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FACIL:50-251 Turkey Point Plant, Unit 4, Florida Power and Light C 05000251
AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
LYONS,E. Florida Power & Light Co.
CONWAY,W.F. Florida Power & Light Co.
RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT: LER 89-001-00:on 890209,emergency diesel generator inoperable w/RHR 4B out of svc due to miscommunication.
W/8 ltr.

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NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/88

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Turkey Point Unit 4	0 5 0 0 0 2 5 1	1 OF 0 3

TITLE (4) "A" Emergency Diesel Generator Inoperable With 4B Residual Heat Removal Pump Out of Service Due to Mis-Communication Between Operations Personnel

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 2	0 9	8 9	8 9	— 0 0 1	— 0 0	0 3	1 3	8 9	N/A	0 5 0 0 0
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	6	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 0 0	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	X 50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
Edward Lyons, Compliance Engineer	AREA CODE 3 0 5 — 2 4 6 - 6 7 3 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On February 9, 1989, at approximately 0900, the operations staff was preparing to conduct an operability test of the "A" Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) prior to removing the "B" EDG from service. Unit 4 was in mode 6 (refueling). The refueling cavity was filled with water to greater than 23 feet above the reactor vessel flange. The 4B Residual Heat Removal pump was out of service for maintenance. At approximately 0926, the operability test of the "A" EDG was commenced. The air start system to the "A" EDG was isolated, and the "A" EDG was manually barred over. The air start system was isolated for approximately 20 minutes. During the time that the air start system was isolated, the "A" EDG would not have started upon a loss of offsite power, and there would be no RHR available to cool the Unit 4 core. The cause of the event was a mis-communication between the Assistant Plant Supervisor-Nuclear and the Reactor Control Operator which resulted in the "A" EDG being barred over instead of performing a rapid start. The test procedure contributed to the event, in that, it did not identify that isolating the air start system would render the EDG inoperable. The test of the "A" EDG was successfully completed at approximately 1238. The procedure for EDG operability testing was revised to require verification that required opposite train equipment is operable prior to barring the EDG.

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NRC Form 366
(9-83)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Turkey Point Unit 4	0 5 0 0 0 2 5 1	8 9	0 0 1	0 0	0 2 OF 0 3

TEXT *(If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's)* (17)

DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT

On February 9, 1989, at approximately 0900, with Unit 4 in mode 6 (refueling), the operations staff was preparing to perform an operability test of the "A" Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) (EIIS:EK, Component:DG) prior to removing the "B" EDG from service for preventive maintenance. The unit was in the process of being refueled, however, there was no fuel movement in progress at the time of the event. The refueling cavity was filled with water to greater than 23 feet above the reactor vessel flange. Approximately 85 fuel assemblies had been reloaded into the core prior to the event. The 4B Residual Heat Removal (RHR) (EIIS:BP, Component:P) pump had previously been removed from service for maintenance.

At approximately 0926, procedure 0-OSP-023.1, "Diesel Generator Operability Test" was commenced. This procedure allows for testing the EDG by performing a rapid start, or by manually barring the EDG over prior to start. A mis-communication between the Assistant Plant Supervisor-Nuclear (APSN) (licensed utility employee) and the Unit 4 Reactor Control Operator (RCO) (licensed utility employee) resulted in the "A" EDG being manually barred over prior to starting. The RCO did not realize that this would result in the EDG being inoperable concurrent with the opposite train RHR loop being out of service. Prior to the EDG being barred over, the air start system is isolated. While the air start system is isolated, the EDG will not start on a loss of offsite power. The air start system was isolated for approximately 20 minutes.

At Turkey Point Unit 4, the "A" EDG provides emergency power for the 4A RHR pump and the "B" EDG provides emergency power for the 4B RHR pump. Therefore with the 4B RHR pump out of service for maintenance, and the "A" EDG out of service for testing, there would be no RHR available during a loss of offsite power.

The test of the "A" EDG was successfully completed at approximately 1238.

CAUSE OF THE EVENT

The event was caused by a mis-communication between the APSN and the Unit 4 RCO, in that, the APSN directed the RCO to perform a rapid start test, which does not require isolation of the air start system, however, the RCO performed a test which does require isolation of the air start system. The procedure used to test the EDG contributed to the event, in that, the procedure did not identify that isolating the air start system will render the EDG inoperable.

ANALYSIS

Throughout the event, offsite power was available, and cooling was provided for the Unit 4 core by the 4A RHR pump. The Unit 4 core had approximately 85 fuel assemblies loaded at the time of the event, therefore, decay heat levels were very low. The refueling cavity was filled with water to greater than 23 feet above the reactor vessel flange. If a loss of offsite power had occurred while the "A" EDG air start system was isolated, the "A" EDG would not have started

automatically. However, with the low decay heat level, and the high water level, adequate time would be available for an operator to realign the air start system and manually start the "A" EDG. Based on the above, the health and safety of the public was not affected.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1) The test of the "A" EDG was successfully completed at approximately 1238.

2) Procedure 0-OSP-023.1, "Diesel Generator Operability Test" was revised to require that operability of required equipment in the opposite train be verified prior to isolating the air start system for the EDG to be tested.

3) A communications policy formalizing repeat backs has since been issued which should minimize occurrences of this type.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Similar events: LER 250-89-001 describes an event involving an EDG and opposite train equipment, however, the circumstances are different.

FPL

P.O. Box 14000, Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420

MARCH 1 3 1989

L-89-93
10 CFR 50.73

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Re: Turkey Point Unit 4
Docket Nos. 50-251
Reportable Event: 251-89-01
Date of Event: February 9, 1989
"A" Emergency Diesel Generator Inoperable With
4B Residual Heat Removal Pump Out of Service
Due to Mis-Communication Between Operations Personnel

The attached Licensee Event Report (LER) is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 to provide notification of the subject event.

Very truly yours,

DA Sager

W. F. Conway
Senior Vice President - Nuclear

WFC/RHF/gp

Attachment

cc: Stewart D. Ebneter, Regional Administrator, Region II, USNRC
Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, Turkey Point Plant

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