NEXTera ENERGY POINT BEACH

December 13, 2017

NRC 2017-0054
10 CFR 50.73

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1
Docket 50-266
Renewed License Nos. DPR-24

Licensee Event Report 266/2017-003-00

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report (LER) 266/2017-003-00 for Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1. NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC is providing this LER regarding the degraded condition on Unit 1.

This letter contains no new regulatory commitments.

If you have any questions please contact Mr. Eric Schultz, Licensing Manager, at 920/755-7854.

Sincerely,

NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC

Bob Coffey
Site Vice President

Enclosure

cc: Administrator, Region III, USNRC
Project Manager, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, USNRC
Resident Inspector, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, USNRC
PSCW

NRC FORM 366 (04-2017) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 03/31/2020

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See Page 2 for required number of digits/characters for each block)

(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3/)

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET NUMBER	3. PAGE
Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 1	05000266	1 of 2

4. TITLE

Degraded Condition

5. EVENT DATE			6. LER NUMBER			7. REPORT DATE			8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
									NA	NA
10	30	2017	2017	003	00	12	13	2017	FACILITY NAME NA	DOCKET NUMBER NA

9. OPERATING MODE	11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: *(Check all that apply)*			
MODE 3	☐ 20.2201(b)	☐ 20.2203(a)(3)(i)	☒ 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
	☐ 20.2201(d)	☐ 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
	☐ 20.2203(a)(1)	☐ 20.2203(a)(4)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
	☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(i)	☐ 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(x)
10. POWER LEVEL	☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)	☐ 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)	☐ 73.71(a)(4)
0%	☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)	☐ 50.36(c)(2)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)	☐ 73.71(a)(5)
	☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)	☐ 50.46(a)(3)(ii)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)	☐ 73.77(a)(1)
	☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(v)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)	☐ 73.77(a)(2)(i)
	☐ 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)	☐ 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	☐ 73.77(a)(2)(ii)
		☐ 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)	☐ OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A	

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER

LICENSEE CONTACT	TELEPHONE NUMBER *(Include Area Code)*
Thomas P. Schneider, Senior Licensing Engineer	920-755-7797

13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANU-FACTURER	REPORTABLE TO EPIX
B	AB	PSF	NA	Y	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED	15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
☐ YES *(If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)* ☒ NO		NA	NA	NA

ABSTRACT *(Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)*

On October 30, 2017, with Unit 1 in MODE 3 for refueling activities, a boric acid indication downstream of 1CV-309B, 1P-1B Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Labyrinth Seal 1DPT-124 Upper Root Valve was identified as a through-wall flaw. The flaw location on the root valve to differential pressure transmitter (DPT) instrument tubing welded joint was within the reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure boundary.

This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) for material defects in the primary coolant system that were not acceptable in accordance with ASME Section XI.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
CONTINUATION SHEET

(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3/)

1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOCKET NUMBER	3. LER NUMBER		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.
Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 1	05000266	2017	003	00

NARRATIVE

Description of the Event:
At 0404 CST on October 30, 2017, with Unit 1 in MODE 3 for refueling activities, a boric acid indication downstream of 1CV-309B, 1P-1B RCP Labyrinth Seal 1DPT-124 Upper Root Valve was identified as a through-wall flaw. The flaw location on the root valve [RTV] to DPT [PDT] instrument tubing welded joint [PSF] was within the RCS [AB] pressure boundary.

The root valve to DPT instrument tubing welded joint has been repaired and returned to service.

This 60 day licensee event report is being submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) for any event or condition that results in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being degraded. The material defect in the primary coolant system could not be found acceptable in accordance with ASME Section XI, IWB-3600, "Analytical Evaluation of Flaws" or ASME Section XI, Table IWB-3410-1, "Acceptance Standards."

Cause of the Event:
The most likely cause of the degraded barrier was crater cracking at a weld stop point in the root valve to instrument tubing welded joint.

Analysis of the Event:
Maintenance activities identified a through-wall flaw downstream of the root valve to the RCP Labyrinth Seal DPT instrument tubing welded joint. The condition was discovered during reactor startup activities after the reactor had been shut down for several weeks for a planned refueling. The labyrinth seal serves as a buffering interface, to limit the exchange of reactor coolant from the seal portion of the RCP. The RCP Labyrinth Seal DPT instrument provides performance information only of the buffer interface. The through-wall flaw was within the RCS pressure boundary. The through-wall flaw in the welded joint was most likely the result of crater cracking at a weld stop point. The flaw has been corrected. Adequate heat removal capability for the reactor was provided by two separate engineered safety feature system trains.

Corrective Actions:
The root valve to DPT instrument tubing welded joint has been repaired and returned to service. RCS pressure boundary systems and components will continue to receive repetitive visual examinations on predetermined frequencies in accordance with existing programs.

Safety Significance:
The event was determined to be of very low safety significance. The flaw location was on small bore piping. There was no loss of any safety systems, structures or components needed to shut down the reactor, maintain safe shutdown conditions, remove residual heat, control the release of radioactive material or mitigate the consequences of an accident. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public as a result of this condition.

Similar Events:
There have not been similar events of this degraded condition in the past three years.

Component Failure Data:
None