unaffected by this event as the valves were in their proper position when checked.

In the case of 1FP-355 and 1DW-63 additional check valves are in series to provide redundant containment isolation capability. Had the valves been open during accident conditions, the potential for additional containment releases to the Reactor Auxiliary Building is minimized.

In the case of the valve chamber drain valves, a chamber does not communicate directly with the containment. The valve chamber serves to collect and isolate potential leakage from the containment sump isolation valves and from the pipe penetration to the containment sump. If these valves were left open the leakage would be released into the Reactor Auxiliary Building drains or leak-off holdup tanks.

Releases into the Reactor Auxiliary Building would either be monitored by area radiation monitors and/or the Plant Vent Stack radiation monitors.

This event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a violation of Technical Specifications Action Item 4.6.1.1.a.

There have not been any similar events reported of this nature.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Corrective Action:

The valves were checked and verified to be in their proper position upon discovery that they were omitted from OST-1029.

Action to Prevent Recurrence:

1. OST-1029 has been revised to include the six valves in the monthly surveillance test to check their position, and has been performed.
2. A review of drawings for all systems with fluid penetrations into the containment building was done to verify that OST-1029 is complete and has no additional errors.





Carolina Power & Light Company

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1987 SEP 25 A 9:43

HARRIS NUCLEAR PROJECT
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New Hill, NC 27562
SEP 21 1987

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
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1
DOCKET NO. 50-400
LICENSE NO. NPF-63
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 87-043-00

Gentlemen:

In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, the enclosed Licensee Event Report is submitted. This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within thirty (30) days of a reportable occurrence and is in accordance with the format set forth in NUREG-1022, September, 1983.

Very truly yours,


R. A. Watson
Vice President
Harris Nuclear Project

RAW:acm

Enclosure

cc: Dr. J. Nelson Grace (NRC - RII)
Mr. B. Buckley (NRR)
Mr. G. Maxwell (NRC - SHNPP)

MEM/LER-87-043/1/OS1

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