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SUBJECT: Forwards brief description of procedure change to initial test program as described in Section 16 of FSAR, per 10CFR50.59 & License Condition 2.C.4. Change does not involve unreviewed safety question or Tech Spec change.

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Carolina Power & Light Company

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SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1  
DOCKET NO. 50-400  
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REPORT IN ACCORDANCE WITH 10CFR50.59

Gentlemen:

In accordance with Title 10 to the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50.59, the enclosed report is submitted. This report fulfills the requirement for a written report within thirty (30) days of a change to the Initial Test Program described in Section 14 of the FSAR as required by license condition 2.C.4.

This report contains a brief description of a procedure which changes the description given in the FSAR. The description also contains a brief summary of the safety evaluation which shows that the change does not involve an unreviewed safety question or require a change to technical specifications.

Very truly yours,

R. A. Watson  
Vice President  
Harris Nuclear Project

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RAW:MW/sdg

Enclosure

cc: Dr. J. N. Grace (NRC-RII)  
Mr. G. Maxwell (NRC-SHNPP)

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CHANGE TO PROCEDURE DESCRIBED IN FSAR

Title: 9100-S-01, Rev. 2, Change #18 & #19, Power Ascension  
Test Program - Power Escalation

Approval Date: 05/08/87 & 06/04/87

Description: The purpose of this procedure is to provide administrative guidelines for testing at specific power level plateaus. The procedure provides the tests contained within the program and the sequence and method of approval to increase reactor power to the next test power plateau.

Change #18: Test Procedure 9100-S-01 has been changed to delete the requirement for a large load reduction and generator trip from 100% power. These tests are described in FSAR Section 14.2.12.2.18. The tests are being deleted from the current test program and are being deferred, until the plant is fully modified to prove the design aspects of these tests.

Contrary to the tests acceptance criteria, as the plant is currently designed, both tests are expected to trip the plant. The large load reduction is expected to require a reactor trip due to a loss of main feedwater. The generator trip test is expected to require a turbine trip on turbine overspeed.

Several modifications are required to enable the plant control systems to handle these transients without requiring a reactor and turbine trip. These modifications are expected to be completed to warrant running these two tests after the startup of Cycle 2.

Change #19: Additionally procedure 9100-S-01 has been changed to delete the 10% load swing from 100% power from the power ascension test program. This test is described in FSAR Section 14.2.12.2.17. The intent of Regulatory Guide 1.68 is that the plant be proven to first show the ability to sustain a 10% load swing and second to make any adjustments to automatic control systems necessary to meet that end. Based on the Heater Drain Pump Transient at 100% power on 5/27/87 and previous Load Swing Tests at 30%, 50%, and 75%, the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.68 has been completed satisfactorily.

CHANGE TO PROCEDURE DESCRIBED IN FSAR  
(continued)

Safety  
Summary:

Change #18: The 100% trip test has shown that the plant responds safely to a trip from 100% power without actuation of primary or secondary safety valves, and safety injection. However, actuation of auxiliary feedwater has been required due to the performance of the condensate and feedwater system controls. Previous testing of the turbine included a test of the mechanical and electrical overspeed trip devices.

This testing concludes that the safety of the plant is not compromised in the event of a generator trip and overspeed.

Change #19: The plant experienced and safely executed an unplanned 10% load swing on 5/27/87 when a Heater Drain Pump tripped and operations executed a 80 MWe (901 MW gross - 821 MW gross) decrease in power in approximately two minutes. All automatic control systems operated properly during the transient. The increase in power was performed at a normal rate of 5 MW/minute. As a result of this transient and the previous load swing tests, no adjustments to any automatic control system has been necessary.

Therefore, the deferral of the large load reduction and generator trip tests and the deletion of the 10% load swing test as described above do not increase the probability or consequences of analyzed accidents, nor introduce a different type of accident or equipment malfunction than already evaluated in the FSAR. Thus no unreviewed safety question exists.



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